British Empire

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pages: 469 words: 146,487

Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World by Niall Ferguson

British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, Corn Laws, European colonialism, imperial preference, income per capita, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, Khyber Pass, land reform, land tenure, liberal capitalism, Livingstone, I presume, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, night-watchman state, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, profit motive, Scramble for Africa, spice trade, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, the new new thing, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, undersea cable, union organizing, zero-sum game

., The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980 (New Haven, 2001) Brown, Judith M. and Louis, Wm. Roger (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford/New York, 1999) Canny, Nicholas (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. I: The Origins of Empire (Oxford/New York, 1998) Fieldhouse, David, The Colonial Empires (London, 1966) Harlow, Barbara and Carter, Mia, Imperialism and Orientalism: A Documentary Sourcebook (Oxford/ Malden, Massachusetts, 1999) Hyam, Ronald, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815–1914 (Basingstoke, 1993) James, Lawrence, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, 1994) Judd, Dennis, Empire: the British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London, 1996) Lloyd, Trevor, Empire: The History of the British Empire (London, 2001) Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris, 2001) Marshall, P.

I: The Origins of Empire (Oxford/New York, 1998) Fieldhouse, David, The Colonial Empires (London, 1966) Harlow, Barbara and Carter, Mia, Imperialism and Orientalism: A Documentary Sourcebook (Oxford/ Malden, Massachusetts, 1999) Hyam, Ronald, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815–1914 (Basingstoke, 1993) James, Lawrence, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, 1994) Judd, Dennis, Empire: the British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London, 1996) Lloyd, Trevor, Empire: The History of the British Empire (London, 2001) Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris, 2001) Marshall, P. J. (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1996) — (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford/New York, 1998) Morris, James, Heaven’s Command: An Imperial Progress (London, 1992 [1973]) —, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (London, 1992 [1968]) —, Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat (London, 1992 [1979]) Pagden, Anthony, Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World, from Antiquity to the Present (London, 2001) Palmer, Alan, Dictionary of the British Empire and Commonwealth (London, 1996) Porter, Andrew N. (ed.), Atlas of British Overseas Expansion (London, 1991) (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, New York, 1999) Winks, Robin W.

III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, New York, 1999) Winks, Robin W. (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. V: Historiography (Oxford, New York, 1999) CHAPTER 1 Andrews, Kenneth R., ‘Drake and South America’, in Thrower, Norman J. W. (ed.), Sir Francis Drake and the Famous Voyage, 1577–1580 (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1984), pp. 49–59 Armitage, David, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000) Barua, Pradeep, ‘Military Developments in India, 1750–1850’, Journal of Military History, 58/4(1994), pp. 599–616 Bayly, C. A., Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1988) —, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830 (London, 1989) Bernstein, Jeremy, Dawning of the Raj: The Life and Trials of Warren Hastings (London, 2001) Boxer, C. R., The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800 (London, 1965) Brenner, Robert, ‘The Social Basis of English Commercial Expansion, 1550-1650’, Journal of Economic History, 32/1 (1972), pp. 361–84 Brigden, Susan, New Worlds, Lost Worlds (London, 2000) Carlos, Ann M. and Nicholas, Stephen, ‘Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson’s Bay Company’, Journal of Economic History, 50/4 (1990), pp. 853–75 Carnall, Geoffrey and Nicholson, Colin (eds.), The Impeachment of Warren Hastings: Papers from a Bicentenary Commemoration (Edinburgh, 1989) Cell, Gillian T.

pages: 637 words: 117,453

Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War by Andrew Stewart

British Empire, Fellow of the Royal Society, imperial preference, Monroe Doctrine, union organizing

Sir Edward Campbell believed that 'it is a horrid term for the greatest Empire the world has ever known' and, despite being informed that the phrase had been first used over 40 years ago, the irate parliamentarian resolved that he would continue to use 'British Empire'. Flight-Lieutenant Raikes, by his own description a right-wing member of the House, was of a similar mind. He welcomed the continuing use of the term and believed that there had been 'a gasp of relief' from many countries upon learning that 'the British still believe in something which they are prepared to hold and fight for'. Mr Emmott, the Member from eastern Surrey, was also troubled and as he put it: 'Are the British not to be permitted to acknowledge their pride in the British Empire, their determination to defend it against those who would destroy it and their will to make all sacrifices for it?' He believed that the British public was actually mystified by 'a pestilent doctrine which teaches men to be apologists for the British Empire, to be ashamed of it, to explain it away as part of the old world'.

Slim, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, 1902-1980 (London, 1982), pp. 11, 21; Donald Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914 (Baltimore, 1965), p. 194. 8 Martin Kitchen, The British Empire and Commonwealth (London, 1996), pp. 61-3; Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience (London, 1996), pp. 214-25; James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London, 1985), pp. 148-54; Robert Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, (London, 1981), pp. 1-4; James Williamson, Great Britain and the Commonwealth (London, 1965), pp. 178-80; BBC Research Manuals, 'Number 4, The Development of Self-Government in the British Empire', Abrams Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge), ABMS1/7/9, p. 3. 9 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p. 21. 10 Hyam, 'The British Empire in the Edwardian Era' in OHBE4, pp. 56-7. 11 Paul Hayes, 'British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (Vol. 12; 1984), pp. 113-14. 12 Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset, Vol. 1: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 (New York, 1970), pp. 191-3. 13 Judd and Slim, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, pp. 39-40; Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, (London, 1987), p. 79; Porter, The Lion's Share, (London, 1975), p. 228. 14 C.

Lord Ismay (1960), Memoirs, London: Heinemann. Jackson, Ashley (2006), The British Empire and the Second World War, London: Hambledon Continuum. James, Lawrence (1994), The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, London: Little, Brown and Company. James, R. (ed.) (1976), Victor Cazalet, London: Collins. Jeffries, Charles (1938), The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jeffries, Sir Charles (1956), The Colonial Office, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Jenkins, Roy (2001), Churchill, London: Macmillan. Joll, James (1984), The Origins of the First World War, London: Longman. Joske, Sir Percy (1978), Sir Robert Menzies: A New Informal Memoir, Sydney: Angus and Robertson. Judd, Denis (1968), Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932, London: Macmillan. -(1996), Empire: The British Imperial Experience, London: Harper Collins. -(2004), The Lion and the Tiger, The Rise and Fall of the British Raj, 1600-1947, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

pages: 264 words: 74,688

Imperial Legacies by Jeremy Black;

affirmative action, British Empire, centre right, colonial rule, Donald Trump, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, imperial preference, Khartoum Gordon, mass immigration, Monroe Doctrine, out of africa, Scramble for Africa, transatlantic slave trade

In this context, however, there is no sign that the particularly hostile character of the treatment of Western imperialism, and notably of the British Empire, will cease. This treatment can be reconceptualized by looking at the important distinction between Western empires, notably that of Britain, and those in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries of the Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals, and Manchu. With all its faults, the British Empire, like, subsequently, the American state, arose in the context of modernity and the Enlightenment as broadly conceived: they came with promises of the rule of law, participatory governance, freedom, autonomy, and individualism, to at least some of their members. Moreover, these ideas subsequently spread in their area of power, as with the abolition of slavery and the spread of democracy. This point undercuts the notion that the British Empire can be automatically incorporated into a world history in which empire is the default setting for large-scale political structures over time.

The key Birmingham politician of the Victorian period, Joseph Chamberlain, an exponent of a stronger British Empire who became secretary of state for the Colonies (1895–1903), was described as “still revered despite his aggressive and racist imperial policy.” One board attacked Britain’s “hasty” departure from India in 1947 for “trauma and misogyny,” and a second board offers another partisan context: “Capitalism is a system that prioritises the interests of the individuals and their companies at the expense of the majority.” Janine Eason, the director of engagement, said that it was “not possible” for a museum to present a “neutral voice, particularly for something as multifaceted as stories relating to the British Empire,” and, instead, that the exhibition was both a way to serve the multicultural population of Birmingham and was intended “to provoke.”

The rise and fall of empires has become a narrative that adds epic interest and moral notes to the cyclical patterns beloved by so many writers. This cycle is particularly observed in the treatment of the British Empire and the (“would-be”) treatment of the United States, even if the process can be subliminal (for writer and readers) as much as it can be explicit. Separate to such narratives, the bitter identity politics of empire and even more “ex-empire” lead to claims and assertions about collective memories, amnesia, and forgetfulness.8 These often-angry politics, encourage the deployment of empire, especially the British Empire, as a case study for modern intellectual concerns, notably, but not only, about race and gender; this is a process that is repeated with the United States. In turn, these concerns become the way for many to study and present empire, especially the United States.

pages: 427 words: 124,692

Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British by Jeremy Paxman

British Empire, call centre, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, conceptual framework, Etonian, European colonialism, Fellow of the Royal Society, imperial preference, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, Kibera, land tenure, Livingstone, I presume, mass immigration, offshore financial centre, polynesian navigation, Scramble for Africa, transatlantic slave trade

: Anti-Imperialism and Exhibitions in Interwar Britain’, p. 78. 251 ‘the fate of’: Quoted in MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 234. 251 ‘respect the right’: Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 123–4. 251 ‘I have not’: Churchill, ‘The End of the Beginning’ speech, Mansion House, 10 November 1942, quoted in Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good, p. 281. 252 ‘sturdy British infantrymen’: The Times, 8 December 1941. 253 ‘the survival of’: Quoted in James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, p. 491. 253 ‘the possibility of’: Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate, p. 43. 253 ‘I trust you’ll’: Morris, Farewell the Trumpets, p. 452. 254 ‘Thus’, Churchill proclaimed: Quoted in ibid., p. 451. 254 ‘until after protracted’: Quoted in Gilbert Churchill: A Life, p. 716. 255 ‘the end of’: Quoted in Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, p. 422. 256 ‘The British Empire’: Quoted in Judd, Empire, p. 310. 256 ‘We have always’: Attlee, quoted in the Daily Herald, 16 August 1941. 256 The Labour manifesto: Dale, ed., Labour Party General Election Manifestos, pp. 52, 59, 72. 257 ‘their cookery from Paris’: Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn, p. 63. 258 ‘I hate Indians’: John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945, quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 258 ‘if Christ came’: Churchill, ‘Our Duty in India’, speech, 18 March 1931, printed in the Spectator, 6 June 1931, p. 533. 259 ‘the chatterboxes who’: Callahan, Churchill, p. 28. 259 ‘War has been’: Daily Mail, 16 November 1929, quoted in Herman, Gandhi & Churchill, p. 323. 259 ‘a monstrous monument’: Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p. 267n. 259 a peevish telegram: Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 78. 259 ‘on the subject’: Barnes and Nicholson, eds., The Empire at Bay, pp. 988, 993. 260 ‘territory over which’: Hansard, 5th series, vol. 426, cols. 1256–7, 1 August 1946, quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 260 ‘men of straw’: Quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 260 ‘Britain’s desertion of’: Quoted in Sarvepalli Gopal, ‘Churchill and India’, in Blake and Louis, eds., Churchill, pp. 470–71. 261 ‘melancholy event’: Quoted in Herman, Gandhi & Churchill, p. 591. 261 ‘not aware of’: Churchill note of 6 July 1945, quoted in Sherman, Mandate Days, p. 171. 262 ‘it surely is’: W.

., The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945, quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 258 ‘if Christ came’: Churchill, ‘Our Duty in India’, speech, 18 March 1931, printed in the Spectator, 6 June 1931, p. 533. 259 ‘the chatterboxes who’: Callahan, Churchill, p. 28. 259 ‘War has been’: Daily Mail, 16 November 1929, quoted in Herman, Gandhi & Churchill, p. 323. 259 ‘a monstrous monument’: Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p. 267n. 259 a peevish telegram: Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 78. 259 ‘on the subject’: Barnes and Nicholson, eds., The Empire at Bay, pp. 988, 993. 260 ‘territory over which’: Hansard, 5th series, vol. 426, cols. 1256–7, 1 August 1946, quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 260 ‘men of straw’: Quoted in Louis, ‘Churchill and the Liquidation of the British Empire’. 260 ‘Britain’s desertion of’: Quoted in Sarvepalli Gopal, ‘Churchill and India’, in Blake and Louis, eds., Churchill, pp. 470–71. 261 ‘melancholy event’: Quoted in Herman, Gandhi & Churchill, p. 591. 261 ‘not aware of’: Churchill note of 6 July 1945, quoted in Sherman, Mandate Days, p. 171. 262 ‘it surely is’: W.

(London, 1835) Sidney, Henry, A Viceroy’s Vindication? Sir Henry Sidney’s Memoir of Service in Ireland, 1556–78, ed. Ciaran Brady (Cork, 2002) Simms, Brendan, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire (London, 2008) Smith, A. Donaldson, Through Unknown African Continents: The First Expedition from Somaliland to Lake Lamu (London, 1897) Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1776) Smith, George, ‘Christian Missions, Especially in the British Empire’, in William Sheowring, ed., The British Empire Series, 5 vols. (London, 1899–1902) Smith, John, Captain John Smith: A Select Edition of his Writings, ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman (Chapel Hill, 1988) ____, Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England and the Summer Iles (London, 1624) ____, Works, ed.

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Ghosts of Empire: Britain's Legacies in the Modern World by Kwasi Kwarteng

Ayatollah Khomeini, banking crisis, British Empire, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of penicillin, Etonian, illegal immigration, imperial preference, invisible hand, Khartoum Gordon, land reform, sceptred isle, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, trade route, urban planning, Yom Kippur War

Its avowed values could not be further removed from those of the British Empire. As I hope to show in many of the examples of imperial history I outline in the following chapters, the anarchic individualism and paternalism which underpinned the British Empire led to messy outcomes. Transitions from British rule to independence were difficult, because the Pax Britannica was itself transient and without any firm foundation. The British Empire was nothing more than a series of improvisations conducted by men who shared a common culture, but who often had very different ideas about government and administration. There is very little unifying ideology in this imperial story. It was grand and colourful but it was highly opportunistic, dominated by individualism and pragmatism. The British Empire is a bizarre model to follow for fostering stability in today’s world.

I place the British Empire in this category. By putting institutions in their own context, I am arguing against a rather Whiggish view of history in which the past is merely a prologue to the present, where one thing leads inevitably to another, in a steady ascent of progress. History is more interesting and complicated than that. The British Empire is not some prelude to a modern twenty-first-century Western world of democracy, multiculturalism and liberal economics. The British Empire was something different. Some of its aspects, its hierarchy, its open disavowal of the idea of human equality and its snobbery, would strike the metropolitan reader of twenty-first-century London or New York as unpleasant and alien. Others, while recognizing the hierarchical nature of the British Empire, have said that conditions in the empire merely matched conditions in Britain itself.

The paper was entitled ‘On the Petroleum Situation in the British Empire’, and it was dated 29 July 1918, three months before the war’s end. Oil was needed – there was no doubt about that. It was ‘twice as economical as coal’. The problem was that there was very little to be found in the British Empire. Even before the war, Slade argued, Britain got 62 per cent of its oil from the United States. Romania and Russia were responsible for nearly 20 per cent, while the rest was obtained from far-flung, unreliable places like Mexico and the Dutch colonies in the Far East. The only way to secure the strategic position, or, in Sir Edmund’s stately phrase, to keep ‘our hold over the sea communications of the world in the event of another war’, was to find oil within the British Empire. If such a source could be found, then ‘the predominance now enjoyed by foreign oil corporations will be a thing of the past’.

pages: 215 words: 64,460

Shadows of Empire: The Anglosphere in British Politics by Michael Kenny, Nick Pearce

battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, colonial rule, corporate governance, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, imperial preference, informal economy, invention of the telegraph, Khartoum Gordon, labour mobility, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, Monroe Doctrine, Nixon shock, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, trade route, Washington Consensus

It was, according to James Belich – the historian whose pioneering work has done most to shape our understanding of it – an English-speaking world that, like the Arab or Iberian worlds, was ‘divided and sub-global, yet transnational, inter-continental, and far flung’, comprising ‘a shifting, varied but interconnected mélange of partners and subjects … lubricated by shared language and culture’ in which people, goods and ideas circulated with relative ease.7 As such, the Anglo-world is best thought of as distinct from, but related to, both the wider British Empire and what has been called the ‘British world system’, the global economic and political system created by the growth and consolidation of the British Empire.8 It includes the white settler societies of ‘Greater Britain’ but also the USA, with which the UK had deep economic and ideological ties in the nineteenth century. As the British Empire declined in the twentieth century, this Anglo-world came to form the core of a new ‘Anglo-America’ – an economic, political, ideological and military constellation through which the USA first assumed, and then exercised, global hegemony (as we shall see, the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the USA is a central axis upon which debate about the Anglosphere would come to turn).

Koch Foundation Charmley, John Chesney, George Tomkyns China Churchill, Winston: and Anglosphere; and British Empire; and Commonwealth; and Europe; Fulton speech (1946); Harvard speech (1943); History of the English-Speaking Peoples; legacy; Obama and his bust; and Powell; and Thatcher; and USA City of London: and 1940s British economy; and EU single currency; importance; nineteenth-century investment in USA; and tariff reform Clark, Helen Clarke, Kenneth Clinton, Bill Cold War: course of; end; and South Africa colonialism see British Commonwealth; British Empire Common Agricultural Policy Commonwealth see British Commonwealth communism: and ANC; as definer of Anglosphere; demise; and Marshall Plan; Thatcher's attitude Congress of Europe Conquest, Robert Conservative Party: and Anglosphere; and Brexit; and British Empire; Churchill's speech to 1948 conference; Churchill's status; and Commonwealth; and Europe; Heath's brand; and New Right Anglosphere; and South Africa; splits under Thatcher; Thatcher's influence; and US nuclear strategy; see also Churchill, Winston; May, Theresa; Powell, Enoch; Thatcher, Margaret Council of Europe Cuba Cummings, Dominic Curtis, Lionel Davis, David De Gaulle, Charles defence capabilities, contemporary defence spending Delors, Jacques democracy devolution digital technologies, and trade Dilke, Charles Drake, Sir Francis Dubai East Africa economy: in 1940s and 1950s; British compared with rest of Europe; Commonwealth and Empire's importance to; effect of Bretton Woods collapse; EU's sovereign debt crises; global financial meltdown (2007–8); IMF bailout; under Wilson; see also money Eden, Anthony Eisenhower, Dwight D.

The fluid and evolving lineage of thinking associated with the Anglosphere has been directed to different political ends at various junctures, but was especially important, we will suggest, in giving sustenance and shape, in recent years, to the Eurosceptic conviction that the UK's future lies outside the European Union (EU) and involves the resumption of alliances based on deep cultural affinities with other English-speaking countries. The Anglosphere is a concept with a long historical lineage. Its origins lie in the late Victorian era, when historians and politicians debated what held the British Empire together, particularly those ‘kith and kin’ colonies where ‘Anglo-Saxons’ had settled, and whether stronger forms of political, economic and military unity were needed to secure the empire against the threats posed by the rise of rival powers, the USA among them. The idea lived on in the early twentieth century through debates in high politics about tariff reform versus free trade and came alive again both in arguments over the future of the British Empire between the world wars and in the soul-searching about Britain's place in the world that accompanied decolonisation, the rise of the ‘New Commonwealth’, and Britain's entry to the European Economic Community (EEC).

To the Ends of the Earth: Scotland's Global Diaspora, 1750-2010 by T M Devine

agricultural Revolution, British Empire, deindustrialization, deskilling, full employment, ghettoisation, housing crisis, invention of the telegraph, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, land tenure, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, new economy, New Urbanism, oil shale / tar sands, railway mania, Red Clydeside, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Scramble for Africa, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, women in the workforce

Mackenzie, ‘Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English Worlds? A Four Nation Approach to the History of the British Empire’, History Compass, 6/5 (2008), pp. 1244–63. 24. Andrew Thompson, ‘Empire and the British State’, in Stockwell, ed., British Empire, p. 51. 25. Ibid. 26. See, for example, Kevin Kenny, ed., Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford, 2004); David Fitzpatrick, ‘Ireland and the Empire’, in Andrew Porter, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 495–522; Keith Jeffery, ed., ‘An Irish Empire?’ Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester, 1996). 27. Devine, Scotland’s Empire, pp. 94–118, 140–63. 28. Kevin Kenny, ‘The Irish in the Empire’, in Kenny, ed., Ireland and the British Empire, pp. 104–5. 29. Sir M. O’Dwyer, India as I Knew It, 1885–1925 (London, 1925), pp. 1–8, 17–21; Scott B.

., A Global Clan. Scottish Migrant Networks and Identities since the Eighteenth Century (London, 2006). Richardson, David, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Eighteenth Century Slave Trade to America, Vol. 3 (Bristol, 1991). Richardson, David, ‘The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1660–1807’, in P. J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998). Richter, Daniel K., ‘Native Peoples of North America and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire’, in P. J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998). Riddy, John, ‘Warren Hastings: Scotland’s Benefactor?’, in Geoffrey Carnall and Colin Nicholson, eds., The Impeachment of Warren Hastings (Edinburgh, 1989). Rider, Peter E. and Heather McNabb, eds., A Kingdom of the Mind.

Bailyn, Bernard, Voyagers to the West (London, 1986). Baines, Dudley, Migration in a Mature Economy (Cambridge, 1985). Barkan, E. B., ed., A Nation of Peoples. A Sourcebook on America’s Multicultural Heritage (Westport, Conn., 1999). Bartlett, Thomas, ‘ “This famous island set in a Virginian sea”: Ireland in the British Empire, 1690–1801’, in P. J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998). Bartlett, Thomas, ‘Ireland, Empire and Union, 1690–1801’, in Kevin Kenny, ed., Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford, 2004). Basu, Paul, ‘Roots tourism as return movement: semantics and the Scottish diaspora’, in Marjory Harper, ed., Emigrant Homecomings (Manchester, 2005). Basu, Paul, Highland Homecomings (Abingdon, 2007). Baxter, R. D., National Income of the United Kingdom (London, 1867).

pages: 370 words: 111,129

Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India by Shashi Tharoor

affirmative action, barriers to entry, Boris Johnson, British Empire, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, corporate raider, deindustrialization, European colonialism, global village, informal economy, joint-stock company, land tenure, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, night-watchman state, Parkinson's law, trade route

Chaudhuri, the Bengali intellectual and author of the bestselling Autobiography of an Unknown Indian (1951), with its cringe-worthy dedication to the British Empire in India: To the memory of the British Empire in India, Which conferred subjecthood on us, but withheld citizenship. To which yet every one of us threw out the challenge: ‘Civis Britannicus sum’ Because all that was good and living within us was made, shaped and quickened by the same British rule. This unedifying spectacle of a brown man with his nose up the colonial fundament made Chaudhuri a poster child for scholarly studies of how Empire creates ‘native informants’, alienated from and even abhorring their own cultures and societies. Chaudhuri’s admiration for the British empire extended to his appreciation of it for restraining Indians from defecating in public—an activity which assuredly the British did not, in fact, succeed in controlling, let alone stopping, except in the public areas of major towns.

Niall Ferguson, for instance, argues that Britain’s empire promoted ‘the optimal allocation of labour, capital and goods in the world…no organisation in history has done more to promote the free movement of goods, capital and labour than the British empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And no organization has done more to impose Western norms of law, order and governance around the world. For much (though certainly not all) of its history, the British Empire acted as an agency for relatively incorrupt government. Prima facie, there therefore seems a plausible case that Empire enhanced global welfare—in other words, [that it] was a Good Thing.’ This ‘Good Thing’ was so proclaimed at the height of globalization at the dawn of the twenty-first century, when it suited Ferguson to portray the British empire as the pioneer of this much-vaunted global economic phenomenon, its conquests dressed up as overseas investment and its rapacity as free trade—the very elements that contemporary globalizers were claiming would raise everyone’s levels of prosperity.

British interfered with social customs only when it suited them: See, for example, the impassioned appeals by anti-slavery campaigners for the British government to put an end to certain traditional practices of servitude, which were of course completely ignored by Company officialdom: Wilson Anti-Slavery Collection, A Brief View of Slavery in British India, 1841, Manchester: The University of Manchester, John Rylands University Library. URL: ‘Unlike Stalin’s Russia, the British empire’: Lawrence James, The Making and Unmaking of British India, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; also published as Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India, London: Little, Brown &Co., 1997. For whom was the British empire an open society?: See the essays in Philippa Levine, ed., Gender and Empire, Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series, Oxford University Press, 2004. Let’s look at the numbers one last time, widening the lens a little: See As of 2014 Britain accounted for 2.4 per cent of global GDP:

Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain by John Darwin

Alfred Russel Wallace, British Empire, colonial rule, Corn Laws, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, European colonialism, financial independence, friendly fire, full employment, imperial preference, Khartoum Gordon, Khyber Pass, Kowloon Walled City, land tenure, mass immigration, Nelson Mandela, open economy, plutocrats, Plutocrats, principal–agent problem, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Right to Buy, Scientific racism, South China Sea, special economic zone, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, union organizing

.), Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 1: The Origins of Empire (Oxford, 1998), pp. 139–40. 6. T. C. Barnard, ‘New Opportunities for British Settlement: Ireland, 1650–1700’, in Canny, Origins, p. 324. 7. H. McD. Beckles, ‘The “Hub of Empire”: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century’, in Canny, Origins, p. 222; Canny, ‘The Origins of Empire’, in ibid., p. 31. 8. J. Horn, ‘British Diaspora: Emigration from Britain 1680–1715’, in P. J. Marshall (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 2: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998), p. 30. 9. See R. S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies 1624–1713 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1972). 10. K. Fedorowich, ‘The British Empire on the Move, 1776–1914’, in S. Stockwell, The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, 2008), p. 67. 11.

This was Richard Hakluyt in 1595–8. See D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000), p. 108. 22. See M. Nicholls and P. Williams, ‘Sir Walter Ralegh’ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography online. 23. See C. Hill, ‘Ralegh – Science, History and Politics’, in his The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965), p. 154. 24. Cited in E. Williams (ed.), Documents of West Indian History 1492–1655 (Port of Spain, 1963), p. 269. 25. D. B. Quinn, Raleigh and the British Empire (pbk edn, London, 1962), p. 134. 26. G. Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne (London, 1967). 27. Quoted in Sacks, Widening Gate, p. 340. 28. For a recent survey, K. Morgan, ‘Mercantilism and the British Empire 1688–1815’, in D. Winch and P. K. O’Brien (eds.), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914 (London, 2002), pp. 165–92. 29.

Porter, Bibliography of Imperial, Colonial and Commonwealth History since 1600 (Oxford, 2002) which has some 24,000 entries, many running to dozens of volumes. S. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, 2008) has an excellent – if somewhat shorter – bibliography. A. Jackson and D. Tomkins, Illustrating Empire: A Visual History of British Imperialism (Oxford, 2011) offers an interesting selection of imperial imagery. B. Porter, The Lion’s Share, first published in 1975 but with several later editions, provides an excellent overview of the British Empire since 1850. W. R. Louis (general ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire (5 vols., Oxford, 1998–9) is now the most comprehensive account, beginning with N. Canny (ed.), Origins of Empire (Oxford, 1998). It has yielded a series of companion volumes on themes including gender, black experiences, migration, the history of settler and expatriate communities, and missionaries, as well as studies of the place of Ireland, Canada, Australia and twentieth-century Britain in the empire.

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Heaven's Command (Pax Britannica) by Jan Morris

British Empire, Cape to Cairo, centralized clearinghouse, Corn Laws, European colonialism, Fellow of the Royal Society, Khartoum Gordon, Khyber Pass, land reform, land tenure, Livingstone, I presume, Magellanic Cloud, mass immigration, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, plutocrats, Plutocrats, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, trade route

WHITE SETTLERS: Lord Durham and the colonials, 8. AN ACT OF GOD: The Irish Famine, a negation of empire. 9. ‘WHAT A FINE MAN!’: Character and the growth of power. Part Two THE GROWING CONVICTION: 1850–1870 10. GROOVES OF CHANGE: Technology and the British Empire. 11. THE EPIC OF THE RACE: The Indian Mutiny. 12. PAN AND MR GLADSTONE: An Adriatic interlude, 13. THE IMPERIAL STYLE: Taking a Gothic turn. 14. ILLUSTRIOUS FOR THE NILE: Exploration and the death of Speke. 15. GOVERNOR EYRE: ‘Old ’Angsman’ and the Jamaica Rebellion. 16. ‘AIN’T THE PENTATEUCH QUEER: Religion and the British Empire. 17. THE HUMILIATION OF THE METIS: The subjection of an alien culture. 18. IN THE PACIFIC: Sailing safe in the American ocean, Part Three THE IMPERIAL OBSESSION: 1870–1897 19. A FIXED PURPOSE: The ideology of Empire. 20.

There were evangelists who believed in empire as the instrument of Christian duty, and social theorists who believed in emigration as the instrument of enlightened progress, and merchants unconvinced of the advantages of Free Trade, and activists of the West India Interest and the India lobby, and soldiers bored after a decade of peace, and adventurers coveting fresh opportunities of self-advantage. There were fighting patriots, and speculators of exotic preference, and there were even ornamental visionaries, half a century before their time, who conceived a new British Empire framed in symbolism, and endowed with a grand and mystic meaning. One of these was Robert Martin, who standing back from his immense collection of imperial facts, and contemplating his engravings of colonial seals and charters, concluded that the British Empire of 1837, ramshackle and disregarded though it seemed, would prove to be one of the great accomplishments of history, ‘on whose extension and improvement, so far as human judgement can predict, depends the happiness of the world’.1 Another was J. M. Gandy, an able but erratic architect of grandiloquent style.

In the British view the Voortrekkers were renegades from the imperial authority: by the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act of 1836 the British Empire had claimed jurisdiction over all British subjects south of the 25th parallel—which ran hundreds of miles to the north. Her Majesty’s Government were accordingly perturbed to hear that these particular subjects were now stirring up trouble and establishing pretensions among the native peoples so far along the coast. The nearest imperial forces were at Grahamstown, and the notion of such uncouth Calvinists butchering Basutos or subverting honest Zulu kings was profoundly disquieting to Whitehall. So it was that on November 14, 1838, Sir George Napier, Governor of Cape Colony, announced after all the annexation to the British Empire of Port Natal—‘in consequence of the disturbed state of the Native tribes in the territories adjacent to that part, arising in a great degree from the unwarranted occupation of parts of those territories by certain emigrants from this colony, being Her Majesty’s subjects, and the probabilities that those disturbances will continue and increase’.

pages: 502 words: 128,126

Rule Britannia: Brexit and the End of Empire by Danny Dorling, Sally Tomlinson

3D printing, Ada Lovelace, Alfred Russel Wallace, anti-communist, anti-globalists, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, British Empire, centre right, colonial rule, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden,, epigenetics, Etonian, falling living standards, Flynn Effect, housing crisis, illegal immigration, imperial preference, income inequality, inflation targeting, invisible hand, knowledge economy, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, megacity, New Urbanism, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, University of East Anglia, We are the 99%, wealth creators

To be most convincing, those who teach and tell the lies have to believe them to be truths. If it had not been the British, however, it would have been another European state that would have been the centre of the largest empire of the world. It was Britain partly, if not largely, by chance. FIGURE 3.2: A MAP OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE WITH AREA IN PROPORTION TO CURRENT POPULATION The dates when some areas were claimed and rescinded from the British Empire are given in brackets.39 When you looked at what makes up most of the former British Empire today in Figure 3.2 and considered how small Britain is, did you think Britain was more significant, and if so, why? Was it how you were brought up? How you were nurtured? Were you ever shown a map like this at school? Were you ever told the stories we are telling here? What did the people you grew up with believe?

However, when you compare prices around major train stations in these cities, and account for the square metres that are inside dwellings, central London is often found to be the most expensive, at least for now – its prices are falling. 57 Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Cmnd 4262, London: The Stationery Office. 58 Adams, T. (2013) ‘Doreen Lawrence: “I could have shut myself away, but that is not me”’, The Guardian, 20 April, INDEX Abramovich, Roman 1 abstentions in EU referendum 1, 2, 3 Acheson, Dean 1 Act of Union (1707) 1, 2, 3 Adonis, Andrew 1 age as factor in referendum 1, 2, 3 and views on immigration 1 and support for political parties 1 Al Nahyan, Mansour bin Zayed 1 Aliens Act (1905) 1, 2 Allen, Graham 1 Andrew, Prince 1 Anglo-Saxon myth 1 arms trade 1, 2, 3 Arne, Thomas 1 Arsenal 1 Ashcroft, Lord 1, 2, 3 Attlee, Clement 1, 2 BAE 1 Baker, Herbert 1 Bamford, Lord 1 Bank of England 1, 2 Banks, Arron 1, 2, 3 Barclay, Stephen 1 Barnier, Michel 1 Bartley, Jonathan 1 bell curve 1, 2 Benn, Tony 1 Besant, Annie 1 Bevan, Aneurin 1 Bildt, Carl 1 Blair, Tony 1, 2, 3 Blake, William 1 Bloomberg, Michael 1 Blunkett, David 1 Blunt, Anthony 1 BMG 1 Boer War 1, 2 Bolton, Henry 1 Bonaparte, Napoleon 1 Bone, Peter 1 Booth, Robert 1 Borja, Mario Cortina 1, 2 Bowers, Simon 1 Boyle, Frankie 1 Bradlaugh, Charles 1 Bradley, Karen 1 Bragg, Billy 1 Branson, Richard 1 Bravo, Antonio 1 Bravo, Manuel 1 Brexit Cookbook, The 1 Brexit negotiations Theresa May’s position on 1 free trade deals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 life after Brexit 1, 2, 3 impact on EU 1 and financial services 1 and impact reports 1 and Brexit War Cabinet 1 and ‘no deal’ Brexit 1, 2 and Greenland example 1 ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexits 1 Labour Party position on 1 costs of Brexit 1 Britain definition of 1, 2 misconception of identity 1 role in modern world 1 post-Empire 1, 2, 3 mythology of 1, 2, 3, 4 creation of 1 ‘Great’ in 1 identity of 1, 2, 3 and natural selection 1 international comparisons 1 rise in inequality in 1 pride in 1 industrial revolution in 1 pollution in 1 arms trade in 1, 2, 3 financial services in 1, 2, 3, 4 arms trade in 1 manufacturing industry in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 statistics on trade 1 values of 1 wage levels in 1 life expectancy in 1 possible break-up of 1 Britannia 1 British Brothers’ League 1 British Chamber of Commerce 1 British Empire loss of 1, 2 pride in 1, 2 and immigration 1 creation of 1 and British identity 1 education about 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and dependencies 1 as market captive 1, 2, 3, 4 remnants of 1, 2, 3 and public schools 1 racism in 1 fantasy of 1 and Darwinism 1 delusions of grandeur 1 spoils of 1 legacy of 1, 2 Opium Wars 1 and need for food 1 British Empire Union 1 British Medical Journal 1, 2 BRIT(ish): On Race Identity and Belonging (Hirsch) 1 British Union of Fascists 1 Brokenshire, James 1 Brown, Gordon 1, 2, 3 Bullingdon Club 1 Burgess, Guy 1 Buxton, Ronald 1 Cairncross, John 1 Cairns, Alun 1 Cambridge Analytica 1 Cambridge University 1, 2, 3, 4 Cameron, David promises referendum 1, 2 negotiations with EU 1 on ‘Jerusalem’ 1 on trade with the EU 1 at Oxford University 1, 2 family involvement in slavery 1 toughness on immigration 1 at Eton 1 resignation of 1 millionaires in Cabinet 1 wealth of 1 negotiations with EU 1 unauthorised biography of 1 Campbell, Alastair 1 Capital Group 1 Carney, Mark 1 Catholic Herald 1 Cavell, Edith 1 Centre for Social Justice 1 Chagos Islanders 1 Chandler, Christopher 1 Channel Islands 1 Charles, Prince 1, 2, 3, 4 Chelsea football club 1 Child Poverty Action Group 1 Churchill, Winston 1, 2, 3 Clark, Greg 1 Clarke, Kenneth 1, 2 class as factor in referendum 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the British Empire 1 Clegg, Nick 1 Clinton, Bill 1 Cockburn, Patrick 1 Collingham, Lizzie 1, 2 Commonwealth 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Commonwealth Immigration Act (1968) Conan Doyle, Arthur 1, 2 Confederation of British Industry (BFI) 1 Confession of Faith (Rhodes) 1 Conservative Party donations to 1, 2 issue of EU in 1, 2, 3 wins 2015 general election 1 in European Parliament 1 age of supporters 1 Contemporary Review Journal 1 Corbyn, Jeremy 1 personality of 1, 2 election as Labour Party leader 1 and Windrush scandal 1 and 2017 general election 1 honesty of 1 comparisons with Attlee 1, 2 opposition to austerity 1 and second referendum 1 Corera, Gordon 1 corporal punishment 1 Cox, Geoffrey 1 Cox, Jo 1, 2, 3 Crabb, Stephen 1 Cromwell, Oliver 1 Culloden, Battle of 1 Cumberbatch, Benedict 1 Cummings, Dominic and political repercussions of referendum 1 to be played by Benedict Cumberbatch 1 early life and career 1, 2 belief in natural selection 1, 2, 3 in Vote Leave campaign 1, 2, 3 Cyprus 1 Daily Express 1 Daily Mail 1, 2 Daily Mirror 1 Daily Telegraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Dalla Valle, Luciana 1, 2 Dalrymple, William 1 Daly, Paul 1 Darling, Alistair 1 Darwin, Charles 1, 2, 3, 4 Darwinism 1 Davis, David and customs union ‘backstop’ 1 and impact reports 1 made Secretary for Exiting the EU 1 Frankie Boyle on 1 bets on referendum result 1 Demetriades, Panicos 1 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 1, 2, 3 Der Spiegel 1 Deripaska, Oleg 1 Duncan Smith, Iain 1 East India Company 1, 2, 3 Economists for Free Trade 1 Edmiston, Lord 1 education as factor in referendum 1 universities 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 selective 1 and inequality 1, 2, 3 history of in Britain 1 competition in 1 rise in levels of 1 in OECD countries 1 reforms to 1 Education and Race from Empire to Brexit (Tomlinson) 1 Edward, Prince 1 Edward I, King 1 Edwards, David 1 El-Enany, Nadine 1, 2, 3, 4 Elgot, Jessica 1 Elliott, Larry 1 Elliott, Matthew 1 Empire Marketing Board 1, 2 Empire Windrush 1, 2 England, pride in 1, 2 environmental legislation 1 Eton 1 eugenics 1, 2, 3 European Parliament 1 European Research Group (ERG) 1, 2 Evans, Natalie 1 Evans-Gordon, Major 1 Eyres, Harry 1 Falkland Islands 1 Fallon, Michael 1, 2 Farage, Nigel 1 contemplates Northern Ireland seat 1, 2 foiled leadership ambitions 1 and fantasy of British Empire 1 and immigration 1, 2 and Grassroots Out 1 farming industry 1 Festival of Britain 1 Field, Frank 1 financial services 1, 2, 3, 4 Financial Times 1, 2 Fingleton, Eamonn 1 Finnish Lessons (Sahlberg) 1 Fletcher, C. R. L. 1 Flynn Effect 1 Foot, Michael 1 football clubs 1 Foresight reports 1, 2 Fox, Liam and fantasy of British Empire 1 trade deals 1 and arms trade 1 resignation as Secretary of State for Defence 1 and Grassroots Out 1 Frankie Boyle on 1 free trade and British Empire 1, 2, 3 and Brexit negotiations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 economists on 1 advantages of 1, 2 and immigration 1 post-Brexit 1 Galbraith, John Kenneth 1 Galton, Francis 1, 2 Gangaidzo, Innocent 1 Garnier, Mark 1 Gauke, David 1, 2 gender as factor in referendum 1 general elections 1945 1 2005 1 2015 1, 2, 3 2017 1 genetics 1 Gentleman, Amelia 1 geography as factor in referendum 1, 2 George V, King 1 Gibraltar 1 Gillray, James 1 Global Justice Now 1 Glorious Revolution 1 Goldsmith, James 1 Goldsmith, Zac 1 Goodfellow, May 1 Goodwin, Matthew 1 Gorard, Stephen 1 Gove, Michael foiled leadership ambitions 1, 2 as Secretary of State for Education 1, 2 at Oxford University 1 belief in natural selection 1 and children of immigrants 1 political views of 1 in Vote Leave campaign 1 as Secretary of State for the Environment 1 grammar schools 1 Grant, Charles 1 Grassroots Out (GO) 1 Grayling, Chris 1 Great British Bake Off, The 1, 2 Green, Damian 1, 2 Green Party 1 Greening, Justine 1 Greenland 1 Grenfell Tower 1, 2 Griffiths, Peter 1 Guardian, The 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Gugliani, Sam 1 Gummer, Ben 1 Haldane, J.

Index About the authors Copyright LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES FIGURES Figure 0.1: The most generous political donors from the Rich List of 2018 Figure 1.1: Voting by age group in the 2016 EU referendum Figure 1.2: Voting by region in the 2016 EU referendum Figure 1.3: Voting by local authority area in the 2016 EU referendum Figure 2.1: The Britannia 2017 UK five-ounce gold proof coin Figure 2.2: The ‘British nation’ from 55 BC to 1912 – the making of a myth Figure 2.3: EU overseas territories and outermost regions 2018 Figure 2.4: Chris Patten, his daughters and Prince Charles in Hong Kong, 1997 Figure 2.5: Britain’s Royal Navy message to families and children fleeing Syria Figure 3.1: Darwins, Wedgwoods, Galtons and Barclays family tree, 1573–1914 Figure 3.2: A map of the British Empire with area in proportion to current population Figure 3.3: Home locations of UK students at Oxford University in 2012 Figure 3.4: Once a German, always a German – The British Empire Union Figure 4.1: How proud or embarrassed are you about identifying as English? Figure 4.2: ‘John Bull’ locking the door, Daily Express, first published in 1901 Figure 4.3: A cartoon printed in the wake of the 1905 Aliens Act Figure 4.4: William Pitt and Napoleon Bonaparte dissect the plum pudding Figure 4.5: Imports to the UK in billions of US dollars (2017) Figure 4.6: Exports from the UK in billions of US dollars (2017) Figure 5.1: Productivity growth in the UK, 1999–2023, actual and forecasts Figure 5.2: The share of manufacturing in eleven major economies, 1990–2010 Figure 5.3: What do the British manufacture in 2015?

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The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931 by Adam Tooze

anti-communist, bank run, banking crisis, British Empire, centre right, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, credit crunch, failed state, fear of failure, first-past-the-post, floating exchange rates, German hyperinflation, imperial preference, labour mobility, liberal world order, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, negative equity, price stability, reserve currency, Right to Buy, the payments system, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, zero-sum game

In 1919 the demand for racial non-discrimination had been cut out of the League of Nations Covenant. But internally the British Empire could not escape the force of the point. As Lloyd George put it in July 1921 to the Imperial Conference: ‘We are trying to build up a democratic empire on the basis of the consent of all the races that are inside it . . . It really transfigures . . . the human story. The British Empire will be a Mount of Transfiguration if it succeeds.’59 The Commonwealth was to fall well short of such high aspirations, but it did vote over the furious protests of South Africa to affirm that there was an ‘incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians’ domiciled elsewhere in the empire.60 In the event, in 1923 Kenya introduced new exclusions on Indian settlement, but in so doing, along with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, and for that matter Britain itself, it put itself at odds with the very principle of equal treatment that was now acknowledged as a requirement of any consistent liberal vision of global empire.

At the same time, 10 million citizens of the Soviet Union were being kept alive by American famine relief. No other power had ever wielded such global economic dominance. If we turn to modern-day statistics to plot the development of the world economy since the nineteenth century, the two-part storyline is clear enough (Fig. 1).26 Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the British Empire had been the largest economic unit in the world. Sometime in 1916, the year of Verdun and the Somme, the combined output of the British Empire was overtaken by that of the United States of America. Henceforth, down to the beginning of the twenty-first century, American economic might would be the decisive factor in the shaping of the world order. There has always been a temptation, particularly on the part of British authors, to narrate nineteenth- and twentieth-century history as a story of succession, in which the United States inherited the mantle of British hegemony.27 This is flattering to Britain, but it is misleading in suggesting a continuity in the problems of global order and the means for addressing them.

British economic preponderance had unfolded within the ‘world system’ created by its empire, stretching from the Caribbean to the Pacific, expanding through free trade, migration and capital export across a vast ‘informal’ span.28 The British Empire formed the matrix for the development of all the other economies that made up the advancing frontier of globalization in the late nineteenth century. Faced with the rise of major national competitors, some imperial pundits, advocates of a ‘greater Britain’, began to lobby for this heterogeneous conglomerate to be forged into a single, self-enclosed economic bloc.29 But thanks to Britain’s entrenched culture of free trade, a preferential imperial tariff would only be adopted amid the disaster of the Great Depression. The United States was everything that the champions of imperial preference longed for, but the British Empire was not. The United States began as a heterogeneous collection of colonial settlements that in the early nineteenth century had developed into an expansive and highly integrative empire.

The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 by John Darwin

anti-communist, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, cognitive bias, colonial rule, Corn Laws, European colonialism, floating exchange rates, full employment, imperial preference, Joseph Schumpeter, Khartoum Gordon, Kickstarter, labour mobility, land tenure, liberal capitalism, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, Mahatma Gandhi, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, New Urbanism, open economy, railway mania, reserve currency, Right to Buy, rising living standards, Scientific racism, South China Sea, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, undersea cable

Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 (Harmondsworth, 2007). 11 The Middle East in 1945. Source: J. M. Brown and W. R. Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999). PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The British Empire, wrote Adam Smith in 1776, ‘has hitherto been not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine but the project of a gold mine’.1 A hundred years later, his condemnation might have softened. But, viewed as a political or administrative entity, British imperialism remained just such a project: unfinished, untidy, a mass of contradictions, aspirations and anomalies. Defined as the exercise of sovereign power, or the unfettered enjoyment of imperial rule (the criteria still favoured by many historians), the British Empire in its heyday was largely a sham. Over much that was most commercially or strategically valuable, it could claim no authority; over much that was useless, its hold was complete.

Martel, ‘The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain’, all in International History Review, 13 (1991). 11. The grand argument of J. Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1982). 12. For an example of this genre, see A. McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (1995). 13. B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004). 14. P. J. Jupp, British Politics on the Eve of Reform (1998), p. 338. Sales of the leading London newspapers rose from 16 million per year in 1837 to 31.4 million in 1850. See J. White, London in the Nineteenth Century (2007), p. 230. 15. For this lament, see P. A. Buckner (ed.), Canada and the British Empire (Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series) (Oxford, 2008), Introduction. 16. R. E. Robinson, ‘The Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’, in R.

.), The British World, pp. 57–81. 165. See D. MacKay, The Square Mile: Merchant Princes of Montreal (Vancouver, 1987). 166. K. Fedorowich, ‘The British Empire on the Move, 1760–1914’, in S. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, 2008), p. 85. 167. See B. S. Elliott, ‘Emigration from South Leinster to Eastern Upper Canada’, in D. H. Akenson (ed.), Canadian Papers in Rural History, vol. VIII (Gananoque, Ontario, 1992), pp. 277–306. 168. Fedorowich, ‘British Empire on the Move’, p. 83. 169. For D’Arcy McGee, see Dictionary of Canadian Biography (online version); for Gavan Duffy and Coghlan, see Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Chapter 5 1. Indian exports were worth Rupees 329 million (1860) and Rs 2,490 million (1913). D. Kumar (ed.), Cambridge Economic History of India (Cambridge, 1982), vol.

The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History by David Edgerton

active measures, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, blue-collar work, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, centre right, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, Corn Laws, corporate governance, deglobalization, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, Donald Davies, double helix, endogenous growth, Etonian, European colonialism, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, full employment, imperial preference, James Dyson, knowledge economy, labour mobility, land reform, land value tax, manufacturing employment, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Neil Kinnock, new economy, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, packet switching, Philip Mirowski, Piper Alpha, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, trade liberalization, union organizing, very high income, wages for housework, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor

That focus on nation was new – in the past exhibitions of a comparable scale and scope had been imperial and not national. 1938 saw a vast Empire Exhibition in Glasgow. In 1924–5 there was a British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in London, which included a new Empire Stadium. This stadium was known as such at least into the 1960s, though it is now remembered as the old Wembley Stadium.38 But just as for the British there could never be any such thing as British imperialism (as opposed to the British empire), so there could be no such notion as British nationalism (as opposed to the nation). Nationalism was in British understanding an ideology which threatened the empire, and indeed the nation. IRELAND Ireland was the first nation to emerge out of the British empire in the twentieth century. Into the early twentieth century the majority of the Irish people were represented at Westminster by the Nationalist Party.

The combination of more and bigger guns and ships gave the Royal Navy a huge advantage over the Kriegsmarine by 1914.8 The British empire went into the Great War with brand-new warships operated by a competent and modernizing Royal Navy.9 These were the products of a navy where the director of naval education was Sir Alfred Ewing, FRS, former professor of engineering at Cambridge, and where the command of the navy in 1915–16 was in the hands of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, FRS (elected 1901), a co-inventor of the radio. THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR The British empire was not compelled to enter the European war which broke out in August 1914. It ostensibly went to war, in alliance initially with France, Russia and Serbia, to defend Belgium from the barbarous Hun. Ideologically it became a liberal’s war, one against Prussianism and militarism, in the name of freedom and civilization. Yet the British empire, not the German Reich, was allied to the world’s most despotic, backward and anti-Semitic power – Russia – against the most philo-Semitic, scientific and well-educated – Germany.

British forces remained in other parts of France and were evacuated later. France surrendered only at the end of June 1940. While the implications of the fall of France were immense for the British Empire, it should not in itself be taken as being the consequence of British failure or weakness. It resulted from a highly contingent defeat of the French Army. The Anglo-French alliance had, with very good reason, been confident of their overall superiority in military force in 1939 and early 1940. Even after the fall of France, the British empire fought on, and not without a well-founded confidence in eventual victory. Neither ‘Britain’ nor the British empire, was ever alone. It was allied with many governments in exile, which brought with them small armed forces, sometimes large merchant marines and rich imperial territories, such as the Belgian Congo and the Dutch East Indies.

Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Macmillan; Richard Holbrooke; Casey Hampton

Albert Einstein, Bolshevik threat, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, facts on the ground, financial independence, land reform, Monroe Doctrine, Scramble for Africa, trade route, traveling salesman, union organizing

FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 581–84; Yale University Library, Wiseman diary, 19.1.19. 16. Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 2 (20.1.19). 17. Churchill, Aftermath, pp. 243–44. 18. Gilbert, Churchill, vol. 4, p. 231. 19. Mamatey, p. 297; J. M. Thompson, pp. 5–6, 46–50; Knock, pp. 156–57. 20. Noble, p. 270; Ullman, vol. 2, chapter 1. 21. Gilbert, Churchill, vol. 4, pp. 226–27, 230–33; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 8 (17.2.19). 22. Azan, p. 239; Kenez, pp. 180–91; Pipes, pp. 74–75. 23. FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 471–73; vol. 4, pp. 122–23, 379–82; F. Palmer, p. 378. 24. Hovi, pp. 216–17 and passim; FRUS, vol. 4, p. 121; Gilbert, Churchill, vol. 4, p. 254; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 8 (17.2.19). 25. Ministère de la Défense, Clemenceau Papers, 6N72, notes of a conversation at 10 Downing Street, London, 11.12.19; Churchill College, Churchill Papers, Charwell Group, Char 16/20, Lloyd George to Churchill, 16.2.19; Churchill, Aftermath, pp. 266–67; Scottish Record Office, Lothian Papers, 771, 19.2.19, Lloyd George to Kerr, 19.2.19. 26.

PWW, vol. 55, p. 120; Cecil, Great Experiment, p. 72. 28. FRUS, vol. 3, p. 1002; Hunter Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, pp. 279–80. 29. Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 17 (3.4.19. P.M.); House, Intimate Papers, vol. 4, p. 285; Mayer, pp. 378–80. 30. D. Lloyd George, Truth About the Peace Treaties, vol. 1, p. 656. 31. FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 210–15; PWW, vol. 55, pp. 160. 32. Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 27 (21.4.19); Tillman, pp. 280–83. 33. Tillman, pp. 287–94; Hunter Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, pp. 337–38; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 27 (21.4.19). 34. Hunter Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, pp. 442–50; Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, vol. 2, pp. 302–3. 35.

Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations and War Debts, chapter 9; House and Seymour, p. 484; Silverman, pp. 32–35; Kent, pp. 40–43. 11. Rowland, p. 494; C. T. Thompson, p. 236; Yale University Library, House diary, 21.2.19. 12. Burnett, vol. 1, pp. 31–32; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 13 (13.3.19). 13. Baruch, pp. 5–7. 14. Burnett, vol. 1, p. 34; Hardach, pp. 156–60; Schuker, American “Reparations,” p. 20. 15. Burnett, vol. 1, pp. 33, 514; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 33 (1.6.19, A.M.). 16. Burnett, vol. 1, pp. 4–8, 21; B. Kent, p. 69. 17. Bunselmeyer, p. 174, n. 9; Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 33 (1.6.19, A.M.). 18. Silverman, p. 39; Burnett, vol. 1, p. 61; House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, F/45/9/25, Smuts to Lloyd George, 4.12.18; F45/9/29, Smuts to Lloyd George, 26.3.19; F 45/9/33, Smuts to Lloyd George, 5.5.19; Hancock, pp. 539–41. 19.

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Brit-Myth: Who Do the British Think They Are? by Chris Rojek

Bob Geldof, British Empire, business climate, colonial rule, deindustrialization, demand response, full employment, Gordon Gekko, Isaac Newton, Khartoum Gordon, Live Aid, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, means of production, post-industrial society, Red Clydeside, sceptred isle, Stephen Hawking, the market place, urban planning, Winter of Discontent

They expose the brutality of Empire, without saying anything meaningful about the positive contribution of Empire to its colonies. Perhaps Gibson was influenced in forming a negative view of the British Empire by his history lessons as a boy in Australia. After all, it was the first British governor of the colony, Arthur Phillips, who famously declared the interior of the Australian continent to be Terra Nullius (literally ‘land without owners’), thus eradicating the land rights and dismissing the culture of the Aboriginals at a stroke. Here British interests were identified as the only legitimate issues and British judgement was given unquestionable precedence over all others. It is one of the most one-sided and shameful acts of legislation in the whole history 126 BRIT-MYTH of the British Empire. Nor, sadly, does it stand alone. In Imperial Reckoning (2005), Caroline Elkins has recently reminded the world of the British slaughter of as many as 50,000 Kenyans in the Mau Mau Rebellion between 1952 and 1960.

The British history of religious dissent and nonconformity provided a cogent pre-configuration of these myths, which perhaps accounts for why the architects of Empire could take them over so readily and transpose them into a secular context. The vehemence of the belief in the absolute individuality, superiority and charm of the Empire is so totally irrational and disproven by history that it can only be of primitive religious origin. To be sure, before the history of the British Empire there was a history of the British Empire of religious ideas that is not often considered in the context of questions of Empire. John Wyclif ’s bible, which appeared in the fourteenth century, was a precursor of Protestant Reformation and emblazoned English style and individualism as thorny issues for Rome and Europe. In sixteenth-century religious literature, this was supplemented by John Foxe’s Book of Martyrs (1563).

It brought effective systems of sanitation, health and education to countries in which these public benefits had been curtailed by despotism and dictatorship. Despite the fact that it waged many small wars, Ferguson credits the British Empire with administering a level of global peace that has been unmatched since its demise. In short, there is good reason for British nationalists to be proud of their history of Empire. The diametrically opposite view associates guilt and recrimination with the Empire ‘adventure’. For example, in After Empire (2004) Paul Gilroy argues that the British Empire was founded upon organized racism and maintains that its history was thoroughly ‘bloodstained’ and 178 BRIT-MYTH ‘xenophobic’ (p. 164). On this reading, the civilizing mission of Empire was fraudulent. In the context of the colonies, British doctrines of individualism, justice and fair play were masking devices that hid the ‘systematic brutality’ of ‘ethnic absolutism’ which tolerated the treatment of nonwhites as inferior races.

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Britain's Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation by Brendan Simms

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Corn Laws, credit crunch, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, imperial preference, land reform, Monroe Doctrine, moral panic, oil shock, open economy, plutocrats, Plutocrats, race to the bottom, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, South Sea Bubble, trade route, éminence grise

Throughout the contest London was haunted by the prospect that the great powers would intervene on behalf of the Boers and cut the British empire down to size, just as France and Spain had done during the American War of Independence. ‘We have not a friend in Europe,’ one Cabinet minister fretted at the beginning of the war in November 1899, ‘and … the main cause of the dislike is … that we are like an octopus with gigantic feelers stretching out over the habitable world, constantly interrupting and preventing foreign nations from doing that which in the past we have done ourselves.’76 Pro-Boer feeling ran high throughout Europe, especially in France, Germany and Ireland,77 and there was joint military planning between Paris and St Petersburg in 1900 about a possible French descent on Britain and a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. There was even talk of a partition of the British empire, with Spain taking Gibraltar, France making gains in Africa and Russia in Central Asia.

Edmund Burke spoke of a ‘Commonwealth of Europe’ long before the British Commonwealth of Nations was even thought of. The British empire was conquered largely for European reasons. Colonies gave Britain the demographic and financial weight she lacked on the continent; denying them to rival powers was equally important. At the same time, the overseas empire was acquired and maintained through the management of the European balance of power. This was a virtuous cycle, to be sure, but one which began and ended in Europe. When the empire became an embarrassment in Europe and the world after the Second World War, it was mostly wound down. In short: no Europe, no England, no United Kingdom, no British empire and no decolonization. The nature of the European challenge varied greatly over time. It was always strategic.

For the impact of the Polish partition on the constitutional convention see Frederick W. Marks, Independence on Trial. Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge, 1773), pp. 3–51. 25. Federalist no. 5, 10.11.1787, in Pole (ed.), Federalist Papers, pp. 17–18. 26. Cited in Hamish Scott, The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775 (Cambridge, 2001), p. 1. 27. See V. T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 2 vols (London, 1952–64) and Christopher A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830 (London, 1989). On the loyalists as a demographic reserve for empire see: Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles. American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York, 2011). 28. Quoted in Jeremy Black, ‘Recovering Lost Years. British Foreign Policy after the War of the Polish Succession’, Diplomacy and Statescraft, 15 (2004), p. 13. 29.

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Globish: How the English Language Became the World's Language by Robert McCrum

Alistair Cooke, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, call centre, Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Etonian, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, invention of movable type, invention of writing, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, jimmy wales, knowledge economy, Livingstone, I presume, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, Norman Mailer, Parag Khanna, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, Steven Pinker, the new new thing, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile

To patriotic Britons, war with France was now a defence of a way of life against godless, kingless, trouserless revolutionary egalitarians. Pitt’s policy would encourage Britain’s European allies to engage the enemy on the Continent while using sea power to defeat the French everywhere else. This strategy was the making of the second British empire and the promotion of the global brand known to cartoonists as ‘Britannia’, the vindication of every nationalist’s hopes. The surge in Britain’s fortunes was palpable. In 1792 there were just 23 British colonies; in 1816 there were 43. Similarly, in 1750 the first British empire amounted to some 12.5 million inhabitants, but by 1820 that figure had soared to 200 million. The scale of the fighting involved is important, too. The Napoleonic Wars bore much the same relation to the Seven Years War as the Second World War bears to the First, and they had the same kind of democratizing effect.

‘The history of empires’, declared Edward Gibbon in his first published sentence, ‘is the history of human misery.’ Even such a passionate conservative as Edmund Burke could only justify the conduct of empire if it was based on ancient values. ‘The British Empire’, he wrote, ‘must be governed on a plan of freedom, for it will be governed by no other’. This strange clash of English tradition with Victorian ambition resulted in a highly eccentric liberal empire that would be celebrated by its apologists at the old queen’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897 as the work of ‘the greatest governing race the world has ever seen’. From a twenty-first-century perspective, the British empire is now long gone, but its power and influence linger in the national imagination. A surprising number of British families will have at least one distant relative who served as a colonial civil servant, or died serving the Union Jack under a tropical sun.

.), The English Language, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1966 and 1969). Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997 (London, 2007). Susan Brigden, New Worlds, Lost Worlds: The Rule of the Tudors, 1485–1603 (London, 2000). Elizabeth Buettner, Empire Families (Oxford, 2004). Kathleen Burk, Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America (London, 2007). Ian Buruma, Voltaire’s Coconuts, or Anglomania in Europe (London, 1999). Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939–1945 (London, 1969). David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (London, 2001). Peter Carey, Wrong about Japan (London, 2005). George Clark, English History: A Survey (Oxford, 1971). Peter Clarke, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire (London, 2007). Sue Clifford and Angela King, England in Particular (London, 2006).

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Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History by Stephen D. King

9 dash line, Admiral Zheng, air freight, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, bilateral investment treaty, bitcoin, blockchain, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, eurozone crisis, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, Hyman Minsky, imperial preference, income inequality, income per capita, incomplete markets, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, Internet of things, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Kickstarter, Long Term Capital Management, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, moral hazard, Nixon shock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, old age dependency ratio, paradox of thrift, Peace of Westphalia, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, profit maximization, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, reshoring, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, Skype, South China Sea, special drawing rights, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, trade liberalization, trade route, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Office: Europe Office: Set in Minion Pro by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd Printed in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall Library of Congress Control Number: 2017936404 ISBN 978-0-300-21804-6 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 To Yvonne, Helena, Olivia and Sophie CONTENTS Prologue: A Victorian Perspective on Globalization Introduction: The Andalucían Shock Part One Paradise Lost 1 False Prophets, Harsh Truths 2 The New Imperium 3 Relative Success 4 Pride and the Fall Part Two States, Elites, Communities 5 Globalization and Nation States 6 The Spirit of Elitism 7 Competing Communities, Competing Histories Part Three Twenty-First-Century Challenges 8 People and Places 9 The Dark Side of Technology 10 Debasing the Coinage Part Four Globalization in Crisis 11 Obligations and Impossible Solutions Epilogue: A 2044 Republican Fundraiser Notes Bibliography Acknowledgements Index PROLOGUE A Victorian Perspective on Globalization … we have now reached the third stage in our history, and the true conception of our Empire. What is that conception? As regards the self-governing colonies we no longer talk of them as dependencies. The sense of possession has given place to the sense of kinship. We think and speak of them as part of ourselves, as part of the British Empire, united to us, although they may be dispersed throughout the world, by ties of kindred, of religion, of history, and of language, and joined to us by the seas that formerly seemed to divide us. But the British Empire is not confined to the self-governing colonies and the United Kingdom. It includes a much greater area, a much more numerous population in tropical climes, where no considerable European settlement is possible, and where the native population must always outnumber the white inhabitants … Here also the sense of possession has given way to a different sentiment – the sense of obligation.

For the most part, nations act in their self-interest – enlightened or otherwise – in an uncertain and sometimes chaotic world, creating temporary alliances that may last weeks, months, years or decades, but which are always in danger of eventually crumbling. Each country’s self-interest, meanwhile, is determined by its own mythology and history – and how that mythology and history is reinterpreted over time. For someone born in the UK at the turn of the twentieth century, the British Empire was a source of wonder and pride. For someone born in the UK at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the British Empire is more likely to be regarded as a source of considerable embarrassment.2 Mythology and history go a long way to explain why the European and US views of the ‘international community’ are not fully aligned, even though the two sides of the North Atlantic are ostensibly close allies. The US may have been a big supporter – both politically and financially – of major international institutions since the end of the Second World War, but on many occasions has opted not to be governed by those institutions.

(i) Trump, Donald election as president (i), (ii) his simple explanation (i) isolationism and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Mexican wall (i), (ii) populist approach of (i) Republican policy and (i) route to White House (i) secures Republican nomination (i) TPP and (i), (ii) Tsipras, Alexis (i) tuberculosis (i) Turkey (i) Turks (i), (ii) see also Ottoman Empire; Seljuk Turks Twitter (i), (ii) Uganda (i), (ii), (iii) Ukraine (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Umayyad Caliphate (i) unemployment (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) United Arab Emirates (i) United Kingdom (UK) see also Brexit; British Empire 16th century (i) bankers to the world (i) Blair and Brown (i) corporate scandals (i) extradition treaty with US (i) IMF and (i) immigration into (i) inflation (i), (ii) internal inequality (i) joins EEC (i) living standards (i) Mossadeq (i) post-First World War (i) social welfare (i) ‘special relationship’ with US (i) Suez (i) Thatcher and Reagan (i) United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (i), (ii) United Nations (UN) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)n9 United States (US) 1930s bank failures (i) absence of firm leadership (i) brand name companies (i) changing fortunes since Second World War (i) checks and balances (i) China and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) complaints against (i) corporate scandals (i) dismantling the British Empire (i) dollar see American dollar excess Chinese capital (i) First World War view (i) immigration into (i) imperial activities of (i)n1 (Introduction) inflation through war (i) Iraq (i) living standards (i) Locke and the constitution (i) Marshall Plan (i) Middle East inconsistencies (i) middle-income earners (i) military presence in Europe (i) military spending (i) Moscow Olympics (i) naval power (i) 9/11 (i) PACOM (i) Pearl Harbor (i) Plaza Accord (i) population censuses (i) post-First World War (i) post-Second World War initiatives (i) Reagan and Thatcher (i) social mobility (i) Soviet Union and (i) strength of position (i) sub-prime mortgages (i) taxation (i) TPP and (i), (ii) vetoing UN Security Council (i) ‘Washington Consensus’ (i), (ii), (iii) Uruguay Round (GATT) (i) Uzbekistan (i) Varoufakis, Yanis (i), (ii) Vasco da Gama (i), (ii) Venezuela (i) Venice (i) Versailles, Palace of (i) Versailles, Treaty of (i), (ii) Vickers Report (i) Vienna, Congress of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Vietnam (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Vietnam War (i) Vikings (i), (ii) Visigoths (i) Vladivostok (i) Volcker, Paul (i) Vote Leave (i) Wales (i), (ii) Wall Street (i), (ii) Wall Street Journal (i) Walt Disney Productions (i) ‘War on Terror’ (i) Wars of the Roses (i) warships (i) Washington, DC (i), (ii) ‘Washington Consensus’ (i), (ii), (iii) water shortages (i) Waterloo, Battle of (i) Weimar Republic (i) welfare states (i) Wells, H.G.

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This Sceptred Isle by Christopher Lee

agricultural Revolution, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, Corn Laws, cuban missile crisis, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, failed state, financial independence, glass ceiling, half of the world's population has never made a phone call, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, Johannes Kepler, Khartoum Gordon, Khyber Pass, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, new economy, Northern Rock, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, spice trade, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, urban decay

The idea was simple: cheap and rare goods in and British goods out. This trading principle did not always run smoothly but by the death of Victoria and the reign of her son, Edward VII, the British Empire was at its strongest and most profitable. Without the breadth of colonial trading Britain would have been financially embarrassed. Nation-states tumble from historical peaks yet the early years of the twentieth century did not obviously suggest it was right to talk of the Empire sliding away; in fact, there is evidence to suggest that the British Empire was even expanding certainly in terms of its influence in the conduct of the Great War. The 1914–18 conflict was a world war because it was a battle of empires: the British Empire, the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Japanese and to a lesser extent, the Italian colonies. When the war ended, the colour-coding of the globe changed.

If Stuart England under its first monarch was a dour society, the whole period of Stuart dynasty was far more important in the nation’s imperial history than the seemingly more romantic Elizabethan age. The years between the start of the Stuarts in 1603 and the Hanoverians in 1714 was the founding century of the counting house that was the British Empire. For example, twelve of the thirteen American colonies28 were established in that period. In the West Indies, the British-held islands produced enormous wealth, mainly through sugar plantations. Lancaster’s East India Company overwhelmed anything that the Dutch, and before them the Portuguese, had managed in Asia. By the time the Hanoverians arrived the first British Empire was established and the Treaty of Utrecht (1713–14) that followed the Duke of Marlborough’s victories in Europe would simply consolidate that imperial holding. This first stage of empire building had much to do with the ability to fight for what the British wanted and more importantly it had a lot to do with the British character which reflected the nation’s religious intolerance and commercial greed.

None was imprisoned; the survivors were allowed to resume their way of life. The Dutch Reform Church would be paramount, the courts and schools and councils would use Dutch as their first language. True, the Boers were very much part of the British Empire, but the way in which they were administered was to be left to a constitutional commission and even the original British objection to the Boers’ treatment of blacks was to be left for further discussion. Little wonder that after the ruthlessness of the conflict there was an impression that it had come to its various conclusions by gentleman’s agreement. This was the final of the wars of the British Empire. There would be further skirmishes, battles, even campaigns that were the result of Britain having had an empire – for example, the war against Mau Mau in Kenya, Communist confrontation in Malaya, indirectly anti-terrorist campaigns in Palestine and Aden and against the separatists in Cyprus.

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Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq by Ashley Jackson

British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, fixed income, full employment, out of africa, the built environment

This was a particularly important line of communication in the imperial defence system because it offered an invaluable alternative should the Suez Canal sea route ever be closed. In addition, Iraq’s RAF bases and flying-boat facilities at Basra, Habbaniya and Shaibah were key staging posts on the British Empire’s civil and military air routes.4 During the war, Shaibah served as one of four transit routes feeding the Desert Air Force and also the Soviet Union.5 Iran, meanwhile, was the British Empire’s main source of oil, and its transport network was to gain significance as a junction connecting Anglo-American military supplies to Soviet forces fighting the Germans following the launch of Adolf Hitler’s Barbarossa offensive. In the early twentieth century the Iran–Iraq region had assumed cardinal importance to Britain because of its oil.

In September 1940, for example, they considered a sweeping strategic appraisal, the ‘main thrust’ of which was an examination of ‘the factors affecting our ability to defeat Germany’.2 The access of both sides to oil was high on the list, and the main short-term threats to British interests included possible attacks on Britain itself, mounting shipping losses, the security of the Middle East and the security of Britain’s West African colonies, which contained vital resources and ports deemed ‘essential to the control of our sea communications’. Continuing its global panorama, the document noted that Malaya was ‘by no means secure’, and that Iraq and Palestine were threatened and required reinforcement as soon as possible. It was here that the British Empire’s grand strategy began to hit the buffers: The necessity for making provision for our security overseas thus postpones the time when we can hope to undertake major offensive operations . . . While it is obviously desirable to secure every part of the British Empire against enemy aggression, it is clear that, with the forces at our disposal, the allocation of defence resources to different areas must be directly related to the extent that each will contribute to the defeat of Germany.3 This was the real-life game of Risk played by policymakers, planners and regional commanders as they wrestled with the complexity created by the coincidence of global war and global empire.

They supervised the continuing arrival of Polish refugees, many of whom joined the army. The human traffic in the region remained immense, between April and September 1943, for instance, 700,000 British Empire troops passed through the transit camp at Baghdad. In mid-1944, there were still about 100,000 Indian Army servicemen in the PAIC theatre, along with the 30,000 Americans of Persian Gulf Command (PGC).103 The removal of the German threat meant that PAIC and PGC could focus unhindered on the delivery of millions of tons of military aid to the Soviet Union. It also meant that the oil upon which the British Empire depended would remain secure for the duration of the war. While allied fortunes were improving throughout 1943, the war was very far from being won, and threats to Iran and Iraq remained.

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The Anarchy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Company by William Dalrymple

British Empire, colonial rule, crony capitalism, Dava Sobel, deindustrialization, European colonialism, Fellow of the Royal Society, global reserve currency, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, land reform, lone genius, megacity, offshore financial centre, reserve currency, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, upwardly mobile

Even as Haidar was pursuing a terrified Munro back to Madras, British forces in America were already on their way to the final defeat by Washington at Yorktown, and the subsequent final surrender of British forces in America in October the following year. There was a growing sensation that everywhere the British Empire was in the process of falling apart. In Parliament, a year later, one MP noted that ‘in Europe we have lost Minorca, in America 13 provinces, and the two Pensacolas; in the West Indies, Tobago; and some settlements in Africa’.134 ‘The British Empire,’ wrote Edmund Burke, ‘is tottering to its foundation.’135 Soon Parliament was publishing a six-volume report into these failures. ‘The British purchase on India,’ one senior Company military officer told Parliament, ‘is more imaginary than real, to hold that vast territory in subjection with such a disparity of numbers.

XIV, 1912, pp. 25–7; Beckles Willson, Ledger and Sword: The Honourable Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies 1599–1874, 2 vols, London, 1903, vol. 1, pp. 19–23. 7Stevens, The Dawn of British Trade, pp. 5–6; P. J. Marshall, ‘The English in Asia to 1700’, in Nicholas Canny, The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 1, The Origins of Empire, Oxford, 1998, pp. 267–9. 8A pauper in comparison to Mughal prosperity, England was not however impoverished by north European Standards, and conducted a large and growing textile trade, largely through the Netherlands. 9Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1430–1630, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 12, 33, 256. 10Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, London, 2003, pp. 6, 7, 9; G. L. Beer, The Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578–1660, London, 1908, pp. 8–9. 11Giles Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg or, The True and Incredible Adventures of the Spice Trader Who Changed the Course of History, London, 1999, pp. 15–20. 12Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, pp. 176, 200–22, 309, 314; Ferguson, Empire, p. 58. 13National Archives of India Calendar of Persian Correspondence, intro.

., 45r. 57Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, Shuja ud-Daula, vol. 1, p. 232. 58Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, London, 1989, p. 111. 59Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan, p. 258–9. 60Ibid. 61Madec, Mémoire, p. 74. 62Fakir Khairud-Din Illahabadi, ‘Ibrat Nama, BL Or. 1932, 45v. 63Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin, vol. 2, p. 530. 64Ibid. 65The Late Reverend John Entick et al.,The Present State of the British Empire, 4 vols, London, 1774, vol. IV, p. 533. 66Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India, Cambridge, 2011, p. 3. 67Thomas Twining, Travels in India One Hundred Years Ago, London, 1983, pp. 144–5. 68For the domestic political background at this time, see James Vaughn, The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III, Princeton, 2009. 69Keay, Farzana, pp. 53, 89. 70Ghulam Hussain Khan, Seir Mutaqherin, vol. 2, pp. 583–4. 71Gentil, Mémoires sur l’Indoustan, p. 259. 72Sadasukh Dihlavi, Munkatab ut-Tawarikh, trans.

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Outposts: Journeys to the Surviving Relics of the British Empire by Simon Winchester

borderless world, British Empire, colonial rule, Corn Laws, Edmond Halley, European colonialism, illegal immigration, Khyber Pass, laissez-faire capitalism, offshore financial centre, sensible shoes, South China Sea, special economic zone, the market place

To them and to my ever-tolerant family and friends, who put up with a lot, my deepest gratitude. S. B. A. W. Iffley, Oxford August, 1986 Further Reading For anyone fortunate enough to be able to contemplate a journey to these last specks of the British Empire there are, sad to say, rather few relevant books that are worth taking. I have ploughed through scores of works that linger over the stately decline of the Empire and any number of papers that suggest fates for those islands that, for one reason or another, escaped the great retreat. But most are a little dull; I would be loath to advise any friend bound for Montserrat or Tristan; for instance, to lug along The Cambridge History of the British Empire, or Mr D. J. Morgan’s Guidance Towards Self-Government in British Colonies 1941–1971, invaluable though they were for me. So I have omitted that kind of book, meaning no disrespect to the authors.

Patrick Leigh Fermor, The Traveller’s Tree, John Murray, 1950 John Brooks, The South American Handbook, Trade and Travel Publications, updated annually THE FALKLAND ISLANDS Michael Mainwaring, From the Falklands to Patagonia, Allison and Busby, 1983 Ian Strange, The Falkland Islands, David and Charles, 1972 Natalie Goodall, Tierra del Fuego, Ushuaia, 1979 John Brooks, The South American Handbook, Trade and Travel Publications, updated annually THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES AND BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY Robert Fox, Antarctica and the South Atlantic, BBC, 1985 THE PITCAIRN ISLANDS Robert Nicolson, The Pitcaimers, Angus and Robertson, 1966 AND IN GENERAL George Woodcock, Who Killed the British Empire? Jonathan Cape, 1974 Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, Hodder and Stoughton, 1968 James Morris, Farewell the Trumpets, Faber, 1978 If there is room for just a single volume, pack the last. About the Author SIMON WINCHESTER was a geologist at Oxford and worked in Africa and on offshore oil rigs before becoming a full-time globe-trotting correspondent and writer. He lives on a small farm in the Berkshires in Massachusetts and in the Western Isles of Scotland.

Outposts Journeys to the Surviving Relics of the British Empire Simon Winchester For Elaine Contents Map Introduction 1 The Plan 2 British Indian Ocean Territory and Diego Garcia 3 Tristan 4 Gibraltar 5 Ascension Island 6 St Helena 7 Hong Kong 8 Bermuda 9 The British West Indies 10 The Falkland Islands 11 Pitcairn and Other Territories 12 Some Reflections and Conclusions Acknowledgements Further Reading About the Author Praise Other Books by Simon Winchester Copyright About the Publisher Map Introduction The world has changed a very great deal since 1984, the year during which I wrote the following affectionate, in many ways rather poignant, and on occasion sentimental account of my wanderings to and around the British-run relics of the greatest of all modern Empires.

pages: 649 words: 181,179

Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa by Martin Meredith

back-to-the-land, banking crisis, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, liberation theology, Nelson Mandela, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, trade route

‘Africa is still lying ready for us [and] it is our duty to take it . . . more territory simply means more of the Anglo-Saxon race, more of the best, the most human, most honourable race the world possesses.’ To accomplish this feat of empire-building, Rhodes proposed the formation of a secret society, similar to the Jesuit order, a society with ‘members in every part of the British Empire working with one object and one idea’; in effect, a ‘Church for the extension of the British Empire’. He described the kind of men who would make suitable recruits and outlined how they would work to ‘advocate the closer union of England and her colonies, to crush all disloyalty and every movement for the severance of our Empire’. He also proposed that the society should purchase newspapers, ‘for the press rules the mind of the people’. These ideas found their way into a will that Rhodes drew up in Kimberley in September 1877 - one of many wills that he was to write.

On a visit to Kimberley in 1877, Joseph Orpen, an Irish-born surveyor, magistrate and politician, recorded remarks Rhodes made at a dinner party he gave at his two-roomed corrugated iron cottage. Sitting at the head of the table, Rhodes began: ‘Gentlemen, I have asked you to dine . . . because I want to tell you what I want to do with the remainder of my life.’ He intended, he said, to devote it to the defence and extension of the British Empire. ‘I think that object a worthy one because the British Empire stands for the protection of all the inhabitants of a country in life, liberty, property, fair play and happiness . . . Everything is now going on happily around us. The Transvaal is much happier [since annexation] and much better off than it was and is quietly settled under government. The Free State is perfectly friendly and can join us when and if it likes.

To the consternation of the Colonial Office, as the succession of frontier wars with the Xhosa continued, this became an increasingly costly exercise. In his review of the history of British policy at the Cape published in 1853, a former colonial secretary, Earl Grey, concluded that the government’s commitment to British settlement made in 1819 on the grounds of being an economy measure proved to be among the most expensive in the annals of the British empire. What British officials found especially aggravating was that Britain had no vital interest in the Cape other than its naval facilities on the peninsula. ‘Few persons would probably dissent from the opinion that it would be far better for this country if the British territory in South Africa were confined to Cape Town and Simon’s Bay,’ observed Earl Grey. A long-serving senior Colonial Office official, James Stephen, described the Cape interior as ‘the most sterile and worthless in the whole Empire’, with no commercial significance.

pages: 767 words: 202,660

Two Georges by Richard Dreyfuss, Harry Turtledove

British Empire, citizen journalism, clean water

“And when it does, it will light our country - America, our country - and all who serve it, and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.” “My country,” Bushell answered, “is the British Empire, ruled by His Majesty the King-Emperor, Charles III. If the rest of the NAU didn’t feel the same way, the Independence Party would win elections and no one would need to read Common Sense .” “Elections are bought,” Kennedy said with a scornful sniff. “That works - for a while. But those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” “Mr. Kennedy - “ Bushell let it drop. The publisher had composed so many editorials for his magazine, he even talked like one. You’d make Kennedy’s brother the archbishop a Baptist before you convinced him the British Empire did more good than harm, and persisted for that very reason. Perhaps a straight search for information might yield something.

the fellow’s companion asked, chuckling. “There’s one I’d wager the Archbishop of Canterbury has never pondered.” Meteor Crater did not remind Thomas Bushell of a golfer’s divot. To him, it looked like a gunshot wound on the face of the world. Murders by gunfire, thankfully, were rare in the civilian world, but he’d seen more gunshot wounds than he cared to remember in his days in the Royal North American Army. The British Empire and the Franco-Spanish Holy Alliance were officially at peace, so skirmishes between the North American Union and Nueva España seldom made the newspapers or the wireless, but if you got shot in one, you died just as dead as if it had happened in the full glare of publicity. The waiter returned and went through the lounge with a silver tray. When he came to Bushell, he said, “Jameson over ice,” and handed him the glass.

“There they put the tables on gimbals, to keep the food from winding up in the passenger’s laps. And it would be a pity to waste this lovely wine on my trousers. They haven’t the palate to appreciate it.” He chuckled wheezily. Bushell raised his goblet in salute. “His Majesty, the King-Emperor!” he said. He and his companion both sipped their wine to the traditional toast heard round the world in the British Empire. “I drink to headwinds,” the fat man said, lifting his glass in turn. “If they make us late getting into New Liverpool, we shall be able to enjoy another supper in this splendid establishment.” “I shouldn’t drink to that one,” Bushell said. “I have enough work ahead of me to want to get to it as soon as I can. However - ” He paused, remembering supper the night before, then brought the goblet to his lips.

pages: 681 words: 214,967

A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East by David Fromkin

anti-communist, British Empire, colonial rule, Khartoum Gordon, Khyber Pass, MITM: man-in-the-middle, Monroe Doctrine, trade route

With the addition of Palestine and Mesopotamia, the Cape Town to Suez stretch could be linked up with the stretch of territory that ran through British-controlled Persia and the Indian Empire to Burma, Malaya, and the two great Dominions in the Pacific—Australia and New Zealand. As of 1917, Palestine was the key missing link that could join together the parts of the British Empire so that they would form a continuous chain from the Atlantic to the middle of the Pacific. The Prime Minister, of course, saw it the same way. As he wrote later, "For the British Empire, the fight with Turkey had a special importance of its own . .. The Turkish Empire lay right across the track by land or water to our great possessions in the East—India, Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Hong Kong, and the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand."12 Amery, who was about to advise the Cabinet that continued Ottoman (and thus German) control of Palestine was a future danger to the British Empire, believed, with the Prime Minister, that Palestine ought to be invaded immediately—and that Smuts was the general to do it.

Lord Curzon, who in 1918 had said that "the great power from whom we have most to fear in future is France," claimed in 1920 that "the Russian menace in the East is incomparably greater than any-thing else that has happened in my time to the British Empire."16 It was not that Russia was particularly powerful; war, revolution, and civil war had taken too great a toll for that to be true. Rather it was that the Bolsheviks were seen to be inspiring dangerous forces every-where in the East. With Russian encouragement, Djemal Pasha, Enver's colleague in the Young Turk government, went out to Afghanistan in 1920 to serve as a military adviser; and his mission illuminated what the British government most feared. The C.U.P., the continued influence of Germany even in defeat, pan-Islam, Bolshevism, Russia—all had come together and were poised to swoop down upon the British Empire at its greatest points of vulnerability. Thus the Soviets were supporting Persian nationalism against Britain.

Just as Britain's Middle Eastern policy had led France to re-evaluate and eventually to repudiate her alliance with Britain, so now France's policy caused the leaders of the British Empire to look at France through new and apprehensive eyes. A short time later the Prime Minister of South Africa wrote to the then Prime Minister of Britain that "France is once more the leader of the Continent with all the bad old instincts fully alive in her . . . The French are out for world power; they have played the most dangerous anti-ally game with Kemal; and inevitably in the course of their ambitions they must come to realise that the British Empire is the only remaining enemy."33 Another unnerving aspect of the crisis was the apparently reckless conduct of the inner group in the Cabinet: Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Home, and the Conservative leader Austen Chamberlain.

Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination by Adom Getachew

agricultural Revolution, Bretton Woods, British Empire, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, failed state, financial independence, Gunnar Myrdal, land reform, land tenure, liberal world order, market fundamentalism, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, structural adjustment programs, trade liberalization, transatlantic slave trade

But while these anti-­imperialists formulated the connections between war and empire by drawing attention to the global scramble for colonies fueled by finance capital and led by the British, Smuts refashioned the argument to absolve the British Empire of the aggression and rapaciousness that led to war. In Smuts’s account it was the Ottoman and German Empires, the “old Empires” constituted on the basis of “inequality and the bondage and oppression of the smaller national units” and grounded in theories of centralized sovereignty, that had contributed to the war.75 The British Empire, based on the “principles of national freedom and political decentralization,” was exempt from this destructive imperialism and as a result could be the model for the new League of Nations. It was, Smuts argued, a “lesser league,” a miniature form of what the international order could look like in the aftermath of war. Despite the hierarchies between the metropole, the dominions, and dependencies, Smuts argued that the British Empire realized the principles of freedom and equality.

In a 1933 essay marking the centenary of emancipation in the West Indies, James urged the British Empire to once again take the lead in the international struggle against slavery. While he mentioned that forced labor and slavery were practiced throughout the colonized world including within the British Empire, he named China, Arabia, Ethiopia, and Liberia as places where slavery remained deeply entrenched.164 Despite being in the midst of researching the Haitian Revolution, James argued that the path toward emancipation for the five million slaves lay in appealing to the conscience of the British public and government in order to force the League of Nations to act.165 By 1936, James, now embracing Trotskyism, abandoned his faith in the British Empire and the league. He argued that the invasion of Ethiopia taught a lesson to “Africans and people of African descent, especially those who have been poisoned by British imperialist education.”

., 279. 173. Padmore quoted in ibid., 279–­80. Chapter Three: From Principle to Right 1. Antonio Cassese, Self-­Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 37. Churchill would famously declare in 1941 that he had not become “the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation notes to ch a pter thr ee [ 199 ] of the British Empire.” Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 26. 2. Charter of the United Nations, troductory-note/index.html, accessed June 15, 2017. 3. West African Press Delegation, The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa: Memorandum on Post-­war Reconstruction of the Colonies and Protectorates of British West Africa (London: West Africa Press Delegation to Britain, 1943). 4.

pages: 618 words: 180,430

The Making of Modern Britain by Andrew Marr

anti-communist, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, business climate, Corn Laws, Etonian, garden city movement, illegal immigration, imperial preference, Kickstarter, lateral thinking, New Journalism, New Urbanism, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Red Clydeside, rent control, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, V2 rocket, wage slave, women in the workforce

He then trickily cajoled both his cabinet’s hard-line free traders and Chamberlain into resigning, and survived himself, undignified but placid, for longer than seemed possible. Just as the row was hotting up, Churchill wrote to a constituent: It would seem to me a fantastic policy to endeavour to shut the British Empire in a ringed fence. It is very large, and there are a good many things which can be produced in it, but the world is larger & produces some better things than can be found in the British Empire. Why should we deny ourselves the good and varied merchandise which the traffic of the world offers . . . Our planet is not a very big one compared with the other celestial bodies, and I see no particular reason why we should endeavour to make inside our planet a smaller planet called the British Empire, cut off by impassable space from everything else. Churchill had but recently returned from making money in America, and had an American mother, but it was not self-interest that led him to worry in another letter, this time to a free-trade Tory in Chamberlain’s back yard, that a tariff wall would cut off Britain from the United States if it ever came to a European war: ‘I do not want a self-contained Empire.’17 For a man often caricatured as a simple-minded imperial jingo in his earlier career, it was a lucid and noble argument which would soon lead Churchill to desert not just Chamberlain – who was hurt by Winston’s defection – but the Conservative Party itself.

Index abdication crisis (1936) ref1, ref2 Abyssinia ref1 Addison Act (1919) ref1 Addison, Christopher ref1 adultery ref1 advertising ref1 air races ref1 air travel ref1 arguments over airspace ref1, ref2 early passenger services ref1 establishment of Imperial Airways and routes ref1 and flying boats ref1 air-raid protection (ARP) wardens ref1 aircraft production ref1 and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Aitken, Sir Max see Beaverbrook, Lord Alexander, Sir Harold ref1, ref2 Alexandra, Queen ref1, ref2 Allenby, General ref1, ref2 Amritsar massacre (1919) ref1 Anglo-Persian Oil Company ref1 anti-communist organizations ref1 anti-Semitism ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Anti-Slavery Society ref1 appeasement ref1, ref2 arguments for ref1 Chamberlain’s meeting with Hitler ref1 and Halifax’s visit to Germany ref1 and Munich ref1 public support for ref1, ref2 Arab revolt (1917) ref1, ref2 architecture ref1, ref2, ref3 aristocracy ref1, ref2 defending of position against House of Lords reform ref1 in economic retreat ref1 and far-right politics ref1 Lloyd George’s attacks on ref1, ref2 post-war ref1 selling of estates ref1, ref2 Armistice Day ref1 Armour, G.D. ref1 Arnim, Elizabeth von ref1 art: Edwardian ref1 inter-war ref1, ref2 Artists’ Rifles ref1 Asquith, Helen (first wife) ref1 Asquith, Herbert ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 downfall ref1, ref2 and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and Home Rule ref1 and House of Lords reform ref1, ref2 loses seat in 1918 election ref1 and loss of son ref1 marriages ref1, ref2 and press ref1 relationship with Venetia Stanley ref1 succession as prime minister ref1 and tariff reform ref1, ref2 and women’s suffrage ref1, ref2 Asquith, Margot (second wife) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Asquith, Raymond (son) ref1 Asquith, Violet (daughter) ref1 Ataturk, Kemal ref1 Atlantic Charter ref1 Attlee, Clement ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Auchinleck, General Claude ref1, ref2 Audemars, Edmond ref1 Australia and First World War ref1 Automobile Association ref1 Automobile Club ref1 Aveling, Edward ref1 back-to-nature movement ref1 Baden-Powell, Sir Robert ref1, ref2 Balcon, Michael ref1 Baldwin, Stanley ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 and abdication crisis ref1, ref2, ref3 and broadcasting ref1 characteristics ref1 and Churchill ref1 conflict with Rothermere and Beaverbrook ref1, ref2 and General Strike ref1, ref2 and India ref1 and Lloyd George ref1 and protectionism ref1 resignation ref1 succession as prime minister ref1 Balfour, A.J. ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Balfour, Betty ref1 Balfour Declaration (1917) ref1 Bank of England ref1, ref2, ref3 banks ref1 Barnes, Fred ref1 Barry, Sir John Wolfe ref1 Basset Hound Club Rules and Studbook ref1, ref2 Battle of the Atlantic ref1, ref2 Battle of Britain ref1 Battle of the Somme (film) ref1 battleships ref1 see also Dreadnoughts Bauhaus movement ref1 Bax, Arnold ref1 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) ref1, ref2 and abdication crisis ref1 creation ref1 development under Reith ref1, ref2 early announcers and tone of voice ref1 and General Strike (1926) ref1 receives first Royal Charter (1927) ref1 and Second World War ref1 ‘BBC English’ ref1 beach holidays ref1 Beamish, Henry Hamilton ref1 Beatty, Admiral David ref1, ref2, ref3 Beaufort, Duke of ref1 Beaverbrook, Lord (Max Aitken) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 Beck, Harry ref1 Beckwith-Smith, Brigadier ref1 BEF (British Expeditionary Force) and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3 Belgian Congo ref1 Bell, Bishop ref1 Belloc, Hilaire ref1 Benn, Tony ref1 Bennett, Arnold ref1 Whom God Hath Joined ref1 Benz, Karl ref1 Beresford, Lord Charles ref1 Besant, Annie ref1 Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor ref1, ref2 Bevan, Nye ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Beveridge, William ref1, ref2 Bevin, Ernie ref1, ref2 Billings, Pemberton ref1 ‘bird flu’ ref1 birth control see contraception Bismarck ref1 black Americans arrival in Britain during Second World War ref1 Black and Tans ref1 Blackshirts ref1, ref2, ref3 Blake, Robert ref1 Bland, Hubert ref1, ref2 Bland, Rosamund ref1 Blast (magazine) ref1 Blatchford, Robert ref1, ref2 Bletchley Park ref1 Bluebird Garage ref1 Blunt, Wilfred Scawen ref1, ref2 ‘Bob’s your uncle’ phrase ref1 Boer War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 Boggart Hole riot (Manchester) (1906) ref1, ref2 Bolsheviks ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 Bomber Command ref1, ref2 ‘Bomber Harris’ see Harris, Sir Arthur Bonar Law, Andrew ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 Booth, Charles ref1, ref2 Boothby, Bob ref1 Bottomley, Horatio ref1 Bowser, Charlie ref1 Boy Scouts see scouting movement Boys Brigade ref1 Bradlaugh, Charles ref1 Braithwaite, W.J. ref1 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918) ref1 Bristol Hippodrome ref1 British Broadcasting Corporation see BBC British Empire ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 British Empire Exhibition (1924) ref1 British Empire Union ref1 British Eugenics Education Society ref1 British Expeditionary Force see BEF British Gazette ref1, ref1 British Grand Prix ref1 British Legion ref1 British Union of Fascists see BUF Britons, The ref1 Brittain, Vera ref1 Britten, Benjamin ref1 broadcasting ref1 see also BBC Brooke, Sir Alan ref1, ref2, ref3 Brooke, Raymond ref1 Brooke, Rupert ref1 Brown, Gordon ref1 Brownshirts ref1 Buchan, John Prestor John ref1 BUF (British Union of Fascists) ref1, ref2, ref3 Burma ref1 Butler, R.A. ref1, ref2 Cable Street, Battle of (1936) ref1, ref2 Cadogan, Sir Alexander ref1 Cambrai, Battle of (1917) ref1 Campbell, Donald ref1 Campbell, Malcolm ref1 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry ref1, ref2 camping and caravanning ref1 Camping Club of Great Britain and Ireland ref1 Canterbury, Archbishop of ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Carnarvon, Lord ref1 cars ref1, ref2, ref3 benefits of ref1 developments in ref1, ref2 first accident involving a pedestrian and ref1 Fordist mass-production ref1 motorists’ clothing ref1 rise in number of during Edwardian era ref1 Carson, Edward ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 Casement, Sir Roger ref1, ref2 Cat and Mouse Act ref1 cavity magnetron ref1 Cecil, Hugh ref1 CEMA ref1 censorship Second World War ref1, ref2 Chamberlain, Arthur ref1 Chamberlain, Joe ref1 background and early political career ref1 and Boer War ref1 breaks away from Liberals ref1 characteristics ref1 fame of ref1 sets up Liberal Unionist organization ref1 stroke ref1, ref2 and tariff reform debate ref1, ref2, ref3 Chamberlain, Neville ref1, ref2, ref3 and appeasement ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 as Chancellor ref1 and Churchill ref1 downfall and resignation ref1, ref2 failure of diplomacy towards Hitler ref1 and Munich ref1 and Second World War ref1, ref2 Channel Islands ref1 Channon, Sir Henry (‘Chips’) ref1 Chaplin, Charlie ref1, ref2 Chatsworth ref1 Chequers ref1 Cherwell, Lord (Frederick Lindemann) ref1 Cheshire, Leonard ref1 Chesterton, G.K. ref1, ref2 Childers, Erskine execution of by IRA ref1 The Riddle of the Sands ref1 Chindits ref1 Christie, Agatha ref1, ref2 Churchill, Clementine ref1 Churchill, Randolph ref1, ref2 Churchill, Winston ref1, ref2 and abdication crisis ref1 as air minister ref1 anti-aristocracy rhetoric ref1 at Board of Trade ref1 and Boer War ref1 and Bolsheviks ref1 and bombing of German cities during Second World War ref1 and Chamberlain ref1 as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Baldwin ref1 and Empire theatre protest ref1 and eugenics ref1, ref2 as First Lord of the Admiralty and build-up of navy ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 and Gallipoli campaign ref1 and General Strike ref1, ref2 and George V ref1 and German invasion threat prior to First World War ref1 and Hitler ref1, ref2 and Home Rule ref1, ref2, ref3 and India ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and Lloyd George ref1, ref2, ref3 loses seat in 1922 election ref1 political views and belief in social reform ref1 public calls for return to government ref1 rejoins Tory Party ref1 relationship with Fisher ref1 relationship with United States during Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 resignation over India (1931) ref1 and return to gold standard ref1, ref2 and Rowntree’s book on poverty ref1 and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13 and Sidney Street siege ref1 speeches during Second World War ref1, ref2 steps to becoming Prime Minister ref1 suffragette attack on ref1 and tariff reform ref1, ref2 threatening of European peace by Hitler warning and calls for rearmament ref1, ref2, ref3 and Tonypandy miners’ strike (1910) ref1 cinema ref1 Citizens’ Army ref1 City of London Imperial Volunteers ref1 civil service ref1 Clark, Alan The Donkeys ref1 Clark, Sir Kenneth ref1, ref2 Clarke, Tom ref1 class distinctions in Edwardian Britain ref1 divisions within army during First World War ref1 impact of Second World War on ref1, ref2 and politics in twenties ref1 clothing motorists’ ref1 and Second World War ref1 and status in Edwardian Britain ref1 in twenties ref1 Clydebank, bombing of ref1 Clydeside ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 coal miners strike (1912) ref1 Coliseum (London) ref1 Collins, Michael ref1, ref2, ref3 Colville, Jock ref1, ref2, ref3 Common Wealth ref1, ref2 Communist Party of Great Britain ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 communist revolution, fear of ref1 communists ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Conan Doyle, Arthur ref1, ref2 The Hound of the Baskervilles ref1 Concorde ref1, ref2, ref3 Congo Reform Association ref1 Connolly, James ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Connor, William (‘Cassandra’) ref1 Conrad, Joseph ref1, ref2 Heart of Darkness ref1 The Secret Agent ref1 conscientious objectors First World War ref1 Second World War ref1 Conservatives ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12 contraception ref1, ref2, ref3 Coolidge, President Calvin ref1, ref2 Cooper, Duff ref1, ref2, ref3 Corrigan, Gordon ref1 Coventry, bombing of ref1, ref2 Coward, Nöel ref1 crash (1929) ref1, ref2 Cripps, Sir Stafford ref1, ref2 Crookes, Sir William ref1 Crooks, Will ref1 Crystal Palace fire (1936) ref1 Curzon, Lord ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Czechoslovakia ref1, ref2 Dacre, Harry ref1 Daily Express ref1, ref2, ref3 Daily Mail ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Ideal Home Exhibition ref1 Northcliffe’s article on shells crisis during war ref1 Daily Mirror ref1, ref2 Daimler, Gottfried ref1 ‘Daisy, Daisy, Give Me Your Answer Do’ ref1, ref2 Darwin, Charles ref1 Darwin, Erasmus ref1 Darwin, Major Leonard ref1 Davidson, J.C.C. ref1, ref2 Davison, Emily Wilding ref1 Davos Ski Club ref1 De Havilland ref1 De La Warr Seaside Pavilion (Bexhill) ref1 de Nyevelt, Baron de Zuylen ref1 de Valera, Eamon ref1, ref2, ref3 Debrett’s Peerage ref1 Defence of the Realm Act see DORA Dickens, Charles ref1 Dimond, Phyllis ref1 distributism ref1 Distributist League ref1 ditchers ref1, ref2 divorce ref1 Divorce Law Reform Association ref1 Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers’ Union ref1 dockers’ strikes ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Doenitz, Admiral ref1 DORA (Defence of the Realm Act) ref1, ref2, ref3 Douglas, Clifford ref1 Dowding, Sir Hugh ‘Stuffy’ ref1, ref2 Dreadnoughts ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Dresden, bombing of (1945) ref1 drug taking, in twenties ref1 Dunkirk ref1, ref2, ref3 Dunlop, John Boyd ref1 Dyer, General ref1 Easter Rising (1916) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Eckersley, Peter ref1, ref2, ref3 economy and gold standard ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 impact of crash (1929) ref1 post-First World War ref1, ref2 Eden, Anthony ref1, ref2, ref3 Edinburgh Castle pub (London) ref1 Edmunds, Henry ref1 education Edwardian era ref1 inter-war years ref1, ref2 Education Act (1902) ref1 Edward VII, King ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Edward VIII, King ref1 abdication ref1, ref2 affair with Mrs Dudley Ward ref1 enthusiasm for Nazi Germany ref1 love for Wallis Simpson ref1, ref2 and social reform ref1 Egypt ref1, ref2, ref3 Eighth Army ref1, ref2 Eisenhower, General ref1 El-Alamein, Battle of ref1, ref2 elections (1906) ref1 (1910) ref1, ref2 (1918) ref1 (1922) ref1, ref2 (1923) ref1 (1924) ref1 (1931) ref1 (1935) ref1 Elgar, Sir Edward ref1 Eliot, T.S. ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 ‘Burnt Norton’ ref1 The Wasteland ref1 Ellis, Havelock ref1 emigration Edwardian era ref1 inter-war years ref1 Empire Day ref1 Empire theatre (London) ref1 Enigma ref1, ref2 ENSA (Entertainments National Service Association) ref1 eugenics ref1 evolution ref1 explorers ref1 Fabian Society ref1, ref2, ref3 Fairey Battle bombers ref1, ref2 fascism ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 see also BUF Fawcett, Millicent Garrett ref1, ref2 Feisal, Emir ref1, ref2 Fenians ref1 film industry see cinema Film Society ref1 finger prints ref1 Finland ref1 First World War (1914) ref1, ref2 aftermath ref1 and alcohol ref1 Balkans campaign ref1 Baltic plan ref1 and Battle of Jutland ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and BEF ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 British blockade of Germany ref1, ref2, ref3 and burial of the Unknown Soldier ref1 class divisions in army ref1 collapse of German army ref1 comparison with Second World War ref1 conscription ref1; criticism of by UDC ref2 Dardanelles campaign ref1, ref2, ref3 death toll and casualties ref1, ref2, ref3 early military failures ref1 and film industry ref1 and Fisher ref1 food shortages and rationing ref1 formation of coalition government ref1, ref2 French campaign ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Gallipoli campaign ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 German raids ref1 and Haig ref1 impact of on British people ref1 and Middle East ref1 munitions factories ref1 Orpen’s paintings of ref1 and Passchendaele ref1 post-war attack on military chiefs ref1 post-war impact of ref1 preparations for ref1 and press/journalists ref1 public support for ref1 recruitment ref1, ref2 revisionists and ref1 Sassoon’s protest at ref1 scenario if Germany had won ref1 at sea ref1 seeking alternative strategies to Flanders campaign ref1 shells crisis and Daily Mail article ref1 sinking of German battleships by Germany at end of ref1 sinking of Lusitania ref1 slaughter in ref1 steps leading to and reasons for Britain’s declaration of war on Germany ref1 struggle to comprehend meaning of ref1 surrender of Germany ref1; trench warfare ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 U-boat campaign ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 and United States ref1, ref2, ref3 use of convoys ref1 use of horses ref1 and women ref1, ref2 Fisher, First Sea Lord ‘Jackie’ ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Fleming, Sir Alexander ref1 Fleury ref1 flying boats ref1 flying circuses ref1 folk dancing ref1 food imports ref1 Foot, Michael ref1 Ford, Ford Madox ref1 Ford, Henry ref1, ref2 Forde, Florrie ref1 Formby, George ref1 ref2 43 (nightclub) ref1, ref2 France and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3 franchise ref1 and women ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 free trade ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 French, Sir John ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 Fyfe, Hamilton ref1, ref2 gaiety, in twenties ref1 Gallacher, William ref1 Gallipoli crisis ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Galsworthy, John ref1 Galton, Francis ref1, ref2 gambling ref1 Gandhi, Mohandas ref1, ref2 garages ref1 garden cities ref1, ref2 Gardiner, Rolf ref1 Garnett, Theresa ref1 Garsington Manor ref1 Gaumont Palaces ref1 Gawthorpe, Nellie ref1 General Strike (1926) ref1, ref2, ref3 and BBC ref1 gentlemen’s clubs ref1 George III, King ref1 George IV, King ref1, ref2 George V, King ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10 George VI, King ref1 German Naval Law (1912) ref1 Germany ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 of (1914) ref1 building of battleships ref1 early state-welfare system ref1 and eugenics ref1 fear of invasion by in Edwardian Britain ref1 and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 national welfare system ref1 navy ref1 and planned Irish uprising ref1 and Versailles Treaty ref1 Wandervogel youth groups ref1 see also Second World War ‘GI brides’ ref1 Gibbon, Lewis Grassic ref1, ref2 Gibbs, Philip ref1, ref2, ref3 Gibson, Guy ref1 Gifford, Grace ref1 Gill, Eric ref1 GIs ref1 Gladstone, William ref1, ref2 Glasgow ‘forty hours strike’ (1919) ref1 Goering, Hermann Wilhelm ref1, ref2 gold standard ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Gort, Field Marshal ref1 Gough, General Hubert ref1, ref2 Graf Spee ref1 Graves, Robert ref1 Goodbye to All That ref1 Grayson, Victor ref1, ref2 Great Depression ref1, ref2 Great War see First World War Greece and Second World War ref1 Greenshirts (Social Credit) ref1, ref2, ref3 Gregory, Maundy ref1, ref2, ref3 Gresley, Sir Nigel ref1 Grey, Sir Edward ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Grieve, Christopher Murray see McDiarmid, Hugh Grigg, John ref1 Guest, Freddy ref1, ref2 Guilty Men ref1 Gunn, Neil ref1 guns and Edwardian Britain ref1 Haggard, Sir Rider ref1 Haig, Sir Douglas ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Halifax, Lord (Irwin) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Handley Page, Frederick ref1, ref2 Hanfstaengel, Ernst ‘Putzi’ ref1 Hankey, Maurice ref1 Hannington, Wal ref1 Hardie, Keir ref1, ref2, ref3 Hardy, Thomas ref1 Hargrave, John ref1, ref2, ref3 Harmsworth, Alfred see Northcliffe, Lord Harmsworth, Harold see Rothermere, Lord Harris, Sir Arthur (‘Bomber Harris’) ref1, ref2 Harrisson, Tom ref1 Hart, Basil Liddell ref1 Hastings, Max ref1 headwear ref1 hedgers ref1, ref2 Henderson, Arthur ref1 Henderson, Sir Nevile ref1 Hepworth, Cecil ref1 Hindenburg, General ref1 Hipper, Admiral ref1, ref2 Hippodrome (London) ref1 Hitchcock, Alfred ref1 Hitler, Adolf ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 appeasement towards ref1 and Churchill ref1, ref2 and Edward VIII ref1 and Halifax visit ref1 and Lloyd George ref1 and Munich meeting ref1 and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 suicide of ref1 support of by ‘Cliveden set’ ref1 and Unity Mitford ref1, ref2 Ho Chi Minh ref1 Hobhouse, Emily ref1 Hoesch, Leopold von ref1 Holden, Charles ref1 Hollywood ref1 Holtzendorff, Admiral Henning von ref1 Home Guard ref1, ref2, ref3 Home Rule (Ireland) ref1, ref2 honours selling for cash by Lloyd George ref1 Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act (1925) ref1 Hood (battleship) ref1 Hoover Building ref1 Hore-Belisha, Leslie ref1 Houdini, Harry ref1 House of Lords ref1 reform of by Liberals ref1, ref2 housing ref1, ref2, ref3 Housing Manual (1919) ref1 Howard, Ebenezer ref1 Howard, Peter ref1 Hughes, Billy ref1 hunger marches ref1 Hurricanes ref1, ref2 ‘Hymn of Hate’ ref1 Hyndman, Henry ref1 Ibn Saud ref1 illegitimacy ref1 Illustrated London News ref1, ref2, ref3 immigration Edwardian Britain ref1 inter-war years ref1 Immigration Act (1924) (US) ref1 Imperial Airways ref1 income tax ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Independent Labour Party (ILP) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 India ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Indian National Congress ref1 industry Second World War ref1 Victorian Britain ref1 Inskip, Sir Thomas ref1 Instone ref1 International Brigade ref1 International Congress of Eugenics ref1 International Fascist League ref1 ‘ Invasion of 1910, The’ ref1 invasion fear of in Edwardian Britain ref1 IRA (Irish Republican Army) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Iraq ref1, ref2, ref3 Ireland ref1 civil war (1922) ref1 a nd Easter Rising (1916) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 and First World War ref1 formation of independent Da´il in southern ref1 and Home Rule ref1, ref2 and Second World War ref1 war against British and negotiation of peace treaty (1921) ref1 Irish nationalists ref1, ref2, ref3 Irish Republican Army see IRA Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Irish Volunteers ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Ironside, Lord ref1 Irwin, Lord see Halifax, Lord Islam ref1 Ismay, General ref1 Italian futurists ref1 Italians interment of during Second World War ref1 ‘ It’s a Long Way to Tipperary’ ref1 Jackson, Derek ref1 James, Henry ref1, ref2 Japanese and Second World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Jarrow Crusade (1936) ref1 jazz ref1 Jellicoe, John ref1, ref2, ref3 Jerusalem ref1 Jewish People’s Council Against Fascism ref1 Jews ref1, ref2 see also anti-Semitism ‘ jingo’ ref1 Johnston, Edward ref1 Johnston, Tom ref1 journalism ref1 see also press Joyce, James ref1 Joynson-Hicks, Sir William ref1, ref2 Jutland, Battle of ref1, ref2, ref3 Kandahar Ski Club ref1 Karno, Fred ref1 Keating, Sean ref1 Kemal, Mustapha ref1 Kendall, Mary ref1 Kennedy, Joseph ref1 Kenney, Annie ref1 Kent, Duke of ref1 Keppel, Alice ref1 Key, Edith ref1 Keynes, John Maynard ref1, ref2, ref3 Kibbo Kift ref1, ref2, ref3 Kinship in Husbandry ref1 Kipling, Rudyard ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Kitchener, Lord ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11 Knight, John ref1 Krupskaya, Nadezhda ref1 Labour Party ref1, ref1, ref1, ref1, ref1, ref1, ref1, ref1 Labour Representation Committee ref1, ref2 Lancastria, bombing of ref1 Land Army girls ref1 land speed records ref1 Landsdowne House ref1 Landsdowne, Lord ref1, ref2 Lane, Allen ref1 Lansbury, George ref1 Larkin, James ref1 Laszlo, Philip de ref1 Lauder, Harry ref1, ref2, ref3 Lawrence, D.H. ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Lawrence, Katie ref1 Lawrence, T.E. ref1, ref2, ref3 Le Queux, William ref1 League of Isis ref1 League of Nations ref1, ref2 Lebanon ref1 Lee, Arthur ref1 Leeper, Reginald ref1 Leese, Arnold ref1 Left Book Club ref1 Leigh-Mallory, Air Vice Marshal ref1 Lenin, Vladimir ref1, ref2, ref3 Lenton, Lilian ref1 Leopold, King of Belgium ref1 Letchworth ref1, ref2 Lewis, Rosa ref1 Liberal Party ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Liberal Unionist organization ref1 Liddell-Hart, Basil ref1 Lissauer, Ernst ref1 literature ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Little Tich ref1 Liverpool strikes ref1 Liverpool Mersey Tunnel ref1 Llanfrothen Burial Case ref1 Lloyd George, David ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 anti-landlord rhetoric ref1, ref2 and Boer War ref1, ref2 as Chancellor of the Exchequer ref1 in charge of munitions ref1, ref2 and Churchill ref1, ref2, ref3 downfall ref1, ref2 and First World War ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 and Hitler ref1 hostility towards Haig ref1 and Ireland ref1 Orange Book ref1 and People’s Budget ref1, ref2 personal life ref1 political career ref1 as prime minister and wartime regime under ref1, ref2, ref3 rise to power ref1, ref2 and Second World War ref1 selling of honours for cash ref1 share dealing ref1 and tariff reform debate ref1 vision of welfare system ref1 visit to Germany ref1 wins 1918 election ref1, ref2 and women’s vote ref1 Lloyd, Marie ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Lockyer, Sir Norman ref1 London ref1 fog in Edwardian era ref1 music halls ref1 as refuge for revolutionaries abroad in Edwardian era ref1 London Blitz ref1 London Pavilion theatre ref1 London Transport ref1 London Underground map ref1 Loos, Battle of ref1 Lubetkin, Berthold ref1 Ludendorff ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Luftwaffe ref1, ref2, ref3 Lunn, Arnold ref1, ref2 Lunn, Sir Henry ref1 Lusitania ref1 Lynn, Vera ref1 MacColl, Ewan ref1 MacCormick, John ref1, ref2 McDiarmid, Hugh (Grieve) ref1 MacDonagh, Michael ref1 MacDonald, Ramsay ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 background ref1 and formation of National Government ref1, ref2 and Mosley ref1 vilification of ref1, ref2 MacInnes, Colin ref1 McKenna, Reginald ref1 Mackenzie, Compton ref1, ref2 Maclean, John ref1, ref2 Macmillan, Harold ref1 McNabb, Father Vincent ref1 McShane, Harry ref1 Madoff, Bernard ref1 ‘mafficking’ ref1 Major, John ref1 Malins, Geoffrey ref1 Mallard locomotive ref1 ‘Manchester Rambler, The’ ref1 Manners, Lady Diana ref1, ref2 marching ref1 Marconi, Guglielmo ref1 Marconi scandal (1911) ref1 Markiewicz, Countess ref1, ref2 Marlborough, Duke of ref1 Martin, Captain D.L. ref1 Marx, Eleanor ref1 Marx, Karl ref1 Mass Observation system ref1, ref2 Matcham, Frank ref1 Maude, Aylmer ref1 Maurice, Sir Frederick ref1 Maxse, Leo ref1, ref2 Maxton, Jimmy ref1, ref2 May, Phil ref1 medical science ref1 Melba, Dame Nellie ref1 Melbourne, Lord ref1 memorials ref1 Mendelsohn, Erich ref1 metro-land ref1 Meyrick, Kate ref1, ref2, ref3 Middle Classes Union ref1 Middle East ref1, ref2 Mill, John Stuart ref1 Millais, Sir John Everett ref1 Milner, Lord ref1, ref2, ref3 miners dispute (1926) ref1, ref2 Mitchell, Hannah ref1 The Hard Way Up ref1 Mitchell, Reginald ref1, ref2, ref3 Mitford, Deborah ref1 Mitford, Diana see Mosley, Diana Mitford girls ref1 Mitford, Jessica ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Mitford, Nancy ref1, ref2 Wigs on the Green ref1 Mitford, Pamela ref1 Mitford, Tom ref1 Mitford, Unity ref1, ref2, ref3 modernism ref1, ref2, ref3 Montacute House (Somerset) ref1 Montagu, Edwin ref1, ref2, ref3 Montgomery, General Bernard ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Morel, Edmund ref1, ref2 Morrel, Ottoline ref1, ref2 Morris, William (car maker) ref1, ref2 Morris, William (craftsman) ref1 Morrison, Herbert ref1, ref2 Morton, Desmond ref1 Morton, E.V. ref1 Mosley, Cimmie (first wife) ref1, ref2 Mosley, Diana (née Mitford) (second wife) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Mosley, Oswald ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 and anti-Semitism ref1 background and early life ref1 and Battle of Cable Street ref1 and fascism ref1 funding from Mussolini ref1 imprisonment ref1 launching of British Union of Fascists ref1 and MacDonald ref1 marriage to Diana Mitford ref1 and New Party ref1 and Olympia riot (1934) ref1 plans and ideas ref1 resignation from Labour ref1 and Rothermere ref1 Muir, Edwin ref1, ref2 Munich ref1 Munnings, Alfred ref1 Murdoch, Rupert ref1 Murray, Lord ref1 music ref1, ref2 music hall ref1 Mussolini, Benito ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 national debt, post-war ref1 National Government ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 National Insurance Bill (1911) ref1 National Party of Scotland ref1 National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM) ref1 National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) ref1 navy see Royal Navy Navy League ref1 Nazi Germany ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 see also Hitler, Adolf Nehru, Jawaharlal ref1 Nesbit, Edith (Daisy) ref1, ref2, ref3 The Amulet ref1 Five Children and It ref1 The Railway Children ref1 Nevill, Captain ref1 New Party ref1, ref2 newspapers see press Nicholson, William ref1, ref2 nightclubs ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 1922 committee ref1 Nivelle, General ref1, ref2 No-Conscription Fellowship ref1 Nordics ref1 Norman, Sir Montagu ref1, ref2, ref3 Northcliffe, Lord (Alfred Harmsworth) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 background ref1 and Daily Mail ref1 Daily Mail article on shells shortage ref1 and downfall of Asquith ref1 last days and death ref1 Motor Cars and Driving ref1 northern industrial cities, decline of ref1 Northern Ireland ref1 see also Ireland Norway and Second World War ref1, ref2 nostalgia ref1 nuclear bomb ref1, ref2 nudism ref1 O’Connor, General ref1, ref2 Ogilvie-Grant, Mark ref1 Olympia Garage ref1 organic food movement ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Orpen, William ref1, ref2 Orwell, George ref1, ref2, ref3 Homage to Catalonia ref1 The Road to Wigan Pier ref1 Ottoman Empire ref1, ref2, ref3 outdoors ref1 Owen, Frank ref1 Owen, Wilfred ref1, ref2, ref3 Oxford Automobile Company ref1 Oxford Union debate (1933) ref1, ref2 Paget, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur ref1, ref2 Palace Theatre (London) ref1 Palestine ref1 Panahards ref1, ref2 Pankhurst, Adela ref1 Pankhurst, Christabel ref1, ref2, ref3 Pankhurst, Emmeline ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Pankhurst, Sylvia ref1 paperbacks ref1 Paris peace conference ref1, ref2 Park, Keith ref1 Parliament during Second World War ref1 Passchendaele ref1 Patton, General ref1, ref2 Peace Pledge Union ref1, ref2 Pearl Harbor ref1, ref2, ref3 Pearse, Padraig ref1, ref2 Pearson, George ref1 peerages ref1 selling for cash ref1 peers ref1 Penguin Books ref1 pensions ref1 People’s Budget (1909) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Pétain, Marshal ref1 pianos ref1 Pick, Frank ref1 Piper, John ref1 Pistols Act (1903) ref1 Plunkett, Joseph ref1, ref2 Plymouth, bombing of ref1 political extremism ref1 Ponzi, Charles ref1 Poor Law Guardians ref1, ref2 poor/poverty ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Rowntree’s investigation and book on conditions in York ref1 Pound, Ezra ref1, ref2, ref3 Cantos ref1 Powell, Enoch ref1 Powys, John Cowper ref1, ref2 Preece, Sir W.H. ref1 press ref1, ref2 and abdication crisis ref1 and Daily Mail ref1 destruction of Liberal government by ref1 and First World War ref1 see also Beaverbrook, Lord; Northcliffe, Lord; Rothermere, Lord Price, G.

The corn fields of Sussex had been out-shouted by the terraces of Oldham. But shrewd observers knew that once a tax on imported corn was announced in spring 1902 to help pay for the Boer War, the argument for a much larger wall around the British Empire was bound to return. Chamberlain had spent much of the past decade worriedly observing Germany, whose industry, prosperity and social welfare had been built up behind high tariff walls; the same was true of France and Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire; America’s tariffs were even higher, and her growth was even faster. So perhaps it was now time to accept that the world was one of rival trade blocks, and build a barrier round the British Empire too? Real wages were stagnating and British industry was growing too slowly. Chamberlain proposed that food should come in cheaply from South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and Australia; anything else should be taxed severely.

The Ages of Globalization by Jeffrey D. Sachs

Admiral Zheng, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, Columbian Exchange, Commentariolus, coronavirus, COVID-19, Covid-19, cuban missile crisis, decarbonisation, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, domestication of the camel, Donald Trump,, endogenous growth, European colonialism, global supply chain, greed is good, income per capita, invention of agriculture, invention of gunpowder, invention of movable type, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, John von Neumann, joint-stock company, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, mass immigration, Nikolai Kondratiev, out of africa, packet switching, Pax Mongolica, precision agriculture, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, South China Sea, spinning jenny, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, Turing machine, Turing test, urban planning, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, wikimedia commons

Let’s consider the size of the combined Anglo-American economy as a share of the world (figure 7.6), adding together the British Empire and the United States. For this purpose, I define the British Empire to mean Britain and sixteen colonial possessions for which Maddison provides estimates of GDP during the nineteenth century. The largest of the colonial possessions were Ireland until 1922, Canada and Australia until 1931, and India until 1947. As of 1820, the British Empire accounted for around 6 percent of the world’s output. By 1870, by dint of Britain’s own industrialization and its expanded imperial holdings, the British Empire accounted for around 23 percent of the world economy, of which the United Kingdom itself was around 9 percent. The British Empire remained around 20 percent of the world economy until 1918, then began to decline with the independence of various colonial possessions, beginning with Ireland in 1922. 7.6 The Rise and Decline of British-American Economic Dominance, 1820–2008 Source: Angus Maddison.

During the nineteenth century, the United States became the world’s largest economy, with the U.S. share of world output rising from 2 percent in 1820 to 9 percent in 1870, 16 percent in 1900, and 19 percent in 1918. At the end of World War I, therefore, the United States and the British Empire were about the same size. From that point, the U.S. share continued to rise, reaching more than 25 percent at the end of World War II, while the British imperial share continued to decline, falling below 10 percent of the world economy by 1950, following India’s independence in 1947. If we consider the British-American world combined, this English-speaking hegemonic duo accounted for around 40 percent of world production as of 1900, and sustained that remarkable share until World War II, after which India and other British colonies gained their independence. By 1980, the British Empire was basically gone, and the UK itself accounted for less than 4 percent of world output. Until World War I, Britain was undoubtedly the conductor of the Anglo-American orchestra.

With the tapping of fossil fuels, made possible by the invention of the steam engine and the internal combustion engine, industrial production soared. Global populations soared too, as the result of massive increases in food production. While the Ocean Age gave rise to transoceanic empires, the Industrial Age gave rise to the first global hegemon, Great Britain, and later, the United States. These two powers bestrode the entire globe with unprecedented military, technological, and financial power. But, as the end of the British Empire demonstrated, even hegemons can quickly lose their place at the apex of the global competition. We have now entered the Digital Age, from 2000 to the present, the result of the astounding capacities of digital technologies: computers, Internet, mobile telephony, and artificial intelligence, to name a few. The global transmission of data is pervasive: computational power has multiplied billions-fold, and information technologies are disrupting every aspect of the world economy, society, and geopolitics.

pages: 427 words: 114,531

Legacy of Empire by Gardner Thompson

Albert Einstein, British Empire, colonial rule, European colonialism, facts on the ground, ghettoisation, illegal immigration, lateral thinking, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, means of production, Ronald Reagan, zero-sum game

Only the Dominican Republic volunteered to help.4 A number of delegates made no attempt to disguise the anti-Semitism that drove their policies. For example, the Prime Minister of Canada, one of the British Empire’s (white) dominions, referred to Jews as a people who, if admitted, were bound to pollute Canada’s bloodstream. The minister for trade and customs in Australia (another white dominion), who had clearly not noticed the Aborigines in his country, said: ‘as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one’.5 At about the same time as the Evian Conference, the Polish government – which had been considering Madagascar as a dumping ground for its Jewish inhabitants – asked if the British government would admit them to Palestine, or perhaps to another part of the British Empire such as Northern Rhodesia, at the rate of 100,000 per annum. Such attitudes were not far removed from those residing in Britain itself.

It came as no surprise that both Arab and Jewish leaders, convened in London in early 1947, rejected it: the former were demanding independence for the whole territory, the latter a separate state of their own. At this point the British gave up and admitted defeat. The main factor here was that, seriously weakened financially and economically by the global conflict, a struggling British Empire undertook a review of its strategic needs that was free of romance and wishful thinking. The British were about to withdraw from India, their most treasured possession. Independence for India (and Pakistan) in the summer of 1947 was a huge, substantial and symbolic, statement that the days of the British Empire were numbered. In such a context it made no sense at all for the British to be keeping up to 100,000 troops in an ungovernable Palestine, the strategic significance of which (in relation to the Suez Canal), always questionable, was at last discounted.

Confusion persists, too. The British Labour Party has struggled to distinguish anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. On the shelves of booksellers there is no shortage of works on this subject. But much ignorance remains: of the origins of the modern state of Israel, and of the inter-communal antagonism that marked its birth. There is little knowledge of modern political Zionism, little awareness of the British Empire’s historic responsibility for Palestine, and little appreciation of the legacy for Israel. The modern state of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948, just three years after the end of the Second World War. Many assume a direct link between the two events, and of course there was one. Jewish survivors of the horror of Nazi-occupied Europe wanted to start new lives ‘in the only place likely to welcome them’, and Palestine presented itself as just that.2 Tens of thousands of Jews made their way there.

Migrant City: A New History of London by Panikos Panayi

Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, Brixton riot, call centre, discovery of the americas,, financial intermediation, ghettoisation, gig economy, glass ceiling, haute cuisine, immigration reform, income inequality, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, multicultural london english, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, plutocrats, Plutocrats, transatlantic slave trade, upwardly mobile, urban sprawl, white flight

In July 1917 the League of Londoners came into existence after a meeting at the Canon Street Hotel with a key aim of interning more alien enemies, and it organized a series of meetings in the capital during the summer of 1918.10 The most significant Germanophobic body consisted of the British Empire Union, which may have counted 10,000 members by 1918 and aimed at ‘the Extirpation – Root and Branch and Seed – of German Control and Influence from the British Empire’. It came into existence in April 1915 as the Anti-German Union and received a boost from the Germanophobic peak following the sinking of the Lusitania. Its first large meeting occurred in the Aeolian Hall in London in June 1915 and by the end of 1916 it had published the monthly British Empire Union Monthly Record, having changed its name in the spring of 1916. Ostensibly an Empire-wide organization with as many as 10,000 members, its base consisted of London, although branches existed throughout Britain and even in parts of the British Empire such as Canada, Hong Kong and the Bahamas.

., (i) Blind, Carl, (i) Bloomsbury, (i) Blyton, Enid, (i) Boateng, Paul, (i) Bolam, Marc, (i) Bolívar, Simón, (i) Bolivia, (i) Bolivians in London, (i), (ii) see also Latin Americans in London Bombay, (i), (ii), (iii) Bombay Emporium, (i) Bonds, Billy, (i) Bookman, Louis, (i) Booth, Charles, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Life and Labour of the People in London, (i) Bootle, (i) Bordeaux, (i) Bosingwa, José, (i) Boudicca, (i) Bournemouth, (i) Bow, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) see also East End of London; Tower Hamlets boxing, (i) Bozinsky, Reuben, (i) Bradford, (i), (ii), (iii) Bradford Council of Mosques, (i) Brady, Liam, (i) Brady Street Boys Club, (i) Brazilians in London, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) see also Latin Americans in London Bremen, (i), (ii), (iii) Brent, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Brentford, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Brentwood, (i) Bridgetown, George Augustus Polgreen, (i) Brieg, (i) Bright, Mark, (i) Bristol, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) British Brothers’ League, (i), (ii) British Council of Churches, (i) British Empire, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli) British Empire Union, (i) British Empire Union Monthly Record, (i) British Museum, (i), (ii) British National Party, (i), (ii) British Rail, (i), (ii), (iii) British Union of Fascists, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Britons, (i) Brixton, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi) riots (1980s), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Brockley, (i) Brodetsky, Selig, (i), (ii), (iii) Bromley-by-Bow, (i) see also East End of London; Tower Hamlets Brown, Roy, (i) Brown, W.

Migrants have found employment throughout the economic spectrum from the banking and mercantile elites who played a central role in its medieval and early modern history and who have remained a central characteristic of London life almost throughout its history.14 At the same time, the global capital became a city of opportunity for many of those who moved towards it, as the growth of migrant shops and shopkeepers since the end of the nineteenth century indicates.15 Migration has shaped the evolution of the global metropolis both because of the sheer numbers of foreigners who have moved to London but also because they have engaged in occupations on all parts of the social spectrum, from Irish navvies in the nineteenth century to Russian billionaires in the twenty-first century, and in all areas of the city’s economy and culture ranging from Georg Friedrich Handel to Thierry Henry. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL CITY Any understanding of the importance of London as a magnet for migration needs to appreciate its international importance since its development as a city within the Roman Empire and, more importantly, since the rise of the concept of globalization which, in the modern era, became inextricably linked with the expansion of the British Empire. London did not assume its international position as a result of the ‘liberation’ of markets at the end of the twentieth century, because this status had emerged over centuries. Before the arrival of the Romans the area now covered by London ‘was occupied . . . by only a scattered rural population in units no larger than a small village, gaining its living mainly by mixed farming, supplemented to some extent by fishing’.16 Londinium emerged as a Roman city in the first century AD.

Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear and the Making of a Massacre by Kim Wagner

British Empire, colonial rule, European colonialism, Mahatma Gandhi, trade route, Wall-E

What happened at Jallianwala Bagh, Churchill proclaimed: is an episode which appears to me to be without precedent or parallel in the modern history of the British Empire. It is an event of an entirely different order from any of those tragical occurrences which take place when troops are brought into collision with the civil population. It is an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation.3 The real point, however, is to be found elsewhere in Churchill’s speech: Governments who have seized upon power by violence and by usurpation have often resorted to keep what they have stolen, but the august and venerable structure of the British Empire, where lawful authority descends from hand to hand and generation after generation, does not need such aid. Such ideas are absolutely foreign to the British way of doing things.4 Dyer, in other words, was explicitly singled out as a rotten apple, and the massacre itself portrayed as an aberration within an otherwise benign imperial project.

The crimes of one vicious intelligence officer in Kenya obliterate all the patient and benevolent labour of hundreds of district commissioners throughout Africa.’6 Niall Ferguson, whose name has become virtually synonymous with chest-thumping neo-imperialism, similarly describes British brutality in Kenya as ‘exceptional’.7 This approach is not limited to popular writers pandering to conservative sentiments. When British historian John Darwin was criticised in 2015 for not sufficiently highlighting the role of racialised violence within the British Empire, his response was tellingly dismissive: Exactly how to discuss violence in relation to the British Empire is an interesting question. Plainly there were many brutal episodes in its history. Plainly, its authority depended ultimately (and sometimes immediately) upon the use of violence. But then so has that of almost every state in history, precolonial, colonial and postcolonial (and things are not getting better). To say that violence played a central part in Britain’s imperial history is not to add much to the sum of knowledge.8 Since violence was not unique to imperialism, Darwin seems to suggest, no further examination is warranted beyond a token gesture towards those ‘episodes’ about which it is difficult to equivocate.

Baffled by what he was hearing, Rankin asks rhetorically: ‘General . . . how does a child shot with a .303 Lee-Enfield apply for help?’ For the first time, Dyer seems uncertain of himself. This was how director Richard Attenborough reimagined the Amritsar Massacre and the subsequent Hunter Committee inquiry in the Oscar-winning movie Gandhi from 1982.1 This is also how many people today think of what was arguably the bloodiest massacre in the history of the British Empire. While there is an abundance of visual material informing our understanding of key aspects of the history of British India – the viscerally bleak photographs from both 1857 or 1947, for instance – there are no contemporary images of the violence at Amritsar on 13 April 1919. The photographs taken of the Jallianwala Bagh shortly after the massacre show only an empty space.2 It has thus been left largely for Attenborough’s movie to fill in the canvas of the popular imagination and provide the visual repertoire through which today we approach the events of 13 April 1919.

pages: 1,477 words: 311,310

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 by Paul Kennedy

agricultural Revolution, airline deregulation, anti-communist, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, European colonialism, floating exchange rates, full employment, German hyperinflation, imperial preference, industrial robot, joint-stock company, laissez-faire capitalism, long peace, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, night-watchman state, North Sea oil, nuclear winter, oil shock, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, spinning jenny, stakhanovite, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, University of East Anglia, upwardly mobile, zero-sum game

Not surprisingly, therefore, this was the decade when the British Empire, although generally aloof from European entanglements, felt itself under the heaviest pressure, from old rivals like France and Russia, and then newer challengers like Germany, Japan, and the United States. In such circumstances, the importance of the military clauses of the European alliance blocks seemed less and less relevant, since a general war there would not be triggered off by happenings such as the Anglo-French clash at Fashoda (1898), the Boer War, or the scramble for concessions in China. Yet, over the slightly longer term, these imperial rivalries were to affect the relations of the Great Powers, even in their European context. By the turn of the century, the pressures upon the British Empire were such that some circles around Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain called for an end to “splendid isolation” and an alliance with Berlin, while fellow ministers such as Balfour and Lansdowne were beginning to accept the need for diplomatic compromises.

To the Twenty-first Century History and Speculation China’s Balancing Act The Japanese Dilemma The EEC—Potential and Problems The Soviet Union and Its “Contradictions” The United States: The Problem of Number One in Relative Decline Epilogue Notes Bibliography About the Author Other Books by This Author Also by Paul Kennedy Maps 1. World Power Centers in the Sixteenth Century 2. The Political Divisions of Europe in the Sixteenth Century 3. Charles V’s Inheritance, 15194 4. The Collapse of Spanish Power in Europe 5. Europe in 1721 6. European Colonial Empires, c. 1750 7. Europe at the Height of Napoleon’s Power, 1810 8. The Chief Possessions, Naval Bases, and Submarine Cables of the British Empire, c. 1900 9. The European Powers and Their War Plans in 1914 10. Europe After the First World War 11. Europe at the Height of Hitler’s Power, 1942 12. Worldwide U.S. Force Deployments, 1987 Tables & Charts TABLES 1. Increase in Military Manpower, 1470–1660 2. British Wartime Expenditure and Revenue, 1688–1815 3. Populations of the Powers, 1700–1800 4.

In the same way, if a state overextends itself strategically—by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars—it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all—a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline. The history of the rise and later fall of the leading countries in the Great Power system since the advance of western Europe in the sixteenth century—that is, of nations such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, the British Empire, and currently the United States—shows a very significant correlation over the longer term between productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other. The story of “the rise and fall of the Great Powers” which is presented in these chapters may be briefly summarized here. The first chapter sets the scene for all that follows by examining the world around 1500 and by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each of the “power centers” of that time—Ming China; the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim offshoot in India, the Mogul Empire; Muscovy; Tokugawa Japan; and the cluster of states in west-central Europe.

pages: 344 words: 93,858

The Post-American World: Release 2.0 by Fareed Zakaria

affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, airport security, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, centre right, collapse of Lehman Brothers, conceptual framework, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, delayed gratification, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, interest rate derivative, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), knowledge economy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, mutually assured destruction, new economy, oil shock, open economy, out of africa, Parag Khanna, postindustrial economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, Washington Consensus, working-age population, young professional, zero-sum game

Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 212. 5. Paul Kennedy, “Why Did the British Empire Last So Long?,” in Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945: Eight Studies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 197–218. 6. The facts on Britain’s economic situation come largely from Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 151–200. Maddison and Barnett (see below) are also useful sources. 7. This theory on the British decline is fleshed out in Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1997). 8. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Penguin Books, 1998). 9. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 317. 10. James, Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 464. 11. Michael W. Holman, Profiting from International Nanotechnology (Lux Research, Dec. 2006). 12.

There was a “big two” plus one brilliant political entrepreneur who was able to keep himself and his country in the game, so that Britain maintained many elements of great powerdom well into the late twentieth century. Of course, it came at a cost. In return for its loans to London, the United States took over dozens of British bases in the Caribbean, Canada, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. “The British empire is handed over to the American pawnbroker—our only hope,” said one member of Parliament. The economist John Maynard Keynes was more enraged, describing the Lend-Lease Act as an attempt to “pick out the eyes of the British empire.” Less emotional observers saw that it was inevitable. Arnold Toynbee, by then a distinguished historian, consoled Britons that America’s “hand will be a great deal lighter than Russia’s, Germany’s, or Japan’s, and I suppose these are the alternatives.” The fundamental point is that Britain was undone as a great global power not because of bad politics but because of bad economics.

They became, depending on your view, ideological or idealistic. European institutions, practices, and ideas were introduced and imposed, though always maintaining racial preferences—the British court system was brought to India, for example, but Indian magistrates could not try whites. Over time, the European impact on its colonies was huge. And it then spread well beyond the colonies. Niall Ferguson has argued that the British empire is responsible for the worldwide spread of the English language, banking, the common law, Protestantism, team sports, the limited state, representative government, and the idea of liberty.11 Such an argument might gloss over the hypocrisy and brutality of imperial control—economic looting, mass executions, imprisonments, torture. Some—the Dutch and the French, for example—might quibble with the exclusively English provenance of such ideas.

pages: 429 words: 120,332

Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens by Nicholas Shaxson

Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, battle of ideas, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, call centre, capital controls, collapse of Lehman Brothers, computerized trading, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, failed state, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, high net worth, income inequality, Kenneth Rogoff, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, land value tax, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, Martin Wolf, money market fund, New Journalism, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, old-boy network, out of africa, passive income, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, transfer pricing, Washington Consensus

He takes issue with U.S. economist Bradford DeLong’s accusation that he has fallen under the influence of “a strange and sinister sect of British imperial conservatives.”1 Skidelsky’s work argues that for Britain the Second World War was in fact two wars, one pitting Britain under Winston Churchill against Nazi Germany, the other lying behind the facade of the Western alliance and pitting the British empire, led by Keynes, against the United States. America’s main war aim after the defeat of the Axis powers, he argued, was to destroy the British empire. “Churchill fought to preserve Britain and its empire against Nazi Germany; Keynes fought to preserve Britain as a Great Power against the United States. The war against Germany was won; but in its effort to win it, Britain spent its resources so heavily that it was destined to lose both its Empire and its Great Power status.”2 Keynes himself outlined one of his central aims as he negotiated in Washington: “America must not be allowed to pick out the eyes of the British Empire.”3 The arguments are complex, not least because Keynes’s main negotiating partner in Washington, Harry Dexter White, was almost certainly passing information to the Soviet Union.

As Britain entered into the Second World War, Keynes went to Washington to negotiate the terms on which the nation was to receive U.S. assistance and to discuss what might come after the war. Many Americans, he soon realized, were rather more hostile to Britain than he had supposed. Roosevelt, for example, despised the British empire, mistrusted England’s aristocracy, and, Skidelsky notes, “suspected the Foreign Office of pro-fascist tendencies.”8 Americans had fairly effectively chained and muzzled Wall Street after the Great Depression, and policymakers in Washington saw the far more lightly regulated City of London—the financial heart of the hated British empire—with deep suspicion. Britain was discriminating against American goods in international trade, and Roosevelt’s Republican opponents were horrified at the prospect of entanglement in another foreign war. Why help Britain again, many asked, after Britain had snared America into entering the First World War, then refused to pay its war debts and hung on to its empire.

A couple of other small European micro-state havens are worth noting, including Monaco and Andorra, with occasional cameo roles from odd places like the Portuguese Islands of Madeira, which was central to a major Nigerian bribery scandal involving the U.S. oil service company Halliburton17 that resulted in the second largest fine ever paid in a prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The second offshore group, accounting for about half the world’s secrecy jurisdictions, is the biggest. This is a layered hub-and-spoke array of tax havens, centered on the City of London, which mostly emerged from the ashes of the British empire.18 As I will show, it is no coincidence that the City of London, once the capital of the greatest empire the world has known, is the center of the most important part of the global offshore system. The City’s offshore network has three main layers. Its inner ring consists of Britain’s three Crown Dependencies: the nearby islands of Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. The authoritative U.S. publication Tax Analysts estimated conservatively in 2007 that just these three havens hosted about $1 trillion of potentially tax- evading assets.19 At a reasonable annual rate of return of 7 percent and a top income tax rate of 40 percent, the tax evaded on those could be almost $30 billion per year—and income tax evasion is just one of several forms of offshore tax and financial losses.

pages: 490 words: 146,259

New World, Inc. by John Butman

Admiral Zheng, Atahualpa, Bartolomé de las Casas, British Empire, commoditize, currency manipulation / currency intervention, diversified portfolio, Etonian, Francisco Pizarro, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, market design, Skype, spice trade, trade route, wikimedia commons

Allan James Crosby (London: Longman & Co, 1876), #556, 175. 9 “Petition of divers gentlemen of the West parts of England to the Queen,” in CSP-Domestic, 1547–1580, vol. 95, #63, 475. 10 Quinn, Voyages and Colonising Enterprises, 1:102. 11 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London: Pelican Books, 1979), 178. 12 Jason Eldred, “The Just Will Pay for the Sinners: English Merchants, the Trade with Spain, and Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1563–1585,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2010): 5–28; 9. 13 John Dee, General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation (London: John Daye, 1577; Kessinger Legacy Reprint [facsimile], 2003, 10 (“Victorious British Monarchy,” “marvellous Security,” “wonderfully increase”); 28 (“New Foreign Discoveries,” “Ilandish Empire”). 14 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 42–43. 15 Dewar, Sir Thomas Smith, 48. 16 Entry for 28 November 1577 in Halliwell, ed., The Private Diary of Dr John Dee, 4. For the first two reports, see John Dee, The Limits of the British Empire, edited by Ken MacMillan with Jennifer Abeles (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 5, 10–13, 37–41. 17 Joseph H. Peterson, ed., John Dee’s Five Books of Mystery: Original Sourcebook of Enochian Magic (Boston: Weiserbooks, 2003), 8; Suster, John Dee, 55–6; Glynn Parry, “John Dee and the Elizabethan British Empire in Its European Context,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2006), 643–75. 18 Humphrey Gilbert, “A Discourse how Hir Majestie May Annoy the King of Spayne,” in Quinn, Voyages and Colonising Enterprises, 1:170. 19 “A letter written to M.

The Colonial Period of American History. 4 vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934; repr. 1964. Andrews, Kenneth R. Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering During the Spanish War, 1585–1603. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964; paperback edition, 2011. . Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; repr. 1991. Armitage, David. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Ash, Eric H. Power, Knowledge, and Expertise in Elizabethan England. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Aughton, Peter. Bristol: A People’s History. Lancaster: Carnegie Publishing, 2000. Bagwell, Richard. Ireland Under the Tudors: With a Succinct Account of the Earlier History.

John Dee (1527–1609) was a mathematician, cosmographer, and astrologer. A Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge while still a teenager, he was hired to help Richard Chancellor and Martin Frobisher prepare for their voyages across uncharted waters to Cathay. As Elizabeth I’s favorite astrologer, he approved the date for her coronation. Also, he made the case for her title to lands in the New World, coining the phrase “British Empire.” Humphrey Gilbert gave him the right to all the land north of today’s US-Canada border. He never sought to claim these lands, however. Francis Drake (1540–1596) was an explorer. The first English captain to complete a circumnavigation, he struck a trade deal with the king of Ternate in the Spice Islands; laid claim to the northwest coast of America, which he named Nova Albion; and captured a hoard of Spanish treasure that transformed him into one of the richest men in England.

pages: 415 words: 103,801

The Last Kings of Shanghai: The Rival Jewish Dynasties That Helped Create Modern China by Jonathan Kaufman

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Honoré de Balzac, indoor plumbing, joint-stock company, life extension, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, Mikhail Gorbachev, old-boy network, plutocrats, Plutocrats, rent control, Steve Jobs, trade route

From the moment he and his family arrived in Bombay, David allied himself with the British and the expansion of the British Empire. Though dark skinned and an immigrant, he chose to support imperialism. That wasn’t surprising. David saw himself as part of the elite; the Sassoons in Baghdad had risen in part by advising and serving their Turkish rulers. The defining issue of his life—his flight from Baghdad—had been triggered by his misreading the politics of Baghdad and believing the sultan would side with him against Baghdad’s rulers. He was determined that he and his family would never make that mistake again. David arrived in India at a fortunate time. The expanding British Empire wasn’t opening just trade routes, it was opening the British mind. Britain itself remained a stratified society, with clubs and landed aristocrats looking down on “outsiders.”

The long journey proved too exhausting for his elderly father, who died in David’s arms shortly after arrival. Reunited with his wife and children, David thought more about the opportunities that lay in Bombay. After a few years, with his wife newly pregnant, David finally decided to make the move, seeking the protection, and opportunity, of British rule. Landing in Bombay, David Sassoon joined the British Empire at the height of its political and economic power. Almost one-third of the world was under British control, including parts of India, Australia, Malaysia, Syria, and Egypt. The British had crushed Napoleon in Europe and commanded the world’s largest navy. Power and money flowed through London, the world’s largest city. Some countries built empires primarily to capture slaves or natural resources, or to build a barrier between themselves and their enemies.

When he was turned away from the old-boy network of British banks, he helped found the Bank of Bombay, which enabled him to finance new railway lines to ship cotton from the countryside more quickly. Two decades later, when the North blockaded the South in the American Civil War, cutting off the biggest supplier of cotton to Britain, David was perfectly situated to step into the breach—and to make millions. David became a bridge between the traditional trading practices of the Middle East and the new global system developing under the British Empire. Doing business in Asia meant dealing with a hodgepodge of different weights and measures, different currencies, different languages. David imposed standardization. Inside his company, Sassoon employees conducted business in Judeo-Arabic—Arabic words written with Hebrew letters—the language they brought with them from Baghdad. But when it came to business correspondence, David ordered that letters to customers, suppliers, and other companies be written in precise English script, even though he himself barely read or spoke the language.

pages: 790 words: 150,875

Civilization: The West and the Rest by Niall Ferguson

Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, Andrei Shleifer, Atahualpa, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, clean water, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, Copley Medal, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Dean Kamen, delayed gratification, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, Hans Lippershey, haute couture, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, invention of movable type, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, Kitchen Debate, land reform, land tenure, liberal capitalism, Louis Pasteur, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, new economy, Pearl River Delta, Pierre-Simon Laplace, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spice trade, spinning jenny, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, The Great Moderation, the market place, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, total factor productivity, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, undersea cable, upwardly mobile, uranium enrichment, wage slave, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

But the so-called Springtime of the Peoples was not confined to Europe. Like so many other Western ideas in the nineteenth century, French-style revolution swiftly became a global phenomenon. Across the British Empire there was unrest – in Ceylon, Guiana, Jamaica, New South Wales, the Orange River Sovereignty, the Punjab and Van Diemen’s Land.27 Even more remarkable were the events in French West Africa. There, unlike in British colonies, radical political change had the backing of a revolutionary government in the metropolis. All this serves to illuminate the most distinctive feature of French imperialism: its enduring revolutionary character. The British Empire was by instinct socially conservative; with every passing year its administrators grew fonder of local elites, more comfortable with indirect rule through tribal chiefs and ornamental maharajahs.

Some forty years later Spanish rule was ended in Latin America. Yet while one revolution cemented the democratic rights of property-owners, and brought into being a federal republic that within a hundred years was the world’s wealthiest country, the South American revolutions consigned all of America south of the Rio Grande to two centuries of division, instability and underdevelopment. Why was that? Both the Spanish and the British empires experienced crises in the late eighteenth century. The increased regulation of transatlantic trade by the imperial authorities and the high cost of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) paved the way for colonial revolts. Those that broke out in Britain’s American colonies in the 1770s had their counterparts in Spain’s: Túpac Amaru II’s Andean Rebellion of 1780–83 and the Comunero Revolt in New Granada (present-day Colombia) in 1781.

To appreciate why it was that race became such a preoccupation of the West’s interaction with other civilizations, we must now turn to Africa itself, which was to become the focal point of European imperial expansion in the period. In the speech with which this chapter began, Churchill – whose own imperial career had started in the Sudan and South Africa – asked a question that was in many ways central to the lives of an entire generation of empire-builders: ‘Why should not the same principles which have shaped the free, ordered, tolerant civilization of the British Isles and British Empire be found serviceable in the organization of this anxious world?’ Civilization as he understood it had successfully taken root in North America – as successfully in those parts that remained under British rule as in the United States. It had flourished in the arid wilderness of Australia. Why not in Africa, too? In America four European powers had tried their hands at planting their civilizations in foreign soil (five if we count the Dutch in Guiana and ‘New Amsterdam’, six if we count the Swedes in Saint-Barthélemy, seven including the Danes in the Virgin Islands, and eight with the Russian settlements in Alaska and California), with widely varying degrees of success.

pages: 618 words: 160,006

Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World by Andrew Lambert

British Empire, different worldview, Donald Trump, joint-stock company, Malacca Straits, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, open economy, rising living standards, South China Sea, spice trade, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, UNCLOS

In both cases the transfer of political power to local authorities created a desire for autonomy in key issues such as taxes and trade, empowering lawyers and merchants to run cities and provinces. Attempts to impose Roman-style central control on the diffuse commercially minded British Empire prompted revolts. After 1782 the British avoided antagonising local sensibilities. Britain was a new Carthage, not a new Rome. It lacked the manpower, resources and continuous land mass to be Roman. That identity was seized by the Americans. The British were happy to use the cultural language of Roman imperial might to sustain their self-image, notably with Nelson’s Column and the architecture of Imperial Whitehall, but their deepest concern was to prevent the emergence of a new Roman Empire. Even the exponents of a minimalist British Empire recognised there were some things that had to remain under central control. Sea power was, and remains, indivisible: it must be centrally directed, and delivered by an integrated force.

Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783, London: Penguin, 2007, pp. 204–7. Simms’s argument that Europe was critical to Britain’s rise as an imperial power is well made, but compounds an essentially negative agenda in Europe with a strikingly positive approach to the world beyond, undervaluing the influence of the City of London, the East India Company and other commercial interests on national policy. 36. Sophonisba was given in marriage to an elderly Numidian king at the final crisis of the Second Punic War. R. Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilisation, London: Allen Lane, 2010, p. 309. 37. D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 173. Lord Louis Mountbatten had ‘Rule Britannia’ played when the Japanese surrendered Singapore in 1945.

John Sell Cotman’s etching of the Column at Yarmouth to the memory of Lord Nelson, 1817. Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection. Maps The World in the Age of Empire The Mediterranean The Siege of Tyre The Athenian Empire Ancient Athens Rome and Carthage during the Second Punic War Venetian Bases and Caravan Routes The Battle of Lepanto The Dutch Empire Rhodes The Portuguese Empire The British Empire The South China Sea ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As any manuscript heads for publication authors return to the beginning, to reflect on the debt they owe to others, fellow scholars, students, family and friends, delightfully loose categories reflecting the reality that the first and last are often one and the same. Furthermore, as a historian I am acutely conscious of my debt to those who have gone before, a debt we honour by reflecting on works written long go, for very different audiences.

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Liberalism at Large: The World According to the Economist by Alex Zevin

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, Chelsea Manning, collective bargaining, Columbine, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, desegregation, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, hiring and firing, imperial preference, income inequality, interest rate derivative, invisible hand, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Khartoum Gordon, land reform, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Journalism, Norman Macrae, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, railway mania, rent control, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Snapchat, Socratic dialogue, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, unbanked and underbanked, underbanked, unorthodox policies, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, Yom Kippur War, young professional

By the turn of 1865 the victory of the North looked imminent, ‘exciting the brains of Americans’, based on a mania for ‘empire and exclusive possession of a continent’. Bagehot was hostile to this outcome. The rest of the world, he wrote ruefully, ‘could not look with much favour or anticipated comfort on the formation of a new power thus motivated and thus clenched – a power whose two fundamental rules of action and raisons d’être would be, to defy its neighbour, and to annex its neighbour’s land.’139 The British Empire If Bagehot viewed America through the prism of the British Empire and its interests, what did he have to say about the latter? Bagehot’s editorship was less rich in incident than Wilson’s – sitting between bursts of warfare and annexation in the 1850s and 1880s–1890s – and Bagehot showed the same breezy, flexible confidence in imperial destiny as he did in English political economy. Whether in Canada, the Cape, New Zealand or Australia, he admitted that colonists could be difficult, demanding, costly, and confrontational with natives.

For overviews of, as well as interventions in, the scholarly literature on liberalism and empire, see Jennifer Pitts, ‘Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism’, The Annual Review of Political Science, 2010, p 211–35; Andrew Sartori, ‘The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission’, The Journal of Modern History, September 2006, pp. 623–42. 67.Even recent scholarship that disputes this motive concedes the Transvaal’s new economic clout (after gold finds in 1868) threatened to pull other South African states towards it, and away from Britain’s Cape Colony. By 1898 it was the largest producer of gold, accounting for 27 per cent of the world total. Britain was responsible for half of the £75 million invested there by 1899, and two-thirds of its trade. Christopher Saunders and Iain R. Smith, ‘Southern Africa, 1795–1910’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. Andrew Porter, Oxford 1999, Vol. III, pp. 609–10. 68.Forgetting itself for a moment, the Economist deplored ‘the disturbing, revolutionary effect caused by the sudden growth of an enormously aggressive capitalism in a heretofore stagnant and conservative community’, ‘the evolution of giant monopolies’, which had left ‘society, all institutions … hypnotised’: ‘England and the Transvaal’, 10 June 1899. 69.

Its centenary celebration in wartime London was stuffed to bursting with bankers, politicians, economists, diplomats and foreign dignitaries, eating smoked salmon, puffing cigars. ‘Never has so much been read for so long by so few,’ quipped another editor, riffing on Winston Churchill.18 In the second half of the twentieth century, the Economist reached across the Atlantic: the role it once played in the British Empire, it now undertook in the American. A literal bridge between them, star reporters now passed apprenticeships on Wall Street and in Washington, where they enjoyed special access from the start – collared by John F. Kennedy or Lyndon B. Johnson in the marble corridors of Congress, enjoying personal lines to Ronald Reagan’s White House via George Shultz, Henry Kissinger and other pillars of the foreign-policy establishment.

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How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How Western Europe's Poorest Nation Created Our World and Everything in It by Arthur Herman

British Empire, California gold rush, creative destruction, do-ocracy, financial independence, global village, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Joan Didion, joint-stock company, laissez-faire capitalism, land tenure, mass immigration, means of production, new economy, New Urbanism, North Sea oil, oil shale / tar sands, Republic of Letters, Robert Mercer, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, urban planning, urban renewal, working poor

Finally, another study of Scottish engineers should not be missed: that of Robert Louis Stevenson’s family and their construction of lighthouses, described in delightful detail by Bella Bathurst in The Lighthouse Stevensons (New York, 1999). CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE SUN NEVER SETS— SCOTS AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE I first saw the quotation from Robert Louis Stevenson in Ian MacLeod’s The Scots and have not hesitated to borrow it here. The overseas Scots diaspora is a large and complex subject. The best place to start might be Thomas Devine’s chapter on emigration in The Scottish Nation and the collection of essays in R.A. Cage’s edited volume, The Scots Abroad, 1750–1914 (London, 1985). Also worth reading is Gordon Donaldson’s The Scots Overseas (Westport, CT, 1976). Duncan Bruce’s The Mark of the Scots has a section on Scots and the British Empire; James Morris’s Heaven’s Command: An Imperial Progress (London, 1973) is an entertaining survey of the British Empire at its height, even though it says nothing particularly about Scots—except for a wry and witty essay on Charles Napier, which I have quoted in this chapter.

The great Scottish diaspora followed, and in some cases led, the development of what historians sometimes call the “second” British Empire. The first, organized around England’s monopoly of the Atlantic trade, effectively perished in the American Revolution. The new empire was a far more extensive and complex amalgam of far-flung dominions, territories, colonies, naval bases, and assorted dependencies, which eventually covered nearly one-fifth of the earth’s land surface and one-quarter of the world’s population. It was the first global community, an empire “on which the sun never sets,” in the phrase John Wilson of Blackwood’s Magazine first made famous. And without the Scots it might never have existed—let alone reached the status of legend it still holds today. In fact, a Scot created the idea of the British Empire. Charles Pasley came from Eskdalemuir in Dumfriesshire, not far from where Thomas Telford had grown up.

In 1810 he published An Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire. It completely changed the way Britons thought about their empire in relation to the rest of the world. In fact, Pasley had created modern geopolitics. Pasley warned his fellow Britons that they could no longer rely on their “splendid isolation,” or the British navy, to keep them safe in the future. In the modern world, true national security rested on policy and power—especially military power. That included large overseas colonies, which could supply sailors for its navies and soldiers for Britain’s armies. “War we cannot avoid,” he warned. But if Britain thought offensively and acted vigorously, “what nation upon earth can resist us?” Between the Battle of Waterloo and the end of the American Civil War in 1865, the British Empire grew by an average of 100,000 square miles per year.

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The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food by Lizzie Collingham

agricultural Revolution, American ideology, British Empire, centre right, clean water, colonial exploitation, distributed generation, European colonialism, fixed income, full employment, global village, indoor plumbing, labour mobility, land reform, mass immigration, means of production, profit motive, rising living standards, trade route, V2 rocket, women in the workforce

Jackson, The British Empire, pp. 49, 86. 21 The Production of Food Crops, p. 6. 22 Tunzelmann, Indian Summer, p. 138. 23 Smith, Conflict over Convoys, p. 156. 24 The Production of Food Crops, pp. 7, 8, 11. 25 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre, p. 50. 26 Ibid., p. 16; Lloyd, Food and Inflation, p. 91. 27 Chandos, The Memoirs, pp. 222–3. 28 Ibid., p. 238. 29 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre, p. 83. 30 Ibid., pp. 81, 83. 31 Ibid., p. 45. 32 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, p. 89. 33 Cooper, Cairo, p. 162. 34 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre, p. 25. 35 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, p. 129. 36 Ibid., p. 88. 37 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre, p. 117. 38 Jackson, The British Empire, pp. 120–1; Lloyd, Food and Inflation, p. 30. 39 Jackson, The British Empire, pp. 166, 198. 40 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, pp. 55, 58, 65. 41 Milward, War, Economy and Society, p. 280. 42 Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre, p. 81. 43 Ibid., p. 121. 44 Ibid., p. 124. 45 Ibid., p. 106. 46 Ibid., p. 112. 47 Ibid., p. 84. 48 50.8 million to 19.4 million net registered tons.

., p. 201. 66 Davis and Engerman, Naval Blockades, p. 286. 67 Smith, Conflict over Convoys, p. 177. 68 Hammond, Food and Agriculture, p. 187. 69 Costello and Hughes, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 215. 70 French, Waging War, p. 51. 71 Ibid., pp. 21–2. 72 Ibid., p. 61. 73 Ibid., p. 113. 74 Ibid., p. 139. 75 Costello and Hughes, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 215. 76 Ibid., p. 216. 77 Rahn, ‘The war at sea’, p. 341. 78 Hammond, Food and Agriculture, p. 185. 79 Ibid., p. 187. 80 Smith, Conflict over Convoys, p. 177. 81 Ibid., p. 154. 7 Mobilizing the British Empire 1 Stephens, Monsoon Morning, p. 180. 2 Jackson, The British Empire, p. 22. 3 Beaumont, ‘Australia’s war: Europe and the Middle East’, p. 9. 4 Jackson, Botswana, pp. 36, 40. 5 Beaumont, ‘Australia’s war: Asia and the Pacific’, p. 47. 6 Jackson, Botswana, pp. 132–3. 7 Kerslake, Time and the Hour, p. 163. 8 Crowder, ‘The 1939–45 war’, pp. 596, 611. 9 Pearce, ‘The colonial economy’, p. 276. 10 Kamtekar, ‘A different war dance’, p. 195; Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Armies, p. 301. 11 Kamtekar, ‘A different war dance’, p. 204. 12 Ibid., pp. 206–7. 13 Wright, The World and a Very Small Place in Africa, p. 196. 14 Jackson, Botswana, pp. 138–41. 15 Ibid., pp. 143–4. 16 Sen, Poverty and Famines, pp. 155–6. 17 Wright, The World and a Very Small Place in Africa, p. 195. 18 Jackson, Botswana, p. 156. 19 Killingray, ‘African civilians’, p. 141. 20 28 per cent of land in Mauritius was turned over to food crops.

* Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization. 88 Ibid., pp. 38–9. 89 Ibid., p. 73. 90 Beaumont, ‘Australia’s war: Europe and the Middle East’, pp. 17–18; Jackson, The British Empire, p. 2. 91 The papers of G. R. Page, Department of Documents, IWM, p. 30. 92 Crimp, The Diary of a Desert Rat, pp. 20–21. 93 Bierman and Smith, Alamein, p. 151. 94 Crimp, The Diary of a Desert Rat, pp. 38–9. 95 Bierman and Smith, Alamein, pp. 151–2. 96 Levenstein, Paradox of Plenty, p. 93. 97 Jackson, Botswana, p. 76. 98 The papers of G. R. Page, Department of Documents, IWM, p. 30. 99 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, pp. 273–7; Bayly, ‘Spunyarns’, p. 33. 100 Jackson, The British Empire, p. 105. 101 Collier, ‘The logistics of the North African campaign’, pp. 202–3. 102 The papers of G. R. Page, Department of Documents, IWM, p. 47. 103 Ibid. 104 Walker, The Clinical Problems of War, p. 321; Bullard, ‘ “The great enemy” ’, pp. 219–20. 105 Brune, Those Ragged Bloody Heroes, p. 45. 106 Walker, ‘The writers’ war’, pp. 149–50. 107 Brune, Those Ragged Bloody Heroes, p. 101; Dornan, The Silent Men, p. 146. 108 Richmond, The Japanese Forces in New Guinea, p. 369. 109 Brune, Those Ragged Bloody Heroes, p. 93. 110 Ibid., p. 89. 111 Walker, The Clinical Problems of War, p. 321. 112 Beaumont, ‘Australia’s war: Asia and the Pacific’, p. 40. 113 Ibid.; Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, p. 70. 114 Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 229. 115 Ibid., p. 227. 116 The Australian Army at War, p. 70. 117 ‘Appendix.

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Owning the Earth: The Transforming History of Land Ownership by Andro Linklater

agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, Anton Chekhov, Ayatollah Khomeini, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, business cycle, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, facts on the ground, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Google Earth, income inequality, invisible hand, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kibera, Kickstarter, land reform, land tenure, light touch regulation, market clearing, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, mortgage debt, Northern Rock, Peace of Westphalia, Pearl River Delta, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, refrigerator car, Right to Buy, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, spinning jenny, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, ultimatum game, wage slave, WikiLeaks, wikimedia commons, working poor

When farmers arrived from Britain in the early nineteenth century, following their country’s seizure of the Cape in 1806, their need to measure out the ground and own it according to common law collided with the Afrikaaners’ sprawling, barely marked circular tracts of ground measuring about six hundred acres where they raised livestock with slave labor. Faced by demands to pay land taxes and to have their properties properly registered, Afrikaaner frustration mounted and finally boiled over in 1833 when slavery was made illegal throughout the British Empire. To escape civilization and find new grazing, they moved north en masse, their long lines of ox-drawn wagons, scrawny sheep and cattle, and sullen slaves forming the central motif in Afrikaaner legends of the Great Trek. In his poem “The Voortrekker,” Rudyard Kipling, the British Empire’s poet laureate, paid tribute to their stubborn refusal to be hemmed in by propertied living: His neighbours’ smoke shall vex his eyes, their voices break his rest. He shall go forth till south is north, sullen and dispossessed. He shall desire loneliness and his desire shall bring, Hard on his heels, a thousand wheels, a People and a King.

More probably, Gilbert was immersed in General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation by his partner, John Dee. This book was devoted to the magus’s vision of an “incomparable Brytish Impire” that the future would bring. Whatever prompted Dee’s vision, his scrying glass or simply Gilbert’s manic ambition, it was undoubtedly prophetic. According to the Memorials, the empire would be spread across the seas by a mighty navy. Implicitly, as this British Empire expanded, it would carry with it Gilbert’s wild idea that land could be owned as private property around the world. The general, however, was not destined to live long enough to test the accuracy of Dee’s foresight. As night fell, the Squirrel hoisted two lanterns so that the Golden Hind could follow her through the raging seas. But soon after midnight, wrote Captain Hayes, “suddenly her lights were out, whereof as it were in a moment we lost the sight, and withall our watch cryed, the Generall was cast away, which was so true.

Most of the country from the Mississippi to the West Coast remained unsurveyed, but the squares now spanned the continent. What had been measured out was unmistakably a democracy, and quite clearly a republic, but its foundation was undeniably imperial. And the structure that had made it possible was to be the model for the greatest territorial empire the world had ever seen. Chapter Fourteen The Empire of Land The architect responsible for introducing Jefferson’s blueprint to the British Empire was a jailbird. Edward Gibbon Wakefield began to write about land and empire in 1829 while serving three years in Newgate Prison for abducting a wealthy fifteen-year-old girl from school and marrying her in order to gain her fortune. Born into a prominent Quaker family but with a father who lived by his wits, Wakefield’s character faithfully reflected his genetic inheritance. There was something of the evangelist about his boldness, conviction, and eloquence, and at least as much of the fraudster, yet his intelligence and the intensity of his self-belief, apparent in the stare of his pale blue eyes, swayed all but the most skeptical listeners.

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Posh Boys: How English Public Schools Ruin Britain by Robert Verkaik

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Alistair Cooke, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, British Empire, Brixton riot, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, Etonian, G4S, gender pay gap, God and Mammon, income inequality, Khartoum Gordon, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, Livingstone, I presume, loadsamoney, mega-rich, Neil Kinnock, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, school vouchers, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, trade route, traveling salesman, unpaid internship

Although some of the worst kinds of torture were curtailed, efforts by the governors to halt daily cruelties were largely thwarted by senior boys and masters. The argument ran that with so few teachers per pupil a regime of strict discipline was essential to avoid the riots of the past. There was also a widely held notion that this tough upbringing was the best preparation for the tough life ahead, imposing rule over the native majorities of the British Empire. But the greatest criticism of all was that the education they sold was out of step with Britain’s dynamic and rising economy. Their reliance on Greek and Latin to the exclusion of sciences put them at odds with the grammar schools and newly established academies. Charles Darwin, perhaps the most enlightened mind of Victorian Britain, made it quite clear that his public school deserved no credit for his scientific achievements.

The enormous wealth created by the industrial revolution brought about a new class of factory owners, bankers, industrialists and entrepreneurs, all determined to use their fortunes to leave an impression on their country. To achieve this they were more than happy to ensure that their own children benefited from the privilege and advantage that came from a classic public school education. The idea of buying a position among the British aristocracy made absolute business sense. 3 EMPIRE OF THE SONS The Golden Age of the English public school corresponded with the triumph of the British Empire. Generations of diplomats, politicians and civil servants who ruled a quarter of the known world passed through the same school gates. Prime ministers Robert Peel, Lord Palmerston and Winston Churchill attended Harrow, while George Canning, William Gladstone and Arthur Balfour received their education at Eton. For 200 years, the Empire was the playground of the public schoolboy. Cecil Rhodes, the architect of modern imperialism, neatly summed up the British perspective by claiming in 1902: ‘We are the finest race in the world and the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race.’

As Britain embarked on its colonial adventures, muscular Christianity was the defining virtue wholly embraced by the British Army and the legions of missionaries who sallied forth across the Empire. Winning wars, crushing cultures and converting pagans was the best way a man could flex his Christian muscles. The Victorian figure who best represents the ideal of muscular Christianity made his name in a number of famous military campaigns in defence and expansion of the British Empire. General Charles Gordon was a courageous commander and explorer whose adventures were avidly followed by the British public as he chased and fought Britain’s enemies to the very margins of the known world. Gordon did not attend one of the great English public schools but instead went to a minor private institution in Taunton, Devon, called Fullands House, before being sent on to the military academy in Woolwich, then as important as Sandhurst in training army officers.

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The Idea of Decline in Western History by Arthur Herman

agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, anti-communist, British Empire, David Attenborough, European colonialism, George Santayana, ghettoisation, hiring and firing, Joan Didion, laissez-faire capitalism, late capitalism, lateral thinking, liberal capitalism, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, Nelson Mandela, Norman Mailer, nuclear winter, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, profit motive, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile

However, that did not prevent Toynbee from sharing many of the German scholar’s assumptions and sympathies. Like Spengler, Toynbee took as his symbol of the modern West the British Empire. Like Spengler’s Decline of the West, Toynbee’s Study of History was shaped by the conviction that Great Britain’s role in that history was coming to an end. On a tour of Crete in 1912 Toynbee had come upon an elaborate Baroque palace built by a Venetian merchant prince shortly before the island was overrun by the Turks. As he stood gazing at its ruined shell, Toynbee wrote later, the thought suddenly struck him: “If the Venetian Empire had perished, the British Empire could not be immortal.” That melancholy insight would remain with him all his life: the fragility of human hopes and expectations, including his own, in the face of the larger forces of history and time.

By the turn of the century the Liberal and Labour parties often accused each other of stealing the other’s programs. Later they would also compete in their lavish praise of the Soviet Union.19 But one issue split them across the bow: the British Empire. The year that Culture and Anarchy appeared, 1869, also witnessed the opening of the Suez Canal and the expansion of British imperial dominion into a new and unprecedented phase. By 1890 it covered nearly one-quarter of the habitable globe. The old liberal attitude toward imperialism had been ambivalent at best: the British Empire, with its exotic trappings of imperial splendor, durbars and jubilees, and “maps painted red,” was largely the creation of Benjamin’s Disraeli’s Conservatives. Among those of a New Liberal persuasion feelings ran deeper and sharper.20 Webbs and the so-called liberal imperialists stressed that Britain’s empire meant jobs at home and room for her unemployed masses abroad.

.* The important carriers of this parasitism were the Jews, whom Hobson believed directed international finance as well as the British Empire. Johannesburg, the center of South African capitalism, was “essentially a Jewish town”; there “every form of private vice flourished unchecked,” he wrote, with gambling halls, saloons, and brothels. The Jews and their imperialist allies were “an alien body of sojourners … destined to extract wealth from the country and retiring to consume it at home.” Yet their desperate scramble for cheap profit was ultimately doomed, he concluded, since nature’s laws “doom the parasite to atrophy, decay, and final extinction.”23 There were, therefore, two contrasting liberal images of the British Empire as the twentieth century began. One, bitterly negative, was Hobson’s: imperialism was an evil and degenerative system built on capitalist exploitation of natives abroad and the expansion of poverty and the armaments industries at home.

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The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class by Kees Van der Pijl

anti-communist, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, collective bargaining, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, deskilling, diversified portfolio, European colonialism, floating exchange rates, full employment, imperial preference, Joseph Schumpeter, liberal capitalism, mass immigration, means of production, North Sea oil, plutocrats, Plutocrats, profit maximization, RAND corporation, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, trade route, union organizing, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, War on Poverty

When in the context of World War Two, a comparable conjuncture again presented itself to the American ruling class, the Roosevelt forces seized the opportunity to reorient the New Deal from its national–corporatist format to a more liberal-internationalist strategy of expansion, in which domestic working-class demands could be in part evaded, in part compromised, while American economic power was brought to bear on both the British Empire and the Soviet Union in order to force them into compliance with US preferences for an open world. The Lend-Lease policy, then, inaugurated an era in which the two elements in combination–the generalization of Fordism and an offensive diplomacy of Wilsonian inspiration–materialized as a process of class formation on the North Atlantic level, guided by successive formulations of Atlantic unity.

From this perspective, the history of Atlanticism, as both ideology and an actual process of class formation, must be related to the three successive strategies of Atlantic unity which corresponded to the different offensive periods of American capitalism. The first was Roosevelt’s concept of Atlantic Universalism, which derived its specific Atlantic dimension from the European focus of World War Two and the key position of the British Empire in the world America wanted to expand into. The second version of Atlantic unity was the Atlantic Union idea which surfaced at the time of the Marshall Plan and combined a status-quo approach to control of the periphery with a high-pitched Cold War unity against the Soviet Union. The third Atlanticist strategy was the Atlantic Partnership scheme promulgated by President Kennedy in an attempt to restore unity of purpose to an Atlantic world in which the establishment of a restrictive EEC demonstrated the degree to which Western European capital had emancipated itself from American tutelage and was intent on carving out a sphere-of-interest of its own.

But Wilson’s universalism, explicitly conceived as a bourgeois-reformist alternative to the call of the October Revolution, soon lost its relevance in the interwar years as US economic foreign policy was shaped, first, by Wall Street rentier interests, then, by the state-monopolist pursuit of an American sphere-of-interest. Even at the beginning of US involvement in World War Two, as Roosevelt began his epic wheeling-dealing to pry the economic assets of the British Empire from Churchill, US geopolitical goals continued to be framed within a basically sphere-of-interest concept that took the division of the world market for granted. Thus the Council on Foreign Relations commissioned research to determine the minimal size of the informal empire necessary for the survival of US private capitalism in terms of raw material supplies, domestic employment and export outlets.

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Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap by Graham Allison

9 dash line, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, conceptual framework, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, facts on the ground, Flash crash, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, game design, George Santayana, Haber-Bosch Process, industrial robot, Internet of things, Kenneth Rogoff, liberal world order, long peace, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Nelson Mandela, one-China policy, Paul Samuelson, Peace of Westphalia, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, selection bias, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, special economic zone, spice trade, the rule of 72, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade route, UNCLOS, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

William was generally content to approve these, as his priority was to harness English resources for the war with France. [back] 52. Clark, “The Nine Years War,” 230. [back] 53. Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 66. [back] 54. John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xvii. [back] 55. Robert Tombs and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present (London: William Heinemann, 2006), 51. [back] 56. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 58. [back] 57. Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy, 45. [back] 58. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 66. [back] 59. Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy, 46. [back] 60. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 120. [back] 61. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 208.

He not only built more warships, but applied superior technology to make them more lethal: better armed, with new fifteen-inch guns; faster, powered by oil instead of coal; and supplemented by a new instrument of war, the airplane.3 In the thousand days between his memorandum and the outbreak of World War I, Churchill led a Herculean effort to maintain British naval supremacy, simultaneously making bold diplomatic strokes to broker détente with Germany and seizing every advantage should war come. His urgency sprang from his conviction that the German surge at sea signaled not a national security challenge but an existential threat to Britain’s survival. Churchill knew that on British warships “floated the might, majesty, dominion, and power of the British Empire.” If its navy were destroyed, he wrote later, the empire “would dissolve like a dream.” All of Europe would pass “into the iron grip and rule of the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system meant.” To avoid that catastrophe, he insisted, the Royal Navy was “all we had.”4 Britain thus faced an excruciating dilemma, one that strategists even today struggle to escape in planning exercises.5 On the one hand, naval superiority was non-negotiable.

After a year of research into the king’s question, Crowe delivered a diplomatic gem on New Year’s Day 1907.12 “The healthy activity of a powerful Germany,” Crowe allowed, was good for the world. Instead of fearing Germany’s overseas expansion in principle, he wrote, Britain should applaud German competition for “intellectual and moral leadership” and “join in the race.” But what if Germany’s ultimate goal was “to break up and supplant the British Empire”? Crowe knew that German leaders had indignantly denied “any schemes of so subversive a nature,” and it was possible that Germany did not “consciously cherish” them. At the same time, Britain could ill afford to trust German assurances. Germany might seek “a general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbors and ultimately the existence of England.”

pages: 483 words: 134,377

The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor by William Easterly

"Robert Solow", air freight, Andrei Shleifer, battle of ideas, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business process, business process outsourcing, Carmen Reinhart, clean water, colonial rule, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, discovery of the americas, Edward Glaeser,, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, fundamental attribution error, germ theory of disease, greed is good, Gunnar Myrdal, income per capita, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jane Jacobs, John Snow's cholera map, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, M-Pesa, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, oil shock, place-making, Ponzi scheme, risk/return, road to serfdom, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, urban planning, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, World Values Survey, young professional

Perhaps it helps to understand this contradiction to learn that the main author of the soaring language of the charter was Jan Smuts, the long-time South African leader and long-time advocate of white rule in Africa. At the conference in San Francisco, Smuts praised the United Kingdom as the “greatest colonial power” in the world. Smuts saw the United Nations as serving “men and women everywhere, including dependent peoples, still unable to look after themselves.”54 The “international machinery” to promote “advancement” of “dependent peoples” included the British Empire. At the time of the UN’s founding, the United Nations and the British Empire were mutually supportive international organizations. W.E.B. DuBois accused Smuts and the other UN founders of “lying about democracy when we mean imperial control of 750 millions of human beings in colonies.”55 Friedrich Hayek had questioned the moral value of any real power given to an international organization in The Road to Serfdom in 1944. Hayek, with his realism about the Allies wielding such power and his suspicion of unchecked power at any level, reacted a lot like the left-wing anti-imperialist DuBois.

One of many examples this book gave was that of Lord Hailey, who during World War II stressed material development as a way to avoid a discussion of racism in the British Empire. He emphasized material development to avoid a discussion of the political rights of colonial subjects under the absolute power of the empire. He focused on material development to avoid a discussion of equal rights of whites and nonwhites. We discussed how Hailey was able to strike an implicit deal with the Americans: he would not embarrass them about their denial of equal rights to African Americans at home if the Americans would not embarrass the British Empire about its denial of equal rights to Africans. Both would agree to talk only about improved material well-being and not talk about rights. This strategy had already been part of FDR’s New Deal approach toward racial issues, when he needed support from both blacks and Southern segregationists.

Racism and Development The second decision at Versailles—not to endorse racial equality—also had lasting consequences for China and for the formation of development ideas. The Japanese, as the first nonwhite Great Power, wanted respect and proposed a declaration of racial equality at Versailles in 1919. The British and the Americans shot down the equality proposal. The British did not want international attention on racial discrimination within the British Empire. Woodrow Wilson was a segregationist at home who also did not want international interference in white Americans’ treatment of blacks. What is important about this decision is that the idea of development solidified while the West was still unapologetically racist during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939, as we will see with the example of China in this chapter. Racism would be even more at the center in colonial Africa in World War II, as we will discuss in the next chapter.

pages: 564 words: 178,408

Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood With Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour by Lynne Olson

Alistair Cooke, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, European colonialism, financial independence, full employment, imperial preference, indoor plumbing, jobless men, old-boy network, South China Sea

Even before the United States entered the war, the president made his position clear, telling his son Elliott: “We’ve got to make clear to the British from the very outset that we don’t intend to be simply a good-time Charlie who can be used to help the British empire out of a tight spot…. I think I speak as America’s President when I say that America won’t help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.” During Churchill’s first visit to Washington, Roosevelt raised the issue of self-determination for India, the most precious jewel in the British empire’s crown. Churchill reacted so negatively, he later wrote, that the president never brought up the subject again. That was not exactly the case. In future meetings and in his correspondence with the prime minister, FDR repeatedly raised the question of India and of British imperialism in general.

Such a radical idea, he said, should be adopted only “if we wished to make some striking gesture for the purpose of shaming the Americans.” The prime minister and other British officials repeatedly warned the Roosevelt administration that they were running out of dollars, but the U.S. government refused to believe them. The president, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were convinced that the riches of the British empire were virtually limitless. If the British needed more cash, they could simply liquidate some of their investments in North and South America. Morgenthau, in particular, pressed the British to sell to American investors such blue-chip companies as Shell Oil, American Viscose, Lever Brothers, and Dunlop Tires. When the British government protested that such sales (presumably at fire-sale prices) would be a serious blow to the country’s postwar economy, Morgenthau snapped that this was no time to be concerned about such matters.

When World War II broke out and the president began a correpondence with Churchill, who had risen from the political dead as first lord of the admiralty, FDR told Kennedy he had done it only because “there is a strong possibility that he will become prime minister, and I want to get my hand in now.” Once Churchill assumed the premiership, Kennedy, who detested him, reinforced Roosevelt’s already unfavorable impression with repeated assertions that Churchill was anti-American and anti-FDR. Another of Kennedy’s claims—that the prime minister was trying to lure the United States into the war solely to preserve the British empire—reinforced the president’s long-held suspicions of British imperialism. To Roosevelt, the ambassador characterized Churchill as a man “always sucking on a whisky bottle,” a view also held by undersecretary of state Sumner Welles, who called Churchill “a drunken sot” and a “third or fourth-rate man.” Roosevelt apparently accepted the view of Churchill as a serious tippler; when informed of his accession to 10 Downing Street, the president quipped that he “supposed Churchill was the best man that England had, even if he was drunk half of the time.”

How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States by Daniel Immerwahr

Albert Einstein, book scanning, British Empire, Buckminster Fuller, call centre, citizen journalism, City Beautiful movement, clean water, colonial rule, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Donald Trump, drone strike, European colonialism, friendly fire, gravity well, Haber-Bosch Process, Howard Zinn, immigration reform, land reform, Mercator projection, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, QWERTY keyboard, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Feynman, the built environment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, transcontinental railway, urban planning, wikimedia commons

Goodrich tire company Bharat, see India Bierce, Ambrose Bikini Atoll Bill of Rights bin Laden, Abdullah bin Laden, Awadh bin Laden, Mohamed bin Laden, Osama bin Laden, Saad bin Laden, Salem bin Laden construction firm birth control pills; see also contraceptives birther conspiracy theory Birth of a Nation, The (movie) Blackboard Jungle (movie) Black Panthers blacks, see African Americans black sites Blackwell, Blanche Blackwell, Chris Bloody Island Massacre Bollywood Bolsheviks Bonin Islands Boone, Daniel Boone and Crockett Club Boonesborough (Kentucky) Boot, Max Booth, John Wilkes Borneo “Born in the U.S.A.” (Springsteen) Boston Boston Globe Boston Tea Party Boustany, Charles Brazil Brereton, Lewis Breslau, University of Brezhnev, Leonid Bridge on the River Kwai, The (movie) Britain; colonies of, see British Empire; in Desert Storm coalition; industrialization in; U.S. military in British Council British Empire; American independence from; end of; governments of colonies in; holiday celebrating; in International Organization for Standardization; measurement system in; North American colonies of; Oregon claims of; in Paris Peace Conference; Peruvian guano industry monopolized by; telegraph cable system of; uprisings against; in World War I; in World War II; worldwide population of British Guiana Brown, Wenzell Brown v.

The 118,933 mainland military service members posted to territories are not listed with each territory’s population, so islands with military outposts but without local residents, such as Wake, are excluded. The Panama Canal Zone was technically Panamanian land leased to the United States, but the census counted it nonetheless. Nearly nineteen million people lived in the colonies, the great bulk of them in the Philippines. Was that a lot? Not compared with the world-girdling British Empire, which boasted at the time a population of more than four hundred million (the great bulk of whom lived in India). But the United States’ empire was nonetheless sizable. Measured by population, it was, at the time of Pearl Harbor, the fifth largest in the world. Another way to consider those nineteen million territorial inhabitants is as a fraction of the U.S. population. Again taking 1940 as our year, slightly more than one in eight (12.6 percent) of the people in the United States lived outside of the states.

’” * * * The proposition that the United States is an empire is less controversial today. The leftist author Howard Zinn, in his immensely popular A People’s History of the United States, wrote of the “global American empire,” and his graphic-novel spin-off is called A People’s History of American Empire. On the far right, the politician Pat Buchanan has warned that the United States is “traveling the same path that was trod by the British Empire.” In the vast political distance between Zinn and Buchanan, there are millions who would readily agree that the United States is, in at least some sense, imperial. The case can be made in a number of ways. The dispossession of Native Americans and relegation of many to reservations was pretty transparently imperialist. Then, in the 1840s, the United States fought a war with Mexico and seized a third of it.

pages: 650 words: 203,191

After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405 by John Darwin

agricultural Revolution, Atahualpa, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, Columbian Exchange, cuban missile crisis, deglobalization, deindustrialization, European colonialism, failed state, Francisco Pizarro, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Malacca Straits, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, price mechanism, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade

The British were pushed into formalizing their claims, and sometimes backing them up by displays of force. As ever more of the world was partitioned, they acquired fresh sets of potentially troublesome neighbours, newfences to maintain, and a newneed for vigilance. The result was paradoxical. Although the British Empire became larger and larger, the diplomats and strategists charged with protecting it became more and more anxious. Because the British had so much territory scattered round the world, they seemed always at odds with everyone else. The British Empire was like a huge giant, moaned a senior official, ‘with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction’. The minute it was approached by anyone else, the giant would scream with fear at the expected pain.48 It was a poor recipe for diplomatic harmony. The strategists were just as nervous.

After Tamerlane BY THE SAME AUTHOR Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918–1922 Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate JOHN DARWIN After Tamerlane The Global History of Empire since 1405 ALLEN LANE an imprint of PENGUIN BOOKS ALLEN LANE Published by the Penguin Group Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd) Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi – 110 017, India Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, North Shore 0632, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England First published 2007 1 Copyright © John Darwin, 2007 The moral right of the author has been asserted All rights reserved.

The imperial burden of guarding India against attack from within and without seemed heavier. But there were mass ive compensations. After 1860, with the spread of railways, India developed much more rapidly as a source of raw materials and the greatest market for Britain’s greatest export, cotton textiles. And if the burden of garrisoning India was heavy, it cost the British taxpayer nothing. Indeed, after 1860 two-thirds of the standing army of the British Empire (a total of some 330,000 British and Indian soldiers) was a charge on Indian not British revenues, and the forces in India could be (and were) used everywhere from Malta to Shanghai. As the partition of Afro-Asia speeded up after 1880, India’s geopolitical, as well as its economic, value became an axiom of British policy. An uncertain empire had become indispensable. THE RACE AGAINST TIME What had happened in India was a warning, if warning were needed, of what could follow elsewhere in Eurasia and Africa once the Europeans arrived in the neighbourhood with their range of new weapons – commercial, cultural and military.

pages: 407

Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy by Rory Cormac

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, currency manipulation / currency intervention, drone strike, Edward Snowden, Etonian, illegal immigration, land reform, Malacca Straits, Mikhail Gorbachev, private military company, Ronald Reagan, Stuxnet, trade route, union organizing, WikiLeaks, Yom Kippur War

DDEL: National Security Council Staff Papers, OCB Central Series, Box 55, OCB91 Syria (2), OCB, ‘Preparation of Courses of Action against Communism in Syria, Annex: Individual Recommendations Re Courses of Action Against Communism in Syria’, 9 January 1956; OCB91 Syria (3), Gustin to Staats, ‘Courses of Action in Syria’, 18 July 1956. 56. Wilford, America’s Great Game, p.247. 57. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, p.132. 58. Lucas, Divided We Stand, p.117. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi not e s317 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East, p.121. FO 371/128220, British Embassy, Beirut, to Foreign Office, 18 January 1957. Lucas, Divided we Stand, p.218. Wilford, America’s Great Game, p.254. Dorril, MI6, p.637. FO 371/115954, G. Arthur, ‘Iraq and Syria: The Fertile Crescent’, 10 October 1955. CAD: MS 191/1/2/4, Shuckburgh Diary, 6 October 1955. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, p.132. Wilford, America’s Great Game, p.256. DDEL: John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 4, Meetings with the President Aug. thru Dec. 1956 (3), Memorandum of Conversation between the President, Secretary of State, and Under-Secretary of State, 7 November 1956.

Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.185. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire. Chapter 7 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Quoted in Jones, ‘Preferred Plan’, p.408. CAD: MS 191/1/2/5, Shuckburgh Diary, 5/12/56. FO371/135623, ‘Future Policy’, PUSD Planning Section, 15/1/58. PREM11/2401, NFC to Moreton, 30/12/56. Mawby, ‘The Clandestine defence of Empire’ pp.105–17. PREM11/2401, ‘Aden Protectorate: Proposed Special Operations against the Yemen in Dhala Area’, PM(56)79, October 1956. FOI: Dean to Lloyd, ‘Counter-Subversion’ and country-specific annexes, 19/3/56; Dean, ‘Counter-Subversion’, OPS/10/56, 29/3/56; CAB301/118, Dean to Compton, 18/7/57. CAB301/118, Dean to Compton, 18/7/57. Wilford, America’s Great Game, p.268. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire. One other mysterious covert action was codenamed Operation Lidget and authorized at the same time, but it is unclear where it targeted.

FO371/135642, Ramsbotham, ‘Middle East Policy’, 28/8/58, attached: ‘Points for a Middle East Policy’, PUSD, 27/8/58; Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.483; Rawnsley, ‘The Voice of Britain and Black Radio Broadcasting in the Suez Crisis’, pp.511–12; Kyle, Suez, p.151. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp.438–9. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, pp.128–9 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi not e s321 18. FO1110/1220, Barclay to Wright, 24/10/59. 19. FO1110/1220, Foreign Office minute, 10/12/59. 20. Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire. See also Boyd, ‘Sharq Al-Adna/ The Voice of Britain’, pp.443–55. 21. Bittman, The Deception Game, pp.19–20, 29. 22. CAB301/118, Compton to Lloyd, ‘Secret Vote: Special Operations’, 29/4/57. 23. FOI: Brook, ‘Special Political Action’, 31/7/58. 24. CAB301/118, Trend, ‘Reserves’, 25/3/58. 25.

pages: 435 words: 134,462

The Perfect Mile: Three Athletes, One Goal, and Less Than Four Minutes to Achieve It by Neal Bascomb, Kingfisher Editors

British Empire, discovery of penicillin, first-past-the-post, glass ceiling

Two points were indisputable: the Finns had proved to be fine hosts of the competition, and more records were broken in these games than in any other Olympics in history. Less than forty-eight hours after the closing ceremonies in Helsinki, another competition was held, this time in London’s White City Stadium, pitting a British Empire team against the United States. The stadium had staged an Olympic Games itself in 1908 and was infamous for setting the official marathon distance at 26 miles, 385 yards—instead of simply 26 miles —so that the race would finish in front of Queen Alexandra’s royal box. The stadium was now used for greyhound racing and an assortment of other events, including track and field. The Americans beat the British Empire team, as they had beaten the world a few short days before. In the 4 x 1 mile relays, where four runners from each team ran a mile, Roger Bannister earned the Empire team an early lead.

“Roger, you only become”: Bannister, The Four Minute Mile (Globe Pequot Press, 1956),p. 127. “Hello, John”: “Rivals Happy to See Each Other,” Melbourne Age, June 26, 1954; “Mile Stars in Guarded Meeting,” Melbourne Herald, June 27, 1954; Dick Bed-does, “Mile Aces Avoid Talk of Records,” Vancouver Sun, June 26, 1954. 228 On October 30, 1891: “Australia at the British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Vancouver, Canada 1954,” British Empire Games Official Program, July 30, 1954; John Blanch and Paul Jenes, Australia’s Complete History at the Commonwealth Games (John Blanch Publishing, 1982). 229 Henry Luce, the famed publisher: Norris McWhirter, personal interview. To televise the event: “TV Mile Thriller Seen by 40,,,” New York Times, August 8, 1954. For the estimated: Arthur Daley, “Dream Race,” New York Times, August 1, 1954.

Only days after returning to campus, Santee marched into the office of the University of Kansas newspaper. He had an announcement to make: Wes Santee was going to be the first to run the four-minute mile. For years he had known he was capable. Now his intention was a matter of public record. John Landy had a different announcement to make when he landed in Melbourne, but one equally telling. Directly after the British Empire versus the United States match, he boarded a flight to Australia. He had declined to join Macmillan and Perry, who, accompanied by Cerutty, were running in a series of competitions in Scandinavia. Landy needed to get back to his agricultural science studies, which had fallen by the wayside as he strove to make the Olympic team. He also wanted to start training again. Landy wanted to show that his trip to Helsinki had been worth the time and money it had taken to get him there.

pages: 218 words: 63,471

How We Got Here: A Slightly Irreverent History of Technology and Markets by Andy Kessler

Albert Einstein, Andy Kessler, animal electricity, automated trading system, bank run, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Noyce, Bretton Woods, British Empire, buttonwood tree, Claude Shannon: information theory, Corn Laws, Douglas Engelbart, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, fiat currency, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, Grace Hopper, invention of the steam engine, invention of the telephone, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jacquard loom, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, John von Neumann, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph-Marie Jacquard, Kickstarter, Leonard Kleinrock, Marc Andreessen, Maui Hawaii, Menlo Park, Metcalfe's law, Metcalfe’s law, Mitch Kapor, packet switching, price mechanism, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit motive, railway mania, RAND corporation, Robert Metcalfe, Silicon Valley, Small Order Execution System, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, spinning jenny, Steve Jobs, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, tulip mania, Turing machine, Turing test, undersea cable, William Shockley: the traitorous eight

Growth protected, and created, by its own declining price elasticity. Put that in your pipe and smoke it. We’ll see it again with semiconductors and integrated circuits in another couple of hundred years. Transportation Elasticity, Sea and Rail Even in the early 1800’s, the British Empire got off to a slow start. The transatlantic slave trade was abolished in 1807, but it wasn’t until another 20 years later that the British would declare the slave trade a form of piracy, punishable by death. In 1833, slavery was abolished in the entire British Empire, after a 5-year trial period, leading to the more commonly known date of abolishment in 1838. The delay didn’t hurt the engine. The plantations in the American South still had slaves, until 1865, and were cranking out cotton for the British textile mills. But there were still a lot of costs to be wrung out of the system, mainly in transportation costs, which could sometimes run three quarters of the price of English goods in foreign markets.

This set up the incredible simplification of computers in the 20th century, which only had to deal with 2 digits, 1’s and 0’s, true and false, on and off, instead of 10 numbers. This is a major inflection point in harnessing Logic and Memory for computers. Dealing with two instead of ten states lowered the complexity of computing devices by at least a factor of 10. *** Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution kept cranking. Amazing as it sounds, the British Empire really began with the invention of affordable, comfortable clothing. Silk was comfortable but painfully expensive, since there was no way to push productivity out of worms. Wool was cheaper, and warm, but way too itchy. We all know that. It was the act of substitution that fired the economic engine. Cotton was itchy too, until it was stretched and wound into thread and yarn by the Crompton Spinning Mule.

Well, limited protection, one to 20 years, but there are always exceptions to the exceptions. The “protection under law” of ideas prompted individualism, self-interested folks who could work hard knowing they could reap the benefit of their own work. Adam Smith would note this much later, but for now, it set off a wave of invention. A strong and liquid capital market became an important component to enable the British Empire. They almost didn’t have one. Capital Markets and Bubbles Today, money sloshes around the globe quite easily, from Zanzibar to Berkeley Square in milliseconds. But back in the 18th century, money was a local instrument. Almost by necessity, precious metals such as gold and silver were the de facto currency for trade - no one trusted much else. Monarchies and their governments created their own currencies, backed by gold, first as a convenience -- a titan of industry would need wheelbarrows filled with gold to do his business.

pages: 231 words: 72,656

A History of the World in 6 Glasses by Tom Standage

Berlin Wall, British Empire, Colonization of Mars, Copley Medal, Edmond Halley, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, Eratosthenes, European colonialism, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Kickstarter, laissez-faire capitalism, Lao Tzu, multiplanetary species, out of africa, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade

Is it any surprise that the current center of coffee culture, the city of Seattle, home to the Starbucks coffeehouse chain, is also where some of the world's largest software and Internet firms are based? Coffee's association with innovation, reason, and networking—plus a dash of revolutionary fervor—has a long pedigree. A coffeehouse in late-eighteenth-century Paris TEA and the BRITISH EMPIRE 9 Empires of Tea Better to be deprived of food for three days than of tea for one. —Chinese proverb Thank God for tea! What would the world do without tea? How did it exist? —Sydney Smith, British writer (1771-1845) The Drink That Conquered the World w WITH FAR-FLUNG TERRITORIES stretched around the world, the British Empire was famously described in 1773 by Sir George Macartney, an imperial administrator, as "this vast empire on which the sun never sets." At its height, it encompassed a fifth of the world's surface and a quarter of its population.

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition of this book under LCCN: 2004061209 eISBN: 978-0-802-71859-4 First published in the United States in 2005 by Walker & Company This paperback edition published in 2006 Visit Walker & Company's Web site at Book design by Chris Welch Typeset by Coghill Composition Company Printed in the United States of America by Quebecor World Fairfield 8 10 9 7 To my parents Contents Introduction. Vital Fluids Beer in Mesopotamia and Egypt 1. A Stone-Age Brew 2. Civilized Beer Wine in Greece and Rome 3. The Delight of Wine 4. The Imperial Vine Spirits in the Colonial Period 5. High Spirits, High Seas 6. The Drinks That Built America Coffee in the Age of Reason 7. The Great Soberer 8. The Coffeehouse Internet Tea and the British Empire 9. Empires of Tea 10. Tea Power Coca-Cola and the Rise of America 11. From Soda to Cola 12. Globalization in a Bottle Epilogue. Back to the Source Acknowledgments Appendix. In Search of Ancient Drinks Notes Sources Introduction Vital Fluids There is no history of mankind, there are only many histories of all kinds of aspects of human life. —Karl Popper, philosopher of science (1902-94) THIRST is DEADLIER than hunger.

Tea provided the basis for the widening of European trade with the East. Profits from its trade helped to fund the advance into India of the British East India Company, the commercial organization that became Britain's de facto colonial government in the East. Having started as a luxury drink, tea trickled down to become the beverage of the working man, the fuel for the workers who operated the new machine-powered factories. If the sun never set on the British Empire, it was perpetually teatime, somewhere at least. With its associated drinking rituals of genteel afternoon tea and the worker's tea break, tea perfectly matched Britain's self-image as a civilizing, industrious power. How odd, then, that this quintessentially English drink initially had to be imported at great cost and effort from China, that vast and mysterious dominion on the other side of the world, and that the cultivation and processing of tea were utter mysteries to its European drinkers.

pages: 1,213 words: 376,284

Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, From the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First by Frank Trentmann

Airbnb, Anton Chekhov, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, car-free, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, clean water, collaborative consumption, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, Community Supported Agriculture, cross-subsidies, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, equity premium, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial exclusion, fixed income, food miles, full employment, germ theory of disease, global village, haute cuisine, high net worth, income inequality, index card, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, James Watt: steam engine, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kitchen Debate, knowledge economy, labour mobility, libertarian paternalism, Livingstone, I presume, longitudinal study, mass immigration, McMansion, mega-rich, moral panic, mortgage debt, Murano, Venice glass, Naomi Klein, New Urbanism, post-industrial society, post-materialism, postnationalism / post nation state, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, rent control, Richard Thaler, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, stakhanovite, the built environment, the market place, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, young professional, zero-sum game

E. 238–9 Duala 132–3, 252 dualism, Cartesian 95, 230–31 Dubai 618 Duchamp, Marcel 636 Dufayel (department store) 200, 410 Duhamel, Georges: Scenes de la vie future 283 durable goods see consumer durables dustbins 629–30, 633, 648 dusting 222, 226 dustyards 628 Dutch East Indies 26, 90, 164, 172 Dutch National Bank 563 Dutch people see Netherlands/the Dutch Dutch Republic 4, 10, 54–8 DVDs 387, 533 Dynamo Dresden 526 e-bay 654, 658 e-commerce 481–2, 654, 658 earning power 309 see also spending power earthenware 57, 60, 61, 62, 88, 89, 623 East India Company, Dutch (VOC) 25–6, 57, 69, 70 East India Company, English (EIC) 25–6, 64, 65, 70, 85, 89, 92, 120, 139 Easterlin, Richard 452 eating see also food: in China 357; and class 587–8, 604–5; and control of one’s life 324; family meals 14, 461; with friends 467; gender and eating roles 14; at home 14, 353, 376, 461; Irish 599–600; meat 2, 588, 598–9, 604, 675, 684; in migrant food cultures 596–602, 603–5; and the misery U-index 454; national eating habits 166; out 353, 448, 602, 605, 685 see also restaurants; overeating 106–7, 339; power of eating habits 9; rituals 14; slaves eating English food 170; and sociability 14, 155; time spent on 454 Eaton’s (department store) 203 Eco, Umberto 315 economics 2, 91, 140, 151–2; affluent budgets 338–9; budget studies 147–50, 283; consumption and the German national/historical school of 116, 153, 154; and the discovery of the consumer 147–54; economists’ approach to consumption 119, 147–54; and ethics 151; extension of economic theory into daily life matters 427; GDP see gross domestic product; home economists 256; Keynesianism 427–8; spending power see spending power Economist 611 economy: depression 273, 274, 278–88, 405, 413, 414; of East Germany 335; economic growth 11, 273, 278, 303, 324, 325, 364, 368, 394, 411, 415, 540, 639, 677; emotional 685; European economic expansion 28; foreign luxuries and local economy 41; GDP see gross domestic product; inflation 274, 275, 343, 415, 614, 619; Japan’s economic crisis and ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s 371, 384, 498, 534; moral economy 278, 563, 571, 578, 581; recession 287, 403, 405, 420, 426, 428, 521, 668, 683; scarcity economy 332; shadow economy 330; sharing/leasing economy 687–8; and sustained growth of affluence 301, 302; Total Material Requirement 665, 668 Ecuador 80, 162, 476 Eden, Ashley 143 Eden, Frederic 75 Edo 176, 181, 358, 472 see also Tokyo education 3, 12, 142, 288; and advertising 485, 489; in Asia 372, 407; benefits from fair trade 579; company-based 523; consumer education 393–4; ‘consumer’s view of adult education’ 285; educational films 215; English education in British empire 142; home science 256; learning through play 488; and leisure 448–9, 451, 465–9, 467; schools see schools; Soviet 330, 331–2; spending on 148, 304, 326, 537; and taste 214, 548 efficiency 140, 150, 237, 246, 247, 398, 412, 667, 672–5, 686, 688; campaigns 634; energy efficiency 671–3; and the internet 687; rational 270, 360; and socialism 644–5 Egypt, ancient 68 Egypt, modern 202, 299–300, 593; remittances 590, 593 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 307 El Puente foundation 575 elderly people 429–30, 498–519; abuse/neglect of 516; in Asian societies 508, 509, 516–19; as consumers 429–30, 498–519; day centres for 503; facilitating forces of active ageing 501–4; German 200, 332, 499, 507–9, 512, 513; golden age club movement 503–4, 505; leisure and holidays 450, 498–519; pensions see pensions; post-war 506–7; retirement see retirement; Scandinavian 507, 508, 509, 510, 557; and sport 515 electric cookers 240, 248, 249, 253, 364–5, 554 electric labour-saving devices in the home see domestic appliances and technologies electric lights 192, 208, 367 electric switches 248–9 electricity 4, 175, 181, 248–9, 253, 672; in Asia 367–8, 391–2; in Brazil 527; providers 248, 392 electronic waste 622, 652, 653, 664; recycling 662–4 electroplating 225–6 elevators 192–3 Elias, Norbert 294 elite 29, 52, 84, 92, 169–70, 180, 228, 283–4, 340, 345, 436–7, 605, 680; Asian 52, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 381; British 59, 397; colonial 80; communist 294–5; French 340, 345, 346; women 74 Elizabeth I 39 Elmtown, America 497–8 email 464, 465, 470, 471 embroidery 25, 35, 36, 48, 252, 293 Emin Pasha (born Isaak Eduard Schnitzer) 171 emotions: and comfort 270; emotional economy 685; emotional needs 321; growing interest in 682; mass culture diffusing ready-made emotions 315; separated from reason 274; tied to goods 104–5, 315–16, 320–21, 337, 686 empire/empires: African consumption and empire 124–36; America as a ‘market empire’ 307; Atlantic empire 92; Bat’a empire 525; British empire see British empire; British Raj 137–46, 296–8; and capitalism 160; colonial protection and the tug of war between empires 120; colonialism see colonialism; consumption and the stain of empire 357; costs and benefits of empire debate 91, 160–61; as engines of expansion 90; Hobson’s attack on empire 119, 158, 161; and the housewife 300; impact on taste and ritual 78–93, 119, 170–71; imperialism see imperialism; and the imperium of things 119–73; Indian switch from Mughal to British rule 137–8; interplay of consumption, flow of goods and imperial power 120; liberal empire of free trade 91, 120–21, 122, 140, 141, 146, 161, 163–4, 167, 572 see also British empire; mercantilist empire 91, 92, 161, 163, 164; Mughal empire 137, 138, 142; national identity defined in opposition to empire 379; and popularization of exotic drug foods 78–93; Russian empire 204; schizophrenic 135–6; Spanish empire see Spanish empire; and the value of origin 169–71; writing out the colonial producer 173 empiricism 96 employment see labour and work empowerment: through choice 288, 557, 559, 560, 567; of the consumer 6, 203, 260, 287, 288, 295, 557, 559, 560, 567; through domestic appliances 260; through shopping 6, 203; of women 6, 260 emulation 13, 14, 90, 165, 328, 677 see also conspicuous consumption; imitation; status and social positioning; discomfort with 143; equality and emulative consumption 438; as parent of demand 14, 73; in spending, ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ 8, 316, 325, 340, 374, 383, 438 Endrigo, Sergio 352 energy: American sources, demands and consumption 325, 671–3; British domestic consumption 672, 674; cheap energy and high wages 72; companies 367; efficiency 671–3; embedded/embodied 629, 670, 671, 673; EU government expenditure on 538; growth in use 672, 674, 678; and material flow 670; waste-to-energy plants 632 Engel, Ernst 148 Engel’s law 148, 149 Engels, Friedrich 113, 114, 115 England: bankruptcy in 432; Beer Act (1830) 476; and the ‘birth’ of the consumer society 10, 73; Black Death 58; comfort trade-offs 61; Community Health Councils 556; consumer culture 58–63, 61, 62, 65–6, 71–2, 76–7; ‘consumer revolution’ in 17th century 22; debt in 1700 407; early modern 4, 537; elderly people 506, 509–11; Elizabethan 59–60; English as controllers of most ‘good things’ 132; excesses as a drain on wealth 97; farmers’ markets 582; middle classes 117; as missionary nation 126; Parliamentary Committee on Illicit Practices 65; people with holiday homes 655; Poor Law 537; prudence 116; rent 243–4, 555; Shops Act (1911) 476; Stuart England 59; sumptuary laws for clothes 39, 40; Sunday trading 476, 478–9; Sunday Trading Act (1994) 478; trade 26–7, 582; Tudor 60; urban density 93; Victorians see Victorians; wages 58; wealth increase 103 Enlightenment 95–110, 158, 231, 413; and battle against slavery 123–4; and religion 606 Ensslin, Gudrun 322 entertainment see also leisure: affluence and cheap entertainment 455; cinema see cinema; film; colonial planters 161; and conspicuous consumption 228; and the emotional economy 685; equipment 14; and generational bonds 521; growing islands of 281; home entertainment 15 see also DVDs; gramophones; radio; television; and mass culture 315; positive role of play the pursuit of pleasure 218–19; salotto, room for 30; street entertainment 191; Sunday 475, 476–7; as therapy for the elderly 505; urban entertaining spaces 210–21; and wealthy youth 216 environment: climate change 560, 666; ecological footprint 15, 675, 686, 687, 689; environmental justice campaigns 669; Green movement 639, 644; greenhouse gases see greenhouse gas emissions; and material flow 664–75; mining damage 15, 683–4; ‘NIMBY’ 669; outsourcing environmental burden 669–70; past damage to 676; pollution see pollution; recycling and environmental awareness 652 see also recycling of waste; and the shedding of possessions 685–6; sustainability see sustainability; and waste see waste equality and inequality see inequalities; social equality Equipment Installment Plans (EIP) 658 Erhard, Ludwig 308, 309 escapism 305 Esselunga (Italian supermarket) 350 Este, Isabella d’, Marchesa of Mantua 31 Estonia 547 ethics see also morality: and economics 151; ethical consumerism 128, 155–7, 565–80 see also fair trade; fairness see fair trade; fairness; global ethic of care 573, 584; Golden Rule 572; Puritan work ethic 450, 455; and shopping 155, 390, 567, 569 see also fair trade; and wise consumption 289 Euclid Beach Park 218 Europe: annual growth rates in affluence and consumption, 1950s to early 1970s 273; ‘cashing out’ on the home 428; credit 409, 415; domestic appliance adoption 247; early modern 8, 38–43, 53–63, 65–6, 70–77, 398, 678; Eastern 123, 301, 313, 326–37, 427, 461, 463, 535, 598, 600, 607, 644–6 see also Soviet Union; economic expansion 28; EU see European Union; export of plastic waste 652; and the fall of Nazism 300–301; fitness wave 544; GDP 24; and the Iron Curtain 301, 327 see also Cold War; and leisure 449–52, 456, 458–9; merchants 25; and remittances 590; secularization and decline in church-going 479, 606, 607; silver mines 25; smartphones 464; spending on recycling 648; spread of consumer goods from 1950s to 1980s 301; sumptuary laws see sumptuary laws; trade/traders 23, 64, 124, 129; waste and recycling regions 644, 645; waste generation lowering 640–41; and the World Wars see First World War; Second World War; youth spending power 312 European Court of Justice 559, 560 European Social Survey (2004/5) 426–7 European Union 245, 439, 559, 560; European Economic and Social Committee 560; Landfill Directive 640; recycling 640, 652, 653; Single European Act 559; social spending 537, 537, 538, 541; and waste 640, 648, 652 Eurovision Song Contest 352 evangelicalism 128, 608–9 see also Pentecostalism; Calvinist 57, 58, 614; Methodist/Wesleyan 133, 612; Presbyterian 384; prosperity gospel 610–11, 615; Puritan see Puritanism; televangelism 610–11 Everyday Life Reform League (Japan) 250, 256–7 Ewha, Seoul 384 Ewing, Oscar 504 excess, extravagance and opulence 15, 36–7, 49, 55, 97, 100, 103, 106, 294, 302, 382, 405, 407, 434–9, 610; in Asia 48–9, 374, 384–5, 390, 407; and corruption 35–6, 51; and debt 406–7, 428, 431; effects on public 8, 15, 35–6, 302; fears of 41; in funerals 39, 48, 382, 399; imperial spectacle 140–41; sumptuary laws see sumptuary laws; of uncultured nouveau riche (Sombart) 416; wealth as mother of 57; in weddings 8, 37, 39, 41, 48, 596; women’s ‘senseless extravagance’ (Gilman) 228 exotic goods 4, 10, 32, 96, 162, 167–71, 602–3, 678 see also silk; spices; Turkish carpets; beverages 166, 603, 678 see also coffee; tea; foods/drug foods 58, 78–93, 120, 165, 168, 579, 601; and nationalism 168–9 expenditure surveys 319 Exposition Universelle (Paris 1867) 193 extravagance see excess, extravagance and opulence Fabri, Friedrich 134 Facebook 465, 470 factories 89, 153, 293, 525, 528, 638; directors 336; factory homes 457; factory labour/labourers 79, 166, 210, 214, 239, 260, 294, 337; factory production 146; factory textiles 139; owners 177, 195; Soviet 330 Faentino, Andrea 31–2 fair trade 562–71, 564, 681; activism 567, 570–71; advertising 567; branding/labelling 565–6, 570, 577; and choice 563, 566–70; and the co-operative movement 578, 579; education benefits 579; Fairtrade Fortnight 562; global sales of fair trade products 562, 564, 564; health benefits 579; ‘lifestyle’ presentation 567; versus localism 584; origins of 571–80; and responses to globalization 568–9; scale problem of 570; and security 579; shops/world shops 564, 565, 566, 574–5, 576; as a social movement 565, 566, 567, 570–71; and supermarkets 562, 565, 568, 579; towns 562, 568 fairness 343–4, 549, 565–6; fair trade see fair trade; in public services 549, 561; unfairness 276, 335, 336 fairs 203 family: 4–2–1 phenomenon 372; activities 14, 309, 340–41; aristocratic European family networks 84; Asian 363, 364, 365, 367, 382–3, 384, 385, 517–18, 520; choice and rebuilding of post-war family 308; conspicuous consumption as moral threat to 380; extended 145, 260, 382; familycentred happiness 256; family-oriented consumption/consumerism 260, 324, 340–41, 382–3; and generational bonds 520–21; income 147–50, 409, 425, 519; meals 14, 461; planning 365; possessions and family memory 104, 686; privatizing effect of gifted consumer goods on 596; recreational spending 148, 339; time spent with children 461 farmers 44, 47, 54, 55, 73, 75, 203, 634, 649; farmers’ markets 580, 581, 582, 583, 584 fascism 11, 16, 273, 289, 533; and ‘consumerism’ as totalitarian 5, 7; Nazi see Nazism fashion 4, 21, 678 see also clothes; African craze for 135; in Burgundy 69; centres of fashion network 204; children’s 485, 486–7; Chinese 21–2, 44, 46, 47, 49, 69; and the cinema 281–2; codes of dress 40; and the conservative order 41; customization 138; disposable 636; dolls 71; as driver of demand or innovation 22, 67; exotic fashion and antiestablishment politics 323; as heart of Western capitalism 22; and imperialist subjugation 379; magazines 70–71, 200; male 200–201, 315; merchants as ambassadors of 38; as product of East–West exchange 88; radical use of 323; sapping effect on nation 109; shows 528; Soviet cravings for style and 302; and subcultures 6; and sumptuary laws 39–40; teenage 498; women’s 21, 42, 46, 48, 52, 60, 65, 67, 69, 149, 150, 282, 498, 528 Fashion magazine 200 Fazal, Anwar 552 Federal Housing Administration 286, 341, 413 Fedorova, E.

For example, in the Gujarati city of Surat, just north of Mumbai, the main textile industries shrank, but artisans who made the famous gold thread jari managed to hang on.48 Notables, meanwhile, tried to keep up their former lifestyles as best they could, even as their pensions were being cut back by the British. While undermining old elites, the British empire simultaneously promoted new ones, such as the Parsis. Still, with all these nuances and qualifications, it is clear that, overall, the British empire was bad for luxury consumption in India. This was fully intentional. India was ‘backward’, one English observer argued in 1837, because ‘princes and nobles were engrossing all the wealth of the country,’ while its people were ‘groaning’ under the burden. There was no harm done at all if cheap British textiles killed local manufacturers.

With the rapid growth of China, and material advances in India, Brazil and other so-called emerging nations, it is hard to treat consumption as a uniquely Anglo-American export. Though a billion and a half people continue to live at the edge of starvation, it is clear that the bulk of the world’s population is living with more. They have not, however, simply followed in American footsteps. Of course, the British empire and its twentieth-century successor, the United States, were active in spreading their material civilization across the globe. But other societies were not empty vessels: they had their own cultures of consumption. African kingdoms that succumbed to European colonizers in the nineteenth century brought pre-existing tastes and habits to the imperial encounter. In the twentieth century, Japan and West Germany joined the club of affluent societies with a ticket stamped ‘savings’, not cheap credit.

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The English by Jeremy Paxman

back-to-the-land, British Empire, colonial rule, Corn Laws, Etonian, game design, George Santayana, global village, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, Khartoum Gordon, mass immigration, Neil Kinnock, Own Your Own Home, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Right to Buy, sensible shoes, urban sprawl, women in the workforce

The vast retail chains which will within a few decades have driven the small tradesmen out of business are there, but if you dropped into the chain of Boots chemists, it might as easily have been to change your books at the library. In the evening, maybe a visit to the cinema. There is a strong case for agreeing with Churchill that the Second World War had been his country’s ‘finest hour’. He was talking about Britain and the British Empire, but the values of that empire were the values which the English liked to think were something which they had invented. Certainly, the war and its immediate aftermath are the last time in living memory when the English had a clear and positive sense of themselves. They saw it reflected back in films like In Which We Serve, Noël Coward’s fictionalized account of the sinking of HMS Kelly. As the survivors of the destroyer, sunk by German dive-bombers, lie in their life-raft they recall the ship’s history.

One political party after another has made promises to restore the integrity and standing of the country, which have turned out to be outrageous lies. It would not matter in Italy, where they don’t believe in the state anyway and where the institutions which do matter to them – family, village, and town – remain demonstrably alive. The English put their faith in institutions, and of these, the British Empire has evaporated, the Church of England has withered away and Parliament is increasingly irrelevant. And it is not merely that the external sureties have gone, so, it seems, have internal certitudes. I once asked the author Simon Raven what he thought being English meant and he replied with a disconsolate caveat, ‘I’d always hoped it meant gentle manners, cricket, civility between the classes, lack of malice towards others, fair dealing with women, and fair dealing with enemies.

Huxley, the philosopher Herbert Spencer, 5 dukes, 10 earls, 26 MPs, 17 admirals, 59 generals, 200 clergymen and 600 other worthies.12 This insularity gave the English a great self-confidence, but it did nothing for their sophistication. It is hard to escape the conclusion that, deep down, the English don’t really care for foreigners. Before it was necessary for foreign visitors to reverence the British Empire, one visitor after another commented on the remarkable vanity of the English. In 1497, a Venetian noticed that ‘the English are great lovers of themselves, and of everything belonging to them; they think that there are no other men than themselves and no other world but England; and whenever they see a handsome foreigner they say “he looks like an Englishman” and that “it is a great pity that he should not be an Englishman” ’.13 In describing a visit to England by Frederick, Duke of Württemberg in 1592, a German author commented upon the fact that ‘the inhabitants … are extremely proud and overbearing … they care little for foreigners, but scoff and laugh at them’.14 Another visitor, the Dutch merchant Emmanuel van Meteren, noticed the same arrogance when he listed the qualities of the English character.

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The scramble for Africa, 1876-1912 by Thomas Pakenham

active measures, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, Etonian, European colonialism, God and Mammon, imperial preference, Khartoum Gordon, land reform, out of africa, Scramble for Africa, spice trade, spinning jenny, trade route, transatlantic slave trade

The first step was to forge individual federations in Australia and South Africa, cast in the mould of the great Canadian federation already set up at Ottawa. In Australia, Canberra would soon take its place as capital of the new federation. But in South Africa everything was confused by the differences of race. For one thing, the region straddled both British Empires – white and black-and-brown. For another, two of the states, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were Boer republics – outside the British Empire. Already the attempt to annex and federate the Transvaal had stirred up a hornet’s nest among the Boers, as Frere and Carnarvon had discovered to their cost in the 1870s. It would be a brave Colonial Secretary who would wish to re-open that question in a hurry. In August 1895 Chamberlain left his beloved Highbury to take over the CO in earnest.

The seven British officials breathed a sigh of relief and prepared to return to the small house and garden where they had laagered with their horses. There were no flags, no bunting, not even a solitary Union Jack, or a note of ‘God Save the Queen’. All that would come in a month or so, when the first British battalion arrived from Natal and marched into Pretoria. The Transvaal had been formally, if provisionally, united to the British Empire. And it had proved, the British Treasury would be delighted to hear, a quiet wedding, costing almost nothing. Meanwhile a second ceremony, more like a funeral, took place at the side of Church Square, facing the government offices. A small group of Boers – townspeople and bearded takhars (from the back-veld), some with rifles slung over their shoulders – listened as one of the Executive Council read out a solemn protest signed by Thomas Burgers, the Transvaal’s mercurial state President.

According to the terms of his commission, he must win the agreement of the Volksraad (the Transvaal Parliament) or the majority of the white inhabitants – or at least ‘a sufficient number’. It was vital that no blood was shed. For this was the first step in the British government’s master plan for South Africa to persuade the Transvaal and the other Boer republic, the Orange Free State, to join the British Empire and federate with the two British colonies, the Cape and Natal. With his twenty-five mounted policemen, Shepstone had come and seen and conquered. The political and financial crisis in the Transvaal was real enough. The white minority were split into three factions: Boers favouring the President, Thomas Burgers; Boers favouring the Vice-President, Paul Kruger; and newly arrived British, favouring imperial intervention.

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The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order by Benn Steil

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, banks create money, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Charles Lindbergh, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, deindustrialization, European colonialism, facts on the ground, fiat currency, financial independence, floating exchange rates, full employment, global reserve currency, imperial preference, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, lateral thinking, margin call, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Monroe Doctrine, New Journalism, open economy, Paul Samuelson, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, psychological pricing, reserve currency, road to serfdom, seigniorage, South China Sea, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, the market place, trade liberalization, Works Progress Administration

The following day President Roosevelt delivered his famous war message to Congress, declaring December 7, 1941, to be “a date that will live in infamy.… No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.” Churchill, when informed by the president of the horrendous casualties, responded “What a holocaust!”95 But in private he called the Japanese assault “a blessing.… Greater good fortune has never happened to the British Empire.” He had finally gotten what he had so desperately sought. America was in the war. “I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.”96 Over in Moscow, sentiments were similar. “We sighed a deep sigh of relief,” recalled the head of the American desk of the NKVD Intelligence Directorate, Vitali Pavlov.97 Yet this was not merely cheerleading from the sidelines. Pavlov had, secretly, been part of the game.

Churchill did not, and never would, have a sophisticated grasp of monetary issues, but he was ultimately swayed by the widely held view that a renunciation of the prewar parity would have been a “repudiation” of Britain’s solemn obligation to maintain the convertibility of the pound.48 This would, in his mind, have had serious geopolitical ramifications. “If we had not taken this action,” he said in announcing it, “the whole of the rest of the British Empire would have taken it without us, and it would have come to a gold standard, not on the basis of the pound sterling, but a gold standard of the dollar.” As it turned out, a “gold standard of the dollar” would result anyway, but with Britain bearing great economic costs in maintaining what was clearly an overvalued exchange rate from 1925 until 1931, when the country was ignominiously driven off gold again.

Key to this plan was American financing of British military purchases in the United States, which he insisted must be in the form of grants rather than loans. Britain could not once again be forced to bear “the dishonour and the reproaches of default” while allowing the United States to sell at its convenience to foreign markets supplied by the British, thereby cutting off British means of repayment. The government had to guard “against the present emergency being used as an opportunity for picking the eyes out of the British Empire.”110 The underlying assumption of the memo was that the United States was an ally in the war, though one that needed to be trained to behave like one. Such an assumption suffered from two key weaknesses: the United States was not yet at war with anyone, and was not about to be lectured as to what it was allowed to do in playing the role Keynes assigned to it. This he was about to learn in May 1941, on his first official visit to Washington since World War I.

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Culture and Imperialism by Edward W. Said

Ayatollah Khomeini, Bartolomé de las Casas, Bretton Woods, British Empire, colonial rule, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Howard Zinn, Joseph Schumpeter, Khartoum Gordon, lateral thinking, lone genius, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, traveling salesman

Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York: Pantheon, 1981). Mayer’s book, which deals with the reproduction of the old order from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century, should be supplemented by a work that details the passing on of the old colonial system, and trusteeship, from the British empire to the United States, during World War Two: William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1977). 3. North-South: A Program for Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980). For a bleaker, and perhaps truer, version of the same reality, see A. Sivananden, “New Circuits of Imperialism,” Race and Class 30, No. 4 (April–June 1989), 1–19. 4. Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World (New York: Monthly Review, 1974). 5.

Now I am temperamentally and philosophically opposed to vast system-building or to totalistic theories of human history. But I must say that having studied and indeed lived within the modern empires, I am struck by how constantly expanding, how inexorably integrative they were. Whether in Marx, or in conservative works like those by J. R. Seeley, or in modern analyses like those by D. K. Fieldhouse and C. C. Eldridge (whose England’s Mission is a central work),3 one is made to see that the British empire integrated and fused things within it, and taken together it and other empires made the world one. Yet no individual, and certainly not I, can see or fully grasp this whole imperial world. When we read the debate between contemporary historians Patrick O’Brien4 and Davis and Huttenback (whose important book Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire tries to quantify the actual profitability of imperial activities),5 or when we look at earlier debates such as the Robinson-Gallagher controversy,6 or at the work of the dependency and world-accumulation economists André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin,7 as literary and cultural historians, we are compelled to ask what all this means for interpretations of the Victorian novel, say, or of French historiography, of Italian grand opera, of German metaphysics of the same period.

Novels therefore end either with the death of a hero or heroine (Julien Sorel, Emma Bovary, Bazarov, Jude the Obscure) who by virtue of overflowing energy does not fit into the orderly scheme of things, or with the protagonists’ accession to stability (usually in the form of marriage or confirmed identity, as is the case with novels of Austen, Dickens, Thackeray, and George Eliot). But, one might ask, why give so much emphasis to novels, and to England? And how can we bridge the distance separating this solitary aesthetic form from large topics and undertakings like “culture” or “imperialism”? For one thing, by the time of World War One the British empire had become unquestionably dominant, the result of a process that had started in the late sixteenth century; so powerful was the process and so definitive its result that, as Seeley and Hobson argued toward the end of the nineteenth century, it was the central fact in British history, and one that included many disparate activities.14 It is not entirely coincidental that Britain also produced and sustained a novelistic institution with no real European competitor or equivalent.

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The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won by Victor Davis Hanson

British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, European colonialism, facts on the ground, friendly fire, means of production, mutually assured destruction, New Journalism, plutocrats, Plutocrats, RAND corporation, South China Sea, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

Upon becoming prime minister, he did not punish the appeasers such as Chamberlain, Attlee, and to an extent Halifax, but instead, to the degree he could during the war, sought to tap—or to appear to tap—their talents. As prime minister, Churchill focused on the absolute defeat of the Axis powers and the preservation of the British Empire through the ordeal of war. He was aware of the limitations on his own power well apart from the nature of parliamentary government, arising in part from the lasting effects on the British psyche of the prior disasters of fighting in France in World War I, the eroding stature of the British Empire, and the dilemma that Britain had to fight a three-front war against the Germans, Italians, and Japanese, but without the resources of its partner-in-arms, the United States. Churchill also was sensitive to his own unpopularity among many in the British political class, of his unapologetic aristocratic heritage in an age of social welfare, and of the shadow that still hung over his advocacy for the Gallipoli campaign of World War I, in which a bold plan to knock Turkey out of the war ended in catastrophe and the loss of nearly two hundred thousand British, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), and Allied casualties.

Such efforts were also couched in irony, given that Churchill, the colonialist, knew best that his Soviet and American allies would increasingly nose Britain out, as their powers grew and the Axis threat waned. Yet for all his genius, Churchill never quite came to accept that the logic of the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, and the alliance with Joseph Stalin in various ways would shortly dismantle the British Empire. The war had unleashed enormous pent-up populist passions and transnational ideological movements, and in its aftermath there would be little likelihood of the British Empire making an argument to retain at least some of its colonies on the basis of its supposed prewar civilizing mission.51 Britain’s strategic and operational mistakes, in which Churchill played a leading role, were many. An advocate of naval air power, he nonetheless sent British capital ships to Singapore without their accustomed accompanying air support and despite the Royal Navy’s own prior carrier success against Italian battleships.

The nexus of European power and influence had long ago shifted far northward, following the expansion of hostile Ottoman power into the western Mediterranean, the discovery of the New World, the Reformation, the British and French Enlightenments, and the Industrial Revolution. But the Mediterranean world connected three continents and had remained even more crucial after the completion of the Suez Canal for European transit to Asia and the Pacific. The Axis “spine” was predicated on a north-south corridor of fascist-controlled rail lines connecting ports on the Baltic with those on the Mediterranean. Without the Mediterranean, the British Empire could not easily coordinate its global commerce and communications. It was no wonder, then, that North Africa, Italy, and Greece became early battlegrounds, as did the age-old strategic stepping-stones across the Mediterranean at Crete, Malta, and Sicily that suffered either constant bombing or invasions. British, American, Italian, and German soldiers often found themselves fortifying or destroying the Mediterranean stonework of the Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, and Ottomans.

pages: 458 words: 112,885

The Prodigal Tongue: The Love-Hate Relationship Between American and British English by Lynne Murphy

airport security, British Empire, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, Downton Abbey,, illegal immigration, invention of the printing press, joint-stock company, moral panic, pre–internet, Saturday Night Live, Silicon Valley, smart cities, Steven Pinker, too big to fail, transatlantic slave trade, young professional

It is the fear that one’s own culture—the familiar foundations of oneself—is being displaced by language that is both foreign and, in its globalization, more generic. Australianisms and Indianisms don’t inspire that kind of fear because they don’t have that kind of power. The American role in the globalization of English is disconcerting for the nation that formerly exported the English language. The British Empire practically invented linguistic globalization. As American English gained its power and worldwide audience, so did amerilexicophobia. It may be no coincidence that campaigns for an English “academy,” charged with fixing the language in its most perfect form, came soon after the United States gained its independence. In the early days, new American vocabulary was regarded as a silly (and distasteful) colonial indulgence.

And yet today with very little effort I’ve found water closet listed as the “equivalent” of American toilet in a half dozen recent UK–US language comparisons,62 even one with “21st century” in the title.63 3 SEPARATED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE? We really have everything in common with America nowadays, except, of course, language. Oscar Wilde, The Canterville Ghost (1887) At the height of the British Empire, English intellectuals were taken with the notion of an “Anglo-Saxon race,” tracing its roots to the Germanic peoples who settled in Britain after the Romans left in the 5th century. With self-satisfaction they concluded that their “race” was something special, illustrated by the strength of their culture over that of the conquered Celts, their early codification of individual rights with the Magna Carta in 1215, and their break with the Roman church in the 16th century.

In the second half of that century, discovery of gold made Australia attractive, and after World War II the Australian government tried to ensure a white majority population by massively subsidizing the cost for Europeans to move. This led over a million Britons to become “ten-pound Poms,” so-called after the price of the sea voyage. (Pom, short for pomegranate, was rhyming slang for immigrant. It remains an Australian epithet for British people.) Australia, Canada, and other parts of the British Empire (and later the Commonwealth) were thus exposed to more and more recent British English than Americans could get in the pre-television, pre-internet era. And then there was the nastiness of the breakup between the US and Britain, involving an eight-year war with thousands of casualties (and then a further bloody row, 1812–14).29 Canada, Australia, and New Zealand still have a monarch—the British monarch—unlike Americans, who rejected the British aristocracy and the British structure of government.

pages: 493 words: 136,235

Operation Chaos: The Vietnam Deserters Who Fought the CIA, the Brainwashers, and Themselves by Matthew Sweet

Berlin Wall, British Empire, centre right, computer age, Donald Trump, energy security, Fall of the Berlin Wall, game design, Haight Ashbury, hiring and firing, Howard Zinn, Kickstarter, Mikhail Gorbachev, planetary scale, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Feynman, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, Skype, South China Sea, Stanford prison experiment, Thomas Malthus, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, WikiLeaks, Yogi Berra, éminence grise

After a few moments of waiting, the clip came up: a balding, bespectacled nonagenarian standing at a lectern flanked by blue curtains and patriotic flags. There were three large scabs on his forehead, as though he had recently recovered from walking into a door. In patrician, New England tones, he was giving a speech on one of his favorite subjects. “The British Empire,” he declared, “is our enemy. It’s the enemy of all decent people on this planet. The British monarchy is an obscene satanic force. And I do not exaggerate when I say satanic. Because Zeus, who is the author of the Roman Empire, and also author of the British Empire, is otherwise known as Satan. Her policy is what? To reduce the population of the planet. Cause mass deaths. Starvation. Killing. Destroy crops. This woman is satanic!” Michael squinted at the figure on the screen. “The enemies have changed a little,” he said.

Judging by their hand-drawn posters, their main business was cheerleading for the Kremlin. “Sanctions on banks, not Russia!” declared one placard. “Stop Carl Bildt’s war against Putin.” Nobody was paying much attention, so I decided to cheer them up by accepting a free copy of their newspaper. It contained one English-language article, which argued that the financial crisis of 2008 was a manufactured catastrophe. “Call it Tonkin Gulf Syndrome,” it said. “It’s what the British Empire did to suck the U.S. into the Vietnam quagmire.” The author of the article was Lyndon LaRouche. Issues that unite all commentators across the political spectrum are rare. But for the past five decades, the European Workers Party has provided one for Sweden. Everybody from SÄPO to the Communists to the Social Democrats to the libertarian Right has a long-held and consistent view on the EAP—it is profoundly, mystifyingly weird.

LaRouche saw conspirators everywhere. Even the Leesburg Gardening Club was a nest of KGB agents. (“Clacking busybodies in this Soviet jellyfish front … oozing out their funny little propaganda and making nuisances of themselves.”) But he required a more prominent enemy. His pick was both astute and insane. He chose Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, then commissioned a book contending that the British Empire had never fallen but had reinvented itself as a covert body of power and influence. Dope Inc. argued that the queen controlled the world’s illegal drug markets and was fighting a secret opium war against the United States. It had been a long campaign: the British had drawn the United States into the Vietnam War and had also encouraged the development of the student anti-war movement. But it had prevented that movement from achieving its revolutionary potential by keeping it supplied with hashish and LSD.

pages: 522 words: 144,511

Sugar: A Bittersweet History by Elizabeth Abbott

addicted to oil, agricultural Revolution, Bartolomé de las Casas, British Empire, flex fuel, land tenure, liberation theology, Mason jar, Ralph Waldo Emerson, spinning jenny, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, women in the workforce, working poor

See Tinker, A New System of Slavery. 526. Adamson, “Immigration into British Guiana,” in Saunders, Indentured Labour in the British Empire, p. 45. 527. Quoted in Adamson, Sugar without Slaves, p. 51. 528. Adamson, Sugar without Slaves, p. 51. 529. E. Williams, History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago, p. 108. 530. Quoted in Tinker, A New System of Slavery, p. 119. 531. Quoted in ibid., p. 52. 532. Jenkins, The Coolie, p. 194. 533. Sewell, The Ordeal of Free Labor in the West Indies, pp. 123–24. 534. Jenkins, The Coolie, p. 388. 535. Quoted in ibid., p. 424. (Italics in original.) 536. Quoted in Adamson, “The Impact of Indentured Immigration on the Political Economy of British Guiana,” in Saunders, Indentured Labour in the British Empire, p. 49. 537. Quoted in Adamson, Sugar without Slaves, p. 147. 538. Both quotations in Adamson, “The Impact of Indentured Immigration,” p. 49. 539.

This cruelty proceeded from their having them for three years only, which made them spare the Negroes rather than these poor creatures!”48 Map of the West Indies & c. Mexico or New Spain. Also ye Trade Winds and ye several Tracts made by the Galeons and Flota from place to place. From Atlas Minor, London, 1736, by influential Tory cartographer Herman Moll. This map, his masterpiece, portrayed the West Indies as a region with enormous commercial potential at the core of the developing British Empire. The map also assisted British buccaneers who preyed on Spanish shipping. In Barbados, planter William Dickson recalled, the indentured servants were “stinted in their diet, and otherwise ill treated.”49 In a petition to Parliament in 1659, begging for relief, white servants indentured in Barbados described lives spent “grinding at the mills and attending the furnaces, or digging in this scorching island; having nothing to feed on (notwithstanding their hard labour) but potato roots, nor to drink, but water with such roots washed in it … being bought and sold still from one planter to another, or attached as horses and beasts for the debts of their masters, being whipt at the whipping post (as rogues) for their masters’ pleasure, and sleeping in sties worse than hogs in England.”

Chapter 5 Sugar Stirs the Universe THE SUGAR INDUSTRY AT WORK IN EUROPE Across the Atlantic, at the other end of the bridge that carried the Old World to the New, the metropolises were bound up in their colonies’ fortunes. Britain in particular had its sugar colonies and its people’s voracious sweet tooth to thank for its expanding empire. Together with the tea and coffee it sweetened, sugar was one of the most important founding blocks of the British Empire. The eighteenth-century Abbé Raynal went further, exclaiming that the “scorned [sugar] islands … double perhaps triple the activity of the whole of Europe. They can be regarded as the principal cause of the rapid movement which stirs the Universe.”280 The slave-sugar complex was all-pervasive. It linked field slaves and slave boilers to colonial carters and dock workers; seamen, captains and ship’s bursars to freight forwarders, insurance agents and customs agents; harbour officials, longshoremen and carters to refiners, grocers, confectioners; people who took sugar in their tea and spread jam on their bread to refiners, packagers and bakers; and shipbuilders and shipyard workers to brokers and commercial agents known as factors.

pages: 519 words: 148,131

An Empire of Wealth: Rise of American Economy Power 1607-2000 by John Steele Gordon

accounting loophole / creative accounting, bank run, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, buttonwood tree, California gold rush, clean water, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, disintermediation, double entry bookkeeping, failed state, financial independence, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, global village, imperial preference, informal economy, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jacquard loom, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, lone genius, Louis Pasteur, margin call, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, Menlo Park, Mikhail Gorbachev, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, postindustrial economy, price mechanism, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, undersea cable, Yom Kippur War

As a result, New England could build a ship for about half the cost of building one in England. In the forty years between 1674 and 1714, Boston alone averaged forty ships a year, producing more than the rest of the North American colonies combined. Indeed, it was, after London, the greatest center of shipbuilding in the British Empire, with fifteen shipyards in operation by 1700. And New Englanders were not just shipbuilders, they were soon major ship owners as well. By 1700 only the ports of London and Bristol within the British Empire outstripped Boston in shipping. The carrying trade that New England developed extended throughout the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and beyond. And it carried far more than just New England products and imports. New England was well named economically speaking, because its economy was the most like England’s of all the British North American colonies.

Introduction THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, the position of the United States in world affairs has no equivalent in history. Indeed, one has to look to the apogee of the Roman Empire, almost two millennia ago, to find even a remotely comparable situation. Rome conquered the known world by force of arms. Its power arose from its military machine, epitomized by the legions. And every Great Power since has exercised formal political hegemony over alien peoples to advance its own interests. A century ago, the British Empire covered a quarter of the globe’s land area, while a third of the world’s people were subjects of King Edward VII. But only a small minority of those people spoke English or regarded themselves as British. The United States, however, has always been, at most, a reluctant imperialist. In the twentieth century it was the only Great Power that did not add to its sovereign territory as a result of war, although it was also the only one to emerge stronger than ever from each of that century’s three Great Power conflicts.

As the new technologies spread around the world, they inescapably brought with them American ways and an American perspective. English has ever increasingly become the world’s unifying language, as Latin was Europe’s for centuries. Sixty percent of the students who are studying foreign languages in the world today are studying English, which is increasingly a required subject in school systems everywhere. Partly this is because, thanks to the British Empire, so many countries use English as a first or second language, but equally it is because the United States dominates the world in communications and entertainment. The Internet, the most powerful means of communication ever devised, is largely an American invention, and English is the language of more than 80 percent of the four billion Web sites now in existence. The ultimate power of the United States, then, lies not in its military—potent as that military is, to be sure—but in its wealth, the wide distribution of that wealth among its population, its capacity to create still more wealth, and its seemingly bottomless imagination in developing new ways to use that wealth productively.

We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent by Nesrine Malik

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, British Empire, centre right, cognitive dissonance, continuation of politics by other means, currency peg, Donald Trump, feminist movement, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gender pay gap, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, illegal immigration, invisible hand, mass immigration, moral panic, Nate Silver, obamacare, old-boy network, payday loans, planetary scale, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, sexual politics, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Thomas L Friedman, transatlantic slave trade

The fact that it took place off the British Isles seems to be the benchmark for what qualifies as British enough to be taught, and what is not. But British colonies were not administrative outposts, they were British soil, and their residents were British. Until 1948, nationals of British colonies were called ‘British subjects’, meaning they had de facto citizenship of the United Kingdom and the British Empire. Until 1949, everyone born or naturalised in the United Kingdom or the British empire, including independent dominions such as Canada and Australia, enjoyed that right. But British history is still confined to the isles, and the lack of acknowledgement of the rights of offshore British subjects became eroded over the years. This culminated in the 2018 Windrush scandal, where Caribbean British subjects with the right to British nationality were treated like illegal migrants, persecuted, harassed and deported.

The novelist Nikita Lalwani calls it ‘an exercise in British wish-fulfilment’. In the 2011 film, English pensioners who decamp to India for relief from their financially pressured conditions back home end up rescuing the hapless Indian protagonist, his hotel, and sorting out his love life. It is essentially a modern-day story of colonialism, one that is paternalistic and self-deprecating, while at the same time servicing the warm nostalgia for British empire. To this genre was added the 2017 TV series The Good Karma Hospital, which finds a junior doctor beginning a new chapter of her life in southern India following heartbreak in the United Kingdom. Both titles poke fun at the setting as a sort of passive lower life form location in which the protagonist can go through their journey. Raj exoticism is now an established part of British popular culture.

Once the balance sheet tool is wielded it turns history into an account from two sides, trapping those who would like history simply to be demythified in a binary where there can only be two accounts – history as virtuous origin or history as shame. In 2017, Oxford moral and pastoral theology professor Nigel Biggar created a useful illustration of how this tool works. He said that the British should have ‘pride’ in their past and, that if they were taught to believe what the ‘strident anticolonialists’ said, that could lead to a feeling of guilt which makes the public ‘vulnerable to wilful manipulation’. The British empire, according to Biggar, was ‘morally mixed’; he asserted that ‘just like that of any nation state, pride can temper shame’. He continued: ‘Pride at the Royal Navy’s century-long suppression of the Atlantic slave trade, for example, will not be entirely obscured by shame at the slaughter of innocents at Amritsar in 1919. And while we might well be moved to think with care about how to intervene abroad successfully, we won’t simply abandon the world to its own devices.’

pages: 405 words: 121,999

The Human Tide: How Population Shaped the Modern World by Paul Morland

active measures, agricultural Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, clean water, Corn Laws, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Donald Trump, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, global pandemic, mass immigration, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Mohammed Bouazizi, Nelson Mandela, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, sceptred isle, stakhanovite, Thomas Malthus, transatlantic slave trade, women in the workforce, working-age population

Having moved from the demography of Joan Rumbold’s era to that of our own, the population has grown enormously. Back in the eighteenth century there were not a billion people on the face of the earth. Today there are more than 7 billion. Just as the politics, the economics and the sociology of societies today are radically different from those of the past, so is the demography. This process, which started in the British Isles and among sister peoples in the United States and the British Empire around the year 1800, spread first across Europe and then to the whole world. Much of Africa has not yet completed the transition, but most of it is well on its way. Outside sub-Saharan Africa there are barely half a dozen countries today where women have on average more than four children, the global norm as recently as the 1970s. There is now no territory outside Africa with a life expectancy below sixty, again around the global norm in the 1970s and close to the European norm as recently as the 1950s.

It was the weight of numbers–combined with new industrial technologies–that enabled the British and their offspring to make their language, culture and political institutions the global norm. Although England had led the way in population growth, Scotland was in close step. Wales was often included in the English data, but Ireland was different. Whilst aware of these differences and similarities, it is possible to talk of a population explosion which was not just English but which encompassed Britain as a whole. This was important in terms of the British Empire, because both Scotland and Ireland played a disproportionate role in providing immigrants for the lands beyond Europe. Britain’s rise to global pre-eminence was based not just on the population explosion at home but also on its people coming to dominate vast continental spaces abroad. If, as historian Timothy Snyder has argued, speaking of late 1940 and early 1941, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had remade Europe ‘but Great Britain had made the world’, they did so by exporting people.28 It is worth distinguishing between three different areas in which the British had an impact.

Without the population boom there would have been no mass settlement, and without mass settlement Britain’s imperial claims to these territories might have remained as insubstantial as those of Spain to most of Latin America. Equally, without mass settlement these lands could not have become the great granaries and providers of meat and other essentials to a global trading system of which a newly industrialised Britain was the heart. Just as Ireland was the exception within an exception in the British Isles, so South Africa was the exception that proved the rule within the British Empire. Whereas most of Africa was judged unsuitable for European settlement, its climate unhealthy, malaria rampant and transport to its interior untenable, South Africa was seen by the British as a land of emigration thanks to its more amenable climate. People were also drawn by the lure of diamonds and gold. As in Canada, people from the British Isles were not the first Europeans to come to this conclusion, and the history of Britain in South Africa is as much one of displacement of the Dutch settlers as it is of displacement of the Africans.

pages: 413 words: 128,093

On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey Into South Asia by Steve Coll

affirmative action, airport security, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, back-to-the-land, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, global village, income inequality, income per capita, Indoor air pollution, Khyber Pass, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, New Urbanism, Ponzi scheme, Ronald Reagan, upwardly mobile, urban sprawl, yellow journalism

It took hours to pull the minister’s body from his jeep. Buildings throughout the posh palm-lined neighborhood were damaged. Vehicles lay strewn in mangled heaps. One of the smashed cars bore a windshield sticker that said, “Unite to Fight Terrorism.” The Sri Lankan government promoted Wijeratne posthumously to the rank of general and put on a state funeral at Independence Square, a Colombo memorial to the end of the British Empire in South Asia. Army officers drew the minister’s body through the streets on a gun carriage. Sri Lankan honor guards surrounded the square. Buddhist priests eulogized Wijeratne’s accomplishments in service to the state. Soldiers fired a twenty-one-gun salute. One day after the funeral, the weekly security briefing went on as usual in the appointed Colombo conference room. General Cyril Ranatunge, Wijeratne’s immediate successor, insisted on two minutes of silence in honor of the departed minister.

As Benazir learned about politics in Larkana, so Abedi first learned about finance, wealth, power, and law in Mahmudabad’s centuries-old feudal world. In Mahmudabad a series of bejeweled Muslim rajas administered great tracts of land from a gold and silver throne. They financed idealistic politicians such as the Mahatma Gandhi and Pakistan founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah. They doled out gifts to their subjects, paid stipends to renowned poets and intellectuals, plotted against the British Empire, and finally witnessed the birth of independent India and Pakistan in a bloody spasm of post-Partition riots. Abedi and nearly all of BCCI’s senior executives migrated as young adults from what is now India to newly independent Islamic Pakistan in 1947 and 1948, when the kingdoms that the British had employed to rule South Asia fell. In Pakistan, Abedi and other refugees confronted the challenge of building twentieth-century institutions from scratch in a culture still rooted in seventeenth-century feudalism.

In 1922, when Abedi was born, Mahmudabad was the second or third largest princely state in northern India, encompassing 530 villages and thousands of hamlets and generating half a million pounds sterling in annual income. Its line of Shia Muslim rajas dated to the seventeenth century and commanded respect from the British colonial officers they served, as well as from Indians struggling for liberation from the British Empire. The Mahmudabad rajas lived in exorbitant luxury and owned several palaces in the countryside and the city of Lucknow. But they were also deeply involved in anticolonial politics and Shiite religious movements. As far back as the mid-nineteenth century, Abedi’s family served the rajas as revenue officers, administrators, and private secretaries. Their position as courtiers provided them comfort, stability, and middle-class status.

pages: 961 words: 302,613

The First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin by H. W. Brands

always be closing, British Empire, business intelligence, colonial rule, complexity theory, Copley Medal, experimental subject, Fellow of the Royal Society, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, music of the spheres, Republic of Letters, scientific mainstream, South Sea Bubble, Thomas Malthus, trade route

There are supposed to be now upwards of one million English souls in North America (though ’tis thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea), and yet there is perhaps not the one fewer in Britain, but rather many more, on account of the employment the colonies afford to manufacturers at home. This million doubling, suppose but once in 25 years, will in another century be more than the people of England, and the greatest number of Englishmen will be on this side the water. What an accession of power to the British Empire by sea as well as land! What increase of trade and navigation! That the future of America, and with it of the British empire, depended on the availability of land was what made the contest with France so important. The defeat incurred by George Washington in 1754 inspired the British government to action; early the following year it dispatched an expedition of regular army officers and men to America to smite the French intruders and regain Britain’s rightful hold on the Ohio.

When instructed to submit to questions, he silently refused—a refusal that seemed to seal his humiliation. But he was not humiliated; he was outraged. The mask concealed not mortification but anger. Who did these people—this bought solicitor, these smug lords, the corrupt ministers that made the proceeding possible—who did they think they were? Who did they think he was? It was the question of the hour; generalized, it was the question on which hung the fate of the British empire. Who were these Americans? To the British they were Britons, albeit of a turbulent sort. The Americans might live across the ocean, but the colonies they inhabited had been planted by Britain and were defended by Britain; therefore to the government of Britain—preeminently, to the British Parliament—the Americans must submit, like any other Britons. To the Americans, the question was more complicated.

Franklin proudly called himself a Briton. In doing so he did not deny his American birth, for he conceived Americans to be as fully Britons as the English, Scots, and Welsh. He delineated for all who would listen the glorious future of Britain in North America, a future joining American energy to the English tradition of self-government. As a measure of his faith in the future of America within the British empire, he employed his influence to help his son William win appointment as royal governor of New Jersey. But then things began to go wrong. A foolish ministry ignored that tradition of self-government and started treating the Americans as subjects—not subjects simply of King George but of Parliament. The Stamp Act attempted to put this novel interpretation into effect and touched off the first round of rioting in America.

The Splendid and the Vile: A Saga of Churchill, Family, and Defiance During the Blitz by Erik Larson

Albert Einstein, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, plutocrats, Plutocrats, traveling salesman, union organizing, Works Progress Administration

In a poll taken in May 1940, Gallup found that 93 percent opposed a declaration of war, a stance known as isolationism. The U.S. Congress had previously codified this antipathy with the passage, starting in 1935, of a series of laws, the Neutrality Acts, that closely regulated the export of weapons and munitions and barred their transport on American ships to any nation at war. Americans were sympathetic toward England, but now came questions as to just how stable the British Empire was, having thrown out its government on the same day that Hitler invaded Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. On Saturday morning, May 11, President Roosevelt convened a cabinet meeting at the White House at which England’s new prime minister became a topic of discussion. The central question was whether he could possibly prevail in this newly expanded war. Roosevelt had exchanged communiqués with Churchill a number of times in the past, while Churchill was first lord of the Admiralty, but had kept these secret for fear of inflaming American public opinion.

While Germany had more bombers, he said, Britain had bombers too, and would deploy them “without intermission” to attack military targets in Germany. He reminded his audience that Britain had a navy. “Some people seem to forget that,” he said. He made no attempt, however, to skirt the true meaning of the French collapse. The “Battle of France” was over, he said, adding, “I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.” At stake was not only the British Empire but all of Christian civilization. “The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war.” He marched toward his climax: “If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail then the whole world, including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more prolonged, by the lights of a perverted science.”

On one occasion, crews from the nearby base at Watton “gave us the most superb aerial beating up that anyone could possibly conceive,” Mary wrote in her diary. “A flight of Blenheims appeared & one after another swooped down to within 25 or 30 feet of the ground. We all nearly passed out with excitement.” Every day these same pilots took part in life-or-death sorties that, as far as Churchill was concerned, would determine the fate of the British Empire. Civilians watched air battles unfold from the safety of their gardens or while strolling village streets and picnicking in bucolic meadows, as circular contrails filled the sky above. At dusk these caught the last of the day’s sunlight and turned a luminescent amber; at dawn, they became mother-of-pearl spirals. Aircraft crashed into pastures and forests; pilots tumbled from cockpits and drifted to earth.

pages: 471 words: 124,585

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World by Niall Ferguson

Admiral Zheng, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, Atahualpa, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Black Swan, Black-Scholes formula, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial exploitation, commoditize, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, deglobalization, diversification, diversified portfolio, double entry bookkeeping, Edmond Halley, Edward Glaeser, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, German hyperinflation, Hernando de Soto, high net worth, hindsight bias, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Isaac Newton, iterative process, John Meriwether, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour mobility, Landlord’s Game, liberal capitalism, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, negative equity, Nelson Mandela, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Parag Khanna, pension reform, price anchoring, price stability, principal–agent problem, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit motive, quantitative hedge fund, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, seigniorage, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, stocks for the long run, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Bayes, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transaction costs, undersea cable, value at risk, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War

., Jr. 256-8 Blankfein, Lloyd 1-2 Bleichroeder (Arnhold & S.) 315 Bloch, Ivan 297 Bloomfield, Arthur 305 Blunt, John 155-6 BNP Paribas 272 Bolivia 2 Bolsheviks 107 bonds and bond markets 64 benefits of 3 bond insurance companies 347 boom 332 bundled mortgages see securitization collateral for 94 compared with mortgages (spread) 241-2 compared with stock markets 124-5 cotton-backed 94-6 crises and defaults 73 definitions 65-9 emerging market bonds see emerging markets face value (par) 73 future of 115-16 government see government bonds history 65-7 importance and power of 67-9 inflation and 105 insurance companies and 198 interest rates 67 liquidity 71 and mortgage rates 68 and pensions 67 perpetual bonds 76 Right- and Left-wing critics of 89-90 Rothschilds and 80-91 and savings institutions 116 and taxes 68 vulnerability of 99 war and 69-75 widening access to 100 bonds and bond markets - cont. and First World War 297 Bonn Consensus 312 bookkeeping 44-5 Borges, Jorge Luis 111 borrowing see credit; debt Boston 266 Botticelli, Sandro 42 ‘bottomry’ 185 Brady, Nicholas 165 Brailsford, Henry Noel 298 Brazil 18. see also BRICs Bretton Woods 305-8 Bretton Woods II 334 Briand, Aristide 159 BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China: Big Rapidly Industrializing Countries) 284 Britain: and American Civil War 94-5 banknotes 27 banks and industrialization 48-9 business failures 349 colonies see British Empire compared with France 141 compared with Japan 209-11 cost of living 26 cotton industry 94-6 East Indies trade 134; see also East India Company economy 210-11 finances for Napoleonic wars 80-84 financial ignorance 11-12 financial sector’s contribution to GDP 5 fiscal system 75 foreign investment 287 foreign investment in 76 Glorious Revolution 75-6 house prices and property ownership 10. housing policies 251-3 inflation 108 institutional investors and 196-8 and insurance 4 mortgage interest relief 252 national debt 80 pensions see welfare state below poverty in 13 savings glut 293 Spanish Empire and 26 stock market 125 and sub-prime mortgages 8 voting rights 234 welfare state 199 and First World War 101-2 see also British Empire; English-speaking countries; Scotland British Empire: and bond market 101 control of colonies 294-6 corporate finance as foundation of 3 and investment 98-9 as narco-state 290 nationalist and independence movements 295 see also Britain broad money 62 brokers 153-4 Bronowski, Jacob 2 bronze 24 Bruegel, Pieter the Elder 70 Bruges 47 Bubble Act 156 bubbles: asset-price 163 five stages of 8; displacement 143-4 history of 121-2 international pressures and 167 Kaffir (gold mine) 297 Mississippi 126-7 monetary policy and 166-7 property price 233 reflexivity of 316 South Sea 154 super 342 technology ( 6 see also financial crises Büchi, Hernán 216 Buckingham, Dukes of 236-40 Buenos Aires 98 Buffett, Warren 228 building societies 247. see also mutual associations Bulgaria 101 bulls (stock market) 121 Bunn, Matthew 223 bureaucracy 275 burial societies 184 Bush, President George W. 117-18.

Far from being the work of mere leeches intent on sucking the life’s blood out of indebted families or gambling with the savings of widows and orphans, financial innovation has been an indispensable factor in man’s advance from wretched subsistence to the giddy heights of material prosperity that so many people know today. The evolution of credit and debt was as important as any technological innovation in the rise of civilization, from ancient Babylon to present-day Hong Kong. Banks and the bond market provided the material basis for the splendours of the Italian Renaissance. Corporate finance was the indispensable foundation of both the Dutch and British empires, just as the triumph of the United States in the twentieth century was inseparable from advances in insurance, mortgage finance and consumer credit. Perhaps, too, it will be a financial crisis that signals the twilight of American global primacy. Behind each great historical phenomenon there lies a financial secret, and this book sets out to illuminate the most important of these. For example, the Renaissance created such a boom in the market for art and architecture because Italian bankers like the Medici made fortunes by applying Oriental mathematics to money.

A 5 per cent consol purchased by Anna Hawes in January 1796 Given that she paid £101 for a £100 consol, Mrs Hawes was securing an annual yield on her investment of 4.95 per cent. This was not an especially well-timed investment. April that year saw the first victory at Montenotte of a French army led by a young Corsican commander named Napoleon Bonaparte. He won again at Lodi in May. For the next two decades, this man would pose a greater threat to the security and financial stability of the British Empire, not to mention the peace of Europe, than all the Habsburgs and Bourbons put together. Defeating him would lead to the rise of yet another mountain of debt. And as the mountain rose, so the price of individual consols declined - by as much as 30 per cent at the lowest point in Britain’s fortunes. The meteoric rise of a diminutive Corsican to be Emperor of France and master of the European continent was an event few could have predicted in 1796, least of all Mrs Anna Hawes.

pages: 257 words: 56,811

The Rough Guide to Toronto by Helen Lovekin, Phil Lee

airport security, British Empire, car-free, glass ceiling, global village, Haight Ashbury, haute couture, haute cuisine, indoor plumbing, Jane Jacobs, joint-stock company, Khyber Pass, Kickstarter, Marshall McLuhan, megacity, place-making, urban renewal, urban sprawl

An excellent example of the neo-Gothic style once popular in every corner of the British Empire, the cathedral boasts scores of pointed-arch windows and acres of sturdy buttressing. Inside, the nave is supported by elegant high-arched pillars 59 DOWNTOWN TORON TO and flanked by an ambitious set of stained-glass windows that attempts to trace the path by which Christianity reached Canada from Palestine via England. It’s all a little confusing, but broadly speaking, the less inventive windows depict Biblical scenes, whereas those that focus on English history are the more ingenious. These stained-glass windows were inserted at the end of the nineteenth century, but those of St George’s Chapel, in the southeast corner of the church, were added in 1935 to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of King George V. They exhibit an enthusiastic loyalty to the British Empire that is echoed in many of the cathedral’s funerary plaques: take, for example, that of a certain Captain John Henry Gamble, who was born in Toronto in 1844 but died on active service in the Khyber Pass in 1879; his stone is in the west transept.

Five years later, Gooderham added a distillery to produce whisky from Ontario grain and it was a great commercial success. By the 1860s the distillery was producing two and a half million gallons of whisky from a quarter of a million bushels of grain. In 1869, a fire destroyed most of the original works, but its replacement – a series of tidy brown–brick buildings – survives to this day, on Mill Street, just east of the foot of Parliament Street. The distillery, which at one time was the largest in the British Empire, closed in 1990, but the old works remains the best-preserved Victorian industrial complex in Canada. The complex has recently been revamped as the Distillery District (see p.61), which now holds, amongst much else, art galleries, independent designers, bakeries, shops, a microbrewery and no less than three performance venues – all without a multinational chain in sight, for which blessing the developers are due (at least) three hearty cheers

A short walk south from Union Station, the Air Canada Centre, 40 Bay St (T 416/815-5500, W, is home to hockey’s Maple Leafs and basketball’s Raptors; see Chapter 14, Sports and outdoor activities, for more on these two teams. Hour-long tours of the Air Canada Centre ($12) are available, and include a visit to a dressing room and the Maple Leafs Memories and Dreams Suite, which looks at the team’s history. The Royal York hotel Directly opposite the west end of the railway station, the Royal York hotel, 100 Front St W, was the largest and tallest building in the British Empire when it opened in 1929. The architects, Montreal’s Ross and Macdonald, opted for the Beaux Arts style, so as to match the hotel with Union Station, but in lieu of the formal symmetries of its neighbour, the Royal York has a cascading, irregular facade with stylistic flourishes reminiscent of a French chateau. Originally, the hotel had its own concert hall, mini-hospital and 12,000-book library, and each of its one thousand rooms had a radio, private shower and bath.

pages: 413 words: 120,506

The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017 by Rashid Khalidi

Bernie Sanders, British Empire, colonial rule, Donald Trump,, European colonialism, Kickstarter, mass immigration, Ronald Reagan, WikiLeaks

The occasion for this drastic makeover was a campaign of sabotage and terrorism launched against Great Britain after it drastically limited its support of Jewish immigration with the 1939 White Paper on the eve of World War II. This falling-out between erstwhile allies (to help them fight the Palestinians in the late 1930s, Britain had armed and trained the Jewish settlers it allowed to enter the country) encouraged the outlandish idea that the Zionist movement was itself anticolonial. There was no escaping the fact that Zionism initially had clung tightly to the British Empire for support, and had only successfully implanted itself in Palestine thanks to the unceasing efforts of British imperialism. It could not be otherwise, for as Jabotinsky stressed, only the British had the means to wage the colonial war that was necessary to suppress Palestinian resistance to the takeover of their country. This war has continued since then, waged sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, but invariably with the tacit or overt approval, and often the direct involvement, of the leading powers of the day and the sanction of the international bodies they dominated, the League of Nations and the United Nations.

The British government’s intentions and objectives at the time have been amply analyzed over the past century.22 Among its many motivations were both a romantic, religiously derived philo-Semitic desire to “return” the Hebrews to the land of the Bible, and an anti-Semitic wish to reduce Jewish immigration to Britain, linked to a conviction that “world Jewry” had the power to keep newly revolutionary Russia fighting in the war and bring the United States into it. Beyond those impulses, Britain primarily desired control over Palestine for geopolitical strategic reasons that antedated World War I and that had only been reinforced by wartime events.23 However important the other motivations may have been, this was the central one: the British Empire was never motivated by altruism. Britain’s strategic interests were perfectly served by its sponsorship of the Zionist project, just as they were served by a range of regional wartime undertakings. Among them were commitments made in 1915 and 1916 promising independence to the Arabs led by Sharif Husayn of Mecca (enshrined in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence) and a secret 1916 deal with France—the Sykes-Picot Agreement—in which the two powers agreed to a colonial partition of the eastern Arab countries.24 More important than British motivations for issuing the Balfour Declaration is what this undertaking meant in practice for the crystal-clear aims of the Zionist movement—sovereignty and complete control of Palestine.

Lloyd George convinced the Zionist leader that for this reason Britain would never allow representative government in Palestine. Nor did it.25 For Zionists, their enterprise was now backed by an indispensable “iron wall” of British military might, in the words of Ze’ev Jabotinksy. For the inhabitants of Palestine, whose future it ultimately decided, Balfour’s careful, calibrated prose was in effect a gun pointed directly at their heads, a declaration of war by the British Empire on the indigenous population. The majority now faced the prospect of being outnumbered by unlimited Jewish immigration to a country then almost completely Arab in its population and culture. Whether intended this way or not, the declaration launched a full-blown colonial conflict, a century-long assault on the Palestinian people, aimed at fostering an exclusivist “national home” at their expense

pages: 641 words: 182,927

In Pursuit of Privilege: A History of New York City's Upper Class and the Making of a Metropolis by Clifton Hood

affirmative action, British Empire, coherent worldview, David Brooks, death of newspapers, deindustrialization, family office, Golden Gate Park, Google Earth, jitney, mass immigration, new economy, New Urbanism, P = NP, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ray Oldenburg, ride hailing / ride sharing, Scientific racism, selection bias, Steven Levy, The Great Good Place, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, urban planning, We are the 99%, white flight

New York was merely a bargaining chip for these great powers, and the account of the treaty signing that ran in the London Gazette did not mention the restoration of New York City.33 New York continued to benefit by way of its “Dutch connection” with places in the West Indies like Curaçao, where the Dutch trade remained important, but England was a rising power that was beginning to exercise economic and political authority abroad and to organize an empire, and the city prospered as part of the British Empire. Its merchants thus became avid participants in a cultural and economic system called “gentlemanly capitalism.”34 British historians such as P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins attribute the origins of the British Empire to the effects of this gentlemanly capitalism, which they identify as a set of cultural, political, and economic forces that was propelled by a group of merchants and financiers who used overseas trade as a means to acquire the wealth, prestige, and connections they needed to reach a higher social level.

It helps us interpret the masses of letters, diaries, articles, and other textual materials of upper-class New Yorkers that have been deposited in archives and libraries and made available on the Web. I follow Bourdieu in viewing cultural tastes and social measures as tools that people wield in their efforts to possess these goods, with the definition and boundary marking of high-status categories (such as “upper class”) among the most precious stakes up for grabs.9 We start in the 1750s, when New York City was a lesser seaport and provincial capital in the British Empire and when its upper class consisted of royal officials, merchants, planters, and leading professionals. 1 “THE BEST MART ON THE CONTINENT” The 1750s and 1760s AN APPRAISAL OF NEW YORK CITY IN 1753 In 1753 William Livingston wrote a pamphlet entitled A Brief Consideration of New York that proclaimed the superiority of his native province and its major city over other colonies. The scion of one of the richest families in British North America, he grew up on Livingston Manor, a landed estate that occupied more than 150,000 acres near Albany.

However, the standing of merchants within this New York upper class was compromised by the code of gentility and by the place of royal officials atop the status hierarchy. The incompatibility of gentility with overly aggressive moneymaking and the privileged status of royal administrators relegated merchants to a secondary position in that upper class. In the end, what did not change in the 1750s and 1760s proved more important than what did change. Despite New York’s newfound centrality in the British Empire, the Seven Years’ War represents a false dawn in the history of the city. The war did not expand New York’s economy or its population, alter the social composition or the status hierarchy of the upper class, or stimulate new ways of acting and thinking on the part of its merchants. Those transformations would begin later, during the nation-building efforts of the 1780s and 1790s, and would accelerate with the economic growth of the nineteenth century.

pages: 750 words: 169,026

A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East by James Barr

bank run, British Empire, facts on the ground, friendly fire, illegal immigration, Khartoum Gordon, Scramble for Africa, short selling, éminence grise

After the sultan’s government went bankrupt in 1876 the British government abandoned a fifty-year-old policy of supporting the Ottomans’ integrity and independence as a bulwark against other powers’ ambitions. In 1878 Britain seized Cyprus and, four years later, Egypt and the Suez Canal in order to secure the route to India. As the canal turned into the major artery for Britain’s growing eastern commerce, Egypt became the fulcrum of the British Empire. While British investors took what was left of their money and ran, following the Ottoman default, the French moved in to replace them. The French already enjoyed significant prestige within the Ottoman Empire through their religious institutions, which ran dozens of schools that were better and more popular than their Ottoman equivalents. In an attempt to take advantage of the Turks’ decrepitude, they now bought up most of the Ottoman government debt, gambling more than their own government’s annual revenue on the Ottomans’ survival.⁹ But the ‘Young Turks’, who seized power in a coup in 1909, failed to stop the rot.

The prime minister, Asquith, who was recovering from a nervous breakdown, did not want the row with the French to escalate. Kitchener, the minister for war, whose face and finger were now emblazoned on recruiting posters on streets across the land, had previously run Egypt. Lloyd George, the quicksilver minister for munitions, was violently anti-Turkish and liked the idea of further imperial expansion at the Ottomans’ expense. Balfour, the former Conservative prime minister, now at the Admiralty, felt the British Empire had reached its limits, and did not. ‘I feel we ought to settle with France as soon as possible, and get a definite understanding about Syria,’ Sykes proposed.¹⁷ ‘What sort of an arrangement would you like to have with the French?’ asked Balfour. ‘I should like to retain for ourselves such country south of Haifa,’ replied Sykes, gesturing to his map. Balfour looked sceptical. ‘We have always regarded this 90 or 100 miles of desert upon her eastern side as a stronghold of Egypt; now you propose still further east of that to give us a bit of inhabited and cultivated country for which we should be responsible.

He began to argue that, by supporting the creation of a Jewish colony immediately east of Suez, Britain could deny that territory to rival foreign powers who might then threaten its control of the Suez Canal. ‘We cannot proceed on the supposition that our present happy relations with France will continue always,’ he warned his colleagues. ‘A common frontier with a European neighbour in the Lebanon is a far smaller risk to the vital interests of the British Empire than a common frontier at El Arish.’ Samuel also argued that such a move would generate goodwill for Britain within the Jewish diaspora. Large numbers of Jews, who faced repression in Eastern Europe and especially in Russia, had migrated westwards in the years before the war. Yet, although the Jewish population in Britain quadrupled in the thirty years before the war, many Jews regarded their new home as tainted by its alliance with the oppressive Tsarist regime from which many of them had fled.

Racing With Death by Beau Riffenburgh

British Empire, David Attenborough, Ernest Rutherford, Fellow of the Royal Society

But even rigging sails on the sledges made from the floorcloth of the tent did not help their progress greatly, and they continued to make only about four miles per day. They did buck up temporarily on the morning of 17 October when they reached Cape Bernacchi, a low, rocky promontory dominated by pure white crystalline marble. Here, with a flag that motor-car driver Bernard Day had made out of a jumble of fabrics, they took possession of Victoria Land for the British Empire. Almost a week later, they were still crawling at a snail’s pace over slowly decaying sea ice while the Sound gradually broke up to their one side and the mountains loomed over them on their other. Frustrated, Mawson proposed that they forsake the Magnetic Pole altogether and concentrate on ‘what I had understood was to be the work of the expedition provided the Mag Pole were not reasonably obtainable … the coast geographic and magnetic survey with detailed geological reconnaissances at picked spots, the whole allowing us to return to Dry Valley.’

Mawson determined that if they waited where they were for twenty-four hours, the Pole would likely come to them, but rather than do this, they decided to push on thirteen miles to where he calculated the mean position to lie. The next day, they continued until lunch, after which, leaving behind all gear other than a flag and a camera, they trudged the final five miles to Mawson’s ‘mean position’ at 72°15'S, 155°16'E. There, at a height of 7,260 feet, they hoisted the flag made by Day, claimed the area for the British Empire, and gave three cheers. David pulled a string attached to the camera to snap a picture of them. This done, there was no reason to linger, so they did an immediate about-turn. Their major task now was to reach the coast in time for the ship to collect them. Only a week before, 1,114 statute miles farther south, Shackleton, Wild, Marshall, and Adams had held a similar ceremony. Their journey had begun on 29 October, when they left Cape Royds, each leading a pony hauling a sledge.

Speaking to the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), he explained how multiple bases spread along the Antarctic coast would engage in meteorological, magnetic, geological, and geographical work to open up the mysteries of what he called ‘the Australian Quadrant’ of the Antarctic. In addition, he claimed other benefits would accrue: a ship-based oceanographic programme, the expansion of Australian whaling and sealing, the establishment of meteorological stations for weather forecasting, and the verification of Australia as a key component of the British Empire. Within days, with the backing of David Orme Masson, professor of chemistry at the University of Melbourne and president of the AAAS, Mawson was voted £1,000, one-third of the Association’s liquid assets. In addition, a special committee for the expedition was organised to arrange the details of the scientific work and officially to appoint expedition members. With Professor David as chairman, and Masson as another key member, Mawson had powerful scholarly and political backing, as was immediately shown when, within days, he met with Australian Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, who proved most positive.

pages: 184 words: 54,833

Why Orwell Matters by Christopher Hitchens

anti-communist, British Empire, colonial rule, deindustrialization, Etonian, hiring and firing, land reform, Louis Pasteur, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Norman Mailer, nuclear winter, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, sensible shoes

That this is a strong prefiguration of the mentality of Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four will be obvious; that it is no exaggeration is confirmed by the memoir of Orwell’s friend and contemporary Christopher Hollis, who visited him in Burma in 1925 and discovered him mouthing the platitudes of law-and-order: ‘He was at pains to be the imperial policeman, explaining that these theories of punishment and no beating were all very well at public schools, but that they did not work with the Burmese... ’ Four years later, in the pages of Le Progrès Civique in Paris, a certain ‘E. A. Blair’ contributed an essay in French entitled ‘Comment on exploite un peuple: L’Empire britannique en Birmanie’ (‘How a Nation is Exploited: The British Empire in Burm’). The article could justly be described as workman-like; it commences with a careful account of the country’s topography and demography and proceeds to a meticulous examination of the way the colonial power fleeces the Burmese of their natural resources and the fruits of their labour. It is, in all essentials, a study in deliberate underdevelopment and the means by which raw materials are used to finance another country’s industrial progress.

The claim is partly justified by an incisive review he wrote in June 1938, discussing Eugene Lyons’s journalistic memoir Assignment in Utopia: To get the full sense of our ignorance as to what is really happening in the U.S.S.R., it is worth trying to translate the most sensational Russian event of the past two years, the Trotskyist trials, into English terms. Make the necessary adjustments, let Left be Right and Right be Left, and you get something like this:Mr. Winston Churchill, now in exile in Portugal, is plotting to overthrow the British Empire and establish Communism in England. By the use of unlimited Russian money he has succeeded in building up a huge Churchillite organisation which includes members of Parliament, factory managers, Roman Catholic bishops and practically the whole of the Primrose League. Almost every day some dastardly act of sabotage is laid bare — sometimes a plot to blow up the House of Lords, sometimes an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Royal racing-stables.

Of course it is exactly this that excites the jealousy of the ordinary patriotic middle class. I know people who automatically switch off the radio as soon as any American news comes on, and the most banal English film will always get middle-class support because ‘it’s such a relief to get away from those American voices.’ Americans are supposed to be boastful, bad-mannered and worshippers of money, and are also suspected of plotting to inherit the British Empire. (Orwell forgot that last bit when he muttered, shortly after the war, about the new American empire that was ‘advancing behind a smoke-screen of novelists’.) In other words, he could reprobate simplistic anti-Americanism in others even when not completely eliminating it in himself. This ambiguity, as I’ve already tried to point out, occurs in almost all his discussions of prejudice. In one of his letters to Partisan Review, Orwell gave his office address and home telephone number and issued an open invitation to any readers of the magazine to come and call upon him.

American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup by F. H. Buckley

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Bernie Sanders, British Empire, Cass Sunstein, colonial rule, crony capitalism, desegregation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, hindsight bias, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, old-boy network, race to the bottom, Republic of Letters, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, wealth creators

Ah, sighed Edith Sitwell, there were giants in those days!14 There is a sense that the glorious deserve their renown, and that glory bears a badge of honor. And of all the different kinds of glory—celluloid, mathematical, culinary—none shines brighter than military glory. Even the humblest citizens sense that they share in it. The East Ender in Kipling’s day might think that, poor as he was, at least he partook of membership in the British Empire. It is the same for Americans today who bask in the glory of their country. Nietzsche thought it natural that we should seek power and that the weak should serve the strong.15 Realist students of international relations, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, agreed and identified a Nietzschean desire for dominance as the principal cause of rivalry and conflict between nations.16 Once a country finds itself able to become top dog, it will have difficulty resisting the temptation to do so.

While maintaining its allegiance to the Crown, John Bull’s other island might be given the right to local self-government under the Irish parliament in Dublin.4 After long debate and an active rebellion, Home Rule was finally adopted and proclaimed in force with the Government of Ireland Act in 1920.5 The act did nothing to end the IRA’s guerilla war. The establishment of a Northern Ireland parliament for the six majoritarian Protestant counties failed to pacify the country, and the law was superseded by the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which created the Irish Free State. The treaty’s first article stated that “Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada,” which by then was an independent country. The treaty’s “Canada clause” further provided that the relation of Great Britain to Ireland would be as that of Britain to Canada, “and the law, practice and constitutional usage” of Canada would govern Britain’s relation to the Irish Free State.6 By 1921, what the Canadian model offered was full independence. Applied to a Calexit, this would be the equivalent of secession from America.

Small might be beautiful, but you’re more likely to believe this if you live in a small country. Finland will defend its borders but has no wish to extend them. It’s only larger countries that to seek to dominate their region, or the world, and having done so they find it very painful to retreat into smallness. Churchill said he did not become prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire, and he didn’t. That task he passed on to his successors, who presided over Indian independence in 1947 and the Suez debacle in 1956. After Britain gave up its empire, America became the world’s policeman. In a widely praised address at the American Enterprise Institute in 2004, Charles Krauthammer explained what this entailed: “If someone invades your house, you call the cops. Who do you call if someone invades your country?

pages: 482 words: 149,351

The Finance Curse: How Global Finance Is Making Us All Poorer by Nicholas Shaxson

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Airbnb, airline deregulation, anti-communist, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Blythe Masters, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, carried interest, Cass Sunstein, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, centre right, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, cross-subsidies, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Donald Trump, Etonian, failed state, falling living standards, family office, financial deregulation, financial innovation, forensic accounting, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gig economy, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, high net worth, income inequality, index fund, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, Kickstarter, land value tax, late capitalism, light touch regulation, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, neoliberal agenda, Network effects, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, out of africa, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, pushing on a string, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, smart grid, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transfer pricing, wealth creators, white picket fence, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

He urged robust military action to defend British oil interests and the empire, so as to restore confidence in sterling and return it to its glorious place at the forefront of world affairs. ‘This is the choice,’ Macmillan wrote: ‘to slide into a shoddy and slushy socialism, or the march to the third British Empire.’5 Macmillan didn’t seem to grasp that Britain’s imperial magnificence had already, inexorably, begun to crumble. India had gained its independence in 1947, and others would soon follow. The trigger for the near-total collapse of the British empire was the decision by Egypt’s feisty president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to take over the Suez Canal in 1956. Britain and France joined Israel in an invasion of the canal zone, but the United States, which had lost patience with European imperialism and fretted that the escapade would inflame pro-Soviet passions in the Arab world, forced the invaders to withdraw.

British people are admired the world over for fair play, and British judges for their incorruptibility, yet at the same time we find Roberto Saviano, Italy’s most celebrated anti-Mafia journalist, calling Britain ‘the most corrupt place on earth’ because of all the City’s dirty money. This contrast between apparently clean officials and dirty money is no coincidence; it is the heart of the offshore model. With the collapse of the British empire in the second half of the twentieth century, the City temporarily lost its ability to use gunboats and government officials to extract riches from foreign countries, but the overseas territories tax havens, plugged into the Euromarkets, enabled the City to regain its wealth-extracting mojo. Professor Ronen Palan of City University, one of the first academics to take tax havens seriously, describes this spider’s web as ‘a second British empire which is at the very core of global financial markets today’. This second financial empire, with London at the centre of a globe-spanning web of loose money, has many characteristics in common with Britain’s lost territorial empire.

The results include lower economic growth, steeper inequality, inefficient markets, damage to public services, worse corruption, the hollowing-out of alternative economic sectors, and widespread damage to democracy and to society. To unpack the idea of the finance curse we’ll go on a century-long journey that spans the globe; from the era of American robber barons in the early twentieth century, through the 1950s to explore the rebirth of the City of London as a global financial centre after the fall of the British empire, to the birth of modern British tax havens in the Caribbean in the 1960s, then to explore the early roots of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy in the 1970s and 80s, and then on to uncover some surprising truths about London’s outsized role in generating the global financial crisis. After the crisis, we enter the peculiar world of wealth managers, examine the billionaire-friendly subterfuges and immense powers of the accounting giants, and follow the twisting corporate trails leading from care workers in northern England up to the glittering offices of private equity moguls in Mayfair.

pages: 872 words: 259,208

A History of Modern Britain by Andrew Marr

air freight, Albert Einstein, anti-communist, battle of ideas, Beeching cuts, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Geldof, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brixton riot, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, congestion charging, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Etonian, falling living standards, fear of failure, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial independence, floating exchange rates, full employment, housing crisis, illegal immigration, Kickstarter, liberal capitalism, Live Aid, loadsamoney, market design, mass immigration, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, Neil Kinnock, Nelson Mandela, new economy, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open borders, out of africa, Parkinson's law, Piper Alpha, Red Clydeside, reserve currency, Right to Buy, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, strikebreaker, upwardly mobile, Winter of Discontent, working poor, Yom Kippur War

The defeat had shocked Britain and plunged Churchill into despair. These ships were, in the words of one naval historian, ‘symbols of the men and nation that had dominated the sea lanes of the Pacific since the days of Anson and Cook’.22 The fall of Singapore, the psychological death-blow to the British Empire and the single worst defeat in the war for British forces, followed swiftly. But Lt Iki’s gallant action was not simply a tribute to the sunken ships, the Royal Navy generally, or even to that expiring British Empire the Japanese had long admired. It was also a tribute to an Aberdeenshire aristocrat, William Francis Forbes, the Master of Semphill. Semphill is one of those Britons forgotten here, remembered over there. He had been a pioneer aviator who served in the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War and made a once-famous early solo flight to Australia.

Looking back, such a thing may seem impossible – unthinkable. But it was quite possible and it was seriously discussed. This was the moment when Britain was on the edge and her modern story begins. From that decision on that day, everything follows. First, there was the war, from the Battle of Britain, through Pearl Harbor to the final defeat of Germany and Japan. So, second, the world was differently shaped. The end of the British Empire, once the world’s greatest, and the rise of the United States as ruler of the free world occurred for complicated reasons. But they can be plausibly traced back to what Winston, Clem and Arthur agreed was the right thing to do on that difficult day in May. That decision made contemporary Britain, with her weaknesses and strengths, which are the subject of this book. Many unexpected and surprising things followed.

When it was all over, and before Churchill was voted out of power, the Parliament of 1945 was the same one elected in 1935, a Commons frozen from another time. Deference and respect for the Royal Family, belief in the superiority of the white man, a complacent assumption that British manufacturing was still best . . . all that survived seemingly unaltered through the years of danger. Britain still believed herself to be in her imperial heyday, mistress of the seas. Though we think of it as essentially Victorian, the British Empire, declaring itself the first ‘world state’ had continued to grow right up until the mid-thirties. At the beginning of the Second World War there were some 200 colonies, dominions and possessions connected to London, covering more than 11 million square miles. The Empire embraced Pacific tribesmen and Eskimos, ancient African kingdoms and the rubble of the great Mughal empire, Australian farmers and the gold-miners of South Africa.

pages: 424 words: 140,262

Blood, Iron, and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World by Christian Wolmar

banking crisis, Beeching cuts, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, invention of the wheel, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, Kickstarter, Mahatma Gandhi, railway mania, refrigerator car, side project, South China Sea, transcontinental railway, tulip mania, urban sprawl

Beyer, a self-made young man, had travelled to England in 1834 to study textile machinery and despite offers of employment in Germany had returned to work in the drawing office of the Manchester-based Sharp, Roberts & Company which had built a locomotive for the Liverpool & Manchester. Although this had been rather unsuccessful, the company established itself as a pioneering manufacturer and Beyer spent nearly twenty years there before founding his own firm, Beyer Peacock & Company, which would later build locomotives for the early London Underground lines and ultimately construct 8,000 locomotives, many for the British Empire, till the firm’s demise in 1966. As with the early railways in Britain and France, the train service on the completed stub of a line between Leipzig and Althen was an immediate success. Within a couple of months, there were six daily trains each capable of carrying 150 people in each direction every Sunday, more than on any other day, suggesting not only that the tourist market was dominant, but also that, unlike in the UK, there were no concerns about religious objections to Sunday running.

Consequently, as Michael Robbins puts it, ‘Until about 1870… Britain was the heart and centre of railway activity throughout the world’, 1 and while Britain’s own network suffered from unnecessary duplication and a proliferation of lines that could never be viable because the government deliberately eschewed planning or any attempts to control the private companies building the network, its lead was such that its technology, expertise and finance were exported to many countries, including very unlikely ones such as several in Latin America and Asia with little previous connection with the British Empire. British technology, therefore, was widely imitated and its finance in the last quarter of the century became vitally important for many systems, but the British style of laissez-faire planning for the railways, characterized by lack of interest from the state, was rarely imitated. Ireland, then part of the United Kingdom, was the most obvious country to be influenced by British technology, but oddly this did not extend to the choice of gauge.

Both these railways were clearly intended to be the start of a network, linking Bombay with Pune and eventually Madras, and Calcutta with Delhi and later through the newly conquered Punjab right through to Lahore in what is now Pakistan. Dalhousie had been pressing for the creation of a strategic rail network since his appointment as Governor General. He was the sort of dynamic modernizer which the British Empire occasionally threw up and he later claimed he had unleashed in India the ‘great engines of social improvement, which the sagacity and science of recent times had previously given to Western nations – I mean railways, uniform postage and the electric telegraph’. 11 Indeed, he had a past interest in the railways, having chaired a Parliamentary Committee in 1844–5 which attempted to put some order into the chaotic situation when at the height of the railway mania Parliament had been literally inundated with bills petitioning to build lines.

pages: 422 words: 119,123

To the Edges of the Earth: 1909, the Race for the Three Poles, and the Climax of the Age of Exploration by Edward J. Larson

back-to-the-land, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, Eratosthenes, European colonialism, Fellow of the Royal Society, Livingstone, I presume, Scientific racism, the scientific method, trade route, yellow journalism

In a popular idiom from the era, the Anglo-Irish Shackleton “could sell ice to the Eskimos.” He found a fertile market in Australia. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide had expanded from obscure British outposts to brash commercial centers through mining. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the six Anglo-Australian colonies had federated into an independent dominion within the British Empire. With new mineral discoveries slowing, Australians were beginning to look offshore for further growth. Antarctica might provide that opportunity, Shackleton offered. Surely, it promised the prestige of discovery and the possibility of adventure. These arguments had been made before in Australia, most notably by the Australian Antarctic Exploring Committee, a group of Melbourne-based scientists interested in establishing research stations on the southern continent, but few Australians had listened.

“We might with equal chance of success try to sail through the cliffs of Dover, as to penetrate such a mass,” Ross declared.20 The magnetic pole, he determined, lay to the west, behind Victoria Land’s so-called Western Mountains; the geographic pole lay south beyond the ice barrier. Ross could not reach either by ship. Indeed, sailing in wind-powered ships, he could only effect one brief landing, and it was on a rocky islet off the Victoria Land coast, which he presumptuously named Possession Island because on it he claimed possession of the entire region for the British Empire. After cruising twice along the barrier, Ross returned home to report on what he had seen. He could not gauge the ice shelf’s southern extent or say if Victoria Land was part of a continent or merely a large island. No one went back for nearly six decades to settle these points. By then, popular interest in polar exploration had increased, and the Australians were positioned to play a role.

“Twed would eat ship biscuit if I were not here, and would eat that standing over his drill,” his adventuresome wife, Cara, noted in her travel diary, using an acronym for David made from his four initials.47 By jury-rigging the equipment as he went, David managed to drill down over 500 feet by the time he had to depart, with the core still showing coral. While this did not strictly prove Darwin’s subsidence theory, it disproved every alternative hypothesis and won David election to the British Empire’s premier scientific association, the Royal Society. After returning from Funafuti, David resumed his work in glacial geology, leading to a breakthrough that cinched his place on the Nimrod Expedition. Building on the work of University of Adelaide geologist Walter Howchin, he developed and publicized evidence from South Australia of a third global ice age that had occurred eons before the two previously known ones.

pages: 561 words: 87,892

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity by Stephen D. King

Admiral Zheng, asset-backed security, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, G4S, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, market clearing, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Naomi Klein, new economy, old age dependency ratio, Paul Samuelson, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, statistical model, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Market for Lemons, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

How else can we hope to understand the re-emergence of China and India, the growing influence of Russia and the closer integration into the world economy of nations in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe? Through much of the twentieth century, political systems prevented economies from becoming more integrated: indeed, they pushed economies further apart. The collapse of the British Empire, the destruction associated with the First World War, the rise of nationalism, fascism and communism, the horrors of the Second World War and the stalemate of the Cold War all contributed to the destruction of economic relationships. These relationships are now rapidly being rebuilt. Changing patterns of trade and investment opportunities around the world provide compelling evidence of this shift.

As its ventures in India became more complex, so it built up a large private army to protect its interests (matching the earlier behaviour of the Dutch East India Company). It wasn’t long before a commercial operation turned into political ambition, thereby providing an early example of today’s state capitalism, a theme I explore in greater detail in Chapter 7. The mercenaries of the private army became regular soldiers, and India was absorbed into the British Empire. The Opium Wars of the nineteenth century provide a similar example. Again, the East India Company was involved, increasingly exporting opium to a lucrative Chinese market. Again, the British government supported Britain’s commercial interests. The rising demand in Britain for Chinese luxuries such as porcelain and silk had to be paid for somehow. As a consequence, the UK became the world’s biggest drug dealer.

International relations in the nineteenth century were shaped by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (following the Napoleonic Wars), at which Europe was divided into spheres of influence, primarily reflecting the interests of the victorious Great Powers – the UK, Austria, Russia and Prussia (although, even after Napoleon’s departure following mounting defeats, France somehow still managed to get a seat at the table through the efforts of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, Louis XVIII’s envoy, who used his wily diplomatic skills to create friction between the victors). The voices of the people went unheeded and unheard. This was a world of empires and imperfect suffrage. Under the influence of self-determination, sponsored by an increasingly powerful US hostile to colonial influence, the empires of the nineteenth century collapsed in the wars and economic crises that followed. The biggest casualty, most obviously, was the British Empire. The Ottoman Empire went the same way and, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, so did the Soviet Union’s twentieth-century empire. The result was a huge proliferation of nation states. According to Freedom House, there were only fifty-five sovereign countries in 1900, alongside thirteen empires. That compares with the 192 states which, in 2009, were members of the United Nations. Of today’s nations, 113 used to be part of colonial and imperial systems, while a further thirty-three were parts of other states.

pages: 414 words: 128,962

The Marches: A Borderland Journey Between England and Scotland by Rory Stewart

agricultural Revolution, British Empire, connected car, Etonian, glass ceiling, Isaac Newton, Khyber Pass, land reform, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley

* At lunch on the third day, I asked my father, ‘Do you think that you felt proud of the British Empire in the way in which Romans felt proud of the Roman Empire?’ ‘Well, it is very difficult to answer that kind of question,’ he said. ‘We were imperialists, no doubt. I was very proud of the Empire. Even my aunties in Kirriemuir liked the idea of “the Empire on which the sun never sets”.’ ‘And was it a Scottish empire?’ I asked. ‘Absolutely. Our heroes were Scots connected to Empire: that chieftain, for example, not Lord Lovat – the other one – Maclean. Fitzroy Maclean. We Scots dominated almost half the Diplomatic List – and we were the best soldiers in the army. And so on. But we didn’t want to be a separate Scotland – we’d have thought it was boring – we wanted to be part of a British Empire.’ He talked about humming bagpipe tunes to keep his spirits up under bombardment in Hanoi.

The Northumbrian peat had also preserved a play-horse on wheels, a toddler’s shoes – small enough to sit in the palm of an adult hand – and, fittingly for a child of a Roman soldier, a wooden toy sword. It was not much, but enough perhaps to question whether the Romans were really as unsentimental about their children as the stern, unbending marble statues of imperial heroes might suggest. * Although I was born in Hong Kong and brought up in Malaysia, I did not feel I had been brought up as a child of the British Empire. My father’s time in the Malayan Colonial Service was over before I was born. The pictures of him in his white uniform, with his pith helmet and ceremonial sword, seemed to resemble to the last detail the Sargent portrait of Sir Frank Swettenham in 1904, which was also on the dust jacket of a book in our house. So it surprises me, writing this, to realise that when we returned to Malaysia from London in 1979 (he had by then left ‘the office’ and become the director of the Rubbers Growers’ Association) it was still only just over twenty years since independence.

Wasn’t this like the early policies of the Malayan Emergency, where he had cleared the Chinese population from the villages and relocated them to houses in fenced compounds, so that they could be prevented from providing assistance to the insurgents? Again, he simply replied, ‘Not my subject.’ I wondered whether his reluctance to engage with my criticism of the Roman Empire was that it came too close to a criticism of the British Empire, but perhaps he simply felt that he did not know enough about Rome, and was exhausted by my questions. Or were my analogies just not that interesting? I thought that Roman Britain was a profound and powerful symbol for our age, and that what I was saying was very important, because I felt that such flimsy arguments had dragged us into the terrible humiliations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But Iraq had ended, and Afghanistan was ending, and it must all have seemed, even for people like my father, yesterday’s news.

pages: 1,000 words: 247,974

Empire of Cotton: A Global History by Sven Beckert

agricultural Revolution, Bartolomé de las Casas, British Empire, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, imperial preference, industrial cluster, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, laissez-faire capitalism, land tenure, Mahatma Gandhi, market fundamentalism, race to the bottom, Silicon Valley, spice trade, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, women in the workforce

Penzer, Federation of British Industries, Intelligence Department, Cotton in British West Africa (London: Federation of British Industries, 1920); John Harris, Parliamentary Secretary of the Society, to E. Sedgwick, Boston, November 10, 1924, Papers of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, MSS. British Empire S22, G143, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth & African Studies, University of Oxford; John Harris to Maxwell Garnett, January 20, 1925, MSS. British Empire 522, G446, Papers of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, Rhodes House Library, Oxford; D. Edwards-Radclyffe, “Ramie, The Textile of the Future,” Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, Third Series, 20 (July–October 1905): 47. 18. Frédéric Engel-Dollfus, Production du coton (Paris: Paul Dupont, 1867); as General Faidherbe argued in 1889, “La culture du cotonnier comme l’élément le plus puissant du succès de la colonisation”; see General Faidherbe, Le Sénégal: La France dans l’Afrique occidentale (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1889), 102; Association Cotonnière Coloniale, Annexe au Bulletin No 3: Les coton indigènes du Dahomey et du Soudan à la filature et au tisage (Paris: Jean Ganiche, 1904); Charles Brunel, Le coton en Algérie (Alger: Imprimierie Agricole, 1910); for French interest in colonial cotton see also Ed.

England’s domination of these global networks, as we will see, was essential to recast production and become the unlikely source of the cotton-fueled Industrial Revolution. While certainly still revolutionary, industrial capitalism was the offspring of war capitalism, the previous centuries’ great innovation.3 Samuel Greg and his fellow innovators knew that the global reach and power of the British Empire gave them a tremendous advantage over their fellow merchants and artisans in Frankfurt, Calcutta, or Rio de Janeiro. Having started out as a merchant in the employ of his uncles, he had already organized a large putting-out network of cotton spinners and weavers in the Lancashire and Cheshire countryside before investing in his new machines. In addition to the profits and labor from this putting-out network, Greg had easy access to abundant capital from his wife’s family.

For millennia, as we have seen, cultivators had grown cotton in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. But while the cotton plant found a favorable environment in large stretches of the world’s arable lands, Lancashire, or anywhere else in the British Isles for that matter, was not among them. Outside of the greenhouses at the Royal Gardens at Kew (which to this day showcase the core commodities on which the British Empire rested), Britain and much of Europe was too cold and wet for cotton. Among European leaders, only French revolutionaries, with their fervent belief in inventing the world anew, seriously tried to outwit the local climate and grow cotton—and even they failed.5 Indeed, British cotton manufacturing—and later, manufacturing across Europe—seemed a poor bet, for it was the first major industry in human history that lacked locally procured raw materials.

I You We Them by Dan Gretton

agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, back-to-the-land, British Empire, clean water, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, conceptual framework, corporate social responsibility, Desert Island Discs, drone strike, European colonialism, financial independence, friendly fire, ghettoisation, Honoré de Balzac, IBM and the Holocaust, illegal immigration, invisible hand, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, laissez-faire capitalism, liberation theology, Mikhail Gorbachev, Milgram experiment, Neil Kinnock, Nelson Mandela, New Journalism, place-making, pre–internet, Stanford prison experiment, University of East Anglia, wikimedia commons

‘In Year 8 or 9 we did slavery and the British Empire – but we didn’t spend a huge amount of time on it … maybe a couple of lessons. I can’t really remember anything about it, except being made aware that we weren’t the good guys.’ For GCSE they had done four units – Medicine (mid-1800s to the Second World War), the Civil Rights Movement, the Roaring Twenties, and Hitler’s Rise to Power (up to 1939). She’d also completed an EPQ (Extended Project Qualification) on ‘Morality in the Twentieth Century’ – ‘I looked at the Holocaust, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.’ She too agreed with Grass’s analysis, repeating that British colonisation and empire hadn’t formed a critical part of her history syllabus from GCSE through to A levels – ‘We were never formally examined on slavery or any aspect of the British Empire.’ These limitations on history teaching about Britain’s colonial past are certainly not just confined to my relatives’ recent experience.

More and more these days I hear a persistent voice in my head that questions whether the ongoing British obsession with the Second World War, and its ‘finest hour’, isn’t in fact a subconscious process of denial – a deflection away from the reality of history, which we cannot bear to face. The truth which, as Sebald says, ‘lies elsewhere, away from it all, somewhere as yet undiscovered’. * But, to return to Günter Grass’s implicit challenge, how should we begin trying to teach our children about the crimes and genocides committed in the name of the British Empire? Where would you start? There is an immediate challenge here – whereas the particular savagery of Nazism occured within a twelve-year span (or perhaps two generations, going back to its causation), the violence unleashed by the British Empire took place over almost 500 years – more than twenty generations. The contrast with Germany could not be greater. And this is not only a matter of the time frame. The Holocaust took place in a recognisably modern world – we can see television images of Hitler and Himmler chatting, of the senior perpetrators on trial at Nuremberg, we even have images and photographs of the extermination camps.

No one points out that during Hitler’s childhood, a major element in the European view of mankind was the conviction that ‘inferior races’ were by nature condemned to extinction: the true compassion of the superior races consisted in helping them on the way. All German historians participating in this debate seem to look in the same direction. None looks to the west. But Hitler did. What Hitler wished to create when he sought Lebensraum in the east was a continental equivalent of the British Empire. It was in the British and other western European peoples that he found the models, of which the extermination of the Jews is … ‘a distorted copy’. We are part of a European culture, for which the extinction of peoples is not a recent phenomenon, but a pattern repeated over centuries. The first documented European genocide began in 1478 – that of the advanced Berber-speaking inhabitants of the Canary Islands (then ironically called ‘the Fortunate Isles’) – the Guanches.

pages: 535 words: 144,827

1939: A People's History by Frederick Taylor

Albert Einstein, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, collective bargaining, delayed gratification, facts on the ground, full employment, mass immigration, rising living standards, the market place, women in the workforce

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war . . . . . . However much we may sympathise with a small nation confronted by a big powerful neighbour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that.4 It did not quite amount to a volte-face – any more than did Hitler’s temporary change of tactic – but it came close. The bizarre assertion that the crisis was taking place ‘in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing’ seemed especially egregious. If such ignorance about Czechoslovakia – a key country in the chain of Eastern European alliances set up to help contain Germany after the First World War – was indeed a fact, then the Prime Minister needed to sack his foreign policy advisers – or possibly himself.

Chamberlain called down to Read to open up the entrance to the estate’s coal cellar, which lay across the yard. The animal duly dived into it and Read shut the door. Shortly after, the local stag hunt rode up. On Chamberlain’s instructions, the chauffeur professed to have no idea of their quarry’s whereabouts. The hunt galloped off, and the animal was saved. All this time, Chamberlain – the most powerful elected official in the British Empire – remained in the highest branches of the tree, saw in hand, silent and unobserved.7 Neville Chamberlain was also a martyr to gout, and Read became expert, he recalled, at easing the Prime Minister’s swollen feet into his boots. The chauffeur even says that, when Chamberlain had occasion to fly to Germany for the first crisis meeting with Hitler, there were discussions as to whether he might be included in the party, in case a gout attack occurred during the crucial negotiations.

But he added, there was now a ‘Danger Plan’ being discussed in parliament. A plan to allow these persecuted Jews into Britain. What good purpose will it serve? Is it proposed to admit more refugees into Britain? That is a dangerous proposition. We have already accepted our full quota of foreign Jews. We cannot assimilate any more.50 It might be possible to allow Jews to settle in ‘undeveloped parts’ of the British Empire, of course. Except Palestine, which ‘cannot take in any more of them’. Otherwise the problem was a ‘purely administrative one which should be dealt with by Mr Chamberlain and his colleagues’. Under the rubric ‘Least said—’ the leader column concluded with matchless banality: The Daily Express has the greatest sympathy with the Jews. It deplores and regrets the persecution to which they have been subjected.

pages: 239 words: 64,987

Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World by Mark Kurlansky

British Empire, European colonialism, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith

“Ship owners developed a cycle of trade involving cargoes of slaves to the West Indies—a cargo of Blackstrap Molasses from those islands to Boston and other New England ports—and finally the shipment of rum to Africa.” Soon the British Empire was not only too small a market for New England’s cod catch but too small a molasses producer for New England’s distilleries. Total British West Indies molasses production was less than two-thirds of what Rhode Island alone imported. The French colonies needed New England cod, and New England needed French molasses. Then the British Crown, after letting New Englanders taste free trade for more than a century, decided in 1733 to regulate molasses as a key step toward reasserting its control over commerce. Instead the measure turned out to be one of the first inadvertent steps toward dismantling the British Empire. WEST INDIA IN THE WEST INDIES TIME SO HARD YOU CANNOT DENY THAT EVEN SALTFISH AND RICE WE CAN HARDLY BUY

In 1763, they decided to deny France all of its North American possessions except two tiny islands off the south coast of Newfoundland, St. Pierre and Miquelon. Ironically, when France retained Guadeloupe but lost Canada—held its slave colonies but lost its fisheries—the demand this created for West India cure in the French Caribbean led New Englanders on a direct collision course with the British Crown. The conflict went back to the Acts of Trade and Navigation, one of the foundations of the British Empire, according to which colonists were to sell their goods to England and buy their goods from England. Legally, New Englanders should not have traded directly with Spain and the Caribbean but were supposed to have sold their cod to England and then to have purchased Spanish wine and iron from England. The British had good reasons to worry about North America. In 1677, ninety-eight years before the cause of American independence became a shooting war, the British Crown received a polite note from New Englanders accompanied by ten barrels of cranberries, two of corn mush, and 1,000 codfish.

Many of them, most of the important leaders—even Thomas Jefferson, a slave owner—understood that it was hypocrisy to talk about the rights of man and ignore the agony of millions of slaves. But they were not going to let the Revolution break down over this issue, as they feared it might. Throughout the century, Englishmen had predicted that the booming American colonies would try to break free from the Crown, but that, in the end, they would remain in the British Empire because of their inability to get along with each other. What the British Crown failed to understand was that the Revolutionary leaders were pragmatists focused on primary goals and that molasses, cod, and tea were not mere troubling disagreements; they were the issue. Virginians even called the Revolution “the Tobacco War.” England had shown some flexibility. Gloucester, though a legally recognized trade port, did not even have a customs official.

pages: 165 words: 47,405

Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World by Noam Chomsky, David Barsamian

British Empire, collective bargaining, cuban missile crisis, declining real wages, failed state, feminist movement, Howard Zinn, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, liberation theology, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, Ronald Reagan, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, Westphalian system

Subsequent territorial expansions, at least up to World War II, followed pretty much the same pattern. Think of Mexico, large parts of which we took over in the 1840s, or Hawaii, which was stolen by force and guile in 1898. In both cases the native population was pretty much replaced, they weren’t colonized. Again, not totally replaced. The indigenous people are still there, but they’ve essentially been taken over. Also, if you look at the traditional empires, say, the British empire, it’s not so clear that the population of Britain gained from it. It’s a very difficult topic to study, but there have been a couple of attempts. And for what it’s worth, the general conclusion is that the costs and the benefits pretty much balanced out. Empires are costly. Running Iraq is not cheap. Somebody’s paying. Somebody’s paying the corporations that destroyed Iraq and the corporations that are rebuilding it.

If you look at the rest of the aid, very little of the money left the United States. It just moved from one pocket to another. The Marshall Plan aid to France just about covered the costs of the French effort to reconquer Indochina. So the U.S. taxpayer wasn’t rebuilding France. They were paying the French to buy American weapons to crush the Indo-Chinese. And they were paying Holland to crush the independence movement in Indonesia. Returning to the British empire, the costs to the British people may have been about on a par with the benefits that the British people received from it, but for the guys who were running the East India Company the empire led to fantastic wealth. For the British troops who were dying out in the wilderness somewhere, the costs were serious. To a large extent, that’s the way empires work. Internal class war is a significant element of empire.

. … The twenty-first-century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known. “14 Of course, the apologists for every imperial power have said the same thing. So you can go back to John Stuart Mill, one of the most outstanding Western intellectuals. He defended the British empire in very much those words. Mill wrote the classic essay on humanitarian intervention.15 Everyone studies it in law schools. He argued that Britain is unique in the world. It’s unlike any country in history. Other countries have crass motives and seek gain and so on, but the British act only for the benefit of others. In fact, he said, our motives are so pure that Europeans can’t understand us.

pages: 447 words: 141,811

Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind by Yuval Noah Harari

Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, Alfred Russel Wallace, Atahualpa, British Empire, cognitive dissonance, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, David Graeber, Edmond Halley, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, glass ceiling, global village, greed is good, income per capita, invention of gunpowder, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Kickstarter, liberal capitalism, life extension, Mahatma Gandhi, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, out of africa, personalized medicine, Ponzi scheme, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, stem cell, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, urban planning, zero-sum game

Eventually, in the 1780s, Louis XVI, who had ascended to the throne on his grandfather’s death, realised that half his annual budget was tied to servicing the interest on his loans, and that he was heading towards bankruptcy. Reluctantly, in 1789, Louis XVI convened the Estates General, the French parliament that had not met for a century and a half, in order to find a solution to the crisis. Thus began the French Revolution. While the French overseas empire was crumbling, the British Empire was expanding rapidly. Like the Dutch Empire before it, the British Empire was established and run largely by private joint-stock companies based in the London stock exchange. The first English settlements in North America were established in the early seventeenth century by joint-stock companies such as the London Company, the Plymouth Company, the Dorchester Company and the Massachusetts Company. The Indian subcontinent too was conquered not by the British state, but by the mercenary army of the British East India Company.

They focused their efforts not on retaining power, but on transferring it as smoothly as possible. At least some of the praise usually heaped on Mahatma Gandhi for his non-violent creed is actually owed to the British Empire. Despite many years of bitter and often violent struggle, when the end of the Raj came, the Indians did not have to fight the British in the streets of Delhi and Calcutta. The empire’s place was taken by a slew of independent states, most of which have since enjoyed stable borders and have for the most part lived peacefully alongside their neighbours. True, tens of thousands of people perished at the hands of the threatened British Empire, and in several hot spots its retreat led to the eruption of ethnic conflicts that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives (particularly in India). Yet when compared to the long-term historical average, the British withdrawal was an exemplar of peace and order.

Second, empires are characterised by flexible borders and a potentially unlimited appetite. They can swallow and digest more and more nations and territories without altering their basic structure or identity. The British state of today has fairly clear borders that cannot be exceeded without altering the fundamental structure and identity of the state. A century ago almost any place on earth could have become part of the British Empire. Cultural diversity and territorial flexibility give empires not only their unique character, but also their central role in history. It’s thanks to these two characteristics that empires have managed to unite diverse ethnic groups and ecological zones under a single political umbrella, thereby fusing together larger and larger segments of the human species and of planet Earth. It should be stressed that an empire is defined solely by its cultural diversity and flexible borders, rather than by its origins, its form of government, its territorial extent, or the size of its population.

A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge Concise Histories) by Barbara D. Metcalf, Thomas R. Metcalf

affirmative action, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, commoditize, demand response, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, income inequality, joint-stock company, Khyber Pass, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, means of production, new economy, Silicon Valley, spice trade, telemarketer, trade route, upwardly mobile, urban planning

This page intentionally left blank A Concise History of Modern India In this second edition of their successful A Concise History of India, Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf explore India’s modern history afresh and update the events of the last decade. These include the takeover by Congress from the seemingly entrenched Hindu nationalist party in 2004, India’s huge advances in technology, and the country’s new role as a major player in world affairs. From the days of the Mughals, through the British Empire, and into independence, the country has been sustained and transformed by its institutional structures. As the authors argue, it is these institutions which have helped bring about the social, cultural, and economic changes that have taken place over the last half-century and paved the way for the modern success story. Despite these advances, poverty, social inequality, and religious division still fester.

It will then ask how and why the British went on to conquer the entire Indian subcontinent in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, and it will conclude by assessing the relationships that grew up between what was known as the ‘Company Bahadur’, as though it were a Mughal grandee, and its Indian subjects in the years up to 1850. 56 The East India Company Raj, 1772–1850 57 f o u n dat i o n o f c o l o n i a l ru l e When Hastings took office, the East India Company’s agents knew nothing about India apart from the requirements of trade, and they almost never ventured outside their coastal enclaves. With rare exceptions, among them Hastings himself, they knew no Indian languages. Within the existing British Empire, furthermore, rule over a vast indigenous population such as that of India was unprecedented. With the partial exception of Ireland, Britain’s previous imperial expansion, in the West Indies and North America, had involved the dispossession of the native peoples in favour of settlers from Europe and Africa. Hence, as they confronted their new responsibilities in India, the British found themselves sailing in wholly uncharted waters.

The range of the Company state, its monopoly of physical force, and its capacity to command resources, as C. A. Bayly has written, ‘set it apart even in its early days from all the regimes which had preceded it’. conquest and settlement The arrival of Lord Wellesley as governor-general in 1798 ended a quarter-century during which the British had existed as one among several Indian ‘country powers’. Spurred on by a new vision that saw the British Empire encompassing the entire subcontinent, Wellesley inaugurated twenty years of military activity that made the Company by 1818 master of India. Complementing Wellesley’s conquests-at-arms was the elaboration of an aggressive imperial enthusiasm. Much of this was the product of events in Europe. Thoughout these years an embattled Britain confronted Napoleon, whose armies triumphed not only in Europe but in 1798 in Egypt, the gateway to India; and the patriotism stirred up by this desperate struggle easily spilled over into a conviction of Britain’s right to rule whatever territories its armies might conquer.

pages: 387 words: 120,092

The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge by Ilan Pappe

affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Boycotts of Israel, British Empire, double helix, facts on the ground, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, mass immigration, Nelson Mandela, New Journalism, one-state solution, postnationalism / post nation state, stem cell, urban planning, Yom Kippur War

Amud Ha’Esh, a TV documentary series directed by Yigal Lusin for the first, and that time the only, Israeli TV channel in 1981, gives the viewer a good sense of why the Israelis call the 1948 war the War of Independence. That year is described as the culmination of an anti-colonialist struggle against the evil British Empire. The British were defeated and so, according to this narration, left Palestine because they could not withstand the Jewish resistance against them. Meanwhile, the professional historiography indicated that the British decision to withdraw from Palestine arose from the overall and inevitable global collapse of the British Empire. This wider context informed the financial and regional strategic decisions that led to the end of British rule in Palestine.22 The lengthiest feature film on 1948 during those years was He Walked Through the Fields, based on a novel by Moshe Shamir.

In Israel, this revolt usually appeared as a chapter in the history of Palestinian terrorism.28 In both Palestinian and less biased historiography, it appeared as the first, and in many ways, one of the few, successful popular revolts of the Palestinians that achieved some significant political gains, notably the British White Paper of 1939, which limited Jewish immigration and land purchase. This new British policy, together with the emergence of Nazism in Europe, led to a Jewish Zionist revolt against the British Empire. It was a heroic deed against all odds in Israeli historiography, amounting to terrorism in the eyes of not only the Mandatory government of the day but subsequently, leaders of the Irgun and the Stern Gang, such as Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, were regarded as personae non gratae in the United Kingdom because of their terrorist past in Palestine. An episode in the life of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, in which he cooperated with the Nazi regime in Germany, succeeded in further demonising the Palestinians and facilitating a depiction of him as not merely a terrorist but also a Nazi.

Research in British archives done during the 1970s by sensible Zionist historians such as Gavriel Cohen and Michael J. Cohen revealed a far more pragmatic and sensible Bevin than was depicted in the myth.13 Nevertheless, the narrative became an intricate sequence of interdependent elements. Thus, while the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine) faced annihilation from a barbaric Arab world, as a hostile British Empire and an indifferent international community looked on, it had no time to bother with the indigenous population. According to this narrative, these native people became refugees because their own leaders, and those of the Arab League, told them to leave, paving the way for an all-Arab invasion. Only then could they return to the liberated Palestine. Into this collective remembrance were interwoven the individual recollections of Jewish leaders and city dwellers who urged their fellow inhabitants – their Arab neighbours – not to leave and who, alas, failed in convincing them not to do so.14 The story culminates in the image of a moral war, one that produced the most famous Israeli oxymoron: the ‘purity of arms’.

Inside British Intelligence by Gordon Thomas

active measures, Albert Einstein, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, cuban missile crisis, Etonian, Fall of the Berlin Wall, job satisfaction, Khyber Pass, kremlinology, lateral thinking, license plate recognition, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, old-boy network, Ronald Reagan, sensible shoes, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, Yom Kippur War

Thames House, MI5 headquarters since 1994, is situated on the corner of Horseferry Road and Millbank and overlooks Lambeth Bridge. The building was designed by Sir Frank Baines and shows the influence of the Imperial Neoclassical style of Edwin Lutyens, the designer of the Cenotaph in Whitehall. By 1929, Thames House had risen over what had once been a slum quarter of the city, a massive structure in Portland stone hailed as “the finest office building in the British Empire.” Stella Rimington, the first woman to be appointed MI5’s director-general, saw Thames House as “a great pale ghost.” Others who worked there said the exhaust fumes from traffic and the smell of the river penetrated the inner recesses of Thames House. For outsiders who had business with MI5, there was a ritual to be observed: First, hand in their passport to one of the guards in the entrance hall and then be walked through the security barriers to take an elevator to the appropriate floor.

Manningham-Buller had asked her own staff to urgently investigate whether their sources in the Muslim communities indicated that the U.S. attacks were a precursor to a similar one in London. The one question she repeatedly asked was: Could it happen to London? Could the carnage be repeated in the capital, striking at the principal symbols of Britain’s hegemony, its global commercial and financial power, and call into question the certainties and beliefs that had continued to survive long after the British Empire had become a fading memory? “It was catchup time,” recalled Annie Machon, a former MI5 counterterrorism officer, to the author. Although the Security Service also found itself confronting civil liberties groups opposed to some of those “catchup” methods. In August 2002, Home Secretary David Blunkett had issued an unprecedented public apology to British Muslims about “information sweeps conducted by MI5 in Muslim communities.”

Then came the terrible winter of 1946–47 when Eliza’s parents, like millions of others, found themselves living in temperatures below zero from one month to the next as blizzards piled layer upon layer of record-breaking snowfalls across the country. England was gripped in frozen paralysis: Industry closed down; electricity was limited to five hours a day; unemployment rose to six million. Few people realized that was also the time when world leadership began to move from the dying British Empire to the muscular power of the United States. It started when President Harry Truman, in July 1946, signed a congressional bill authorizing a fifty-year loan of $3.75 billion to His Majesty’s government to liquidate America’s obligation to rebuilding the United Kingdom after the war (the loan, with accrued interest, was finally paid off in 2007). In accepting the money, Britain, once proud and expansionist and beholden to no nation, bent its knee in gratitude for its dollar transfusion after a six-year struggle against Nazi Germany.

pages: 183 words: 17,571

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy by Kevin Mellyn

banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, buy and hold, call centre, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, disintermediation, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Home mortgage interest deduction, index fund, information asymmetry, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, mobile money, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, negative equity, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, Real Time Gross Settlement, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Coase, seigniorage, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Steve Jobs, The Great Moderation, the payments system, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, underbanked, Works Progress Administration, yield curve, Yogi Berra, zero-sum game

Hence, the Chinese dismissal of the first British attempts to open trade under Lord Macartney’s diplomatic mission of 1792–1794 was entirely rational because China didn’t need to trade (much less finance) outside its borders. The British Empire by contrast was a merchant-state, where trade, finance, and diplomatic influence vastly outweighed territory or military power. The United States was originally part of that empire and essentially remains a merchantstate, but an inward-looking one, given its vast internal market. Modern China is, whether it likes it or not, a merchant-state built on globalization, just as the British Empire was during the first great age of globalization it led from 1815 to 1914.This global merchant-state role is totally new to China as first a self-contained empire and then a victim of predatory merchant-states such as Britain and Japan.

Of course, today we call integration of markets for goods, services, and money “globalization,” and for much of the last decade we have debated whether it was a good thing or a bad thing. Actually, to the Victorians, including Marx, global markets were a fact of life, and barriers to moving capital were almost nonexistent. Between 1815 and 1914, especially in the second half of the period, the combination of a British Empire committed to free trade, the pound sterling backed by gold as anchor currency for the world, and London as the world’s money market allowed capital to go anywhere it could make a good return. Contemporaries called this system of free markets and the limited constitutional government that went with it liberalism, almost the opposite of how the word is used in America today. Looking back, in this first great age of globalization, finance capital radiating out of London built the modern industrial world and ushered in the greatest 3 4 Chapter 1 | The Rise and Fall of the Finance-Driven Economy rise in living standards in human history.

The direction of credit and investment linked to industrial policy (and social policy) is simply how choices get made. Subsidized green energy is but an extreme example, since the Eisenhower national highway system, subsidies for home ownership, and student loans are all examples of using the financial system for essentially nonmarket, noneconomic ends. This kind of thing goes back to the day when royal monopolies Broken Markets were given to joint stock companies to build out the British Empire for broke British monarchs, and it is not going away any time soon. It is all a matter of degree and balance. In the Victorian Era, the markets became free and global for several generations, but that was an anomaly backed by British wealth and sea power along with an almost mystical British belief in free trade. In the 1980s, as Daniel Yergin’s now incredibly dated documentary The Commanding Heights relates, the financial markets regained some of their freedom after half a century of financial repression and industrial policy.

pages: 299 words: 79,739

Enemy of All Mankind: A True Story of Piracy, Power, and History's First Global Manhunt by Steven Johnson

British Empire, Burning Man, cognitive dissonance, Jeff Bezos, moral panic, Stewart Brand, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, urban planning, wikimedia commons

But if Aurangzeb recognized their authority to protect the Muslim treasure ships and other commercial vessels from piracy, their sovereign power would expand meaningfully, over water if not yet over land. The historian Philip Stern has argued, persuasively, that this strategy—first dreamed up by Samuel Annesley under house arrest in the Surat factory—would prove to be a critical turning point in the relationship between India and England, one that is inevitably neglected in the traditional version of the rise of the British empire in the subcontinent. The standard account, according to Stern, imagines the East India Company as “a commercial body that only ‘turned’ sovereign—accidentally, haphazardly, and unwillingly—with the Company’s great territorial acquisitions in Bengal following Robert Clive’s victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the assumption eight years later of revenue and governance responsibilities in the Mughal office of diwan.”

The not guilty verdict confirmed all the allegations against the British state—that for all its tough talk about hostis humani generis, the state was either tacitly supporting pirates, or incapable of enforcing the laws against them. The admiralty had planned to use the case against the Every gang as a show trial, a statement to the world that would announce the British government’s new zero-tolerance policy for piracy. They had even hired a publisher named John Everingham to release the transcripts of the trial allowing interested readers throughout the British empire who couldn’t make it to Sessions House Yard to follow along. Needless to say, Everingham never published the transcripts. One London periodical apologized for its lack of coverage: “We had prepared a more ample account of the Tryal of the Pyrates,” the editors noted, “but in compliance with the prohibition of Authority have omitted it.” For the five pirates who had pled not guilty, the acquittal must have seemed like a miracle, given the overwhelming legal apparatus that had confronted them in the Old Bailey.

With a guilty verdict and a public execution, the British government—and the East India Company—had managed to produce the show trial that they had originally planned. They had at last established a compelling ending for the dominant narrative. John Everingham’s contract was renewed, and the printer released the court transcripts—with only a brief allusion to the unsuccessful first trial—as a twenty-eight-page bound volume within a matter of weeks. The publication went through multiple printings, and was read throughout the British empire. Its final lines left no doubt where the Crown stood regarding the crimes of piracy: According to this sentence, Edward Foreseth and the rest were executed, on Wednesday, November the 25th, 1696; at Execution-Dock, that being the usual Place for the Execution of Pirates. FINIS. EPILOGUE: LIBERTALIA A few days before his stolen coins were found quilted into his jacket—starting the whole chain of events that would lead to five of his shipmates hanging at Execution Dock—John Dann stumbled across Henry Adams’s new bride in the London suburb of St.

pages: 913 words: 219,078

The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War by Benn Steil

Albert Einstein, Alistair Cooke, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, disintermediation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, imperial preference, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, kremlinology, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, open economy, Potemkin village, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, structural adjustment programs, the market place, trade liberalization, Transnistria, Winter of Discontent, Works Progress Administration, éminence grise

British prime minister Winston Churchill shared these fears, particularly as regards Poland—a country he saw as a barrier to Soviet westward expansion, much as Stalin saw it as a barrier to Western encroachment.4 But FDR never bought into Churchill’s vision of Britain and America marching forward shoulder to shoulder into the postwar era. “The President shared a widespread American suspicion of the British Empire as it had once been,” noted Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. And he had “no fear that other powers,” besides the United States, “might fill that role” after the war.5 Yet by 1947, such fear would concentrate minds in the State Department and Pentagon. The Big Three wartime conference at Yalta in February 1945 was Roosevelt’s last face-to-face meeting with Stalin, a final chance to reconcile clashing interests over the shape of postwar Europe before the advancement of Soviet, American, and British troops settled matters on the ground.

But the scheme took as its starting point political stability, something lacking in the chaotic aftermath of the war. In response to the rising threat of a new security vacuum in Europe, Truman’s State Department effectively mothballed the newly born IMF, dismissing disdainfully the assumptions Morgenthau and White had made to justify their faith in it—that Soviet cooperation would continue into the postwar period; that Germany’s economic collapse could be safely, and indeed profitably, managed; that the British empire could be peaceably dismantled; and that modest balance-of-payments credit support was sufficient to reestablish global trade. These had been based on “misconceptions of the state of the world around us,” future secretary of state Dean Acheson reflected, “both in anticipating postwar conditions and in recognizing what they actually were when we came face to face with them. . . . Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the nineteenth century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.”33 Bohlen concurred.

Winston Churchill, who had just led his nation through to victory in war, was unceremoniously booted from office while representing it at the final Big Three wartime conference at Potsdam in July 1945. Clement Attlee’s Labour Party swept to power on a platform of creating full employment, a National Health Service, and a cradle-to-grave welfare state. “Let us face the future” was the theme of the victorious campaign. Yet the belief remained, even within the Labour leadership, that the country’s strength lay in its past—in (a reformed) empire. “I know that if the British Empire fell,” Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin told the House of Commons in February 1946, “it would be a disaster. I know, further, it would mean that the standard of life of our constituents would fall considerably.”22 But what a difference a year would make. BRITAIN’S NATIONAL DEBT HAVING QUADRUPLED during the war, the strain of policing occupied Europe and restless far-flung colonies had, by 1947, become an intolerable financial burden.

pages: 329 words: 102,469

Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West by Timothy Garton Ash

Albert Einstein, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, centre right, clean water, Columbine, continuation of politics by other means, cuban missile crisis, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Eratosthenes, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), James Watt: steam engine, Kickstarter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, Peace of Westphalia, postnationalism / post nation state, Project for a New American Century, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, Washington Consensus, working poor, working-age population, World Values Survey

Oddly, Britain is more often defensive and resentful in the relationship; yet, calmly considered, Britain has the stronger position. Because of the hegemonic succession from the British Empire to the United States, the world is speaking English, not French, and more often adopting Anglo-Saxon than Gallic ways. The British are winners acting like losers. We should have the confidence to be more generous. This historic compromise with France would, by definition, be somewhere between the neo-Churchillian and the neo-Gaullist positions. That is also substantively the best position. Britain alone is too small and weak to be a major partner for the United States, especially since American leaders generally feel they can take the British for granted. If even Churchill, with the whole might of the British Empire behind him, found himself compelled to beg, like Fala (Roosevelt’s dog), how much more must that be true of a medium-sized European state in relation to the world’s only hyperpower.

He was, noted the diarist Henry “Chips” Channon, “a fanatical Francophil [sic].”49 When he spoke in April 1939 of “a solid identity of interest between the Western democracies,” he meant Britain and France.50 “The French,” he said a month later, “have the finest, though not the largest, army in existence at the present time.”51 Only when that army was so shockingly defeated in June 1940, only when his last, extraordinary offer of a complete political union between France and Britain failed to forestall Pétain’s capitulation to Hitler, did he turn all his efforts to the United States. The way he then conjured the British Empire’s tenuous, tense prewar relationship with America into an enduring Special Relationship (with, for the British if not for Americans, a capital “S” and “R”) was to prove the most enduring Churchillism. If you want a glimpse of the great conjuror at work, read the eyewitness account by H. V. Morton of Churchill’s August 1941 meeting with Roosevelt on Canada’s Placentia Bay. Morton shows him rehearsing, like a film director, the joint church service at which the assembled British and American crews would sing “Onward, Christian Soldiers” and “O God, Our Help in Ages Past” on the deck of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales: “Mr.

Churchill walked about inspecting every detail, often taking a hand by moving a chair an inch one way or another and by pulling out the folds of the Union Jack.”52 Then, in a radio broadcast, he interpreted his own theatrical production to the world, evoking “that densely packed congregation of fighting men of the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws, of the same ideals, and now to a large extent of the same interests, and certainly in different degrees facing the same dangers.” They represented “two major groupings of the human family, the British Empire and the United States, who, fortunately for the progress of mankind, happen to speak the same language and very largely think the same thoughts, or anyhow think a lot of the same thoughts.”53 Notice how the essential qualifications, “very largely,” “a lot of,” “certainly in different degrees,” are scattered like foam in the wake of a battleship advancing at full speed. In fact, America was not at war with Hitler in August 1941 and, to the disappointment of the British, did not come in as a result of that Atlantic meeting.

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Scots and Catalans: Union and Disunion by J. H. Elliott

active measures, agricultural Revolution, banking crisis, British Empire, centre right, land tenure, mass immigration, mobile money, new economy, North Sea oil, Red Clydeside, sharing economy, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, urban renewal

This was a challenge that was also faced by eighteenth-century Ireland, and by the increasingly self-confident colonies of British America. It was faced, too, by the no less ‘provincial’ society of eighteenth-century Catalonia as it struggled to find its place in a Spain dominated by Castile. The Scots had the advantage over the Catalans of being actively involved in the construction of a global empire, and one that defined itself not as English but as British. It was as the Scottish members of a British Empire rapidly outpacing that of Spain – an empire that could take pride in its unique blend of freedom, religious tolerance and commercial enterprise – that they would be able to make their mark in the world. 116 They were British, but not English, while still remaining patriotic Scots. The options available to eighteenth-century Catalans were less immediately attractive. Although Antoni de Capmany might refer to Spain as his ‘nation’, 117 it is difficult to determine the degree to which his compatriots actually thought of themselves as ‘Spaniards’, although there were strong indications by the later eighteenth century that many of them were on their way to doing so. 118 In reality ‘Catalan’ and ‘Spanish’ were no more incompatible as descriptors of loyalty than ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’.

Forward-looking Catalans like Capmany rejected ‘provincialism’, or anything that smacked of federalism, as threatening the unity of the Spanish nation. 49 The two national communities of Scotland and Catalonia, however, would take very different paths over the course of the century as they grappled with the consequences of industrialization and sought to affirm their distinctive identities in a political and economic environment much less favourable to consensus in Spain than in Britain. Industrialization and Its Consequences Massive Scottish participation in the construction of the British Empire from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards did much to reconcile Scots at many levels of society to the fact of Union. It also strengthened their dual patriotism as loyal members of the new British state that had been created in 1707 and also as loyal Scots who could take a justifiable pride in a national contribution to Britain’s international power and overseas expansion out of all proportion to the size of their population.

Those regions or parts of Spain that resented the heavy hand of Madrid had two possible options by way of response. One was to demand a reorganization of the state along the federal lines advocated by Pi i Margall, and a second was to seek a form of home rule within a more or less centralized state. While Pi was himself a doctrinaire liberal, an important practical precedent for this second option had been set by the British North America Act of 1867, which made Canada a self-governing entity within the British Empire. 7 The war in Cuba, breaking out in 1868 and brought to a temporary close ten years later by a proposal from the Spanish authorities for a form of autonomy that came to nothing, showed that home rule, as a possible solution to the problems of Spain and its overseas possessions, was at least an option deserving of serious consideration. A third possible option, independence, which was won by Cuba in 1898 after a bitter struggle against a colonial regime that had united broad sections of society against it, was barely contemplated in the Spain of the later nineteenth century.

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Happy Valley: The Story of the English in Kenya by Nicholas Best

British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, Etonian, lateral thinking, out of africa, Scramble for Africa

Yet there was more to it than adventure, much more. Although Thomson had been prepared to wander through Masai Land simply for the hell of it, the hard-nosed businessmen of the Royal Geographical Society who had put up the cash for his expedition were far more interested in what might come of it in the way of trade. Trade, and ensuing profit for the motherland, was the only reason for the existence of the British Empire. The great powers of Europe were beginning to look towards Africa as a massive counter in the absorbing game of politics. Thomson’s journey raised the question of just how much profit could be squeezed from this vast new territory, at present under no country’s sphere of influence. Thomson himself, a romantic pure and simple, vigorously opposed the idea of opening up the area to commerce.

Von Lettow knew that the real war would be fought out in the mud and blood of Belgium and northern France. If he could divert stores and badly needed troops from the Western Front and bog them down in the malarial and disease-ridden bush of East Africa, he would be doing more than his bit for his country. He acted swiftly. Immediately after the shelling of Dar-es-Salaam by the Astraea and Pegasus, a small force of commandos crossed into Kenya, the only part of the British Empire to be invaded by Germans during the entire war. They had orders to blow up railway bridges, cut telegraph wire and confuse the enemy. The men were led by Tom von Prince, a Scotsman with a German mother, who had taken service with the Germans after being turned down for a commission by the British army. The ‘von’ was a personal present from the Kaiser, a reward for the considerable fighting qualities he had displayed during a long and colourful career.

He would only commit to a battle when he judged that the outcome would justify the loss of irreplaceable men and equipment. Live to fight another day was the Schutztruppe motto. Von Lettow’s men obeyed the order with alacrity. Whenever the invading British moved forward in strength, the Germans would linger just long enough to inflict heavy casualties before slipping away into the bush, leaving their enemies to pick up the pieces and plod on with the advance as best they could. By January 1916 the number of British Empire troops on active service in East Africa had swelled from a few thousand to two divisions, totalling more than thirty thousand men. A large percentage of these lost their lives during the campaign, not from enemy action, but from disease. If malaria did not claim them, then bacillary or amoebic dysentery did. Chills, heatstroke, blackwater fever and rotting feet caused by jigger fleas were commonplace.

pages: 322 words: 84,752

Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up by Philip N. Howard

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, Brian Krebs, British Empire, butter production in bangladesh, call centre, Chelsea Manning, citizen journalism, clean water, cloud computing, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, digital map, Edward Snowden,, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Filter Bubble, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Google Earth, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Julian Assange, Kibera, Kickstarter, land reform, M-Pesa, Marshall McLuhan, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, mobile money, Mohammed Bouazizi, national security letter, Nelson Mandela, Network effects, obamacare, Occupy movement, packet switching, pension reform, prediction markets, sentiment analysis, Silicon Valley, Skype, spectrum auction, statistical model, Stuxnet, trade route, undersea cable, uranium enrichment, WikiLeaks, zero day

The Pax Britannica was a period of history, between Napoleon’s defeat and World War I, during which the British Empire managed global affairs. London was the center of power, the British navy controlled the most important sea-trading routes, and relatively efficient bureaucracies put the world’s resources and people into the Empire’s service. Several aspects of the Pax Britannica may actually describe our future as much as that moment of our past. The British were strong because their network infrastructure gave them unparalleled levels of political, economic, and cultural control. The Pax Britannica was hardly a period of universal peace—it was a period of stability more than peace. There were nasty, violent brushfire wars throughout the British Empire as poor communities resisted the oppression of colonial masters. Rival kings, separatist movements, nationalist causes, and radical socialists (and anarchists, for that matter) constantly challenged the authority of the British crown.

And the infrastructure that allowed the Romans to have an extended period of political and economic stability was territorially bounded. It was an extensive network, but good roads and public works projects ended where the Visigoths began. Rome was not and could not be everywhere. Having power during the Pax Romana meant having some control over the nodes in the Empire’s networks, and as a city, Rome was the confluence of these networks of power. Similarly, in the British Empire, London served as the node, and the big corporate players all managed their affairs from the capital. The fashions, designs, and innovations of London radiated outward to the colonial seats of British power. Cultural exports from the United States were an important part of the Pax Americana: Hollywood movies, television programs, music, and advertising techniques had a significant impact on the values of viewers, listeners, and consumers around the world.

See also M-Pesa Barlow, John Perry, 163 behavior, prediction of, 141 Beinecke, Jessica, 194 Belarus, protests in, 85, 115 Belgium, minorities in, building collective identity, 145 Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine, 50, 216, 221 Bennett, Lance, 138–39 Berners-Lee, Tim, 37–38 big data, 61, 295; analyzing, 176, 179, 180–81; in authoritarian regimes, 195; bringing stability, 68; collection of, overseeing, 112; definition of, 141; growth of, 179, 256; management of, 256; providing collective security, 112, 140–45; providing connective security through, 107; solving social problems with, 176, 178; taking down dirty networks, 99; tracking international criminal activity, 177–78 bin Laden, Osama, 38, 53, 60–61, 114, 176 Bitcoins, 56 Black Code (Deibert), 179 blogging, 76–78, 84–85, 127, 130, 171 Bloomberg News, 192 Blue Coat Systems, 215 Boeing, 115, 212 Boko Haram, 81, 83, 135 Bolivia, 215 Bosykh, Alexander, 198–99 botnets, 2–4, 202–3, 205 bots: attacking security companies, 32; dominating digital networks, 34; evolution of, 203–4; in financial markets, 34; identifying, 210–11; political, 204–11, 233, 234; as political tools, 29–33; pro-regime, 29–30; threats posed by, 208, 209–11; Twitter-based, 30–31; types of, 203; usage of, by country, 206–7; use of, 203–8; wartime use of, 34 bot wars, 53 Bouazizi, Mohamed, 50–51, 137, 221 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 92 Brazil: elections in, 128–29; internet rights in, 165 Breivik, Anders Behring, 216 Bretton Woods system, 231 Bring Back Our Girls, 81 British Empire, 1, 4–5, 15, 67, 107–8, 146–47, 231 broadcast licenses, 249–50 Brown Moses. See Higgins, Eliot Bulgaria, 41, 97 Burma, protests in, 86. See also Myanmar Bush, George W., 128 camps, international, 179 Canada: elections in, 205; minorities in, building collective identity, 145; surveillance in, 133 CANVAS, 164 Carna Bot, 3–4, 32, 203 Castels, Manuel, 126 Castro, Raúl, 92 Catalans, self-governance and, 145 CCTV, 201 censorship, 157; programs and systems for, 87, 133–34, 253 Center for Democracy and Technology, 163 Chad, 94 Chávez, Hugo, 92 Chiapas, uprising in.

pages: 432 words: 85,707

QI: The Third Book of General Ignorance (Qi: Book of General Ignorance) by John Lloyd, John Mitchinson

Albert Einstein, Boris Johnson, British Empire, California gold rush, cognitive dissonance, dark matter, double helix, epigenetics, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johannes Kepler, Kickstarter, music of the spheres, Nelson Mandela, out of africa, Ronald Reagan, The Wisdom of Crowds, trade route

It’s still true that the sun never sets on the British Empire – but only just. The UK currently covers nine time zones. The most easterly is the British Indian Ocean Territory, a collection of atolls midway between Indonesia and Tanzania and home to the Diego Garcia military base. It is six hours ahead of the UK. The most westerly is the Pitcairn Islands, and it’s thanks to these four tiny volcanic islands in the Pacific, inhabited by descendants of the mutineers from the Bounty, that the British can still make this claim. When the sun sets on the Cayman Islands in the western Caribbean, it’s 13 hours before it rises on the British Indian Ocean Territory. But on Pitcairn it’s still daylight. The first person to use the phrase about the British Empire was the statesman and diplomat George Macartney (1737–1806).

The tiny oribatid mite, a member of the spider family as little as a fifth of a millimetre (0.007 inch) long, can resist a pull of 1,180 times its own weight. Alternatively known as moss mites or beetle mites, they can also pull something 530 times their own weight up a vertical surface, using only two of their eight legs. To test this, researchers from the University of Tübingen fixed the mites to a pin with superglue and measured how much force it took to pull them off. Isn’t science fun! STEPHEN What would you say if I said to you that the British Empire was built on diarrhoea? RICH HALL I’d say you were full of shit. Any word that ends in ‘rhoea’ is just bad news, isn’t it? Diarrhoea, pyorrhoea, gonorrhoea. North Korea. What’s the worst thing a swan can do to you? A number of alarming things, but it can’t break your arm. Swans may make threatening noises but your arms are safe with them. A bird’s bones are not only smaller and thinner than human ones; they’re also hollow.

Many were prefabricated and could be bought by mail order. You could have corrugated iron stables, gymnasia, hunting lodges, billiard rooms and laundries. In 1890 the catalogue of David Rowell & Co. was offering a cricket pavilion for £63.50 (£6,000 today), a two-storey cottage for £166 (£16,000 today) or a theatre for £695 (£67,000 today). Corrugated iron churches (or ‘tin tabernacles’) sprang up all over the British Empire: several are still in use as listed buildings today. The craze reached its height in 1851, when Prince Albert ordered a corrugated iron ballroom for Balmoral Castle. It’s still there, now used as a carpenter’s workshop. It wasn’t universally popular. William Morris, founder of the Arts and Crafts Movement, wrote that it was spreading ‘like pestilence over the country’, and some bishops were reluctant to consecrate iron churches.

pages: 1,445 words: 469,426

The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power by Daniel Yergin

anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial exploitation, Columbine, continuation of politics by other means, cuban missile crisis, do-ocracy, energy security, European colonialism, Exxon Valdez, financial independence, fudge factor, informal economy, joint-stock company, land reform, liberal capitalism, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, old-boy network, postnationalism / post nation state, price stability, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Thomas Malthus, Yom Kippur War

[2] Pahlavi, Shah's Story, p. 39 ("miraculous failure"); Ervand Abrahamiam, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 249-50 ("the Great"); Interview with George McGhee; Louis, British Empire, pp. 636, 596 ("infant prodigy" and "nineteenth-century"); George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), pp. 320 ("kindly feeling"); Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 646 ("stupidity"). [3] Berthoud memo, April 18, 1951, EP 1531/204, FO 371/91527; Bevin to Frank, April 12, 1950, EP 1531/37, FO 371/82395, PRO. "The Iranian Oil Crisis," 3460, DeGolyer papers; Raymond Vernon, "Planning for a Commodity Oil Market," in Daniel Yergin and Barbara Kates-Garnick, eds., The Reshaping of the Oil Industry: Just Another Commodity? (Cambridge: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 1985), pp. 25-33 ("Minister and Manager"); Louis, British Empire, p. 56 ("no power or influence"); Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Postwars of Earl Attlee (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 178-79; Robert Stobaugh, "The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy, 1925-1975," in Iran Under the Pahlavis, ed.

Brands, Inside the Cold War: hoy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), chap. 18 (fainting spells); Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 219 ("Old Mossy"); Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 173 ("colonial exploiter"); Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 651 ("great actor"); Interviews with George McGhee and Peter Ramsbotham ("Moslem"); Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), p. 262; C. M. Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982), pp. 113-14; Louis, British Empire, pp. 651-53 ("lunatic" and "cunning"); Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 130-37. [7] Interviews; Louis, British Empire, pp. 667-74 ("Suez Canal"); Notes, June 27, 1951, EP 1531/ 870, FO 371/ 91555, PRO (Churchill); Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan, vol. 1, 1894-1956, (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 310; H. W. Brands, "The Cairo-Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East, 1951-1953," International History Review, 11 (1989), pp. 438-40 ("scuttle and surrender")

On Levy's proposals, see Logan memo, July 31,1951, with Minute, July 29,1951, EP 1531/1290, FO 371/ 91575 ("camouflage"); Shepherd to Foreign Office, October 10, 1951, EP 1531/1837, FO 371/91599 (John Kennedy); Cabinet Minutes, July 30, 1951, CM (51), CAB 128/20, PRO. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 655; Louis, British Empire, p. 677, n. 5 ("mongrelization" and "dilute"); Walters, Silent Missions, pp. 247-56 ("crafty," "Where else?," "certain principles" and Kashani); FRUS: Iran, 1951-1954, pp. 145 ("dream world"). [9] Louis, British Empire, p. 678 ("jolly good"); Fergusson to Stokes, October 3,1951, with Fergusson to Makins, October 4, 1951, EP 1531/1839, FO 371/91599; Ramsbotham to Logan, August 20, 1951, EP 1531/1391, FO 371/91580, PRO. Interview with Peter Ramsbotham ("last act of Figaro"); Peter Ramsbotham to author, July 4, 1990; Painter, Oil and American Century, p. 177.

The Linguist: A Personal Guide to Language Learning by Steve Kaufmann

borderless world, British Empire, discovery of DNA, financial independence, haute cuisine, South China Sea, trade liberalization, urban sprawl

In Eastern Canada, small permanent settlements of English and French speaking people from Europe eventually expanded across the North American continent, driven by the search for furs and by the desire to find farmland. Canada became a colony of the British Empire in 1763. Soon after, as a result of the American Revolution, Canada received a major influx of Americans who wished to remain loyal to the British Crown: the United Empire Loyalists. This group determined how Canadians speak English today. The majority of immigrants to Canada for the first half of the 19th century were British Protestants who reinforced strong feelings of loyalty to the British Empire, opposition to the United States, and a sense of rivalry with the entrenched French speaking Catholic society of Quebec. The original constitution of Canada was known as the British North America Act.

Even though Canadian culture is now truly an amalgamation of influences from all over the world, the English-Canadian language is uniform across the country and is less varied than the pronunciation found in Britain, the US or the Southern Hemisphere. Canadian English is a very useful version of English for non-native speakers. It is easily understood and not out of place anywhere in the world. The Immigrant Experience English speaking Canada does not have a powerful distinctiveness. The ever-increasing variety of people who make up English Canada has meant the decline in importance of British Protestantism, the British Empire and British A Personal Guide to Language Learning 141 institutions. There is no longer a typical Canadian name, nor ethnic origin, nor religion. This lack of clear markers is what makes Canadian culture so accessible. Even the relative neutrality of the Canadian accent and the lack of regional accents make it easier for newcomers to blend into Canadian society. In contrast, older established national groups in the world are more easily identified by common family names or identifiable physical appearance.

pages: 484 words: 120,507

The Last Lingua Franca: English Until the Return of Babel by Nicholas Ostler

barriers to entry, BRICs, British Empire, call centre,, European colonialism, Internet Archive, invention of writing, Isaac Newton, Machine translation of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." to Russian and back, mass immigration, Nelson Mandela, open economy, Republic of Letters, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, trade route, upwardly mobile

What has perturbed the even flow of English as it has spread along with the interests of its speaker communities, making it seem to have a life of its own, or rather a life constrained and defined by interests and activities expressed in other languages? Looking round the world for places where English is notable for its rarity, our gaze First lights on three countries that had once hosted massive use of the language, since they were colonies within the British Empire, but have since moved to promote other languages in its place. They are distributed round the Indian Ocean: Malaysia in the east, ri Lanka centrally, and Tanzania in the west. Each of these countries had multiple language communities when the British took over, and so in each of them English might have been considered able to go on playing a convenient, almost natural, role as a neutral lingua-franca for the whole country.

In the area that became Tanzania, however, this Swahili language (named from Arabic saw hil ‘coasts’, and referring to itself as kiSwahili) had spread particularly widely as a lingua-franca, originally from the coastal region round Zanzibar. It had been picked up and reinforced by European (mainly German) missionaries’ schools in the nineteenth century and carried on under British administration after 1918. Essentially, it was the de facto lingua-franca in the country that had preceded the British Empire’s widespread introduction of English. Ever since the country became an independent and united state (over the period 1961– 64), its First president, Julius Nyerere, had been keen to promote it as the national language, and an effective lingua-franca for all Tanzanians, bridging the gaps among the more than a hundred languages they spoke with a distinctively African medium that avoided any recourse to the colonial language English.* Luckily for Swahili, in Tanzania there was no tribe or tribes much larger or more dominant than the others, as the Luo or Kikuyu were and are in Kenya, or the Baganda in Uganda.

But both the UK and U.S. markets, and especially the latter, had been developed at home; the industrial revolutions that drove them were domestic, and the resources that they exploited were likewise largely mined or grown at home, or (in Britain’s case) in colonies that were under their own management. Outside India and China, these developments that favored English-speaking powers had not required them to solicit the cooperation of foreigners who did not speak their language.* By contrast, third parties who wanted to join in had to make themselves understood. Just as Indians and other British colonial citizens who wanted to get a piece of the action in the British Empire had to strive to learn English, so other foreigners too had to take an interest in the language to make contact. Official(and Semi-official) Languages by Size—EU and Global (Credit: Nicholas Ostler, based on Eurobarometer data) Western Powers’ Shares of World Manufacturing, 1750–1900. (Credit: Nicholas Ostler, based on data from Kennedy 1988) Another cliché of nineteenth-century Britain was that “trade follows the flag”: imperial control of a territory was a useful precursor to getting British business to take an interest in it, as witness Hong Kong for Far Eastern commerce, or New Zealand for wool and dairy products.

The Transformation Of Ireland 1900-2000 by Diarmaid Ferriter

anti-communist, Bob Geldof, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, collective bargaining, deliberate practice, edge city, falling living standards, financial independence, ghettoisation, greed is good, hiring and firing, housing crisis, immigration reform, income per capita, land reform, manufacturing employment, moral panic, New Journalism, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, open economy, postnationalism / post nation state, sensible shoes, the market place, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, wage slave, women in the workforce

The republican Fenian movement of the nineteenth century, dedicated to overthrowing British rule in Ireland when circumstances would permit, was undergoing a process of rejuvenation, and the Irish Parliamentary Party reunited in 1900, after experiencing division and faction in the 1890s. The outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 provided advanced Irish nationalists with an opportunity to galvanise anti-British and pro-Boer sentiment, and to suggest there were lessons to be learned regarding how to take on the might of the British Empire. But it was also the case that thousands of Irish men were loyal servants of the army of that empire, whether out of conviction or economic necessity. The aged Queen Victoria visited Ireland in 1900, for the first time in thirty-seven years, and although advanced nationalists protested loudly, she was well received by most. Majority nationalist opinion, it seemed, was content to aspire to a Home Rule settlement that would see Ireland stay within the empire.

But the idea that a wholesale transference of energy from the life of politics to the life of culture occurred as a result does scant justice to the many forces at work in Irish society at this time. The most recent research suggests that the Irish ‘cultural revival’ of this period was a relatively coherent mass movement, despite differences in religion, class, gender and political conviction. But far from political pessimism, there was also, among the educated Catholic elite, a dynamism and confident outlook, with a vision of a Home Rule Ireland taking a central place in the British Empire.1 Alongside this, a nationalist tradition stretching back two centuries was being communicated to a newly literate mass audience, and sometimes reinterpreted. One aspect of that tradition was a belief in the use of violence to achieve Irish independence from Britain. Adherents of the various philosophies of Irish nationalism were exceptionally active in the opening decade of the twentieth century, and often borrowed freely from each other’s discourse.2 A year after the death of Parnell, in 1892, a small pamphlet was published in Dublin entitled Ireland in the Twentieth Century, in which the writer T.

Regarding his duties in the early days, he remembered a quiet time, occasionally punctuated by drink-induced disorder: ‘whiskey was popular, cheap and deadly … a man with a shilling in his pocket could quickly get fighting drunk … so the police had their hands full at every public gathering.’84 There were 27,000 soldiers stationed in Ireland in 1900 in addition to 12,000 armed RIC men, making Ireland the most densely militarised area of the British Empire in peacetime. The mobilisation caused by the Boer War undoubtedly hardened moderate opinion against the Empire, and helped the radicals in Irish politics to reach a wider audience, but it also obliged many Irish soldiers to fight against the Boers. David Fitzpatrick makes the point that in the early twentieth century ‘the common rhetoric of militarism transcended political divisions in Ireland throughout the turmoil of the period between the Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902 and the Anglo-Irish settlement of 1921–2.

pages: 225 words: 64,595

Catch-67: The Left, the Right, and the Legacy of the Six-Day War by Micah Goodman

Boycotts of Israel, British Empire, European colonialism, mass immigration, one-state solution, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Let me add a note of personal reservation: I believe that the understanding of Zionism as a colonial movement is mistaken. Zionism lacks some of the most basic characteristics of a classical colonial movement. First and foremost, the Zionists had no motherland sending them to a foreign land to exploit its resources. The British Empire did indeed support Zionism at the close of World War I, but Britain eventually surrendered to Arab pressure and turned its back on Zionism on the eve of World War II, almost totally halting Jewish immigration to Israel. At the end of the day, the Jewish state was created not through the benevolence of the British Empire but through a violent struggle against it. Many Israelis think of themselves as refugees from Europe, or even orphans of Europe, but certainly not emissaries of Europe. 5. “Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” 18 August 1988, Article 22, available at 6.

This is of course a generalization that does not always hold true, but in Israel today an almost direct correlation exists between being right-wing and being religious. Things were not always this way. None of the founding fathers of Religious Zionism treated sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel as sacrosanct. Rabbi Yaakov Reines, who founded Religious Zionism in its political form, supported the Uganda Plan—the proposal by the British Empire in the early twentieth century to create a national home for the Jews in eastern Africa. The founder of the movement that would vigorously reject relinquishing parts of the Land of Israel was himself willing to concede the entire land.1 Later, the minister representing the National Religious Party, Haim-Moshe Shapira, strongly objected to Israel’s launching the Six-Day War. The campaign to restore the people of Israel to their ancient biblical heartland and to the Old City of Jerusalem was waged despite the opposition of the party of the religious nationalists.2 Anyone who looks at Religious Zionism today will surely be surprised that Rabbi Reines proposed conceding the Holy Land and that Minister Shapira opposed liberating the Old City.

Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress.2 This perception finds a certain justification in the statements of some of the early Zionists, who initially conceived of a Jewish state as a force for extending the borders of Europe into Asia.3 The Zionists, in this narrative, were the emissaries of the British Empire, and when the imperial hegemon began to falter, they struck an alliance with the American empire instead. For many Palestinians, the confrontation with Israel is a confrontation with a world power that is greater than Israel.4 At the same time, many Israelis feel that their confrontation with the Palestinians is a confrontation with a historic force that is greater than the Palestinians. They feel that the violence wrought against them has a broader historical context, and specifically that it is an expression of anti-Semitism.

pages: 475 words: 156,046

When They Go Low, We Go High: Speeches That Shape the World – and Why We Need Them by Philip Collins

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, collective bargaining, Copley Medal, Corn Laws, crony capitalism, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Donald Trump, F. W. de Klerk, fear of failure, Fellow of the Royal Society, full employment, invention of the printing press, late capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Neil Kinnock, Nelson Mandela, plutocrats, Plutocrats, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Rosa Parks, stakhanovite, Thomas Malthus, Torches of Freedom, World Values Survey

She says treaties only bind you when it is to your interest to keep them. ‘What is a treaty?’ says the German Chancellor. ‘A scrap of paper.’ Have you any five-pound notes about you? I am not calling for them. Have you any of those neat little Treasury pound notes? If you have, burn them; they are only ‘scraps of paper’. What are they made of ? Rags. What are they worth? The whole credit of the British Empire. ‘Scraps of paper’ … Treaties are the currency of international statesmanship … This doctrine of the scrap of paper … that treaties only bind a nation as long as it is to its interest, goes to the root of public law. It is the straight road to barbarism and the whole machinery of civilisation will break down if this doctrine wins in this war. We are fighting against barbarism. But there is only one way of putting it right.

It is also based on asking his audience to recall the events of twenty-two years earlier when the Great War had been won, suddenly, against expectation. The implication is that the same will happen again. We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas … However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own.

If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This was their finest hour.’ For the first time Churchill stops reporting and raises himself to his full rhetorical height. Note, though, that a grand message does not demand grandiose language. Three-quarters of the words in this section are monosyllables. The message is, in summary, the same one he gave in each of his magnificent speeches in the summer of 1940: we confront the face of evil in the world, we have to save not only ourselves but all civilisation, there can be no victory short of extinction for the enemy.

pages: 535 words: 151,217

Pacific: Silicon Chips and Surfboards, Coral Reefs and Atom Bombs, Brutal Dictators, Fading Empires, and the Coming Collision of the World's Superpowers by Simon Winchester

9 dash line, Albert Einstein, BRICs, British Empire, California gold rush, colonial rule, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Frank Gehry, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), land tenure, Loma Prieta earthquake, Maui Hawaii, Monroe Doctrine, oil shock, polynesian navigation, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, trade route, transcontinental railway, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, undersea cable, uranium enrichment

Yet so many glorious beginnings were inevitably followed by as many inglorious endings—with the result that all these various powers have retreated from the ocean, leaving the Pacific now almost entirely to its own devices, to be run by its own people. The graceful Cunarder RMS Queen Elizabeth, shown in her glamorous heyday and at her sad sabotaged demise in Hong Kong, had a thirty-three-year life, which marked the beginning of the decline and fall of the British Empire.* [Associated Press; Louis Gardella.] The foreigners’ first withdrawals from the ocean began, effectively, in the mid-1950s, when France came to accept the reality that its once great Southeast Asian peninsular landholding “Indochine” was no more, and had to be returned. For the next forty years, farewell ceremonies seemed to be held almost monthly, with alien flags lowered and swansdown plumes, helmets, and swords being loaded into cabin trunks and sent home to London, Lisbon, Paris, The Hague, and Washington, from islands and outposts dotted in and around the gigantic blue space of sea.

Then, at once, they began to notice that all along the ranks of portholes, from the ship’s stem to her very stern, and on three of her decks, black, oily smoke started streaming out into the clear winter air. This joined into a cloud, which the morning breeze blew in their direction. Within minutes, the lunching hundreds could smell an acrid, chemical, greasy industrial smoke, heavy and sinister. The greatest old ship of the British Empire was on fire. But no fireboats came, not right away. A local accountant was giving his English fiancée’s parents a Sunday boat ride around the harbor, and the four of them stayed, entranced, for three hours. For the first hour no rescue craft came, and they watched with amazement as the blazes consolidated, as explosions began to rock the ship, and as curtains of fire began to race uncontrollably along the vast superstructure.

And when they raised their national flag, the pictures, transmitted live onto giant screens a thousand miles to the north, prompted Tiananmen Square to erupt in paroxysms (whether enforced is still not known) of fireworks and wild enthusiasm. The British forces who then took part in the flag lowering, moments before midnight, looked by contrast worn, weary, and unkempt, their uniforms still damp from the rainstorm, their performance to be seen as either shabbily charming or unhappily threadbare. The June 1997 night of Hong Kong’s long-awaited “retrocession” from the British Empire was cold and rainswept, drenching the ceremonial and those who attended, and making for an unseemly end to Britain’s presence in the North Pacific.* [FormAsia.] Once the flag was down, Hong Kong was no longer a British colony; and the governor’s formal telegram was transmitted to the queen, a relinquishment done, the retrocession achieved, the ills of the Opium Wars overturned and finished with.

Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism by Quinn Slobodian

Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, invisible hand, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mercator projection, Mont Pelerin Society, Norbert Wiener, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Pearl River Delta, Philip Mirowski, price mechanism, quantitative easing, random walk, rent control, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, special economic zone, statistical model, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, theory of mind, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck, zero-sum game

On the one hand, they condemned the kind of empire that conflated the administration of an overseas territory with preferred access to its resources as itself being an insidious variety of economic nationalism. On the other hand, they looked wistfully back at the Habsburg Empire for supposedly balancing the demands of multiple nationalities while maintaining an internally ­free economic territory. They also praised the British Empire of the nineteenth ­century for preserving ­f ree trade in its colonial markets for all comers. The laudable model of free-­trade empire was promoted at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, when the gathered Eu­ro­pean powers vowed to cooperate to preserve f­ ree commerce in the African continent and maintain what Mises praised in 1919 as “the open door for economic activity of all nations” in the Congo basin.11 The spirit of Open Door empire lived on in the League of Nations mandate system, which proposed a gradual movement of colonies ­toward self-­determination ­under the watchful eye of supranational authorities.12 The director (1920–1924) and l­ater member of the Mandates Commission (1924–1939) was the impresario of early neoliberalism, William Rappard, director of the Gradu­ate Institute of International Studies, who brought both Mises and Röpke to Geneva in the 1930s and hosted key lecture series by Hayek and Lionel Robbins in the same de­cade.

In their own variations on this theme, neoliberals ­imagined the end of empire managed by a supranational state that could override national sovereignty to protect global f­ree trade and ­f ree capital flows. The realization of the 1930s for neoliberals was that the self-­ regulating market was a myth. The foundations of world economic order—­t he gold standard, commercial treaties, and the Open Door policies of the British Empire—­were glaring in their absence. The world economy would not reproduce itself without concerted po­liti­cal effort. Instead of envisioning a return to empire, however, neoliberals acknowledged that the era of the nation was irreversible. The secret was how to keep the nation but defang it. How could nations be sapped of their power to disrupt the world economy? The dream was of decolonization without the destructive desire for economic autonomy.

On that day they parted com­pany.”28 The imagination from which Bonn spoke on that day in London in 1933 was shared by the neoliberals, including his colleagues Robbins and Hayek at the LSE and Röpke, who praised Bonn and likely was inspired to title his 1942 book International Economic Disintegration partially by the subtitle of Bonn’s 1938 monograph The Crumbling of Empire: The Disintegration of World Economy.29 Like Bonn, the neoliberals had a differentiated attitude t­oward empire. They saw a chasm between, on the one hand, the many bad empires that protected their colonial trade and saw the world economy as a zero-­sum container of finite resources, and, on the other hand, the single good empire of the British that promoted ­free trade and sound money. They saw the British Empire as the polestar of the first age of globalization from 1870 to 1914. The belief that the British had betrayed economic universalism since 1931 ­under the class pressures of or­ga­nized ­labor and the intellectual seductions of Keynesianism led them to think hard about what a new organ­izing princi­ple and an organ­izing force could be in a world ­after free-­trade empire ­under the indirect rule of the City of London.

America in the World by Robert B. Zoellick

Albert Einstein, anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Corn Laws, coronavirus, cuban missile crisis, defense in depth, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, energy security, European colonialism, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, hypertext link, illegal immigration, immigration reform, imperial preference, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, MITM: man-in-the-middle, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Norbert Wiener, Paul Samuelson, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transcontinental railway, undersea cable, Vannevar Bush, War on Poverty

They hoped that the states of the New World might change the ways of the Old World. The United States is likely to continue to pursue the promise of Western Hemispheric partnerships. Second, America’s trading, transnational, and technological relations have defined the country’s political and even security ties—as well as its economic links—with the rest of the world. The United States arose out of protest against the British Empire’s infringement of liberties, including taxes on trade. From America’s founding, the country drew a connection between economic and political freedoms and embraced the idea that private parties should be the agents of commerce. America’s merchants became practitioners of a new type of transnational internationalism. Over time, Americans pressed for “open doors” to trade. In the twentieth century, U.S. officials recognized the connections between trade and finance and healthy economies, politics, and security.

The territories would enjoy self-government at each phase, based on universal white, male suffrage; there would be little interference by the national government. At the time, only Pennsylvania’s constitution recognized such a democratic electorate. The territories would share obligations for the Confederation’s debt and for the common defense.4 Jefferson did not want the expansion of the United States to repeat the mistakes of the British Empire by creating second-class colonies. Jefferson’s suggested names for the new territorial-states were a mixture of Native American, classical, and honorific; most, including Cheronesus, Assenispia, and Polypotamia, fortunately fell into history’s wastebasket. But Illinois, Michigan, and Washington received their launch from Jefferson’s report. Jefferson’s interest in geometrical designs led him to ignore geographical features when fixing boundaries, an innovation delayed until the entry of the western states later in the nineteenth century.

He wrote to a friend that the United States opposed China’s dismemberment and that American public opinion would not support a grab for “spoliation,” “but for the present we think our best policy is one of vigilant protection of our commercial interests without formal alliances.” Neither recent immigrants from Ireland and Germany, nor foreign policy traditionalists, would like the idea of an alliance with London on behalf of the British Empire.29 During the summer of 1899, Alfred Hippisley, a Briton on leave from his post as inspector of maritime customs in China, visited his old friend Rockhill and Hay. Hippisley followed up with a letter to Rockhill that offered a practical step. The foreign powers controlled the collection of Chinese tariffs within their spheres of influence. Hippisley urged the United States to press an agreement that all foreign powers should apply Chinese tariffs equally.

A United Ireland: Why Unification Is Inevitable and How It Will Come About by Kevin Meagher

Boris Johnson, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, deindustrialization, knowledge economy, kremlinology, land reform, Nelson Mandela, period drama, Right to Buy, trade route, transaction costs

The same day, at a Gaelic football match in Dublin’s Croke Park, British soldiers, ostensibly preparing to search men leaving the ground, opened fire on the crowd, killing fourteen people including two boys aged ten and eleven. The events of 21 November 1920 became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. (Again, Irish history repeats itself and there would be another, even more infamous, Bloody Sunday to come.) In 1922, a treaty was negotiated that would see an Irish Free State established, under the British Empire, while six counties of the historic province of Ulster would split off to form Northern Ireland. The treaty was narrowly supported in the Dáil, although it couldn’t stop civil war breaking out in Ireland between those for and against it. Eventually Irish Free State forces prevailed. The treaty was implemented and Northern Ireland went its own way. The years between partition in 1922 and the suspension of Stormont in 1972 were characterised by the growth of deep inequalities between Catholics and the numerically superior Protestants of Northern Ireland.

So it split the difference, granting independence over most of the country to a Republican insurgency it could not supress, while creating a protectorate for loyalists it didn’t love but felt it owed. For a state whose empire then covered two-thirds of the globe, it was a large, humiliating concession. The Easter Rising of 1916, a week-long insurrection by armed Republicans against British rule, began a process of events which, in time, would signify the beginning of the end of the British Empire, with countless other national liberation movements taking their lead from Ireland’s example. So it’s hardly surprising that a succession of governments paid little attention to the vestigial statelet of Northern Ireland, a painful reminder of a national humiliation. In return, members of Northern Ireland’s idiosyncratic political class were given carte blanche to run their affairs as they saw fit.

RESETTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND A UNITED IRELAND T he Easter Rising, the week-long insurrection by Irish Republicans in Dublin in April 1916, triggered a sequence of events that eventually led to the creation of the Irish Free State and the establishment of Northern Ireland. It is something of a secret history to most people on the other side of the Irish Sea. This is remiss, given it also effectively symbolised the beginning of the end of the British Empire. The total loss of control in Dublin, even for just a week, was a wounding humiliation for Britain. If uppity Nationalists could bring the second city of the empire to its knees, nothing would ever be the same again. And, indeed, it never was. The event inspired countless other national liberation movements throughout the twentieth century. Everyone from Lenin to Mandela took inspiration from the Rising.

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The Silk Roads: A New History of the World by Peter Frankopan

access to a mobile phone, Admiral Zheng, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, banking crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, Berlin Wall, British Empire, clean water, Columbian Exchange, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, drone strike, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, financial innovation, Isaac Newton, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Malacca Straits, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Murano, Venice glass, New Urbanism, Ronald Reagan, sexual politics, South China Sea, spice trade, statistical model, Stuxnet, the built environment, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, uranium enrichment, wealth creators, WikiLeaks, yield management, Yom Kippur War

Military and logistical support was also provided to the Persian forces, to help them achieve their objectives.29 The British were caught cold – and panicked. Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, was alarmed by this turn of events. ‘Russia and Persia are playing tricks in Affghanistan,’ he wrote in the spring of 1838 – although he remained optimistic that things would soon be satisfactorily resolved.30 Within a few weeks, however, he had become genuinely concerned. The jewel in the British Empire’s crown suddenly looked vulnerable. Russia’s actions had brought it ‘a little too near to our door in India’, he wrote to one confidant. A month later, he was warning others that the barrier between Europe and India had been taken away, ‘laying the road open for invasion up to our very gate’.31 The situation looked bleak indeed. The emergency dispatch of a force to occupy the island of Kharg in the Gulf was enough to deflect the Shah’s attentions and call off the siege of Herat.

The problem was that this was not the message that sank in from Burnes’s work; what really hit home back in Britain was his alarmist report that ‘the court of St Petersburg have long cherished designs in this quarter of Asia’.40 This dovetailed with growing British anxiety in other quarters. The consul-general in Baghdad, Henry Rawlinson, lobbied tirelessly, warning all who would listen that unless Russia’s rise was checked the British Empire would be gravely threatened in India. There were two options: Britain should either extend the empire into Mesopotamia to build a proper buffer protecting the approach from the west; or a major force should be sent from India to attack the Russians in the Caucasus.41 Rawlinson took it upon himself to support local anti-Russian insurgencies wherever he could find them: he funnelled arms and money to Imam Shamil, whose power base in Chechnya was a constant thorn in Russia’s side in the mid-nineteenth century.42 The support he provided helped establish a long tradition of Chechen terrorism against Russia.

More worrying still was that the expansion had been followed up with infrastructure projects to connect new regions to the Russian heartlands. In 1880, construction started on the Trans-Caspian Railway, with a line soon connecting through to Samarkand and Tashkent, and by 1899 a spur connected Merv to Kushk, within striking distance of Herat.33 These railway lines were not just symbolic: they were arteries that would allow provisions, weapons and soldiers to be delivered to the British Empire’s back door. As Field Marshal Lord Roberts emphasised to the officers of the Eastern Command not long afterwards, it was regrettable that the railways had been extended so far. Now, however, a line had been established ‘over which Russia could not be allowed to cross’. If it did, he stated, it would be ‘considered a casus belli’ – that is, grounds for war.34 The railway lines also represented an economic threat.

pages: 877 words: 182,093

Wealth, Poverty and Politics by Thomas Sowell

affirmative action, Albert Einstein, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, correlation does not imply causation, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, European colonialism, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, income per capita, invention of the sewing machine, invisible hand, low skilled workers, mass immigration, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, New Urbanism, profit motive, rent control, Scramble for Africa, Simon Kuznets, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, very high income, War on Poverty

But because the sacred book of the rulers— the Koran— was written in Arabic, this spread the Arabic language and literacy in general to many non-Arab peoples who sought to become Muslims, either for religious reasons or to receive the benefits of literacy or to escape the disabilities of non-Muslims in the Islamic empires. The British Empire, as it existed in Asia and Africa, was ruled largely through Britons acting as viceroys in the respective conquered territories and over the indigenous peoples, but often with these territories and peoples being more immediately administered by local, indigenous officials under a policy of “indirect rule.” This in turn meant that there was an indigenous elite who learned to speak the English language, as a prerequisite for serving under the colonial overlords from Britain. Through missionary schools, a portion of the indigenous general population also became educated in English. Because the British Empire, at its zenith, encompassed one-fourth of the land area of the earth and one-fourth of the world’s population, the language of an island people living off the coast at the western end of the Eurasian landmass became the language of more than 500 million people, only a fraction of whom live in England.

Britain alone produced more than 40 percent of the major inventions, discoveries and innovations in the world, from the mid-eighteenth century to the first quarter of the nineteenth century.4 Its technological preeminence was matched by its preeminence as a conquering nation. A twentieth century Italian scholar asked, “How, in the first place, did a peripheral island rise from primitive squalor to world domination?”5 At its peak, the British Empire included one-fourth of the land area of the world and one-fourth of all the people on earth. Such historic changes in the roles of particular peoples and nations have occurred in other places and other times. The Chinese were for centuries more advanced than any of the Europeans, including among their discoveries and inventions the compass, printing, paper, rudders and the porcelain plates that the West called “chinaware” or simply “china.”

The English legacy is not the reason for the success of North America.26 While it is true that all these countries are former colonies of England, and thus might be described as having been influenced by the culture of England, it is also true that the people who founded Canada and the United States were Englishmen, descendants of people steeped in the culture of England as it unfolded over the centuries— while people in Sierra Leone and Nigeria were descendants of people steeped in the very different cultures of a region of sub-Saharan Africa for many centuries, and exposed superficially to the culture of England for less than one century, during which their own indigenous cultures were by no means extinguished in the historically brief period when they were part of the British Empire. French historian Fernand Braudel referred to “the late and ephemeral colonization of Black Africa by the European powers in the nineteenth century.”27 This was hardly enough to culturally turn Africans into Europeans. Many former English colonies populated by non-English peoples continued to observe some aspect of the culture of England after becoming independent— lawyers wearing wigs in court, for example— but these outward observances of English traditions did not prevent these former colonies from having a fundamentally very different cultural legacy from that of England, and correspondingly very different economic and political experiences going forward after independence.

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The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times by Giovanni Arrighi

anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business process, colonial rule, commoditize, Corn Laws, creative destruction, cuban missile crisis, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, double entry bookkeeping, European colonialism, financial independence, financial intermediation, floating exchange rates, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, late capitalism, London Interbank Offered Rate, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Peace of Westphalia, profit maximization, Project for a New American Century, RAND corporation, reserve currency, spice trade, the market place, The Nature of the Firm, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile, Yom Kippur War

From this wider angle of vision, nineteenth-century Britain appears to have followed in the footsteps not of Venice or the United Provinces, but of Imperial Spain. As Paul Kennedy (1987: 48) has observed, like the Habsburg bloc three centuries earlier, the nineteenth-century British empire “was a conglomeration of widely scattered territories, a political-dynastic tour de force which required enormous sustained resources of material and ingenuity to keep going.” As we shall detail in chapter 3, this similarity between the spatial configurations of the nineteenth-century British empire and the sixteenth-century Spanish empire was matched by a striking similarity between the strategies and structures of the cosmopolitan networks of THE THREE HEGEMONIES OF HISTORICAL CAPITALISM 59 long-distance trade and high finance which assisted the power pursuits of the ruling groups of the two imperial formations.

British hegemony expanded the system through the inclusion of the settler states which emerged from the decolonization of the Americas and through the elevation of the property rights of subjects above the sovereignty rights of rulers. The system so instituted was still a system of mutually legitimating, exclusive territorial sovereignties, like the original Westphalia System. But it was a system subject to British governance — a governance which Britain was able to exercise by virtue of its control over the European balance of power, over an extensive and dense world market centered on Britain itself, and over a global British empire. Although this governance was widely perceived as being exercised in the general interest of the member states of the system, it involved a lesser exclusiveness of sovereignty rights than was actually enjoyed in the original Westphalia System. This evolutionary process of simultaneous expansion and supersession of the modern interstate system was taken one step further by its enlarged reconstitution under US hegemony.

(Anderson 1987: 33; emphasis in the original) Taking issue with Ingham’s and Anderson’s characterization of nineteenth-century British capitalism as primarily commercial and financial in structure and orientation, Michael Barrat Brown has underscored its imperial and agro-industrial foundations. By the time the great mid-century expansion of British and world trade took off, Britain had already conquered a territorial empire of unprecedented and unparalleled scale and scope: [Contrary] to the views equally of Lenin and of Gallagher, Robinson and Fieldhouse, now repeated by Ingham and Anderson, most of the British Empire had already been established by 1850 — not only in Canada, and the Caribbean, Madras, Bombay and the Cape Coast from the seventeenth century, but in Gibraltar, Bengal, Ceylon, the Cape, Botany Bay, Penang, Guiana and Trinidad by the end of the eighteenth; and to these were added by 1850 virtually the whole of India, plus Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Natal. Further increments, then, were almost entirely on the African continent.

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Capital Without Borders by Brooke Harrington

banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, complexity theory, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, diversified portfolio, estate planning, eurozone crisis, family office, financial innovation, ghettoisation, haute couture, high net worth, income inequality, information asymmetry, Joan Didion, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, liberal capitalism, mega-rich, mobile money, offshore financial centre, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, South Sea Bubble, the market place, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, wealth creators, web of trust, Westphalian system, Wolfgang Streeck, zero-sum game

On the contrary, attracting the custom of high-net-worth individuals can turn an “economic backwater”—as the British Virgin Islands were described up until the mid-1970s—into a financial center.58 The BVI, which eliminated most taxes and created an innovative law to help international businesses avoid tax in their home jurisdictions, now hosts 40 percent of the world’s offshore business, representing hundreds of billions of dollars in corporate and private wealth.59 However, as will be explained below, this economic surge has been a mixed blessing for the local people of the BVI, who have seen their tax burden increased and their democratic process compromised. Wealth management, globalization, and postcolonial development If global financialization is “a decidedly Anglo-American phenomenon,” that is due in large measure to the impact of trusts and the fiduciary role, which spread with the expansion of the British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.60 As a direct result of colonialism, the trust and the concept of trusteeship—core tools of the wealth management profession—diffused into the legal systems of every imperial territory. The remnants of that framework can still be observed in today’s leading offshore financial centers, most of which are current or former British territories, including Singapore, Hong Kong, the Channel Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands.

See also dynastic wealth; inheritance family foundations, 151 family offices, 72–73 Family Wealth: Keeping It in the Family (Hughes), 250–51 fiduciary responsibility: as absent in bankers, 63; duty of care, 45–46, 87; fiduciary capitalism, 272; gendering of fiduciary role, 64–65; ideology of moral leadership supplied by fiduciary role, 249–50; laws governing, 44–46, 315n38, 315n39; patriarchal authority of fiduciaries, 86; private fiduciaries, 252; spreads with expansion of British Empire, 253–54; structural expansion of fiduciary role, 250; in trusts, 173; of wealth managers, 23, 63, 67–68, 76, 79, 82–84 finance: complexity of international financial markets, 272; continuing crises in, 298; defined, 6; deregulation of, 126; dirty work of, 132–33; divorce financial analysis, 162, 331n101; each jurisdiction creates its own legal system for, 237; fiduciary responsibility absent in, 82; as global, 56–57, 60, 128, 253–59; lack of organization at international level, 235; little infrastructure needed for, 255; long-term relationships with clients in financial services, 320n1; payment and privilege in, 59–67; professional innovation in, 279; wealth management as at core of, 6.

See also inheritance taxes; tax avoidance; tax evasion; tax havens; tax shelters tax evasion: British Virgin Islands refuses to respond to evasions of, 264; European Union’s Savings Tax Directive for combating, 299; Israel co-opts wealth managers in crack down on, 270; tax avoidance distinguished from, 150; wealth managers associated with, 12, 23 tax havens: African and Russian wealth held in, 203; British Virgin Islands as, 262; client-facing jobs in, 265–66; economic effects on former colonies, 258–59; in former British empire, 264; Jersey as, 24; OECD opposition to, 55, 256, 257, 261; sovereignty in, 256–57, 259–62; the wealthy move to, 137. See also offshore finance tax shelters: colonies as, 254; complexity of, 53; corporate, 151; offshore financial centers as, 47; trust-corporation configuration as, 188; in United Kingdom, 241–42 TEP (Trust and Estate Planning) certification, 26; in advertisement for wealth manager, 60; as industry standard, 30, 55–56; on offshore financial centers, 129, 130; on the state, 236–37; on taxes, 226 testamentary freedom, 166 Thyssen-Bornemisza, Baroness Carmen, 160 tiered entities, 189–92 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 204, 209 trade: free, 239, 254, 293; sanctions, 295; trade-restriction avoidance, 159–60; wealth from global, 5, 51 training programs, 97–98, 103 transaction costs: continuity of wealth reduces, 214; for corporations, 181, 182; for foundations, 180; increased cost of borrowing, 221; minimizing, 209, 212; for private investment opportunities, 212; succession planning reduces, 215 treaties, 133, 256, 264 Treaty of Westphalia (1684), 133, 234, 235, 290, 293–97 Trevor (Panama-based wealth manager), 83, 229, 255 Trudeau, Kevin, 157–58 trust: in client relations, 20, 81–105, 120–21, 287; culture and, 108–16; in institutions, 75; pricing related to, 107, 108; rule of law as basis of, 109; similarity as basis for, 95; social identity and, 119–20 trust and estate planning: American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, 30; bar association special-interest groups for, 29; becomes an industry, 126; Chartered Trust and Estate Planner certification, 30; disparate professions in, 55; professionalization of, 4, 5–6; transformation of capitalism and emergence of, 51; university degrees in, 56.

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The Pineapple: King of Fruits by Francesca Beauman

British Empire, Columbian Exchange, Corn Laws, Fellow of the Royal Society, Honoré de Balzac, Isaac Newton, John Harrison: Longitude, language of flowers, Maui Hawaii, refrigerator car, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route

.), Blundell’s Diary and Letter Books 1702–1728 (1952) 39. 45 ‘Commissioner Mathews, Chatham Dock. Comments on the cost of stone pineapples for his garden. 3 June 1739’ in the Public Record Office ADM 106/906/147. 46 For trade with the empire, see James Walvin, Fruits of Empire (1997). For the empire in this period, see Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (1994); H. V. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire 1688–1755 (1996); and C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World 1780–1830. 47 James Grainger, The Sugar-Cane: a poem (1766) 30. 48 Peter Mason, Infelicities: Representations of the Exotic (1998) 1. 49 For responses to the empire in this period, see G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds), Exoticism in the Enlightenment (1989), as well as Kathleen Wilson, ‘Empire of Virtue: the Imperial Project and Hanoverian Culture c.1720–1785’, in Lawrence Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War (1994) 128–56. 50 Quoted in Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (1992) 59. 51 Quoted in Consumer Society 15. 52 Britons. 53 A.

Perhaps the pineapples on his gateposts were a way for Blundell to pay private tribute to this close-to-home casualty of the New World.44 The decision by Admiral Thomas Mathews, Commissioner of the Navy, to install stone pineapples in his garden in Chatham in 1736 may have been influenced by similar motives: he had spent years on the high seas in command of a squadron against pirates in the East Indies.45 The ‘long’ eighteenth century (the period between the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815) saw imperialism evolve into a central tenet of British identity. At the same time, Britain established its dominant position within the many trading empires of Europe. As a result, as the century progressed the pineapple’s role as a symbol of status became increasingly intertwined with its role as a compelling and high-profile expression of the emerging British empire.46 A poem of 1766 by James Grainger recounts how on the island of St Christopher’s, ‘the Sun’s child, the mail’d anana, yields / His regal apple to the ravish’d taste . . .’, a metaphor for the way that the ‘mail’d’ native Americans had been forced to ‘yield’ themselves to those who ‘ravish’d’, that is the British.47 The exotic is a construct: any entity only becomes exotic when it is different to what we know already.

When sold in slices, it no longer had its crown and armour to sustain its reputation as the king of fruits. With its position as a ‘perfect’ fruit thus undermined, it inevitably lost much of the kudos it gained from its arresting appearance. This was just the beginning of an encroaching disrespect for its finery. For the lower and middle classes, imported pineapple was a way of comprehending the emerging British empire for those participating in it imaginatively, as consumers, rather than physically, through travel or government. The nineteenth century was one of almost continual imperial warfare by British troops, with all the associated financial demands. The pineapple was a tangible affirmation of the benefits of this – bringing the wonders of the empire to the doorsteps of the many. It may not have had the economic clout of sugar or tobacco, but just one whiff of its smell or glimpse of its crown brought a world of sunshine into the fusty, dusty dining rooms of Victorian Britain.

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1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War by Benny Morris

Albert Einstein, British Empire, family office, friendly fire, illegal immigration, mass immigration

About 20 percent of the IDF Medical Corps at the end of 1948 were foreign volunteers.37 The Yishuv entered the civil war with one large militia and two very small paramilitary or terrorist organizations: the Haganah, the military arm of the mainstream Zionist parties, especially the socialist Mapai and Mapam, with thirty-five thousand members; and the IZL, the military arm of the Revisionist movement and its youth movement, Betar, and the LHI, which was composed, somewhat unnaturally, of breakaways from the IZL and left-wing revolutionaries who regarded the British Empire as their chief enemy. The IZL had between two and three thousand members and the LHI some three to five hundred. During the civil war, the three organizations occasionally coordinated their operations and did not clash with one another. The Haganah, which as of 1 June 1948 was renamed the Israel Defense Forces, was the organization that counted. During the first months of the civil war, while defending the Jewish settlements and lines of communication, it reorganized.

The withdrawal-promoting Security Council resolution of 4 No vember was buttressed by a memorandum by Bunche defining and endorsing the truce lines of 14 October.6 Israel initially demanded that Egypt withdraw from the areas its troops still occupied in Palestine-that is, the Gaza Strip and the Bethlehem area-and that the future armistice boundary between the two countries be based on the old international Egypt-Palestine frontier, agreed between the British Empire (effectively governing Egypt) and the Ottomans (ruling Palestine) in 19o6. The Egyptians initially sought what amounted to sovereignty over the central and southern Negev-partly in order to restore the historic territorial contiguity of the Arab and Islamic worlds-and demanded that Israel withdraw from the areas of Beersheba, Bir Asluj, and Auja. The southern Negev and Beersheba, they said, could be demilitarized.

Ernest Bevin to Douglas Busk, "Conversation with the Iraqi Foreign Minister," 23 December 1947, PRO FO 371-61893. 2. Bandman, When Will Britain Withdraw from Jerusalem? 12. 3. Cohen, Palestine and Great Powers, 223. 4. Freundlich, From Destruction to Resurrection, 62. 5. Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, 281-282. 6. Niv, Battles of the IZL, 5:161-163, 274-280. 7. Cohen, Palestine and Great Powers, 245. 8. Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 475. 9. Cohen, Palestine and Great Powers, z45. 10. Sela, "Question of Palestine," 317-322; Ben-Dror, "UNSCOP," 20-21. 11. Unsigned, "Jewish Displaced Persons and Refugees May 1947," undated, CZA S25-5353- 12. Text of Andrei Gromyko's speech, Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 19411953, 1:189-196. 13. Ben-Dror, "UNSCOP," 39-55. 14. Urquhart, Bunche, 140 (quoting Bunche to his wife, Ruth, 29 June 1947). 15.

pages: 240 words: 75,304

Time Lord: Sir Sandford Fleming and the Creation of Standard Time by Clark Blaise

British Empire, creative destruction, Dava Sobel, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, Khartoum Gordon, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, undersea cable, Upton Sinclair

But the Scotch, like the country they had left and the new territory they were building, were negotiating a very tight passage between proud survival and overt surrender. They were “emigrants,” not immigrants. They had known poverty in their homeland, but overnight, it seemed, had been transformed into hardy transplants in Canada, the United States, or in England itself. Fleming’s life is one long demonstration of competing loyalties to Canada, to Scotland, and to the idea of the British Empire. As a prime example of the successful emigrant, he nevertheless lamented on return visits to Scotland the loss of his distinctive accent, and even his ear for the purer strains of the “north of Tweed” dialect. Only in Kirkcaldy was he taken for a native. The Fleming brothers nearly died on that forty-four-day passage in 1845. On one fearful night in the midst of a North Atlantic gale, Sandford took readings of wind speed and direction, calculated the ship’s heading and tonnage, and determined that they might not survive until morning.

They followed one another, and in fact rails could not function adequately without the telegraph. But cables were infinitely faster and more adaptable. The moment had come, now that the rails were in sight of the ocean, to continue the cables under the Pacific, just as they had already crossed the Atlantic. Vancouver would be connected to Fiji and Australia, Australia with India and South Africa. A glance at any map confirmed the fact that the red patches on the earth, the British Empire, fairly begged for connection. Without abandoning standard time, he would now take up the final great scheme of his life, the laying of the trans-Pacific and worldwide, all-British cable. His vision had always been one of one-world and instantaneous communication. The time zones were but a rough sketch of what he next planned to do. What good is time if it can’t be put to work? IN 1895 Sandford Fleming, then sixty-eight years old and on the brink of achieving the great success for which he would be knighted two years later, was visiting County Mayo, Ireland.

Geographically I was in a remote corner of a country where I was entirely unknown, and I discovered myself telegraphically with my friends in London. Ever since my visit to Blacksod Bay I have had visions of the extension of the use of the electric telegraph and have regarded it as a heaven sent means of communication. I have asked myself the question can we bring the Dominion telegraphically as near England as Ireland and Scotland are today? Can we bring the whole worldwide British Empire telegraphically into one neighborhood? Miraculous as it must have seemed at the time, it is about as far as the marriage between steam and electricity can be pushed. The coordinated efforts involved, brought into focus that day, are also indicative of the mechanical disadvantage of steam technology, then entering its unacknowledged decline. The diesel engine had been invented two years earlier, the telephone was already widely in use, and the compact power of electricity was all the rage, from incandescent lights to the phonograph, oscillating fans, and motion pictures.

pages: 208 words: 74,328

The Road to Wigan Pier by George Orwell

anti-work, British Empire, Etonian, place-making, Upton Sinclair

Even the right-wing ‘intellectual’, who is not definitely in revolt against British imperialism, pretends to regard it with a sort of amused detachment. It is so easy to be witty about the British Empire. The White Man’s Burden and ‘Rule, Britannia’ and Kipling’s novels and Anglo-Indian bores – who could even mention such things without a snigger? And is there any cultured person who has not at least once in his life made a joke about that old Indian havildar who said that if the British left India there would not be a rupee or a virgin left between Peshawar and Delhi (or wherever it was)? That is the attitude of the typical left-winger towards imperialism, and a thoroughly flabby, boneless attitude it is. For in the last resort, the only important question is, Do you want the British Empire to hold together or do you want it to disintegrate? And at the bottom of his heart no Englishman, least of all the kind of person who is witty about Anglo-Indian colonels, does want it to disintegrate.

I remember a night I spent on the train with a man in the Educational Service, a stranger to myself whose name I never discovered. It was too hot to sleep and we spent the night in talking. Half an hour’s cautious questioning decided each of us that the other was ‘safe’; and then for hours, while the train jolted slowly through the pitch-black night, sitting up in our bunks with bottles of beer handy, we damned the British Empire – damned it from the inside, intelligently and intimately. It did us both good. But we had been speaking forbidden things, and in the haggard morning light when the train crawled into Mandalay, we parted as guiltily as any adulterous couple. So far as my observation goes nearly all Anglo-Indian officials have moments when their conscience troubles them. The exceptions are men who are doing something which is demonstrably useful and would still have to be done whether the British were in India or not: forest officers, for instance, and doctors and engineers.

And unless Socialist doctrine, in an effective form, can be diffused widely and very quickly, there is no certainty that Fascism will ever be overthrown. For Socialism is the only real enemy that Fascism has to face. The capitalist-imperialist governments, even though they themselves are about to be plundered, will not fight with any conviction against Fascism as such. Our rulers, those of them who understand the issue, would probably prefer to hand over every square inch of the British Empire to Italy, Germany and Japan than to see Socialism triumphant. It was easy to laugh at Fascism when we imagined that it was based on hysterical nationalism, because it seemed obvious that the Fascist states, each regarding itself as the chosen people and patriotic contra mundum, would clash with one another. But nothing of the kind is happening. Fascism is now an international movement, which means not only that the Fascist nations can combine for purposes of loot, but that they are groping, perhaps only half consciously as yet, towards a world-system.

pages: 249 words: 79,740

The Next Decade: Where We've Been . . . And Where We're Going by George Friedman

airport security, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business cycle, continuation of politics by other means, creative destruction, Deng Xiaoping, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, hydraulic fracturing, illegal immigration, Monroe Doctrine, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea

Empires are rarely planned or premeditated, and those that have been, such as Napoleon’s and Hitler’s, tend not to last. Those that endure grow organically, and their imperial status often goes unnoticed until it has become overwhelming. This was the case both for Rome and for Britain, yet they succeeded because once they achieved imperial status, they not only owned up to it, they learned to manage it. Unlike the Roman or British Empire, the American structure of dominance is informal, but that makes it no less real. The United States controls the oceans, and its economy accounts for more than a quarter of everything produced in the world. If Americans adopt the iPod or a new food fad, factories and farms in China and Latin America reorganize to serve the new mandate. This is how the European powers governed China in the nineteenth century—never formally, but by shaping and exploiting it to the degree that the distinction between formal and informal hardly mattered.

To create alliances in which the United States maneuvers other countries into bearing the major burden of confrontation or conflict, supporting these countries with economic benefits, military technology, and promises of military intervention if required. To use military intervention only as a last resort, when the balance of power breaks down and allies can no longer cope with the problem. At the height of the British Empire, Lord Palmerston said, “It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” This is the kind of policy the president will need to institutionalize in the coming decade.

Where he cannot fail is in his responsibility to guide the United States in a hostile world. CHAPTER 2 REPUBLIC, EMPIRE, AND THE MACHIAVELLIAN PRESIDENT The greatest challenge to managing an empire over the next decade will be the same challenge that Rome faced: having become an empire, how can the republic be preserved? The founders of the United States were anti-imperialists by moral conviction. They pledged their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor to defeat the British Empire and found a republic based on the principles of national self-determination and natural rights. An imperial relationship with other countries, whether intended or not, poses a challenge to those foundational principles. If you believe that universal principles have meaning, it follows that an anti-imperial republic can’t be an empire and retain its moral character. This has been an argument made in the United States as far back as the 1840s and the Mexican-American war.

Lonely Planet Jamaica by Lonely Planet

British Empire, buttonwood tree, carbon footprint, estate planning, European colonialism, food miles, jitney, Kickstarter, talking drums, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, urban planning

Even if you’re not attending, you’re attending – the festivities tend to take over MoBay. Red Stripe Reggae Sumfest | SHELBY SOBLICK / GETTY IMAGES © August It’s as hot as Jamaica gets, and about as humid too. In fact, the rains may be coalescing into ominous storm clouds. Yet the celebrations on the island aren’t slowing down. zIndependence Day August 6 marks Jamaica’s independence from the British Empire, and occurs with no small fanfare and delivery of dramatic speeches, especially in the Kingston area. Celebrations mark the event island-wide. October Now the rains are coming in hard, and there may be hurricanes gathering off the coast. On the plus side, accommodations run dirt cheap. zJamaica Coffee Festival Thousands of coffee-lovers converge on the spacious lawns of Devon House in Kingston during the first week of October to slurp up Jamaica’s world-famous coffee in an orgy of beverages, liqueurs, ice cream, cigars and classic Jamaican chow.

East of the airport and closer to Montego Bay are two of the popular Sandals hotels: Sandals Montego Bay ( GOOGLE MAP ; %952-5510;; N Kent Ave; all-inclusive r from US$479; paWs), one of the great-grand-daddies of all-inclusive resorts, and Sandals Royal Caribbean ( GOOGLE MAP ; %953-2231;; Hwy A1; 3 nights all-inclusive r from US$1700, ste from US$2700; paWs), a couples-only outpost of the Sandals empire that lays on nostalgia for the British Empire. Sandals Inn ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ; %952-4140;; Kent Ave; all-inclusive r from US$690; paWs) is just to the west of the airport. Slightly closer to MoBay’s city center on the Freeport Peninsula near the cruise ship terminal are two more all-inclusive resorts: the high-rise Sunset Splash Montego Bay ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ; %in the USA 888-774-0040;; Sunset Dr; all-inclusive r from $US360; paWs) and the closely guarded, couples-only Secrets St James ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ; %953-6600;; Freeport; r from US$768, ste from US$1531; paWs).

The breezy interior is graced by heavy mahogany porticoes and a stately balcony, while the 17th-century graves in the cemetery tell an interesting story of cross-racial love and acceptance. Heading east, High St ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ), lined with colonnaded Georgian merchant houses, leads to the 1913 Hendricks Building ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ; 2 High St) with a stop sign protruding from a small cannon next to it. Just beyond is the Imperial bridge ( GOOGLE MAP ; High St), constructed with materials from all corners of the British Empire. It overlooks the river, with its remaining sugarcane warehouses; the slave market was held on the east bank. On the corner of Market St and Main St, an upturned cannon sprouting a stop sign harks back to Black River's days as a British military garrison. North along Market St is the Zong Massacre memorial ( MAP GOOGLE MAP ; Market St), commemorating the 1781 event in which 133 African slaves were thrown overboard by the crew of the Zong slave ship, with the subsequent legal case contributing to the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

pages: 333 words: 86,628

The Virtue of Nationalism by Yoram Hazony

Berlin Wall, British Empire, conceptual framework, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, invention of the printing press, Mahatma Gandhi, Peace of Westphalia, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, Steven Pinker, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Torches of Freedom, urban planning, Westphalian system

But the emphasis on this fact obscures the fundamental similarity between the conflicts of neighboring, independent nations and those that arise within the imperial state, in which a revolt is almost always that of a conquered nation against the alien nation that has subjugated it. 37. As a rule, advocates of the imperial state do not see themselves as having set out only to exploit the other nations of the world. There are, of course, exceptions, and Niall Ferguson describes the rise of the British Empire in just these terms. Niall Ferguson, Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2002). For a more balanced account, see Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 38. Genesis 6.5–8.14, 11.1–9. 39. The three-way distinction between city-states, national states, and empires is treated in Grosby, Biblical Ideas of Nationality, 29–39, 121–122; Yoram Hazony, “Empire and Anarchy,” Azure 12 (Winter 2002), 27–70; Azar Gat, Nations, 3, 83. 40.

These are imperialist projects, even though their proponents do not like to call them that, for two reasons: First, their purpose is to remove decision-making from the hands of independent national governments and place it in the hands of international governments or bodies. And second, as you can immediately see from the literature produced by the individuals and institutions supporting these endeavors, they are consciously part of an imperialist political tradition, drawing their historical inspiration from the Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the British Empire. For example, Charles Krauthammer’s argument for American “Universal Dominion,” written at the dawn of the post–Cold War period, calls for America to create a “super-sovereign,” which will preside over the permanent “depreciation… of the notion of sovereignty” for all nations on earth. Krauthammer adopts the Latin term pax Americana to describe this vision, invoking the image of the United States as the new Rome: Just as the Roman Empire supposedly established a pax Romana (or “Roman peace”) that obtained security and quiet for all of Europe, so America would now provide security and quiet for the entire world.4 This flowering of imperialist political ideals and projects in the last generation should have sparked a rigorous debate between nationalists and imperialists over how the political world should be organized.

Wilson himself had had the foresight to suspect Germany of seeking for herself “a place of mastery” among the peoples of the world, and yet the postwar settlement was aimed not at assuring that this could not happen, but rather at pursuing the principle of the national self-determination of all peoples, whether strong or weak. This policy dramatically strengthened Germany’s eastward position, paving the way for Hitler’s devastation, twenty years later, of each of these countries in turn.111 Similarly, Eisenhower’s support for Arab nationalism and self-determination in the Middle East helped to demolish the remains of the British Empire, thereby destroying one of America’s most faithful and reliable allies in the struggle against Soviet Communism. At the same time, this support for Arab national self-determination in Egypt gave rise to the aggressive dictatorship of Gamal Abdel Nasser—who repaid America’s kindness by taking Egypt into the Soviet imperial orbit.112 These examples are not intended as arguments against Czech or Egyptian independence.

The Frayed Atlantic Edge: A Historian’s Journey From Shetland to the Channel by David Gange

agricultural Revolution, back-to-the-land, British Empire, garden city movement, global village, Scientific racism, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, upwardly mobile

In the seventeenth century, harried by agents of James VI, Dùn Èistean fell from use, and Lewis ceased to be a seat of power. A century later, the triumph of Hanoverian kings over the Scottish Stuart line moved power still further south and increased the determination of Lowlanders to break the clans conclusively. By the start of the nineteenth century the Macleod lords were gone, replaced by mainland agents of the British Empire (Mackenzies and Mathesons) who subjected Lewis to the profiteering with which they ravaged the globe. Communities were economic assets to be moved between sites like cash between investments. The gravitational centre of island life moved east, away from the Atlantic: traditional seats of coastal power – such as Ness and Ùig – gave way to the growth of Stornoway. When incomes from kelp collapsed, the priorities of landlords turned conclusively from the shoreline: for the first time in Lewis’s history, the strand was seen as valueless.

Just 289 spoke no Gaelic, but three of that tiny Anglo band were the schoolmaster and his family, shipped in by the school board from Birmingham.10 The Education Act was followed by a bombardment of anti-Gaelic propaganda. Simon Laurie, professor of education at the University of Edinburgh, insisted that a child taught Gaelic had been ‘miseducated – in fact, cut off from being a member of the British Empire altogether’. In 1878, the leading Edinburgh publisher and politician, William Chambers, published two caustic articles on ‘The Gaelic Nuisance’. Because Gaelic-speakers didn’t have English books and newspapers, he insisted, they must ‘vegetate between vague legends and superstition’.11 To learn Gaelic, he stated, was to remain ignorant: to wipe out this abomination required ‘moral courage in the face of popular prejudice’ but he saw this crusade gaining momentum around him.

Aberdaron, 299–300, 303, 310–11 Abersoch, 293 Aberystwyth, 293 Abrams, Lynn, 218 Acair (Stornoway press), 109 Achebe, Chinua, Things Fall Apart, 250 Achill, island of, 253–4 Adam, Seumas, 191–7, 345 Adomnan, 206 Aikerness Holm, 68–9 Aith (town of Shetland), 38 Alasdair mac Mhaighstir Alasdair, 128, 138, 171, 172, 173–4, 344 Alexandrine desert, 283, 285 Amargin (ancient Irish poet), 286 AMEC (energy consortium), 113 An Garbh-eilean, island of, 134 An Teallach (‘the Forge’, mountain), 3, 153, 155 An Tiaracht (mini-skellig), 277 Anderson, Andrew and Danny, 29–30 Anderson, Iain, 74 anemones, 279, 333 angler fish, 236 Anglican communion, 342 Apollo moon missions, 69 Applecross Peninsula, 165, 167, 168 Araidh na Suiridh (Skye), 94 Aran Islands (Oileáin Árann), 210, 254–7, 258, 261, 340; bounty from shipwrecks, 263; cliff-face place names, 263–4; Dún Aonghasa (clifftop fort), 261–2, 263; An Sunda Caoch (‘the Blind Sound’), 262–3; threat to fishing community, 264, 265 archaeological heritage, xi; absence of inscriptions on gneiss, 92; Barra Isles, 116–17; Erskine Beveridge, 111; Broch of Mousa on Havera, 44–5, 47; Callanish stone circle, 92; on early Admiralty maps, 239–40; early wooden tools as rare in Scotland, 168; and female scientists of the coast, 282; Gokstad ship, 26; Inner Sound and Skye, 167–71; intermingling of eras, 8–9, 45–6, 60, 79, 80; Jarlshof on Shetland, 50; microliths, 168; mysteries of Papay, 65; ‘papa’ sites, 63–6, 117–20; and role of sea in Mesolithic world, 168–70; Rousay coast, 77, 78–81; runic inscriptions at Maes Howe, 86; South Welsh history, 294; west coast of Ireland, 206, 211–12, 214; see also human history, traces/hints of Arctic terns, 32, 38 Ardmore, 195–6 Argentina, 8 Argyll coastline, 198–204, 208 Arkle (mountain), 125–6, 134 Arnold, Matthew, ‘Dover Beach’ (1867), 298 Arran, Isle of, 295 Arranmore, island of, 210 Arthurian legend, 334 Asleifson, Sweyn, 66 Assynt, 124, 254, 317 Atlantic (film, 2016), 264–5 auks, 7, 17, 62–3, 98, 315 Avenius, Rufus (Roman poet), 209 Azoulay, Ariella, 226–7 Baleshare (Uist township), 111 Balfours (Orcadian laird family), 73 Balnakiel (near Cape Wrath), 123, 128–9, 172 Balor (Irish god of darkness), 213, 214, 225 Bardsey, island of (Ynys Enlli), 291, 294, 295–304; current island community, 304–10 Barker, George, 319 barley, 47, 219–20 Barmouth (Wales), 292, 293 barnacle geese, 174 Barra, 91–2, 109, 116, 209; lighthouse keeping on, 204 Barra Head (Beàrnaraigh), 116 Barrett, Josie, 244 Bateman, Meg, 345 BBC Philharmonic Orchestra, 83 HMS Beagle, 239 bearberry, 160 Beaufort, Francis, 207 Beinn Dearg Mòr (mountain), 155 Beinn Eighe nature reserve, 159–60 Belize, xi, 86, 87, 88 Belmullet (County Mayo), 245 Below, Will Ernst von, 244–5 Ben Loyal (mountain), 125 Ben Stac (mountain), 125, 137 Berger, John, 224, 329–30 Bernard van Leer Foundation, 105 Beveridge, Erskine, 111 biodiversity, 237 birlinns (boats), 171–2, 173–4, 244 Birmingham, University of, 10–12, 339 bladderwrack, 23 Blasket Islands (Na Blascaodaí), 271, 276–9, 340 bluethroats, 201 boatbuilding and boats: birlinns, 171–2, 173–4, 244; currachs, 208–9, 221, 255; Galway hooker sailboats, 254; Irish, 207, 208–9, 221; Irish small boat tradition, 210, 245–6, 247, 287–8; Norse design, 26, 27, 28, 134, 171–2; Sgoth Niseach (traditional Ness boat), 98, 108; on Shetland, 23, 26–8, 29–31; sixareens, 28, 29–31; symbolic ships, 172; transport of cattle, 150, 151, 152; in Wales, 292; on Western Isles, 98, 108; Zulu-class sailing boats, 221–2 Bonar, Patrick, The Story of the Cope (2009), 229 Brae of Moan (Rousay), 78 Brathwaite, Kamau, 87 Brazil, 191 Breen, Colin, 206 Brent Spar scandal, 248 Breton culture, 10, 295, 324, 334 British Empire: agents of in Western Isles, 100; anti-Gaelic propaganda, 103–4; boys’ adventure periodicals, 191–2; clearances, 8, 78, 80–1, 95, 96, 100–1, 102, 127, 136, 187, 188, 195–6; and elites of Victorian Scotland, 88; mapping of, 239–40, 241–2; and Skye, 178–9; and slavery, 88, 190 British Museum, 280–1 Britishness, 341–2 Broadford (Skye), 150 Bronze Age culture, 60, 78, 80, 262 Broo (deserted village on Shetland), 49, 92–3 Brook, Julie, 117 Brough Holm (Shetland skerry), 23 Brown, Peter, 294 the Bull and the Cow rocks, 198, 277, 287 Bullock, William, 62 Bunting, Basil, Briggflatts (1966), 321 Burma, 179 Burra Firth, 18–20 the Burren, 254–6 Bury, J.B., 146, 149 buttercups, 42, 93 butterworts, 37 Cairngorm range, 145 calcareous shell-sand, 93, 94, 95 Caldey (Pembrokeshire island), 291 Callanish stone circle, 92 Calve, island of (Tobermory Bay), 196–7 Calvin and Hobbes (cartoon strip), 189 Calvinism, 128, 304 Campbell, Anne, 113–14 Canna, isle of, 172, 189 Cannon, Moya, 259–60, 268 Cape Clear Island, 277, 287 Cape Wrath, 2, 123, 127, 134 Cara, isle of, 189 Carbost, Old Inn at, 181 Cardigan Bay (Bae Ceredigion), 291–2, 311 Caribbean, 86, 87, 88, 190 Carlyle, Thomas, 148 Carrigskeewaun (County Mayo), 254 Carrowteige, Connolly’s pub at, 245–7 Carson, Rachel, 18, 345 Cartesian philosophy, 343 Carthusian monks, 174–5 Carthy, Hugh, 169 cartography see maps cathedral architecture, 32–3 Catholicism: and Act of Union (1801), 239; and Barra, 91, 204; and Cromwell, 211, 255, 287; and lighthouse keeping, 204; and Scottish conversion to Calvinism, 128; transnational alliances in Iberian heyday, 283; and Uist, 204; unique Irish theology, 285–6; see also Celtic Christianity cattle, 43, 66, 72, 117, 316; droving routes, 149, 150–2 Ceilidh Place (Ullapool venue), 124, 141–2 Celtic Christianity: ancient chapels on Ness, 98, 99; asceticism of, 175, 285–6; early Irish saints and holy men, 98, 118–19, 175, 206, 207, 260, 325; early saints and holy men, 325; Enlli as sacred place, 296, 297–9, 301–4, 305; era of the scholar saints, 284–7; expansion by sea routes, 118, 284–5; Irish monks on Westray, 61; logic of in ninth century Ireland, 257; and ‘papa’ sites, 118–19; sea as place of transcendence, 272–4, 286; Skellig Michael, 283–7; St Columba (Colmcille), 118, 206, 214, 215, 225, 272–3, 284; St Ronan on Lewis, 98–9; travels of the first Irish monks, 91; unique Irish theology, 285–6 Celtic civilisations, x; Irish Celts and Norse world, 94, 118; Lyonesse myth, 333–5; mythology, 213, 255, 261–2, 273–4; and ‘papa’ sites, 118, 119–20; as romanticised, 12; whales in Irish culture and myth, 272–5; see also Gaelic culture; Gaelic language Celtic revival, 94–5 centaury, 94 Chamberlain, Brenda, 291, 302–3 Chambers, William, 103–4 charcoal, 157, 158, 168 Charles Stuart, Prince (’Bonnie Prince Charlie’), 128, 129, 166, 171, 182 Chlèirich (Eilean a’ Chlèirich), 1–3, 8–9, 335, 336 choughs, 228, 315 chromite, 39–40 Church of Scotland, 204 cillín (burial ground for unbaptised children), 252–3 Clanranald, 139, 171, 244 Clare, John, 130 The Claymore (Dunnett and Adam periodical), 191–2 climbing, 117, 125–6, 145, 156, 179–82 Coigach Peninsula, 1, 124 Coille na Glas Leitir at Loch Maree, 159–60 Coire Lagan (Skye), 179–80 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 148 Collins ‘New Naturalist’ series, 159 communication technologies, 5–6, 129; e-commerce, 343; new geographies of mass communication, 9–10, 109, 197, 343, 344–5; ocean cable, 207 Connacht: ‘ABC of earth wonders’, 255–7; coast south of Erris, 255; ‘deep mapping’ projects in, 242, 254–5, 256–8, 261; human traces/ruins, 256; mapping of coast, 240–1; marginal history of ABC zone, 255, 257; see also Galway, County (province of Connacht); Mayo, County (province of Connacht) Connemara (County Galway), 85, 210, 211–12, 223, 254–5, 256–61, 266–8 Coptic Christians, 285 Corbett, Michael, 108 Cork, County, 210, 279 cormorants, 71 Cornish language, 10, 295, 316, 322, 324 Cornish Studies Centre (Redruth), 322, 333 Cornwall: chough as symbol of, 315; Cornish nationalism, 332; Cornish Revival culture, 324, 333, 334; English feeling of, 315–16; Gorsedh Kernow, 324, 332; great Atlanticist writers and artists, 316–25, 326–32; historic links with Atlantic edge, 325; human traces/ruins, 334; and Lyonesse myth, 333–5; painters in St Ives, 326–32; pilchard industry, 323, 324; post-war painters, poets and thinkers, 317–25, 326–32; sea abstracted from the land, 316; smuggling and wrecking, 323–4; tin and copper mines, 323; tourism in, 312, 315–16, 325, 326; vanished culture of, 315–16, 321–4; wildlife and flora, 315, 333 corporate and multinational interests, 247–50, 251–3 Corrib, Lough, 255 Corrib gas field, 248–9, 251–3 Coruisk, Loch (Coire Uisg) (Skye), 182 Costie, Alex, 69–70 Covenanter rising (1679), 219 Crawford, O.G.S., 333–4 creeling, 71–2, 98, 117, 209, 230 Cregan family of Erris, 246 Crichton Smith, Iain, 93, 103, 104, 321 Crieff, 151 Cromwell, Oliver, 211, 255, 287 Cronin, Nessa, 279, 282 Cross, Dorothy, 281–2 crossbills, 160 Culloden, battle of (1746), 129, 171 Cumberland, Duke of (‘Butcher’), 129 Cumming, John, 30–1 Cunliffe, Barry, Facing the Ocean (2001), ix, 169–70, 342–3 curlews, 70, 86 Curwen, E.

pages: 513 words: 156,022

Dictatorland: The Men Who Stole Africa by Paul Kenyon

agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, British Empire, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, Etonian, European colonialism, falling living standards, friendly fire, land reform, mandatory minimum, Nelson Mandela, Norman Mailer, offshore financial centre, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Scramble for Africa, transatlantic slave trade, Yom Kippur War

When Robert was born, in 1924, the influx of white settlers, attracted by what turned out to be abundant reserves of copper, meant that the governance of the company’s territory had shifted. Whereas the majority in the Southern Rhodesian legislature had once been unelected company men, they were now overtaken by elected white settlers, making the territory effectively self-governing. As a result, the British Crown decided to revoke the BSAC’s charter. Both Northern and Southern Rhodesia were transferred into the hands of the British Empire. Soon, the indigenous black population, numbering 2 million, was restricted to specially demarcated ‘Native Reserves’, that quickly became overcrowded. Many of them were simply evicted from their land, and forcibly moved into the communal areas. Before Robert Mugabe was of school age, the 44,000 white settlers had awarded themselves four times more territory than the black population, including all that was most fertile, accessible and mineral-rich

By the time Dave Kingston was ten years old, however, the ‘oil fever’ nation seemed to be running dry. The discovery rate simply couldn’t keep up with the runaway demand for cars. An historic shift was under way. The search for oil needed to move beyond Texas and beyond the shores of the US, to geologically uncharted lands. America had only one competitor in the international search for oil, and that was the British Empire. * Hanging on the wall of Edgar Lloyd’s study in South Wales is a photograph showing him and a dozen African officials looking out over a tropical river. A gleaming American stretch car is waiting on the mud road beside them. There are other shots of Lloyd in white shorts and knee-high socks exploring a mangrove swamp, and slashing through forests with a cutlass. Lloyd was working for BP in colonial Africa just as the search for oil began to extend to other parts of the world, away from the petroleum heartlands of America and the Middle East.

It would soon be renamed British Petroleum, or BP. Relying on a single supplier so far from home, however, was still a strategic risk; no one was sure how long Persia could be kept inside Britain’s imperial orbit, and so the search needed to move on, just like it had in the United States. And when it came to combing the world for resources Britain enjoyed a head start over all its rivals. The British Empire, at its peak, held sway over one-fifth of the world’s population and almost a quarter of its land. Britain was able to call upon its territories for exclusive and generous exploration rights. In Africa, the early favourites for an oil discovery of commercial value were Nigeria, Ghana, Egypt and Sudan. Other European nations had their own contenders; the Portuguese had high hopes for Angola, the French were already drilling in the Algerian desert, and Spain anticipated that Equatorial Guinea would prove fruitful.

pages: 927 words: 216,549

Empire of Guns by Priya Satia

banking crisis, British Empire, business intelligence, Corn Laws, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, European colonialism, Fellow of the Royal Society, hiring and firing, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Khyber Pass, Menlo Park, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, rent-seeking, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, spinning jenny, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, transatlantic slave trade, zero-sum game

As I looked through the Galton records in the Birmingham City Archive, I discovered a point of view that seemed to me to upend received wisdom about the industrial revolution, and so, partly by accident and partly by will, I hunkered down for a long spell in the eighteenth century and communion with the troubles of another extended family—every unhappy family being unhappy in its own way, as Tolstoy tells us. But I have also written this book in a time of mass shootings in the United States. My daughter was in first grade when the Sandy Hook shooting happened, in December 2012. My heart broke like everyone else’s, five years into my study of guns in the eighteenth-century British Empire. My investigation into the place of guns in that world showed me that their uses are not fixed, but change with time and place. There were no casual shootings in Britain until suddenly, because of cultural shifts inaugurated by the Napoleonic Wars, there were. Likewise, the shooting in my family was not unrelated to the violence that tore up Punjab in the 1980s, and the mass shootings of our time are not unrelated to the war on terror.

The interests and culture of industrialists and of financial and commercial elites were intimately related, bound by marriage, social ties, and complementary interests in banks and bullion. Finance capital and industrial capital were coeval and related. The increasingly dulcet tones of Galton’s gentlemanly life deafened the family to the cacophony of gunmaking in the alleys around their home in Steelhouse Lane; in the same manner, we have become amnesiac about the wars that made the British Empire and the world’s first industrial capitalist economy. Insofar as Francis Galton’s theories of eugenics emerged from his study of his own family history, it behooves us to understand that family well. We forget the place of war manufacturing in industrial capitalism like we forget the blood in our veins. Part One THE INDUSTRIAL LIFE of GUNS 1 The State and the Gun Industry, Part 1: 1688–1756 The story goes that firearms drove knights from the battlefield, heralding the rise of the modern state.

Meanwhile, Galton continued to beg Parr and Atkinson to collect on debts to the firm. In explaining the delay, he gave Freame & Barclay an insider view of the gun trade, emphasizing the many big merchants who owed them money, including Richard Oswald and the Hanburys. Through the bonds of debt and credit, Farmer and Galton were drawn into the orbit of such men, whose merchant empires were pillars of the expanding British Empire. When Oswald later needed to borrow from a bank, four times between 1769 and 1778, he, too, turned to the Barclays. In May 1755, Farmer had hopeful news from Lisbon, and his bankruptcy committee examined guns that had been made for Oswald and Earl Daniel and were stored in the firm’s London warehouse. Patterns were also arriving from Birmingham, because the committee, too, had decided to buy Farmer & Galton’s guns.

Growth: From Microorganisms to Megacities by Vaclav Smil

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, 3D printing, agricultural Revolution, air freight, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, autonomous vehicles, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, colonial rule, complexity theory, coronavirus, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, endogenous growth, energy transition, epigenetics, happiness index / gross national happiness, hydraulic fracturing, hydrogen economy, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of movable type, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Law of Accelerating Returns, longitudinal study, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, mass immigration, McMansion, megacity, megastructure, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microbiome, moral hazard, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, old age dependency ratio, optical character recognition, out of africa, peak oil, Pearl River Delta, phenotype, Pierre-Simon Laplace, planetary scale, Ponzi scheme, Productivity paradox, profit motive, purchasing power parity, random walk, Ray Kurzweil, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, Republic of Letters, rolodex, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, technoutopianism, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, urban sprawl, Vilfredo Pareto, yield curve

Political entities satisfying that understanding existed millennia before the rise of the imperium Romanum and included various Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Indian, and Chinese empires. The Parthian, Sassanid, Qin, and Han empires were Rome’s contemporaries (and the first two its enemies), and among many empires that followed, Byzantium became a byword for its bureaucratic opacity and durability, the Muslim and Mongol empires for their rapid ascent, the Ottoman Empire for its long decline, the Russian Empire for its eastward expansion, the British Empire for its thalassocratic might, and the Soviet empire for its relentless suppression of dissent. Barfield (2001) introduced a useful hierarchy into the classification of empires. Primary empires, exemplified by Rome or China’s dynasties, are established by conquest of large (subcontinental or continental-size) territories and encompass large (at least millions) and diverse populations. Secondary (shadow) empires assume forms ranging from those pressuring neighboring primary empires for tributes (nomad states on China’s steppe and desert borders excelled in this for millennia) to maritime trade empires relying on relatively small forces and limited territorial control to lever great economic benefit; nobody mastered this strategy better than the Dutch (Ormrod 2003; Gaastra 2007).

These analyses were done within the framework of the world-system—an international system, a network of polities making war and allying with one another (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1994; Wallerstein 2004)—and concentrated on four world-regional political/military networks, Mesopotamia, Egypt, South Asia, and East Asia, and the expanding Central System which includes the Persian, Roman, Islamic, Mongol, and British empires (Inoue et al. 2012). After comparing the frequencies of cycles and sweeps across these five interpolity networks, they found, surprisingly, more similarities than differences and identified a total of 22 upsweeps and 19 downsweeps. But they found only three instances of sustained system-wide collapses: the post-Islamic Caliphate collapse in the Central System, the post-Eastern Han collapse in East Asia, and the post-Guptan collapse in the South Asian system.

Comparisons also found that the frequency of cycles increased over the long run but the frequencies of upsweeps and downsweeps showed no long-term trends: no downward trend in downsweeps implies that, contrary to a common assumption, resilience has not grown with sociocultural complexity and size. Empires become large centrally controlled entities by growing from their limited core areas to encompass distant territories inhabited by populations speaking different languages and belonging to different cultures. This definition encompasses a wide range of political entities, ranging from such explicitly established imperial structures as the imperium Romanum or the British Empire to a de facto empire reassembled by the Soviet Union after the Russian Empire’s dissolution during WWI and expanded after the Soviet victory in WWII by both direct and indirect control of half a dozen eastern and central European countries. Central control could be exercised in different ways. What might be seen as a default mode is the sanctioned (and often inherited) rule of an individual, sometimes in an openly dictatorial fashion, at other times guided by the arguments of close advisors, or by various degrees of consensus arrived at by bargaining with other powerful actors (a common way of arranging the affairs of Europe’s medieval and early modern Holy Roman Empire).

pages: 224 words: 12,941

From Gutenberg to Google: electronic representations of literary texts by Peter L. Shillingsburg

British Empire, computer age, double helix, HyperCard, hypertext link, interchangeable parts, invention of the telephone, means of production, optical character recognition, pattern recognition, Saturday Night Live, Socratic dialogue

He called it ‘‘The Collection of British Authors,’’ which by the outbreak of the War had published 5,372 works, keeping many of them in print for the entire period of its existence. One must turn to The Modern Library from Random House, the Everyman’s Library, and Penguin or Oxford Classics in the twentieth century for endeavors of a comparable scale. In his day, the Baron had no enduring competitors. The inception and growth of his series parallels the development of the British Empire – a relevant context in at least two respects. The first is that the British Empire spanned the globe in ways that created a global market-demand for the English language and for British literature. Englishmen were invading the four corners of earth in what now is generally viewed, usually with disapproval, as moral, economic, military, 7 8 Robert Patten, Charles Dickens and his Publishers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978); Peter Shillingsburg, Pegusus in Harness (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992); June Steffensen Hagen, Tennyson and his Publishers (London: Macmillan, 1979); Simon Gatrell, Hardy the Creator (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) and R.

He purchased advanced proof sheets and in some cases manuscripts in order that his books would appear in the bookstores before any of his Continental competitors – such as Jugel in Frankfurt, Galigniani or Baudry in Paris, or Robertson and Schroder in Brussels – could even obtain a printed copy to reprint from. By the time competitors could print their so-called pirated (though not in fact illegal) editions, Tauchnitz already had his cheap paperback versions in the stores of Germany, France, Italy, and the approaches to and egresses from the British empire. The first publisher gets the most sales. This part of the story is recounted, deliberately, in disapproving terms to show that the initial praiseful remarks could easily be turned against 9 Simon Nowell-Smith, International Copyright Law and the Publisher in the Reign of Queen Victoria (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) provides a classic account. Victorian fiction: shapes shaping reading 133 the entrepreneur.

Index abridgment 32 access to texts 85 open source 106, 108 adaptation 20, 85 aesthetic object 5, 169, 174–6, 178, 182, 186 author’s 174 editor’s 184 intended 174 aesthetics 22, 23, 188 agnosia, tonal 48 Altick, Richard 128 aphasia 47–8 archives 4, 34, 82, 85 CD-based 121 archivists 4, 12 Aristotle 29 artifacts 13, 24, 26, 169, 174–5, 178, 182, 186–7 assumptions 191 Austin, J.L. 46 Australian Colonial Texts Series 36 authenticity 23 author 6, 53, 174 commentary 158 European 186 function 53 German 176 literary 63 putative 34–6, 45 authoring 50 authority 6, 32, 174, 177 author’s 52 in script acts 56 mixed 182–4 unmixed 184 authorship 130 economics of 130 Barthes, Roland 60 Barwell, Graham 10, 141 Beardsley, Monroe 60 Beckett, Samuel Samuel Beckett project 108 Beowulf project 4, 108 Bernays, M. 170 Berrie, Phill 10, 91, 118, 124, 142 bibliographic codes 16–18, 72 Bickerton, Derek 42–3 Binder, Henry 84 biography 60 Birney, Earle 187 Blake, William 4, 142 book 12–14 ‘‘bookness’’ of’ 139 buyers 6, 135 electronic 1–2, 28–9, 65; complexity of 28; as distinguished from print books 29; quality of 29–30 physical condition of 129 as physical object 12, 49, 127, 135 print book 1, 65; advantages 29; as copytext 168; as distinguished from electronic books 29; survival rate 27 production 6, 64 virtual 141 book collecting 151 book historians 136 book history 158 goal of 135 Boorstin, Daniel 193 Bordalejo, Barbara 10 Bornstein, George 8, 16 Bowden, Ann 133–4 Bowers, Fredson 9, 25, 153, 185 Bradbury and Evans 36 Braddon, Mary Elizabeth 147 Bradford, Robin 153 Bree, Linda 10 British Empire 131 Brown, Charles Brockden 164 Brown-Rau, Alexandra 108 Bryant, John 8–9 209 210 Index Burton, Anthony 123 Byron, George Gordon, Lord 16, 72, 185 Caldwell, Price 10, 75, 77 Calvin, William H. 43, 46 Cambridge, Ada 36 Carlyle, Thomas 161, 170 Carey, Peter 64 Caxton, William 179 censorship 33 Center for Editions of American Authors (see Modern Language Association) Cervantes 29 Chaucer, Geoffrey 4, 87, 179–84 Chaucer project 142, 144 The General Prologue on CD-ROM 87 Chesnutt, David 142 Chopin, Kate 36 Clark, Marcus 120 Cockran, Patti 142 codex 29, 85 Cohen, Morton 131 Colby, Robert 122 Cole, Gavin 10 collation Hinman Collator 110 historical 164 Lindstrand Comparator 110 sight 22, 110 software 107 Committee on Scholarly Editions (see Modern Language Association) communication 7, 41–2, 45 event 67 of determinate effects 63 theory 140 Communist Manifesto, the 16–18 compositors 181 computer files legacy research materials 109, 112, 115, 122; quality control 116 computer technology 26–8, 139 (see also software and markup) Contemporary German Editorial Theory 9, 169 context 31, 54, 66, 78, 146, 191 functional 67 generative 54 generic 55 historical 59, 130 matter 54 place 54 relevant 74 sense-making 73 thematic 55 time 54 contextualization 55 conventionality 41 conventions 50–1 copyright 139 copyright law 132 costing 2 Crane, Stephen 84 criticism, literary 12, 63, 83, 151 junk 75 Marxist 130 New 60, 75 Practical 60 psychological 60 reader response 45 textual (see textual criticism) critics literary (see criticism) textual (see textual critics) Cross, Nigel 127, 128 cultural engineering 163 deconstruction 51–3 Descartes, René 198 Dedner, Burghard 26 Deppman, Jed 10 Derrida, Jacques 43, 51, 60 de Saussure, Ferdinand 60 de Smedt, Marcel 91, 108 Dewey, John 196 Dickens, Charles Clarendon Dickens editions 134 Dickinson, Emily 4, 65, 75 Emily Dickinson project 142 Dijksterhuis, E.

pages: 363 words: 94,139

Jony Ive: The Genius Behind Apple's Greatest Products by Leander Kahney

Apple II, banking crisis, British Empire, Chuck Templeton: OpenTable:, Computer Numeric Control, Dynabook, global supply chain, interchangeable parts, John Markoff, Jony Ive, Kickstarter, race to the bottom, RFID, side project, Silicon Valley, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Levy, the built environment, thinkpad, Tim Cook: Apple

His government commissioned official reports to find the economic potential of design in its industries and found that design-centered companies “saw a turnover rise by fourteen percent and profits by nine percent.”22 No doubt Jony’s father, Mike, had made a huge contribution to the rise of design in his native land and he was honored thusly. In 1999, in recognition of his contributions to British design education, Mike Ive was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE). In 2003, Jony was appointed a member of Royal Designers for Industry; in 2004, he was awarded the RSA Benjamin Franklin Medal; and in 2005, he won what was to be the first in a string of prestigious awards from the British Design & Art Direction (D&AD). In 2006, he was named Commander of the Order of the British Empire (a higher award than his father’s OBE). Jony didn’t make a public comment about the award at the time, but in a statement, Apple said: “We are as proud as could be that Jony is receiving such a prestigious commendation.”23 • • • Although his designs were drawing much notice, bigger work (quite literally) was still ahead.

By the end of January, a single share of Apple cost $447.61. Apple was riding high, having surpassed ExxonMobil as the most valuable publicly held company in the world. Sir Jony Ive The year 2012 began auspiciously for Jony Ive, as it had for Apple, despite Jobs’s passing. Jony was named a Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE) in the Queen’s New Year Honours List, for services to design and enterprise. It was the second time he had been recognized in the honors list, having been made a Commander of the British Empire (CBE) in 2005. The second highest order of chivalry, the KBE entitled its new bearer to style himself Sir Jonathan Ive. Jony described the honor as “absolutely thrilling” and said he was “both humbled and sincerely grateful.” In a rare interview with the Daily Telegraph, he said he was “the product of a very British design education,” adding that, “even in high school, I was keenly aware of this remarkable tradition that the UK had of designing and making.

When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence by Stephen D. King

Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, congestion charging, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, cross-subsidies, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, endowment effect, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, financial repression, fixed income, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, joint-stock company, Kickstarter, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, loss aversion, market clearing, mass immigration, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, New Urbanism, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, old age dependency ratio, price mechanism, price stability, quantitative easing, railway mania, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade route, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population

The US went one better: its population enjoyed average per capita incomes by the beginning of the twenty-­first century fully 50 per cent higher than those in Germany and three times higher than those in Argentina. What accounts for Argentina’s spectacular fall from grace? Argentina was a major outperformer between 1870 and the outbreak of the First World War, thanks largely to the free-­trade instincts of the late nineteenth-­century British Empire, new scientific advances and the mass migration of people in the late nineteenth century. It may have been a long way away from Europe and the US but Argentina was able to take full advantage of the Royal Navy’s commitment to keep international sea lanes open. New refrigerator technologies – and faster ships – meant its beef could be 14 4099.indd 14 29/03/13 2:23 PM Taking Progress for Granted exported to destinations many thousands of miles away.

In an attempt to reduce Argentina’s high dependency on developments – both good and bad – elsewhere in 15 4099.indd 15 29/03/13 2:23 PM When the Money Runs Out the world economy, Argentine politicians in the 1930s moved rapidly to push through their version of economic autarky. Rejecting international linkages – which were increasingly blamed for Argentina’s woes – Buenos Aires tried to develop its own manufacturing capacity behind closed doors, an approach ruled out by both the Canadians and Australians thanks to their privileged access to the markets of the British Empire and, indeed, to Britain’s own influence on their behaviour.4 To do this, a labyrinthine arrangement of tariffs and capital controls was developed, leading in turn to huge distortions in the allocation of resources. With domestic activity aimed primarily at satisfying immediate demands for higher consumption, Argentina increasingly became a ‘hand to mouth’ economy. Short of domestic savings and absent a sensible export strategy, Argentina was simply unable to afford the capital goods that might have led to faster long-­term growth.

Given these political upheavals, it’s hardly surprising that, over the last century or so, Argentina went from one financial crisis to the next: from 1890 through to the beginning of the twenty-­first century, Argentina had to cope with five debt defaults or restructurings6 and 17 4099.indd 17 29/03/13 2:23 PM When the Money Runs Out six stock-­market crashes that led, in turn, to sustained periods of economic contraction.7 Argentina ended the twentieth century with one of the worst financial records in history. Claims on future Argentine economic output have often ended up totally worthless. In hindsight, it is easy to see why, in the interwar period, Argentina went down an ultimately doomed road to autarky: international financiers had seemingly let Argentina down, the crumbling British Empire no longer offered the certainties of old, the Americans preferred to invest at home rather than abroad and the slow march towards another war in Europe persuaded Argentina that self-­sufficiency was best. The argument was seductive. It was also, sadly, wrong. Self-­sufficiency beckoned only because Argentina’s engagement with other nations in the interwar period – nations that, themselves, were increasingly heading towards a more protectionist model – had been so damaging.

pages: 407 words: 121,458

Confessions of an Eco-Sinner: Tracking Down the Sources of My Stuff by Fred Pearce

additive manufacturing, air freight, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, British Empire, car-free, carbon footprint, clean water, congestion charging, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, demographic transition, Fall of the Berlin Wall, food miles, ghettoisation, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Isaac Newton, Kibera, Kickstarter, mass immigration, megacity, Nelson Mandela, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, out of africa, peak oil, Pearl River Delta, profit motive, race to the bottom, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, Steve Jobs, the built environment, urban planning, urban sprawl, women in the workforce

His name is Iqbal Ahmed, or ‘Mr Prawn’ as he is known in the trade, after one of his brands. He is a big fish in the British Bangladeshi community, and a hero among restaurant owners. I went to see him at his headquarters in Droylsden, right by Manchester City football stadium. In the boardroom, surrounded by photographs of him shaking hands with royals and political leaders, and collecting his Order of the British Empire from Prince Charles, he fed me plates of breaded prawns and the story of his success. Iqbal is the son of Bangladeshi parents who fell on hard times and moved to Britain. ‘Our family were landlords, but we lost our land,’ he said. In Britain, his father ran a small grocery shop in nearby Oldham, ‘open all hours’. Iqbal has restored family fortunes by creating a £200-million prawn business, called Seamark, which has two processing plants, one in Chittagong, the main port in Bangladesh, and the other in Manchester.

Over a couple of centuries, some 4 million Africans were kidnapped by slave traders and shipped to the Caribbean to work on the sugar plantations of Barbados and Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba. All to satisfy Europe’s sugar craving. Though the involvement of Mr Tate and Mr Lyle started after slavery ended, their company is the inheritor of that trade, and still gets most of its sugar from the Caribbean and other former British colonies such as Swaziland, Mauritius and Fiji. Tate & Lyle sold off its plantations in the 1960s and 1970s, as the British Empire itself dissolved. And we have other sources of sugar now, such as home-grown European sugar beet, sold under the brand name Silver Spoon by a subsidiary of the food giant Associated British Foods. But Tate & Lyle is still the dominant buyer from a string of countries that remain hugely dependent on growing sugar cane. And that makes those countries hugely dependent on Tate & Lyle. Take Swaziland.

Sloane, who later gave his name to a famous square in London and created a treasure trove of foreign delights that formed the basis for the British Museum collection, also brought opium and cannabis and Chinese rhubarb to Britain. But none took so well to the British palate as milk chocolate. From Sir Hans Sloane’s milk chocolate, it was a small step to Mr Cadbury’s Dairy Milk and Mr Fry’s Chocolate Cream. And the British Empire did the rest. The cocoa bean from the forests of Central America became one of the world’s most profitable and addictive commodities, loved by hundreds of millions of chocoholics round the world. The human race consumes around 3 million tonnes of cocoa beans a year – half a kilo for everyone on the planet. The business of meeting our predilection employs 14 million people, 10 million of them in Africa.

pages: 1,169 words: 342,959

New York by Edward Rutherfurd

Bonfire of the Vanities, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, illegal immigration, margin call, millennium bug, out of africa, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, rent control, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, the market place, urban renewal, white picket fence, Y2K, young professional

And his father looked awkward and muttered, “Well, it all depends.” But Miss Clara just said, very quiet, “No, it is never right.” And with her character, I knew she wouldn’t be changing her mind about that. Indeed, I heard her say to her husband once that she wouldn’t be sorry if the whole business of slavery came to an end. But he answered that as things stood, he reckoned a good part of the wealth of the British Empire depended on the slaves in the sugar plantations, so it wouldn’t be ended any time soon. I stayed with Miss Clara and her husband through that year. During that time there was an outbreak of yellow fever in the city, but fortunately it didn’t touch our house. And I remained with them most of the next. Back in England, both Queen Mary and her husband, Dutch King William, had now died, and so the throne was given to Mary’s sister, Anne.

For when the two judges saw it—though they were friends of Governor Cosby themselves—they threw the stooges out and started again. The new jury was not rigged. The trial would be honest. British fair play. New York might be a long way from London, but it was English, after all. The whole colony was waiting with baited breath. Not that it mattered. The defendant hadn’t a hope. The third day of August, the year of Our Lord 1735. The British Empire was enjoying the Georgian age. For after Queen Anne, her equally Protestant kinsman, George of Hanover, had been asked to take the throne; and soon been followed by his son, a second George, who was ruler of the empire now. It was an age of confidence, and elegance, and reason. The third day of August 1735: New York, on a hot and humid afternoon. Seen from across the East River, it might have been a landscape by Vermeer.

My Dutch grandfather intended to free the only two slaves he had.” Eliot bowed his head noncommittally. A mischievous twinkle came into the merchant’s eye. “But at the same time, cousin,” he continued, “you may acknowledge that we British are also guilty of a mighty hypocrisy in this matter. For we say that slavery is monstrous, yet only if it takes place on the island of Britain. Everywhere else in the British Empire, it’s allowed. The sugar trade, so valuable to England, entirely depends upon slaves; and British vessels carry thousands every year.” “It cannot be denied,” Eliot politely acknowledged. “Does it concern you, sir,” Kate now ventured, “that New York is so dependent upon a single trade?” The merchant’s blue eyes rested upon her, approvingly. “Not too much,” he answered. “You’ve heard of the Sugar Interest, I’ve no doubt.

pages: 950 words: 297,713

Crucible: The Long End of the Great War and the Birth of a New World, 1917-1924 by Charles Emmerson

Albert Einstein, anti-communist, British Empire, continuation of politics by other means, currency peg, Etonian, European colonialism, ghettoisation, Isaac Newton, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Solar eclipse in 1919, strikebreaker, trade route

Nadya points out the plan’s fatal flaw: ‘You will fall asleep and see Mensheviks in your dreams and you will start swearing, and shout, scoundrels, scoundrels! and give the whole conspiracy away’. Vladimir storms down to the local police station, assuring the Zurich authorities that he is going to leave Switzerland very soon, and demands they return the one-hundred-franc administrative deposit he gave them when he arrived. HALIFAX, DOMINION OF CANADA, BRITISH EMPIRE: Scurrying back from the United States to Russia to take part in the greatest event in the history of the world, the principled non-tipper runs into a problem: a telegram from British naval intelligence. ‘FOLLOWING ON BOARD KRISTIANIAFJORD AND SHOULD BE TAKEN OFF AND RETAINED PENDING INSTRUCTION’, it reads. The name Trotsky is one of those listed. He is alleged to be carrying ten thousand dollars, provided by ‘socialists and Germans’.

It aims to represent all black people around the world, be they middle class and educated like William Du Bois (who can count the universities of both Harvard and Berlin as his alma maters) or poor and illiterate. Its structure of infinitely replicable local chapters is designed to work for a city, a country or a continent. All the divisions must maintain a band or orchestra. UNIA has its own newspaper, the Negro World. It is a flamboyant enterprise. Its organisational chart overflows with magnificent titles borrowed from the traditions of black Freemasonry and the British Empire of which Garvey is a subject: High Chancellor, Chaplain-General, President-General. (In this, it is perhaps not very different from a recently refounded white supremacist organisation known as the Ku Klux Klan, with its knights and wizards.) Grandest of all, the supreme leader is known as the Potentate. A Moses to his people, he is entitled to rule over them for life. The constitution stipulates that he must be of ‘Negro blood and race’ and may only marry a ‘lady of Negro blood and parentage’.

By the beginning of November, he is back in hospital in Milan again, further away from danger than if he were in Chicago, where influenza closes everything except the city’s churches for weeks. Ernest Hemingway’s war is over. For the rest of the world, it limps on. SPA: On the first day of autumn, Ludendorff calls his staff officers together to a meeting. The Western Front could break at any moment, he tells them. Germany’s allies have already folded, or will soon be forced to surrender. A combination of Arab and British Empire forces captures Damascus the same day; Istanbul is wide open after the collapse of Bulgaria; Austria–Hungary is a spent force militarily. The German army, ‘poisoned with Spartacist and socialist ideas’, cannot be relied upon. The real enemy now is revolution. In consequence of this, the general tells his staff, the German high command has recommended to the Kaiser that Germany sue for peace immediately.

pages: 850 words: 224,533

The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World by Oona A. Hathaway, Scott J. Shapiro

9 dash line, Albert Einstein, anti-globalists, bank run, Bartolomé de las Casas, battle of ideas, British Empire, clean water, colonial rule, continuation of politics by other means, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Donald Trump, facts on the ground, failed state, humanitarian revolution, index card, long peace, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, spice trade, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, uranium enrichment, zero-sum game

The plan was to send Genêt to the United States where he would persuade France’s fellow republic to join its noble cause.7 The Girondins understood that the United States might refuse to enter the war.8 In that case, they expected assistance just short of war.9 The French Foreign Ministry instructed Genêt to ask the United States to expedite the repayment of the debt owed to France that was incurred during the Revolutionary War. He would then use the funds to buy American supplies for the war effort back home.10 Next, the ministry instructed Genêt to undermine the Spanish and British Empires by assembling teams of American adventurers to infiltrate Spanish-held Florida and Louisiana and the British colony of Canada, where they would foment rebellion.11 Finally, Genêt came armed with a thick stack of three hundred blank letters of marque (special letters authorizing private sailors to attack and capture foreign vessels) that he would use to assemble a fleet of “privateers”—a veritable private navy of American sailors—to prey on British shipping.12 On February 7, 1793, Genêt set out in the forty-four-gun frigate Embuscade for Philadelphia, then the capital of the United States.

He advised the emperor that the treaty permitted self-defense and thus would not prevent Japan from protecting its interests in the region.1 Tachi pointed to statements by Western nations to support his interpretation. In correspondence with the United States, Great Britain stated that it would join the new Pact only on the “understanding” that it would not limit Britain’s “freedom of action” relating to “certain regions of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety”—namely, the vast territory that constituted the British Empire.2 France also required public assurances that it could defend territory within its own imperial orbit.3 In testimony before the U.S. Senate, Kellogg explained that the treaty would not interfere with the right of self-defense. He even said it would not disturb the Monroe Doctrine—which prohibited European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.4 These assurances persuaded the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the concept of self-defense in the Pact was, as an internal memo put it, “elastic enough to rationalize future Japanese actions in China.”5 That, it would turn out, was a terrible miscalculation—one that Japan would realize too late.

He even said it would not disturb the Monroe Doctrine—which prohibited European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.4 These assurances persuaded the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the concept of self-defense in the Pact was, as an internal memo put it, “elastic enough to rationalize future Japanese actions in China.”5 That, it would turn out, was a terrible miscalculation—one that Japan would realize too late. Japan had failed to appreciate the critical difference between the past and the future. Past conquests would be protected, but future conquests would not. Indeed, the Pact appealed to the West because it promised to secure and protect previous conquests, thus securing Western nations’ place at the head of the international legal order indefinitely. The British Empire of 1928 encircled the globe, covering nearly 31 million square kilometers. The French Empire was smaller but still immense, stretching over 12.5 million square kilometers.6 Together, the United Kingdom and the United States controlled three quarters of all the mineral resources in the world.7 The Peace Pact would protect this territory from reconquest, securing the vast empires at the moment they had begun to weaken—and competitors had begun to emerge.

pages: 200 words: 64,329

Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain by Fintan O'Toole

Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, British Empire, colonial rule, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, Desert Island Discs, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, full employment, Khartoum Gordon, Peter Thiel, Potemkin village, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stanford marshmallow experiment

To make matters much worse, the former Axis powers of Japan, Germany and Italy were booming, as were France and the Benelux countries, all of whom had been rescued from the Nazis in part by the British. Who could avoid a sense of disappointed expectations? We must acknowledge, too, the sheer exhilaration of being English for a young, white, privileged man during and after the war. The great journalist and historian of the British Empire James (later Jan) Morris, recalled in 1962, when Britain was making its first abortive bid to join the Common Market: Almost the instant I grew up a memorable thing happened to me: for scarcely had I passed my nineteenth birthday when I was commissioned into a superb cavalry regiment in one of the most triumphant armies of British history. Our mess included men of remarkable character, cultivation, and assurance; our soldiers were marvellously stalwart, cocky, and amiable; our division, having stormed its way across Africa and up the length of Italy, seemed ready to take on the four corners of the world in arms.

Morris, in his reflections on the great change of mood, could still console himself with the obvious truth that England was morally and culturally superior: ‘More than most Powers, we can still presume to precedence in teaching nations how to live’.8 Even in making the argument in 1971 that Britain should stay out of Europe and forget all its pretensions to be a world power, Joan Robinson, professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, appealed to a notion of innate moral superiority that could be nurtured in splendid isolation: ‘I think that, as empires go, the British Empire was not discreditable and that to give it up (in the main) without a fight was a very unusual example of common sense. Let us now have enough sense to accept the position of a small country and try to show the world how to preserve some elements of civilisation and decency that the large ones are rapidly stamping out.’9 Nancy Mitford, contemplating the prospect of Britain helping to build a new European empire asked (half-facetiously) ‘What about Prince Charles as Emperor?

The use of Independence Day as a way of framing Brexit was intended to appeal primarily to Americans, who are familiar with 4th July as their own Independence Day holiday, marking the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. There are, however, two big problems with this neo-imperial project. One is that even the most deluded Brexiteer would concede that even if it were ever to come about, its centre would not be in London but in Washington. It would be an American, not a British empire. George Orwell had long ago anticipated it in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where it essentially exists as Oceania. It is not good news for England, which is now called Airstrip One. Even as pure fantasy, which it is, the Anglo-Saxon Union does not set the pulses racing – liberation from a marginal position in one empire to a marginal position in another is not much of a thrill. Secondly, the imperial idea has little appeal to the working-class English voters who are crucial to Brexit.

pages: 476 words: 144,288

1946: The Making of the Modern World by Victor Sebestyen

anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, Etonian, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, illegal immigration, imperial preference, Kickstarter, land reform, long peace, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, operation paperclip

In 1946 Britain had a million and a quarter men (and a very few women) under arms, albeit down from around five million at the height of the war; fleets in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean; a China station based in Hong Kong, and other bases in a dozen countries and colonies from the West Indies to Aden and Malaya, as well as one hundred and twenty full RAF squadrons. All would be retained, despite acute financial hardship at home. The American Ambassador to Britain, John Winant, cabled back to Under Secretary of State in Washington, William Clayton, after the loan terms were finalised: ‘The British are hanging on by their fingernails. . . in the hope that somehow or other, with our help, they will be able to preserve the British empire and their leadership of it.’12 * In Britain, the end of the war was not Zero Hour, but the general election of 1945 had seemed like a clear break from the past. The overwhelming scale of the Labour victory might have shocked Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, but few people in Britain were all that surprised. Voters had not passed judgment on the six years of war, but on the decade before that.

‘Stalin looked at me as if I was an idiot and ended the conversation.’14 The Soviet dictator was frequently impatient about the ‘hypocrisy’ of the Western leaders, who so often lectured the Soviets with fine rhetoric about self-determination for smaller, weaker countries, and about democracy. He would point out that when the US and the UK had signed the Atlantic Charter, earlier in the war, which contained a sweeping statement about the freedom of people to choose the form of government they wished, Churchill had insisted on an assurance that the Charter would not apply to any of the colonies in the British Empire, including India, where a popular independence movement had long been campaigning for freedom. The Monroe Doctrine gave the US a self-appointed right to stop others interfering anywhere in the Americas – and the Americans permitted nobody else any say in the future of Japan. From Stalin’s point of view the other Allies had limited rights to interfere in Poland, a country so clearly important to the USSR.

Everybody knows it as the ‘Iron Curtain Speech’ but Churchill had titled it ‘The Sinews of Peace’. Of course he knew which sound-bite would receive the most attention, but only a small part of the speech referred directly to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Most of it was about the ‘fraternal association’ between the English-speaking peoples, the ‘special relationship’ he mentioned several times in the text, and the need for ‘the British Empire’ and the US to unite more closely to create a lasting peace. He did not specifically mention the American loan to Britain, which was then being debated in Congress, though it was clearly a factor in what he was saying. He spoke about sharing military bases, manufacturing interchangeable weapons, building institutions together – eventually sharing a common citizenship. He was the first major statesman in the world to speak openly in strong terms about the breakdown of the Big Three’s wartime alliance, and that hit the front pages.

pages: 469 words: 97,582

QI: The Second Book of General Ignorance by Lloyd, John, Mitchinson, John

Ada Lovelace, Boris Johnson, British Empire, Buckminster Fuller, Captain Sullenberger Hudson, Charles Lindbergh, clean water, double helix, Etonian, George Santayana, ghettoisation, Isaac Newton, Lao Tzu, Louis Pasteur, Mikhail Gorbachev, Murano, Venice glass, out of africa, the built environment, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, traveling salesman, US Airways Flight 1549

There are also 150 aboriginal languages which are still spoken (compared to the 600 or so spoken in the eighteenth century). Of these, all but twenty are likely to disappear in the next fifty years. Attempting to declare English the official language risks looking insensitive. The Vatican is the only country in the world that has Latin as an official language. When did Parliament make slavery illegal in England? 6 April 2010. With a few minor exceptions, slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire in 1833, but it wasn’t thought necessary to outlaw it at home. In 1067, according to the Domesday Book, more than 10 per cent of the population of England were slaves. The Normans, perhaps surprisingly, were opposed to slavery on religious grounds and within fifty years it had virtually disappeared. Even serfdom (a kind of modified slavery) became increasingly rare and Queen Elizabeth I freed the last remaining serfs in 1574.

At the same time, Britain was becoming a colonial power and it was the height of fashion for returning Englishmen to have a ‘black manservant’ (who was in fact, of course, a slave). This unseemly habit was made illegal by the courts in 1772 when the judge, Lord Mansfield, reportedly declared: ‘The air of England is too pure for any slave to breathe’, with the result that thousands of slaves in England gained their freedom. From that moment, slavery was arguably illegal in England (though not in the British Empire) under Common Law, but this was not confirmed by Parliament until the Coroners and Justice Act. Previous acts of Parliament dealt with kidnap, false imprisonment, trafficking for sexual exploitation and forced labour, but never specifically covered slavery. Now, Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act (which came into force on 6 April 2010) makes it an offence in the UK, punishable by up to fourteen years’ imprisonment, to hold a person in ‘slavery or servitude’.

‘If Imperial Japan had not started the war,’ he said, ‘how could we communists have become mighty and powerful?’ Which nationality invented the ‘stiff upper lip’? It wasn’t the British. Unlikely as it may sound, it was the Americans. To keep a stiff upper lip is to remain steadfast and unemotional in the face of the worst that life can throw at you. Though long associated with Britain – and especially the British Empire – the oldest-known uses of the term are all from the USA, beginning in 1815. Americans were going around with ‘stiff upper lips’ in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) and in the letters of Mark Twain (1835–1910) and it was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that the expression first appeared in print in Britain. By 1963, when P. G.Wodehouse published his ninth Jeeves and Wooster novel, Stiff Upper Lip, Jeeves!

pages: 241 words: 90,538

Unequal Britain: Equalities in Britain Since 1945 by Pat Thane

Ayatollah Khomeini, British Empire, call centre, collective bargaining, equal pay for equal work, full employment, gender pay gap, longitudinal study, mass immigration, moral panic, Neil Kinnock, old-boy network, pensions crisis, sexual politics, Stephen Hawking, unpaid internship, women in the workforce

In the twentieth century between World Wars 1 and 2, a substantial population of African and Asian seamen, recruited from the Empire to the merchant navy during World War I, settled in Britain, especially in port cities such as Liverpool and Cardiff. They experienced discrimination in the labour market and the benefits system when they sought to exercise their rights as British citizens.1 Historically, anyone born within the vast British Empire was a British subject of the British monarch and entitled to the same rights as those who were born in Britain.2 However, registration of births was not complete throughout the Empire, and immigrants from poorer backgrounds often could not provide evidence of their place of birth, which could disqualify them from claiming their rights. Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, especially following the famine of the 1840s, there was substantial immigration to England, Scotland and Wales from Ireland due to poverty.

Similarly, the Indian Workers’ Association (in Hindustani, Mazdoor Sabha) was founded in Coventry in 1938, then formed branches in London and elsewhere. It existed to promote the cause of Indian independence, and to fight for the rights of Indian workers in Britain and against all forms of discrimination. POST-WAR IMMIGRATION The British Nationality Act 1948 confirmed the right of 800 million colonial citizens to enter the United Kingdom. It was designed to reinforce the long-established principle that everyone born within the British Empire had equal rights of citizenship throughout Britain and the colonies. However, few expected that non-White colonial citizens would take up their rights in large numbers, since they had not done so in the past. Even the relatively small number of immigrants who arrived from the Caribbean on the SS Windrush in 1948 provoked some panic.7 West Indians began to migrate to Britain in large numbers in the 1950s.

However, prosecutions were concentrated in a few police districts,41 and the increase was partly due to Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyffe’s drive for greater uniformity in prosecutions and the use by the police of entrapment techniques and conspiracy charges to ensnare homosexual men.42 The press sensationalized and disseminated the details of a series of successful prosecutions of prominent men, often on flimsy evidence. In 1952, the mathematician Alan Turing, who received an Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work on cracking the Enigma code during the war, was arrested for homosexual offences. He accepted hormone treatment instead of a prison sentence, but committed suicide in 1954.43 In 1953, the novelist and playwright Rupert Croft-Cooke was sentenced to nine months in prison on the testimony of two sailors. While in prison, he wrote The Verdict of You All, describing the climate of fear at the time: As the witch-hunt of homosexuals ordered, or at least countenanced by the Home Secretary raised its disgusting hue and cry, the prisons began to house a new kind of victim, men of the highest probity and idealism who’d been dragged from useful lives . . . found themselves stunned and baffled in prison.44 Shortly before his release from prison, Croft-Cooke was asked, but refused, to return his war medals.45 The most spectacular scandal was the trial and conviction of Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, his cousin Michael Pitt-Rivers and Daily Mail diplomatic correspondent Peter Wildeblood for homosexual activity in 1954.

pages: 261 words: 103,244

Economists and the Powerful by Norbert Haring, Norbert H. Ring, Niall Douglas

"Robert Solow", accounting loophole / creative accounting, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, asset allocation, bank run, barriers to entry, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, buy and hold, central bank independence, collective bargaining, commodity trading advisor, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, diversified portfolio, financial deregulation, George Akerlof, illegal immigration, income inequality, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, Jean Tirole, job satisfaction, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, knowledge worker, law of one price, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, mandatory minimum, market bubble, market clearing, market fundamentalism, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, new economy, obamacare, old-boy network, open economy, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Ponzi scheme, price stability, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, Renaissance Technologies, rolodex, Sergey Aleynikov, shareholder value, short selling, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, transaction costs, ultimatum game, union organizing, Vilfredo Pareto, working-age population, World Values Survey

Only through having been caught so blatantly with their noses in the troughs (e.g. the 2011 Academy Award–winning documentary Inside Job) has the American Economic Association finally been forced to adopt an ethical code, and that code is weak and incomplete compared with other disciplines. Increasingly, and especially during the past ten years, there is evidence that the US is beginning to doctor the numbers for measures such as productivity and GDP to make itself look stronger and more powerful than it actually is. In this it is copying its forebear, the British Empire, which increasingly began to tell itself lies as it failed to arrest its relative economic decline after the recession of 1873–79, until the Second World War bankrupted and broke up its global hegemony. Economics is supposed to be about revealing truth such that society learns to become better than it was before. In this, it is supposed to be like physics or medicine. It is not supposed to be another tool for the powerful to enrich themselves at the expense of others.

This use of distinguished economists for the purposes of promotion was of course not new. The great British founder of neoclassicism, Alfred Marshall, was the undisputed leader in economics from the death of Jevons in 1882 until his own death in 1924, and was famous for his evenhandedness and avoidance of controversy. But even he got involved in media campaigning against imperial initiatives, such as the 1903 tariff reform movement that aimed to turn the British Empire into a single free trade zone in order to inhibit the rise of the United States and Germany. The big change, however, was that Bernays was merely having distinguished economists put in appearances at media events completely unconnected with economics. This, over time, caused the American public to begin to see distinguished economists as a type of THE ECONOMICS OF THE POWERFUL 17 celebrity, especially as Bernays found that the typically male experts of that time were particularly likely to put in appearances at events where famous actresses would be present.

For calculating profits, salaries and bonuses are treated as an expense, even though treating the aboveaverage part of them as a way to disburse excessive profits might be closer to the truth. After all, financial sector salaries have risen to twice the average in the economy, whereas three decades ago they were equal to this average (Johnson 2009). The only time that finance has been known to have been as profitable for as long as they have been during the past 30 years was in the UK during the period leading up to 1913, as the British Empire stagnated MONEY IS POWER 101 (Imlah 1952; Dimson et al. 2002). Are sustained abnormal banking profits a sign of hidden local economic stagnation as capital is redirected to more profitable locations in the world? Perhaps with the long British experience of finance in mind, the British Warwick Commission noted that a bloated financial sector is a disaster waiting to happen as well as a continuous drag on the economy.

pages: 356 words: 103,944

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy by Dani Rodrik

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round,, endogenous growth, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, full employment, George Akerlof, guest worker program, Hernando de Soto, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, information asymmetry, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, night-watchman state, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, open economy, Paul Samuelson, price stability, profit maximization, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, savings glut, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, tulip mania, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey

Recall how the East India Company was superseded by the British Raj when the former proved unable to handle local insurgency, or how the Hudson’s Bay Company’s police powers were handed over to the Dominion of Canada. The British Empire brought law and order to societies that lacked them, argues the Harvard historian Niall Ferguson: “no organization in history has done more to promote the free movement of goods, capital and labor,” he writes, “than the British Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”13 One does not need to buy into Ferguson’s glowing take on the British Empire to agree with his assertion that imperialism was a tremendously powerful force for economic globalization. A recent statistical study found that two countries that were members of the same empire had twice the volume of trade between them compared to trade with others outside the empire, holding as many things constant as is feasible in this kind of quantitative work.

If the locals proved insufficiently in awe of Smith and Ricardo’s ideas, gunships standing at the ready could always provide the necessary persuasion. So Britain signed a treaty with Ottoman Turkey in 1838 that forced the country to restrict import duties to a maximum of 5 percent and abolish import prohibitions and monopolies. The British also fought the so-called “Opium War” with China in 1839–42 to open up the country to imports of opium and other goods exported from the British Empire. Commodore Matthew C. Perry signed a treaty with Japan on behalf of the United States in 1854 to open the country to foreign shipping and trade. These and other similar treaties would impose ceilings on import duties (one-sided, of course), restrict the ability of the less powerful countries to conduct their trade policies independently, grant foreign traders legal privileges, and enforce foreigners’ access to ports.

pages: 221 words: 71,449

Not My Father's Son: A Memoir by Alan Cumming

British Empire, colonial rule, Downton Abbey, financial independence, friendly fire, Skype

Sensing my desire for more, the historian piped up, “This is a gallantry award of which you should feel very proud.” But then something else was revealed that connected with me even more. The Military Medal Tommy Darling had been awarded was such a high honor that he had been invited to Buckingham Palace in 1941 to receive it. Sixty-eight years later, I, his grandson, had also been to Buckingham Place to pick up a medal. I was awarded the OBE (Officer of the British Empire) in the Queen’s Honors List of 2009 for “services to film, theatre and the arts and to activism for equal rights for the gay and lesbian community,” a tad less heroic and gallant than my grandfather’s, but an honor nonetheless. My mum, my brother, and my husband all came to the palace that day with me. I remember Mary Darling bubbling with excitement and pride like a little girl in a fairy tale, a feathery fascinator perched on her head as she sat between Tom and Grant in the front row and waited for me to appear to collect my medal.

There, the Highlanders found themselves tested in entirely new ways. They were trained in jungle warfare. The Japanese had entered the war in 1941 after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and very quickly developed a reputation for total lack of fear, and of fighting to the death. Edgar now pulled out a map and showed me that by March 1944 the Japanese forces had advanced through Burma and had their sights set firmly on neighboring India, the jewel in the British Empire’s crown. They crossed over the northeastern border and amassed their troops around the mountain town of Kohima with the aim of pushing west to take Delhi. I had a feeling this was not going to end well. The Cameron Highlanders were on the front lines of the battle at Kohima, made to push through Japanese forces that had taken positions on a hillside. The Highlanders fought mortar fire, grenades, snipers . . . all with the knowledge that the Japanese took no prisoners.

Maybe the horrors he had encountered in his career were so ingrained in him that he could no longer function unless he had access to their potential. But whatever the reasoning, he was about to walk into the middle of the most brutal of colonial wars. {Courtesy of iStock, ©studiocasper.} Malaya, or Malaysia as it is now known, was bordered to the north by Thailand and in turn is just a bridge’s distance north of the island of Singapore. It had been part of the British Empire since the early nineteenth century, and its huge rubber and tin resources made it a hugely valuable asset to the UK. But after the Second World War, Malaya saw growing unrest as its economy suffered, and soon the Malayan National Liberation Army, the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, began a campaign to disrupt British trade in an attempt to overthrow its colonial rule. In 1948 three European plantation managers were murdered and what became known as the Malayan Emergency began.

pages: 265 words: 71,143

Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order by Jason Sharman

British Empire, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, death of newspapers, European colonialism, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, land tenure, offshore financial centre, passive investing, Peace of Westphalia, performance metric, profit maximization, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, spice trade, trade route, transaction costs

After all, the great “civilized” powers were at the same time the most militarily powerful and possessed vast colonies to further their mission of “civilizing” the “uncivilized” states.17 Though an imperial power of long standing, various French colonial expeditions from the 1830s (Algeria), and those in sub-Saharan Africa fifty years later seem to have owed at least as much to the pursuit of grandeur, and wiping out the stain of the humiliating defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1871, as the pursuit of material advantage.18 Even the late expansion of Dutch colonialism in Southeast Asia reflected a similar dynamic from the 1890s, with prestige concerns again said to outweigh economic factors or concerns regarding European rivals.19 Along these lines, Lorge dismisses Europeans’ empire-building as a product of “their willingness to spend blood and treasure in what were, on balance, unprofitable ventures all in the interest of glory.”20 He explains the “failure” of Chinese and other Asian polities to build maritime empires as a result of their reluctance to subsidize such loss-making vanity projects.21 Whether colonial empires did in fact enhance military or economic capacity is fairly dubious, especially considering the cost of establishing, garrisoning, and administering these new possessions. The fact that the new wave of chartered companies formed to reap the benefits of these new overseas opportunities (while sparing the metropole the costs of imperial governance) almost always lost money, and often went broke, or only survived at the expense of the taxpayer, indicates the scanty commercial benefits of the new colonies.22 One calculation suggests that “The British Empire … generated no profits, at least in the years 1880–1912. In fact it required a subsidy.”23 Even where colonies did bring profits, typically to small sections of the elite, it is unclear whether these same or greater profits could have been gained through arm’s-length trade or investment, minus conquest and formal subordination.24 Though the imperial powers did recruit troops in the colonies, the main duties of these forces was to garrison and extend imperial borders, rather than improving the defense of the metropole itself.25 Perhaps more importantly, if scholars are still arguing about the economic and security benefits of empire (if any), it is highly unlikely that contemporary leaders were able to make accurate calculations.

The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hoffman, Philip T. 2015. Why Did Europe Conquer the World? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Howard, Michael. 1976. War in European History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. 2005. War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hyam, Ronald. 2010. Understanding the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Isaacman, Allen. 1972. Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: Zambezi Prazos, 1750–1902. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Jackson, Robert H. 1993. “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations.” In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stern, Philip J. 2006. “British Asia and British Atlantic: Connections and Comparisons.” William and Mary Quarterly 63 (4): 693–712. Stern, Philip J. 2009. “History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present and Future!” History Compass 7 (4): 1146–1180. Stern, Philip J. 2011. The CompanyState: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stevens, Carol B. 2007. Russia’s Wars of Emergence 1460–1730. Harlow: Pearson. Strang, David. 1991. “Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutionalist Accounts.” International Organization 45 (2): 143–162. Streusand, Douglas E. 1989. The Formation of the Mughal Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Streusand, Douglas. 2001.

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Britain's 100 Best Railway Stations by Simon Jenkins

Beeching cuts, British Empire, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, market bubble, railway mania, South Sea Bubble, starchitect, the market place, urban renewal, wikimedia commons

A contemporary cartoon had Queen Victoria pleading with her weeping husband, ‘Tell me, oh tell me, dearest Albert, have YOU any railway shares?’ Hudson was accused of fraud and fled the country. To Karl Marx in Das Kapital, the Mania was ‘the first great railway swindle’. The fire did not go out. As after 1836, enough capital had been committed to instigate a renewed round of construction, more vigorous than the first. Railways were voracious for money, materials and talent. Not since the rise of the British Empire in the 18th century had opportunity so beckoned to all classes. The nation hurled itself at the challenge of conquering distance. Victory needed iron, coal, timber, bricks, quarries, factories and forges. It needed cartographers, geologists, surveyors, engineers and men who could understand and handle money. There were never enough of these. Many builders of the new railway came from the army, as military engineers, but most recruits were apprenticed on the job, few with any qualifications or regulation.

The builders were playful, escapist, even mischievous, as they spread centuries of Europe’s stylistic history across their façades. Some saw the diversity and eclecticism of Victorian architecture as a political virtue. Writing in the 1860s, the president of the Royal Institute of British Architects, Alexander Beresford Hope, was overtly political. He championed eclecticism as emblematic of the British Empire. It would draw inspiration from ‘Benares and Labrador, Newfoundland and Cathay … We must assimilate and fuse everything that we eclect [sic]’ into what he called ‘a progressive eclecticism’. After the early-Victorian battle of the styles, architecture should become a peace treaty, a resolution. The future, said Beresford Hope, would lie in the capacity of architects to sympathise with the legacy of their precursors and build a new style on that basis.

It was lengthened in the 1870s, lingering on as a terminus for the Midland Railway’s trains from the north. It was briefly a goods area in the 20th century, but this closed in 1965. British Rail then barred its future use as a station by building a signalling centre across its entrance. The old shed was used variously for storage, as an exhibition hall, an ‘interactive science centre’ and even an abortive museum of the British Empire. Its inconvenient location told against it. The building is now a venue for weddings, exhibitions and conferences, but there are plans to bring it back into some form of railway use, involving the welcome removal of the signalling centre. No sooner had Brunel’s work been completed than a different company, the Bristol and Exeter Railway (B&ER), arrived from the south-west with a terminus at right angles to Brunel’s shed.

The Politics of Pain by Fintan O'Toole

banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, British Empire, colonial rule, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, Desert Island Discs, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, full employment, Khartoum Gordon, Peter Thiel, Potemkin village, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stanford marshmallow experiment

To make matters much worse, the former Axis powers of Japan, Germany and Italy were booming, as were France and the Benelux countries, all of whom had been rescued from the Nazis in part by the British. Who could avoid a sense of disappointed expectations? We must acknowledge, too, the sheer exhilaration of being English for a young, white, privileged man during and after the war. In 1962, when Britain was making its first abortive bid to join the Common Market, the journalist and historian of the British Empire James (later Jan) Morris recalled the euphoria of those years. When he turned nineteen, he was given a commission in a “superb” cavalry regiment in ‘one of the most triumphant armies of British history.’ His comrades were ‘men of remarkable character, cultivation, and assurance’ in a division that had fought its way triumphantly across North Africa and up through Italy: ‘Our enemies were humbled, our allies seemed dullards beside us, and it never occurred to me to doubt that this intensely English organism, this amalgam of bravado and tradition . . . was the very best thing of its kind that any country in the world could offer.’5 When the six countries of the Coal and Steel Community met at Messina on 7 November 1955 – a meeting that would lead to the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the foundation of what would become the European Union – Britain was invited to join them.

Morris, in his reflections on the great change of mood, could still console himself with the obvious truth that England was morally and culturally superior: ‘More than most Powers, we can still presume to precedence in teaching nations how to live’.8 Even in making the argument in 1971 that Britain should stay out of Europe and forget all its pretensions to be a world power, Joan Robinson, professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, appealed to a notion of innate moral superiority that could be nurtured in splendid isolation: ‘I think that, as empires go, the British Empire was not discreditable and that to give it up (in the main) without a fight was a very unusual example of common sense. Let us now have enough sense to accept the position of a small country and try to show the world how to preserve some elements of civilisation and decency that the large ones are rapidly stamping out.’9 Nancy Mitford, contemplating the prospect of Britain helping to build a new European empire asked (half-facetiously) ‘What about Prince Charles as Emperor?

The use of Independence Day as a way of framing Brexit was intended to appeal primarily to Americans, who are familiar with 4th July as their own Independence Day holiday, marking the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. There are, however, two big problems with this neo-imperial project. One is that even the most deluded Brexiteer would concede that even if it were ever to come about, its centre would not be in London but in Washington. It would be an American, not a British empire. George Orwell had long ago anticipated it in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where it essentially exists as Oceania. It is not good news for England, which is now called Airstrip One. Even as pure fantasy, which it is, the Anglo-Saxon Union does not set the pulses racing – liberation from a marginal position in one empire to a marginal position in another is not much of a thrill. Secondly, the imperial idea has little appeal to the working-class English voters who are crucial to Brexit.

pages: 97 words: 31,550

Money: Vintage Minis by Yuval Noah Harari

23andMe, agricultural Revolution, algorithmic trading, Anne Wojcicki, autonomous vehicles, British Empire, call centre, credit crunch, European colonialism, Flash crash, greed is good, job automation, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, lifelogging, pattern recognition, Ponzi scheme, self-driving car, telemarketer, The Future of Employment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, zero-sum game

Eventually, in the 1780s, Louis XVI, who had ascended the throne on his grandfather’s death, realised that half his annual budget was tied to servicing the interest on his loans, and that he was heading towards bankruptcy. Reluctantly, in 1789, Louis XVI convened the Estates General, the French parliament that had not met for a century and a half, in order to find a solution to the crisis. Thus began the French Revolution. While the French overseas empire was crumbling, the British Empire was expanding rapidly. Like the Dutch Empire before it, the British Empire was established and run largely by private joint-stock companies based in the London stock exchange. The first English settlements in North America were established in the early seventeenth century by joint-stock companies such as the London Company, the Plymouth Company, the Dorchester Company and the Massachusetts Company. The Indian subcontinent too was conquered not by the British state, but by the mercenary army of the British East India Company.

pages: 96 words: 33,963

Decline of the English Murder by George Orwell

British Empire, invisible hand, laissez-faire capitalism, Lao Tzu, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thorstein Veblen

I have seen a young coal miner, for instance, a lad who had already worked a year or two underground, eagerly reading the Gem. Recently I offered a batch of English papers to some British legionaries of the French Foreign Legion in North Africa; they picked out the Gem and Magnet first. Both papers are much read by girls,* and the Pen Pals’ department of the Gem shows that it is read in every corner of the British Empire, by Australians, Canadians, Palestine Jews, Malays, Arabs, Straits Chinese, etc. etc. The editors evidently expect their readers to be aged round about fourteen, and the advertisements (milk chocolate, postage stamps, water pistols, blushing cured, home conjuring tricks, itching-powder, the Phine Phun Ring which runs a needle into your friend’s hand, etc. etc.) indicate roughly the same age; there are also the Admiralty advertisements, however, which call for youths between seventeen and twenty-two.

Here is the stuff that is read somewhere between the ages of twelve and eighteen by a very large proportion, perhaps an actual majority, of English boys, including many who will never read anything else except newspapers; and along with it they are absorbing a set of beliefs which would be regarded as hopelessly out of date in the Central Office of the Conservative Party. All the better because it is done indirectly, there is being pumped into them the conviction that the major problems of our time do not exist, that there is nothing wrong with laissez-faire capitalism, that foreigners are unimportant comics and that the British Empire is a sort of charity-concern which will last for ever. Considering who owns these papers, it is difficult to believe that this is unintentional. Of the twelve papers I have been discussing (i.e. twelve including the Thriller and Detective Weekly) seven are the property of the Amalgamated Press, which is one of the biggest press-combines in the world and controls more than a hundred different papers.

Nuclear War and Environmental Catastrophe by Noam Chomsky, Laray Polk

American Legislative Exchange Council, British Empire, cuban missile crisis, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, energy security, Howard Zinn, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, Malacca Straits, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, WikiLeaks

The principles that were established were very interesting and explicit, and later implemented. They devised the concept of what they called the Grand Area, which the US must dominate. And within the Grand Area, there can be no exercise of sovereignty that interferes with US plans—explicit, almost those words. What’s the Grand Area? Well, at a minimum, it was to include the entire Western Hemisphere, the entire Far East, and the whole British Empire—former British Empire—which, of course, includes the Middle East energy resources. As one high-level advisor later put it: “If we can control Middle East energy, we can control the world.”59 Well, that’s the Grand Area. As the Russians began to grind down the German armies after Stalingrad, they recognized that Germany was weakened—at first, they thought that Germany would emerge from the war as a major power.

pages: 605 words: 110,673

Drugs Without the Hot Air by David Nutt

British Empire, double helix,, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, longitudinal study, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral panic, offshore financial centre, randomized controlled trial, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), War on Poverty

Even when pipe-smoking of tobacco became more common, and cannabis started being used as a medicine, there was almost no recreational use of the drug in Britain until the late 19th century, and levels remained very low until the 1960s. Of course, the British government did encounter widespread use of the drug as the British Empire expanded into Asia. Here it was viewed as a commodity, which, because it was seen as an essential daily item by many Indians, could be used as a means of social control. Just as the East India company cornered the market in salt, they shut down the local production of cannabis, forcing people to buy their “bhang” from the British. (When you factor-in the opium trade in China, and the vast profits made from trading tea, coffee and alcohol, the British Empire was easily the largest drug dealer in the history of the world!) When cannabis entered the physician’s medicine chest in Britain in the 1840s, it was 18overshadowed by the more potent painkilling properties of opium, partly because opium was easier to convert into other forms such as laudanum, morphine and heroin.

Iverson, Oxford University Press, 2000 17 THC levels were at one point as high as 21%, they soon dropped back down to 15%• Cannabis: classification and public health, ACMD, April 2008 18 overshadowed by the more potent painkilling properties of opium• Indian Hemp and the Dope Fiends of Old England: A sociopolitical history of cannabis and the British Empire 1840–1928, Sean Blanchard and Matthew J Atha, URL-28, 1994 19 Indian Hemp Drugs Commission report in 1894• Indian Hemp Drugs Commission report in 1894, Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, available online on the Medical History of British India website, URL-29, accessed December 7th 2011 20 In 1945 there were a total of 4 prosecutions for cannabis offences, and it wasn’t until 1950 that the number of prosecutions for cannabis (86) outnumbered those for opium and other manufactured drugs (83).• Indian Hemp and the Dope Fiends of Old England: A sociopolitical history of cannabis and the British Empire 1840–1928, Sean Blanchard and Matthew J Atha, URL-28, 1994 21 The situation was very different in the USA• Illegal drugs: a complete guide to their history, chemistry, use and abuse, Paul M Ghalinger, Plume, 2003 22 diverting prescriptions from their doctors• Necessity or nastiness?

pages: 335 words: 107,779