deindustrialization

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pages: 357 words: 95,986

Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work by Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams

3D printing, additive manufacturing, air freight, algorithmic trading, anti-work, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, basic income, battle of ideas, blockchain, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, centre right, collective bargaining, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, David Graeber, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, deskilling, Doha Development Round, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ferguson, Missouri, financial independence, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of work, gender pay gap, housing crisis, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, intermodal, Internet Archive, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kickstarter, late capitalism, liberation theology, Live Aid, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market design, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, mass incarceration, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, patent troll, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Philip Mirowski, post scarcity, post-work, postnationalism / post nation state, precariat, price stability, profit motive, quantitative easing, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Slavoj Žižek, social web, stakhanovite, Steve Jobs, surplus humans, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, wages for housework, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population

Mediation by the market distinguishes these postcolonial subsistence economies from pre-capitalist subsistence economies,104 even though they both function as a desperate means of survival.105 But while primitive accumulation is responsible for the origins of these slums, it is ‘premature deindustrialisation’ that looks set to consolidate their existence. If previous periods of industrialisation at least had the benefit of providing enough factory jobs for the new proletariat, premature deindustrialisation threatens to eliminate this traditional pathway entirely. Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic.

Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic. Deindustrialisation can also be seen in ‘reshoring’, where manufacturing returns to developed economies in jobless, automated forms.112 These deindustrialisation trends are taking hold across the developing economies of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and most of Asia.113 Even in countries where manufacturing employment has increased in absolute terms, there have been significant decreases in the labour-intensity of the process.114 The result of all of this is not only an incomplete transition to a significant working class, but also the stymying of the expected employment path for the workforce.

From its origins, the proletariat was riven by divisions – between the waged male worker and the unwaged female labourer, between the ‘free’ worker and the unfree slave, between skilled craftsmen and unskilled labourers, between the core and periphery, and between nation-states.13 The tendency to unify was always a limited phenomenon, and these differences persist today, exacerbated under conditions of a globalised division of labour. Perhaps more fundamentally, if deindustrialisation (the automation of manufacturing) is a necessary stage along the path towards a postcapitalist society, then the industrial working class could never have been the agent of change. Its existence was predicated upon economic conditions that would have to be eliminated in the transition to postcapitalism. If deindustrialisation is required for the transition to postcapitalism, then the industrial working class was inevitably going to lose its power in the process – fragmenting and falling apart, just as we have seen in recent decades. Who, then, can be the transformative subject today?


The Making of a World City: London 1991 to 2021 by Greg Clark

Basel III, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, carbon footprint, congestion charging, corporate governance, cross-subsidies, deindustrialization, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, East Village, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, financial intermediation, global value chain, haute cuisine, housing crisis, industrial cluster, intangible asset, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Masdar, mass immigration, megacity, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, Pearl River Delta, place-making, rent control, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, smart cities, sovereign wealth fund, trickle-down economics, urban planning, urban renewal, working poor

This book is divided into three broadly chronological sections, capturing London’s past, present and future. The first section sets the stage for London’s early positioning as a world city. In Chapter 2 I consider the groundwork laid for London by government leaders, corporate chiefs and civic activists in the period before 1991. London was the first major city in Europe to undergo large-scale de-industrialisation, a process which had a seismic impact not only on East London’s character but on the development and orientation of the whole city. The negotiated response to the city’s de-industrialisation and preparation for a different mode of globalisation was marked by political conflict and ideological division. None of the major decisions in this period were made free of tension between central government and local councils, between advocates and critics of the City of London, and between representatives of big business and trade unions.

The UK’s urban system became dramatically specialised during the industrial era of the 1830s to 1945, so much so that only Manchester amongst the other larger UK cities retained its business diversity. Our recent story of London’s emergence as ‘world city’ begins in the 1970s and 1980s when the UK was ravaged by de-industrialisation. In that setting, the UK government’s very active role in support of the first decade of London’s world city agenda is understandable both as a desire to help ensure the competitiveness Lessons from London for other cities 189 of the capital city and as an example of the outward-looking agenda it wanted to inspire in other UK cities where de-industrialisation hit hardest. The UK system of government also has some very distinctive features by international standards. It is one of the most fiscally and financially centralised of any modern nation state: sub-national governments have extremely limited self-financing powers and they need to appeal to national government for transfer payments and grants for most major investment projects.

White working-class populations were departing for a better quality of life and new job opportunities in distant suburbs or adjacent counties (Butler and Hamnett, 2009). In this context, urban regeneration in London gradually came to be identified as a task of re-engineering for economic competitiveness and new job creation. Economic activity had to be re-galvanised in sites where it had declined most, and where social inclusion had deteriorated. This was especially the case in the rapidly de-industrialising waterfront areas in the east and south, which had suffered due to the advent of the global container system that saw cargo move to deep-water ports at Tilbury and Folkestone. Because these vast areas required social and physical infrastructure capable of competing for inward investment, quality of place re-emerged at the heart of London’s planning predicament. London prior to 1991: The back story 13 The late 1960s and early 1970s marked a watershed in London governments’ approach to city spaces.


pages: 365 words: 88,125

23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, borderless world, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, deskilling, ending welfare as we know it, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, full employment, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, Myron Scholes, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, post-industrial society, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, rent control, shareholder value, short selling, Skype, structural adjustment programs, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Tobin tax, Toyota Production System, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

In addition to the outsourcing effect, the extent of manufacturing contraction is exaggerated by what is called the ‘reclassification effect’.2 A UK government report estimates that up to 10 per cent of the fall in manufacturing employment between 1998 and 2006 in the UK may be accounted for by some manufacturing firms, seeing their service activities becoming predominant, applying to the government statistical agency to be reclassified as service firms, even when they are still engaged in some manufacturing activities. One cause of genuine de-industrialization has recently attracted a lot of attention. It is the rise of manufacturing imports from low-cost developing countries, especially China. However dramatic it may look, it is not the main explanation for de-industrialization in the rich countries. China’s exports did not make a real impact until the late 1990s, but the de-industrialization process had already started in the 1970s in most rich countries. Most estimates show that the rise of China as the new workshop of the world can explain only around 20 per cent of de-industrialization in the rich countries that has happened so far. Many people think that the remaining 80 per cent or so can be largely explained by the natural tendency of the (relative) demand for manufactured goods to fall with rising prosperity.

It is instead the falling relative prices of the manufactured goods due to faster growth in productivity in the manufacturing sector that is the main driver of the de-industrialization process. Thus, while the citizens of the rich countries may be living in post-industrial societies in terms of their employment, the importance of manufacturing in terms of production in those economies has not been diminished to the extent that we can declare a post-industrial age. Should we worry about de-industrialization? But if de-industrialization is due to the very dynamism of a country’s manufacturing sector, isn’t it a good thing? Not necessarily. The fact that de-industrialization is mainly caused by the comparative dynamism of the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the service sector does not tell us anything about how well it is doing compared to its counterparts in other countries.

THING 9 1 K. Coutts, A. Glyn and B. Rowthorn, ‘Structural change under New Labour’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2007, vol. 31, no. 5. 2 The term is borrowed from the 2008 report by the British government’s Department for BERR (Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), Globalisation and the Changing UK Economy (2008). 3 B. Alford, ‘De-industrialisation’, ReFRESH, Autumn 1997, p. 6, table 1. 4 B. Rowthorn and K. Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the balance of payments in advanced economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 28, no. 5. THING 10 1 T. Gylfason, ‘Why Europe works less and grows taller’, Challenge, 2007, January/February. THING 11 1 P. Collier and J. Gunning, ‘Why has Africa grown slowly?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1999, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 4. 2 Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, a Cameroonian engineer and writer, notes: ‘The African, anchored in his ancestral culture, is so convinced that the past can only repeat itself that he worries only superficially about the future.


pages: 385 words: 111,807

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide by Ha-Joon Chang

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, discovery of the americas, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global value chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Gunnar Myrdal, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, information asymmetry, intangible asset, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, inventory management, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, liberation theology, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Nelson Mandela, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, post-industrial society, precariat, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, working-age population, World Values Survey

During the last two decades, in some rich countries, such as Germany, Italy and France, the fall in the share of manufacturing in GDP has been quite large in current prices (by 20 per cent in Germany, 30 per cent in Italy and 40 per cent in France), but not been so large in constant prices (by less than 10 per cent in all three).11 In several rich countries, the share of manufacturing has actually risen, if calculated in constant prices: in the US and Switzerland, its share has risen by around 5 per cent in the last couple of decades;12 in Finland and Sweden, the share has actually risen by as much as 50 per cent over the last few decades.13 An important exception is the UK, in which the share of manufacturing has fallen dramatically in the last couple of decades, even in constant prices.14 This suggests that the UK’s deindustrialization has largely been the result of the absolute decline of its manufacturing industry due to loss of competitiveness, rather than the relative price effect due to differential productivity growth rates. ‘Premature’ deindustrialization in developing countries In the last three decades, many developing countries have experienced ‘premature’ deindustrialization. That is, the share of manufacturing (and industry in general) in their outputs and employments started falling at a much earlier stage of economic development than had been the case for the rich countries. Latin America’s share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 25 per cent in the mid-1960s to 27 per cent in the late 1980s but has fallen dramatically since then.

They look to India, which is supposed to have become – through its success in the export of services like software, accountancy and the reading of medical scanning images – ‘the office of the world’ to China’s ‘workshop of the world’ (a title which had originally been conferred on Britain after its Industrial Revolution). Deindustrialization doesn’t mean that we are producing fewer manufactured products While many people, including key policy-makers, have been seduced by it, the discourse of post-industrial society is highly misleading. Most rich countries have indeed become ‘post-industrial’ or ‘deindustrialized’ in terms of employment; a decreasing proportion of the labour force in these countries is working in factories, as opposed to shops and offices. In most, although not all, countries this has been accompanied by a fall in the share of manufacturing in output.

When this relative price effect is taken into account and the shares of different sectors are recalculated in constant prices (that is, applying the prices of the starting year to the quantities produced in subsequent years), as opposed to current prices (today’s prices), the share of manufacturing has not fallen very much in most rich countries. It has even risen in several countries, as I will show later. Some deindustrialization is due to ‘optical illusions’ The extent of deindustrialization has also been exaggerated due to the ‘optical illusions’ created by the way in which statistics are compiled. A lot of services that used to be provided in-house in manufacturing firms (e.g., catering, security guards, some design and engineering activities) are now outsourced, that is, supplied by independent companies (at home or abroad; in the latter case this is called off-shoring).


The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History by David Edgerton

active measures, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, blue-collar work, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, centre right, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, Corn Laws, corporate governance, deglobalization, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, Donald Davies, double helix, endogenous growth, Etonian, European colonialism, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, full employment, imperial preference, James Dyson, knowledge economy, labour mobility, land reform, land value tax, manufacturing employment, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Neil Kinnock, new economy, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, packet switching, Philip Mirowski, Piper Alpha, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, trade liberalization, union organizing, very high income, wages for housework, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor

See Simon Gunn, ‘Ring Road: Birmingham and the Collapse of the Motor City Ideal in 1970s Britain’, The Historical Journal (2017). CHAPTER 12: NATIONAL CAPITALISM 1. Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to Conservative Party Conference’, 10 October 1975, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777, accessed 29 August 2017. Thanks to Thomas Kelsey. 2. C. J. F. Brown and T. D. Sheriff, ‘De-industrialisation: A Background Paper’, in F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1979), pp. 239–40. 3. Ibid., p. 241. 4. For examples, see Michael Barratt-Brown, ‘The Controllers II’, Universities and Left Review 6 (spring 1959), available at http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/ulr/06_38.pdf, accessed 5 February 2018; Sam Aaronovitch, The Ruling Class (London, 1961). 5. Raphael Samuel, ‘The Boss as Hero’, Universities and Left Review 7 (autumn 1959), p. 28. 6.

Brooke, Peter, ‘India, Post-Imperialism and the Origins of Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” Speech’, Historical Journal 50 (2007), pp. 669–87. Brooks, Richard and Solomon Hughes, ‘Public Servants, Public Paydays’ (Revolving Doors Special), Private Eye 1426 (15 September 2016), pp. 19–24. Brown, Callum, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000 (London, 2001). Brown C. J. F. and T. D. Sheriff, ‘De-industrialisation: A Background Paper’, in F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1979), pp. 239–40. Brown, Judith M. and William Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 4: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999). Burgess, Keith, The Challenge of Labour (London, 1980). Burn, Duncan (ed.), The Structure of British Industry, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1958). Burnett, D. Graham, The Sounding of the Whale: Science and Cetaceans in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, Illinois, 2012).

Huw Beynon and Hilary Wainwright, The Workers’ Report on Vickers: The Vickers Shop Stewards Combine Committee Report on Work, Wages, Rationalisation, Closure and Rank-and-File Organisation in a Multinational Company (London, 1979), p. 140. 4. For a vigorous argument to this effect see John Medhurst, That Option No Longer Exists: Britain, 1974–76 (Winchester, 2014). 5. See ‘A Blueprint for Survival’, The Ecologist 2 (January 1972), and Edward Goldsmith, ‘De-industrialising Society’, The Ecologist 7 (May 1977). 6. The Economist, 2 June 1979. 7. M. Artis, D. Cobham and M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Social Democracy in Hard Times: The Economic Record of the Labour Government 1974–1979’, Twentieth Century British History 3 (1992), pp. 32–58. 8. For reflections see Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The 1970s: Syndicalism without Syndicalists’, New Society (5 April 1979), and Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in the History of Labour (London, 1984). 9.


pages: 370 words: 111,129

Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India by Shashi Tharoor

affirmative action, barriers to entry, Boris Johnson, British Empire, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, corporate raider, deindustrialization, European colonialism, global village, informal economy, joint-stock company, land tenure, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, night-watchman state, Parkinson's law, trade route

As we know, some apologists for British rule argue that the condemnation of Britain for its destruction of Indian industry and economic growth is unjustified. Britain, they claim, did not deindustrialize India; India’s share of world GDP merely went down because India ‘missed the bus’ for industrialization, failing to catch up on the technological innovations that transformed the West. India had a significant world share of GDP when the world was highly agrarian. As the world changed, they argue, other countries overtook India because of scientific and industrial progress that India was unable to make. That is a highly disputable proposition. As I have demonstrated, deindustrialization was a deliberate British policy, not an accident. British industry flourished and Indian industry did not because of systematic destruction abetted by tariffs and regulatory measures that stacked the decks in favour of British industry conquering the Indian market, rather than the other way around.

‘The British empire in India was the creation of merchants’: Ferdinand Mount, The Tears of the Rajas: Mutiny, Money and Marriage in India 1805–1905, London: Simon & Schuster, 2015, p. 773. Mr. Montgomery Martin, after examining: Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901. Indian shipbuilding…offers a more complex but equally instructive story: This section relies heavily on Indrajit Ray, 1995, ‘Shipbuilding in Bengal under Colonial Rule: A Case of “De-Industrialisation”, The Journal of Transport History, 16 (1), pp. 776–77. India’s once-thriving shipbuilding industry collapsed: Ibid The total amount of cash in circulation in the Indian economy fell: Wilson, India Conquered, p. 433. Even Miss Prism…could not fail to take note: Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, Act II, London: Leonard Smithers and Company, 1899. English troopers in battle would often dismount and swap their own swords: Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men, London: Penguin, 1974, p. 39.

Prasad, Amba, Indian Railways: A Study in Public Utility Administration, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, The Struggle for Pakistan, University of Karachi, 1969. Rai, Lala Lajpat, Unhappy India, Calcutta: Banna Publishing Company, 1928. Rangarajan, Mahesh, India’s Wildlife History, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001. Ray, Indrajit, ‘Shipbuilding in Bengal under Colonial Rule: A Case of ‘De-Industrialisation’, The Journal of Transport History, 16 (1), 1995. Raychaudhuri, Tapan, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in 19th Century Bengal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Rees, J. D., The Real India, London: Methuen, 1908. Scott, Paul, The Jewel in the Crown, London: Heinemann, 1966. ———, The Day of the Scorpion, London: Heinemann, 1968. ———, The Towers of Silence, London: Heinemann, 1971. ———, A Division of the Spoils, London: Heinemann, 1975.


pages: 868 words: 147,152

How Asia Works by Joe Studwell

affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, crony capitalism, cross-subsidies, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, failed state, financial deregulation, financial repression, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, land reform, land tenure, large denomination, liberal capitalism, market fragmentation, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, passive investing, purchasing power parity, rent control, rent-seeking, Right to Buy, Ronald Coase, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, working-age population

Paul Bairoch, Mythes et paradoxes de l’histoire économique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2005). 2. The academic debate over the relative productivity performance of manufacturing versus services revolves around the reasons for the ‘de-industrialisation’ of rich countries. However, many of the theoretical considerations are the same as for developing states. See, for instance, Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28: 5, 2004, p. 767 and Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). 3. Share of services trade in total international trade from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Separately, it is notable in east Asia that even the offshore port financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore had considerable manufacturing sectors in the early stages of their economic take-off, and Singapore still does today.

Rodrik, ‘Industrial Organization and Product Quality: Evidence from South Korean and Taiwanese Exports’, mimeo, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June 1988). James Rorty, ‘The Dossier of Wolf Ladejinsky: The Fair Rewards of Distinguished Civil Service’, Commentary, April 1955. Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 28, no. 5 (2004). Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). Rosanne Rutten (ed.), Brokering a Revolution: Cadres in a Philippine Insurgency (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008). Jeffrey Sachs and Susan Collins (eds.), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3: Country Studies – Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1989).


Powers and Prospects by Noam Chomsky

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, colonial rule, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deskilling, Fall of the Berlin Wall, invisible hand, Jacques de Vaucanson, John von Neumann, liberation theology, Monroe Doctrine, old-boy network, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, theory of mind, Tobin tax, Turing test

They also may have had the highest real wages in the world at the time and the best conditions for working class organisation, so the most detailed recent scholarship indicates, contrary to long-standing beliefs. ‘Britain itself would have been deindustrialized by the cheapness of Indian calicoes if protectionist policies had not been adopted’, the same work concludes.7 Contemporaries saw matters much in that light. A century after Defoe, liberal historian Horace Wilson observed ruefully that without protection, ‘the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers’. It was India, not Britain, that was deindustrialised, including steel, ship-building, and other manufactures. Britain showed the same ‘constant face’ when Egypt tried to undertake an industrial revolution under Mohammed Ali; with rich agricultural resources and domestic cotton, Egyptian development might have succeeded, as France and Britain feared, had it not been for British financial and military power, which intervened to bar unwanted competition and interference with British imperial strategy.

One reason for the enormous difference since is that the rulers were able to avoid the market discipline rammed down the throats of their dependencies. ‘There is no doubt’, Bairoch concludes in his detailed refutation of the leading ‘myth of economic science’, ‘that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialisation’, in fact, its ‘de-industrialisation’, a story that continues to the present under various guises. Bairoch in fact considerably understates the role of state intervention for the wealthy, because he limits himself in conventional manner to a narrow category of market interferences: protection. But that is only a small part of the story. To mention only one omission, the early industrial revolution in England and the US was fuelled by cotton, which was cheap and accessible thanks to the expulsion or extermination of the native population of the southeast United States and the import of slaves, departures from market orthodoxy that do not enter the odes to its wonders.


pages: 304 words: 90,084

Net Zero: How We Stop Causing Climate Change by Dieter Helm

3D printing, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, blockchain, Boris Johnson, carbon footprint, clean water, congestion charging, coronavirus, COVID-19, Covid-19, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, demand response, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, fixed income, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Haber-Bosch Process, hydrogen economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, market design, means of production, North Sea oil, off grid, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, planetary scale, price mechanism, quantitative easing, remote working, reshoring, Ronald Reagan, smart meter, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, statistical model, Thomas Malthus

However, none of this counted from the perspective of the EU’s 2020–20–20 climate package. Or rather it did count on the positive side, without any offset for the imported carbon. Closing down energy-intensive production scored as an unambiguous plus, and carbon-intensive imports simply did not count at all. The lesson others learned from all this is that a unilateral policy can actually speed up deindustrialisation. That is not what the US has had in mind, and China could sit back, talk the talk and encourage the Europeans to deindustrialise further, in the knowledge that it would be Chinese companies that would go on benefiting. The UK’s Climate Change Act The UK went further than any other country by putting its unilateralism on a solid legal foundation with the Climate Change Act in 2008. The Act passed through parliament almost unanimously. Its centre piece was an 80 per cent carbon reduction target by 2050, which is legally binding.

What really bothers me, and makes me pick up the pen again to write on climate change, is the widely repeated claim made by the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) in the foreword to its recent report ‘Net Zero: The UK’s Contribution to Stopping Global Warming’: By reducing emissions produced in the UK to zero, we also end our contribution to rising global temperatures.[2] This is misleading in that the net zero target the CCC advocates is for territorial emissions in the UK, and unless every other country we trade with gets to net zero by 2050 too, or we stop importing carbon-intensive goods, it is simply not true. The net zero carbon production target takes no account of the carbon we import, and which pervades much of our spending. For a deindustrialised economy with only 20 per cent manufacturing, this is particularly pertinent. To give a simple example, if British Steel had closed down (something which was under active consideration at the time the CCC published its report), UK territorial emissions would have gone down, but the subsequent increased imports of steel from, say, China would mean global warming would go up, and by more than it would have had that steel manufacturing remained here.

By 2018 it was $13.6 trillion. That is 38 times bigger. To get your head around these astonishing numbers, the UK’s GDP in 1990 was just over $1 trillion, and now it is just over $2.6 trillion. With all this GDP growth comes pollution, and in China’s case pollution on a planetary scale. Every other country in the world pales into insignificance in terms of added environmental pollution since 1990. The Europeans deindustrialised, and the US went sideways. From around 2005, the US had natural gas to substitute for coal, and hence it could both grow and limit its carbon emissions. On a carbon consumption basis, the net effect was relatively benign compared with what was going on elsewhere. China was off the scale in emissions. Figure 6 The growth of China’s GDP in trillions of US$ between 1960 and 2018[20] Table 1 CO2 emissions by country, 2015.[21] Data is for CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in tonnes in 2015.


pages: 369 words: 94,588

The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism by David Harvey

accounting loophole / creative accounting, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, call centre, capital controls, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, failed state, financial innovation, Frank Gehry, full employment, global reserve currency, Google Earth, Guggenheim Bilbao, Gunnar Myrdal, illegal immigration, indoor plumbing, interest rate swap, invention of the steam engine, Jane Jacobs, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Just-in-time delivery, land reform, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, means of production, megacity, microcredit, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, Pearl River Delta, place-making, Ponzi scheme, precariat, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, statistical arbitrage, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, urban renewal, urban sprawl, white flight, women in the workforce

Finance capital, both internally within the US and internationally, had to move to the fore to allocate surplus capital to wherever the profit rate was highest. In many industries that turned out not to be in the United States, and especially not in the traditional centres of production in the north-east and the mid-west, but in the west and the south. The result was the wrenching and relentless reorganisation and relocation of production throughout the world. Deindustrialisation of older production centres occurred everywhere from Pittsburgh’s, Sheffield’s and Essen’s steel industry to Mumbai’s textile industry. This was paralleled by an astonishing spurt in the industrialisation of entirely new spaces in the global economy, particularly those with specific resource or organisational advantages – Taiwan, South Korea, Bangladesh and the special production zones such as Mexico’s maquiladoras (tax-free assembly plants) or the export platforms created in China’s Pearl River delta.

The space and time configurations of social life are periodically revolutionised (witness what happened with the coming of the railroads in the nineteenth century and the current impact of the worldwide web). Movement becomes ever faster and space relations ever closer. But this trend is neither smooth nor irreversible. Protectionism can return, barriers can be refortified, civil wars can disrupt flows. Furthermore, revolutions in spatial and temporal relations produce stresses and crises (witness the difficult adjustments forced on many cities by widespread deindustrialisation in the heartlands of capitalist production in the 1980s as production moved to east Asia). The geography this produces will be examined later. Why do capitalists reinvest in expansion rather than consume away their profits in pleasures? This is where ‘the coercive laws of competition’ play a decisive role. If I, as a capitalist, do not reinvest in expansion and a rival does, then after a while I am likely to be driven out of business.

New landscapes and new geographies have been created within which capital circulates in ways that are frequently haunted by deep contradictions. If the vast amount of fixed capital embedded in the land (look down upon the land next time you fly just to get a sense of how vast this is) is to be realised, then it must be used and paid for by capitalist producers in the here and now. Abandoning all those assets, as happened to many older industrial cities in the huge wave of deindustrialisation of the 1980s, incurs losses (social as well as infrastructural) and can itself be a source of crises that affect not only those that hold the debt on many of these infrastructural investments but also the economy at large. It is here that Marx’s thesis that capitalism inevitably encounters barriers within its own nature (in this case, within the spaces, places and environments it has produced) becomes most visible. ——— The relations between capital and labour as well as those between capital and nature are mediated by the choice of technologies and organisational forms.


pages: 464 words: 116,945

Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism by David Harvey

accounting loophole / creative accounting, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, California gold rush, call centre, central bank independence, clean water, cloud computing, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, drone strike, end world poverty, falling living standards, fiat currency, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Food sovereignty, Frank Gehry, future of work, global reserve currency, Guggenheim Bilbao, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, informal economy, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jane Jacobs, Jarndyce and Jarndyce, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Just-in-time delivery, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, microcredit, new economy, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, peak oil, phenotype, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, short selling, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, wages for housework, Wall-E, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population

The long and painful history of deindustrialisation has left whole cities, like Detroit, bereft of activity and therefore sinks of lost value even as other cities, like Shenzhen or Dhaka, become hubs of activity that demand massive investments in fixed capital coupled with rental extractions and property market booms if they are to succeed. The history of capital is rife with stories of localised booms and crashes in which the contradiction between fixed and circulating capital, between fixity and motion, is strongly implicated. This is the world where capital as a force of creative destruction becomes most visible in the physical landscape we inhabit. The balance between creativity and destruction is often hard to discern, but the costs imposed on whole populations through deindustrialisation, gyrations in property values and land rents, disinvestment and speculative building all emanate from the underlying and perpetual tension between fixity and motion which periodically and in specific geographical locations heightens to the point of an absolute contradiction and, hence, produces a serious crisis.

While the bundling of new technologies and organisational forms has always played an important role in facilitating an exit from crises, it has never played a determinate one. The hopeful focus these days is on a ‘knowledge-based’ capitalism (with biomedical and genetic engineering and artificial intelligence at the forefront). But innovation is always a double-edged sword. The 1980s, after all, gave us deindustrialisation through automation such that the likes of General Motors (which employed well-paid unionised labour in the 1960s) have now been supplanted by the likes of Walmart (with its vast non-unionised low-wage labour force) as the largest private employers in the United States. If the current burst of innovation points in any direction at all, it is towards decreasing employment opportunities for labour and the increasing significance of rents extracted from intellectual property rights for capital.

It is always unsatisfied … The economy is perpetually constructing itself.6 New technological configurations displace the old and in so doing initiate phases of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter famously dubbed ‘gales of creative destruction’.7 Whole ways of life and modes of being and thinking have to drastically alter to embrace the new at the expense of the old. The recent history of deindustrialisation and its association with dramatic technological reconfigurations is an obvious case in point. Technological change is neither costless nor painless and the cost and the pain are not evenly shared. The question always to be asked is: who gains from the creation and who bears the brunt of the destruction. So what role do the distinctive needs and requirements of capital play in this process?


pages: 322 words: 84,580

The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All by Martin Sandbu

"Robert Solow", Airbnb, autonomous vehicles, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, collective bargaining, debt deflation, deindustrialization, deskilling, Diane Coyle, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial intermediation, full employment, future of work, gig economy, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, intangible asset, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, liquidity trap, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Martin Wolf, meta analysis, meta-analysis, mini-job, mortgage debt, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, pattern recognition, pink-collar, precariat, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, Richard Florida, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, social intelligence, TaskRabbit, total factor productivity, universal basic income, very high income, winner-take-all economy, working poor

Low economic growth and damaged public finances after the crisis have led governments to cut spending in ways that have often caused the most pain to those who were already the worst off. This has added people who may have been faring reasonably well until 2008 to the ranks of those bearing the cost of decades of deindustrialisation. In a sentence: incontinent policy before the crisis brought a financial collapse, and timid policy afterwards amplified the suffering it caused. * * * Strike three: the task ahead. In the baseball metaphor, the first strike for many Western governments was their poor handling of deindustrialisation; and for most, the second strike was the run-up to and the aftermath of the global financial crisis. A third economic challenge is now under way, as technology has begun to deliver another shock like the one that afflicted manufacturing.

Poorer areas grew faster than richer ones, so the countryside and small-town periphery were catching up with the big central cities economically. But around 1980 this changed on both sides of the Atlantic. Since then, the richer cities have pulled away from a small-town and rural hinterland where incomes have increasingly fallen behind and economic opportunities have become more limited (I discuss this at greater length in chapter 11). Deindustrialisation is again a big part of the reason for this. The big shift from manufacturing to services favours some kinds of places over others.11 The industrial economy is shaped by the scale economies of the factory, which once allowed high-value economic activity to centre on midsize towns. Industrial production that keeps its technological edge still can. But knowledge-based services thrive in the concentration of people and activities found in the big cities, whose bubbling human diversity and greater potential for serendipitous interaction make them the richest cauldrons of ideas.

In particular, the European social market economies did a better job of bringing along those at the bottom than the United States (Figure 4.2)—but both individual and regional inequality grew significantly in Europe as well.15 We should not be surprised, therefore, by growing polarisation and alienation in Western societies, nor at their political consequences. * * * Strike two: A great recession made at home. If Western governments’ policy mistakes had been confined to mismanaging deindustrialisation, populist forces may have remained quiescent after their initial, largely unsuccessful emergence in the 1980s. But the global financial crisis in 2008 and the Great Recession that followed it added to the ranks of the economically disaffected and stoked their support. In many countries, a critical mass of citizens now turned their backs on mainstream Western politics in support of the insurgent antisystem parties—the same that had first emerged in the 1980s in some places, and similar but new ones in others.


pages: 209 words: 89,619

The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class by Guy Standing

8-hour work day, banking crisis, barriers to entry, basic income, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, call centre, Cass Sunstein, centre right, collective bargaining, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, deskilling, fear of failure, full employment, hiring and firing, Honoré de Balzac, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, libertarian paternalism, low skilled workers, lump of labour, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, mini-job, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, nudge unit, old age dependency ratio, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, pensions crisis, placebo effect, post-industrial society, precariat, presumed consent, quantitative easing, remote working, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, science of happiness, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, Tobin tax, transaction costs, universal basic income, unpaid internship, winner-take-all economy, working poor, working-age population, young professional

(Maltby) 138 Canada 79, 114 capital funds 176–7 Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman) 156 care work 61, 86, 125–6 careers, leisure 129 cash transfers 177 see also conditional cash transfers (CCTs) CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 Cerasa, Claudio 149 Channel 4, call centre programme (UK) 16 charities 53 children, care for 125 China 28 and contractualisation 37 criminalisation 88 deliberative democracy 181 education 73 immigrants to Italy 4–5 invasion of privacy 135 migrants 96, 106–9, 109–10 old agers 83 191 192 INDEX China 28 (Continued) Shenzhen 133, 137 and time 115 wages 43 youth 76 see also Chindia China Plus One 28 Chindia 26, 27–9, 83 see also China Chrysler Group LLC 43 circulants 90, 92 Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission (US) 152–3 civil rights 14, 94 class, social 6–8, 66–7 Coase, Ronald 29 Cohen, Daniel 57, 66, 69 collaborative bargaining 168 collective attention deficit syndrome 127 commodification of companies 29–31 of education 67–72 and globalisation 26 labour 161–2 of management 40 of politics 148–53 re- 41–2 conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 140 see also cash transfers conditionality 140, 175 and basic income 172–3 and workfare 143–5, 166–7 connectivity, and youth 127 contract status 35, 36, 37, 44, 51, 61 contractors, independent/ dependent 15–16 contractualisation 37 counselling for stress 126 Crawford, Matthew 70 credit 44 crime 5, 129–30 criminalisation 14, 145, 146 crystallised intelligence 85 cultural rights 14 de Tocqueville, Alexis 145 de-industrialisation 5, 37–8 debt, and youth 73–4 Delfanti, Alessandro 78 deliberative democracy 180–1, 182 denizens 14, 93–102, 105, 113, 117, 157–8 Denmark 150 dependent/independent contractors 15–16 deskilling 17, 33, 40, 124 developing countries 12, 27, 60, 65, 105–9 disabled people 86–7, 89, 170 discrimination age 84–5 disability 81 gender 60, 123 genetic profiling 136–7 and migrants 99, 101–2 disengagement, political 24 distance working 38, 53 dole (UK) 45 Duncan Smith, Iain 143 Durkeim, Emile 20 economic security 157, 171, 173–6 The Economist 17–18, 33, 52, 137 economy, shadow 56–7 education 10, 67–73, 135–6, 159–60 Ehrenreich, Barbara 21, 170–1 elites 7, 22, 24, 40, 50 criminality 152 and democracy 181 ethics 165 Italian 148 and the Tea Party (US) 151 empathy 22–3, 137 employment agencies 33 employment security 10b, 11, 17, 36, 51, 117 Endarkenment 70 Enlightenment 24, 70 enterprise benefits 11, 12 environmental issues 167 environmental refugees 93 Esping-Andersen, G. 41 ethics 23–4, 121–2, 165 ethnic minorities 86 EuroMayDay 1, 2, 3, 167 European Union (EU) 2, 39, 146, 147 and migrants 97, 103, 105 and pensions 80 see also individual countries export processing zones 105–6 Facebook 127, 134, 135 failed occupationality 21 INDEX family 27, 44, 60, 65, 126 fear, used for control 32 fictitious decommodification 41 financial capital 171, 176–7 financial sector jobs 39–40 financial shock 2008-9 see Great Recession Financial Times 44, 55, 121, 155 firing workers 31–2 Fishkin, James 180 Fletcher, Bill 170–1 flexibility 18 labour 23–4, 31–6, 53, 60, 61, 65 labour market 6, 120–1, 170 Ford Motor Company 42, 43 Foucault, Michel 88, 133 Foxconn 28–9, 43, 105, 137 see also Shenzhen France criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 education 69 leisure 129 migrants 95, 97, 101–2, 114 neo-fascism 149 and old agers 85 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 Telecom 11 youth 65–6 fraternity 12, 22, 155 freedom 155, 167–70, 172 freelance see temporary employment freeter unions 9 Friedman, Milton 39, 156 functional flexibility 36–8, 52 furloughs 36, 50 gays 63–4 General Motors (GM) 42, 43, 54 genetic profiling 136 Germany 9 de-industrialisation 38 disengagement with jobs 24 migrants 91, 95, 100–1, 114 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 temporary employment 15, 35 wages 40 and women 62 youth and apprenticeships 72–3 193 Glen Beck’s Common Sense (Beck) 151 Global Transformation 26, 27–31, 91, 115 globalisation 5–7, 27–31, 116, 148 and commodification 26 and criminalisation 87–8 and temporary employment 34 Google Street View 134 Gorz, Andre 7 grants, leisure 180–2 Great Recession 4, 49–51, 63, 176 and education 71 and migrants 102 and old agers 82 and pensions 80 and youth 77–8 Greece 52, 56, 117, 181 grinners/groaners 59, 83–4 Habermas, Jürgen 179 Haidt, J. 23 Hamburg (Germany) 3 happiness 140–1, 162 Hardt, M. 130 Hayek, Friedrich 39 health 51, 70, 120, 126 Hitachi 84 Hobsbawm, Eric 3 hormones 136 hot desking 53 Howker, Ed 65 Human Rights Watch 106 Hungary 149 Hurst, Erik 128 Hyatt Hotels 32 IBM 38, 137 identity 9 digital 134–5 work-based 12, 15–16, 23, 158–9, 163 Ignatieff, Michael 88 illegal migrants 96–8 In Praise of Idleness (Russell) 141, 161 income security 10b, 30, 40, 44 independent/dependent contractors 15–16 India 50, 83, 112, 140 see also Chindia individuality 3, 19, 122 informal status 6–7, 57, 60, 96, 119 inshored/offshored labour 30, 36, 37 194 INDEX International Herald Tribune 21 internet 18, 127, 139, 180, 181 surveillance 134–5, 138 interns 16, 36, 75–6 invasion of privacy 133–5, 167 Ireland 52–3, 77 isolation of workers 38 Italy education 69 neo-fascism 148–9 pensions 79 Prato 4–5 and the public sector 52, 53 shadow economy 56 and temporary employment 34 youth 64 Japan 2, 30 and Chinese migrants 110 commodification of companies 30 and migrants 102, 103 multiple job holding 119–20 neo-fascism 152 pensions 80 salariat 17 subsidies 84 and temporary employment 15, 32–3, 34–5, 41 and youth 66, 74, 76, 77 job security 10b, 11, 36–8 Kellaway, Lucy 83–4 Keynes, John Maynard 161 Kierkegaard, Søren 155 Klein, Naomi 148 knowledge 32, 117, 124–5, 171 labour 13, 115, 161–2 labour brokers 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 labour flexibility 23–4, 31–45 labour intensification 119–20 labour market flexibility 6 labour security 10–11, 10b, 31 Laos 112 lay-offs see furloughs Lee Changshik 21 legal knowledge 124–5 legal processing 50 Legal Services Act of 2007 (UK) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 13, 128–30 see also play lesbians 63–4 Liberal Republic, The 181 Lloyds Banking Group 50–1 localism 181–2 long-term migrants 100–2 loyalty 53, 58, 74–5 McDonald’s 33 McNealy, Scott 69 Malik, Shiv 65 Maltby, Lewis 138 Manafort, Paul 152 management, commodification of 40 Mandelson, Peter, Baron 68 Maroni, Roberto 97 marriage 64–5, 92 Martin, Paul 141 Marx, Karl 161 masculinity, role models for youth 63–5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 68–9 Mayhew, Les 81 Mead, Lawrence 143 mergers, triangular 30 Mexico 91 Middle East 109 migrants 2, 13–14, 25, 90–3, 145–6 and basic income 172 and conditionality 144 denizens 93–102, 157–8 government organised 109–13 internal 105–9 and queuing systems 103–5 and recession 102–3 Mill, John Stuart 160 Morris, William 160, 161 Morrison, Catriona 127 multinational corporations 28, 92 multitasking 19, 126–7 National Broadband Plan 134 near-sourcing/shoring 36 Negri, A. 130 neo-fascism 25, 147–53, 159, 175, 183 Netherlands 39, 79, 114, 149–50 New Thought Movement 21 New York Times 69, 119 News from Nowhere (Morris) 161 Niemöller, Martin 182 INDEX non-refoulement 93 Nudge (Sunstein/Thaler) 138–9 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 numerical flexibility 31–6 Obama, Barack 73, 138–9, 147, 148 Observer, The 20 occupations associations of 169–70 dismantling of 38–40 freedom in 162–4 obsolescence in 124 offshored/inshored labour 30, 36, 37 old agers 59, 79– 86, 89 old-age dependency ratio 80–1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 27 origins of the precariat 1–5 outsourcing 29, 30, 33, 36, 37, 49 Paine, Thomas 173 panopticon society 132–40, 142–3 Parent Motivators (UK) 139–40 part-time employment 15, 35–6, 51, 61, 82 Pasona 33 paternalism 17, 29, 137, 153, 178, 182 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 pensions 42, 51, 52, 76–7, 79–81, 84–6 PepsiCo 137 personal deportment skills 123 Philippines 109 Phoenix, University of 71 Pigou, Arthur 117, 125 play 13, 115, 117, 128, 141 pleasure 141 Polanyi, K. 163, 169 political engagement/disengagement 24, 147 Portugal 52, 56 positive thinking 21, 86 Prato (Italy) 4–5 precariat (definition) 6, 7–13 precariato 9 precariatisation 16–18 precarity traps 48–9, 73–5, 114, 129, 144, 178 pride 22 prisoners 112, 146 privacy, invasion of 133–5, 167 private benefits 11 productivity, and old age 85 proficians 7–8, 15, 164 proletariat 7 protectionism 27, 54 public sector 51–4 qualifications 95 queuing systems 103–5 racism 97–8, 101, 114, 149 Randstad 49 re-commodification 41–2 recession see Great Recession refugees 92, 93, 96 regulation 23, 26, 39–40, 84, 171 Reimagining Socialism (Ehrenreich/ Fletcher) 170–1 remote working 38, 53 rentier economies 27, 176 representation security 10b, 31 retirement 42, 80–3 rights 14, 94, 145, 163, 164–5, 169 see also denizens risk management 178 Robin Hood gang 3 role models for youth 63–5 Roma 97, 149 Rossington, John 100 Rothman, David 88 Russell, Bertrand 141, 161 Russell, Lucie 64 Russia 88, 115 salariat 7, 8, 14, 17, 32 Santelli, Rick 150 Sarkozy, Nicolas 69, 97, 149 Sarrazin, Thilo 101 Schachar, Ayelet 177 Schneider, Friedrich 56 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 71 seasonal migrants 98–100 security, economic 157, 171, 173–6 self-employment 15–16, 66, 82 self-esteem 21 self-exploitation 20, 122–3 self-production 11 self-regulation 23, 39 self-service 125 services 37–8, 63 195 196 INDEX Sex, Drugs and Chocolate: The Science of Pleasure (Martin) 141 sex services 63 sexism, reverse 123 shadow economy 56–7, 91 Shenzhen (China) 133, 137 see also Foxconn Shop Class as Soulcraft (Crawford) 70 short-time compensation schemes 55–6 side-jobs 119–20 skill reproduction security 10b skills 157, 176 development of 30, 31, 40 personal deportment 123 tertiary 121–4 Skirbekk, Vegard 85 Smarsh 138 Smile or Die (Ehrenreich) 21 Smith, Adam 71 snowball theory 78 social class 6–8, 66–7 social factory 38, 118, 132 social income 11–12, 40–5, 51, 66 social insurance 22, 104 social memory 12, 23, 129 social mobility 23, 57–8, 175 social networking sites 137 see also Facebook social rights 14 social worth 21 sousveillance 134, 135 South Africa, and migrants 91, 98 South Korea 15, 55, 61, 75 space, public 171, 179–80 Spain BBVA 50 migrants 94 and migrants 102 pensions 79 and the public sector 53 shadow economy 55–6 temporary employment 35 Speenhamland system 55, 143 staffing agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 state benefits 11, 12 status 8, 21, 32–3, 94 status discord 10 status frustration 10, 21, 63, 67, 77, 78, 79, 89, 114, 123, 160 stress 19, 126, 141, 141–3 subsidies 44, 54–6, 83–6, 176 suicide, work-related 11, 29, 58, 105 Summers, Larry 148 Sun Microsystems 69 Sunstein, Cass 138–9 surveillance 132–6, 153, 167 see also sousveillance Suzuki, Kensuke 152 Sweden 68, 110–11, 135, 149 symbols 3 Taking of Rome, The (Cerasa) 149 taxes 26 and citizenship 177 France 85 and subsidies 54–5 Tobin 177 United States (US) 180–1 Tea Party movement 150–1 technology and the brain 18 internet 180, 181 surveillance 132–6 teleworking 38 temporary agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 temporary employment 14–15, 49 associations for 170 Japan 9 and numerical flexibility 32–6 and old agers 82 and the public sector 51 and youth 65 tertiarisation 37–8 tertiary skill 121–4 tertiary time 116, 119 tertiary workplace 116 Tesco Law (UK) 40 Thailand, migrants 106 Thaler, Richard 138–9 therapy state 141–3, 153 Thompson, E.P. 115 time 115–16, 163, 171, 178 labour intensification 119–20 tertiary 116, 119 use of 38 work-for-labour 120–1 titles of jobs 17–18 Tobin taxes 177 Tomkins, Richard 70 towns, company 137 INDEX toy-factory incident 108–9 trade unions 1, 2, 5, 10b, 26, 31, 168 and migration 91 public sector 51 and youth 77–8 see also yellow unions training 121–4 triangular mergers 30 triangulation 34 Trumka, Richard 78 trust relationships 8–9, 22 Twitter 127 Ukraine 152 undocumented migrants 96–8 unemployment 145 benefits 45–8, 99, 104 insurance for 175 voluntary 122 youth after recession 77 uniforms, to distinguish employment status 32–3 unions freeter 9 yellow 33 see also trade United Kingdom (UK) 102–3 benefit system 173 Channel 4 call centre programme 16 company loyalty 74–5 conditionality 143–5, 166–7 criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 disabled people 170 and education 67, 70, 71 financial shock (2008-9) 49–51, 71 labour intensification 119 Legal Services Act (2007) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 129 migrants 91, 95, 99, 103–5, 114, 146 neo-fascism 150 paternalism 139–40 pensions 43, 80 and the public sector 53 public spaces 179 and regulation of occupational bodies 39 shadow economy 56 and social mobility 56–8 and subsidies 55 197 temporary employment 15, 34, 35 as a therapy state 142 women 61–2, 162 workplace discipline 138 youth 64, 76 United States (US) care for children 125 criminalisation 88 education 69, 70–1, 73, 135–6 ethnic minorities 86 financial shock (2008-9) 49–50 migrants 90–1, 93, 94, 97, 103, 114 neo-fascism 150–1, 152–3 old agers 82–3, 85 pensions 42, 52, 80 public sector 52 regulation of occupational bodies 39 social mobility in 57–8 subsidies 55, 56 taxes 180–1 temporary employment 34, 35 volunteer work 163 wages and benefits 42 women 62, 63 youth 75, 77 universalism 155, 157, 162, 180 University of the People 69 University of Phoenix 71 unpaid furloughs 36 unpaid leave 50 uptitling 17–18 utilitarianism 88, 132, 141, 154 value of support 11 Vietnam 28, 111–12 voluntary unemployment 122 volunteer work 86, 163–4 voting 146, 147, 181 Wacquant, L. 132 wages 8, 11 and benefits 41–2 family 60 flexibility 40–5, 66 individualised 60 and migrants 103 and temporary workers 32, 33 Vietnam 28 see also basic income Waiting for Superman (documentary) 69 Wall Street Journal 35, 163 198 INDEX Walmart 33, 107 Wandering Tribe 73 Weber, Max 7 welfare claimants 245 welfare systems 44 Wen Jiabao 105 Whitehead, Alfred North 160 Williams, Rob 62 wiretapping 135 women 60–5 and care work 125–6 CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 labour commodification 161 and migration 92 multiple jobholding 119–20 reverse sexism 123 work 115, 117, 160–1 and identity 158–9 and labour 13 right to 145, 163, 164–5 security 10b work-for-labour 120–1, 178 work-for-reproduction 124–7 work–life balance 118 worker cooperatives 168–70 workfare 143–5, 166–7 working class 7, 8 workplace 116, 122, 130, 131 discipline 136–8 tertiary 116 Yanukovich, Victor 152 yellow unions 33 youth 59, 65–7, 89, 156 commodification of education 67–72 connectivity 127 and criminality 129–30 generational tension 76–7 and old agers 85 precarity traps 73–5 prospects for the future 78–9 and role models 63–5 streaming education 72–3 zero-hour contracts 36

They disliked the state, which they equated with centralised government, with its planning and regulatory apparatus. They saw the world as an increasingly open place, where investment, employment and income would flow to where conditions were most welcoming. They argued that unless European countries, in particular, rolled back the securities that had been built up since the Second World War for the industrial working class and the bureaucratic public sector, and unless the trades unions were ‘tamed’, de-industrialisation (a new concept at the time) would accelerate, unemployment would rise, economic growth would slow down, investment would flow out and poverty would escalate. It was a sobering assessment. They wanted drastic measures, and in politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan they had the sort of leaders willing to go along with their analysis. The tragedy was that, while their diagnosis made partial sense, their prognosis was callous.

As China is the world’s most dynamic and largest labour market, these developments mark a move to a multi-layered global labour force in which privileged salariats will work alongside a growing precariat. Individual contracts, casualisation and other forms of external flexibility come together in another clumsy term, ‘tertiarisation’. This is more than is conveyed by ‘the tertiary sector’, which implies a shift to services. For decades the world’s production and employment have been shifting to services. The popular term ‘de-industrialisation’ is misleading, since it implies an erosion 38 THE PRECARIAT and loss of capacity, whereas much of the change has been consistent with technological advances and the changing nature of production. Even in Germany, an export powerhouse, the share of manufacturing in output and employment has shrunk to under 20 per cent. In France, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is much lower.


Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All by Michael Shellenberger

Albert Einstein, Asperger Syndrome, Bernie Sanders, Bob Geldof, carbon footprint, Cesare Marchetti: Marchetti’s constant, clean water, Corn Laws, coronavirus, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, cuban missile crisis, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, energy transition, failed state, Gary Taubes, global value chain, Google Earth, hydraulic fracturing, index fund, Indoor air pollution, indoor plumbing, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet Archive, land tenure, Live Aid, LNG terminal, long peace, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, off grid, oil shale / tar sands, Potemkin village, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, renewable energy transition, Steven Pinker, supervolcano, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, union organizing, WikiLeaks, Y2K

“Ethiopia got good results because of the now-deceased prime minister [Meles Zenawi] who went to China to get garment and shoe factories.”83 I asked Dinh if he shared Rodrik’s view that poor nations might need to find a path to development other than manufacturing. “In the U.S., manufacturing employment peaked at twenty million people in 1978,” said Dinh, “and since then, it has shed its low-end industries to focus on higher, more specialized manufacturing. That’s different from Nigeria de-industrializing at 7 or 8 percent (share of manufacturing in GDP) before its manufacturing reached the maturity stage.” Dinh added, “In a lot of developing countries, the de-industrialization is due to poor policy, bad governance, or neglect, not because of some natural peak as the case of the U.S. or Europe.” Dinh dismissed the notion that China’s high productivity made the expansion of manufacturing in African nations irrelevant. “In the developing world, everyone, rich or poor, needs simple things like chairs or shoes,” he said.

The Manufacturing Ladder The real risk to forests comes not from the expansion of energy-intensive factories in poor nations, as Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion claim, but rather from the declining need for them. On one hand, Africa has made real progress during the last half century. Agricultural productivity has risen, but manufacturing was a higher percentage of the economy in the mid-1970s than it is today. “Most countries of Africa are too poor to be experiencing de-industrialisation,” writes Rodrik, “but that is precisely what seems to be taking place.”78 One exception is Ethiopia, which has attracted Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, and fast-fashion leader H&M,79 both because of its low wages compared to places like China and Indonesia, where they have risen, as well as to its investments in hydroelectric dams, the electricity grid, and roads.80 “Ethiopia has experienced GDP growth of more than 10 percent per annum over the last decade,” notes Rodrik, “due in large part to the increase in public investment, from 5 percent to 19 percent of GDP.”81 Ethiopia had to end and recover from a bloody seventeen-year civil war, which resulted in at least 1.4 million deaths, including one million from famine, before its government could invest in infrastructure.

In the seven years since we bought our home, Helen and I have not lit a fire in our fireplace once, and do not intend to do so in the future, because of the pollution it would create. Countries with high population density, like Germany, Britain, and Japan, consume less energy per person than population-diffuse places like California, thanks to reduced car usage, but nowhere near the levels of people like Suparti, much less Bernadette. As nations like Indonesia industrialize, they at first require more energy per unit of economic growth, but as they deindustrialize, like the United States, they require less. Globally, the history of human evolution and development is one of converting ever-larger amounts of energy into wealth and power in ways that allow human societies to grow more complex. 6. Energy Density Matters When you interview women who are small farmers about what it’s like to cook with wood you might assume they would complain about the toxic smoke they must breathe.


pages: 223 words: 10,010

The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality Is Essential for Recovery by Stewart Lansley

"Robert Solow", banking crisis, Basel III, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, business process, call centre, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate raider, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Everybody Ought to Be Rich, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, James Dyson, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Meriwether, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Martin Wolf, mittelstand, mobile money, Mont Pelerin Society, Myron Scholes, new economy, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Right to Buy, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, The Great Moderation, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working-age population

In that decade, Stoke-on-Trent was still the pottery capital of the world and Royal Doulton had 18 local factories. GEC was one of the world’s leading electronics companies and Raleigh’s Nottingham factory was still producing 100,000 bicycles a year. A decade later, large parts of the industrial landscape had been turned into a wasteland. Of course some decline in manufacturing was always inevitable while the process of de-industrialisation and the expansion of the service sector is in many ways a desirable hallmark of economic maturity. 94 Some industries in which Britain once had a comparative advantage such as steel, textiles and coalmining were in historic decline unable to compete with newly industrialising countries with cheaper labour. It is generally desirable for economies to adapt to changing global patterns by shifting low value production to areas which can produce the same goods more cheaply, replacing them with higher value production.

Between 1974 and 2001, manufacturing employment fell by a third across the nations which make up the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. What is significant is that the falls in the UK and the US have been much steeper. 95 In Mrs Thatcher’s first term alone, as the number of bankruptcies exploded, manufacturing output fell by a third. It is no coincidence that in both these countries finance became an increasingly dominant force as the process of de-industrialisation accelerated. Indeed the fortunes of these two sectors have been moving in opposite directions—as finance has triumphed, manufacturing has slumped. The economic policies pursued by both Mrs Thatcher and Ronald Reagan—from a high exchange rate to financial and labour market de-regulation—were highly favourable to finance. One of the effects of Reaganomics was an overvalued dollar, hardly dream conditions for exporters.

According to one cabinet member at the time, the leading ‘wet’ Sir Ian Gilmour, the Thatcherites displayed a ‘systematic belittling of manufacturing industry’s importance. They always put the interests of finance and commerce well before those of industry.’ 100 The view that manufacturing was dispensable also chimed with the views of the leading new right economists. As Milton Friedman said in 1980, Britain’s manufacturing should be allowed to fall to bits.101 When Labour came to power in 1997, they took no action to slow the pace of deindustrialisation. After its fall in 1992—one that proved the key to economic recovery —the pound strengthened again and stayed high for the duration of Gordon Brown’s Chancellorship. Even during the relative boom conditions from 1997 to 2007 a further 1.5 million manufacturing jobs were lost in the UK, as fast a rate as in the 1980s. Throughout the last twenty five years, industry has proved a largely powerless force.


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Extreme Economies: Survival, Failure, Future – Lessons From the World’s Limits by Richard Davies

agricultural Revolution, air freight, Anton Chekhov, artificial general intelligence, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, big-box store, cashless society, clean water, complexity theory, deindustrialization, eurozone crisis, failed state, financial innovation, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, James Hargreaves, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, large denomination, Livingstone, I presume, Malacca Straits, mandatory minimum, manufacturing employment, means of production, megacity, meta analysis, meta-analysis, new economy, off grid, oil shale / tar sands, pension reform, profit motive, randomized controlled trial, school choice, school vouchers, Scramble for Africa, side project, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Skype, spinning jenny, The Chicago School, the payments system, trade route, Travis Kalanick, uranium enrichment, urban planning, wealth creators, white picket fence, working-age population, Y Combinator, young professional

Walsh, D. (2016), History, Politics and Vulnerability: Explaining Excess Mortality in Scotland and Glasgow, Glasgow Centre for Population Health, May. ————, Bendel, N., Jones, R., and Hanlon, P. (2010), ‘It’s Not “Just Deprivation”: Why Do Equally Deprived UK Cities Experience Different Health Outcomes?’ Public Health, 124 (9), 487–5. ————, Taulbut, M., and Hanlon, P. (2008), The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation Trends in Mortality in Scotland and Other Parts of Post-industrial Europe, Glasgow Centre for Population Health and NHS Health Scotland, April. Whyte, B., and Ajetunmobi, T. (2012), Still the ‘Sick Man of Europe’?, Glasgow Centre for Population Health, November. Withey, D. (2003), The Glasgow City Improvement Trust: An Analysis of Its Genesis, Impact and Legacy, and an Inventory of Its Buildings, 1866–1910, PhD thesis, University of St Andrews.

These cities, not Edinburgh, are viewed locally as Glasgow’s peers – all large west-coast cities, they share an industrial history, Irish and religious heritage, and historic football teams. The idea that the three are alike stands up in more rigorous statistical comparisons: data on everything from employment to diet, income deprivation to drugs, suggests the three places – all struck by de-industrialization – are a close match. Yet one statistic stands out: premature deaths are 30 per cent more common in Glasgow than in Liverpool and Manchester. And in-depth studies that take account of economic and social deprivation fail to explain the mystery away: when all is taken into consideration, people still die too young in Glasgow. This ‘excess’ of deaths, over and above those that health experts can explain, was spotted in 2010.

They spotted just one relic of their past – an old lamppost that had once marked the end of their street. With nothing else by which to remember their previous life, they took a photograph together standing next to it. DEAR GREEN PLACE It is hard to prove that an ambitious housing policy explains the mysterious ‘Glasgow effect’ but the pattern certainly fits. While Manchester and Liverpool, Glasgow’s best comparators, both saw a sharp de-industrialization neither experienced the same degree of mandatory resettlement or house demolition. Once a city where keys were left in doors, recent surveys show that a lower share of those in Glasgow than in Liverpool or Manchester agree that people can be trusted. Once a place where births, weddings and deaths were communal events, today almost 10 per cent of people in Glasgow feel isolated and lonely (the average in England is 4 per cent).


pages: 370 words: 102,823

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth by Michael Jacobs, Mariana Mazzucato

balance sheet recession, banking crisis, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collaborative economy, complexity theory, conceptual framework, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Detroit bankruptcy, double entry bookkeeping, Elon Musk, endogenous growth, energy security, eurozone crisis, factory automation, facts on the ground, fiat currency, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, forward guidance, full employment, G4S, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, investor state dispute settlement, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, mass incarceration, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberal agenda, Network effects, new economy, non-tariff barriers, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, price stability, private sector deleveraging, quantitative easing, QWERTY keyboard, railway mania, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, the built environment, The Great Moderation, The Spirit Level, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, very high income

Even above 2 degrees of warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns that we can expect a much higher incidence of extreme weather events (such as flooding, storm surges and droughts), which may lead to a breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services, particularly in coastal regions and cities; lower agricultural productivity, increasing the risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems; increased ill-health and mortality from extreme heat events and diseases; greater risks of displacement of peoples and conflict; and faster loss of ecosystems and species.32 Broadly speaking, the evidence on this has been known for a quarter of a century.33 But until very recently very little has been done to avoid it. The major reason is that the production of greenhouse gas emissions—particularly carbon dioxide—is so embedded in capitalism’s historic systems of production and consumption, which have been built on the use of fossil fuels. In total 80 per cent of the world’s energy still comes from oil, gas and coal. In developed economies, as a result both of structural deindustrialisation and recent climaterelated policies, emissions are now declining. But part of this is simply due to the effective transfer of production to the developing world as globalisation has occurred.34 Western economies are not yet reducing their emissions—either those they generate themselves or those embodied in the goods and services they import—at anything like the speed required to control global warming (see Figure 9).

In this chapter we argue that low investment is at the root of European stagnation, and that a sustained (and sustainable) recovery can only be investment-driven. Investment is necessary to cure insufficient demand and unemployment in the short run, but also to introduce innovative technologies and increase potential output in the long run. Moreover, only higher investment can reverse the disquieting trend of de-industrialisation that can be observed throughout Europe. However, the measures that the European institutions have so far put in place to revive investment—in particular the ‘Growth Compact’ and President Jean-Claude Juncker’s ‘Investment Plan for Europe’—are likely to prove inadequate to deliver the desired outcomes. This chapter argues that a two-pronged approach is needed to achieve a significant increase in European investment.

But in Germany, too, output growth averaged little more than 1 per cent per year in the same period. Recovery from the global and European crises was short-lived, as displayed in Figure 1, and there is little sign of a return to robust growth within the next decade. Figure 1: GDP growth (% change on same quarter of previous year) Source: Eurostat Another remarkable and disquieting trend is de-industrialisation, which has accelerated during the crisis. In 2013 alone, the share of industry in GDP fell by 1 percentage point at the EU level—from 15 per cent to 14 per cent. In Germany, Europe’s major industrial champion, in 2014 the share of industry was 25.1 per cent, or 30.7 per cent including construction activities. This is down from 30.2 per cent (36.8 per cent) in 1991, the first year of common statistics after German reunification: it has been decreasing, on average, by 0.2 per cent per year.


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The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics by David Goodhart

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, assortative mating, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, borderless world, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, central bank independence, centre right, coherent worldview, corporate governance, credit crunch, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, first-past-the-post, gender pay gap, gig economy, glass ceiling, global supply chain, global village, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, market friction, mass immigration, mittelstand, Neil Kinnock, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, obamacare, old-boy network, open borders, Peter Singer: altruism, post-industrial society, post-materialism, postnationalism / post nation state, race to the bottom, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, selection bias, shareholder value, Skype, Sloane Ranger, stem cell, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, ultimatum game, upwardly mobile, wages for housework, white flight, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, World Values Survey

It is now the largest chemical company in the world with sales of €70 billion and profit of just under €7 billion, it employs 120,000 people worldwide and 53,000 of that number in Germany. How they must weep on Teeside. The benefit of having employees represented at the highest level in large German companies—something that the May government has been thinking about for Britain too—can also be seen in the more gradual pace of de-industrialisation in the heavy industrial Ruhr region of Germany in the 1980s and 1990s compared with most of Britain’s industrial regions. The pace of de-industrialisation in Britain picked up sharply in the early 1980s as the effect of North Sea oil sent the pound rocketing and Mrs Thatcher’s new free market government removed all capital controls, and in some cases sharply cut financial support to nationalised industries. (The closure of uneconomic coal mines led to the year long 1984/5 strike and the rapid subsequent rundown of the whole industry).

And uneducated people loved him back: almost 70 per cent of whites without college degrees voted for Trump.25 It is true that a majority of the poorest voters—those earning less than $50,000 a year—divided 52 per cent/42 per cent in favour of the Democrats. But those who switched from Democrat to Republican were almost entirely from middle and lower income groups. Indeed, according to Torsten Bell of the Resolution Foundation, a full 16 per cent of voters earning less than $30,000 switched to Trump. This explains his unexpected success in the de-industrialised Midwestern states like Michigan and Wisconsin, hit hard by the China shock.26 Even more than in Britain, white Americans tell pollsters that they think ‘Things were better in the past’. A YouGov poll in 2016 found nearly 60 per cent agreeing and only 21 per cent disagreeing.27 Those who perceive loss—whether due to age, lack of opportunities, personalities that favour stability, sense of declining status—are much more anti-immigrant and populist.

Support for the Dutch Labour party, for example, has fallen from nearly 30 per cent to less than 10 per cent in recent years as educated people in big cities and university towns have peeled off to the Greens and a liberal party called D66 (between them they now get the votes of 80 per cent of Dutch students), while working class strongholds in places like Rotterdam have switched to the Geert Wilders Party of Freedom. The Anywhere/Somewhere value divide has been only one part of the story of social democratic decline. Others include the achievement of many historic social democratic goals; de-industrialisation and the shrinking of the traditional, unionised working class; and the more mainstream legitimacy of populist parties. From a high point at the end of the 1970s electoral support for the centre-left across Europe has fallen by around one third and looks likely to fall further—it is hard to see where the sociological or ideological impetus for another Clinton/Blair style revival might come from.


World Cities and Nation States by Greg Clark, Tim Moonen

active transport: walking or cycling, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, business climate, cleantech, congestion charging, corporate governance, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, financial independence, financial intermediation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global supply chain, global value chain, high net worth, housing crisis, immigration reform, income inequality, informal economy, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, megacity, new economy, New Urbanism, Norman Mailer, open economy, Pearl River Delta, rent control, Richard Florida, Silicon Valley, smart cities, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, stem cell, supply-chain management, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transit-oriented development, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, War on Poverty, zero-sum game

National government identified London’s primacy as ‘the regional problem’ and responded with several regional balancing policies to shift economic activity from the capital (Massey, 1979). Supported by the London government of the time, these policies saw London lose more than one million people to the surrounding Greater South East, and fall to its own 100‐year population low of 6.7 million by 1985. Together, the post‐imperial years, the excessive damage and de‐population after World War 2 and then the successive waves of de‐industrialisation hit London very hard. How that de‐industrialisation was both contested and managed, and how London was encouraged to shift rapidly into advanced traded ­services, explains why and how it took a path to world city status in the 1990s and 2000s. Initially, London became the UK’s guinea pig for post‐industrial development in the 1980s. Central government established a new kind of urban development corporation in London that could bypass local authorities’ planning and investment powers in order to activate economic growth in derelict brownfield areas.

Nevertheless, the framing of global cities in a world of declining nation state power has been widespread and influential and deserves to be analysed in more detail. As national leaders and governments came to power with new economic solutions and ideas, a wave of liberalisation began in the global economy that saw flows of capital, goods, information and labour accelerate faster than political structures could adjust. Cities that had been in a spiral of decline and de‐population as a result of de‐industrialisation and disinvestment suddenly appeared more flexible than their national governments at taking advantage of the new order; some rapidly became switchboards for key corporate decision‐making and negotiations between national and international representatives in government and business alike. Analysts and commentators searched for new conceptual tools to grasp this change. The emergence of a new way of thinking about cities coincided with a wave of optimism and prophecy about the future of global society, as the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed and regional economic integration accelerated.

In terms of gross output, Hong Kong’s finance and business cluster is 12 times as large as its share of the Chinese population, for example, and Moscow’s concentration is nearly five times. At the opposite end of the spectrum, relative concentrations in Seoul and Tokyo are much lower (1.3–1.5 times) because of their more diversified roles in technology, R&D, chemicals and other sectors which are also traded globally. On the other hand, world cities are at different stages in cycles of industrialisation and de‐industrialisation. Hong Kong, New York, Seoul and London all have a lower share of manufacturing relative to their population size, having made a Cities and nation states: The story so far 25 Table 2.2: World cities’ share of national economic output in financial services and manufacturing Hong Kong London Moscow Mumbai New York Paris São Paulo Seoul Shanghai Singapore Tokyo Toronto % of national share of business/ financial services sector Sector size compared to share of population (average = 1) % of national share of manufacturing sector Sector size compared to share of population (national = 1) 6.3 44.3 38 5.7 11.4 40.4 27.1 67 6.1 100 43.9 27.6 11.99 2.02 4.78 3.4 1.91 2.15 2.76 1.39 3.47 1 1.47 1.65 0.1 15.9 13.8 3.5 3.0 19.1 21.2 31.9 4.5 100 24.2 19.2 0.26 0.73 1.73 2.06 0.50 1.02 2.16 0.66 2.55 1 0.81 1.15 Source: Istrate and Nadeau (2012).


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The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay by Guy Standing

3D printing, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, Bonfire of the Vanities, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, cashless society, central bank independence, centre right, Clayton Christensen, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, ending welfare as we know it, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Firefox, first-past-the-post, future of work, gig economy, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Growth in a Time of Debt, housing crisis, income inequality, information retrieval, intangible asset, invention of the steam engine, investor state dispute settlement, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, labour market flexibility, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, lump of labour, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, mini-job, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Neil Kinnock, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, nudge unit, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, openstreetmap, patent troll, payday loans, peer-to-peer lending, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, precariat, quantitative easing, remote working, rent control, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Right to Buy, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Sam Altman, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, Stephen Hawking, Steve Ballmer, structural adjustment programs, TaskRabbit, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, the payments system, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, Travis Kalanick, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, Y Combinator, zero-sum game, Zipcar

If capital gains on financial assets are included, the rise in the rentier share was even greater. Here the USA stands out. The rentier share rose more than sevenfold between 1980 and 2000.27 By then, rental income, as narrowly defined, accounted for over a third of national income, up from about a fifth before the Global Transformation started. The share of income going to profits in non-financial sectors actually fell. Meanwhile, deindustrialisation has been relentless. During the early twentieth century, agriculture shrank to less than 3 per cent of US national income, while manufacturing began its steep decline. In 1950, manufacturing accounted for 28 per cent of GDP. By the time of the crash of 2008, its share was down to 11 per cent. The symbolic year was 1985, when financial services (banking, property, insurance, advertising and marketing) first accounted for more of national income than manufacturing.

THE BRITISH DISEASE Economists have a theory called the Dutch Disease, named after the Dutch experience following the discovery of gas deposits; this led to a rise in the currency that resulted in lost manufacturing exports and employment. Today, a variant could be called the British Disease, since it is most pronounced in Britain. It arises from the domination of financial capital over the whole economy, stemming from the Big Bang of 1986, when the City of London was deregulated. One outcome has been a persistently strong currency, which has made manufacturing exports uncompetitive and accelerated deindustrialisation. It has also boosted inequality.52 Canada suffered similarly after 2008, when money flowed into its financial sector because it had largely escaped the turbulence of the banking crisis. This pushed up the value of the Canadian dollar, causing the manufacturing sector to lose 20 per cent of its capacity. The USA also suffers from the British Disease; finance dominates the economy (and policymaking) to the detriment of its industrial base.

‘Left’ parties everywhere had abandoned traditional values for a crude utilitarianism in trying to appeal to ‘the middle class’, the ‘aspirational middle’ or, in its later guise, ‘the squeezed middle’. In doing so they were competing with the right, which was much more comfortable in that zone. What has happened on the right is equally fascinating. Its old class base also weakened in the early phase of globalisation and the early stages of rentier capitalism. Deindustrialisation meant a dwindling number of industrialists to fund and mobilise support. Moreover, all across the Western world, middle-income groups seemed to be shrinking as well. In 2004, defining middle income as between 75 per cent and 125 per cent of national median income, only in Scandinavian countries did about half the population fit, whereas in the UK and USA that middle had decreased to about a third.12 It was to shrink almost everywhere after 2008.


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Platform Capitalism by Nick Srnicek

3D printing, additive manufacturing, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Amazon Web Services, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, cloud computing, collaborative economy, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, deskilling, disintermediation, future of work, gig economy, Infrastructure as a Service, Internet of things, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, liquidity trap, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, mittelstand, multi-sided market, natural language processing, Network effects, new economy, Oculus Rift, offshore financial centre, pattern recognition, platform as a service, quantitative easing, RFID, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Gordon, self-driving car, sharing economy, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, software as a service, TaskRabbit, the built environment, total factor productivity, two-sided market, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, unconventional monetary instruments, unorthodox policies, Zipcar

Where, then, do we focus our attention if we wish to see the effects of digital technology on capitalism? We might turn to the technology sector,3 but, strictly speaking, this sector remains a relatively small part of the economy. In the United States it currently contributes around 6.8 per cent of the value added from private companies and employs about 2.5 per cent of the labour force.4 By comparison, manufacturing in the deindustrialised United States employs four times as many people. In the United Kingdom manufacturing employs nearly three times as many people as the tech sector.5 This is in part because tech companies are notoriously small. Google has around 60,000 direct employees, Facebook has 12,000, while WhatsApp had 55 employees when it was sold to Facebook for $19 billion and Instagram had 13 when it was purchased for $1 billion.

In Italian autonomism, this would be a claim about the ‘general intellect’, where collective cooperation and knowledge become a source of value.3 Such an argument also entails that the labour process is increasingly immaterial, oriented towards the use and manipulation of symbols and affects. Likewise, the traditional industrial working class is increasingly replaced by knowledge workers or the ‘cognitariat’. Simultaneously, the generalised deindustrialisation of the high-income economies means that the product of work becomes immaterial: cultural content, knowledge, affects, and services. This includes media content like YouTube and blogs, as well as broader contributions in the form of creating websites, participating in online forums, and producing software.4 A related claim is that material commodities contain an increasing amount of knowledge, which is embodied in them.


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Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain by James Bloodworth

Airbnb, Berlin Wall, call centre, clockwatching, collective bargaining, congestion charging, credit crunch, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, gig economy, Jeff Bezos, low skilled workers, Network effects, new economy, North Sea oil, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, payday loans, post-work, profit motive, race to the bottom, reshoring, Silicon Valley, Travis Kalanick, Uber for X, working poor, working-age population

It was tolerable, and most of the staff I spoke to seemed if not to enjoy it then at least not to find it too oppressive, even if I thought they should be paid more. But even at ‘good’ companies like Admiral there were, for the most part, few trade unions in sight, meaning that there was nothing in place to stop a good company at some point metamorphosing into a bad one. Everything we enjoyed could be whisked away at short notice, like a dummy yanked from the mouth of a helpless child. 15 The crash de-industrialisation of the 1980s left a grim legacy in parts of South Wales. This sense of defeat seeped into your veins in certain towns like the injection of an intravenous drug. This was especially true in Ebbw Vale, the largest town in Blaenau Gwent. The town took its name from the Ebbw River, which ran almost parallel to the town of Cwm, three miles to the south. As in the north-east, at one time families had flooded into the Valleys from the surrounding areas as industry sprang up and provided plenty of work.

.: These Poor Hands 23, 149, 190 courier firms 211, 215, 217, 223, 236, 244–7, 250, 256, 257 Cwm, Wales 147, 148, 187, 190, 195, 196, 197 Cwmbran, Wales 143 Daily Express 124–5 Daily Mail 66, 134, 188 Dan (bicycle courier) 248, 249 Dangerfield, George 72 Davies, Idris 148–9 Gwalia Deserta (Wasteland of Wales) 148 ‘The Angry Summer’ 174 debt 62, 69, 146, 151, 153 Deliveroo 215, 217, 223, 250, 256, 257 democratic socialists 192 Department for Work and Pensions 133 Dickens, Charles 29, 205, 210, 249; Hard Times 138–9 Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 88–90, 109–10, 214 Dorothy (housemate of JB) 203, 204–5 DriveNow 217 Dropit 217 Eastern Europe, migrant workers from 11, 13, 15, 21, 24, 26–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 45, 57, 61–2, 75, 114–16, 128–9, 154, 203–4, 260–1 see also under individual nation name Ebbw Vale, Wales 147, 149, 154; legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 Elborough, Travis 93 emergency housing 96 employment agencies 1, 16, 19, 20, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 56, 65–6, 70, 72, 73, 82, 86, 127, 130, 158, 189, 194 see also under individual agency name Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 248 employment contracts/classification: Amazon 19–20, 53, 58 care sector 87–8, 107–8, 116 Uber 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 zero-hours see zero-hours contracts employment tribunals 38, 229–30, 243–4 English seaside, debauchery and 92–3 Enterprise Rent-A-Car 214 ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) programmes 115–16 European Economic Community (EEC) 195 European Referendum (2016) 61, 195–6 Evening Standard 208, 241 Express & Star 59–60 Fabian Society 109 Farrar, James 229–31, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 241–2, 250, 254, 255–6 Fellows of the Academies of Management 17 Fernie, Sue 182 financial crisis (2008) 1, 2, 45, 125, 195, 209 Flash (former miner) 165–8, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 176–8, 179, 188, 196 Fleet News 246 Foot, Michael 149 football 56, 58, 92, 94, 97, 98, 126, 135, 169 fruit picking 61 FTSE 123, 262 Gag Mag 122 Gallagher, Patrick 246 Gary (homeless man, Blackpool) 96–104, 105 Gaz (Gag Mag seller, Blackpool) 122 GDP 146 General Election (2015) 109 General Strike (1926) 148, 149, 173 gentrification 219 Geoff (former miner) 189, 190, 191, 193 ‘gig’ economy 2, 208–10, 217–18, 232, 236, 242, 243–4, 248, 249–50, 252, 257 see also Uber Gissing, George: New Grub Street 64 GMB union 36 grammar schools 261 Guardian 5, 235 Hamstead Colliery, Great Barr 169 Hazel (home carer) 110–11, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119 Heller, Joseph: Catch-22 235–6 Hemel Hempstead 54, 70 Henley, William Ernest: ‘England, My England’ vii Hoggart, Richard: The Uses of Literacy 45 home care worker (domiciliary care worker): Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks 88–90, 109–10 employment contracts 87–8, 107–8, 116, 118, 120 length of home care visits 108–9, 110 local authority budget cuts and 107–10 MAR (Medication Administration Record) sheets 114, 115 migrant workers as 114–16 negligent 86–7 privatisation of social care and 106–8, 109 recruitment 82–4 ‘shadowing’ process 88, 109–10 societal view of 106 staffing crisis 85–6, 119 suicide rate among 100 typical day/workload 110–14, 118 unions and 88 view job as vocation 86–7 wages/pay 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 Home Instead 119 homelessness 95–105, 138, 187, 208 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 housing/accommodation: Amazon workers, Rugeley 20–2, 24–6 Blackpool 80, 124, 137–8 buy-to-let housing market 24 emergency housing 96 homelessness and 95, 96, 101, 102, 137–8 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 inability to buy 62 landlords and 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 London 203–8 migrant workers and 20–2, 24–6, 197–8 social housing 62, 206 Swansea 124, 150 housing benefit 96, 137–8, 248 immigration 26–7, 61, 115–16, 128–9, 144, 193, 197–9, 236, 259–61 see also migrant workers indeed.co.uk 83–4 independent contractors 209, 248, 251–2 Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) 230, 257 inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 226, 238, 262, 263 inflation 2, 122 job centres 19, 96, 133–6, 139–40, 156, 158 Joe (housemate of JB) 22 John Lewis 23, 83 Joseph Rowntree Foundation 70, 159 June (call centre employee) 181–2, 183, 184 Kalanick, Travis 215, 228, 229, 233, 235 Kelly, Kath 66 Khan, Sadiq 256 Koestler, Arthur: The God that Failed 228 Labour Party 7, 57, 59, 61, 109, 144, 149, 150, 173, 174 Ladbroke Road, Notting Hill, London 219 Lamb, Norman 109 Lancashire Evening Post 104–5 landlords, private 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 Lea Hall Colliery, Staffordshire 31–2, 54, 55, 56, 57 Lea Hall Miners’ Social Club, Staffordshire 55, 56, 74 Len (step-grandfather of JB) 143–4 Lili (London) 203–4 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 Lloyd George, David 172 loan sharks 151, 156 local councils 104–5, 164 London 201–57 accommodation/housing in 65, 203–8, 218 gentrification in 219 ‘gig’ economy in 208–57, 263 homelessness in 95 migrant labour in 205–6, 213, 239 wealth divide in 207–8, 238 London Congestion Charge 254 London Courier Emergency Fund (LCEF) 247 London Metropolitan Police 90 London, Jack 205 low-skilled jobs, UK economy creation of 153 Lydia (Amazon employee) 70 Macmillan, Harold 3 manufacturing jobs, disappearance of 59, 139 Marine Colliery, Cwm, Wales 190 Mayhew, Henry 4, 205 McDonald’s 52, 68, 83 Merkel, Angela 196 Metcalf, David 182 middle-class 6, 39, 51, 67, 68, 69, 72–3, 74, 75, 149, 178, 205, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263 migrant labour: Amazon use of 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 57, 61–2, 65, 71–5, 258, 260–1 care home workers 114–16 ‘gig’ economy and 203–6, 213, 239 restaurant workers 154 retail sector and 128–9 Miliband, Ed 109 mining see coal mining Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 173 Miners’ Strike (1984–5) 3, 174–7 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Morecambe, Lancashire 137–8 Morgan family 156–8 Morgan, Huw: How Green Was My Valley 147 Moyer-Lee, Jason 257 National Coal Board (NCB) 54, 170, 171 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 108 National Union of Miners (NUM) 174, 176 New York Times 222 NHS (National Health Service) 106, 108, 247 Nirmal (Amazon employee) 45–6, 51 Norbert (Amazon employee) 71–5 nostalgia 3, 60, 93–4, 216 Nottingham 2, 151–2 objectivism 228 oil crisis (1973) 122–3 Oliver, Jamie 154 Orwell, George 56, 169 Palmer, William 29 pay see wages and under individual job title and employer name payday loans 156 PayPal 216 Pimlico Plumbers 251–2 platform capitalism 215 PMP Recruitment 19, 189–90 Poland, migrant workers from 128–9, 130, 135, 197–8 ‘poor, the’ 145 Port Talbot, Wales 166, 176, 190, 196 ‘post-truth’ discourse 199 ‘post-work’ world 165 poverty: Blackpool and 132, 137 class and 4 darkness and 96 diet/weight and 137 ease of slipping into 5 Eastern Europe and 26 monthly salary and 156 as a moral failing 188–9 press treatment of 66–7 time and 67 working poor living in 194 Preston, Lancashire 100, 105, 138–9 private school system 123 progressive thought 262 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 107 Putin, Vladimir 71 Rand, Ayn 228–9, 235, 236; The Fountainhead 228, 229 recession (2008) 1, 45, 104, 121, 125, 156 ‘regeneration’ 55, 60–1, 146 rent-to-own 157–8 retirement, working in 58–9 Reve, Gerard: The Evenings 160 Robin (Cwm) 196, 197 Rochelle (home care worker) 117–19 Romania, migrant workers from 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 32, 44, 46, 51, 53, 61, 65, 71–5, 203, 206, 258 Ron (former miner) 170, 195 Royal London 59 Royal London pub, Wolverhampton 71 Royal Mail 151 Rugeley, Staffordshire 28–35 Amazon distribution centre in 11–76, 79, 86, 119, 127, 128, 159, 258 decline of coal mining industry in 31–2, 54–6, 57, 169 disappearance of manufacturing jobs from 54–63 high street 28–35 immigration and 30–4, 193–4 Tesco and 58–9, 62–3 Scargill, Arthur 175 scientific management theories 17 Scotland Yard 90 self-employment: ’gig’ economy and 214–15, 222, 229–30, 234, 243–4, 245, 246, 249, 250–1 increase in numbers of workers 2, 209 ‘independent contractors’ and 209, 248, 251–2 Selwyn (former miner) 175, 178, 179, 263–4 Senghenydd, Glamorgan pit explosion (1913) 169–70 Shelter 104 Shirebrook Colliery, Derbyshire 55 Shu, William 250 Silicon Valley, California 210, 232 Sillitoe, Alan: Saturday Night and Sunday Morning 2, 3, 94 Sky Sports News 126 social democracy 3, 263 social housing 62, 206 socialism 7, 56, 131, 144, 148, 149, 173 social mobility 58, 199, 261 South Wales Miners’ Museum, Afan Argoed 166, 196 South Wales Valleys 141–200 accommodation in 150, 197 Amazon in 145–6 beauty of 148 call centre jobs in 153–64, 180–6 coal industry and 143–4, 147–9, 165–79, 180, 188, 189, 190–1, 193, 195, 196 immigration and 197–9 JB’s family history and 143–4 legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 nostalgia and 147 radical history of 149–50 see also under individual place name ‘spice’ 95 Sports Direct 55 squatting 96, 99 steel industry 176, 180, 188, 189, 190, 196–7 Steven (housemate of JB) 124, 126, 127–31 Stoke-on-Trent 58–9 suicide 99–100 Sunday Times 175 ‘Best Companies to Work For’ 154 Rich List 125 Swansea, Wales 145–6, 150–2, 154–64, 176, 178, 197, 205 Tata Steel 190 tax 65, 69, 70, 118, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 212, 229, 244, 246, 248, 251, 255 Taylor, Frederick W.: The Principles of Scientific Management 17 Tesco 35, 57, 58–9, 62–3 Thatcher, Margaret 122, 123, 146, 174–5, 193, 207, 263–4 Thorn Automation 57 Thorn EMI 59 trade unions: Amazon and 36 B&M and 130, 131 call centres and 160, 181, 184–5, 186 care sector and 88 coal industry decline and 55–6, 173, 174, 263–4 decline of 2, 3, 35 ‘gig’ economy and 230, 257, 261 objectivism and 228 oil crisis (1973) and 122 Thatcher and 123, 174, 193, 263–4 Wales and 144, 149 see also under individual union name Trades Union Congress (TUC) 173 transgender people 40–1 Transline Group 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 65–6, 86 Transport for London (TFL) 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Tredegar Workmen’s Medical Aid Society 247 Trefil, Wales 149 Trump, Donald 7 Uber 207, 211–57 ‘account status’ 221 clocking in at 218 corporation tax and 229 customers 221, 222, 226–7, 237–41, 244, 257 driver costs/expenses 214, 217, 233, 241, 246, 253–5 driver employment classification/contract 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 driver hours 221, 226, 230, 232, 233, 236, 246, 253, 255 driver numbers 211–13, 233–5 driver wages/pay 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 employment tribunal against (2016) 229–34 flexibility of working for 213–14, 218, 230–3, 248, 250–1 James Farrar and see Farrar, James migrant labour and 213, 236 ‘Onboarding’ class 224–5, 238, 241, 256 opposition to 215–17 philosophy of 228–9, 235, 236 psychological inducements for drivers 222–3 rating system 225–7, 232, 238, 239, 243, 253 rejecting/accepting jobs 221–2, 224–5 ride process 219–21 surge pricing 237, 238, 253 TFL and 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Travis Kalanick and see Kalanick, Travis UberEATS 256 UberPOOL 225, 240–2, 253, 255–6 UberX 212, 225, 240, 241, 255 VAT and 229 vehicle requirements 214 unemployment 2, 32, 36, 62, 121–3, 132, 138, 148, 157, 172, 178, 179, 189–95, 199, 218 Unison 88, 108 Unite 55, 160 United Private Hire Drivers 230, 257 university education 3, 6, 61, 62, 123, 150–1, 152, 153–4 USDAW 130–1 Vettesse, Tony 138 Vicky (care sector supervisor) 86, 87 Wade, Alan 121, 123–4 wages: Amazon 18, 19, 37–9, 42–3, 65–6, 68, 69, 70, 159 call centre 155–6, 158–60, 164, 180 care sector 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Uber 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 wage stagnation 2 see also under individual employer, job and sector name Wealth and Assets Survey 207–8 wealth inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 238 Wells, H.

.: These Poor Hands 23, 149, 190 courier firms 211, 215, 217, 223, 236, 244–7, 250, 256, 257 Cwm, Wales 147, 148, 187, 190, 195, 196, 197 Cwmbran, Wales 143 Daily Express 124–5 Daily Mail 66, 134, 188 Dan (bicycle courier) 248, 249 Dangerfield, George 72 Davies, Idris 148–9 Gwalia Deserta (Wasteland of Wales) 148 ‘The Angry Summer’ 174 debt 62, 69, 146, 151, 153 Deliveroo 215, 217, 223, 250, 256, 257 democratic socialists 192 Department for Work and Pensions 133 Dickens, Charles 29, 205, 210, 249; Hard Times 138–9 Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 88–90, 109–10, 214 Dorothy (housemate of JB) 203, 204–5 DriveNow 217 Dropit 217 Eastern Europe, migrant workers from 11, 13, 15, 21, 24, 26–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 45, 57, 61–2, 75, 114–16, 128–9, 154, 203–4, 260–1 see also under individual nation name Ebbw Vale, Wales 147, 149, 154; legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 Elborough, Travis 93 emergency housing 96 employment agencies 1, 16, 19, 20, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 56, 65–6, 70, 72, 73, 82, 86, 127, 130, 158, 189, 194 see also under individual agency name Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 248 employment contracts/classification: Amazon 19–20, 53, 58 care sector 87–8, 107–8, 116 Uber 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 zero-hours see zero-hours contracts employment tribunals 38, 229–30, 243–4 English seaside, debauchery and 92–3 Enterprise Rent-A-Car 214 ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) programmes 115–16 European Economic Community (EEC) 195 European Referendum (2016) 61, 195–6 Evening Standard 208, 241 Express & Star 59–60 Fabian Society 109 Farrar, James 229–31, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 241–2, 250, 254, 255–6 Fellows of the Academies of Management 17 Fernie, Sue 182 financial crisis (2008) 1, 2, 45, 125, 195, 209 Flash (former miner) 165–8, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 176–8, 179, 188, 196 Fleet News 246 Foot, Michael 149 football 56, 58, 92, 94, 97, 98, 126, 135, 169 fruit picking 61 FTSE 123, 262 Gag Mag 122 Gallagher, Patrick 246 Gary (homeless man, Blackpool) 96–104, 105 Gaz (Gag Mag seller, Blackpool) 122 GDP 146 General Election (2015) 109 General Strike (1926) 148, 149, 173 gentrification 219 Geoff (former miner) 189, 190, 191, 193 ‘gig’ economy 2, 208–10, 217–18, 232, 236, 242, 243–4, 248, 249–50, 252, 257 see also Uber Gissing, George: New Grub Street 64 GMB union 36 grammar schools 261 Guardian 5, 235 Hamstead Colliery, Great Barr 169 Hazel (home carer) 110–11, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119 Heller, Joseph: Catch-22 235–6 Hemel Hempstead 54, 70 Henley, William Ernest: ‘England, My England’ vii Hoggart, Richard: The Uses of Literacy 45 home care worker (domiciliary care worker): Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks 88–90, 109–10 employment contracts 87–8, 107–8, 116, 118, 120 length of home care visits 108–9, 110 local authority budget cuts and 107–10 MAR (Medication Administration Record) sheets 114, 115 migrant workers as 114–16 negligent 86–7 privatisation of social care and 106–8, 109 recruitment 82–4 ‘shadowing’ process 88, 109–10 societal view of 106 staffing crisis 85–6, 119 suicide rate among 100 typical day/workload 110–14, 118 unions and 88 view job as vocation 86–7 wages/pay 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 Home Instead 119 homelessness 95–105, 138, 187, 208 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 housing/accommodation: Amazon workers, Rugeley 20–2, 24–6 Blackpool 80, 124, 137–8 buy-to-let housing market 24 emergency housing 96 homelessness and 95, 96, 101, 102, 137–8 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 inability to buy 62 landlords and 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 London 203–8 migrant workers and 20–2, 24–6, 197–8 social housing 62, 206 Swansea 124, 150 housing benefit 96, 137–8, 248 immigration 26–7, 61, 115–16, 128–9, 144, 193, 197–9, 236, 259–61 see also migrant workers indeed.co.uk 83–4 independent contractors 209, 248, 251–2 Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) 230, 257 inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 226, 238, 262, 263 inflation 2, 122 job centres 19, 96, 133–6, 139–40, 156, 158 Joe (housemate of JB) 22 John Lewis 23, 83 Joseph Rowntree Foundation 70, 159 June (call centre employee) 181–2, 183, 184 Kalanick, Travis 215, 228, 229, 233, 235 Kelly, Kath 66 Khan, Sadiq 256 Koestler, Arthur: The God that Failed 228 Labour Party 7, 57, 59, 61, 109, 144, 149, 150, 173, 174 Ladbroke Road, Notting Hill, London 219 Lamb, Norman 109 Lancashire Evening Post 104–5 landlords, private 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 Lea Hall Colliery, Staffordshire 31–2, 54, 55, 56, 57 Lea Hall Miners’ Social Club, Staffordshire 55, 56, 74 Len (step-grandfather of JB) 143–4 Lili (London) 203–4 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 Lloyd George, David 172 loan sharks 151, 156 local councils 104–5, 164 London 201–57 accommodation/housing in 65, 203–8, 218 gentrification in 219 ‘gig’ economy in 208–57, 263 homelessness in 95 migrant labour in 205–6, 213, 239 wealth divide in 207–8, 238 London Congestion Charge 254 London Courier Emergency Fund (LCEF) 247 London Metropolitan Police 90 London, Jack 205 low-skilled jobs, UK economy creation of 153 Lydia (Amazon employee) 70 Macmillan, Harold 3 manufacturing jobs, disappearance of 59, 139 Marine Colliery, Cwm, Wales 190 Mayhew, Henry 4, 205 McDonald’s 52, 68, 83 Merkel, Angela 196 Metcalf, David 182 middle-class 6, 39, 51, 67, 68, 69, 72–3, 74, 75, 149, 178, 205, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263 migrant labour: Amazon use of 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 57, 61–2, 65, 71–5, 258, 260–1 care home workers 114–16 ‘gig’ economy and 203–6, 213, 239 restaurant workers 154 retail sector and 128–9 Miliband, Ed 109 mining see coal mining Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 173 Miners’ Strike (1984–5) 3, 174–7 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Morecambe, Lancashire 137–8 Morgan family 156–8 Morgan, Huw: How Green Was My Valley 147 Moyer-Lee, Jason 257 National Coal Board (NCB) 54, 170, 171 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 108 National Union of Miners (NUM) 174, 176 New York Times 222 NHS (National Health Service) 106, 108, 247 Nirmal (Amazon employee) 45–6, 51 Norbert (Amazon employee) 71–5 nostalgia 3, 60, 93–4, 216 Nottingham 2, 151–2 objectivism 228 oil crisis (1973) 122–3 Oliver, Jamie 154 Orwell, George 56, 169 Palmer, William 29 pay see wages and under individual job title and employer name payday loans 156 PayPal 216 Pimlico Plumbers 251–2 platform capitalism 215 PMP Recruitment 19, 189–90 Poland, migrant workers from 128–9, 130, 135, 197–8 ‘poor, the’ 145 Port Talbot, Wales 166, 176, 190, 196 ‘post-truth’ discourse 199 ‘post-work’ world 165 poverty: Blackpool and 132, 137 class and 4 darkness and 96 diet/weight and 137 ease of slipping into 5 Eastern Europe and 26 monthly salary and 156 as a moral failing 188–9 press treatment of 66–7 time and 67 working poor living in 194 Preston, Lancashire 100, 105, 138–9 private school system 123 progressive thought 262 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 107 Putin, Vladimir 71 Rand, Ayn 228–9, 235, 236; The Fountainhead 228, 229 recession (2008) 1, 45, 104, 121, 125, 156 ‘regeneration’ 55, 60–1, 146 rent-to-own 157–8 retirement, working in 58–9 Reve, Gerard: The Evenings 160 Robin (Cwm) 196, 197 Rochelle (home care worker) 117–19 Romania, migrant workers from 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 32, 44, 46, 51, 53, 61, 65, 71–5, 203, 206, 258 Ron (former miner) 170, 195 Royal London 59 Royal London pub, Wolverhampton 71 Royal Mail 151 Rugeley, Staffordshire 28–35 Amazon distribution centre in 11–76, 79, 86, 119, 127, 128, 159, 258 decline of coal mining industry in 31–2, 54–6, 57, 169 disappearance of manufacturing jobs from 54–63 high street 28–35 immigration and 30–4, 193–4 Tesco and 58–9, 62–3 Scargill, Arthur 175 scientific management theories 17 Scotland Yard 90 self-employment: ’gig’ economy and 214–15, 222, 229–30, 234, 243–4, 245, 246, 249, 250–1 increase in numbers of workers 2, 209 ‘independent contractors’ and 209, 248, 251–2 Selwyn (former miner) 175, 178, 179, 263–4 Senghenydd, Glamorgan pit explosion (1913) 169–70 Shelter 104 Shirebrook Colliery, Derbyshire 55 Shu, William 250 Silicon Valley, California 210, 232 Sillitoe, Alan: Saturday Night and Sunday Morning 2, 3, 94 Sky Sports News 126 social democracy 3, 263 social housing 62, 206 socialism 7, 56, 131, 144, 148, 149, 173 social mobility 58, 199, 261 South Wales Miners’ Museum, Afan Argoed 166, 196 South Wales Valleys 141–200 accommodation in 150, 197 Amazon in 145–6 beauty of 148 call centre jobs in 153–64, 180–6 coal industry and 143–4, 147–9, 165–79, 180, 188, 189, 190–1, 193, 195, 196 immigration and 197–9 JB’s family history and 143–4 legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 nostalgia and 147 radical history of 149–50 see also under individual place name ‘spice’ 95 Sports Direct 55 squatting 96, 99 steel industry 176, 180, 188, 189, 190, 196–7 Steven (housemate of JB) 124, 126, 127–31 Stoke-on-Trent 58–9 suicide 99–100 Sunday Times 175 ‘Best Companies to Work For’ 154 Rich List 125 Swansea, Wales 145–6, 150–2, 154–64, 176, 178, 197, 205 Tata Steel 190 tax 65, 69, 70, 118, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 212, 229, 244, 246, 248, 251, 255 Taylor, Frederick W.: The Principles of Scientific Management 17 Tesco 35, 57, 58–9, 62–3 Thatcher, Margaret 122, 123, 146, 174–5, 193, 207, 263–4 Thorn Automation 57 Thorn EMI 59 trade unions: Amazon and 36 B&M and 130, 131 call centres and 160, 181, 184–5, 186 care sector and 88 coal industry decline and 55–6, 173, 174, 263–4 decline of 2, 3, 35 ‘gig’ economy and 230, 257, 261 objectivism and 228 oil crisis (1973) and 122 Thatcher and 123, 174, 193, 263–4 Wales and 144, 149 see also under individual union name Trades Union Congress (TUC) 173 transgender people 40–1 Transline Group 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 65–6, 86 Transport for London (TFL) 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Tredegar Workmen’s Medical Aid Society 247 Trefil, Wales 149 Trump, Donald 7 Uber 207, 211–57 ‘account status’ 221 clocking in at 218 corporation tax and 229 customers 221, 222, 226–7, 237–41, 244, 257 driver costs/expenses 214, 217, 233, 241, 246, 253–5 driver employment classification/contract 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 driver hours 221, 226, 230, 232, 233, 236, 246, 253, 255 driver numbers 211–13, 233–5 driver wages/pay 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 employment tribunal against (2016) 229–34 flexibility of working for 213–14, 218, 230–3, 248, 250–1 James Farrar and see Farrar, James migrant labour and 213, 236 ‘Onboarding’ class 224–5, 238, 241, 256 opposition to 215–17 philosophy of 228–9, 235, 236 psychological inducements for drivers 222–3 rating system 225–7, 232, 238, 239, 243, 253 rejecting/accepting jobs 221–2, 224–5 ride process 219–21 surge pricing 237, 238, 253 TFL and 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Travis Kalanick and see Kalanick, Travis UberEATS 256 UberPOOL 225, 240–2, 253, 255–6 UberX 212, 225, 240, 241, 255 VAT and 229 vehicle requirements 214 unemployment 2, 32, 36, 62, 121–3, 132, 138, 148, 157, 172, 178, 179, 189–95, 199, 218 Unison 88, 108 Unite 55, 160 United Private Hire Drivers 230, 257 university education 3, 6, 61, 62, 123, 150–1, 152, 153–4 USDAW 130–1 Vettesse, Tony 138 Vicky (care sector supervisor) 86, 87 Wade, Alan 121, 123–4 wages: Amazon 18, 19, 37–9, 42–3, 65–6, 68, 69, 70, 159 call centre 155–6, 158–60, 164, 180 care sector 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Uber 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 wage stagnation 2 see also under individual employer, job and sector name Wealth and Assets Survey 207–8 wealth inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 238 Wells, H.


pages: 283 words: 87,166

Reaching for Utopia: Making Sense of an Age of Upheaval by Jason Cowley

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, centre right, Charles Lindbergh, coherent worldview, Corn Laws, corporate governance, crony capitalism, David Brooks, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, Etonian, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, illegal immigration, liberal world order, Neil Kinnock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Right to Buy, Robert Mercer, Ronald Reagan, University of East Anglia

The mood among the electorate in Scotland reminds him of the final weeks of campaigning in the 2011 Scottish election, when, having been trailing in the polls, the SNP won a landslide in a proportional voting system that was designed to prevent such an outcome, setting us on the road to where we are today, with the British people so divided and the United Kingdom fracturing. ‘That night,’ Salmond says of 2011, ‘I was just watching things fall one by one. It’s happening again.’ The decline of Labour in Scotland is deep and has been a long time in the making, the result of institutional complacency, failures of leadership and profound structural changes – deindustrialisation, the decline of the trade unions and of cross-border class solidarity, globalisation, the London effect, and so on – and also the Iraq War. Yet it has been accelerated by the 2014 referendum campaign and the perception among many Scots that, as Salmond puts it, ‘Labour was hand-in-hand, hand-in-glove, shoulder-to-shoulder with the Conservative Party.’ It didn’t help that, with the exception of Gordon Brown and romantic unionists such as the historians Tom Holland and Simon Schama, few in and around the Better Together camp were able to elaborate a persuasive moral and cultural account of why the United Kingdom should be cherished.

The Chancellor, ever alert to an opportunity, could not resist making an anti-Labour gibe (‘We are supporting industry in the north-east and not putting all our bets on the City of London as under the last Labour government’) as he extolled the virtues of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and reaffirmed his commitment to reviving British manufacturing, which has fallen to ten per cent of GDP (part of the blame for which lies with the deindustrialisation policies of the Thatcher government). Earlier, before assembled dignitaries and senior Japanese executives from Hitachi, Osborne had introduced the Prime Minister affectionately as ‘my boss’. Later, as we sat at a table drinking tea, Osborne attempted to explain why he and Cameron had worked together so successfully for so long. ‘First of all, we are very good friends,’ he said, keeping his shrewd eyes averted.

‘We can’t make a politics for straight, white men,’ said one of the panellists, a blonde-haired woman from the Karl Renner Institute, the political academy of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Corbyn nodded vigorously. The Labour leader – his image projected on a large screen behind him – said that politics had been shaken up across the world and that corporate America had ‘bought up industrial America, deindustrialised it and sold it off’. He and his fellow socialists had to be ‘agents of change’. Injustice had been ‘brought about by free market economics’, he said, and: ‘We should stand up to unfettered capitalism . . . We cannot be protectors of the status quo.’ His speech was a hymn to socialist internationalism. I sat listening alongside Corbyn’s charming Mexican wife, Laura. She used her phone to take photographs of her husband as he spoke, which she then shared with me.


pages: 346 words: 90,371

Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing by Josh Ryan-Collins, Toby Lloyd, Laurie Macfarlane

"Robert Solow", agricultural Revolution, asset-backed security, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, basic income, Bretton Woods, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, credit crunch, debt deflation, deindustrialization, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, full employment, garden city movement, George Akerlof, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, land tenure, land value tax, Landlord’s Game, low skilled workers, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, money market fund, mortgage debt, negative equity, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, Pareto efficiency, place-making, price stability, profit maximization, quantitative easing, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Florida, Right to Buy, rising living standards, risk tolerance, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, the built environment, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, transaction costs, universal basic income, urban planning, urban sprawl, working poor, working-age population

More recently, there has been growing debate about the role of technological advance and digitalisation in amplifying this effect. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) argue that increased network externalities and brand effects resulting from advances in computer processing, artificial intelligence and networked communication will see the ‘winner takes all’ phenomenon become more prominent over time. Deindustrialisation and the rise of the service sector Across many advanced economies the process of deindustrialisation and the rise of the services sector have resulted in significant changes to the shape of the labour market. Between 1979 and 2009 the percentage of the UK workforce in manufacturing experienced a 60% decline, and this was matched with a rapid increase in the service industry and high-end technological occupations (Shaheen et al., 2011). While the new technological occupations demanded a highly skilled workforce, many of the new service-orientated roles have been low skilled and more likely to be part time, temporary and low paid (Westwood, 2006).

Addison Act (1919), 78 adverse selection, 127 affordable housing: capital grants, 34; housing investment bank proposal, 209–10; need for public investment, 222–3; planning permission conditionalities, 33, 93–6, 216; public corporations’ investment levels, 220–1; see also social housing age, and net property wealth, 181–2, 181 agricultural land, 9, 61, 68, 69, 122–3 agricultural tariffs, 43 agriculture: common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3; increase in productivity, 68 Alliance and Leicester, 139 Aquinas, Thomas, 16 Arkwright, Richard, 71 armed forces, demobilisation, 78, 79 Association of Residential Letting Agents (ARLA), 134 Assured Shorthold Tenancy, 89 Australia: house price to income ratio, 112, 114; land value taxes, 204–5; mortgage market structure, 156 Bank of England, 210 banks/banking: alternatives to bank debt financing, 211–12; business relationship banking, 208–9; credit and money creation, 115, 206–7; housing investment bank proposal, 209–10; incentives for non-property lending, 206–8; income from mortgage interest, 61; international regulation, 135; land as lending collateral, 7, 55, 127–8; land-related credit creation, 8, 114–19, 190–1, 222; lending by industry sector, 118–19, 118; lending relative to GDP, 117–18, 117; leverage, 184; macroprudential policy, 206; minimum deposit requirements (corset controls), 132, 155; money supply, 115; regulating property-related credit, 154–5; securitisation, 135–42, 156–7, 156; structural reform recommendations, 208–9; wholesale money markets, 131, 139 Basel Accord (Basel I), 135 basements, 57, 57n16 Bath, 71 Belgium, mortgage market structure, 156 Bradford and Bingley, 139 Bretton Woods system, 83 Brighton, 71 building societies: demutualisation, 134–5, 136; effect of mortgage funding deregulation, 132–3; emergence, 72, 128; favourable tax regime, 132; history, 129; interest rate cartel, 130, 132; mergers and acquisitions, 136; mortgage funding arrangements, 131; stability, 129–30, 132, 158 Building Societies Act (1986), 133 buy-to-let (BTL): increase, 7, 184; mortgages, 122, 134; overseas investors, 100, 160; tax relief, 62, 86, 160 Cadbury, George, 71 Canada, mortgage market structure, 156 capital: conflated with land, 48–52, 62; definition, 37–8; differences between land and capital, 51–7; differences between wealth and capital, 170–1; factor in production, 37–8 capital gains tax: for buy-to-let landlords, 62; definition, 85–6; exemption for primary residencies, 85–6, 104, 202 capital goods depreciation, 52–3 capital investment, 56 Capital Markets Union (CMU), 141 capitalism: Golden Age, 83; land as private property, 36; Primitive Accumulation concept, 18 Cerberus Capital Management, 136, 137 cholera, 70, 73 Churchill, Winston, 76–7, 189 Clark, John Bates, 48–51, 57–9 classical economics, 17, 38, 45, 48, 70 co-ownership housing, 72, 86 coal industry, 69 collateral: commercial real estate, 148; land as, 7, 20–1, 127–8, 160; see also home equity withdrawal collectivisation, 43 commercial real estate (CRE), 148–50; bank lending, 118–19, 118, 130, 148; credit bubbles and crises, 111, 148–9; data sets, 63; effect of UK vote to leave EU, 150; foreign investment, 149; investment returns, 148, 149–50; and Japanese crisis, 151–3; rating lists, 202; time-limited leases, 214 common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3 communications technology, 9 Community Land Trusts, 72, 198–9, 214, 221 commuting, 27 Competition, Credit and Control Act (1971), 130 compulsory purchase: ‘hope value’ court judgments, 88; housing construction, 80–1; infrastructure projects, 31, 73, 196–7, 222 conservation areas, 32 construction industry see housing construction industry consumption: affected by house deposit saving, 145; and asset-based wealth, 123–4; consumption-to-income ratio trends, 143–4, 144; equity release and consumer demand, 145–7, 146; and house prices, 147; and inequality, 185–7 cooperative housing, 72, 215 Corn Laws, 43, 69–70 corporate income tax, 168–9 council tax, 104, 201, 202 credit conditions index, 143–4, 144 credit controls, 132 credit liberalisation, 144 Crown Estate, 19, 31 Darrow, Charles, 47 de Soto, Hernando, 21 debt, public sector debt, 219–21 debt-to-income ratio, 115–16, 116, 139, 159, 186 defaults, mortgage lending, 141 deindustrialisation, 168 Denmark: land value taxes, 204; size of new-builds, 97 developing economies, and private property, 21–2 development charge, 82 digital economy, 9 Eastern Europe, serfdom, 23–4 Eccles, Marriner, 186–7 economic growth: dependence on land values, 190–1; and homeownership, 21–2 economic modelling, 50–1, 155, 218 economic rent: Crown Estate, 31; determined by collective rather than individual investment, 40; financial sector, 44, 184; infrastructure projects, 194–5, 196–7; and land, 39–44, 56–7; and land taxes, 34–5, 45–8, 76–7, 199, 222; and landownership, 10–13, 25; oil sector, 44; urban areas, 41–2, 73–4 economic theory: landownership, 16–18; marginal productivity theory, 49–50, 51, 56, 57–9, 165–7; shortcomings, 64–5, 191–2, 217; teaching reform proposals, 218 Edinburgh New Town, 66, 71, 80 eminent domain theory, 16 Enlightenment, 16 equity release see home equity withdrawal European Investment Bank, 210 European Union: Capital Markets Union (CMU), 141; common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3; full-recourse mortgage loans, 141–2; government debt, 220; UK decision to leave, 150, 160 Eurostat, 64, 219 factory workers, accommodation, 71 feudal system, 18, 19, 32 financial crisis (2007-8): causes, 153–4, 159–60, 186–7; effect on mortgages, 100; and house and land prices, 101, 140; Northern Rock, 136–7; payment defaults, 123; UK banking collapse, 139–40 financial instability, 152–3, 154–5, 185–7 Financial Policy Committee, 155, 206 financial sector: economic rent, 44, 184; profitability, 184; reform proposals, 205–12; see also banks/banking financialisation, 120; declining wage share in national income, 169; land, 14, 110–12; land and property, 160 First World War, 77 Fisher, Irving, 152 Florida, credit-driven bubbles, 111 foreign exchange controls, 132 France: feudal system, 32; Livrét A accounts, 210; mortgage market structure, 156; private tenancy, 32; residential property wealth, 9, 10 French Physiocrats, 38 Friedman, Milton, 87 Garden City movement, 72, 75–6 GDP: and bank lending by sector, 118–19, 118; and declining wage share, 169; and domestic mortgage lending, 118, 156–8, 156; and home equity withdrawal, 146; and household debt, 151; and outstanding credit loans, 117; and property wealth, 9–10, 10 George, Henry, 12, 25, 34, 45, 58, 60–1, 76, 87, 199; Progress and Poverty, 40–1, 46–7 Germany: business relationship banking, 208–9; credit controls, 207; economic success and low homeownership, 215; house price to income ratio, 112, 114; mortgage market structure and homeownership, 156, 157–8; private tenancy, 32 Gini coefficient, 163, 177, 178 globalisation, 167–8, 169 Great Depression, 186–7 Great Moderation, 154, 191 Grotius, Hugo, 16 Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), 139 health problems, and inequality, 185 help-to-buy schemes, 122 Henry VIII, King, 20 high-rise buildings, 57 Hill, Octavia, 71 home equity withdrawal: contribution to consumer demand, 145–7, 146; and financial crisis, 187; and living standards, 180; and mortgage market structure, 156–7, 156; to finance consumer goods, 127, 133 homeownership: benefits, 101; difficulties in saving for, rent trap, 106; downward trend, 83, 103, 178; as financial asset, 63; housing costs, 179; increased unemployment and reduced labour mobility, 27–8, 215; interwar growth, 78; investment opportunity, 92; low-supply equilibrium, 102; and mortgage market structure, 156–8, 156; mutual co-ownership, 86; political and electoral dominance, 24–5, 92; Right to Buy policy, 89, 90–1, 103; rise in 1970s/80s, 86; second homes, 160; trends, 106–7, 107 Hong Kong, Mass Transit Railway, 195 house building see housing construction industry house prices: boom and bust, 88, 99; and consumer demand, 147; and credit availability, 116–18; financial crisis collapse, 140; and growing inequality, 177–8; house price-credit feedback cycle, 119–24; increase with buy-to-let mortgages, 134; low-supply equilibrium, 102; negative equity, 123, 133–4; price-to-income ratios, 99, 100, 112–14, 114, 139, 183, 183; and real disposable income, 115–16, 116; replacement cost vs market price, 6; rise due to insufficient supply, 63; volatility, 8, 8, 112–14, 114; volatility reduced by land taxes, 200 Housing Act (1924), 78 Housing Act (1980), 89 Housing Act (1988), 89 housing associations, 72, 82, 83, 93 housing benefit, 34, 96, 106 housing construction industry: barriers to entry, 97; building clubs, 72; compulsory land purchase, 80–1; concentration, 96–7; costs, 8, 95; development charge, 82; effect of financial crisis, 101; land banks (with planning permission), 96–7, 101; peak, 82; poor design quality, 97; private house building, 78; size trends, 97; speculative house building, 93, 94–5, 96; trends, 82–5, 82, 83 housing costs: by tenure type, 179; and inequality, 179–80 housing demand, 63, 114 Housing, Town Planning, &c.


pages: 502 words: 128,126

Rule Britannia: Brexit and the End of Empire by Danny Dorling, Sally Tomlinson

3D printing, Ada Lovelace, Alfred Russel Wallace, anti-communist, anti-globalists, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, British Empire, centre right, colonial rule, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, epigenetics, Etonian, falling living standards, Flynn Effect, housing crisis, illegal immigration, imperial preference, income inequality, inflation targeting, invisible hand, knowledge economy, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, megacity, New Urbanism, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, University of East Anglia, We are the 99%, wealth creators

Exactly what do we have to be proud of about Britain or its Prime Ministers? However Brexit is resolved, whatever is done now, Britain’s status in the world and in Europe will inevitably be much reduced, even if the UK somehow stays in the European Union. It will be difficult for the English, fed on so much past imperial propaganda, to accept a reduced place in the world after Brexit. The Scots, who suffered deindustrialisation first in the mid-1970s, have had longer to get used to the new global realities. Brexit partly came about because some were finding it very hard before the vote to accept Britain’s current status as not special compared to other countries. They were hoping to put the ‘Great’ back into Great Britain. The whole idea of being just one of twenty-eight European states, and of having to co-operate and compromise, rather than lording it over them, had never gone down well with the manufactured British psyche.

It was a pity that over the years so many companies were later sold by shareholders (the employees and customers got no say) to foreign competitors and hedge funds, who took advantage of globalisation and often moved them abroad for cheaper labour costs, or closed the company down and stripped out the assets, leaving the workers with nothing. The proportion of GDP coming from manufacturing compared to services fell quickly as a result of 1980s deindustrialisation. In 1970, manufacturing accounted for 33 per cent of the economy (including sectors like mining, quarrying, steel making, gas/electricity and water, plus all the parts that went into cars) while services accounted for 55 per cent. As Figure 5.2 above illustrated, by 2014 manufacturing accounted for only 10 per cent of GDP, while services were up to nearly 80 per cent.44 And as Figure 5.3 below shows, half of British manufacturing now is cars, food, metals (often a euphemism for arms) and medicinal drugs.

O. 1 London inequality in 1, 2 abstentions in EU referendum 1, 2, 3, 4 multiculturalism in 1 fall in immigration to 1, 2 wealthy immigrants in 1 housing in 1, 2, 3 consequences of EU referendum 1 gentrification in 1 Lucas, Caroline 1, 2 Lumley, Joanna 1 Luyendijk, Joris 1, 2 Lynch, Patrick 1 McCarthy, Joseph 1 MacDonald, Ramsay 1 McDonnell, John 1 Mackinder, Halford 1 McLoughlin, Patrick 1 McVey, Esther 1, 2 Maier, Juergen 1 Major, John 1 Malthus, Thomas 1 Manchester City 1 Manchester Guardian 1 Manning, Ralph 1 manufacturing industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Manzoor, Sarfraz 1 Markle, Meghan 1, 2 Marquand, David 1 Martin, Kingsley 1 Massie, Alex 1 May, Philip 1 May, Theresa support from DUP 1 changed position on Brexit 1 portrait removal 1 belief in selective education 1, 2 use of nuclear weapons 1 and US steel tariffs 1 suggests transition period 1 Florence speech 1 speeches to Conservative Party conference 1 and fourth industrial revolution 1 position on immigration 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Windrush scandal 1 becomes Prime Minister 1 and 2017 general election 1 Davos speech 1 invokes Article 1 2 Mercer, Johnny 1 Merkel, Angela 1 Meynell, Francis 1 MI5 1, 2 MI6 1 Miliband, Ed 1 Mill, James 1 Miller, Edgar 1 Miller, Gina 1 Minford, Patrick 1, 2 Modood, Tariq 1, 2 Moore, Suzanne 1 Mosley, Oswald 1, 2 Mundell, David 1 Murdoch, Rupert 1 Muslim Council of Britain 1, 2 Myerson, George 1 National Front 1, 2 National Health Service 1, 2 National Organization of Deported Migrants (NODM) 1 National Service 1 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) 1 New Statesman 1 New World-Wide Geographies, The (Stembridge) 1 New York Times 1, 2, 3 New Zealand 1 Northern Ireland negotiations over border 1 abstentions in EU referendum 1 and customs union ‘backstop’ 1 Oakeshott, Isabel 1 obesity as factor in referendum 1, 2 and inequality 1, 2 Observer, The 1, 2 Odey, Crispin 1 Office for National Statistics 1 On the Origin of Species (Darwin) 1, 2, 3 Opium Wars 1 Ormosi, Peter 1, 2, 3 Orwell, George 1, 2, 3, 4 Osborne, George 1 Oswald, Andrew J. 1 Oxford University 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Paisley Jr, Ian 1 Panama Papers 1 Paradise Papers 1, 2 Parris, Matthew 1 Patel, Priti 1 patriotism 1, 2, 3 Patten, Chris 1, 2, 3 Pearl, Raymond 1, 2 Pearson, Karl 1, 2, 3 Peston, Robert 1 Philby, Kim 1 Philip, Prince 1, 2, 3 Philipps, Rhodri 1 Piers Gaveston dining society 1 Piris, Jean-Claude 1 Pitt, William 1 Policy Exchange 1 Polish Resettlement Act (1947) 1 pollution 1 Porter, Bernard 1 Portes, Jonathan 1 poverty lack of empathy for 1 and nutrition 1 under austerity 1, 2 Powell, Enoch and Darwinism 1 encouraged immigration 1 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech 1 views on European Union 1, 2, 3 Proto, Eugenio 1 Pursglove, Tom 1 Putin, Vladimir 1 Raab, Dominic 1, 2, 3 race/racism in 1970s 1 and British Empire 1 and immigration 1 of Cecil Rhodes 1 and inequality 1 and sense of ‘fairness’ 1 and Brexit 1 Rae, Alasdair 1 Ramsay, Adam 1, 2, 3 Rand, Ayn 1 Ransome, Arthur 1 Redoano, Michela 1 Rees-Mogg, Jacob at Oxford University 1 on transition period 1 in European Research Group 1 and Paradise Papers 1 wealth of 1 and divisions in Conservative Party 1 Reeves, Rachel 1 referendum on EEC membership (1975) 1, 2, 3, 4 referendum on EU membership (2016) abstentions in 1, 2, 3 age as factor in 1, 2, 3 geography as factor in 1, 2 class as factor in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 political repercussions of 1 sense of own finances as factor in 1 educational levels as factor in 1 obesity as factor in 1, 2 immigration as factor in 1, 2 gender as factor in 1 impact on immigration 1 Leave campaigns 1, 2, 3 consequences of 1 Referendum Party 1 Rhodes, Cecil 1, 2, 3 Rhodes scholarship 1, 2, 3 Ricardo, David 1, 2 Rimington, Stella 1 Robinson, Joan Violet 1 Rolet, Xavier 1 Rothschild, Nathaniel 1 Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health 1 royal family 1 Rudd, Amber 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ‘Rule Britannia’ (Arne) 1, 2 Rwanda 1 Sachs, Jeffrey 1 Sadler, Michael 1 Sahlberg, Pasi 1 Sánchez, Óscar Arias 1 Sankara, Thomas 1 Saudi Arabia 1, 2 Sayer, Duncan 1 Schama, Simon 1 Scotland rejects Brexit legislation 1 independence referendum (2014) 1 abstentions in EU referendum 1 result of EU referendum in 1 in creation of Britain 1 deindustrialisation in 1 Scottish National Party (SNP) 1 Sedwill, Mark 1 selective education 1 Sheppard, Dick 1 Shilliam, Robbie 1 Shinwell, Emmanuel 1 Siddiqui, Nadia 1 Sidera, Sandro 1 slavery 1, 2 Small Island (Levy) 1 Smith, Adam 1, 2 Smith, Julian 1 Social Mobility Commission 1 Sorensen, Reg 1 Sovereign Individual, The (Rees-Mogg) 1 Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) 1 Spectator, The 1 Stander, Julian 1, 2 Starmer, Keir 1 steel industry 1, 2 Stembridge, J.


pages: 336 words: 83,903

The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work by David Frayne

anti-work, basic income, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, call centre, clockwatching, David Graeber, deindustrialization, deskilling, future of work, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, McJob, means of production, moral panic, new economy, post-work, profit motive, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Skype, unpaid internship, working poor, young professional

On the basis of extensive research, the authors concluded that Marienthal’s inhabitants were on a slippery slope of despondency and resignation, displaying low expectations of the future, a dragging experience of time, and feelings of apathy. Given the fact that Marienthal’s local identity was so closely tied with industry, the closure of its factory meant nothing less than the destruction of a way of life, and there is certainly no reason to doubt the credibility of these findings. Indeed, the case of Marienthal invites comparison with my home region of South Wales, which continues to suffer the miserable effects of deindustrialisation following Thatcher’s closure of its coal mines in the 1980s. Such cases are proof of the power of unemployment to dismantle communities and destroy familiar ways of life. Translated into English in the 1970s, the Marienthal study was a commendable and empathic portrayal of an unemployed community. However, at risk of using the study as something of a straw man, I agree with Cole that the research warrants our scrutiny.

Index * * * A achievement, social, measured through work, 15 Adam, a former computer programmer, 120, 127–8, 138–41, 170, 180 Adorno, Theodor, 69–72, 75, 76–7, 162; ‘Free Time’, 69 advertising, 85–8, 171; spending of industry, 88 affluence, ideals of, 181 agoraphobia, 152, 153 Alan, a former office administrator, 157–8 alienating tendencies, use of term, 62 alienation, 9, 48, 50, 61, 62, 63, 90, 93, 126, 146, 178, 200, 230; in Marx, 46, 47; normalisation of, 52; use of term, 51 alternatives: experimenting in, 223; utopian, 145 altruism, 113 Amazon, working conditions at, 51 anger management techniques, 53 Anne, a photographer, 127, 170; co-founder of Idlers’ Alliance, 207–8 anti-consumerist ethics, 163 anxiety, 13, 148, 151, 152, 164, 200; about education, 79; in face of consumer choices, 168 apricots, cultivation of, 79 Arendt, Hannah, 24, 39 Aristotle, concept of good life, 4 art of living, 4 Ashton, John, 229 ATOS company, 104; scandal regarding, 152 autonomous activities, 20 autonomous self-development, 36; right of, 35 autonomously organised production, 112 autonomy, 10, 29, 64, 91, 113, 141, 142, 150, 198, 205, 210–37; in work, limits to, 61–6; moral, 155; of workers, 69 B bakeries, production process in, 51–2 Basic Income, 225; as personal entitlement, 226; universal and unconditional, 225 Bauman, Zygmunt, 73, 159–60, 169–70 Beck, Ulrich, 73 being, mode of being, 79–80, 166 ‘being yourself’’ in work, 59–60 Bell, Daniel, 26 Ben, husband of Cheryl, 178, 179 benefit fraud, claimed costs of, 101 benefits, conditionalities of, 104 Berardi, Franco, 54–5, 81 Berger, Peter, 125, 128, 130, 144; with Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 125 Beveridge, William, 28 Billig, Michael, 231 binary dichotomies in society, 99 biomedical labels: adoption of, 151–2; resistance to, 152, 153 black working class, rebellion of, 115 Black, Bob, The Abolition of Work, 206 Black, Carol, 108 Blauner, Robert, 48, 62 body, starts shouting, 149 see also broken body books: from libraries, 206; on subject of work, 206–7; reading of, 175, 195 boredom at work, 12, 140 Bowring, Finn, 116, 171 Braverman, Harry, 48 breakpoints, 125, 128, 129, 141, 142, 154, 216; causes of, 129; relating to personal health issues, 148 Brennan, Teresa, 148 Bridge, Angela, 189–90 broken body, 147–54 Brown, Philip, 42 Bruce, a former care home worker, 137, 146, 148–51, 200, 202, 203, 204 ‘bullshit jobs’, 40 bureaucracy at work, 132; intensification of, 133 Burroughs, William, 206 C ‘Californian ideology’, 59; boundaries of, 60 call centres, labour practices in, 50–1 calmer life, living of, 151 Calvin, John, 25 Cameron, David, 99 Cannon, David, 154–5, 233 capitalism, 24, 37, 44, 48, 64, 65–6, 147; as production of needs, 85; development of, 25–6, 29, 39–40; fixated on work and consumption, 3, 4; industrial, 30; insecurity in, 73; potential reduction of working time in, 32–3; resistance to, 188; spirit of, 25–6 career, concept of, 127 Casey, Catherine, 16–17, 56–7, 58, 212 casual labour, 28 Cederström, Carl, and Peter Fleming, Dead Man Working, 55 Chaplin, Charlie, in Modern Times, 49 character assessment of workers, 56 cheese, buying of, 169 Cheryl, an interviewee, 120, 165–7, 176–7, 178 child-friendly policies, 116 childcare, 155, 206, 211 children, a factor in decision-making, 161 chirpiness, required in job, 136 Christmas, celebration of, 145, 186 cinema attendance, moral panic regarding, 96 Citizens Advice Bureau, 153 city spaces, privatisation and commercialisation of, 222 claimants, viewed as wasters, 99 claiming benefits, viewed as game, 135 Clive, an interviewee 201 clubbing together to get something done, 22 cognitive labour, 54–5 Cohen, Stanley, 126, 127, 129, 210 Cole, Matthew, 106, 205 collaborative forms of work, 64 Collinson, David, 213 colonisation of life: by economic demands, 9, 93; by work-related demands, 67–94 commodification, 92 commodity-intensive lifestyle, questioning of, 164 commons, abolition of, 186 commuting, costs of, 178 company people, creation of, 56 computerisation, of bakery, 51–2 computers, 50, 61, 72, 139–40, 172, 175, 177; gaming, 177 conditions of work, 226, 233 ‘constantly on call’, 72 consumer motivation, theories of, 88–91 consumer satisfaction, 85 consumer society, 26–7 consumerism, 40, 83–4, 91, 162–3, 169, 214, 228, 231; costs of, 160; depends on exploitation, 167; ethically conscious, 87; motivation for, 85, 178 consumers: needs of, exaggerated, 92; persuasion of, 86 consuming less, 172, 187 consumption: de-spiritualisation of, 176; gospel of, 82–94; growth of, 94; ostentatious, 186; replaces self-production, 92; therapeutic, 180 convenience, need for, 178–9 convenience commodities, consumption of, 91 conversation, love of, 137–8, 141 conviviality, as valued good, 116 cooking of meals, 145; pleasures of, 176–7, 187 coping strategies at work, 11 Coupland, Douglas, Generation X, 114 Cremin, Colin, 58, 76 customer complaints procedures, 54 CVs, preparation of, 75 cynicism, 12, 212–13 D Dalla Costa, Mariarosa, 115 dead end, experience of, 141 death, witnessing of, 130 debt, of students, 81 decentralisation of work, 32 deindustrialisation, 107 ‘delusions’ of workers regarding work, 21, 22 democracy, 215; engagement in, 222; in the workplace, 13 denaturalisation of work, 17, 216 Department of Trade and Industry (UK), work–life balance study, 218 dependency, alleged culture of, 100 depression, 148, 152 de-reification, 128, 144 desires, consumerist, pursuit of, 170 deskilling of work, 42, 48 diet, simplicity of, 136 dignity, 137, 193 disabilities see people with disabilities disability allowances, 152, 153 discipline at work, 28 discreditable, 200–1 dis-ease, feeling of, 130 disengagement from work, 47–52 dis-identification, 213 dissatisfaction, organised creation of, 85 distribution of income, 14 Dittmar, Helga, 88 division of labour, 28, 29, 48, 133, 146; gendered, 229–30 ‘doing nothing of value’, 141, 190, 233 domestic work, 19 see also outsourcing of domestic work downshifter, use of term, 120 downshifter study in USA, 165 Dubi, Steve, 46 Duncan Smith, Ian, 102 E eating together: pleasure of, 143, 144, 147; whittled away, 176 economic growth, 34, 37 education, 78; aims of, 80; anxiety context of, 79; as certification for work, 69; as socialisation, 15; broad, value of, 79; investment in, 42 eight-hour day, 71 Eleanor, an interviewee, 120, 124, 129, 144, 161–2, 167–8, 182, 183, 207 Emma, an interviewee, 196–7, 198–9, 202–3 emotional conduct, management of, 62 emotional investment, in office work, 136 emotional labour, 52–3, 57, 137 emotions, management of, 53–4 employability, 6, 9, 15, 16, 81, 82; discipline demanded by, 77–8; pressure of, 73–82 employee appraisals, 54 employers, 76–7 Employment Support Allowance (ESA), 148, 153 employment, paid see paid employment encirclement by the market, 92 ‘end of work’, argument, 33, 35, 36, 82 Engels, Friedrich, 74 entitlement, alleged culture of, 100, 103, 232 environmental awareness, 168 escapes, 129; construction of, 12 escapism, 10, 27, 210–37 ethical reflection, need for, 217 ethically dubious work, 135 see also worthwhile ethic eudaemonia, 4 Euro May Day movement, 115 exclusion, social, 161 extra hours, working of, 57 F Facebook, 88 factories, closure of, 106–8 family, work as, 56–7 family life: importance of, 230; prioritising of, 218 feminism, 22; interest in shorter working hours, 229; second-wave, 114–15 Fevre, Ralph, 106 Ffion, an interviewee, 145, 167, 170, 177, 181 Fisher, Mark, 214, 229 five-day week, 97 Fleming, Peter, 59–61, 64, 212–13 Fletcher, Harrell, 189 flight attendants, working conditions of, 53 ‘flow state’ condition, 12 Ford, Henry, 95 Ford assembly line, 48 foreign encounters, power of, 144 four-day week, recommended for public health reasons, 229 Fourier, Charles, 30–1 France, 35-hour week legislation in, 223–4 Frankfurt School, 2, 35 Franklin, Benjamin, 28 free choice of work, 31 free-time, 29, 33, 39, 40, 69–72, 123, 155, 157, 221, 228; as continuation of work, 72; as valued good, 116; authentic, 82; ‘excessive’, 83; experience of, 162; fragmentation of, 71, 73; increase of, 38; preservation of, 24; reabsorption of, 84; scarcity of, 41, 173, 175 freedom from work, 38 freelance work, 155 friendliness, simulation of, 54 Fromm, Erich, 79, 80, 166 Fryer, D., 109 full-time working, 90, 110–11, 141; resistance to, 28, 29 fun, culture of, in work, 59–60, 62, 213, 232 G Galbraith, J.


pages: 309 words: 85,584

Nine Crises: Fifty Years of Covering the British Economy From Devaluation to Brexit by William Keegan

banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, congestion charging, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Etonian, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, financial thriller, floating exchange rates, full employment, gig economy, inflation targeting, Just-in-time delivery, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, oil shock, Parkinson's law, Paul Samuelson, pre–internet, price mechanism, quantitative easing, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, short selling, South Sea Bubble, The Chicago School, transaction costs, tulip mania, Winter of Discontent, Yom Kippur War

It must be emphasised that this was less to do with lack of confidence in sterling than with overconfidence in the dollar. That overconfidence led later that year to the Plaza Agreement, when the G7 leading finance ministers (not forgetting their central bankers) embarked on a collective policy to halt the rise in the dollar, and indeed to lower it to a level that was not threatening to cripple US exports and cause deindustrialisation. The dive in the pound led to an hilarious episode featuring Bernard Ingham, the hard-nosed and bluff Yorkshireman who was Mrs Thatcher’s chief press officer, and a Friday briefing of the weekend press. The Observer’s political editor was my friend and colleague Adam Raphael. He returned to our offices, then opposite Battersea Park, with the news that, as far as the loyal Ingham was concerned, his political mistress believed in market forces, and if the pound fell to $1 or below, so be it.

Lawson subsequently admitted that 1986 had been ‘a terrible year for the pound’. The next stage in his attempts to win over a reluctant Prime Minister came in February 1987. This was the month when the G7 decided that enough was enough in the exchange markets. The Plaza Agreement of September 1985 had achieved its purpose: the dollar had fallen to a more sensible level, and concerns that an overvalued US currency would cause massive deindustrialisation in the US economy had dissipated. There had been enough adjustment. What was now needed in the currency markets was a period of stability. The meeting at which G7 finance ministers and central bank governors agreed on a policy of concerted intervention to steady the markets took place at the Louvre in Paris, and the resulting agreement became known as the Louvre Accord. Lawson enjoyed the international financial stage, and got on particularly well with James Baker, the US Treasury Secretary.


pages: 504 words: 143,303

Why We Can't Afford the Rich by Andrew Sayer

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Albert Einstein, anti-globalists, asset-backed security, banking crisis, banks create money, basic income, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, collective bargaining, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demand response, don't be evil, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, G4S, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, income inequality, information asymmetry, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, job automation, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, land value tax, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, means of production, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, neoliberal agenda, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, patent troll, payday loans, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, predatory finance, price stability, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus, wealth creators, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, working poor, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Because we are so dependent on each other, there are always likely to be questions of fairness and justice where economic activities are concerned. Are you being paid fairly? Is it right that some get so much/little, and pay so much/little tax? Should students pay for their university courses? Should you get interest on your savings? Should there be more/less/no child benefit? More money for carers, or none? Who should pick up the bill when a company goes bankrupt, and who should pay for clearing up a derelict site left by deindustrialisation? Who should pay for pollution? These and other such questions are about moral economy. I believe we need to think much more about them – about whether our familiar economic arrangements are fair and justifiable, instead of taking them simply as immutable facts of life – or equally bad, as matters of mere subjective ‘preferences’, or ‘values’, beyond the scope of reason.30 Individuals may sometimes give more than they get, or get more than they give, for justifiable reasons, as in the case of parent–child relations, but sometimes they do so for no good reason other than power.

Surveys of public opinion show that the majority judge those below them much more harshly than those above them,23 and although in recent years rich bankers in particular have come in for more criticism, hostility towards them is still less than towards those at the bottom. Neoliberal governments and media work hard to keep it that way, so resentment is directed downwards. Here the problem is not merely individual but structural – a consequence of job shortages. These are normal in capitalism – more in recessions than in booms, and more in areas of deindustrialisation, like Liverpool or Detroit. To the extent that such areas have any jobs at all, they tend to be low paid and unskilled. Right-wing politicians love to point to individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds who, through heroic struggle, find a job and then get ahead, and they castigate others for not doing the same. But where there are not enough jobs to go round, it’s a zero-sum game: if one person gets a job, it means that another does not.

Inflation reduced the real rate of interest, favouring debtors; debt payments become less onerous if the currency you have to pay them in is losing value fast. For a while, with a still-strong labour movement, many workers could continue to win wage rises to keep up with inflation but, as unemployment rose in the old industrialised countries, the post-war balance of power between capital and organised labour crumbled as deindustrialisation hit union membership. At the end of the decade, leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan seized the moment to attack the unions and weaken employment legislation. In effect they declared class war on organised labour, which was blamed for the high inflation. In both the US and the UK, the governments raised interest rates, making their currencies strong and hence making business difficult for export industry, as it drove up the prices of exports relative to those of goods from other countries.


pages: 355 words: 92,571

Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets by John Plender

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Black Swan, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, computer age, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, diversification, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, God and Mammon, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Meriwether, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, labour market flexibility, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, London Interbank Offered Rate, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, money market fund, moral hazard, moveable type in China, Myron Scholes, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, principal–agent problem, profit motive, quantitative easing, railway mania, regulatory arbitrage, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, Steve Jobs, technology bubble, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, time value of money, too big to fail, tulip mania, Upton Sinclair, Veblen good, We are the 99%, Wolfgang Streeck, zero-sum game

Many also feel instinctively that a nation’s strength can be measured by the amount of swarf on its boots – swarf being the metal chippings found on factory floors. And because this view is so widespread, the decline of manufacturing in countries such as the US and UK is generally perceived to be disturbing, especially when there is high unemployment in ‘rustbowl’ industries that are conspicuous victims of globalisation and de-industrialisation. According to this school of thought, advanced countries cannot live by services alone, not least because services have less export potential than manufactures. So a shrinking manufacturing base must be equated with national decline, as must the growing financialisation of the economy. No surprise, then, that the decline in manufacturing employment in the UK, from 31 per cent of the workforce in 1975 to 25 per cent in 1983 to 8 per cent today, causes much angst, as does the almost-as-severe percentage fall in the US, where manufacturing employment is down to 9 per cent.

You cannot go on watching with indifference the disappearance of your principal industries, and always hoping that you will be able to replace them by secondary and inferior industries.59 Chamberlain was echoing those who, in the debate on luxury in the eighteenth century, feared that the increasing production of goods designed to meet the whims and fancies of fashionable women would cause society to become decadent and effeminate. He in turn was echoed decades later by Lord Weinstock, chief executive of Britain’s General Electric Company, before the House of Lords committee on overseas trade in 1985, when Margaret Thatcher’s government presided over a painful period of de-industrialisation: What will the service industries be servicing when there is no hardware, when no wealth is actually being produced? We will be servicing, presumably, the production of wealth by others. We will supply the Changing of the Guard, we will supply the Beefeaters around the Tower of London. We will become a curiosity. I do not think that that is what Britain is about. I think that is rubbish.


pages: 308 words: 99,298

Brexit, No Exit: Why in the End Britain Won't Leave Europe by Denis MacShane

3D printing, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, centre right, Corn Laws, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Etonian, European colonialism, first-past-the-post, fixed income, Gini coefficient, greed is good, illegal immigration, James Dyson, labour mobility, liberal capitalism, low cost airline, low cost carrier, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mont Pelerin Society, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, new economy, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, price stability, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, reshoring, road to serfdom, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, Thales and the olive presses, trade liberalization, transaction costs, women in the workforce

George Osborne’s stewardship of the economy, with its relentless focus on austerity cuts while protecting the already-rich, helped fuel the anger against him and David Cameron that many believe was part of the reason for the anti-London establishment Brexit vote. Following the financial crash, the take-home pay of the average British employee fell by 10 per cent between 2007 and 2015 – the longest continuous fall in income since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was the areas worst hit by the great de-industrialisation of the 1980s and 1990s that saw the biggest increase in poverty and where the Brexit vote was the strongest. Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey Where wealth accumulates, and men decay wrote Oliver Goldsmith in ‘The Deserted Village’ 250 years ago. Britain’s greatest historian of postwar Europe, Tony Judt, used part of those lines for the title of his great deathbed essay – Ill Fares the Land – attacking the meretricious Britain that came into being this century as the gap between have and have-not Britain grew ever wider.

In France in 2016, militant trade unions all but destroyed the French socialist government with a series of militant, sometimes violent strikes and protests in opposition to minor labour market reforms that had been accepted by trade unions across the Rhine or further north decades before. In Italy, Spain, France or Portugal trade unions were off-shoots of political parties or the Catholic Church and obeyed the line of the communist party leaders or cardinals. Trade union membership slumped as deindustrialisation in the 1980s and 1990s eliminated the majority of jobs in the metal industries, where archetypal working-class trade union organisation was strongest. Women and immigrant workers were more difficult to organise and had different priorities from the classic twentieth-century white male proletariat. Unions gave up the difficult task of organising the new post-industrial proletariat and instead focused on public-sector workers – teachers, civil servants, hospital workers, public transport workers, employees of state agencies.


The Ecotechnic Future: Envisioning a Post-Peak World by John Michael Greer

back-to-the-land, Black Swan, clean water, Community Supported Agriculture, David Strachan, deindustrialization, European colonialism, Extropian, failed state, feminist movement, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, hydrogen economy, hygiene hypothesis, illegal immigration, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of agriculture, mass immigration, McMansion, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, post-industrial society, Project for a New American Century, Ray Kurzweil, Stewart Brand, the scientific method, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, upwardly mobile, Whole Earth Catalog, Y2K

Finally, even small cities have the cultural and social resources — ​libraries and colleges, community groups and ­local politics, among other things — ​to maintain civilized life even in hard times. In a deindustrializing world, all these things are potent sources of strength. While some will undoubtedly fail, cities may well be the most viable options for personal and cultural survival as the deindustrial age opens. Historically speaking, the largely independent city-state surrounded by its own agricultural hinterland is one of the most common foundations for an urban-agrarian society, and societies that have attained broader geographical integration routinely fall back to the city-state pattern in times of trouble. Some variant of it is very likely across significant parts of North America in the deindustrial future. Some parts of the continent lack the agricultural and resource base to support such a pattern; others will likely be in the path of armed invasions or mass migration, in which case all bets are off.

Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Tomorrow’s Homes Retrofitting the Future The Household Economy The Decline and Fall of Home Economics The Specialization Trap 8. Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Hundred Energy Slaves The Deindustrial Want Ads The Twilight of Automation Trailing-Edge Technologies 141 Contents 9. Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 The Innovation Fallacy The Paradox of Production Jevons’ Alternative Master Conservers 10. Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Lifeboat Ecovillages Cities in the Deindustrial Future The Ecology of Social Change 11. Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 A Failure of Mimesis The Twilight of Culture Cultural Conservers Religion and the Survival of Culture 12.

It’s quite likely, therefore, that deindustrial societies that can no longer build a hydroelectric plant or a computer could still maintain the less demanding knowledge and resource base needed to keep them running, in the same way that Dark Age societies all over Europe used and repaired Roman aqueducts they could never have built themselves. The resulting salvage societies will have advantages that purely ecotechnic societies will not, and so these ­human The Way of Succession ecologies will spread wherever the supply of potential salvage allows them to function. Still, their time will pass; many of the legacies of the industrial age will not be renewable, and when they’re gone, they’re gone. The result is a striking parallel to succession. In the near and middle future, as the deindustrial age unfolds, the societies that will flourish best are those that will be least able to survive over the long term.


The Origins of the Urban Crisis by Sugrue, Thomas J.

affirmative action, business climate, collective bargaining, correlation coefficient, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Ford paid five dollars a day, George Gilder, ghettoisation, Gunnar Myrdal, hiring and firing, housing crisis, income inequality, indoor plumbing, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, jobless men, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, mass incarceration, New Urbanism, oil shock, pink-collar, postindustrial economy, rent control, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, side project, Silicon Valley, strikebreaker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, white flight, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

For a snapshot of industrial problems in other cities in the 1950s, see Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 160–67. The history of deindustrialization after World War II has yet to be written. But glimpses of the overall pattern in other cities can be found in: “Deindustrialization: A Panel Discussion,” Pennsylvania History 58 (1991): 181–211; John T. Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1989); Irwin Marcus, “The Deindustrialization of Homestead: A Case Study, 1959–1984,” Pennsylvania History 52 (1985) 162–82; Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: A History of Labor in a Textile City, 1920–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 320–28; Ronald Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at General Electric and Westinghouse (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 232–36.

Above all, it argues that the process of capital mobility and urban devastation began amidst the post—World War II economic boom. When I wrote Origins, most popular and scholarly analyses of deindustrialization focused on the 1970s, in particular the oil shocks, the rise of international competition in industries which America had long dominated, and globalization, as corporations roamed the globe in search of cheap labor. A spate of recent historical scholarship on the industrial transformation of twentieth-century America (a subfield that has taken off in recent years) bears out my argument about the crucial role that capital flight and the introduction of labor-saving technologies played in the devastation of urban America well before the 1970s. The process of deindustrialization began as early as the 1920s in cities dominated by the textile industry, intensified in the post-World War II years, and took a new form in the wake of the economic crises of the 1970s.

Cities dominated by a single industry—like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Gary—reeled when their key industries began to close plants and relocate to other regions. But the process of deindustrialization was equally damaging in cities like Philadelphia, Oakland, and Chicago, which had diverse economic bases. The ostensibly “new” globalization of capital seen in the late 1990s and the early part of the twenty-first century is part of the same process that I described ravaging mid-twentieth-century Detroit, even if American corporate tax and trade policies have made it easier for companies to ignore national boundaries and for capital to migrate long distances.10 The flip side of urban deindustrialization, disinvestment, and depopulation was the process of suburbanization. One of the greatest migrations of the twentieth century was the movement of whites from central cities to suburbs.


Once the American Dream: Inner-Ring Suburbs of the Metropolitan United States by Bernadette Hanlon

big-box store, correlation coefficient, deindustrialization, desegregation, edge city, feminist movement, housing crisis, illegal immigration, informal economy, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, McMansion, New Urbanism, Silicon Valley, statistical model, The Chicago School, transit-oriented development, urban sprawl, white flight, working-age population, zero-sum game

Labor Market Restructuring A significant feature of an advanced capitalist society is the mobility of capital and the deindustrialization of older cities and suburbs (Bluestone 2 The foreclosure rate is measured as the number of homeowner households per foreclosure event. 52 / Chapter 4 and Harrison 1982). In the past fifty years, the U.S. economy has witnessed a shift away from the traditional manufacturing base to more specialized service and information-producing industries (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Noyelle and Stanback 1983; Sassen 1990, 1991). This shift has caused the decline of many long-established, manufacturing metropolitan areas, particularly in the Northeast and the Midwest. This shift has led to the loss of relatively high-paying union jobs in manufacturing in the cities and older suburbs, greatly impacting the local economies of these deindustrialized communities (Bluestone and Harrison 1989).

For instance, in a study of the change in Chicago’s suburbs, Morton Winsberg (1989) finds that heavy declines in household income were most striking in deindustrialized suburbs. Similarly, Scott Bollens (1988) finds that, particularly in the older, northeastern metropolitan areas of the United States, the more troubled suburbs tended to be manufacturing oriented, and Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas Vicino (2007), in their study of Baltimore’s inner suburbs, find a predominance of decline among older, industrial suburbs on the southwestern border of the city. In the traditional manufacturing regions of the United States, older working-class suburbs have witnessed the effects of runaway industry and, in the case of metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, the abandonment by such industries as aerospace and defense, which have had tremendous impacts on these areas (Davis 2005). Deindustrialization follows the trail of industry, and, just as inner-city plants were often the first to close, now it is the turn of inner-ring suburban plants.

By 2000, manufacturing employment had declined to just 16 percent of total employment. Unemployment rates were 6 percent for white males and more than 16 percent for African American males by 2000. As with many working-class inner-ring suburbs, Dundalk has experienced the effects of deindustrialization. With the loss of its industrial base, this suburb has experienced income declines and poverty increases. The median family income in 1969 was $48,464 (in 1999 dollars), which declined to $46,035 in 1999. The poverty rate doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1969 and 1999. Another offshoot of deindustrialization is environmental degradation. Dundalk and other inner-ring suburbs are scattered with old industrial sites, some vacant, derelict brownfields. Brownfields are contaminated or perceived-to-be-contaminated vacant industrial sites that are typically difficult to redevelop.


pages: 606 words: 87,358

The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization by Richard Baldwin

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, additive manufacturing, Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, air freight, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, Branko Milanovic, buy low sell high, call centre, Columbian Exchange, commoditize, Commodity Super-Cycle, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, domestication of the camel, Edward Glaeser, endogenous growth, Erik Brynjolfsson, financial intermediation, George Gilder, global supply chain, global value chain, Henri Poincaré, imperial preference, industrial cluster, industrial robot, intangible asset, invention of agriculture, invention of the telegraph, investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, Islamic Golden Age, James Dyson, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Lao Tzu, low skilled workers, market fragmentation, mass immigration, Metcalfe’s law, New Economic Geography, out of africa, paper trading, Paul Samuelson, Pax Mongolica, profit motive, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Robert Metcalfe, Second Machine Age, Simon Kuznets, Skype, Snapchat, Stephen Hawking, telepresence, telerobotics, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, trade route, Washington Consensus

Understanding the First Unbundling’s Stylized Facts Chapter 2 identified five top-line facts that marked globalization’s first unbundling: The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized Trade boomed Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North than in the South The Great Divergence happened Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North. All these stylize facts can be easily understood as implications of globalization’s first unbundling. The explanation starts with the first two facts since they are tightly linked. Northern Industrialization, Southern Deindustrialization, and Trade In a deservedly famous paper on “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” Paul Krugman and Tony Venables explain the first two facts with the new economic geography (NEG) framework.

Understanding the Second Unbundling’s Stylized Facts Chapter 3 identified seven essential outcomes from Phase Four. The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar Commodity prices experienced a super-cycle that initiated growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations The Great Convergence occurred The nature of North-South trade changed to involve much more back-and-forth trade Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization The impacts were very geographically specific. The first four essential outcomes are closely entwined with the South’s industrialization, so they provide a good starting point. Southern Industrialization, Northern Deindustrialization, and Offshoring Phase Four was witness to a partial reversal of the reversal of fortune that occurred in Phase Three—at least for some of the ancient civilizations.

Since the cost of moving ideas fell much less, the innovations stayed in the North. The North industrialized and the South deindustrialized. Because of this uneven experience with industry, the Northern growth takeoff was earlier and faster than the South’s takeoff—and the result was the Great Divergence and rapid growth in international trade flows. When the ICT revolution lowered the cost of moving ideas inside the boundaries of international production chains, G7 firms started to arbitrage the gigantic imbalance in the planetary distribution of know-how by moving Northern knowledge to the South. The result was a rapid industrialization of the nations involved in these global value chains and a rapid deindustrialization of the G7 firms’ home nations. As before, rapid industrialization triggered rapid income growth, but this time the growth affected about half of humanity rather than just a fifth as it had done in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.


pages: 221 words: 55,901

The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon

Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, Pareto efficiency, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus

See also emerging economies development aid, 148–53, 157 development gap, 34–35, 83 Di Bao program, 166 discrimination: ghettos and, 66– 67; immigrants and, 64, 66, 127; labor and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; non-­material inequalites and, 64–66, 69; racial, 65; women and, 64–65, 103 disinflation, 95, 102, 110 distribution, 10n1, 186; capital-­ labor split and, 55–58, 60; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71–72; fairer globalization and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; geographical disequilibria and, 83; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see also Gini coefficient); global, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 124–38, 141– 45, 156; growth and, 49–50, 188; international, 17–18, 30, 148; median of, 31; OECD countries and, 10–11, 12n3; policy and, 26, 72, 135, 188; range of, 16; real earnings loss and, 78; redistribution and, 4, 7, 37 (see also redistribution); rise in inequality and, 74, 77–79, 82, 85, 90–92, 94–96, 99, 103–4, 106–7, 112, 114–15; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 16, 18 (see also standard of living); taxes and, 37, 92–94 (see also taxes); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 194 distribution (cont.) 52; transfers and, 4, 14, 48, 105, 110, 130, 135–36, 142, 148, 153, 158–67, 170, 175, 181, 183, 187; wage, 3, 78–79, 107 Divided We Stand report, 52 Doha negotiations, 154 drugs, 66, 133 Dubai, 127 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 156 education, 34, 187; college, 132; evolution of inequality and, 61, 65–68; fairer globalization and, 149, 152, 167–73, 180–81; globalization and, 132, 140, 143; labor and, 168, 180; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50; national inequality and, 167–73; poverty and, 24; preschool, 169–70; redistribution and, 149, 152, 167–73; rise in inequality and, 111; taxes and, 167–73; tuition and, 170 efficiency: data transfer technology and, 78; deregulation and, 94, 96, 105, 108; economic, 1, 4, 6, 111, 116, 119, 129–33, 135, 140–45, 158, 164, 167, 171, 181; emerging economies and, 78; equality and, 116, 129–31; fairness and, 8, 129– 31; globalization and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; human capital and, 175; import substitution and, 34, 180; inefficiency and, 105, 129–30, 132–33, 135, 140, 170–71, 180, 188; labor Index and, 175; loss of, 142, 164; opportunity and, 142–45; Pareto, 130n5; privatization and, 94, 96, 105, 108; redistribution and, 142–45; rents and, 180; social tensions and, 188; spontaneous redistribution and, 133; taxes and, 170; technology and, 78; weak institutions and, 36; wealth of nations and, 1 elitism, 182; fairer globalization and, 151, 165; globalization and, 127n4, 136, 138; rise in inequality and, 4, 6–7 emerging economies: Africa and, 122–23 (see also Africa); competition and, 178, 187–88; conditional cash transfers and, 165– 66; credit cards and, 165; domestic markets and, 120, 125; efficient data transfer and, 78; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; global inequality and, 40, 77– 80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188–89; globalization and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; institutions and, 109– 12; Kuznets curve and, 113; labor and, 77; natural resources and, 127; profits and, 117; rise in inequality and, 109–12; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 165; trends in, 57; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 entrepreneurs, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188 equality: efficiency and, 116, 129– 31; policy for, 184–89; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31–32, 36 Ethiopia, 21–22, 46t, 155 Index195 European Union (EU), 24, 156, 174, 177 Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 155 evolution of inequality: Africa and, 46t, 54–55; Brazil and, 46t, 55, 59, 70; capital and, 55–58, 60, 73; China and, 47, 53, 57–60; consumption and, 42t, 44t; convergence and, 65, 69; credit and, 61; crises and, 48, 50, 54, 57, 73–74; developed countries and, 47, 52–53, 56, 59–64, 66; developing countries and, 47, 53–55, 57, 63, 68; distribution and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71– 72; education and, 61, 65–68; elitism and, 4, 6–7, 46t; emerging economies and, 57; exceptions and, 52–53; France and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; ghettos and, 66–67; Gini coefficient and, 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58–59; Great Depression and, 48; growth and, 33, 49–50, 54; India and, 54, 57, 59–60; institutions and, 55, 69; investment and, 56; labor and, 55–58, 60; markets and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; national income inequality and, 48–52; non-­monetary inequalities and, 49, 60–70; normalization and, 41, 43–44; opportunity and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; perceptions of inequality and, 69–73; policy and, 55, 72; primary income and, 48–50, 58; production and, 57; productivity and, 63; profit and, 56; reform and, 54, 72; rise in inequality in, 48–52, 73, 77–80, 91–95, 97–98, 102–8; risk and, 63, 66; standard of living and, 41, 43– 45, 46t, 53–55, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 73; surveys and, 42t, 43–45, 56, 68n17, 69–71; taxes and, 12–14, 37, 48, 50, 56n5; Theil coefficient and, 42; United Kingdom and, 46t, 50, 51f, 59, 67, 68n17; United States and, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 33, 46t, 47–50, 51f, 58, 59n9, 66–70, 73; wealth and, 58–60 executives, 73, 88–89, 97, 174 expenditure per capita, 13, 15, 42t, 44t exports: deindustrialization and, 76, 82; fairer globalization and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; globalization and, 124, 128; rise in inequality and, 76, 82–84 fairer globalization: Africa and, 147, 151, 154–56, 179, 183; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; Bolsa Familia and, 166; Brazil and, 150, 154, 166–68, 173; capital and, 158–62, 167, 171, 175, 182; China and, 150, 154, 165–66, 172, 178; competition and, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182; consumers and, 177–78; consumption and, 159, 177; convergence and, 146–47, 157; correcting national inequalities and, 158–80; credit and, 164–65, 172, 180; crises and, 163, 176; deregulation and, 173; developed countries and, 150, 154–57, 160, 162, 164, 168–72, 176, 178–79, 181; developing countries and, 154, 166; development aid and, 196 fairer globalization (cont.) 148–53, 157; Di Bao program and, 166; distribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; education and, 149, 152, 167–73; 180–81; elitism and, 151, 165; emerging economies and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and, 155; exports and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; France and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient and, 156, 166; goods and services sector and, 180; growth and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; health issues and, 152, 166; imports and, 154, 177–78, 180; India and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; inheritance and, 170– 73; institutions and, 151, 168, 174–75; international trade and, 176–77; investment and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; liberalization and, 156, 179; markets and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50; national inequality and, 147, 158; opportunity and, 155, 167, 170, 172; policy and, 147–53, 157, 167–73, 175, 177, 179–83; poverty and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; prices and, 147– 48, 176, 178, 182; primary income and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; production and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; productivity and, 155, 177–78; profit and, 173, 176; Progresa program and, Index 166; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; reform and, 151, 161, 163, 168–69; regulation and, 152, 173–76, 181–82; risk and, 148, 154, 156, 159, 164, 171, 174–75, 178; standard of living and, 146–48, 154, 156–58, 160, 165, 168–69; surveys and, 169; taxes and, 148, 158–73, 175, 181–83; technology and, 156, 173; TRIPS and, 156; United Kingdom and, 163, 169; United States and, 155, 159–61, 163– 64, 169, 174–75, 182; wealth and, 162, 164, 167, 170–73 Fitoussi, Jean-­Paul, 14 France: evolution of inequality and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient of, 20; global inequality and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; offshoring and, 81; rise in inequality and, 80, 88, 92–93, 95, 97, 99, 103; soccer and, 87; wage deductions and, 159 G7 countries, 56 G20 countries, 182 Garcia-­Panalosa, Cecilia, 107 Gates, Bill, 5–6, 70, 150 Germany, 2, 21, 46t, 50, 51f, 80, 88, 92 Ghana, 46t, 54 ghettos, 66–67 Giertz, Seth, 160–61 Gini coefficient: Brazil and, 22; Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, Index197 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58– 59; fairer globalization and, 156, 166; France and, 20; historical perspective on, 27–28; meaning of, 18–19; purchasing power parity and, 28; rise in inequality and, 110; United States and, 21; wealth inequality and, 58–60 Glass-­Steagall Act, 174n15 global distribution, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 156 global inequality: Africa and, 16, 21, 23, 30–31, 34, 36; between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38–39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90–91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; Brazil and, 21– 23; crises and, 20, 38–41; cross-­ country heterogeneity and, 13; definition of, 3–4, 9–10, 25–26, 30–32, 39; developed countries and, 10–11, 21, 34–39; developing countries and, 10–11, 13, 21, 32, 34–39; effects of, 38–40; emerging economies and, 40, 77–80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188– 89; at the end of the 2000s, 20– 25; evolution of inequality and, 41 (see also evolution of inequality); expenditure per capita and, 13, 15, 42t, 44t; France and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; globalization and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; great gap and, 33–36; historic turning point for, 25–32; Human Development Report and, 25; institutions and, 36; measuring, 10– 20; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50, 185; normalization and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; policy and, 185–89; Povcal database and, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t; prices and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; profit and, 13; reduction of, 2, 185–86; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30–32, 36; rise of, 2–4, 7; risk and, 20; standard of living and, 10–26, 29, 31–33, 36, 39; surveys on, 10, 12–15, 20n10, 21–22, 29, 42t, 43–45; technology and, 3–4, 34–35; trend reversal in, 37–38; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 35–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124– 29, 184–85, 189 globalization: Africa and, 122–23, 126–27; Asian dragons and, 34, 82; Brazil and, 127, 133; capital and, 117, 125–26, 132, 137; China and, 120–22, 128; competition and, 117–18, 130, 186 (see also competition); as complex historical phenomenon, 1–2; consumption and, 137–39; convergence and, 120–22, 125; credit and, 131–32, 137–40; crises and, 119–22, 125, 135–39, 142; debate over, 1; deindustrialization in developed countries and, 75–82; democratic societies and, 135–36; deregulation and, 95–99; developed countries and, 117, 119, 121, 127n4, 128, 133, 143; developing countries and, 121, 127n4, 128, 132, 143; education and, 132, 140, 143; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; elitism and, 127n4, 136, 138; 198 globalization (cont.) emerging economies and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; exports and, 124, 128; fairer, 146–83 (see also fairer globalization); future of inequality between countries and, 119–22; global inequality and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; goods and services sector and, 127, 130; growth and, 118–29, 134–39; health issues and, 140– 41, 144; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; imports and, 119, 124; inequality within countries and, 124–29; inheritance and, 144–45; institutions and, 124; as instrument for modernization, 1; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; investment and, 119, 130, 134–35, 143; laissez-­faire approach and, 118, 129; markets and, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; as moral threat, 1; national inequality and, 119; negative consequences of inequality and, 131–42; opportunity and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; as panacea, 1; policy and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; poverty and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; prices and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; primary income and, 135, 143–44; production and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; productivity and, 120, 125, 127, 144; profit and, 117; redistribution and, 121, 124–38, 141–45; reform and, 124, 126–27, 138; regulation and, 136; rise in inequality and, 117–18; risk and, 127–28, Index 137–39, 144; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 120–23, 126, 138, 143; surveys and, 127n4, 141n15; taxes and, 74, 89n10, 91–94, 104, 114–15, 129–30, 135–36, 142–45; technology and, 86–91, 118–20, 125; trends and, 118; United States and, 135–39; wealth and, 74, 95, 98, 125, 127, 129, 131–32, 139, 143–45 Great Depression, 48 Greece, 46t, 135 gross domestic product (GDP) measurement: Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, 41–45, 56–57; fairer globalization and, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; global inequality and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39; normalization and, 29, 41, 43–45; rise in inequality and, 94; Sen-­Stiglitz-­ Fitoussi report and, 14 Gross National Income (GNI), 148–49 Growing Unequal report, 52 growth, 4; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; constraints and, 35; consumption and, 13–15, 42t, 44t, 80, 137–39, 159, 177; convergence and, 16; determinants of, 34; distribution and, 49–50, 188; emerging economies and, 125 (see also emerging economies); evolution of inequality and, 33, 49–50, 54; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; GDP mea- Index199 surement of, 30, 39 (see also gross domestic product (GDP) measurement); globalization and, 118–29, 134–39; great gap in, 33–36; import substitution and, 34, 180; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; negative, 31; political reversals and, 36; poverty and, 28–29; production and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; rate of, 15, 29–35, 79, 125, 185; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; relative gap and, 18, 20, 30–32, 36; rise in inequality and, 75, 79, 82, 84, 109–12; trends in, 40, 121 health issues, 24, 187; fairer globalization and, 152, 166; globalization and, 140–41, 144; public healthcare and, 37, 111, 140 Heckscher-­Ohlin model, 76 Hong Kong, 34, 82, 174 housing, 12, 61, 137 human capital, 74, 167, 175 Human Development Report, 25 Ibrahimovich, Zlata, 87 IKEA, 172 immigrants, 64, 66, 127 imports: fairer globalization and, 154, 177–78, 180; globalization and, 119, 124; import substitution and, 34, 180; rise in inequality and, 80 income: average, 9, 18, 21, 29–30, 43, 72; bonuses and, 87, 174; convergence and, 16; currency conversion and, 11; definition of, 45; deindustrialization and, 75–82; developed/developing countries and, 5, 36; disposable, 20, 22, 24, 48, 50, 51f, 74, 91, 163; distribution of, 3 (see also distribution); executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; family, 10; financial operators and, 87–88, 90–91; gap in, 3, 5–6, 27f, 33– 36, 42t, 44t, 149; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; high, 50, 52, 56, 85–93, 97–99, 140, 143, 158–62, 164, 189; household, 10–12, 43, 45, 50, 58, 105, 107, 137, 163, 177; inequality in, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132– 34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; international scale for, 17–18, 23, 30; lawyers and, 89–90; mean, 17, 20n10, 27f, 42t, 44t; median, 6, 49, 71, 102–3, 106; minimum wage and, 52–53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; national, 7, 16–19, 30, 43, 48–52, 60, 73, 84n6, 125, 149, 153, 172; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11; opportunity and, 5; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; per capita, 20, 25, 29–30, 42t, 45, 48, 55–56, 120; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; primary, 48–50, 58, 135, 143–44, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; 200 income (cont.) purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; real earnings loss and, 78; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31– 32, 36; superstars and, 85–87, 89–90; taxes and, 37, 89n10, 92–93, 145, 159, 161–65, 170 (see also taxes); technology and, 34, 180; virtual, 12; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; wealth inequality and, 58–60; women and, 64– 65, 103 India: evolution of inequality and, 54, 57, 59–60; fairer globalization and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; household consumption and, 15; international trade and, 75; Kuznets hypothesis and, 113; rise in inequality and, 2, 15–16, 19, 30, 34, 46t, 75, 83, 90, 112–13; taxes and, 165 Indonesia, 30, 46t, 54, 111, 127 industrialization: deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; labor and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188 Industrial Revolution, 26, 29, 33, 35 inequality: between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38– 39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90– 91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118– 19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see Index also Gini coefficient); income, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132–34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; international, 17; inverted U curve and, 54, 113; measurement of, 18; negative consequences of, 131–42; non-­ monetary, 49, 60–70; perceptions of, 69–73; social tensions and, 188; standard of living and, 18 (see also standard of living); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 42; wealth, 58–60; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 37–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124–29, 184–85, 189 infant mortality, 150 inflation, 50, 95, 102, 110 inheritance: fairer globalization and, 170–73; globalization and, 144–45; rise in inequality and, 93 institutions: deregulation and, 91– 112 (see also deregulation); disinflation and, 95, 102, 110; emerging economies and, 109– 12; evolution of inequality and, 55, 69; fairer globalization and, 151, 168, 174–75; global inequality and, 36; globalization and, 124; markets and, 91–92; privatization and, 94–109; reform and, 91–112; rise in inequality and, 91–112, 114; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 92–94; “too big to fail” concept and, 174–75; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 International Development Association, 149 Index201 international income scale, 17–18, 23, 30 International Labor Organization, 51 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54, 57, 84, 90, 109–10 international trade: capital mobility and, 74; China and, 75; de­ industrialization and, 75–76, 78–79; effect of new players, 75–76; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; India and, 75; offshoring and, 81–82; rise in inequality and, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114; Soviet Union and, 75; theory of, 76; wage ladder effects and, 78–79 inverted U curve, 54, 113 investment: direct, 76, 79; evolution of inequality and, 56; fairer globalization and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; foreign, 83, 85, 112, 155, 157, 160, 179; globalization and, 119, 130, 134– 35, 143; production and, 119; public services and, 143; re-­ investment and, 56; rise in inequality and, 76, 79, 82–83, 85, 92, 97–98, 112; taxes and, 92 Ivory Coast, 54 Japan, 34, 46t, 51f, 103 job training, 34, 181, 187 Kenya, 46t, 54 kidnapping, 133 Kuznets, Simon, 113, 126 labor: agriculture and, 12, 82, 84, 122–23, 127–28, 132, 155; artists and, 86–87; bonuses and, 87, 174; capital and, 3–4, 55– 58, 60, 158, 161n7, 185; capital mobility and, 3; cheap, 77, 117; costs of, 81, 100, 104–5, 117, 176, 187; decline in share of national income and, 73; deindustrialization and, 75–82; demand for, 168; deregulation and, 99– 109; discrimination and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; distribution of income and, 175 (see also distribution); education and, 168, 180; efficiency and, 96–97, 175; emerging economies and, 77; entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 55–58, 60; excess, 81, 83; executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; goods and services sector and, 13, 73, 80, 85, 91, 102, 127, 130, 180; growth and, 154, 179; immigrant, 64, 66, 127; increased mobility and, 90–91; industrialization and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 80, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; International Labor Organization and, 51; job training and, 34, 181, 187; manufacturing and, 57, 80–82, 84, 123, 154–55, 157; median wage and, 49, 71, 102– 3, 106; minimum wage and, 52– 53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; mobility of, 185; offshoring and, 81–82; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19– 20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; 202 labor (cont.) privatization and, 99–109; productivity and, 63, 79, 81–82, 89, 100, 102, 104, 114, 120, 125, 127, 144, 155, 177–78; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; real earnings loss and, 78; reserve, 84; security and, 133; skilled, 76–78, 82–83, 86, 90, 114, 117, 126, 176; standard of living and, 69 (see also standard of living); superstars and, 85, 87, 89–90; supply of, 130– 31, 164; taxes and, 159–60, 171; technology and, 85–91 (see also technology); unemployment and, 37, 39, 53, 62–63, 66, 69, 77, 94, 100–108, 164, 175–76; unions and, 100–106, 108, 156, 179; unskilled, 3, 76–77, 79, 83, 105, 117, 154; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; women and, 64–65, 103, 114; writers and, 86–87 Lady Gaga, 5–6 laissez-­faire approach, 118, 129 Latin America, 9, 34, 36, 54–55, 58, 109–11, 155, 165–66, 168, 180 lawyers, 89–90 liberalization: capital and, 96; customs, 156; deregulation and, 96–99, 108–9, 112 (see also deregulation); fairer globalization and, 156, 179; mobility of capital and, 115; policy effects of, 97–99; Reagan administration and, 91; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; rise in inequality and, 76, 91, 93, 96–99, 108–9, 112, 115; tax rates and, 93 Luxembourg, 16, 19 Index Madonna, 71 Malaysia, 127 manufacturing: deindustrialization and, 75–82, 84, 123; emerging economies and, 57, 84; fairer globalization and, 154–55, 157; France and, 81; offshoring and, 81–82; United Kingdom and, 80; United States and, 80 markets: competition and, 76–77, 79–82, 84, 86, 94–98, 102, 104, 115–18, 130, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182, 186–88; credit, 131; deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; deregulation and, 91–92, 99–109 (see also deregulation); development gap and, 34–35, 83; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; effect of new players, 75–76; emerging economies and, 120 (see also emerging economies); entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; exports and, 76, 82–84, 124, 128, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; globalization and, 35, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; housing, 12, 61, 137; imports and, 1, 34, 80, 119, 124, 154, 177–78, 180; institutions and, 91–112; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; labor and, Index203 144 (see also labor); liberalization and, 112 (see also liberalization); monopolies and, 94, 111, 127, 136; offshoring and, 81– 82; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; reform and, 54 (see also reform); regulation and, 74 (see also regulation); rise in inequality and, 74, 76– 79, 83, 86, 90–112, 114; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; single market and, 76; South-­South exchange and, 35; TRIPS and, 156 median wage, 49, 71, 102–3, 106 Mexico, 46t, 57, 59, 109–10, 133, 166, 172 middle class, 51, 71, 93, 109, 133– 34, 136, 140 Milanovic, Branko, 4–5, 17n8, 29n16 Millennium Development Goals, 149–50, 185 minerals, 84, 127 minimum wage, 52–53, 100, 102– 8, 175, 177 monopolies, 94, 111, 127, 136 Morocco, 173 Morrisson, Christian, 28 movies, 87 Murtin, Fabrice, 28 national inequality, 2–4; correcting, 158–80; education and, 167–73; fairer globalization and, 147, 158; Gini coefficient and, 27 (see also Gini coefficient); globalization and, 119; market regulation and, 173–75; protectionism and, 147, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 158–73, 175, 178; rise in, 6, 48– 52, 115, 204; taxes and, 158–73, 175, 181–83 natural resources, 84–85, 92, 122, 126–28, 127, 151 Netherlands, 46t, 50, 66, 70, 102 Nigeria, 9, 46t, 54, 127, 151 non-­monetary inequalities: access and, 61, 67–68; capability and, 61; differences in environment and, 66–68; discrimination and, 64–66, 69; employment precariousness and, 63–64; evolution of inequality and, 49, 60–70; intergenerational mobility and, 68; opportunities and, 49, 60– 70; social justice and, 60, 70; unemployment and, 62–63 normalization: evolution of inequality and, 41, 43–44; GDP measurement and, 29, 41, 43– 45; global inequality and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29 Occupy Wall Street movement, 6, 135 OECD countries, 27t; evolution of inequality and, 42t, 43, 44t, 50– 52, 64, 65n13; fairer globalization and, 149, 159, 162, 164– 65; Gini coefficient and, 51; income distribution and, 51; relaxation of regulation and, 99; restrictive, 64; rise in inequality and, 50–51, 94, 99, 102, 106n18, 107; social programs and, 94; standard of living and, 11–12, 43, 50–52, 64, 94, 99, 102, 107, 120, 149, 159, 162, 164–65; U-­shaped curve on income and, 50 OECD Database on Household 204 Income Distribution and Poverty, 11–12 offshoring, 81–82 oil, 92, 127 opportunity, 5; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; as capability, 61; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 155, 167, 170, 172; globalization and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; redistribution and, 142–45; rise in inequality and, 102 Pakistan, 46t, 111 Pareto efficiency, 130n5 Pavarotti, Luciano, 86–87 payroll, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175 Pearson Commission, 149 pension systems, 167 Perotti, Roberto, 134 Philippines, 46t, 111 Pickett, Kate, 140 Piketty, Thomas, 4, 48, 59n8, 60, 89n10, 125, 160n4 PISA survey, 169–70 policy, 4; adjustment, 109, 153; Cold War and, 149, 153; convergence and, 147–48; development aid and, 148–53; distributive, 26, 72, 135, 188; educational, 149, 152, 167–73; evolution of inequality and, 55, 72; fairer globalization and, 147–53, 157–58, 167–73, 175–83; Glass-­Steagall Act and, 174n15; global inequality and, 185–89; globalization and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; globalizing equality and, 184–89; import substi- Index tution and, 34; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; poverty reduction and, 147–48; protectionist, 7, 99– 100, 107–8, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; reform and, 74 (see also reform); rise in inequality and, 34, 74–75, 85, 94, 97, 99– 100, 104, 106–11, 114–16; social, 7; standard of living and, 147–48 population growth, 28–29, 110, 183 portfolios, 88 Povcal database, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t poverty, 1, 44t, 109; Collier on, 23; convergence and, 147–48; criminal activity and, 133–34; definition of, 24; development aid and, 147–52; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; ghettos and, 66–67; global inequality and, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32; globalization and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; growth and, 28–29; measurement of, 23–24; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; reduction policies for, 147–48; traps of, 144, 150, 164 prices: commodity, 84, 182; exports and, 178; factor, 74, 126; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 176, 178, 182; global inequality and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; globalization and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; imports and, 80; international compari- Index205 sons of, 11; lower, 94, 137; oil, 92; rise in inequality and, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; rising, 110, 122, 178; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; statistics on, 11, 27; subsidies and, 109–10, 175 primary income: evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 58; fairer globalization and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; globalization and, 135, 143–44 privatization: deregulation and, 94–112; efficiency and, 94, 96, 105, 108; globalization of finance and, 95–99; institutions and, 94–109; labor market and, 99–109; reform and, 94–109; telecommunications and, 111 production: deindustrialization and, 75–82; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; globalization and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; growth and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; material investment and, 119; North vs.

Some believe it has contributed to the “wealth of nations” by making them on the whole more efficient. Others feel it has caused the majority of humanity to sink into poverty in order to benefit a privileged elite. Criticism has been heaped upon it. Globalization is said to be the cause of economic crises, the destruction of the environment, the excessive importance of finance and the financial sector, deindustrialization, the standardization of culture, and many other ills of contemporary society, including an explosive rise in inequality. My goal is to shed some light on this debate by focusing on one of the above points in particular, one that has arguably drawn the most attention: inequality. Globalization is a complex historical phenomenon that has existed, in some 2 Introduction form or another, since the beginning of human society, but which we can track with more precision over recent centuries.1 No one denies that it exists, and there is little doubt that it will continue.

To the extent that globalization enables better integration primarily of the developing world into the global economy, one might expect that its potential distributive effects have been different in developed and developing economies. As this also applies to the nature of policy reforms and the circumstances in which they have been undertaken, care will be taken throughout the chapter to distinguish the two sets of countries. The Effects of Globalization and Deindustrialization on Developed Countries The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a radical change in the world economy. Whole swaths of the world were opened up to international trade, most importantly China in the 1980s and the Soviet bloc and India at the turn of the 1990s. Simple economic reasoning suggests that the opening up of these giants to international trade was equiv- 76 Chapter 3 alent to the entrance of around a billion workers, for the most part unskilled, into international competition, with the simultaneous effect of creating a relative scarcity of other factors of production, particularly capital, skilled labor, and raw materials.


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Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic Slump by Tom Clark, Anthony Heath

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, British Empire, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, credit crunch, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Etonian, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, full employment, Gini coefficient, hedonic treadmill, hiring and firing, income inequality, interest rate swap, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, MITM: man-in-the-middle, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, obamacare, oil shock, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, science of happiness, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, unconventional monetary instruments, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working poor

Summary results and fieldwork details at: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cu­mulus_uploads/document/u7f0cyctl1/YGCam-Archi­ve-results-040413-All-Countries.pdf 35. Borie-Holtz et al., No End in Sight, pp. 3–7. 36. Comparative data for the wider American workforce are drawn from another survey, conducted by the Heldrich Center in November 2009. See ibid., Table 2. 37. Valerie Walkerdine and Luis Jimenez, Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 137–8. 38. The satisfaction scores of the continually employed group was essentially unchanged over these years – rounding to 5.3 in both years. This updated analysis was kindly provided by James Laurence and Chaeyoon Lim. 39. Between the 2002/03 and the 2008/09 waves, the satisfaction scores of those who have moved into unemployment drop by just over 0.5 (a fractionally larger fall than in the most recent data) while the ‘newly re-employed’ actually experience a marginal increase in happiness.

‘Suicide in England and Wales 1861–2007: A time-trends analysis’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 39:6 (2010), pp. 1464–75, available at: http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/39/6/1464.full Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, Fontana/HarperCollins, London, 1994 [1840]. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases source’, Science, NS 185:4157 (1974), pp. 1124–31, available at: www.socsci.uci.edu/∼bskyrms/bio/readings/tversky_k_heuristics_biases.pdf Walkerdine, Valerie and Luis Jimenez. Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012. Whittaker, Matthew. On Borrowed Time? Dealing with household debt in an era of stagnant incomes, Resolution Foundation, London, 2012. Wilcox, W. Bradford (ed.). The State of Our Unions, 2009, National Marriage Project, University of Virginia and the Institute for American Values, Charlottesville, VA, 2009. Willetts, David.


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What Would the Great Economists Do?: How Twelve Brilliant Minds Would Solve Today's Biggest Problems by Linda Yueh

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, additive manufacturing, Asian financial crisis, augmented reality, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, Corn Laws, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, cryptocurrency, currency peg, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, endogenous growth, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fear of failure, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, fixed income, forward guidance, full employment, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Gunnar Myrdal, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index card, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, information asymmetry, intangible asset, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, lateral thinking, life extension, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, market bubble, means of production, mittelstand, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, Nelson Mandela, non-tariff barriers, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, price mechanism, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, reshoring, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, universal basic income, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working-age population

The answer holds lessons for other economies that may follow those two nations as they embark on the typical economic path of industrialization followed by deindustrialization. Industrialization, deindustrialization and reindustrialization Great Britain became the first industrialized nation in the late eightteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by Germany and the United States. The period, which became known as the Industrial Revolution, saw the economy transformed from an agrarian society into one characterized by factories owned and run by merchants who traded their wares both at home and overseas. In our own times, Britain and several other advanced economies, including the United States, have experienced yet another fundamental structural change: deindustrialization. Since the 1980s Thatcher-era reforms that liberalized the financial sector – notably the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986, when markets were opened up to greater competition – Britain has seen industry give way to services.

At its peak, financial services alone made up some 8 per cent of UK national output, which is not that much smaller than all of Britain’s manufacturing combined. This is the essence of deindustrialization, where industry has given way to a dominant services sector in the same way that agriculture was overtaken by manufacturing during Adam Smith’s time. * * * The question is, can the US, and perhaps the UK, reverse deindustrialization? It’s a refrain heard frequently since the crisis. ‘Made in America’ and ‘Made in Britain’ are among the phrases uttered by governments and businesses after the worst recession in a century. But, reversing the process of deindustrialization is challenging in a globalized world economy. Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers.

Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers. In fact, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik even points to ‘premature deindustrialization’ in some developing countries which are moving from agriculture directly to services due to the forces of globalization, which holds potentially worrying consequences for countries that have yet to gain a firm foothold in the middle-income stratum. We are in unknown territory. The impetus for deindustrialization is greater in Britain and America than in other nations. After suffering their worst financial crisis in a century, they are anxious for change. That’s not the sole consideration. Adam Smith may be the economist who named the ‘invisible hand’ that allowed the market to dictate what was produced and how it was priced, but he did not think highly of the services sector.


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Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy by Dani Rodrik

3D printing, airline deregulation, Asian financial crisis, bank run, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, central bank independence, centre right, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, continuous integration, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, endogenous growth, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, failed state, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, full employment, future of work, George Akerlof, global value chain, income inequality, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, investor state dispute settlement, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, Kenneth Rogoff, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market fundamentalism, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, new economy, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, Pareto efficiency, postindustrial economy, price stability, pushing on a string, race to the bottom, randomized controlled trial, regulatory arbitrage, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Sam Peltzman, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steven Pinker, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey, zero-sum game, éminence grise

But worryingly similar trends are very much evidenced in Sub-Saharan Africa too, where few countries had much industrialization to begin with. The only countries that seem to have escaped the curse of premature industrialization are a relatively small group of Asian countries and manufactures exporters. The advanced countries themselves have experienced significant employment deindustrialization. But manufactures output at constant prices has held its own comparatively well in the advanced world, something that is typically overlooked since so much of the discussion on deindustrialization focuses on nominal rather than real values. The reasons behind these trends have to do both with technology and trade. Rapid global technological progress in manufacturing has reduced the prices of manufactured goods relative to services, discouraging newcomers in developing countries from entry.

Peasants could be transformed into factory workers virtually overnight, implying significant productivity gains for the economy. Manufacturing was traditionally a rapid escalator to higher income levels. But once manufacturing operations become robotized and require high skills, the supply-side constraints begin to bite. Effectively, developing countries lose their comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rich countries. We see the consequences in the premature deindustrialization of the developing world today. In a world of premature deindustrialization, achieving economy-wide productivity growth becomes that much harder for low-income countries. As we saw in an earlier chapter, it is not clear whether there are effective substitutes for industrialization. The economist Tyler Cowen has suggested that developing countries may benefit from the trickle down of innovation from the advanced economies: they can consume a stream of new products at cheap prices.16 This is a model of what Cowen calls “cellphones instead of automobile factories.”

Perhaps we should not be surprised that even advanced countries are having difficulty these days living up to liberal democratic norms. The natural tendency for countries without long and deep liberal traditions is to slide into authoritarianism. This has negative consequences not just for political development but economic development as well. The growth challenge compounds the democracy challenge. One of the most important economic phenomena of our time is a process I have called “premature deindustrialization.”10 Partly because of automation in manufacturing and partly because of globalization, low-income countries are running out of industrialization opportunities much sooner than their earlier counterparts in East Asia did. This would not be a tragedy if manufacturing was not traditionally a powerful growth engine, for reasons I discuss below. With hindsight, it has become clear that there was in fact no coherent growth story for most emerging markets.


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The Globotics Upheaval: Globalisation, Robotics and the Future of Work by Richard Baldwin

agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, AltaVista, Amazon Web Services, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, basic income, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Cass Sunstein, commoditize, computer vision, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, Douglas Hofstadter, Downton Abbey, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, facts on the ground, future of journalism, future of work, George Gilder, Google Glasses, Google Hangouts, hiring and firing, impulse control, income inequality, industrial robot, intangible asset, Internet of things, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, job automation, knowledge worker, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, Machine translation of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." to Russian and back, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, mass incarceration, Metcalfe’s law, new economy, optical character recognition, pattern recognition, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, post-work, profit motive, remote working, reshoring, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Gordon, Robert Metcalfe, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, side project, Silicon Valley, Skype, Snapchat, social intelligence, sovereign wealth fund, standardized shipping container, statistical model, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, supply-chain management, TaskRabbit, telepresence, telepresence robot, telerobotics, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, universal basic income

That “somewhere” was the emerging economies, primarily China. This was one of the most dramatic aspects of the Services Transformation. The historically fast deindustrialization of the former industrial giants, and the historically fast industrialization of a handful of formerly unindustrialized economies—call them the Industrializing 6 (China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey). Most economists misthink this massive flip in the world of manufacturing by focusing on the production that was offshored. In reality, it was about thoughts, not things. As I detail at length in my 2016 book, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization, knowledge is the key to understanding this rapid deindustrialization. The point is that the US, German, and Japanese offshoring firms sent along their know-how with the offshored stages of production and displaced jobs.

This technological impulse pushed the economy in a radically different direction, since it was radically different—Byrnjolsson and McAfee call it the Second Machine Age. ICT created better substitutes for people whose jobs involved manual tasks and better tools for people whose jobs involved mental tasks. The result was a “skills twist.” The technology created jobs for people who worked with their heads but destroyed jobs for those who worked with their hands. The resulting deindustrialization devastated communities and created enormous social and economic difficulties for blue-collar workers—especially in nations that failed to help their citizens make the transition (like the US and UK). The Globotics Transformation has been launched by a third technological impulse—digital technology. The digitech impulse is radically different than steam power and ICT, but in a way that is subtler than the difference between steam and ICT.

The new ICT impulse produced a new economic transformation, as I point out at length in my 2016 book, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.3 The societal changes weren’t anywhere near as epic as those of the Great Transformation, but they still shook things up in a big way. Industrialization—which had been the codeword for progress for a couple of centuries—turned into deindustrialization. The results were dramatic. NEW TECHNOLOGY PRODUCES A NEW ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION The impact of the ICT impulse was first felt though the automation of industrial jobs. Computer-controlled machines rapidly displaced workers, especially in the auto industry, and especially those involved in welding, painting, and specific pick-and-place tasks. As ICT advanced, the repetitive, manual tasks that industrial robots could handle increased—displacing jobs as it went.


A United Ireland: Why Unification Is Inevitable and How It Will Come About by Kevin Meagher

Boris Johnson, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, deindustrialization, knowledge economy, kremlinology, land reform, Nelson Mandela, period drama, Right to Buy, trade route, transaction costs

Of course, for most of the last century, that’s exactly what it was; a fiefdom built on communal inequality. Over the last two decades, however, there have seen massive structural changes that have served to level the playing field between Protestants and Catholics, not least the Good Friday Agreement process and the disbandment of the RUC, but also the massive changes to the economy, notably the deindustrialisation of the economy and, with it, increases in urban poverty and decay. Northern Ireland will appear to be hanging on by its fingertips – still the least economically dynamic or socially liberal part of the United Kingdom. People in Britain, a few staunch Unionists aside, will feel little affinity with the place. The Irish will, broadly, like to see their country unified, with guarantees that the economic impacts won’t be adverse.


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People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent by Joseph E. Stiglitz

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, basic income, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, central bank independence, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, gig economy, global supply chain, greed is good, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, late fees, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Peter Thiel, postindustrial economy, price discrimination, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, shareholder value, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, two-sided market, universal basic income, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, working-age population

At the time, it didn’t seem so golden—I saw massive racial discrimination and segregation, great inequality, labor strife, and episodic recessions. One couldn’t help but see the effects, both on my schoolmates and on the façade of the city. The city traced the history of industrialization and deindustrialization in America, having been founded in 1906 as the site of the largest integrated steel mill in the world, and named after the founding chairman of US Steel, Elbert H. Gary. It was a company town through and through. When I went back for my fifty-fifth high school reunion in 2015, before Trump had become the fixture in the landscape that he is today, the tensions were palpable, and for good reason. The city had followed the country’s trajectory toward deindustrialization. The population was only half of what it was when I was growing up. The city was burned out. It had become a filming location for Hollywood movies set in war zones, or after the apocalypse.

Even if economic policies successfully avoided another Great Depression, it is not a surprise that there have been political consequences of this unbalanced rescue.2 Hillary Clinton’s referring to those in the deindustrialized parts of the country supporting her opponent as the “deplorables” may have been a fatal political error (saying that was itself deplorable): to them, her words reflected the cavalier attitude of the elites. A series of books, including J. D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis3 and Arlie Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right4 documented the feelings of those who had experienced deindustrialization and the many others who shared their discontent, showing how distant they were from the country’s elites.5 One of Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign slogans was, “It’s the economy, stupid.”

We signed bad trade deals that led to the loss of American industrial jobs.1 This criticism of globalization has found enormous resonance, especially in the parts of the country that experienced deindustrialization. By contrast, globalization’s advocates claim that all of this is sheer nonsense. America has benefited from globalization. Protectionist policies put at risk all that has been gained through trade. In the end, they say, protectionism will not help even those who’ve lost their jobs due to globalization or seen their wages collapse. They, the US, and the entire world will be worse off. Globalization’s advocates shift the blame for deindustrialization and the American malaise elsewhere: the real source of job loss and low wages for unskilled workers has been improved technology, and globalization is getting a bum rap.


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Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century by Torben Iversen, David Soskice

Andrei Shleifer, assortative mating, augmented reality, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, centre right, cleantech, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, first-past-the-post, full employment, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, implied volatility, income inequality, industrial cluster, inflation targeting, invisible hand, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, means of production, mittelstand, Network effects, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, passive investing, precariat, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, RFID, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, smart cities, speech recognition, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, too big to fail, trade liberalization, union organizing, urban decay, Washington Consensus, winner-take-all economy, working-age population, World Values Survey, young professional, zero-sum game

These changes have severed previously strong complementarities in production between skilled and semiskilled workers. Deindustrialization contributed to this process by gradually segregating many low- and intermediary-skilled workers into insecure, often part-time or temporary, service jobs (Wren 2013). The combined effect of new technology and deindustrialization has been a divergence in employment security and income between core and peripheral workers (Kalleberg 2003), with the college-educated in much more secure positions. A key question for our entire understanding of the role of democratic politics in redistribution is the extent to which governments have stepped in to compensate and assist workers who have been adversely affected by deindustrialization and technological change.25 In past work, we have argued that in multiparty PR systems where each class is represented by its own party, there is an incentive for the middle-income party to ally with the low-income party because the size of the pie to be divided rises with the wealth of those excluded from the coalition.

Table A3.1 shows the regression results from the second stage of the estimation, which are the basis for figure 3.7 in the main text. We might add that the general results presented in table 1 are confirmed if we use a nationally specific shock variable in a non-linear setup. The shock variable in this analysis is deindustrialization, defined as the annual drop in industrial employment as a share of the working age population, incorporated into a nonlinear model. The results are reported in Iversen and Soskice (2014). This analysis also shows that our common shock variable, as defined above, is fairly highly correlated with the deindustrialization variable, measured as annual means (.64). TABLE A3.1. Regression results for the effect of shocks on government policies Total social spending Spending on unemployment Spending on ALMP Shock 0.78*** (0.12) 0.68*** (0.12) 0.51*** (0.12) PR with weak CD * shock 0.74*** (0.26) 1.24*** (0.32) 1.53*** (0.27) PR with strong CD * shock 0.12 (0.16) 0.24 (0.24) 0.25 (0.27) Unexpected growth –0.15*** (0.01) –0.24*** (0.03) –0.44 (0.19) Share population under 15 0.52*** (0.17) — — Share population over 65 0.30 (0.17) 0.43*** (0.02) — Automatic disbursements 0.69*** (0.11) N 493 483 397 Adj.

One can of course find examples of governments giving tax concessions to companies that promise to retain jobs instead of moving them to low-wage countries. Such pressures and temptations arise naturally as part of Vernon’s (1966) product life-cycle as production becomes more routinized and can be performed by robots or low-skilled workers abroad. But we think it is far more remarkable that governments in ACDs routinely shun such temptations. At the height of deindustrialization in the 1980s governments across ACDs engaged in policies that accelerated the decline of sunset industries by cutting back subsidies, privatizing unproductive public enterprises, and removing barriers to competition from low-wage countries while betting on new high value-added industries moving in to take advantage of an abundance of high-skilled labor (and the associated institutional supports).


pages: 232

Planet of Slums by Mike Davis

barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, centre right, clean water, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, failed state, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet Archive, jitney, jobless men, Kibera, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, liberation theology, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, megacity, microcredit, Nelson Mandela, New Urbanism, Pearl River Delta, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent control, structural adjustment programs, surplus humans, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor

Eighty percent of Marx's industrial proletariat now lives in China or somewhere outside of Western Europe and the United States.38 In most of the developing world, however, city growth lacks the powerful manufacturing export engines of China, Korea, and Taiwan, as well as China's vast inflow of foreign capital (currently equal to half | of total foreign investment in the entire developing world). Since the ! mid-1980s, the great industrial cities of the South — Bombay, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Belo Horizonte, and Sao Paulo — have all j suffered massive plant closures and tendential deindustrialization. ' Elsewhere, urbanization has been more radically decoupled from industrialization, even from development per se and, in sub-Saharan Africa, from that supposed sine qua non of urbanization, rising agricultural productivity. The size of a city's economy, as a result, often bears surprisingly little relationship to its population size, and vice versa. Figure 5 illustrates this disparity between population and GDP rankings for the largest metropolitan areas.

Cities — in spite of their stagnant or negative economic growth, and without necessary investment in new infrastructure, educational facilities or public-health systems — have simply harvested this world agrarian crisis. Rather than the classical stereotype of the labor-intensive countryside and the capital-intensive industrial metropolis, the Third World now contains many examples of capital-intensive countrysides and labor-intensive | deindustrialized cities. "Overurbanization," in other words, is driven by [ the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs. This is one of | the unexpected tracks down which a neoliberal world order is shunting 1 the future.48 From Karl Marx to Max Weber, classical social theory believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin, and Chicago — and indeed Los Angeles, Sao Paulo, Pusan, and today, Ciudad Juarez, Bangalore, and Guangzhou have roughly approximated this canonical trajectory.

This is one of | the unexpected tracks down which a neoliberal world order is shunting 1 the future.48 From Karl Marx to Max Weber, classical social theory believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin, and Chicago — and indeed Los Angeles, Sao Paulo, Pusan, and today, Ciudad Juarez, Bangalore, and Guangzhou have roughly approximated this canonical trajectory. Most cities of the South, however, more closely resemble Victorian Dublin, which, as historian Emmet Larkin has stressed, was unique amongst "all the slumdoms produced in the western world in the nineteenth century ... [because] its slums were not a product of the industrial revolution. Dublin, in fact, suffered more from the problems of de-industrialization than industrialization between 1800 and 1850."49 Likewise, Kinshasa, Luanda, Khartoum, Dar-es-Salaam, Guayaquil, and Lima continue to grow prodigiously despite ruined importsubstitution industries, shrunken public sectors, and downwardly mobile middle classes. The global forces "pushing" people from the countryside — mechanization of agriculture in Java and India, food imports in Mexico, Haiti, and Kenya, civil war and drought throughout Africa, and everywhere the consolidation of small holdings into 48 See Josef Gugler, "Overurbanization Reconsidered," in Gugler, Cities in the Developing World, pp. 114—23. 49 Foreword to Jacinta Prunty, Dublin Slums, 1800-1925: A Study in Urban Geography, Dublin 1998, p. ix.


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Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines by Richard Heinberg, James Howard (frw) Kunstler

addicted to oil, anti-communist, Asilomar, back-to-the-land, clean water, Community Supported Agriculture, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, ending welfare as we know it, energy transition, Fractional reserve banking, greed is good, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), land reform, means of production, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, plutocrats, Plutocrats, reserve currency, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, the built environment, the scientific method, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, urban planning

Nevertheless, the fact that we have reached the end of the era of cheap oil and gas demands that we re-examine the potential costs and benefits of our current trajectory and its alternatives. I believe we must and can de-industrialize agriculture. The general outline of what I mean by de-industrialization is simple enough: a radical reduction of fossil fuel inputs to agriculture, accompanied by an increase in labor inputs and a reduction of transport, with production being devoted primarily to local consumption. Once again, fossil fuel depletion almost ensures that this will happen. But at the same time, it is fairly obvious that if we don’t plan for de-industrialization, the result could be catastrophic. It’s worth taking a moment to think about how events might unfold if the process occurs without intelligent management, driven simply by oil and gas depletion.

Table of Contents Praise Title Page Join the Conversation Acknowledgements Foreword Preface Introduction ON TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ARTS Chapter 1 - Tools with a Life of Their Own Classy Tools It’s the Energy, Silly Peak Oil and the Limits of Technology Staring at Techno-Collapse Chapter 2 - Fifty Million Farmers Intensifying Food Production The 21 Century: De-Industrialization Examples and Strategies The Key: More Farmers! If We Do This Well Chapter 3 - (post-) Hydrocarbon Aesthetics Designing for the Tragic Interlude of Cheap Abundance Hydrocarbon Style: Big, Fast, and Ugly Oh, To Be Hip Again Manifesto for a Post-Carbon Aesthetic ON NATURE’S LIMITS AND THE HUMAN CONDITION Chapter 4 - Five Axioms of Sustainability History and Background Five Axioms Evaluation Chapter 5 - Parrots and Peoples Chapter 6 - Population, Resources, and Human Idealism THE END OF ONE ERA, THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER Chapter 7 - The Psychology of Peak Oil and Climate Change Explaining Our Incomprehension Acceptance and Beyond: Peak Oil Grief Collective PTSD A Model for Explanation and Treatment: Addiction and Dependency Proactive Application: Social Marketing Chapter 8 - Bridging Peak Oil and Climate Change Activism Differing Perspectives Differing Recommendations Supply Side, Demand Side Common Ground Chapter 9 - Boomers’ Last Chance?

Fortunately, during the past century or two we have also developed the disciplines of archaeology and ecology, which teach us how and why those ancient societies failed, and how the diversity of the web of life sustains us. In principle, if we avail ourselves of this knowledge, we need not mindlessly repeat yet again the time-worn tale of catastrophic civilizational collapse. The 21st Century: De-Industrialization How might we avoid such a fate? Surely the dilemmas we have outlined above are understood by the managers of the current industrial food system. They must have some solutions in mind. Indeed they do, and, perhaps predictably, those solutions involve a further intensification of the food production process. Since we cannot achieve much by applying more energy directly to that process, the most promising strategy on the horizon seems to be the genetic engineering of new crop varieties.


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How to Kill a City: The Real Story of Gentrification by Peter Moskowitz

affirmative action, Airbnb, Bay Area Rapid Transit, British Empire, clean water, collective bargaining, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Detroit bankruptcy, drive until you qualify, East Village, Edward Glaeser, Golden Gate Park, housing crisis, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, Kickstarter, Kitchen Debate, late capitalism, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, private military company, profit motive, RAND corporation, rent control, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, school choice, Silicon Valley, starchitect, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the High Line, trickle-down economics, urban planning, urban renewal, white flight, working poor, Works Progress Administration, young professional

The Great Depression put big development plans on hold, but New York remained committed to deindustrializing and refilling itself with high-cost real estate. Deindustrialization impacted nearly every city in the United States, but New York was an exception in that it planned its industrial decline. That explains why whereas industrialization peaked in 1956 in the rest of the United States, New York’s industry—mainly small manufacturing and garments—peaked ten years earlier. It also explains why New York was one of the only cities in the United States where land values increased as deindustrialization occurred. The planners had made way for a new kind of city, one focused on real estate, not industrial jobs, long before others caught on. Through the 1930s and ’40s, New York’s government continued to put pressure on the city to deindustrialize, while politicians simultaneously presented the city’s industrial job loss as an inevitable consequence of cheaper labor in the South and globalization.

If you look at the inner-ring suburbs of New York, you can see why: by the 1960s, in places near commuter trains or within a reasonable driving distance of the city, nearly all of the land was developed and housing prices were high, making it hard for developers to buy on the cheap and sell at a markup. Sure, they could buy land even farther from the city and attempt to develop it, but commuters are only willing to travel so far, and New York’s suburban commute times were already pushing the hour mark. The city, on the other hand, was a bargain, thanks to white flight and deindustrialization. In 1979, geographer Neil Smith came up with what has become possibly the most influential academic theory on gentrification: the rent gap. Smith posited that the more disinvested a space becomes, the more profitable it is to gentrify. The idea behind his theory is a basic tenet of free-market economics: capital will go where the rate of potential return (i.e., the potential to make profit) is greatest.

“Having produced a scarcity of capital in the name of profit they now flood the neighborhood for the same purpose, portraying themselves all along as civic-minded heroes, pioneers taking a risk where no one else would venture, builders of a new city for the worthy populace,” Smith writes. This milk-and-revitalize strategy can sound conspiratorial, and the reality often bears out that interpretation. New York’s real estate and banking barons bought up cheap land in the outer boroughs before they lobbied for the deindustrialization of Manhattan, so they could profit both off the city’s new condos and the industry and poor people forced into Brooklyn and Queens. But it doesn’t have to be the result of clever plotting. Creating markets where profit potential is highest—that is, purchasing declining and underfunded buildings, and then quickly renovating and flipping them—is just sound economics. A rental market where the poor are adequately provided for, where there is enough space in a neighborhood to accommodate everyone, costs building owners more and is less profitable.


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The Great Economists: How Their Ideas Can Help Us Today by Linda Yueh

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, additive manufacturing, Asian financial crisis, augmented reality, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, Corn Laws, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, cryptocurrency, currency peg, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, endogenous growth, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fear of failure, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, fixed income, forward guidance, full employment, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Gunnar Myrdal, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index card, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, information asymmetry, intangible asset, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, lateral thinking, life extension, manufacturing employment, market bubble, means of production, mittelstand, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, Nelson Mandela, non-tariff barriers, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, price mechanism, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, reshoring, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, universal basic income, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working-age population

The answer holds lessons for other economies that may follow those two nations as they embark on the typical economic path of industrialization followed by deindustrialization. Industrialization, deindustrialization and reindustrialization Great Britain became the first industrialized nation in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by Germany and the United States. The period, which became known as the Industrial Revolution, saw the economy transformed from an agrarian society into one characterized by factories owned and run by merchants who traded their wares both at home and overseas. In our own times, Britain and several other advanced economies, including the United States, have experienced yet another fundamental structural change: deindustrialization. Since the 1980s Thatcher-era reforms that liberalized the financial sector – notably the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986, when markets were opened up to greater competition – Britain has seen industry give way to services.

At its peak, financial services alone made up some 8 per cent of UK national output, which is not that much smaller than all of Britain’s manufacturing combined. This is the essence of deindustrialization, where industry has given way to a dominant services sector in the same way that agriculture was overtaken by manufacturing during Adam Smith’s time. The question is, can the US, and perhaps the UK, reverse deindustrialization? It’s a refrain heard frequently since the crisis. ‘Made in America’ and ‘Made in Britain’ are among the phrases uttered by governments and businesses after the worst recession in a century. But, reversing the process of deindustrialization is challenging in a globalized world economy. Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers.

Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers. In fact, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik even points to ‘premature deindustrialization’ in some developing countries which are moving from agriculture directly to services due to the forces of globalization, which holds potentially worrying consequences for countries that have yet to gain a firm foothold in the middle-income stratum. We are in unknown territory. The impetus for deindustrialization is greater in Britain and America than in other nations. After suffering their worst financial crisis in a century, they are anxious for change. That’s not the sole consideration. Adam Smith may be the economist who named the ‘invisible hand’ that allowed the market to dictate what was produced and how it was priced, but he did not think highly of the services sector.


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Vertical: The City From Satellites to Bunkers by Stephen Graham

1960s counterculture, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, Buckminster Fuller, Buy land – they’re not making it any more, Chelsea Manning, Commodity Super-Cycle, creative destruction, deindustrialization, digital map, drone strike, Edward Glaeser, Edward Snowden, energy security, Frank Gehry, ghettoisation, Google Earth, Gunnar Myrdal, high net worth, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, Indoor air pollution, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Jane Jacobs, late capitalism, low earth orbit, mass immigration, means of production, megacity, megastructure, moral panic, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, nuclear winter, oil shale / tar sands, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, Project Plowshare, rent control, Richard Florida, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, Skype, South China Sea, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, trickle-down economics, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, white flight, WikiLeaks, William Langewiesche

‘Modern Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3:32 pm (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final coup de grâce by dynamite.’25 Built in the 1950s, the Pruitt-Igoe project became in the 1960s and 1970s a symbol of the racialised decay of inner urban cores and white flight as the middle classes rushed to the suburbs. Redlining, deindustrialisation and the growing emergence of racialised ghettos in Pruitt-Igoe and similar projects allowed mainstream media to demonise such places and their inhabitants. Pruitt-Igoe thus emerged as a symbol of urban decay, collapse and hopelessness. Its spectacular erasure was widely used as shorthand for a period in the US where ‘those who lived in cities no longer cared for them, and those who lived elsewhere feared and detested them.’26 The fact that communal housing was widely deemed to chime with socialist thinking didn’t help.

Poor housing management policies, racialised policing and catastrophic drugs policies must also be considered. We should also address the often shoddy and cheapskate design of the resulting tower blocks, the failure to deliver promised infrastructure, services or jobs, poor communication between architects and housing offices and the power of demonising stigma. Above all, we must recognise the systematic deindustrialisation of and disinvestment in many of the surrounding local economies imagined to sustain the towers and the severe problems of mass unemployment that followed. Perhaps more important, though, is the need to stress that many examples of high-rise social housing throughout Europe and North America – including modernist high-rise housing – have been extremely successful.33 In hundreds of cases, socially oriented and publicly built and managed vertical housing remains tremendously popular.


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Inside the Robot Kingdom: Japan, Mechatronics and the Coming Robotopia by Frederik L. Schodt

carbon-based life, computer age, Computer Numeric Control, computer vision, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, factory automation, game design, guest worker program, industrial robot, Jacques de Vaucanson, Norbert Wiener, post-industrial society, robot derives from the Czech word robota Czech, meaning slave, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, telepresence, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, V2 rocket, Whole Earth Review, women in the workforce

To them, a Harley is more than a motorcycle; it is a symbol of the American ethos. Even free-trade advocate Ronald Reagan seemed to acknowledge this when, in 1983, without obvious economic or military reasons, he authorized whopping tariffs to protect the Harley-Davidson company and its 1,400 employees. Third, deindustrialization of the United States in particular has frightening implications both for the world economy and for Japan. Japanese labor unions have occasionally worried that their nation's robotization has aggravated unemployment overseas, but industrialists worry about deindustrialization, too. Hajime Karatsu in his 1985 article "Is U.S. Industry Going Down the Tubes?" wrote that "if present trends continue, U.S. industry will soon be in danger of complete collapse. World leaders must focus their attention on this impending crisis and consider what must be done to avert it."20 In the postwar period, the tremendous purchasing power of the American consumer has fueled the economic growth of Europe and Asia, especially Japan.

As Wiener imagined for India, roboticist Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, professor at the University of Tokyo's Mechanical Engineering Department, thinks one reason China is so interested in robotics, and especially in the training of software engineers for industry, is that a software engineer can be trained in three years, while it takes at least ten to train a skilled lathe operator.18 * * * * * * * * * * * * In the advanced, richer nations, robots have increasingly become a means of countering "deindustrialization," or what the Japanese call the "hollowing" of industry—the transformation of manufacturing concerns into marketing specialists who no longer make what they sell. According to Joseph Engelberger, Japan's success with robots is the real driving force behind their application in United States and European industry today. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom has in the past heaped scorn on British manufacturers who fail to robotize, contrasting Japan's high number of robots and low unemployment with the opposite situation in Britain and noting that "the people who object to new technology will use their pay packets to buy the products of new technology from other countries."19 The advantages of using robotics are obvious, but why should the advanced nations even bother?

Why not accept the world trend of specialization and international division of labor and become, as many experts suggest, post-industrial societies based on software, design, and the service industries? First, nations with strong manufacturing industries have historically dominated other areas as well. Process and product technology have become much more closely linked today, so that to remain technologically advanced an industry requires a mastery of manufacturing technology equal to or greater than its mastery of design technology. For the US., deindustrialization exposes a deep-rooted national schizophrenia—a political and military establishment fixated on the Soviet Union and committed to a defense policy that requires a maximum of industrial self-sufficiency, and an economic establishment increasingly dependent on Japanese and Asian manufacturing and technology. Second, manufacturing is more than making money; it can be an expression of culture.


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What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right by George R. Tyler

8-hour work day, active measures, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Black Swan, blood diamonds, blue-collar work, Bolshevik threat, bonus culture, British Empire, business cycle, business process, buy and hold, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate governance, corporate personhood, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Brooks, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Diane Coyle, disruptive innovation, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, Gordon Gekko, hiring and firing, income inequality, invisible hand, job satisfaction, John Markoff, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, lake wobegon effect, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, moral hazard, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, performance metric, pirate software, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, precariat, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transcontinental railway, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

Yet these prominent US free traders did what good economists do when confronted with convincing new data: they changed their minds in the face of surging Chinese goods, mercantilist policies such as the persistent undervaluation of the Chinese currency, the yuan, expansive offshoring, and wage erosion. It wasn’t just the impact of trade, which directly accounts for maybe 15 percent of American wage declines, or the magnitude of offshoring. Instead, it was the combined impact of offshoring, deindustrialization, Us versus Them and all the rest, plus technology change, which intensified the impact of trade on wages and deindustrialization. Alan Blinder, for example, concluded that even good jobs in “safe” domestic service sectors (health care, education, and finance) are jeopardized by global integration and the threat of offshoring. He determined that the number of sectors at risk is two to three times larger than the number of manufacturing jobs subject to offshoring—and that the danger is growing.19 Krugman’s conversion occurred in 2007; global integration was exacerbating income disparities and “fears that low-wage competition is driving down US wages have a real basis in both theory and fact,” he concluded.20 And Summers grew concerned with multinationals behaving like “stateless elites whose allegiance is to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interest of the nation where they are headquartered….

Do not mistake the arguments presented here for codetermination, work councils, and the like as primarily driven by notions of fairness. The stakes for Americans are much graver than considerations of equity. As we see next, the dismal investment and productivity performances that are hallmarks of the Reagan decline have also caused a notable deindustrialization of the American economy. It is simply impossible to conjure a bright economic future for America when the number of high-value jobs is not rising and firms are being out-invested by the margins just noted by international competitors. CHAPTER 23 DEINDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA MARKS THE REAGAN DECLINE “The progression of an economy such as America’s from agriculture to manufacturing to services is a natural change.”1 RONALD REAGAN “A strong manufacturing sector is not a requisite for a prosperous economy.”2 New York Stock Exchange, 1984 “The US de-emphasized technology.

Some guidance is offered by the methods of German auto firms in the American South, which collaborate with local schools to train needed workers.28 Reversing mobility, wage, and poverty trends, while creating more apprentice opportunities, cannot succeed without reindustrialization and an abundance of high-value domestic jobs it can create. Returning High-Productivity Jobs to America Reagan era officials viewed deindustrialization as inevitable, akin to aging. Many others believed it, too, including a Washington Post editorial board in 2012, which pooh-poohed hopes of matching the German success in rebuilding an industrial base: “It’s unrealistic to imagine a return to the relatively high levels of manufacturing employment and wages that the United States enjoyed in the 1950s.”29 US families cannot rekindle the American Dream by taking in each other’s wash. Moreover, the inevitability of deindustrialization is belied by history and rejected by a number of economists and US business leaders, such as retired Intel CEO Paul Otellini and Andrew Liveris of Dow.30 They have not only Japanese and German history on their side but American history as well, one replete with the successful deployment of policies that have stimulated domestic enterprises and facilitated the creative destruction process.


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Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class by Owen Jones

Asperger Syndrome, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, British Empire, call centre, collapse of Lehman Brothers, credit crunch, deindustrialization, Etonian, facts on the ground, falling living standards, first-past-the-post, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, mass immigration, Neil Kinnock, Occupy movement, pension reform, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, race to the bottom, Right to Buy, rising living standards, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working-age population

The researchers' conclusion was that 'the UK's very high incapacity claimant numbers are an issue of jobs and of health: Glasgow is a particularly striking example of how the de-industrialization of Britain has left continuing-but disguised-mass unemployment inits wake. The city houses more incapacity benefit claimants than any other local authority. The number of people claiming some form of disability benefits peaked in 1995 at one in five of the working population, or almost three times the UK level. A group of Glasgow University and Glasgow City Council experts looked at how the number of recipients increased during the 1980s, and concluded: 'The main reason for the huge growth in sickness benefit claims was the city's rapid de-industrialization.' The number of manufacturing jobs in 1991 had collapsed to just a third of the 1971 figure. Staggeringly, Glasgow rose from 208'th to tenth place among local authorities for economic inactivity levels in the decade following 1981.

For the first time since the World War II,the next generation will be worse off than the generation before it. of course, we all have agency: we don't all respond to the same situation in the same way. But it only takes a small proportion of young people who have nothing much to lose to bring chaos to the streets. It is also impossible to ignore the fact that men featured so prominently among the rioters. Nine out of ten apprehended rioters were men. Britain's rapid de-industrialization and the disappearance of so many skilled middle-income jobs were particularly disruptive--given that such work often excluded women-to the lives of working-class men. Over a generation ago, a young working-class man could leave school at the age of sixteen and have a decent prospect of getting an apprenticeship, training that might open a gateway to a skilled, respected job that could give life some structure.

It would be wrong of me to portray Ashington as some sort of postapocalyptic hellhole or as a society in total meltdown. The town centre is studded with shops like Argos, Curry's, Carphone Warehouse and Gregg's bakery. There's a real community spirit in the air. People are warm towards one another-as they were towards me, a stranger asking them intrusive questions. Communities like Ashington were devastated by the whirlwind of de-industrialization unleashed by Thatcherism, but people do their best to adjust and get on with their lives, even in the toughest of circumstances. Father Ian Jackson has been the local Catholic priest in Ashington since 2002. 'It's a very warm, caring kind of community. People really look out for each other,' he told me. 'I think it was hit badly with the closure of the mines-there's very little work for people, so it's quite deprived in a lot of ways.


pages: 219 words: 62,816

"They Take Our Jobs!": And 20 Other Myths About Immigration by Aviva Chomsky

affirmative action, Bernie Sanders, British Empire, call centre, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, European colonialism, full employment, guest worker program, illegal immigration, immigration reform, informal economy, invisible hand, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, mass immigration, mass incarceration, new economy, out of africa, postindustrial economy, race to the bottom, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, structural adjustment programs, The Chicago School, thinkpad, trickle-down economics, union organizing, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

Even the census itself acknowledges that racial categories “are sociopolitical constructs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature.”8 The U.S. economy has changed drastically between the two periods of immigration. In the 1890s, the United States was industrializing rapidly, and most new immigrants went to work in the mines, mills, and factories of the new industrial economy. In the 1960s, the country was undergoing deindustrialization, and the mines, mills, and factories were closing, creating a “rust belt” in the very regions that had previously been a magnet for immigrants. The deindustrialized economy still created a demand for immigrant workers, but in the service industry: “cleaning—all kinds of cleaning,” as one immigrant worker, who ran his own small house-cleaning business, described it to me. Immigrants now clean houses and office buildings. They clean hospitals and restaurants. They clean people, clothes, and cars.

Scholars from the dependency school responded that underdevelopment and development were two sides of the same coin: underdevelopment was not a starting state but rather a result of colonial exploitation. Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa critiques the term and the theory behind it. Other economists offered “industrialized” and “non-industrialized,” and later added “newly industrialized” or NICS (newly industrialized countries, referring usually to Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). But the deindustrialization of the first world, and the very different nature of the industrialization now going on in the third, makes these terms problematic. Despite the radical changes in the global economic and social order since the 1950s, the concepts of First World and Third World still offer considerable power for understanding the roots and nature of global inequality. Latino/Hispanic. Although the terms are often used interchangeably today, they have very different histories.

In this respect, postindustrial immigration to the United States was not unique. European countries were experiencing the same phenomenon. Industrialization had been accompanied, everywhere that it occurred in the late nineteenth century, by colonial expansion—military, political, and economic. (Sometimes this expansion took the form of direct colonial rule; sometimes it consisted of informal means of control.) Deindustrialization, in the late twentieth century, was accompanied by immigration from former colonies. These different events were part of an interconnected historical process, and to understand the differences between the two waves of immigration, we need to understand the entire historical process. These issues of race and the global economy were also interrelated. People who were colonized were considered racially different in ways that left very deep roots in the modern world, and colonialism also left long-term economic consequences.


pages: 239 words: 62,311

The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa by Irene Yuan Sun

barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, capital controls, clean water, Computer Numeric Control, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, European colonialism, floating exchange rates, full employment, global supply chain, invisible hand, job automation, low skilled workers, M-Pesa, manufacturing employment, means of production, mobile money, post-industrial society, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, union organizing, Washington Consensus, working-age population

Steve Onyeiwu, “The Modern Textile Industry in Nigeria,” Textile History 28, no. 2 (1997): 234–249. 3. Salihu Maiwada and Ellisha Renne, “The Kaduna Textile Industry,” Textile History 44, no. 2 (2013): 171–196. 4. Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, “Globalization and De-Industrialization: South-South Neo-Liberalism and the Collapse of the Nigerian Textile Industry,” The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008): 159–170. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Maiwada and Renne, “The Kaduna Textile Industry.” 8. Ibid. 9. Akinrinade and Ogen, “Globalization and De-Industrialization.” 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Onyeiwu, “The Modern Textile Industry in Nigeria.” 14. L. N. Chete, J. O. Adeoti, F. M. Adeyinka, and O. Ogundele, “Industrial Development and Growth in Nigeria: Lessons and Challenges,” Brookings Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper No. 8., The Brookings Institution, 2016. 15.

Firms During Leaders’ Summit,” Washington Post, August 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-announces-more-investment-in-africa-by-us-firms/2014/08/05/bb3a9e98-1cd5-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html. 34. Stephen Gordon, “A Little Context on the Decline of Manufacturing Employment in Canada,” Maclean’s, February 12, 2013, http://www.macleans.ca/economy/business/some-context-for-the-decline-in-canadian-manufacturing-employment/, based on data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. 35. Dani Rodrik, “On Premature Deindustrialization,” Dani Rodrik’s weblog, October 11, 2013, http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/10/on-premature-deindustrialization.html. 36. Robert Lawrence, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, October 7, 2015. 37. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 38. Erich Weede, “Economic Freedom and the Advantages of Backwardness,” (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, January 31, 2007), http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/economic-freedom-advantages-backwardness. 39.

When the Tungs and other eager Chinese industrialists showed up in the 1960s, Africa seemed poised for take-off, with government policies emphasizing industrial sectors, a small but promising industrial base left behind by European colonizers, and a general sense of optimism from being newly independent. But the following years brought devastating shocks: a macroeconomic crisis, worsening government corruption and ineptitude, and increasingly fierce global competition. In Nigeria, two of the four big Chinese family-run industrial firms collapsed. As a whole, Nigeria—and the rest of Africa—deindustrialized. But the lessons of history run both ways at once. Even in the face of headwinds, there is often a way to do business. The remaining two family-run firms not only survived, but thrived. Macroeconomic conditions have been better in the past fifteen years than in previous decades across many parts of Africa, and that has attracted hundreds of new Chinese manufacturing investments. The Tungs and other old-timers know that conditions are always temporary, that another downturn could come any time, yet they are confident in their ability to do business in Africa for generations to come.


pages: 1,000 words: 247,974

Empire of Cotton: A Global History by Sven Beckert

agricultural Revolution, Bartolomé de las Casas, British Empire, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, imperial preference, industrial cluster, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, laissez-faire capitalism, land tenure, Mahatma Gandhi, market fundamentalism, race to the bottom, Silicon Valley, spice trade, spinning jenny, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, women in the workforce

Because for many decades cotton was the most important European industry, it was the source of huge profits that eventually fed into other segments of the European economy. Cotton also was the cradle of industrialization in virtually every other part of the world—the United States and Egypt, Mexico and Brazil, Japan and China. At the same time, Europe’s domination of the world’s cotton industry resulted in a wave of deindustrialization throughout much of the rest of the world, enabling a new and different kind of integration into the global economy. Yet even as the construction of industrial capitalism, beginning in the United Kingdom in the 1780s and then spreading to continental Europe and the United States in the early decades of the nineteenth century, gave enormous power to the states that embraced it and to capitalists within them, it planted the seeds of further transformation in the empire of cotton.

The empire of cotton, and with it the modern world, is only understood by connecting, rather than separating, the many places and people who shaped and were in turn shaped by that empire.11 I am centrally concerned with the unity of the diverse. Cotton, the nineteenth century’s chief global commodity, brought seeming opposites together, turning them almost by alchemy into wealth: slavery and free labor, states and markets, colonialism and free trade, industrialization and deindustrialization. The cotton empire depended on plantation and factory, slavery and wage labor, colonizers and colonized, railroads and steamships—in short, on a global network of land, labor, transport, manufacture, and sale. The Liverpool Cotton Exchange had an enormous impact on Mississippi cotton planters, the Alsatian spinning mills were tightly linked to those of Lancashire, and the future of handloom weavers in New Hampshire or Dhaka depended on such diverse factors as the construction of a railroad between Manchester and Liverpool, investment decisions of Boston merchants, and tariff policies made in Washington and London.

Mexico had had a long-established and thriving nonmechanized textile industry but that industry had come under pressure from cheaply manufactured yarn and cloth imports from Britain and the United States. The newly independent Mexican state tried to address this problem by raising tariffs, or even prohibiting the import of cotton textiles and yarn. Independence meant that Mexico escaped the massive wave of deindustrialization sweeping other parts of the world. The first mechanized cotton mill in Mexico that would last (unlike the Aurora Yucateca) opened in 1835 in Puebla, founded and managed by Esteban de Antuñano, and indeed it was Antuñano himself who most forcefully demanded that the country protect itself from cotton imports. Like Tench Coxe in the United States and Friedrich List in Germany, Antuñano advocated import-substituting industrialization as a path toward wealth and political stability.


The New Class War: Saving Democracy From the Metropolitan Elite by Michael Lind

affirmative action, anti-communist, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, centre right, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, future of work, global supply chain, guest worker program, Haight Ashbury, illegal immigration, immigration reform, invisible hand, knowledge economy, liberal world order, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, moral panic, Nate Silver, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, union organizing, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, WikiLeaks, Wolfgang Streeck, working poor

For the last two generations, in different decades, and in different Western countries, the occasions of populist protest have been different—the white backlash against the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, the traditionalist backlash against the sexual and censorship revolution of the 1970s, populist resistance to the Japanese import shocks of the 1980s, and then, more recently, mass immigration, globalization, deindustrialization, and the Great Recession. All of these different issues resulted in similar alignments of large portions of the non-college-educated working class against managerial and professional elites. Long before Brexit and Trump, their lack of voice and influence made alienated native working-class voters—mostly but not exclusively white—a destabilizing force in politics. In the United States, “hardhats” and “Middle American radicals” were already identified as a social force as early as the 1960s and 1970s, when the foreign-born population of the US was at its lowest point and immigration was not a major issue.

Compared to more direct prolabor measures like minimum wages, collective bargaining and limits on global labor arbitrage, pulverizing the most productive firms in the economy is a very roundabout and inefficient way to try to raise wages, like burning down a barn to roast a pig in the famous fable by Charles Lamb.12 Like redistributionism, antimonopolism cannot work at the national level in today’s system of liberalized trade and globalized production. If the Justice Department used antitrust to break up large suppliers in the US, firms that coordinate global supply chains could simply shift those links in production to foreign countries with more lenient competition policies. The result could be accelerated by American deindustrialization, with further massive shifts in employment from the traded sector to the low-wage, low-productivity domestic service sector. In some cases, foreign state-backed national champions might win US domestic market share from American firms that had been broken up by the federal government. Just as a UBI cannot work without stringent and strictly enforced limits on immigration, so a neo-Brandeisian antimonopoly policy cannot work except in a much more protectionist and autarkic US economy, which could only be created by measures that cosmopolitan, open-borders progressives, like their newfound libertarian allies in matters of trade and immigration, would be sure to denounce as xenophobic, racist, and nativist

Empowering organized labor by means like tripartite business-labor-government bargaining can provide real checks on the managerial overclass, without sacrificing the dynamism of the mixed economy. * * * — THE AMERICAN WRITER Daniel McCarthy has aptly called approaches like the ones I have criticized in this chapter “palliative liberalism.”14 However popular these miracle cures may be among the managerial elite and the overclass intelligentsia, as remedies for working-class distress in the deindustrialized heartlands of the Western world the panaceas of redistributionism, education, and antimonopolism are like prescriptions of aspirin for cancer. They may ameliorate the symptoms, but they do not cure the disease—the imbalance of power, within Western nation-states, between the overclass and the working class as a whole, including many exploited immigrant workers who labor for the affluent in the metropolitan hubs.


pages: 356 words: 91,157

The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class?and What We Can Do About It by Richard Florida

affirmative action, Airbnb, basic income, Bernie Sanders, blue-collar work, business climate, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, Columbine, congestion charging, creative destruction, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, East Village, edge city, Edward Glaeser, failed state, Ferguson, Missouri, Gini coefficient, Google bus, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, jitney, Kitchen Debate, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, land value tax, low skilled workers, Lyft, megacity, Menlo Park, mortgage tax deduction, Nate Silver, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, occupational segregation, Paul Graham, plutocrats, Plutocrats, RAND corporation, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, superstar cities, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the High Line, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trickle-down economics, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, white flight, young professional

Old industrial warehouses and factories were being transformed into studios and living spaces. Punk, new wave, and rap were electrifying the area’s music venues and clubs—the first tender shoots of what would later become a full-blown urban revival. But it was in Pittsburgh, where I taught for almost twenty years at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), that I began to sort out the main factors acting on America’s cities. Pittsburgh had been devastated by deindustrialization, losing hundreds of thousands of people and considerable numbers of high-paying factory jobs. Thanks to its world-class universities, medical centers, and corporate research and development units, as well as its major philanthropies, the city was able to stave off the worst. Its leaders were working hard to change its trajectory, and as a professor of economic development I was involved in the thick of it.

Our divides were causing greater inequality both within cities and metro areas, and between them. As I pored over the data, I could see that only a limited number of cities and metro areas, maybe a couple of dozen, were really making it in the knowledge economy; many more were failing to keep pace or falling further behind. Many Rustbelt cities are still grappling with the devastating combination of suburban flight, urban decay, and deindustrialization. Sunbelt cities continue to attract people to their more affordable, sprawling suburban developments, but few are building robust, sustainable economies that are powered by knowledge and innovation. Tens of millions of Americans remain locked in persistent poverty. And virtually all our cities suffer from growing economic divides. As the middle class and its neighborhoods fade, our geography is splintering into small areas of affluence and concentrated advantage, and much larger areas of poverty and concentrated disadvantage.

I delved deep into the many challenges that face the rapidly growing cities of the world’s emerging economies, where urbanization is failing to spur the same kind of economic growth and rising living standards that it did for the advanced nations.3 The New Urban Crisis is different from the older urban crisis of the 1960s and 1970s. That previous crisis was defined by the economic abandonment of cities and their loss of economic function. Shaped by deindustrialization and white flight, its hallmark was a hollowing out of the city center, a phenomenon that urban theorists and policymakers labeled the hole-in-the-donut. As cities lost their core industries, they became sites of growing and persistent poverty: their housing decayed; crime and violence increased; and social problems, including drug abuse, teen pregnancy, and infant mortality, escalated. As urban economies eroded and tax revenues declined, cities became increasingly dependent on the federal government for financial support.4 Many of these problems remain with us to this day.


pages: 332 words: 89,668

Two Nations, Indivisible: A History of Inequality in America: A History of Inequality in America by Jamie Bronstein

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, blue-collar work, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate personhood, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, ending welfare as we know it, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, income inequality, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, mandatory minimum, mass incarceration, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, moral panic, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, obamacare, occupational segregation, Occupy movement, oil shock, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price discrimination, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Sam Peltzman, Scientific racism, Simon Kuznets, single-payer health, strikebreaker, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, wage slave, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Works Progress Administration

WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS The Great Recession and the social unrest of the Occupy movement and the Tea Party show that inequality matters, but there are other reasons to pay attention to inequality as well. The first reason is permanence. Deindustrialization has removed good manufacturing jobs from the economy, leaving low-wage service jobs that notoriously pay poverty-level wages. Although repairing the nation’s aging infrastructure might provide widespread employment at good wages, it has not been a priority, even in Great-Recession-linked stimulus packages.50 Trade unions, which, despite their flaws (including sclerotic leadership and deep-seated racism and Cold War ideology) once provided a measure of job protection, pensions, and other benefits for their members, ebbed with deindustrialization and the rise of low-paid, insecure labor.51 Trade globalization, it traditionally has been thought, lifts all boats, because even if well-paid manufacturing jobs are exported overseas, the price of goods and services becomes cheaper.

For Williamson and Lindert, the “Great Compression” of midcentury was based on the waning of unemployment during the Great Depression and World War II; government transfers, in the form of either taxation or direct transfer payments; and a reduction in the prices of necessities that made up the consumer basket of poorer people. The Great Depression may also have substantially eroded the wealth of the top 1 percent of the population, from about 36.6 percent of the national wealth in 1929 to around 25 percent in 1950.20 No matter what the cause of the Great Compression of the postwar years, inequality began increasing again in the 1980s, under pressure from both economic trends (deindustrialization and globalization) and government decision making (tax cuts for the wealthy and cuts to social and educational spending) and has now reached levels at or above those in the 1920s.21 In addition to showing that inequality has been a constant feature in American history, this book will also argue that inequality is not necessary for, and in fact undermines, national prosperity. The economist Simon Kutznets predicted in the 1950s that while industrialization invariably results in inequality in the short run, in the long run one can see an inverted “U-shaped” curve, as economic growth lifts all fortunes and helps to compress inequality.22 Kuznets’s supposition has not been borne out by experiences in the developed world since the 1980s.23 In contrast, Williamson and Lindert and Thomas Piketty have shown that inequality is not a necessary condition of economic growth.

Such critical turning-points include the end of the Civil War, when the government failed to consider stakeholding for freed African Americans; during World War II, when a proposal was on the table to make the nation responsible for the full employment of its citizens; during the Nixon administration, when a basic income guarantee came close to passage; and during the Reagan administration, when neoliberal promises distracted working people from deindustrialization and globalization. This book is divided into eight chronological chapters. Chapter 1 covers the period from the American Revolution to the late 1820s. It argues that like the classical civilizations that the Founders so much admired, a virtuous American republic was predicated on the theory that all and only white men were equal citizens, but that this did not mean they were entitled to equal standing or even equal political participation.


pages: 323 words: 90,868

The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century by Ryan Avent

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, Airbnb, American energy revolution, assortative mating, autonomous vehicles, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business cycle, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, creative destruction, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, disruptive innovation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, gig economy, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, intangible asset, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, inventory management, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph-Marie Jacquard, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, lump of labour, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, mass immigration, means of production, new economy, performance metric, pets.com, post-work, price mechanism, quantitative easing, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reshoring, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, software is eating the world, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, The Future of Employment, The Nature of the Firm, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, very high income, working-age population

Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s. Remarkably, manufacturing now accounts for less than 10 per cent of American employment. In the emerging world, deindustrialization is occurring at ever earlier stages of development: an ailment that economist Dani Rodrik has labelled ‘premature deindustrialization’.12 When manufacturing’s share of total value added in the South Korean economy peaked in 1988, real income per person in South Korea was about $10,000, or just less than half the American level at the time. When that same peak was reached in Indonesia in 2002, its real income per person was roughly $6,000, or about 15 per cent of the American level.

That knowledge would not be especially valuable at other publications, nor would it do the designer much good to try to rely on the corresponding social capital from her old employer at her new job. So, as social capital loomed larger within rich economies, it became clear that firms were not the only context in which social capital took on new salience. Its rise also boosted the fortunes of big cities with lots of skilled workers. By the end of the 1970s, deindustrialization and suburbanization had many of the rich world’s great industrial cities on the ropes. Populations were crashing. In 1975, New York City very nearly went bankrupt. Popular cinema was filled with dystopian visions of the urban future, in which street punks ruled the streets of gutted cities. But from the 1980s onwards, a turnaround was apparent in some of those very same distressed cities.

The digital revolution, which helped to establish the supply-chain revolution in the first place, continues to shape trade patterns and the ways in which trade enables development. This time, new technology seems to be making life harder for the emerging world. Supply-chain-powered development represented an accelerated – if somewhat superficial – form of industrialization. It seems to have also, as a side effect, accelerated deindustrialization. Readers in rich economies will be well aware of the phenomenon – the loss of manufacturing work to other locations – that hollowed out once-great cities like Detroit. Britain, the first industrializer, was the first to face this particular ill, quite early in the twentieth century. Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s.


pages: 182 words: 55,234

Rendezvous With Oblivion: Reports From a Sinking Society by Thomas Frank

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, business climate, business cycle, call centre, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, edge city, Frank Gehry, high net worth, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, McMansion, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, offshore financial centre, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, too big to fail, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Works Progress Administration

And while each of these fads came and went, here is what also happened: utilities were privatized to disastrous effect, the real estate bubble grew and burst, the banks got ever bigger, state governments declared war on public workers, and the economy went off a cliff. It is time to acknowledge the truth: that our leaders have nothing to say, really, about any of this. They have nothing to suggest, really, to Cairo, Illinois, or St. Joseph, Missouri. They have no comment to make, really, about the depopulation of the countryside or the deindustrialization of the Midwest. They have nothing to offer, really, but the same suggestions as before, gussied up with a new set of clichés. They have no idea what to do for places or people that aren’t already successful or that have no prospect of ever becoming cool. And so the dull bureaucrat lusts passionately for the lifestyle of the creative artist, but beneath it all is the harsh fact that foundations have been selling the vibrant, under one label or another, for decades; all they’ve done this time is repackage it as a sort of prosperity gospel for Ivy League art students.

* * * Now, I have no special reason to doubt the suspicion that Donald Trump is a racist. Either he is one or (as the comedian John Oliver puts it) he is pretending to be one, which amounts to the same thing. And there is no denying the jolt of energy he has given the racist right. But there is another side to the Trump phenomenon. A map of his support may coordinate with racist Google searches, but it coordinates even better with deindustrialization and despair, with the zones of economic misery that thirty years of Washington’s free-market consensus have brought the rest of America. It is worth noting that in his stump speeches, Trump often makes a point of assailing that Indiana air-conditioning company from the video. What this suggests is that he’s telling a tale as much about economic outrage as it is of racism on the march. Many of Trump’s followers are bigots, no doubt, but many more are probably excited by the prospect of a president who seems to mean it when he denounces our trade agreements and promises to bring the hammer down on the CEO who fired you and wrecked your town.

It seems clear that if rich liberals had heeded the concerns of the people I am describing, Donald Trump would not be president today. But does that mean they will change their ways now? Put the question slightly differently: Will the Washington Post or the New York Times take the sad fate of Democratic centrism as a signal to bring a whole new vision to their op-ed pages? Will the think tanks and pressure groups of Washington finally be told by their donors: we’re shifting your grant money to people who care about deindustrialization? Of course not. Liberalism today is an expression of an enlightened professional class, and their core economic interests simply do not align with those of working people. If coming up with a solution to what ails liberalism means heeding the voices of people who aren’t part of the existing nonprofit/journalistic in-group, then there will be no solution. If the unreconstructed Democratic Party is to be saved, I suspect, what will save it is what always saves it: the colossal incompetence of the Republicans.


pages: 248 words: 57,419

The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy by Richard Duncan

asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Bretton Woods, business cycle, currency manipulation / currency intervention, debt deflation, deindustrialization, diversification, diversified portfolio, fiat currency, financial innovation, Flash crash, Fractional reserve banking, income inequality, inflation targeting, Joseph Schumpeter, laissez-faire capitalism, liquidity trap, market bubble, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage debt, private sector deleveraging, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, trade liberalization

The country is deindustrializing because wage rates in the U.S. manufacturing sector are 30 to 40 times higher than the prevailing global wage rate for factory workers, which is $5 per day. Consequently, the nature of the economy has changed. An economic paradigm built on debt expansion, asset price bubbles, and the service industry replaced the previous paradigm that was centered on the production of tangible goods. In 2008, however, that new paradigm exhausted its potential to support asset prices or the demand for services, leaving the country deindustrialized and without the kind of capital structure capable of generating profits, savings, and new investments. That left the United States ripe for a brutal economic contraction. The crisis has caused the process of deindustrialization to accelerate.

Later, the United States promoted trade liberalization and cross-border capital flows with no concern for the very large U.S. trade deficits that emerged as a result. Finally, it failed to act when many of its trading partners blatantly manipulated the value of their currencies in a way that prevented the trade imbalances from correcting. When the U.S. credit bubble began in earnest in the 1980s, other countries expanded their industrial capacity to satisfy the United States’ rapidly expanding debt-financed demand. The United States began to deindustrialize and wage rates stagnated, but that did not matter so long as U.S. stock prices and home prices kept inflating, because American households were able to borrow more and to consume more. The United States was able to import more each year, and that demand absorbed the rest of the world’s rapidly increasing industrial supply. In the developing world where the most rapid economic expansion took place, wage rates were (and remain) far too low to allow domestic demand to absorb the supply of goods being produced in those countries.

This scenario is by no means guaranteed, however. Politics might make any additional increase in government spending impossible. The path described in Scenario three would certainly be the least painful way to reach 2015. Reaching 2015 in that way would not mean the issues at the core of the crisis had been resolved, however. Global supply would still greatly exceed global demand. The United States would continue to deindustrialize and that, in turn, would continue to depress wages and so prevent any new expansion of private sector credit growth. Moreover, the U.S. government would be more indebted and less creditworthy than it is now, and inflation would be on the rise. Large-scale deficit spending financed in large part by fiat money creation would be a fix, not a solution. The longer-term outlook would remain alarming.


Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the US City by Mike Davis

affirmative action, Berlin Wall, business cycle, clean water, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, desegregation, edge city, illegal immigration, immigration reform, Internet Archive, invisible hand, job automation, longitudinal study, manufacturing employment, market bubble, mass immigration, new economy, occupational segregation, postnationalism / post nation state, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, strikebreaker, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, War on Poverty, white flight, white picket fence, women in the workforce, working poor

'Almost overnight, taquerias, money transfer outlets and immigration consultants have malls in filled strip and east of the strip. new immigrant neighborhoods to One roadside swap meet catering to immigrant Latinos in the adjacent city of North Las Vegas mated 20,000 customers each weekend." sists the north now Some of draws an esti- this influx con- of families relocating from the deindustrialized neighborhoods of East Oakland and the dead copper towns of southern Arizona; but mostly it is spillover from the immigrant barrios of Los Angeles County. Extrapolations from current school-age demographics indicate that Latinos will become the majority in the city of Las Vegas within a decade. This far-reaching Latin Americanization of large and mediumsized central cities is being driven by a formidable demographic engine: a Spanish-surname population that is increasing by lion annually or (1990-96) ten times faster than the tion.^^ While stricted" nativist hysteria has focused mil- 1 Anglo popula- on supposedly "unre- immigration, the growth of the Latino population is equally the consequence of higher fecundity in the context of larger families, especially thirds of Mexico is all Latinos).

"In an- moved into particular neighbor- "^^^ many Latino immigrants are able to deploy "social capital" to reduce their subsistence costs and thereby subsidize their own superexploitation. This goes part of MAGICAL URBANISM 94 the way toward explaining how it has been possible for Latino urban populations to grow so rapidly during periods when most US big cities have been undergoing massive deindustrialization. Immigration foes, Avilez, Daniel tire of course, contend that the likes of Laureano Eduardo and Benvenito Hernandez have stolen en- crops of jobs from native-born workers. Indeed, one former Los Angeles Times editorialist used the pages of the Atlantic Monthly to blame the 1992 Rodney King riots on the displacement of Black labor by recent immigration from Mexico. uted California's environmental crisis, Others have attrib- even the gridlock on its freeways, to the federal government's alleged failure to control the border.

Eco- nomic restructuring simultaneously the lowest-paid and most pulls these immigrants into easily exploitable jobs and removes the mobility structures that unskilled newcomers previously used to get ahead. ... Mexicans and Central Americans seem to have herded into niches [including gardening, food preparation, housecleaning and garment manufacture] that constitute mobility traps." Another report suggests that deindustrialization and early 1990s rendered ethnic resources useful than previously to Mexican social newcomers their part, is McCarthy and Vernez argue networks less to Los Angeles. These trends apply to the California economy jobs in the as a whole. For that "the pool of low-skill shrinking, belying the widespread belief that California's past 20 to 30 years of 'economic restructuring' expanded the number of jobs for less-educated workers."


pages: 393 words: 91,257

The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class by Joel Kotkin

Admiral Zheng, Andy Kessler, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, clean water, creative destruction, deindustrialization, demographic transition, don't be evil, Donald Trump, edge city, Elon Musk, European colonialism, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gig economy, Gini coefficient, Google bus, guest worker program, Hans Rosling, housing crisis, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, liberal capitalism, life extension, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, megacity, Nate Silver, new economy, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, Parag Khanna, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, post-work, postindustrial economy, postnationalism / post nation state, precariat, profit motive, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, Richard Florida, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Sam Altman, Satyajit Das, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, smart cities, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, superstar cities, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Future of Employment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trade route, Travis Kalanick, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, Wolfgang Streeck, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y Combinator

Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984), 249; Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 499; Economic Policy Institute, “The growing trade deficit with China has led to a loss of 3.4 million U.S. jobs between 2001 and 2017,” October 23, 2018, https://www.epi.org/press/the-growing-trade-deficit-with-china-has-led-to-a-loss-of-3-4-million-u-s-jobs-between-2001-and-2017/. 35 David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The New Tribes Shaping British Politics (London: Penguin, 2017), 151. 36 Sherry Linkon and John Russo, “Economic Nationalism and the Half-Life of Deindustrialization,” Working-Class Perspectives, October 30, 2017, https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2017/10/30/economic-nationalism-and-the-half-life-of-deindustrialization/. 37 Alan B. Krueger, “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality,” Council of Economic Advisors, January 12, 2012, https://milescorak.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/speech-2012_01_12_inal_web-1.pdf. 38 Fatih Guvenen et al., “Lifetime Incomes in the United States Over Six Decades,” National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2017, https://www.nber.org/papers/w23371.pdf. 39 Phillip Inman, “Social mobility in richest countries ‘has stalled since 1990,’” Guardian, June 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/15/social-mobility-in-richest-countries-has-stalled-since-1990s; Miles Corak, “Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in Comparison,” in The Economics of Inequality, Poverty, and Discrimination in the 21st Century, ed.

Gangs proliferate in the decayed and rat-infested environment, and murder rates are among the highest for a large city in the high-income world.3 Chicago’s crime is heavily concentrated in the poorer districts, as is typical of big cities: according to one study, 5 percent of the nation’s streets account for half of the urban crime.4 In the late nineteenth century, the muckraking journalist Frank Norris described Chicago as “the heart of the nation.”5 Today it is becoming essentially two different cities: one-third is what the local analyst Pete Saunders calls “global Chicago,” which is something of a Midwestern San Francisco, while the other two-thirds is more like Saunders’s hometown of Detroit as it is today, much of it a depopulated ruin or a dangerous netherworld of crime.6 Globalization and rapid deindustrialization together have led to the attrition of relatively well-paying jobs tied to the steel industry, meat processing, and manufacturing of agricultural equipment. Over a period of fifteen years, the number of manufacturing jobs in Chicago was cut in half, and it now stands at the lowest level in modern history.7 Meanwhile, the middle class has been decimated. In 1970, half of Chicago’s residents were middle-class; by 2019 the proportion was down to 16 percent, according to a University of Illinois study.8 The once large black urban middle class has been particularly ravaged.

Today, around 40 percent of black 20-to-24-year-olds in Chicago are out of work and out of school, compared with 7 percent of their white counterparts.9 William Lee, a Chicago Tribune reporter who grew up in the South Shore neighborhood, says that the large-scale exodus has left those remaining on the South Side “feeling like life after the rapture, with relatives, good friends and classmates vanishing and their communities shattering.”10 The forces of globalization and deindustrialization have likewise transformed many big cities around the world from centers of opportunity to places that are starkly divided between rich and poor.11 Today the world’s great cities—Paris, London, Tokyo, New York, San Francisco—are attractive to those who already have wealth or the most impressive academic credentials, but less promising to the middle and working classes. The engines of upward mobility have stalled.


pages: 316 words: 87,486

Listen, Liberal: Or, What Ever Happened to the Party of the People? by Thomas Frank

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, American ideology, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, blue-collar work, Burning Man, centre right, circulation of elites, Clayton Christensen, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, David Brooks, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, Frank Gehry, full employment, George Gilder, gig economy, Gini coefficient, income inequality, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Lean Startup, mandatory minimum, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, mass immigration, mass incarceration, McMansion, microcredit, mobile money, moral panic, mortgage debt, Nelson Mandela, new economy, obamacare, payday loans, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, pre–internet, profit maximization, profit motive, race to the bottom, Republic of Letters, Richard Florida, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, TaskRabbit, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, Travis Kalanick, Uber for X, union organizing, urban decay, women in the workforce, Works Progress Administration, young professional

Florida himself would later back away from certain aspects of his original theory, admitting that “we can’t stop the decline of some places, and that we would be foolish to try.”14 I bring all this up not because I want to refute it—it refutes itself—but because its eager adoption by liberal politicians tells us something important about the modern Democratic Party and its attitudes toward equality. In its quest for prosperity, the Party of the People declared itself wholeheartedly in favor of a social theory that forthrightly exalted the rich—the all-powerful creative class. For many cities and states, this was the economic strategy; this was what our leaders came up with to revive the urban wastelands and restore the de-industrialized zones. The Democratic idea was no longer to confront privilege but to flatter privilege, to sing the praises of our tasteful new master class. True, this was all done with an eye toward rebuilding the crumbling cities where the rest of us lived and worked, but the consequences of all this “creative class” bootlicking will take a long time to wear off. Working by then as a consultant to governments around the country, Florida himself ventured into politics in 2004, when he took to the pages of Washington Monthly to denounce the Republican Party and the science-doubting administration of George W.

What he means is that economic justice only comes about through economic growth, and therefore the primary duty of anyone who wants to tackle inequality is “to create a nurturing environment where business leaders and entrepreneurs want to locate and expand.”6 SHINING CITY ON A HILL The real spiritual homeland of the liberal class is Boston, Massachusetts. As the seat of American higher learning, it seems unsurprising that it should anchor one of the most Democratic of states, a place where elected Republicans are highly unusual. When other cities and states, made desperate by the advance of deindustrialization, set up fake bohemias and implore their universities to generate profitable ideas, Boston is the place they are trying to emulate, the city where it all works, smoothly and successfully. This is the city that virtually invented the blue-state economic model, in which prosperity arises from higher education and the knowledge-based industries that surround it. As of 2010, some 152,000 students lived in the city of Boston, making up 16.5 percent of the total population.

But the ones that have been successfully repurposed are in some ways even worse, filled as they often are with enterprises offering cheap suits or help with drug addiction. A clinic in the hulk of one abandoned mill has a sign on the window reading, simply, “Cancer & Blood.” The effect of all this is to remind you with every prospect that this is a place and a way of life from which the politicians have withdrawn their blessing. Like so many other American scenes, this one is the product of decades of deindustrialization, engineered by Republicans and rationalized by Democrats. Fifty miles away, Boston is a roaring success, but the doctrine of prosperity that you see on every corner in Boston also serves to explain away the failure you see on every corner in Fall River. This is a place where affluence never returns—not because affluence for Fall River is impossible or unimaginable, but because our country’s leaders have blandly accepted a social order that constantly bids down the wages of people like these while bidding up the rewards for innovators, creatives, and professionals.


pages: 318 words: 85,824

A Brief History of Neoliberalism by David Harvey

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, creative destruction, crony capitalism, debt deflation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, financial repression, full employment, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, labour market flexibility, land tenure, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, neoliberal agenda, new economy, Pearl River Delta, phenotype, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, The Chicago School, transaction costs, union organizing, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

The deregulation of everything from airlines and telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of untrammelled market freedoms for powerful corporate interests. Tax breaks on investment effectively subsidized the movement of capital away from the unionized north-east and midwest and into the non-union and weakly regulated south and west. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher rates of return. Deindustrialization at home and moves to take production abroad became much more common. The market, depicted ideologically as the way to foster competition and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 70 to 28 per cent in what was billed as ‘the largest tax cut in history’ (Figure 1.7). Figure 1.6 The attack on labour: real wages and productivity in the US, 1960–2000 Source: Pollin, Contours of Descent.

But business should ‘assiduously cultivate’ the state and when necessary use it ‘aggressively and with determination’.6 But exactly how was state power to be deployed to reshape common-sense understandings? One line of response to the double crisis of capital accumulation and class power arose in the trenches of the urban struggles of the 1970s. The New York City fiscal crisis was an iconic case. Capitalist restructuring and deindustrialization had for several years been eroding the economic base of the city, and rapid suburbanization had left much of the central city impoverished. The result was explosive social unrest on the part of marginalized populations during the 1960s, defining what came to be known as ‘the urban crisis’ (similar problems emerged in many US cities). The expansion of public employment and public provision—facilitated in part by generous federal funding—was seen as the solution.

With unemployment surging to 10 per cent in the mid-1980s, the moment was propitious to attack all forms of organized labour and to cut back on its privileges as well as its power. Transfer of industrial activity from the unionized north-east and midwest to the non-unionized and ‘right-to-work’ states of the south, if not beyond to Mexico and South-East Asia, became standard practice (subsidized by favourable taxation for new investment and aided by the shift in emphasis from production to finance as the centrepiece of capitalist class power). Deindustrialization of formerly unionized core industrial regions (the so-called ‘rust belt’) dis-empowered labour. Corporations could threaten plant closures, and risk—and usually win—strikes when necessary (for example in the coal industry). But here too it was not merely the use of the big stick that mattered, for there were a number of carrots that could be offered to labourers as individuals to break with collective action.


Global Financial Crisis by Noah Berlatsky

accounting loophole / creative accounting, asset-backed security, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, centre right, circulation of elites, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate raider, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, energy security, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, Food sovereignty, George Akerlof, God and Mammon, Gordon Gekko, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, market bubble, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, moral hazard, new economy, Northern Rock, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, South China Sea, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, working poor

In the name of ‘free trade’ and ‘comparative advantage’ [the ability of a country to produce a good at a lower relative cost than an192 Solutions to the Global Financial Crisis other] African countries were forced to accept sweeping trade liberalisation that has been very costly in economic and social terms. Trade liberalisation has increased Africa’s external dependence, destroyed domestic industries, accelerated deindustrialisation and led to the deterioration of its terms of trade. While African countries were being told about the virtues of ‘free trade’, OECD countries were provided huge agricultural subsidies erecting disguised or open protectionist policies, all of which have made ‘free trade’ a joke. Still in the name of ‘comparative advantage’, African countries were forced to give priority to cash crops at the expense of food production.


pages: 467 words: 116,902

The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness by Michelle Alexander

affirmative action, cognitive bias, Columbine, Corrections Corporation of America, deindustrialization, desegregation, different worldview, ending welfare as we know it, friendly fire, Gunnar Myrdal, illegal immigration, land reform, large denomination, low skilled workers, mandatory minimum, mass incarceration, means of production, new economy, New Urbanism, pink-collar, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

The budget of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, for example, was reduced from $274 million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984, and antidrug funds allocated to the Department of Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million.74 Determined to ensure that the “new Republican majority” would continue to support the extraordinary expansion of the federal government’s law enforcement activities and that Congress would continue to fund it, the Reagan administration launched a media offensive to justify the War on Drugs.75 Central to the media campaign was an effort to sensationalize the emergence of crack cocaine in inner-city neighborhoods—communities devastated by deindustrialization and skyrocketing unemployment. The media frenzy the campaign inspired simply could not have come at a worse time for African Americans. In the early 1980s, just as the drug war was kicking off, inner-city communities were suffering from economic collapse. The blue-collar factory jobs that had been plentiful in urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s had suddenly disappeared.76 Prior to 1970, inner-city workers with relatively little formal education could find industrial employment close to home.

To make matters worse, dramatic technological changes revolutionized the workplace—changes that eliminated many of the jobs that less skilled workers once relied upon for their survival. Highly educated workers benefited from the pace of technological change and the increased use of computer-based technologies, but blue-collar workers often found themselves displaced in the sudden transition from an industrial to a service economy. The impact of globalization and deindustrialization was felt most strongly in black inner-city communities. As described by William Julius Wilson, in his book When Work Disappears, the overwhelming majority of African Americans in the 1970s lacked college educations and had attended racially segregated, underfunded schools lacking basic resources. Those residing in ghetto communities were particularly ill equipped to adapt to the seismic changes taking place in the U.S. economy; they were left isolated and jobless.

Adding to their troubles is the “spatial mismatch” between their residence and employment opportunities.25 Willingness to hire ex-offenders is greatest in construction or manufacturing—industries that require little customer contact—and weakest in retail trade and other service sector businesses.26 Manufacturing jobs, however, have all but disappeared from the urban core during the past thirty years. Not long ago, young, unskilled men could find decent, well-paying jobs at large factories in most major Northern cities. Today, due to globalization and deindustrialization, that is no longer the case. Jobs can be found in the suburbs—mostly service sector jobs—but employment for unskilled men with criminal convictions, while difficult to find anywhere, is especially hard to find close to home. An ex-offender whose driver’s license has been suspended or who does not have access to a car, often faces nearly insurmountable barriers to finding employment. Driving to the suburbs to pick up and drop off applications, attend interviews, and pursue employment leads may be perfectly feasible if you have a driver’s license and access to a vehicle, but attempting to do so by bus is another matter entirely.


pages: 255 words: 75,172

Sleeping Giant: How the New Working Class Will Transform America by Tamara Draut

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, always be closing, American ideology, battle of ideas, big-box store, blue-collar work, collective bargaining, creative destruction, David Brooks, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, ending welfare as we know it, Ferguson, Missouri, financial deregulation, full employment, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, mass incarceration, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, obamacare, occupational segregation, payday loans, pink-collar, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Powell Memorandum, profit motive, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, shared worldview, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trickle-down economics, union organizing, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, white flight, women in the workforce, young professional

The pace of job losses was swift, a hard jerking away of people’s livelihoods and dignity, leaving a reverberating pain that would last for decades. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened up opportunities for black men to work in the reigning industrial sector of the time, but predominantly in the hardest, lowest-paid jobs—the very jobs that were most susceptible to being replaced by machines.43 As a result, black men experienced more than their fair share of dislocation as a result of deindustrialization. Thanks to a generation of discriminatory housing policies, black Americans were also more likely to be living in the central core of urban America. So when major steel factories on the outskirts of major cities—Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, Cleveland—shut down, the communities closest to these economic hubs faced severe economic isolation and collapse. The depth of the loss was substantial.

And the loss of her dad’s job quickly plummeted the family from “being working class to being super-poor,” Patrisse remembers. Instead of having access to private doctors and world-class care at Kaiser Permanente, she and her brothers now had to go to the public county hospital. Her dad was never able to rebound to his previous salary, instead relying on a series of low-paying jobs at auto-repair franchises like Midas. Cullors describes the connection between deindustrialization and mass incarceration as happening “fast, fast, fast.” Her neighborhood, Van Nuys, was poor in the 1990s, and right next door to the affluent community of Sherman Oaks, which made Van Nuys susceptible to gentrification and its black residents undesirable. “The neighborhood became super-surveilled and super-policed. I witnessed my brothers and their friends being harassed on a daily basis, stopped and frisked.

As Michelle Alexander observes in her stunning and critically acclaimed book The New Jim Crow, “Conservatives found they could finally justify an all-out war on an ‘enemy’ that had been racially defined years before.”47 By the time Reagan took office, two things were crystal-clear about the ideology of the Republican Party: 1) it would use race to divide the working class to win elections; and 2) it would use race to fuel antigovernment sentiment to shrink the role of government. So just when urban America was reeling from the economic upheaval of deindustrialization and black working-class men and women found themselves either jobless or underemployed, the narrative about what was happening in these neighborhoods depicted black people as morally and culturally defective, mired in a web of self-destruction that included drugs, out-of-wedlock births, and crime. Ronald Reagan masterfully spun dog-whistle narratives, turning racially coded language into electoral gold.


pages: 270 words: 73,485

Hubris: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Crisis and How to Avoid the Next One by Meghnad Desai

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, German hyperinflation, Gunnar Myrdal, Home mortgage interest deduction, imperial preference, income inequality, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, laissez-faire capitalism, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market clearing, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, negative equity, Northern Rock, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, Paul Samuelson, price stability, purchasing power parity, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, seigniorage, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tobin tax, too big to fail, women in the workforce

(i), (ii) Rothschilds (i) Roubini, Nouriel (i) Royal Charter, grants of monopoly (i) rules of competition (i) Russia (i), (ii) Russian revolution (i), (ii) saltwater economists (i), (ii) Samuelson, Paul (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) “Analytical Aspects of an Anti–Inflation Policy” (with Robert Solow) (i) Say, Jean-Baptiste (i) Say’s Law (i), (ii) scarcity value (i) Scholes, Myron (i), (ii), (iii) Schumpeter, Joseph (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) The Theory of Economic Development (i) Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States (with Milton Friedman) (i) Scottish Enlightenment (i) Second International (i) secular stagnation (i) securitization of mortgages (i) seigniorage privilege (i) self-interest (i) self-organizing society (i) self-sufficiency (i) service sector (i), (ii) servomechanism (i) shadow banking structure (i) shares (i) Sherman Act (i) Shiller, Robert (i), (ii) shocks (i), (ii), (iii) contagion (i) debt crises (i) political (i) see also oil shock short cycles (i) short-run rate of interest (i) Silesian weavers (i) single global currency (i) skills, types needed (i), (ii) slack (i) slavery, abolition of (i) Slutsky, Eugen (i), (ii), (iii) Smith, Adam (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) the founding of the political economy (i) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (i), (ii) The Theory of Moral Sentiments (i), (ii) social science, founding (i) Socialist International (i) society regulation (i) self-organizing (i) Solow, Robert (i), (ii), (iii) “Analytical Aspects of an Anti–Inflation Policy” (with Paul Samuelson) (i) sovereign debt crises (i), (ii) Soviet Union, break up (i), (ii) speculation (i) speculative motive (i), (ii) stag-deflation (i) stagflation (i), (ii), (iii) Stalin, Joseph (i) static vision (i) statistics (i) development of (i) historical research (i) usefulness (i) sterling, as reserve currency (i) stochastic calculus (i) stock market crash, London (i) stock markets bull run (i) competition (i) computer technology (i) stock prices, randomness (i) Stockholm School (i) Stop-Go cycle (i) policy (i) Summers, Larry (i) surplus value (i) sustainable recovery, sources of (i) Sutcliffe, Robert (i), (ii) sweetwater economists (i), (ii) Sweezy, Paul (i) System of Natural Liberty (i) T bills (i), (ii), (iii) tatonnement (i) tax cut, US (i) technical progress, role of (i) technological innovations author’s experiences (i) displacement effect (i), (ii) and manufacturing location (i) see also computer technology technological shocks (i) telecommunications (i) Thailand, Crisis, 1997 (i) Thatcher, Margaret (i) theories, need for validation (i) theory of economic behavior of the household (i) Thornton, Henry (i) time, role of (i) time series data (i) Tinbergen, Jan (i) Tobin, James (i) Tobin tax (i) total money supply, and prices (i) total output, heterogeneity (i) trade doctrine see under Ricardo trade-off, unemployment and inflation (i) trade surpluses, banking (i) trade unions effect on money wage (i) as harmful (i) power (i) rise of (i) strengthening (i) weakening (i) transactions motive (i) transmission mechanism (i) Troubled Assets Recovery Program (TARP) (i) true costs of production (i) Truman, Harry (i) trusts (i) Tugan-Baranowsky, Michael (i) Turkey (i) Turner, Adair, Lord (i) Two Treatises on Government (Locke) (i) uncertainty (i) underemployment equilibrium (i), (ii), (iii) undersaving (i), (ii) unearned income (i) unemployment aggregate level (i) cycles (i) effect of wages (i) explaining (i) and inflation (i) involuntary (i) and money wage (i) natural rate (i) see also Keynesian models unifying principle (i) unique static equilibrium, and moving data (i) unit labor costs (i) United Kingdom budget deficit elimination (i) deindustrialization (i) economic trajectory (i) Great Depression (i) monetarism (i) recovery strategy (i) see also Britain United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (i) United States budget deficit (i) deindustrialization (i) econometric modeling (i) economic trajectory (i) economic weakness, post WWI (i) fiscal boost (i) Gold Standard (i) Great Depression (i) interest rates (i) Keynesianism (i) post-World War I power (i) post-World War II (i) Progressive Movement (i) prosperity (i) recovery strategy (i) seigniorage privilege (i) tax cut (i) trade deficit (i) welfare state expansion (i) westward expansion (i) withdrawal of currency (i) see also America unorthodoxy (i) urbanization (i) US House of Representatives, Greenspan’s testimony (i) usury defining (i) laws (i) prohibition (i), (ii) utopianism (i), (ii) valuation of assets, theory of (i) of capital (i) value vs.price (i) as price (i) relative (i), (ii) value added (i) value of goods, determination (i) variable costs (i) variables (i) Vietnam War (i) visions of economy (i) vocabulary, economic (i), (ii), (iii) volition (i) wage agreements, voluntary (i) demands, post-World War I (i) downward trend (i) effect on unemployment (i) rates, and unemployment (i) restraint (i) rises (i) share: declining (i); developed and developing economies (i); rise in (i), (ii) wage/profit distinction (i) units (i), (ii) see also money wages; real wages Walras, Antoine Auguste (i) Walras, Léon (i), (ii) Walrasian model (i) wars, financing (i) wealth distribution (i) inequality of (i) indicators (i) Smith’s theory (i) weaving, mechanization (i) welfare economics (i) welfare state, levels of support (i) White, Harry (i) Wicksell, Knut (i), (ii) basis of Hayek’s theory (i) later development of ideas (i) Wicksellian boom, developing countries (i) Wicksellian cycle, combined with Kondratieff cycle (i) William III (i) women, in workforce (i) workers dependence on capitalists (i) living standards (i) migration (i) productive/unproductive (i) workforce, recruitment of women (i) World Trade Organization (WTO) (i), (ii) World War I (i) World War II, outbreak (i) yields (i) Zombie firms (i)

It had risen in the UK from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s and reached a peak in 1975. This was also the year in which the UK experienced its highest ever rate of inflation – 25 percent. Academic economists did not take much notice, though Glyn was a Fellow at Oxford and Sutcliffe was teaching at Kingston Polytechnic then. They also predicted the consequences of the profit squeeze. Capital began migrating out to Asia during the 1970s and the UK began deindustrializing. This was to have a long-lasting effect on the structure of the UK economy. Similar trends were noticed in the US in the Northeast region at the same time. These economies began to become more service based and the income distribution became more unequal as the previously employed manual workers in manufacturing now became unemployed and unemployable, or had to take lower paid service jobs.

The economy goes around in a cycle perpetually without ever reaching an equilibrium. These cycles can in principle be as long as 20 or 30 years depending on the parameters of the equations. Figure 6 The Goodwin cycle This insight is profoundly un-Keynesian as well as un-neoclassical. But it is informative. However, even this way of looking at the world was not fully global, as Marx would have wished. Stagflation resulted in the deindustrialization of the developed economies and the industrialization of what were hitherto developing economies. They were soon to be called the newly industrialized economies. Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore were called the Asian Tigers. They were followed by Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and finally in the 1980s, China. Capital migrated from the West, where labor had become expensive, to Asia, the land of cheap labor, in search of higher profits.


pages: 550 words: 89,316

The Sum of Small Things: A Theory of the Aspirational Class by Elizabeth Currid-Halkett

assortative mating, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, cognitive dissonance, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, discrete time, disruptive innovation, Downton Abbey, East Village, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, Geoffrey West, Santa Fe Institute, income inequality, iterative process, knowledge economy, longitudinal study, Mason jar, means of production, NetJets, new economy, New Urbanism, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, post-industrial society, profit maximization, Richard Florida, selection bias, Silicon Valley, The Design of Experiments, the High Line, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, the market place, Thorstein Veblen, Tony Hsieh, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, Veblen good, women in the workforce

Workers’ ties to their organizations triumphed over their own ideas and ambitions, and yet, to Mills’s point, this loyalty was rewarded and it paved a path for ongoing mobility. The classic film The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956) and more recently the TV series Mad Men, were popular mainstream depictions of how this relationship played out. The collapse of the manufacturing economy changed the currency of social and economic mobility quite considerably. Deindustrialization of Western economies (particularly within the United States and Great Britain) is largely explained by three key forces: oversaturation of the market (there are only so many dishwashers a household can buy), technology and automation (machines are low-cost and faster than people when it comes to factory lines), and globalization (labor costs are cheaper elsewhere and technologies in transport along with computers make it possible to outsource production to Southeast Asia or South America).34 As a result, those well-paying factory jobs that defined the good life in the United States disappeared quickly.

These jobs were well-paid but relatively unskilled, thus many members of America’s middle class achieved prosperity, material comfort, and economic and social security without birthright, and, antithetical to the current formula for upward mobility, without a college degree. The hemorrhaging of these factory jobs to developing countries and the closing up of factory shops meant that this stable middle class had lost its means for survival. Deindustrialization brought erosion to major urban centers (where many factories were located) and joblessness throughout huge swaths of the country.36 In manufacturing’s place came the rise of the service economy, a truly bifurcated economic structure. Globalization manifested itself in the outsourcing of cheap labor for manufacturing but also through the emergence of elite “global cities,” to use Saskia Sassen’s term.

This density was due to the rise in production—the manufacturing economy created the capability and the subsequent demand for mass-produced material goods, which brought forth immigrant workers and tenement housing. This expansion also made cities hard places to live. Cities became untenable by the mid-twentieth century (with the rise of public health problems, overcrowding, and pollution). Thus, unsurprisingly, when the federal government offered low-interest, amortized loans for suburban home ownership, those who could, fled urban centers.4 The subsequent urban deindustrialization, commencing in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, left cities with no middle class and no jobs. Those who study cities—economists, sociologists, urban planners—thought the demise would continue, that the city as we knew it would never recover. Indeed, they were partially right. Cities are no longer centers of manufacturing, and factories, which had gone to South America and Asia, did not reopen.


pages: 207 words: 59,298

The Gig Economy: A Critical Introduction by Jamie Woodcock, Mark Graham

Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, British Empire, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate social responsibility, crowdsourcing, David Graeber, deindustrialization, disintermediation, en.wikipedia.org, full employment, future of work, gender pay gap, gig economy, global value chain, informal economy, information asymmetry, inventory management, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, knowledge economy, Lyft, mass immigration, means of production, Network effects, new economy, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, planetary scale, precariat, rent-seeking, RFID, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, self-driving car, sentiment analysis, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, TaskRabbit, The Future of Employment, transaction costs, Travis Kalanick, two-sided market, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, union organizing, women in the workforce, working poor, young professional

The thinking might go: first, industrialization introduces new forms of work, in which workers are made to accept unfair conditions. Next, industrial workers successfully organize and precarious conditions are overcome through the collective power of workers. However, because contemporary worker power is premised on the ‘standard employment relationship’ brought about by industrialization, all that workers have collectively achieved is threatened by waves of de-industrialization. Although there are examples of the process developing like this, in many parts of the world the experience of industrialization was very different. For example, Bent (2017: 12) argues that large-scale industries were established in both Egypt and India under British imperial rule. This industrialization was deeply shaped by the exploitative relationships of the British Empire. Despite worker resistance, the industrialization that took place ‘was highly disruptive to existing social and economic systems … these changes resulted in the creation of working arrangements that were unstable, insecure, and contingent – in a word, precarious’ (Bent, 2017: 14).

The changes in production identified by Ricardo Antunes (2012: 37) have had a significant impact on work: extensive deregulation of labour-rights, eliminated on a daily basis in all corners of the world that have industrial production and services; increase in the fragmentation of the working class, precarisation and subcontracting of the human force that labours; and destruction of class-unionism and its transformation into docile unionism, based on partnership. The failure of the trade union movement to fully adapt to deindustrialization has also greatly reduced the collective power of workers relative to capital. In these contexts, trade unions ‘face considerable obstacles to extending their presence in private services, not least from hostile employers’ (Williams and Adam-Smith, 2009). In many contexts, as workers’ power is reduced, and the deregulated environment allows for new kinds of employment relationships. Significant risks are shifted from employers to workers, while at the same time making workers bargain as individuals rather than as collectives.

Whenever we use a digital service, product or even an algorithm that was trained using digital labour, there is almost no way to know whether an exhausted worker is behind it; whether they get laid off if they become sick or get pregnant; whether they are spending twenty hours a week just searching for work; how precarious their source of income is; or whether they are being paid an unfairly low wage. In the Global North, this kind of work is growing within a context of deindustrialization, becoming an option for people who may have seen alternative kinds of jobs disappearing. As Alana Semuels (2018) has uncovered in interviews with microworkers in the US, this kind of work is increasing. One of her interviewees, Erica, explained that she started working for Amazon Mechanical Turk after struggling to find work in her ‘economically struggling town’. She noted that ‘here, it’s kind of a dead zone.


pages: 281 words: 83,505

Palaces for the People: How Social Infrastructure Can Help Fight Inequality, Polarization, and the Decline of Civic Life by Eric Klinenberg

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, assortative mating, basic income, big-box store, Broken windows theory, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, clean water, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, East Village, Filter Bubble, ghettoisation, helicopter parent, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, John Snow's cholera map, late fees, Mark Zuckerberg, mass incarceration, Menlo Park, New Urbanism, Peter Thiel, Ray Oldenburg, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, smart grid, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Great Good Place, the High Line, universal basic income, urban planning, young professional

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the social world that the steel mills had created was already breaking down. Massive deindustrialization hit American and European cities and continued through the last decades of the twentieth century. As factories shuttered, so too did the union halls, taverns, restaurants, and civic organizations that glued different groups together. Unmoored, unemployed, and unable to find new opportunities, people moved away. Between 1970 and 1990, nearly six hundred thousand people left Chicago, and most of them came from industrial areas like the one my great-grandfather settled in a century ago. Sociologists have thoroughly documented how deindustrialization devastated neighborhoods, making cities and suburbs throughout the United States even more segregated by race and class. But we are only now coming to terms with how much damage deindustrialization and the decline of blue-collar communities did to the body politic, how fractured and distrustful we have become.

But we are only now coming to terms with how much damage deindustrialization and the decline of blue-collar communities did to the body politic, how fractured and distrustful we have become. The presidential campaign and election of 2016 was hardly the first sign of America’s social and political polarization, and deindustrialization is by no means its only cause. Until recently, though, leading public opinion scholars showed that pundits and policy elites were more polarized than voters. America, claimed the Stanford political scientist Morris Fiorina in 2005, was “closely divided,” not “deeply divided.” Citizens identified strongly with or against one of the two major parties, but—with exceptions for issues such as abortion, sexual morality, and capital punishment—they generally did not have firm or extreme views on most major policy matters. That’s changed in the last decades, however, as social inequality and class segregation have deepened, national news programs that transcended ideological lines have lost viewers, and the Internet has generated the rise of “filter bubbles,” where everyone can find facts and opinions that confirm their beliefs.

“Durkheim-like recipe for suicide”: Ibid., 429–30. naturally occurring opioids: Tristen Inagaki, Lara Ray, Michael Irwin, Baldwin Way, and Naomi Eisenberger, “Opioids and Social Bonding: Naltrexone Reduces Feelings of Social Connection,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 11, no. 5 (2016): 728–35. “cause there ain’t shit else to do”: Katherine McLean, “ ‘There’s Nothing Here’ Deindustrialization as Risk Environment for Overdose,” International Journal of Drug Policy 29 (2016): 19–26. comparatively fragile communities: Michael Zoorob and Jason Salemi, “Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of Social Capital in Mitigating the Drug Overdose Epidemic in the United States,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 173 (2017): 1–9. to find them and call 911: In a stunning article on opioid addiction in West Virginia, the journalist Margot Talbot reports a spike in people taking drugs and overdosing in public spaces, including parks and athletic fields, in part because they want other people to find them and call 911 if they overdose.


pages: 394 words: 85,734

The Global Minotaur by Yanis Varoufakis, Paul Mason

active measures, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, endogenous growth, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, full employment, Hyman Minsky, industrial robot, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, labour market flexibility, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, market fundamentalism, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money market fund, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, negative equity, new economy, Northern Rock, paper trading, Paul Samuelson, planetary scale, post-oil, price stability, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, structural adjustment programs, systematic trading, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, urban renewal, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks, Yom Kippur War

This two-pronged effect is causing Latin America to deindustrialize and return to the status of a primary goods producer. These developments have a global reach. For if Brazil and Argentina turn their eyes toward Asia, as they have already started doing, they may abandon their long-term struggle to break into the food markets of the United States and Europe, from which they have been barred by severe protectionist measures in favour of American, German and French farmers. Already, Latin America’s shifting trade patterns are affecting the orientation of a region that was, until very recently, thought of as the United States’ backyard. Latin America’s governments are choosing not to resist their countries’ transformation into China’s primary goods producers. They may not like deindustrialization much, but it is preferable to the prospect of another crisis like that of 1998–2002, and another visit from an IMF seeking to exact more pounds of flesh from their people.

In the meantime, American households saw their debt share of national income rise from 66 per cent in 1997 to 100 per cent ten years later. Put together, aggregate US debt in 2008 exceeded 350 per cent of GDP, when in 1980 it had stood at an already inflated 160 per cent. As for Britain, the City of London (the financial sector in which British society had put most of its eggs, following the rapid deindustrialization of the early 1980s) sported a collective debt almost two and a half times Britain’s GDP, while, in addition, British families owed a sum greater than one annual GDP. So, if an accumulation of inordinate debt infused more risk than the world could bear, how come no one saw the crash coming? That was, after all, the Queen’s reasonable question. The British Academy’s answer grudgingly confessed to the combined sins of smug rhetoric and linear extrapolation.

Both countries had been rendered dependable (thanks to the overwhelming presence of the US military); both featured solid industrial bases; and both offered a highly skilled workforce and a people that would jump at the opportunity of rising, phoenix-like, from the ashes. Moreover, they both offered considerable geostrategic benefits vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there was a good deal of resistance to this idea to be overcome – resistance grounded in the urge to punish Germany and Japan by forcing them to deindustrialize and return to an almost pastoral state from which they would never again be able to launch an industrial-scale war. Indeed, Harry White, the US representative at Bretton Woods, had advocated the effective removal of Germany’s industry, forcing German living standards down to those of the country’s less-developed neighbours. In 1946, the Allies, under the auspices of the Allied Control Council, ordered the dismantling of steel plants with a view to reducing German steel production to less than 6 million tons annually, i.e. around 75 per cent of Germany’s pre-war steel output.


Work in the Future The Automation Revolution-Palgrave MacMillan (2019) by Robert Skidelsky Nan Craig

3D printing, Airbnb, algorithmic trading, Amazon Web Services, anti-work, artificial general intelligence, autonomous vehicles, basic income, business cycle, cloud computing, collective bargaining, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, data is the new oil, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, deskilling, disintermediation, Donald Trump, Erik Brynjolfsson, feminist movement, Frederick Winslow Taylor, future of work, gig economy, global supply chain, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Jarndyce and Jarndyce, Jarndyce and Jarndyce, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, Loebner Prize, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, moral panic, Network effects, new economy, off grid, pattern recognition, post-work, Ronald Coase, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Steve Jobs, strong AI, technoutopianism, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, the market place, The Nature of the Firm, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, Turing test, Uber for X, uber lyft, universal basic income, wealth creators, working poor

At the most radical end of this school of thought is accelerationism, a utopian leftist theory that the pace of automation should be sped up as much as possible in order to achieve a society in which human labour is unnecessary.2 I would argue, perhaps predictably, that the answer is more nuanced than either camp would have it. Those in the first camp often draw examples from areas in the UK affected by deindustrialisation in which whole communities have lost their jobs and incomes, and with these their sense Recent commentators to advocate this include Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams (2015) and Aaron Bastani (2018). 2 180 R. Kay of purpose and self-respect. However, this outcome is specific to the circumstance: it does not mean that work is inherently necessary for meaning. The sudden removal of paid employment will inevitably lead to a loss of meaning for those affected, since there are no alternative structures of meaning available to supplant it.


pages: 538 words: 145,243

Behemoth: A History of the Factory and the Making of the Modern World by Joshua B. Freeman

anti-communist, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate raider, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, en.wikipedia.org, factory automation, Ford paid five dollars a day, Frederick Winslow Taylor, global supply chain, indoor plumbing, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, James Hargreaves, joint-stock company, knowledge worker, mass immigration, means of production, mittelstand, Naomi Klein, new economy, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, Pearl River Delta, post-industrial society, Ralph Waldo Emerson, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, spinning jenny, Steve Jobs, strikebreaker, technoutopianism, the built environment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, Tim Cook: Apple, transaction costs, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, urban planning, Vanguard fund, women in the workforce, working poor, Works Progress Administration, zero-sum game

., 1989; William Serrin, Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town (New York: Random House, 1992). 2.Lindsay-Jean Hard, “The Rouge: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow,” Urban and Regional Planning Economic Development Handbook, University of Michigan, Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Dec. 4, 2005, http://www.umich.edu/~econdev/riverrouge/; Perry Stern, “Best Selling Vehicles in America—September Edition,” Sept. 2, 2016, http://www.msn.com/en-us/autos/autos-passenger/best-selling-vehicles-in-america-%E2%80%94-september-edition/ss-AAiquE5#image=21. 3.Laurence Gross, The Course of Industrial Decline: The Boott Cotton Mills of Lowell, Mass., 1835–1955 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 44–45, 102–03, 229, 238–40. 4.Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, “The Meanings of Deindustrialization,” in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 4. There is a large literature on deindustrialization. In addition to this volume, see the cluster of articles on “Crumbling Cultures: Deindustrialization, Class, and Memory,” ed. Tim Strangleman, James Rhodes, and Sherry Linkon, in International Labor and Working-Class History 84 (Oct. 2013). 5.Paul Wiseman, “Why Robots, Not Trade, Are Behind So Many Factory Job Losses,” AP: The Big Story, Nov. 2, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/265cd8fb02fb44a69cf0eaa2063e11d9/mexico-taking-us-factory-jobs-blame-robots-instead; Mandy Zuo, “Rise of the Robots: 60,000 Workers Culled from Just One Factory as China’s Struggling Electronics Hub Turns to Artificial Intelligence,” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1949918/rise-robots-60000-workers-culled-just-one-factory-chinas.

For Bell and many others, “knowledge workers” or “symbolic analysts” had elbowed aside blue-collar workers to constitute the key economic group. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a brief flurry of political and cultural interest in the discontent of industrial workers—the so-called “blue-collar blues”—but an economic downturn quickly put an end to that. The next time factory workers captured public attention, they did so as a result of deindustrialization and the massive social crisis it brought to the “rust belt.” Between 1978 and 1982, employment in the automobile industry fell by a third, with more than three dozen factories shuttered in the Detroit area alone. During those same years, the steel industry shed more than 150,000 jobs. Bethlehem cut ten thousand jobs at Sparrows Point and phased out operations in Lackawanna, New York, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

Imitation, licensing, and theft have allowed each wave of factory developers to incorporate past innovations, as industrial giantism leapt across oceans and political divides. But if resilient and durable as a totality, industrial giantism in any given place has proven unsustainable. Specific communities have experienced the giant factory not as a continuity of progress but as an arc of disruptive innovation, growth, decline, and abandonment. As historians Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott wrote in a book about American deindustrialization, “the industrial culture forged in the furnace of fixed capital investment was itself a temporary condition. What millions of working men and women might have experienced as solid, dependable, decently waged work really only lasted for a brief moment.”4 Especially in areas dominated by a single industry, when the cycle of factory giantism moved on, prolonged devastation resulted, even as somewhere else on the globe giant factories were creating new possibilities and wealth.


pages: 7,371 words: 186,208

The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times by Giovanni Arrighi

anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business process, colonial rule, commoditize, Corn Laws, creative destruction, cuban missile crisis, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, double entry bookkeeping, European colonialism, financial independence, financial intermediation, floating exchange rates, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, late capitalism, London Interbank Offered Rate, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Peace of Westphalia, profit maximization, Project for a New American Century, RAND corporation, reserve currency, spice trade, the market place, The Nature of the Firm, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile, Yom Kippur War

Thus, as Flemish clothworkers were subjected to embargoes and to military aggression, they were at the same time encouraged to move to England. And when at the end of the fourteenth century the Flemish industry finally collapsed, many did just that (Miskimin 1969: 93-9). The success of this carrotand-stick strategy can be gauged from the trends depicted in Figure 2.2, which shows the expansion of the English cloth industry during the Hundred Years War and the parallel “forcible” deindustrialization of one of the three main centers of Flemish cloth production, Ypres. Commenting on these trends, Harry Miskimin has underscored the “negative-sum game” that underlay them. Edward III had been triumphantly successful in destroying the Flemish industry and in transferring part of it to England, but the Flemish depression must moderate the claims permitted to the English success. The English accomplishment lay in the transplantation of an industry rather than in the creation of a new area of industrial enterprise. . . .

I T T F 6 01 l 3 1 l 1350 1360 1370 1380 1390 1310 1330 1350 1370 1390 Source: Miskimin (1969: 94) 2.2 Trends in the Cloth Trade: Shipments from England and Production at Ypres (thousands of cloths) 102 THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY world market — the decline at the city of Ypres alone was greater than the entire English export trade — England, through the exercise of national power and the economic control of raw materials, had gained regional economic prosperity at the expense of Flanders. (Miskimin 1969: 95-6) The conclusion that the expansion of cloth production in England consisted of nothing more than a transplant of an industry, and that the transplant was associated with an overall decline in economic prosperity, becomes even more inescapable once we bring into the picture the “spontaneous” deindustrialization of Florence, which preceded that of Ypres and was even more massive. According to Giovanni Villani, in 1338 there were 200 or more workshops in Florence producing between 70,000 and 80,000 pieces of cloth for a total value of more than 1,200,000 gold florins. Thirty years earlier, there had been about 300 producing over 100,000 pieces of cloth, although these cloths were coarser and about half as valuable (Lopez and Raymond 1955: 71-4; Luzzatto 1961: 106).

Even closer is the resemblance between the Edwardian era and what is known as the “periwig period” of Dutch history — a period that broadly corresponds to the phase of financial expansion of the Dutch cycle of accumulation, particularly to the closing two or three decades of the expansion. As in Florence 400 years earlier and in Britain 125 years later, the financial expansion of the latter half of the eighteenth century was associated in Holland with widespread processes of “deindustrialization” (most clearly reflected in shipbuilding) and with a contraction in workingclass incomes. “The merchant-bankers and the wealthy rentiers might never have ‘had it so good,’ ” notes Charles Boxer (1965: 293-4), but as an eyewitness reported at the end of the period, “ ‘the well-being of that class of people who lead a working life [was] steadily declining.’ ” And as in Renaissance Florence or in Edwardian Britain, or for that matter in Reaganite America, the capitalists-turned-rentiers of periwig Holland THE “ENDLESS” ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 179 were only concerned with the very short run.


pages: 626 words: 167,836

The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation by Carl Benedikt Frey

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, business cycle, business process, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, collective bargaining, computer age, computer vision, Corn Laws, creative destruction, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, Donald Trump, easy for humans, difficult for computers, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, factory automation, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, future of work, game design, Gini coefficient, Hyperloop, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, industrial robot, intangible asset, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, invention of agriculture, invention of movable type, invention of the steam engine, invention of the wheel, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job satisfaction, job-hopping, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Loebner Prize, low skilled workers, Malcom McLean invented shipping containers, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, minimum wage unemployment, natural language processing, new economy, New Urbanism, Norbert Wiener, oil shock, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, Pareto efficiency, pattern recognition, pink-collar, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, Renaissance Technologies, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, robot derives from the Czech word robota Czech, meaning slave, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, social intelligence, speech recognition, spinning jenny, Stephen Hawking, The Future of Employment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade route, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Turing test, union organizing, universal basic income, washing machines reduced drudgery, wealth creators, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

Bush’s 2000 results—in areas most exposed to Chinese imports.47 But while globalization is the most frequently cited villain, automation has also helped shatter the communities of the so-called blue-collar’s aristocracy. Even if production is brought back to the United States, it will not replace the vast numbers of jobs for non-college-educated members of the middle class that have been lost to the process of deindustrialization. The computer revolution, which has also been an underlying facilitator of globalization, has meant diminishing opportunity for the unskilled across the board: routine work is now disappearing in parts of the developing world as well.48 In America, this process has been going on for decades, yet it was hidden by other factors. Though many blue-collar men have seen their incomes decline in real terms, family incomes were still rising for some, as more and more women joined the workforce.

His assaults on trade were surely excessive, but there is no question that many manual workers and their families have felt the consequences of low-cost competition intensely—especially since China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Globalization did not lift all of the boats, but neither did automation. As the economist Dani Rodrik writes, “Globalization was hardly the only shock which gutted established social contracts. By all accounts, automation and new digital technologies played a quantitatively greater role in de-industrialization and in spatial and income inequalities.”58 Rodrik also offers a powerful explanation for why globalization has become the political target that automation has not. “What gives trade particular political salience,” he argues, “is that it often raises fairness concerns in ways that the other major contributor to inequality—technology—does not.”59 Inequality is more problematic when it occurs due to unfair competition.

In the words of the economist Robert LaLonde, “Whereas private markets offer insurance for storms and fire, no such insurance is available when a middle-aged worker loses a job and suffers a permanent drop in wages. There is a market failure here, and government should correct it.”33 Tax Credits In the popular press, universal basic income (UBI) has become a widely discussed way of limiting individual losses resulting from automation and deindustrialization. Of course, there are arguments in favor of UBI that have nothing to do with technological change, but this is not the place to dwell on them. The question here is whether it provides a good way of addressing the discontents brought about by the rise of the robots. In essence, UBI—which is closely tied to Milton Friedman’s old idea of a negative income tax—would give people a minimum income regardless of whether they worked or not.


pages: 440 words: 108,137

The Meritocracy Myth by Stephen J. McNamee

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, American ideology, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, business cycle, collective bargaining, computer age, conceptual framework, corporate governance, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, estate planning, failed state, fixed income, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, joint-stock company, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low-wage service sector, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, occupational segregation, old-boy network, pink-collar, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, prediction markets, profit motive, race to the bottom, random walk, school choice, Scientific racism, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, white flight, young professional

What is more, these forms of discrimination often become components of cumulative disadvantage, which have been referred to as “multiple jeopardy,” or the effects of intersectionalities. We conclude that discrimination trumps merit; the more forms of discrimination that are operative, the more effective the trump. In the concluding chapter, “Growing Inequality in the Twenty-First Century,” we outline the implications of globalization and deindustrialization, the long wage recession, and increasing economic inequality since the 1970s for the sustainability of the notions of meritocracy and the American Dream in the twenty-first century. We examine strategies that individual Americans have developed to cope with the problems created by these changes. Individual coping strategies, however, will not make the system more equal, more meritocratic, or more fair.

In addition, as part of the overall downsizing strategy, middle-level management jobs were trimmed while new computer technologies automated routine information-processing tasks. In the postwar period, it had been possible for many working-class Americans with only a high school diploma to realize the American Dream by working in factories and corporate offices with good pay, good benefits, and long-term job stability. With “deindustrialization” and “downsizing,” many of these workers were laid off (Uchitelle 2006). New jobs were created, but these were mostly in the “soft,” low-wage, low-skill service sector. Reflecting on her interviews with these workers, economist Paula Rayman put it this way: During the early 1980s, many workers in America who thought they had it made in the major industrial corporations of auto, steel, and aircraft found themselves unemployed. . . .

Economist Frank Levy points to several factors responsible for this change: the civil rights movement, which reduced economic discrimination; the extension of the interstate highway system and the development of network television, which helped link the South to other regions; and the spread of air-conditioning, making the South more amenable to the “climatically challenged” (1998, 133). The availability of cheap land, low wages, low taxes, and low levels of unionization also encouraged industrial development in the South. During the same period, deindustrialization of the Northeast and Midwest (the Rust Belt) depressed wages, especially in the manufacturing sectors. Despite these changes, significant regional gaps in income and poverty rates remain. Table 6.2 depicts median household income differences and family poverty rates among regions in the United States in 2011.[1] Median household income ranges from a high of $53,864 in the Northeast to a low of $46,899 in the South, representing a 12.9 percent gap.


pages: 224 words: 73,737

Poverty Safari: Understanding the Anger of Britain's Underclass by Darren McGarvey

basic income, British Empire, carbon footprint, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, impulse control, means of production, side project, universal basic income, urban decay, wage slave

Thousands of families, already struggling to make ends meet, were placed under so much strain that it altered them physically, psychologically and emotionally. What was left of the local economy adapted to supply the community’s mutating demands; off licences, pubs, chip shops, licensed bingo halls, bookmakers and, latterly, drug dealers, provided temporary relief from the grim reality of deindustrialisation. But these seemingly harmless activities soon became vices that would later find expression as public health epidemics. In such oppressive and downtrodden social conditions, people began to distrust public institutions and the various authority figures, like police and social workers, despatched to mop up the rising tide of social problems. Meanwhile, in the more troubled pockets of these challenged communities, people hid themselves away in a dark underbelly and attempted to raise children while descending into sordid lives of alcoholism and substance misuse.


pages: 409 words: 118,448

An Extraordinary Time: The End of the Postwar Boom and the Return of the Ordinary Economy by Marc Levinson

affirmative action, airline deregulation, banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, car-free, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, clean water, deindustrialization, endogenous growth, falling living standards, financial deregulation, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, income inequality, income per capita, indoor plumbing, informal economy, intermodal, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, late capitalism, linear programming, manufacturing employment, new economy, Nixon shock, North Sea oil, oil shock, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, price stability, purchasing power parity, refrigerator car, Right to Buy, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, rolodex, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, statistical model, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, unorthodox policies, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, Wolfgang Streeck, women in the workforce, working-age population, yield curve, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Data on Japanese R&D spending are from Steven Englander and Axel Mittelstädt, “Total Factor Productivity: Macroeconomic and Structural Aspects of the Slowdown,” OECD Economic Survey 10 (1988): 36. 17. Dale W. Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda, “Productivity and International Competitiveness in Japan and the United States, 1960–1985,” in Hulten, ed., Productivity Growth in Japan and the United States, 45. 18. The term “deindustrialization” was popularized by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 19. James Chan Lee and Helen Sutch, “Profits and Rates of Return in OECD Countries,” OECD Economics and Statistics Department, working paper 20, 1985. 20. See US International Trade Commission, Bolts, Nuts, and Screws of Iron and Steel (Washington, DC, 1975). It is noteworthy that none of the law’s proponents identified improving productivity as one of its purposes.

Japan ran steady trade deficits with the countries that supplied it with raw materials—Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Australia—but large surpluses with the high-income countries whose sophisticated industrial products competed with Japan’s. As Japan’s trade shifted from deficit to surplus, the United States went from rough balance before 1975 to persistent and large trade deficits. The upper Midwest, the heartland of heavy industry, became known as the “Rust Belt,” the victim of a disease that would soon be labeled “deindustrialization.” Canada and Europe had their rust belts, too, and the English Midlands, the German Ruhr, and the coal and steel towns of France and Belgium would soon be just as depressed as the erstwhile industrial hotspots in the United States.18 Throughout the Golden Age, manufacturers in every country had benefited from seemingly unlimited demand for their products. Profits were high—far higher than in farming, mining, or the service sector—and those strong profits financed rising wages, research and development to create new products, and investment in yet more factories.

See also political parties Cost of Living Council, 107 cost-push inflation, 75–77 Council of Economic Advisers, 48, 65–66 crisis cartels, 127 Czechoslovakia, 19 Dai-ichi Kangyo of Tokyo, 91 Daly, Herman E., 63 Dance of Death (Strindberg), 164 Davignon, Étienne, 127 Davignon Plan, 127 de Gasperi, Alcide, 24 de Gaulle, Charles, 24, 162, 200, 201 de Larosière, Jacques, 244, 249 debt crisis, 243–256; cause of and solution to, 253–256; emergency loans and, 247–249; impact on First World, 251–252; inflation and, 246; unemployment and, 246 deindustrialization, 124 Delors, Jacques, 209, 210 demand-pull inflation, 75–76 democracy, 268 Denison, Edward, 231 Denmark: anti-tax movement in, 151–153, 154; income per person in, 160 dependency theory (government intervention re: raw materials and manufacturing), 42 Der Spiegel, 89 deregulation, 12, 99–114, 237; of aviation, 113; of electricity, 113; of energy sector, 99–109, 110, 113; of gas, 99–100, 102, 103–104, 107–108, 109, 113; of interest rates on deposits and loans, 112, 113; of natural gas, 103, 104, 108–109, 110, 113; of oil, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104–106, 107–108, 109, 110, 113; positive and negative results of, 113–114; of telecommunications sector, 107, 113; of transportation sector, 106–107, 110–112, 113–114.


pages: 349 words: 114,914

We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy by Ta-Nehisi Coates

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Broken windows theory, Charles Lindbergh, crack epidemic, crony capitalism, David Brooks, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, fear of failure, Ferguson, Missouri, Gunnar Myrdal, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, income inequality, jitney, low skilled workers, mandatory minimum, mass incarceration, moral panic, new economy, obamacare, payday loans, phenotype, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, single-payer health, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, War on Poverty, white flight

And I understood that this wrong was not unconnected to the yawning gap in resources between black people and white people. But the awareness was imprecise and could not match the visceral power of Wilson’s theory, which was not historical but observable, as Jay would say, on any Martin Luther. For those seeking immediately actionable solutions, there was also something useful about this perspective. If white supremacy was not the primary injury, if what injured black people was the same deindustrialization and governmental retreat that threatened working people everywhere, then there was no need for solutions that took racism into account. Instead, programs could be targeted at those in need, and the residual problems of a presumably historical racism could be solved while eliding any discussion of their origins. True, it was widely accepted, racism is “part” of the problem. But it was not the whole problem, and overheated accusations of bigotry had done great harm and clouded the mutual interest of all working and poor people, regardless of color.

In New York, another liberal governor, Mario Cuomo, found himself facing an exploding prison population. After voters rejected funding for more prisons, Cuomo pulled the money from the Urban Development Corporation, an agency that was supposed to build public housing for the poor. It did—in prison. Under the avowedly liberal Cuomo, New York added more prison beds than under all his predecessors combined. This was penal welfarism at its finest. Deindustrialization had presented an employment problem for America’s poor and working class of all races. Prison presented a solution: jobs for whites, and warehousing for blacks. Mass incarceration “widened the income gap between white and black Americans,” writes Heather Ann Thompson, a historian at the University of Michigan, “because the infrastructure of the carceral state was located disproportionately in all-white rural communities.”

Shakur is a community activist and the author of two books chronicling his road to prison, his experience inside, and his return to society. Taylor is a sociologist at Michigan State University, where he researches urban communities and violence and serves as an adviser to Michigan’s prisons and juvenile detention centers. A twenty-four-year age gap separates Taylor and Shakur, a gap that’s reflected in their visions of Detroit. Shakur, who is forty-two, recalls a town ravaged by deindustrialization, where unemployment was rampant, social institutions had failed, and gangs had taken their place. “The community collapsed,” Shakur said. “Our value system became surviving versus living. Drugs, gangs, lack of education all came to the forefront. And prison and incarceration.” Taylor, who is sixty-six, recalls a more hopeful community where black professionals lived next door to black factory workers and black maids and black gangsters, and the streets were packed with bars, factories, and restaurants.


pages: 396 words: 117,897

Making the Modern World: Materials and Dematerialization by Vaclav Smil

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, additive manufacturing, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, British Empire, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, energy transition, Fellow of the Royal Society, global pandemic, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), James Watt: steam engine, megacity, megastructure, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, post-industrial society, purchasing power parity, recommendation engine, rolodex, X Prize

Given the country's still unfavorable fuel mix (with a high dependence on coal) and far from exhausted opportunities for higher industrial, commercial, and household efficiencies, this downward trend of average energy intensities should continue, albeit at a slower rate, for decades to come. In the UK, the decline has been led by the country's continuing shift from coal to hydrocarbons and by further deindustrialization; the first process has now gone about as far as it can go, while the fate of the country's once globally dominant industrial sector remains in question. Deindustrialization has been also an important contributing factor in the American decline of energy intensity and, as I will demonstrate, that decline is less impressive once the energies needed to produce the increasing mass of imports are accounted for. Energy use in post-unification Germany was lowered by the closure of many inefficient industries in the former DDR, but the entire country continued on its steady path of gradual efficiency improvements even while deriving a relatively large share of its GDP from energy-intensive manufacturing.

By that time, recycled metals provided almost a third of the total supply of roughly 87 Mt, and by the year 2000, with total metal consumption at nearly 144 Mt, they supplied 44%. But while metal recycling has shown a generally upward trend (albeit with some notable recession-induced downturns), domestic consumption of primary metals reached a fluctuating plateau in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, followed by a general decline for the next 30 years that is ascribable to the first wave of deindustrialization of America, that is to the country's loss of global dominance in iron and steelmaking and the declining output of color metals. Steel production peaked in 1979 at 91.9 Mt, a decade later it was 52% lower, and by the century's end it was, at 47.9 Mt, barely above that level. The peak years of domestic output were 1969 for zinc, 1972 for copper and nickel, and 1973 for lead (only copper production was eventually surpassed, for eight years starting in 1992, before it fell back again).

After a temporary decline in fuel imports total primary energy supply (TPES) resumed its growth (albeit at a slower rate) but the consumption of metallic ores and nonmetallic minerals began to stagnate and after 1990 to decline. Japan remains an affluent society based on mass consumption of mostly imported materials, but the post-1990 combination of population aging, economic setbacks, and deindustrialization have brought reduced imports and stagnating or declining output and consumption rates. A more profitable task than to offer such brief summaries for other leading industrialized nations (most of them sharing heavy dependence on imports of essential materials) is to turn to some fundamental attributes of material flows, to their energy costs and to their environmental impacts. I will do this in two separate sections, the first quantifying fuels and electricity requirements for many raw and processed materials, the second introducing results of revealing life-cycle assessments, a relatively new analytical tool whose aim is to present costs other than capital and operating expenditures. 4.5 Energy Cost of Materials Before any materials can start flowing through economies, energies must flow to power their extraction from natural deposits or their production by industrial processes ranging from simple mechanical procedures to complex chemical reactions.


pages: 75 words: 22,220

Occupy by Noam Chomsky

corporate governance, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, Howard Zinn, income inequality, invisible hand, Martin Wolf, Nate Silver, Occupy movement, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, precariat, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, too big to fail, union organizing

The change took place in the 1970s. There are a lot of reasons for it. One of the underlying factors, discussed mainly by economic historian Robert Brenner, was the falling rate of profit in manufacturing. There were other factors. It led to major changes in the economy—a reversal of the several hundred years of progress towards industrialization and development and that turned to a process of de-industrialization and de-development. Of course, manufacturing production continued overseas—very profitable, but no good for the work force. Along with that came a significant shift of the economy from productive enterprise—producing things people need or could use—to financial manipulation. The financialization of the economy really took off at that time. On Banks Before the 1970s, banks were banks.

Lots of people moved into reasonable lifestyles. What’s called here “middle class.” “Working class,” as it’s called in other countries. But it was real. And the 1960s accelerated it. The activism of the 1960s, after a pretty dismal decade, really civilized the country in lots of ways that are permanent. They’re not changing. They’re staying on. When the 1970s came along there were sudden and sharp changes: de-industrialization, off-shoring of production, and shifting to financial institutions, which grew enormously. I should say that, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was also the development of what several decades later became the high-tech economy: computers, the Internet, the IT Revolution, mostly developed in the 1950s and 1960s, substantially in the state sector. It took a couple of decades before it took off, but it was developed there.


pages: 339 words: 95,270

Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace by Matthew C. Klein

Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial innovation, financial repression, fixed income, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, global value chain, illegal immigration, income inequality, intangible asset, invention of the telegraph, joint-stock company, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, Malcom McLean invented shipping containers, manufacturing employment, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, money market fund, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, paradox of thrift, passive income, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, sovereign wealth fund, The Nature of the Firm, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, trade liberalization, Wolfgang Streeck

Yet despite the inflation of the health care, government, construction, finance, and education sectors—which accounted for most of the jobs created in the years before the financial crisis—the age-adjusted share of Americans with a job never surpassed the peak reached in 2000. The drop was particularly severe for those without college degrees. The collapse of the housing bubble eventually revealed the full extent of the damage wrought by deindustrialization.37 Government disability payments helped displaced workers make ends meet but could not replace the lost income. This magnified the impact of imports to everyone who lived in affected communities, regardless of whether they worked in retail, restaurants, or higher-paid industries such as accountants and lawyers. For those parts of America, it was a catastrophe. Men without jobs were unable to find women to marry or to have children with.

To the misfortune of American workers, the overvaluation of the dollar meant that American consumers would prefer to buy goods made abroad at the expense of domestic manufacturing.39 The rest of the world’s unwillingness to spend—which in turn was attributable to the class wars in the major surplus economies and the desire for self-insurance after the Asian crisis—was the underlying cause of both America’s debt bubble and America’s deindustrialization. Foreign financial inflows forced Americans to absorb their glut of manufacturing capacity at the expense of U.S. jobs and incomes. This necessarily required foreign savers to mitigate the impact of job losses on American spending by buying dollar-denominated assets, which pushed down interest rates, expanded credit, and facilitated a surge in household borrowing. A careful study published in 2017 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York explicitly linked these forces.

Starting in the 1990s, however, savers in the rest of the world decided that the dollar was the international reserve asset, regardless of any formal commitments. The resulting financial inflows were accommodated by the U.S. political and financial system—with disastrous consequences for Americans. When foreign savers buy U.S. assets, America’s current account deficit rises through some combination of lower income from deindustrialization and higher spending on imports. Unless there are trillions of dollars of worthwhile investments in the United States waiting for funding—and there are not—the higher spending must take the form of wasteful investment or additional consumption. And unless the U.S. government fully offsets the purchases from foreign central banks by commensurately increasing its debt issuance, the American private sector will have to absorb additional foreign financial inflows by selling assets, issuing equity, or borrowing.


pages: 98 words: 27,609

The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It) by Michael R. Strain

Bernie Sanders, business cycle, centre right, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, feminist movement, full employment, gig economy, Gini coefficient, income inequality, job automation, labor-force participation, market clearing, market fundamentalism, new economy, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, social intelligence, Steven Pinker, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, upwardly mobile, working poor

There are roughly 55.6 million men in that group; an 8 percent decline in labor market participation means nearly 4.5 million men who should be trying to get a job are not. That’s a huge problem. The data are also consistent with the conservative populists’ narrative regarding declining opportunities for men with lower educational attainment. Participation rate declines are choppy, with periods of decline alternating with periods of stability. The declining periods roughly coincide with periods of known deindustrialization, times when recessions and global competition forced outmoded factories to close down. This suggests that some men have failed to find their way back into the labor force after each period of adjustment despite the overall trend of rising wages and opportunity. More research is needed, but I suspect one will find that certain groups of men become unemployable after these downturns and drop out of a labor market that has no use for them.

According to a 2018 Brookings report, 62 percent of U.S. counties identified as having a disproportionately large share of manufacturing jobs in 1970 have successfully transitioned to new industries, and 22 percent exhibited strong or emerging economic performance over the past two decades while still having a large manufacturing sector intact.58 In his inaugural address, President Trump described an “American carnage” of “rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation.”59 This populist characterization is inaccurate. Few towns have been devastated by deindustrialization. Similarly, the common experience of Americans is to have some postsecondary education. It isn’t to be without a high school diploma. Only 10 percent of American adults have less than a high school education.60 And every death of despair is a tragedy. Though there are far too many such deaths, they remain far from the common experience. Public policy should absolutely do more to bring economic opportunity to people in these situations.


pages: 710 words: 164,527

The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order by Benn Steil

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, banks create money, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Charles Lindbergh, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, deindustrialization, European colonialism, facts on the ground, fiat currency, financial independence, floating exchange rates, full employment, global reserve currency, imperial preference, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, lateral thinking, margin call, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Monroe Doctrine, New Journalism, open economy, Paul Samuelson, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, psychological pricing, reserve currency, road to serfdom, seigniorage, South China Sea, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, the market place, trade liberalization, Works Progress Administration

“As one who has played around with psychological warfare,” added State Department Press Division head Michael McDermott, “ … I wouldn’t be at all surprised if this Conference didn’t contribute a good deal” to ending the war. The Germans “couldn’t but say, ‘My God, what are we up against?’ and quit.” Tragically, this was not to be the case; the Germans would fight on another eight and a half months. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s own soon-to-be publicized ideas for deindustrializing postwar Germany would arguably serve to buttress rather than weaken German war morale, and thereby extend the war and its attendant carnage. Brown pledged to “do what I can to sell [the agreement] to the bankers of the country.” Morgenthau was grateful, “because they seem to be the only people who right now are vociferous [against] this thing.” “And Bob Taft,” corrected Senator Tobey. “I will leave Taft to you!”

White shared Morgenthau’s view that such a policy would leave Germany in a position to pursue catastrophic armed aggression yet again—a temptation to which a violent and troublesome nation would inevitably succumb. In a radio broadcast from London, the Secretary told British listeners: “It is not enough for us to say, ‘we will disarm Germany and Japan and hope that they will learn to behave themselves as decent people.’” He radically split both his British and American government interlocutors by arguing that Germany needed to be partitioned into two independent, deindustrialized states. The economy was to be remade around tiny agricultural provinces. Further, the Saar, Ruhr, and Upper Silesia regions were to be internationalized, and other areas hived off to neighboring countries. Angered that the State Department was proceeding against what he discovered to be the agreement among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to dismember Germany, made at the Tehran conference in November 1943, Morgenthau, on his return home from Europe, petitioned the president for his intervention.

“We either have to castrate the German people,” Morgenthau recorded the president saying, “or you have got to treat them in such manner so they can’t just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.”32 The Secretary took that as his cue to initiate Treasury’s own analysis—an analysis that he would shape, and for which White, as usual, would provide most of the substance. It was a mark of his desire for Keynes’s approbation that White offered as support for his work the claim that “Keynes seems to be wholly in our corner” on German partition.33 This was at best an exaggeration, as Keynes was sympathetic only to a temporary partition and rejected entirely the idea of deindustrializing the country.34 For his part, Morgenthau cared little what Keynes thought, and focused his energies on gaining the support of Stimson, Hull, and others in the administration who mattered. In this exercise, Morgenthau could not have resembled Keynes less, relying on unrefined instinct and emotion rather than facts and reason, at times straying into the realm of the bizarre. “Don’t you think the thing to do is to take a leaf from Hitler’s book,” he asked Stimson, “and completely remove [German] children from their parents and make them wards of the state, and have ex-US Army officers, English Army officers and Russian Army officers run these schools and have these children learn the true spirit of democracy?


pages: 356 words: 103,944

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy by Dani Rodrik

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, endogenous growth, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, full employment, George Akerlof, guest worker program, Hernando de Soto, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, information asymmetry, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, night-watchman state, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, open economy, Paul Samuelson, price stability, profit maximization, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, savings glut, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, tulip mania, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey

In the words of the economists Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford, commodity-exporting countries gave up productivity in exchange for population.8 The countries of the periphery not only failed to industrialize, they actually lost whatever industry they had. They deindustrialized. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, Asia and Latin America had levels of industrial activity roughly similar to Europe’s. Europe experienced a nearly sixfold increase in these levels between 1750 and 1913. Asia and Latin America meanwhile witnessed a decline to less than a third of their initial level.9 In 1900, developing nations produced only about half the quantity of manufactured goods that they did in 1830. As the economic historian Paul Bairoch, the source of these estimates, writes: “There cannot be any question but that the cause of de-industrialization in the Third World lay in the massive influx of European manufactured goods, especially textiles, on the markets of these countries.”10 Chalk up two against globalization.

It is difficult to know. No doubt some would fail, and others would need revision before they became fully effective. What matters ultimately is having a government that understands the nature of the challenge and is willing to try different solutions to overcome it. By 2009, South Africa had elected a new president, Jacob Zuma, and installed a new government. Government officials were warning about the risk of deindustrialization and talking about industrial policy as the central plank of South Africa’s response to the global financial crisis.36 A New Narrative for Development As early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton had argued that those who believed that modern industries would develop on their own, without support from government, were mistaken.37 There were too many obstacles, not the least competition from more advanced nations, for these industries to arise spontaneously and naturally in the United States.

Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 5 (December 2001), pp. 1369–1401. See also Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Huber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 6 evket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Ottoman De-Industrialization 1800–1913: Assessing the Shock, Its Impact, and the Response,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14763, March 2009. 7 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization and Under-development in the Pre-Modern Third World,” The Luca d’Agliano Lecture, Turin, Italy, March 31, 2006. 8 Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford, “Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 1143–1179. 9 I am referring here to manufacturing output levels in per capita terms. 10 Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History, 11 (Spring 1982), pp. 269–310. 11 The tale of the contrasting paths of Argentina and the United States is told in Alan Beattie, False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009), chap. 1. 12 Ichirou Inukai and Arlon R.


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The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory by Andrew J. Bacevich

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, clean water, Columbian Exchange, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, gig economy, global village, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, illegal immigration, income inequality, Jeff Bezos, Kickstarter, Marshall McLuhan, mass incarceration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Norman Mailer, obamacare, Occupy movement, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Potemkin village, price stability, Project for a New American Century, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Saturday Night Live, school choice, Silicon Valley, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, WikiLeaks

Jobs “going south.” Perot was adamant: “We’ve got to make things here.” In the final debate, he took a swipe at the media for going “bonkers” over his proposal to consult citizens directly by instituting electronic “town halls.” (“I guess it’s because you will lose your right to tell them what to think.”) Yet he concentrated his fire on what he called “the center of the bull’s-eye”: the deindustrialization of the American economy. If NAFTA became law, “you’re going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country,” he declared, “right at a time when we need the tax base to pay the debt and pay down the interest on the debt and get our house back in order.” While Perot’s candidacy centered on economic concerns, he joined Buchanan in expressing his wariness about Washington’s growing appetite for military interventions abroad.

For most Americans the aftermath of bust was something other than boom. The rich were once again getting richer, but the take-home pay of working-class Americans remained stagnant, as it had for decades.14 And the shuttering of factories that had long sustained the middle class—4.5 million manufacturing jobs lost since the passage of NAFTA in 1994—continued.15 Globalization was accelerating the deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, exporting more jobs than it was creating. As for those Americans born into poverty, they were likely to die poor as well: Studies revealed a sharp decline in social mobility dating back to the 1980s, but worsening in the wake of the Cold War.16 Globalization was supposed to lift all boats. Instead, it was leaving millions stranded. By 2016, evidence of acute economic distress and insecurity was evident, even among those fortunate enough to have jobs.

collapse of Nixon in China and Wallace and conservatives consumerism and materialism consumer protection containment Coolidge, Calvin Council on Foreign Relations credit card debt crime criminal justice reform Cruz, Ted Cuba invasion of 1898 Obama and Cuban Missile Crisis culture wars Culture Wars (Hunter) Cyrus the Great death penalty Declaration of Independence Defense Department Defense of Marriage Act (1996) deindustrialization Deliberate Force, Operation demagogues democracy Democratic Party primaries of 2016 “deplorables” depression and anxiety Desert Storm, Operation Dewey, Commodore Dewey, Thomas discrimination diversity military and Obama and divorce Donaldson, Sam Doonesbury (Trudeau) Douthat, Ross Dowd, Maureen drugs and substance abuse Dukakis, Michael Duke University Dulles, John Foster Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) Eastern Europe economy.


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The Dark Net by Jamie Bartlett

3D printing, 4chan, bitcoin, blockchain, brain emulation, carbon footprint, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Chrome, Howard Rheingold, Internet of things, invention of writing, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Julian Assange, Kuwabatake Sanjuro: assassination market, life extension, litecoin, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, moral hazard, moral panic, Occupy movement, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, Ross Ulbricht, Satoshi Nakamoto, Skype, slashdot, technological singularity, technoutopianism, Ted Kaczynski, The Coming Technological Singularity, Turing test, Vernor Vinge, WikiLeaks, Zimmermann PGP

By losing authentic, face-to-face communication, Zerzan thinks the internet encourages thoughtlessness, cruelty, a lack of reflection and short attention spans. He has a point. A growing number of writers have pointed to possible long-term detrimental health effects of online stimulation, such as technostress, data asphyxiation, information fatigue syndrome, cognitive overload and time famine. The only answer, he says, is to leave technology behind and return to a non-civilised way of life through large-scale deindus-trialisation and what he calls ‘rewilding’. If sci-fi writers like William Gibson inspire the transhumanists, the anarcho-primitivists prefer the writings of Henry David Thoreau: back to nature. I ask Zerzan how far back he’s willing to go in pursuit of a natural state of existence. Should we also rid ourselves of dialysis machines? Sewage plants? Bows and arrows? He won’t commit precisely on what he’d like to get rid of: he prefers to see it as a direction of travel.


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Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats by Maya Goodfellow

Boris Johnson, British Empire, call centre, collective bargaining, colonial rule, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, European colonialism, falling living standards, G4S, housing crisis, illegal immigration, low skilled workers, mass immigration, megacity, moral panic, open borders, race to the bottom, Right to Buy, Scientific racism, Winter of Discontent, working poor

In the 2004 European elections, UKIP received 2,650,768 votes and picked up another ten seats to add to their existing two. The BNP received just over 800,000 votes in those same elections.52 Meanwhile turnout had been falling since 1992 and Britain’s two main parties were witnessing long-term membership decline. The invasion of Iraq – which went ahead despite hundreds of thousands of people marching through the streets of London against it, me, as a young teenager, included – long-term deindustrialisation, wage stagnation and lack of affordable housing left many feeling disconnected from what they saw as an out-of-touch elite. With not much hope or faith in a democratic system that offered the political equivalent of different shades of the same colour, a lot of people simply stopped voting altogether. Though they comfortably won the 2005 election, New Labour lost fifty-eight seats in the process; it was clear they were rapidly losing support.


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Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World by Jason Hickel

air freight, Airbnb, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, cognitive dissonance, coronavirus, corporate governance, corporate personhood, COVID-19, David Graeber, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Elon Musk, energy transition, Fellow of the Royal Society, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gender pay gap, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of the steam engine, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, land reform, liberal capitalism, longitudinal study, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, McMansion, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microbiome, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, out of africa, passive income, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, quantitative easing, rent control, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, the scientific method, The Spirit Level, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, universal basic income

In fact, in recent decades it’s been increasing dramatically, even to the point of outpacing GDP growth. There has been no decoupling. It was all an illusion of accounting.26 As it turns out, the much-celebrated shift to services has delivered no improvements at all when it comes to the resource intensity of rich nations. Services represent 74% of GDP in high-income nations, having grown rapidly since deindustrialisation began in the 1990s, and yet the material use of high-income nations is outpacing GDP growth. Indeed, while high-income nations have the highest share of services in terms of contribution to GDP, they also have the highest per capita material footprints. By far. The same is true on a global scale. Services have grown from 63% of GDP in 1997 to 69% in 2015, according to World Bank data. Yet during this same period global material use has accelerated.


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The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War by Benn Steil

Albert Einstein, Alistair Cooke, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, disintermediation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, imperial preference, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, kremlinology, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, open economy, Potemkin village, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, structural adjustment programs, the market place, trade liberalization, Transnistria, Winter of Discontent, Works Progress Administration, éminence grise

Yet like Henry Wallace—who who would tap him as a future treasury secretary during his 1948 presidential campaign—White was also a great admirer of the Soviet Union and its economic system. He would, over the course of twelve years in Washington, to a much greater degree than Wallace, use his position to aid Moscow materially and with secret intelligence.25 He would also give substance to the so-called Morgenthau Plan to deindustrialize postwar Germany—effectively to render the country pastoral and infirm. Together with the dismantling of Britain’s empire under Washington’s approving gaze, the Morgenthau Plan became a pillar of Stalin’s expectations that he would be able to control a buffer of central and eastern European nations without interference from an indifferent United States and a weak and divided western Europe. Yet Truman, who considered Morgenthau a “blockhead,” and opposed his meddling in German affairs, forced him to resign before leaving for Europe in July.

As for Washington’s policy on Germany, it had, since 1945, lurched just as radically as Moscow’s. The Truman administration was now in revolt against the Morgenthau mind-set that had held sway, however tenuously, in Washington a mere two and a half years prior, which viewed a united, industrially revived Germany as a continued threat to Europe. FDR’s State Department never supported Morgenthau’s plan for deindustrialization and dismembership, believing it “would provide a ready-made program for nationalistic agitators”; instead it supported only decentralization, or federalization, as a means of containing German nationalism and militarism. Once Truman became president, he condemned Morgenthau’s “meddling” and put the State Department back in control of foreign policy.91 Europe’s economic crisis now made Morgenthau’s ideas look reckless.

This program doubled as a security policy, since a Germany that could not produce steel could not field an army threatening to France. “With the aim of military security,” explained a French foreign office official to his American counterpart in 1946, “we prefer to increase French steel production and output to the detriment of the Ruhr.”16 Yet to put the plan into action would require huge imports of German coal and coke, and thus dependence on unlikely German collaboration in its own deindustrialization. The Monnet Plan therefore relied on French control of the German Ruhr area, Rhineland, and Saarland, or at least a measure of such control through schemes aimed at “internationalizing” them. Here, French interests clashed with those of the Benelux, which saw a robust German recovery as essential for generating the industrial and consumer demand for its exports. The three nations therefore demanded immediate action to boost Germany’s coal and industrial output and an end to misguided Allied meddling in German internal economic policy.


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Culture works: the political economy of culture by Richard Maxwell

1960s counterculture, American ideology, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, big-box store, business process, commoditize, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, intermodal, late capitalism, Marshall McLuhan, medical malpractice, Network effects, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, refrigerator car, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, talking drums, telemarketer, the built environment, Thorstein Veblen, Unsafe at Any Speed, urban renewal, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce

A rapid rise in automobile ownership and the federal postwar highway building programs allowed large numbers of people—and retail businesses—to move out of the downtowns.26 At the same time, in some parts of the urban United States, the mobility of industrial capital had already begun pulling plants and businesses out of urban areas, setting off the racialized “urban crisis” of the 1960s and prefiguring the catastrophic deindustrialization of the 1980s.27 According to Lizabeth Cohen, “between 1947 and 1953 alone, the suburban population increased by 43 percent, in contrast to a general population increase of 11 percent,” and this population was increasingly racially and ethnically segregated.28 Tax and lending laws were changed at this time to favor the interests of large real-estate developers and investors. Tax write-offs, construction loan interest write-offs, low capital gains tax rates for real-estate profits, and especially a tax maneuver called “accelerated depreciation” added up reasons for the very wealthy to speculate in buildings and land.

Although this critique of the political economy of shopping has refused to embrace the ideals of consumerism or the practical realities of commercialization, it has shown the importance of analyzing consumption and production as parts of a single system. This is crucial for rethinking how activist consumers can shape demands for a more transparent shopping landscape—a clearer picture of where products come from and how they are made. There is abundant evidence that the same processes of capital flight, deindustrialization, and internationalization that have increased poverty, part-time work, and more stressful and unsafe working days have created the bounty that Wal-Mart, Target, and Westfield Villages celebrate. Indeed, megaretailers have played an important part in driving wages, job security, and working conditions downward for many people—and not just Americans—as they have helped flood the world with cheap goods.

Also during the 1980s, under the influence of the law and economics movement, the judiciary gradually shifted the burden of proof in intellectual property cases concerning the boundaries of the public domain: where previously the assumption was that things in the public domain should stay that way unless a compelling case could be made for privatization, these days the assumption is the reverse, that things should be privatized unless a compelling case can be made not to. Finally, faced with deindustrialization at home and the realization that intellectual property was the last remaining area of clear-cut U.S. industrial domination, the U.S. State Department embraced these trends and took on the expansion of intellectual property rights internationally as a key foreign-policy goal.23 In sum, it is significant that executives such as NBC’s Scott Sassa no longer refer to popular programs, films, or songs when discussing media strategy.


The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities and Metros Are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy by Bruce Katz, Jennifer Bradley

3D printing, additive manufacturing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, British Empire, business climate, carbon footprint, clean water, cleantech, collapse of Lehman Brothers, deindustrialization, demographic transition, desegregation, double entry bookkeeping, edge city, Edward Glaeser, global supply chain, immigration reform, income inequality, industrial cluster, intermodal, Jane Jacobs, jitney, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, lone genius, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, Masdar, megacity, Menlo Park, Moneyball by Michael Lewis explains big data, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, place-making, postindustrial economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Richard Florida, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, smart cities, smart grid, sovereign wealth fund, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the market place, The Spirit Level, Tony Hsieh, too big to fail, trade route, transit-oriented development, urban planning, white flight

Larry Ledebur and Jill Taylor, “A Restoring Prosperity Case Study: Akron, Ohio” (Brookings, 2008), p. 10. 6. Quoted in Iver Peterson, “‘Mistake by the Lake’ Wakes Up, Roaring,” New York Times, September 10, 1995 (www.nytimes.com/1995/09/10/us/mistake-bythe-lake-wakes-up-roaring.html). 7. Ibid. 8. Brookings Analysis of Moody’s Analytics. 9. John Russo and Sherry Lee Linkon, “Collateral Damage: Deindustrialization and the Uses of Youngstown,” in Beyond the Ruins: the Meanings of Deindustrialization, edited by Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott (Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 208. 10-2151-2 notes.indd 219 5/20/13 7:00 PM 220 NOTES TO PAGES 66–77 10. Ibid. 11. Lavea Brachman and Alan Mallach, “Ohio’s Cities at a Turning Point: Finding the Way Forward” (Brookings, 2010), p. 13. 12. Bob Paynter and Marcia Pledger, “Comeback City Fights Old-Shoe Image,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 14, 2001 (www.cleveland.com/quietcrisis/index. ssf?

The informal power to convene is probably the least respected tool an elected official or recognized private or civic leader possesses but the most important one when addressing issues as multidimensional as the desired shape and structure of a metropolitan economy. Mayor Bloomberg understood this in responding to the Lehman Brothers collapse, when he and his administration reached out to dozens of corporate and civic leaders. So did philanthropic leaders in Northeast Ohio and Detroit as the “quiet crisis” of deindustrialization took full effect in the early years of this century. A metro, of course, does not need a crisis to build a network. Houston’s Neighborhood Centers has been creating and stewarding networks throughout its 100-year history, accumulating trust and legitimacy in the process. Network building can be a useful technique in the early months of a new administration, the path chosen by Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel in 2011, at the beginning of his term, when he deputized a group of business, civic, and community leaders to establish the city’s Plan for Economic Growth and Jobs.

New York: Basic Books, 2012. 11-2151-2 biblio.indd 247 5/20/13 7:00 PM 248 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Marklund, Göran, Nicholas S. Vonortas, and Charles W. Wessner. The Innovation Imperative: National Innovation Strategies in the Global Economy. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2009. McComb, David G. Houston, a History. University of Texas Press, 1981. Mercier, Laurie. “Remembering and Redefining Deindustrialized Youngstown.” American Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2003): 315–21. Miller, Carol Poh, and Robert Anthony Wheeler. Cleveland: A Concise History, 1796–1996. 2nd ed. Indiana University Press, 1997. Moretti, Enrico. The New Geography of Jobs. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012. Moynihan, Daniel P., ed. Coping: Essays on the Practice of Government. New York: Random House, 1973. ———. Toward a National Urban Policy.


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The Knowledge Economy by Roberto Mangabeira Unger

additive manufacturing, balance sheet recession, business cycle, collective bargaining, commoditize, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, first-past-the-post, full employment, global value chain, information asymmetry, knowledge economy, market fundamentalism, means of production, Paul Samuelson, savings glut, secular stagnation, side project, total factor productivity, transaction costs, union organizing, wealth creators

In a world economy in which relatively capital-intensive mass production was associated with the richest societies, industrialization meant ascent in the international division of labor. Developing countries can no longer rely on this prescription to sustain economic growth and begin to close the gap separating them from the richest economies. Some have long suffered from what has been described as premature deindustrialization. Others have tried to prolong the life of mass production by combining low wages (by international standards) with a specialized and subordinate niche in global value chains, useful to the megafirms of knowledge-intensive production. They have embraced the commoditized side of a business that in its upper reaches, typically in a faraway rich country, exemplifies the familiar insular form of experimentalist, knowledge-intensive production.

A figure that plays a strategic role in most contemporary economies—the advanced middle-size firm—is, however, largely missing. And none of the institutional equipment of the Brazilian state or of the doctrines of development—from import-substituting industrialization to the pursuit of financial confidence—has saved the country from becoming one of the most striking examples of premature deindustrialization. In the wake of the commodity-price boom of the first decade of the twenty-first century and of Chinese demand for agricultural, ranching, and mining products, manufacturing has declined dramatically as a percentage of both output and exports. Rather than being replaced or converted, belated Fordism simply shrank. Brazil found itself becoming old before it had become rich, and losing mass production before it had acquired the knowledge economy.

., 198 politics constitutional structure and, 150–52 culture and, 109 democracy and, 77, 97, 156, 279 engagement and, 155 history of, 37, 100 hot and cold, 157–58 money and, 156–57 in rich countries, 178–82 security and, 111–12 transformative, 91, 150–51, 157–58, 211–12, 221–22, 235–36, 286 populism, 171, 179, 180, 188 post-marginalist economics, 239 competitive selection theory and, 253–56 deficit of institutional imagination in, 243–50 production and exchange theory of, 251–52 precarious employment, 63–69, 178 as growing practice, 59, 66, 185, 279 protection measures for, 67–69, 224 premature deindustrialization, 162, 165–66 price neutrality, 68–69, 185 primitive accumulation, 32 product differentiation, 22–23 production exchange’s relationship to, 227, 251–52 imagination and, 37, 39, 40, 286–87 manufacturing and, 22–23 subcontracting of, 58, 65, 185 transformation of nature and, 35 See also industrial mass production; mechanized manufacturing; moral culture of production; most advanced practice of production productivity confinement of knowledge economy consequences for, 10, 56, 71 cooperation and innovation required for, 106, 184 development economics on, 85–86, 161, 212 digital technologies’ boost to, 9, 19 inclusive vanguardism’s potential in, 1, 13, 221 labor and, 8, 63, 184, 211, 225 law of diminishing marginal returns and, 25, 28–29, 191 mass production and, 84, 85–86 most advanced practice of production and, 3, 178 Smith on, 266 social liberalism/social democracy on, 178, 186 and supply-demand relationship, 193, 215 of US economy, 8–9, 19 progressive taxation, 64, 76, 208 attenuating inequalities through, 73, 74, 182, 205 redistributive goals of, 78–80 property rights current organization of, 109 need for institutional innovation in, 124–28 no universal applicability for, 106, 247 See also contract and property law protectionism, 12–13 pseudo-vanguardism, 89–90, 100 characteristics of, 57–59 labor and, 63, 66 psychology cognitive, 42 cooperation/innovation and, 111–12 economics and, 273 Keynesianism on, 200, 257 public domain, 131 public services administrative Fordism and, 86–87, 110, 185, 187 civil society and, 87, 110 public spending, 198, 205, 207–8 pure economics, 243–44, 247, 248, 249 Qualcomm, 59 relative prices, 251, 252 marginalist economics and, 238–40 taxes and, 78, 207 value theory and, 265–66 returns to scale, 25–27, 28, 29, 30 Ricardo, David, 263 Roosevelt, Franklin, 175, 204 Samuelson, Paul, 253 savings, 9, 266–67 growth and, 32–33 hoarding and, 197, 259 productive investment and, 197, 202 Say, Jean-Baptiste, 263 scale product differentiation and, 22–23 returns to, 25–27, 28, 29, 30 scarcity inequality and, 33, 280 Marx and Keynes on, 277–79 persistence of, 279–83 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 139 scientific agriculture, 6, 53, 88, 163 secular stagnation, 8–11, 259 self-employment, 144 as free labor, 45, 69, 185–86, 222, 282, 286 Senior, Nassau, 263 services bureaucratic rationalization in, 86–87 desire for, 281–82 firms providing, 7, 87 knowledge-intensive, 6, 11, 53 manufacturing and, 22–23, 53, 163 workforce in, 65, 72–73 See also public services Simmel, Georg, 47, 105 sliding scale, 68 small businesses, 54–55, 77, 170 as economic rearguard, 11–12 government and, 165 Smith, Adam, 3, 39, 159, 251–52, 263 classical economics and, 232, 263, 271 imagination undervalued by, 267–68 on labor brutalization, 32, 266 and most advanced practice study, 3–4, 18, 159, 227 on production, 251–52, 264–65 on value and price, 239 social capital, 49–51, 105 social democracy, 75, 76–77, 112, 171 liberalization of, 177–78, 181 social-democratic settlement, 181–83, 186, 261 social entitlements, 76, 181, 209, 248 consumption taxes used to finance, 78, 208 demand restraints and, 64, 205, 258 moderating inequality through, 73, 74–75, 117, 205, 206 social inheritance, 138–39, 112–13 social protection, 77, 112, 177, 181 Social Security, 176, 204 social spending, 80, 206, 211 attenuating inequality through, 2, 13, 77, 177, 182 demand constraints and, 193, 205–7 solidarity, 48, 108, 110, 114–15 stagnation, 15, 191, 192, 259 confinement of knowledge economy effect on, 56, 59, 71, 72, 81, 117, 178, 277 inclusive vanguardism as response to, 183, 230 secular, 8–11, 259 stakeholders, 112–13, 125–26, 133–34, 135, 222 stock options, 58 subcontracting, 58, 65, 185 supervision and implementation, 23, 37–38, 49 supply-demand relationship, 189–96 broadening demand access, 13, 195–96, 200–201, 203–7, 209, 213, 257–58 broadening supply access, 13, 180, 195–96, 214–25 discontinuity in, 191–92 economic growth and, 191 economic instability and, 193–95 heteronomy in, 192–93 inclusive knowledge economy and, 16–17, 159, 195, 196, 202–3 individual firms and, 215–19 Keynesianism on, 197–98, 257–59 labor-capital relations and, 63–64 marginalist economics on, 238 Sweden, 76–77 tax-and-transfer, 13, 64, 78, 207, 209 taxes compensatory redistribution and, 74, 78–80, 207–8 on consumption, 75, 77–78, 79, 208 indirect and regressive, 75, 77–78, 208 progressive, 64, 73, 74, 76, 78–80, 182, 205, 208 public spending and, 77–78, 207–8 relative prices and, 78, 207 value-added, 77–78 Taylor, Frederick, 39 technical division of labor, 84, 266 changes to, 21–22, 23, 35–36, 37–38 ideal of, 223–24 knowledge economy and, 20–21, 37–38, 94 in military, 38–39 technical education, 93–94 technology digital and information, 9, 19, 57 increased access to, 119, 123, 184, 224 innovation and, 20, 30–31, 67, 107 productivity and, 9, 19 relation to practices, 4, 22, 40–41, 43 scientific experimentalism and, 30–31 Toyota method of production, 20, 22 transformative variation, 37, 43, 285–86 trust and discretion inclusive vanguardism and, 82, 103, 104 innovation and, 49 in knowledge economy, 47, 94 market economy and, 47–48 moral culture of production and, 101, 107–8, 121 unemployment, 178, 249 unified property right advantages and disadvantages of, 125–26 disaggregated property and, 126–27 economic decentralization and, 102, 125, 186, 237 under generalized knowledge economy, 222, 223 intellectual property and, 130, 131 legal doctrine of, 48, 102, 127 market economy and, 102, 109, 245 United States agriculture in, 88, 209–10 constitutional structure of, 150–51 expansionary monetary policy in, 203–4 financial crisis and, 198–99, 204 New Deal in, 175–76, 204 productivity in, 8–9, 19 regressive income redistribution in, 199, 205 during World War II, 50–51 value-added tax (VAT), 77–78 value theory, 239–40, 265–66 venture capital, 119–20, 194 Vico, Giambattista, 105 wage labor, 63, 251 employment contract and, 102 free labor and, 45, 69, 104, 185, 222–23 in inclusive knowledge economy, 222–24 overcoming of, 224, 236–37 Walras, Léon, 229, 238, 241, 257 Walmart, 57, 59 Weber, Max, 47, 86, 105 work teams, 22, 38, 48


pages: 242 words: 73,728

Give People Money by Annie Lowrey

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, airport security, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, ending welfare as we know it, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, full employment, gender pay gap, gig economy, Google Earth, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, indoor plumbing, information asymmetry, Jaron Lanier, jitney, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kickstarter, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, late capitalism, Lyft, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, mass incarceration, McMansion, Menlo Park, mobile money, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, obamacare, Peter Thiel, post scarcity, post-work, Potemkin village, precariat, randomized controlled trial, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Bork, Ronald Reagan, Sam Altman, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, Steve Jobs, TaskRabbit, The Future of Employment, theory of mind, total factor productivity, Turing test, two tier labour market, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, women in the workforce, working poor, World Values Survey, Y Combinator

Walmart has 1.5 million employees: Walmart, “Company Facts,” https://corporate.walmart.com/​newsroom/​company-facts, accessed Nov. 7, 2017. Amazon had a third: Amazon, Third Quarter Earnings Report, Oct. 26, 2017, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/​phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-reportsother. Instagram employed just 13: Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 2. “Premature deindustrialization”: Dani Rodrik, “Premature Deindustrialization” (NBER Working Paper no. 20935, Feb. 2015). “East Asian growth model”: Mike Kubzansky, telephone interview by author, Feb. 10, 2017. automated chatbots: Mike Lewis, Denis Yarats, Yann N. Dauphin, Devi Parikh, and Dhruv Batra, “Deal or No Deal? Training AI Bots to Negotiate,” Facebook code, June 14, 2017, https://code.facebook.com/​posts/​1686672014972296/​deal-or-no-deal-training-ai-bots-to-negotiate/.

Studies have found that almost half of American jobs are vulnerable to automation, and the rest of the world might want to start worrying too. Countries such as Turkey, South Korea, China, and Vietnam have seen bang-up rates of growth in no small part due to industrialization—factories requiring millions of hands to feed machines and sew garments and produce electronics. But the plummeting cost and lightspeed improvement of robotics now threaten to halt and even shut down that source of jobs. “Premature deindustrialization” might turn lower-income countries into service economies long before they have a middle class to buy those services, warns the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. A common path to rapid economic growth, the one that aided South Korea, among other countries, might simply disappear. The tidal shift could “be devastating, if countries can no longer follow the East Asian growth model to get out of poverty,” Mike Kubzansky of the Omidyar Network, a nonprofit foundation funded by the eBay billionaire, told me.


pages: 151 words: 38,153

With Liberty and Dividends for All: How to Save Our Middle Class When Jobs Don't Pay Enough by Peter Barnes

Alfred Russel Wallace, banks create money, basic income, Buckminster Fuller, collective bargaining, computerized trading, creative destruction, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, en.wikipedia.org, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, Jaron Lanier, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, Mark Zuckerberg, Network effects, oil shale / tar sands, Paul Samuelson, profit maximization, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, the map is not the territory, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Upton Sinclair, Vilfredo Pareto, wealth creators, winner-take-all economy

Not only were foreign manufacturers outcompeting ours; American companies were moving factories overseas. Americans were told not to worry—we’d become a service economy, and white-collar jobs would fill the blue-collar void. But food servers, retail clerks, and health aides were paid considerably less than their industrial counterparts. A steadily tightening squeeze, with wages stagnating and prices of middle-class necessities rising, took hold. In addition to deindustrialization, three other long-term phenomena gained momentum after 1980: globalization, automation, and deunionization. Globalization. Since the early 1800s, economists have argued that trade is good and more trade is better. Their rationale is the theory of comparative advantage. As David Ricardo reasoned, if England could make textiles more efficiently than Portugal, and Portugal could make wine more efficiently than England, then both countries—including their workers—would benefit by trading woolens for port.

See also Dividends; Rent adjacent possible and, 121 audit of, 62 benefits, entitlement to, 62 components of, 60–61 defined, 11 at economy-wide level, 140–141 externalities and, 64 guidelines for creating, 89–92 management of, 62 mental ideas and, 122–127 one person, one share, 123–124 political environment and, 120 potential dividends and, 139–146 pre-distribution and, 125–127 quantity of assets needed for, 93–95 shared wealth dividends, 124–125 specific assets and, 141–146 user fees for, 85–86 Copyrights, rent from, 144 Cowen, Tyler, 135 Creative destruction, 120 Credo, 45 Crisis preparing for, 121–127 to-do lists and preparing for, 127–131 Currency trading, 92 D Dales, John, 98 Darwin, Charles, 120 Debt fractional reserve banking and, 90 leverage, 47 Debt-free money distribution, 90–91 Lincoln, Abraham and, 91 Defined-benefits pensions, 123 Deindustrialization, 17 Dell Computers, 25–26 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 109 Democrats and direct spending, 22 The Depression and the Townsend Plan, 133–134 Deregulation, 21 Derivatives, potential revenue from transaction fees, 143 Deunionization, 18–19 Distribution of wealth, 14 Dividends, 9–10. See also Alaska model cap-and-dividend system, 105–107 carbon taxing and, 115 from co-owned wealth, 3–4, 86 from electromagnetic spectrum, 145 Europe, plans in, 129–130 from intellectual property rights, 144 offshoots and, 75 perceptual advantage of, 77 potential dividends and co-owned wealth, 139–146 practical application of, 87–89 sources of money for, 93–94 for sustaining middle class, 75–76 universal dividend systems, 73–74 wind energy dividends in Oregon, 128 Dobbs, Lou, 86–87, 125 Dole, Bob, 79 E Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 81 Earth Day, 134 “The Economic Equivalent of War” (Barnes), 34–35 Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (Keynes), 135–136 Economic stimulus package, 37 The Economist on robots, 26 Education, 21, 24–25 80/20 rule, 30–31 Eldredge, Niles, 120 El Paso Natural Gas, 102 Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 81–82 Employment.


pages: 126 words: 37,081

Men Without Work by Nicholas Eberstadt

business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, deindustrialization, financial innovation, full employment, illegal immigration, jobless men, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, mass immigration, moral hazard, post-work, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population

Each recession following the 1979 one shows a drop in the employment-to-population ratio, which we would expect, but each one is followed by a recovery with an employment peak lower than the one immediately preceding. Even the nearly twenty-year Reagan-Clinton expansionary period showed a peak prime-age male employment-to-population ratio of about 90 percent, or about 5 percent lower than the peak that pertained during the 1948–73 period. This is a time of the deindustrialization of America. Manufacturing is closing down or streamlining, and the jobs that are being created are jobs for which less-well-educated, native-born males have no comparative advantage over females or, in many cases, less-well-educated immigrants. But the post-1999 period shows just how relevant these developments are. The recession of the early 2000s was relatively mild in aggregate terms, but it was devastating to prime-age male employment.

Figure 13.1 makes the case. Between 1970 and 2012, manufacturing jobs as a share of total employment in the United States dropped by about sixteen percentage points, to just over 10 percent. But that outcome was hardly unique: in France, for example, the drop was over fifteen points; in Sweden, sixteen points; in Australia sixteen points. France and Sweden follow closely the United States’ “de-industrial” trend line, and Australia now has a markedly lower share of employment in manufacturing than America—yet trends in labor force participation for prime-age men in the United States were uniquely disappointing when compared to other rich Western societies. Why this unwelcome “American exceptionalism”? Whatever the reason, it’s not because other advanced economies weren’t undergoing big structural transformations, too.


pages: 424 words: 119,679

It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear by Gregg Easterbrook

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, air freight, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, coronavirus, David Brooks, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Exxon Valdez, factory automation, failed state, full employment, Gini coefficient, Google Earth, Home mortgage interest deduction, hydraulic fracturing, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, impulse control, income inequality, Indoor air pollution, interchangeable parts, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, longitudinal study, Lyft, mandatory minimum, manufacturing employment, Mikhail Gorbachev, minimum wage unemployment, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, Paul Samuelson, peak oil, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post scarcity, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, self-driving car, short selling, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Slavoj Žižek, South China Sea, Steve Wozniak, Steven Pinker, supervolcano, The Chicago School, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, There's no reason for any individual to have a computer in his home - Ken Olsen, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, transaction costs, uber lyft, universal basic income, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, working poor, Works Progress Administration

That anyone can get high-quality health care, rather than the rich being in teaching hospitals while the poor are in dingy charity institutions, has been a boon to public health. As more workers in nearly all nations, including China and India, shift from manual labor to white-collar or service industry employment, public health improves. Deindustrialization is spoken of by politicians and pundits as if referring to something dreadful—in health terms, deindustrialization is a major plus. Commentators like to glamorize factory labor and underground mining: both lead to chronic degenerative health problems that arrive during the prime of life. The more people there are who sit at desks rather than work in factories, the more public health improves. In 1900, some 80 percent of Americans were employed at manual or semiskilled labor, 20 percent in professional roles.

., crime bill, 110–111 decline of, 109–111, 120, 137–139 global rates of, 106, 111 law enforcement and, 110–115 lead and violent, 111–112 media and, 105, 107 political campaigns and, 105–106 sentencing for, 115–116 violent, 106 See also terrorism crime-boss government, 182 The Culture of Narcissism (Lasch), 84 death air pollution and, 30 capital punishment, 116, 155–156 of law enforcement officers, 115 leading causes in US of, 24 by prescription drugs, 34 self-inflicted, 35 technology and workplace, 155 traffic deaths, 28, 142–143, 145–146 Deaton, Angus, 82 The Decline of the West (Spengler), 197, 198 declinism, 210, 285 academia and, 201 aging and, 203 anecdotes and, 218–220 Big Sort communities and, 222–223 blame and identity groups and, 218 blame-Washington attitude and, 207–209 Brexit referendum and, 204, 209, 217 freedom of association and, 222–223 history of panics of, 200 homogamy and, 223 Kaus on, 223–224 logic of, 92 luck and, 217–218 media and, 202 national bookkeeping switcheroo and, 208 natural selection and, 202 Obama and, 200–201, 221 opinionization of America and, 214–215 Plato and, 202–203 politics and, 84, 200–202, 206–209, 220–222 power and, 221 religious attendance and, 222 Sanders and, 84, 201–202 Sharkey on, 224–225 smartphones and, 212 Sputnik and, 200 victimhood and, 204–205, 217 Western civilization and, 201 See also Facebook and social media; Trump, Donald DeConto, Robert, 233–234 deindustrialization, 29 democracy China and, 170 creativity and, 167 Diamond, L., on, 165–166, 178, 183–184, 185–186 dictatorship and, 164–166 economy and, 167–168, 170, 173–174, 193 education and, 169–170 ethics and, 174 freedom of thought and, 168–169 internet and, 175–176 inventions and inventiveness in, 172–173 recession of, 165 short-selling strategy for, 175 slavery and oppression and, 174–175 Trump lying and, 184–185 World War I and, 170–171 World War II and, 171–173 See also corruption developing world positive change in, 17, 18 poverty in, 20, 280 sanitation infrastructure in, 30 traffic deaths in, 142–143 Diamond, Larry, 165–166, 178, 183–184 two-party duopoly for, 185–186 dictatorship, 193 Carnation Revolution and, 165 coup d’état and, 166 democracy and, 164–166 education and, 169 internet and, 175–176 World War II and, 171–173 dietary habits, of West, 25, 116 disability, 249, 257 education and, 37 veterans and, 36–37, 258 disease in Africa, 25, 39 avian and swine flu, 22 chemical and biological weapons and, 26–27 Ebola, 23, 25 films and, 28 influenza pandemic, 27–28 malaria, 39 media negativity and, 24–25 MERS, 23 mosquitoes and, 39 news coverage and, 24–25 obesity as, 5, 26, 35 smoking and, 24 unstoppable contagion, 27, 28 vaccinations and, 25, 39–40 weight gain and metabolic syndrome, 25–26 See also public health Dodd-Frank Act, 92–93 Dust Bowl, 5 dynamism catastrophism and, 20–21, 221, 283 food production and, 21 East of Eden (Steinbeck), 17–18, 58, 134 Easy Rider (movie), 198, 199 Ebola, 23, 25 echo chamber, 215–216 economy, 209–210 bulk transportation and, 80–81 buying power and, 85–86, 87, 246, 249 Clinton, H., on, 67 coal mining and, 61, 76–77, 233 collapse anxiety and, 68 communism and, 174 comparative advantage and, 79–80 control and, 65–66 currency and, 69 democracy and, 167–168, 170, 173–174, 193 Dodd-Frank Act and, 92–93 education and, 169 fascism and, 66 Feldstein on, 91 globalization and, 82 golden age of, 69–70 Great Recession and, 64, 68, 97 inequality and, 84–85 inflation and, 87 infrastructure and, 93–95 Keynes on, 98–99 marriage and, 267, 268 media negativity and, 77, 79, 87–88 modern monetary theory and, 96 Panasonic and, 68–69 paper mills and, 78–79 Piketty on, 84–85 predictions and, 64 pretax income and, 84–85, 91 regulations of, 92–93 retirement economics, 31, 273–274 slow growth and, 90–92 Soviet and American, 167 state pension accounts and, 97–98 trade boosting, 79, 245–246 Trump and, 70–71 US domestic production and, 77–78 US GDP and, 84, 90–91 war and, 93, 132–134 Washington Consensus and, 66–67 Western living standards and, 88 See also market economy; middle class, US; national debt, US education, 280 book reading and, 271 in China, 170 college as, 269–271 democracy and, 169–170 disability and, 37 economy and, 169 immigrants and, 269–270 jobs and, 89–90 longevity and, 37–38 marriage and, 267 public school system and, 38, 269 skilled trades and, 270 wage and, 89–90 The Education of Henry Adams (Adams), 197, 198 Ehrlich, Paul, 5 elections.

See specific topics Nike, 253, 256 Nixon, Richard, 54–55, 179, 256–257 nuclear power, 226–227 nuclear weapons, 125–126, 160–161, 277–280 Obama, Barack, 62, 109, 131 anecdotes of, 219 declinism and, 200–201, 221 Dodd-Frank Act and, 92–93 on drone aircrafts, 159 fuel-economy regulatory regime and, 147–148 on infrastructure, 94 national debt and, 97, 100 ObamaCare and, 29, 220, 249 on tax, 254 ObamaCare, 29, 220, 249 obesity, 5, 26, 35 optimism, 283–285 ozone, 48, 49–50, 62 Paine, Lincoln, 80 Paine, Thomas, 256 Panasonic, 68–69 Paris Agreement, 239, 243 The Passing of the Great Race (Grant), 197, 198 Piketty, Thomas, 84–85 Pinker, Steven, 120, 137, 138–139 Plank, Terry Ann, 278 Plato, 202–203 pollution, 26, 30, 59 See also air pollution Prince William Sound, 43 The Promised Land (Lemann), 71 public health, 27 ability to pay and, 29 carbon dioxide and, 62 deindustrialization and, 29 flu pandemics and, 28 health care and, 29, 40, 101–102, 220, 247–248, 249 inequality and healthcare, 247–248 longevity and, 30–31 mosquitoes and, 39 ObamaCare and, 29, 220, 249 pollution reduction and, 30 sanitation infrastructure and, 29–30 racism, 223, 259–260, 266 law enforcement and, 113–114 refugees and, 197 slavery and, 174–175, 191 Radelet, Steven, 20 Reagan, Ronald, 206–207, 209, 273 Reilly, Bill, 45–46 religion, 222, 282 resource consumption, 280 resource depletion fossil fuels and, 52–53, 54, 55–57 immensity of geology and, 54 market forces and, 51–52 price controls and, 54–55 uninterrupted trends and, 51 in US and European Union, 51–52 Resources for the Future, 45, 46 Ricardo, David, 134 Rose, Reginald, 197–199 Rubenstein, David, 271 Russia.


pages: 325 words: 89,374

Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing by John Boughton

British Empire, deindustrialization, full employment, garden city movement, ghettoisation, housing crisis, Jane Jacobs, laissez-faire capitalism, manufacturing employment, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, neoliberal agenda, new economy, New Urbanism, profit motive, rent control, Right to Buy, rising living standards, starchitect, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the market place, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, young professional

Black, chair of the Housing Committee in Hull (where Labour held fifty-seven of sixty council seats), was, in his own words, not ‘an idealist’ – his interest, he said, was ‘in seeking to achieve results, not some theory of government’.39 The result he wanted was £50 million to £60 million to complete the refurbishment of the North Hull Estate. 22nd Avenue, the North Hull Estate North Hull was a large, predominantly interwar cottage estate. It wasn’t by any means one of the ‘worst’ estates in the country though – with around one in five of its working-age adults jobless – it suffered the problems common to many hit by deindustrialisation. Around half the estate had been modernised by 1989 when the money ran out, and the council found its application for Estate Action funding refused. A two-hour car journey shared by Trippier and Black from Blackburn to Hull in July that year facilitated the beginnings of a deal that served the interests of both parties. The government needed a HAT victory and a council able and willing to deliver one.


pages: 160 words: 46,449

The Extreme Centre: A Warning by Tariq Ali

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bonus culture, BRICs, British Empire, centre right, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, first-past-the-post, full employment, labour market flexibility, land reform, light touch regulation, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mortgage debt, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, North Sea oil, obamacare, offshore financial centre, popular capitalism, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Westphalian system, Wolfgang Streeck

The astonishing development of technology, the third industrial revolution in the Western world and Japan, has undoubtedly created the material basis to satisfy the needs of all its citizens; but the economic structure based on maximizing profits at any cost is like a concrete wall that divides the top layers from the rest. The cost of production is now so low that the practical value of the commodity has to be ignored in order to keep prices artificially high. With the savage deindustrialization of the West, the parasitic marketing and advertising industries are amongst the largest in the world, second only to arms production. Consumerism has conquered all. Our needs are manipulated. Sixty-seven varieties of jeans, washing powders organic and non-organic, hi-tech gadgets and thousands of other commodities large and small, most of them unnecessary. Who decides? The market, chorus the neoliberals.

The huge social movements against privatizations and social restructuring in Venezuela (IMF impositions), Bolivia (water) and Peru (electricity) challenged this relegation and helped launch political parties which they then lifted into government. The movements had already pledged a series of anti-capitalist structural reforms to transform conditions. It was their successes in this field that enabled their repeated electoral triumphs. This process had no equivalent in Europe. Here, deindustrialization had broken the spinal cord of the old working classes. Neoliberal impositions completed the process. Defeated and demoralized, the official trade unions, linked to a segment of the extreme centre, capitulated to neoliberalism. Their protest now tends to be confined to ritual marches or one-day strikes that have virtually nil impact, ignored by both the rulers and the new generation of semi-employed or unemployed youth who want change but feel that none of the traditional parties can provide it.


pages: 165 words: 45,129

The Economics of Inequality by Thomas Piketty, Arthur Goldhammer

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, basic income, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, deindustrialization, endogenous growth, Gini coefficient, income inequality, low skilled workers, means of production, moral hazard, Pareto efficiency, purchasing power parity, Simon Kuznets, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, very high income, working-age population

During the first phase of the Industrial Revolution, they argue, wage inequality increased as industry demanded more and more skilled labor and large numbers of unskilled laborers streamed in from the countryside. From the end of the nineteenth century to the 1970s, wage inequality decreased in all the developed countries. The phase of decreasing inequality occurred because skill gaps narrowed considerably thanks to rapid development of mass education and training, and growing demand for industrial workers with mid-level skills. Since the beginning of deindustrialization in the late 1960s, however, a new phase has ostensibly begun. New sectors (such as business services, computers, and communications) require workers with very high skill levels, but much of the population has been unable to acquire these skills through either the educational system or personal experience. These relatively unskilled workers find work in low-productivity sectors (such as personal services, the food service industry, and retailing) or else find themselves unemployed or underemployed.

The apparent ineffectiveness of affirmative action contributed greatly to the conservative reaction against social programs in general in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, it is likely that the deterioration of the relative position of African Americans in the labor market since the 1970s, which fueled this reaction, is more simply explained as a by-product of the general increase in wage inequality and of deindustrialization, which hit African American workers hard, especially in the northern United States (Wilson, 1987). The Social Determination of Wage Inequality Some wage inequalities cannot be explained solely in terms of an underlying inequality of human capital (whether efficient or inefficient). For example, certain economic actors (such as firms or trade unions) may attempt to manipulate the wage structure resulting from the supply and demand of human capital to their advantage.


pages: 349 words: 98,868

Nervous States: Democracy and the Decline of Reason by William Davies

active measures, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Amazon Web Services, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, citizen journalism, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, Colonization of Mars, continuation of politics by other means, creative destruction, credit crunch, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, discovery of penicillin, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, drone strike, Elon Musk, failed state, Filter Bubble, first-past-the-post, Frank Gehry, gig economy, housing crisis, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, Johannes Kepler, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, loss aversion, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mont Pelerin Society, mutually assured destruction, Northern Rock, obamacare, Occupy movement, pattern recognition, Peace of Westphalia, Peter Thiel, Philip Mirowski, planetary scale, post-industrial society, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Florida, road to serfdom, Robert Mercer, Ronald Reagan, sentiment analysis, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, smart cities, statistical model, Steve Jobs, the scientific method, Turing machine, Uber for X, universal basic income, University of East Anglia, Valery Gerasimov, We are the 99%, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

Another way in which this split appears is in terms of graduates versus nongraduates. This conflict has been a feature of American politics since the 1960s, and now more or less determines the shape of the electoral map, with Democrats winning in coastal regions, big cities, and university towns, and Republicans winning more or less everywhere else. But a similar divide has subsequently emerged in numerous European countries in the context of deindustrialization. The geography of Britain’s 2016 EU referendum result made this abundantly clear: outside Scotland and Northern Ireland, the areas that voted “Remain” were major cities (London, Manchester, Leeds, much of Birmingham), the high-tech business cluster along the Thames Valley, and smaller university towns and cities (Norwich, Leicester, Exeter, Oxford, Cambridge), but almost the entire rest of England voted “Leave.”

Rising political polarization can be linked to various cultural divisions, for example urban versus rural or graduate versus nongraduate. But there is something more bewildering going on involving the body. Evidence from across Europe and the United States shows that people who are drawn toward nationalists such as Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen often have significantly lower health prospects and life expectancy than average. Pockets of economic decline in deindustrialized areas are suffering especially on this front. Increases in life expectancy have either stagnated or, in certain instances, started to reverse. Psychologists have noted that nationalists are also more likely to hold “authoritarian values.” Predictably, this involves distrust of elected representatives and the mainstream media. But it also involves a particular perspective on the bodies of others: people with authoritarian values are more likely to support the death penalty, physical punishment of children, and torture.

One precondition of such interventions would be for regulators to move beyond their narrowly defined economic criteria of what counts as a problem in the first place. The Silicon Valley dream, of building the machines which mediate mind and world, is dashed, once companies are restricted to serving specific markets and clearly articulated human needs. Much of the lure of populists, both of a left- and a right-wing variety, is their willingness to make promises. In many cases, these promises might be rash, as when Donald Trump campaigned around de-industrialized regions of the Midwest promising to bring back traditional manufacturing jobs. But for those who have studied the supporters of such politicians, the appeal of this type of rhetoric makes sense. The sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild’s exploration of the lives of Tea Party enthusiasts in Louisiana revealed to her a “deep story” underlying their political views.19 On a fundamental emotional level, these people felt that some basic moral agreement had been broken, whereby their patience and hard work was no longer adequate for them to be deemed respectable citizens.


pages: 348 words: 102,438

Green and Prosperous Land: A Blueprint for Rescuing the British Countryside by Dieter Helm

3D printing, Airbnb, barriers to entry, British Empire, clean water, conceptual framework, corporate social responsibility, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Diane Coyle, digital map, facts on the ground, food miles, Haber-Bosch Process, illegal immigration, Internet of things, Kickstarter, land reform, mass immigration, New Urbanism, North Sea oil, precision agriculture, quantitative easing, smart meter, sovereign wealth fund, the built environment, urban planning, urban sprawl

London’s air quality ranks with that of Beijing, Delhi and Paris as among the worst in the world, with Marble Arch recording levels over five times that set by the EU upper limit. The good news is that most cities in Britain are seeing improving overall air quality, albeit from a low base. There are no pea soup fogs anymore. These improvements have come from driving out domestic coal fires and more generally the closure of large-scale coal-powered industries from the surrounding areas. The coming of natural gas, gas central heating, and deindustrialisation have together made a big difference. The phasing-out of coal-fired electricity generation, which contributed nearly 80 per cent of generation as recently as the 1980s, should be completed by around 2025, representing another step change. Yet just because it has been improving does not mean that it is good enough. The bad news comes from the newer forms of pollution that have crept in. These include diesel vehicles and ammonia from agriculture, as well as the very localised household pollution that comes with household chemicals.


pages: 391 words: 22,799

To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise by Bethany Moreton

affirmative action, American Legislative Exchange Council, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bretton Woods, Buckminster Fuller, collective bargaining, corporate personhood, creative destruction, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, estate planning, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Gilder, global village, informal economy, invisible hand, liberation theology, longitudinal study, market fundamentalism, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, new economy, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, price anchoring, Ralph Nader, RFID, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, walkable city, Washington Consensus, white flight, Whole Earth Catalog, Works Progress Administration

The federal power of the 49 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART court might again prove necessary to frog-Â�march them into the twenty-Â� first century. But thirty years ago, Â�women did not emerge from inequality at work into full economic citizenship in “men’s jobs”—the stable, well-Â�paid factory or professional-Â�managerial work that had been the backbone of€ postwar prosperity. Rather, under the stress of deindustrialization, men’s jobs came to look more like Â�women’s work. Casualization, “flexÂ�iÂ� bilÂ�ity,” part-Â�time or temp work, and the erosion of beneÂ�fits, seniority, and tenure—the conditions that had once best described most Â�women’s work in an industrial economy became generalized to the work force as€a whole. Unwaged household labor, personal relationships, and part-Â� time jobs had supported the American breadwinner all along.

And where sins against industrial production had galvanized some Christian activists 121 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART in€ the days of the temperance campaigns, sins against reproduction evoked the most impassioned responses in the new economic dispensation.100 The evangelical revival associated with the Bible Belt became a sigÂ� nifiÂ�cant national phenomenon in the later years of the twentieth century, and its growth paralleled that of Wal-Â�Mart itself into deindustrialized areas of the country. Thus in 1992, Janet Rugg at store #1378 wrote to Wal-Â�Mart’s Bentonville headquarters explaining exactly what she valued about working for a Christian serÂ�vice company, beyond merely her paycheck. I come from a factory background, which meant work came first, before family, church, or anything else. Also you were treated as a person hired just to do a job. They did not care about you as a person at all.

Haynes Bonner Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 113–15; George Gilder, Men and Marriage 311 NOTES TO PAGES 123 – 1 2 7 (Gretna, LA: Pelican, 1993; orig. pub. Sexual Suicide, 1973), 39, quoted in Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 169. 104. Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 157. 8. Making Christian Businessmen 1. Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 167–69; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 95; Bluestone and Harrison, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3–5; Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class (New York: Verso, 1999), 208–9; Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor, and Gavin Wright, “Introduction,” in The Mosaic of Economic Growth, ed.


The Cigarette: A Political History by Sarah Milov

activist lawyer, affirmative action, airline deregulation, American Legislative Exchange Council, barriers to entry, British Empire, collective bargaining, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, fixed income, Frederick Winslow Taylor, G4S, global supply chain, imperial preference, Indoor air pollution, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Kitchen Debate, land tenure, new economy, New Journalism, Philip Mirowski, pink-collar, Potemkin village, precariat, price stability, profit maximization, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, The Chicago School, Torches of Freedom, trade route, union organizing, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, War on Poverty, women in the workforce

For an in-depth analysis of the political economy of the 1970s, see Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). For an overview of the process and cultural significance of deindustrialization see Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). For the canonical work that enshrined “deindustrialization” as part of the American lexicon, see Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 65. William L. Weis and Nancy Wick, “Smokeless Office: America’s Bosses Clear the Air,” American Health, April 1985; William L.


pages: 565 words: 122,605

The Human City: Urbanism for the Rest of Us by Joel Kotkin

autonomous vehicles, blue-collar work, British Empire, carbon footprint, Celebration, Florida, citizen journalism, colonial rule, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Downton Abbey, edge city, Edward Glaeser, financial independence, Frank Gehry, Gini coefficient, Google bus, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, labor-force participation, land reform, life extension, market bubble, mass immigration, McMansion, megacity, new economy, New Urbanism, Own Your Own Home, peak oil, pensions crisis, Peter Calthorpe, post-industrial society, RAND corporation, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Seaside, Florida, self-driving car, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, starchitect, Stewart Brand, Ted Nelson, the built environment, trade route, transit-oriented development, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce, young professional

ABC7 NEWS. (2013, November 5). “Voters reject condo complex project on San Francisco waterfront,” http://abc7news.com/archive/9315343/. ABKOWITZ, Alyssa. (2015, April 2). “A High-Rise Race in Mumbai,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-high-rise-race-in-mumbai-1427988257. ABLEY, Ian. (2009, July 26). “UK Green Path Leads to Deindustrialization and Worsening Housing Shortage,” New Geography, http://www.newgeography.com/content/00928-uk-green-path-leads-deindustrialization-and-worsening-housing-shortage. ABRAHAMSON, Eric John. (2013). Building Home: Howard F. Ahmanson and the Politics of the American Dream, Berkeley: University of California Press. ADACHI, Sachiho A., et al. (2014, August). “Moderation of Summertime Heat Island Phenomena via Modification of the Urban Form in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area,” Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology, vol. 53, 1886–1900, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JAMC-D-13-0194.1.

Although its dominion will be far less powerful than in the past, its prospects are far from “bleak,” as was commonly believed in the 1970s.136 That era was particularly tough for inner cities, which were still reeling from the massive loss of manufacturing and retail jobs that took place after World War II.137 Yet as historian Robert Bruegmann points out, the loss of these industries helped create the pre-conditions for a new, dynamic core economy. Deindustrialization curbed congestion and pollution and chased working-class families away from the core. The hip city of today rests on the wreckage of the old industrial version.138 This transformation has allowed city cores to maintain or even slightly expand their shares of metropolitan jobs, even if overall, suburbs accounted for more than 80 percent of all employment gains.139 As previously mentioned, certain core geographies, rid of the detritus of their past, have proved well suited for particular industries—high finance, media, and fashion—where regular face-to-face meetings, social connections, and access to privileged information remain critical.140 Analyst Aaron Renn has also noticed a recent rise in the number of “executive headquarters” located in cities.


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The Rise of the Network Society by Manuel Castells

"Robert Solow", Apple II, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Noyce, borderless world, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, complexity theory, computer age, computerized trading, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, declining real wages, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, dematerialisation, deskilling, disintermediation, double helix, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, edge city, experimental subject, financial deregulation, financial independence, floating exchange rates, future of work, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, Hacker Ethic, hiring and firing, Howard Rheingold, illegal immigration, income inequality, Induced demand, industrial robot, informal economy, information retrieval, intermodal, invention of the steam engine, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job-hopping, John Markoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, Leonard Kleinrock, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, megacity, Menlo Park, moral panic, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, packet switching, Pearl River Delta, peer-to-peer, planetary scale, popular capitalism, popular electronics, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Robert Gordon, Robert Metcalfe, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, social software, South China Sea, South of Market, San Francisco, special economic zone, spinning jenny, statistical model, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, the medium is the message, the new new thing, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, urban renewal, urban sprawl, zero-sum game

The financial crisis of 1997–8 destroyed much of the newly acquired wealth of these countries. By the end of 1999, the Asian economies seemed to be on their path to recovery. But a substantial part of manufacturing, of the property market, and of the banking industry of these countries, and a large proportion of formal employment, had been wiped out by the crisis. Poverty and unemployment sky-rocketed. In Indonesia a process of de-industrialization, and de-urbanization took place, as millions of people returned to the countryside, looking for survival (see volume III, chapter 4). The fall-out of the Asian crisis, of the Mexican crisis, of the Brazilian crisis, of the Russian crisis, shows the destructive power of volatility in the global economy. The new economic system is at the same time highly dynamic, highly selective, highly exclusionary, and highly unstable in its boundaries.

For the United States, Cohen and Zysman estimate that 24 percent of GNP comes from the value added by manufacturing firms, and another 25 percent of GNP comes from the contribution of services directly linked to manufacturing. Thus, they argue that the post-industrial economy is a “myth,” and that we are in fact in a different kind of industrial economy. Much of the confusion comes from the artificial separation between advanced economies and developing economies which, under the conditions of globalization, are in fact part of the same productive structure. Thus, while analysts were proclaiming the de-industrialization of America, or of Europe in the 1980s, they simply overlooked what was happening in the rest of the world. And what was happening was that, according to studies from the ILO,6 global manufacturing employment was at its highest point in 1989, having increased by 72 percent between 1963 and 1989. The trend continued in the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1997, while manufacturing jobs declined slightly in the US (from 19,367 million to 18,657 million), and substantially in the European Union (from 38,400 to 29,919), they actually increased in Japan, and were multiplied by a factor of between 1.5 and 4 in major industrializing countries, so that, overall, new manufacturing jobs elsewhere largely exceeded the losses in the developed world.

The story is a very different one in the 1970–90 period, when the process of economic restructuring and technological transformation which took place during these two decades led to a reduction of manufacturing employment in all countries (see tables 4.1–4.14 in Appendix A). However, while this trend was general, the shrinkage of manufacturing employment was uneven, clearly indicating the fundamental variety of social structures according to differences in economic policies and in firms’ strategies. Thus, while the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy experienced rapid de-industrialization (reducing the share of their manufacturing employment in 1970–90 from 38.7 to 22.5 percent; from 25.9 to 17.5 percent; from 27.3 to 21.8 percent, respectively), Japan and Germany reduced their share of manufacturing labor force moderately: from 26.0 to 23.6 percent in the case of Japan, and from 38.6 percent to a still rather high level of 32.2 percent in 1987 in the case of Germany. Canada and France occupy an intermediate position, reducing manufacturing employment from 19.7 percent (in 1971) to 14.9 percent, and from 27.7 to 21.3 percent, respectively.


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Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short by David Archibald

Bakken shale, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), means of production, mutually assured destruction, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, out of africa, peak oil, price discovery process, rising living standards, sceptred isle, South China Sea, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, Yom Kippur War

It has since fallen rapidly, to 0.9 million barrels per day in 2012. Peak coal production in that country was 292 million metric tons—a hundred years ago. It is now less than 10 million metric tons per annum. The UK is now importing almost all of the fossil fuel it burns. The British decided to move to wind power but recently found that turbines were lasting only about half as long as the wind industry said they would. The Climate Change Act, effectively de-industrializing the country, was passed in the House of Commons in October 2008 by 463 votes to 3, even as snow was falling outside. The winters since that act was passed have been particularly bitter, but that is only a taste of what is to come. The UK imports 40 percent of the food it consumes and has an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, but it is still accepting immigrants. The longest growing season in the past 241 years (which is as far back as we can calculate) was 300 days, in 2000.

Just how thin the veneer of civility over British society is was shown by the five days of riots in August 2011 in which criminal elements rampaged through parts of the major cities. Controlling criminality combined with hunger will require extreme measures by current standards, but they won’t seem extreme at the time in a world desensitized by death on a massive scale. The scientific establishment in the United States has also been corrupted by the climate change myth. But America is not so far down the path of feckless de-industrialization as Britain. Americans are in a far better position to prepare to face the real threats of the future, the dangers predicted by the actual data—but only if the United States can cast off the fashionable millenarianism that now holds sway in government and academia alike. Some parts of the dystopia really threatening the world cannot be avoided, only ameliorated by good preparation. Other parts could in theory be avoided with sufficient care, diligence, investment, and preparation.


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Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain by Fintan O'Toole

Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, British Empire, colonial rule, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, Desert Island Discs, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, full employment, Khartoum Gordon, Peter Thiel, Potemkin village, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stanford marshmallow experiment

Most of the time, we are quite comfortable holding at least two contradictory ideas in our heads at the same time. I grew up with those contradictions. The official Irish culture of my childhood and youth was one that defined Ireland as whatever England was not. England was Protestant; so Catholicism had to be the essence of Irish identity. England was industrial; so Ireland had to make a virtue of its underdeveloped and deindustrialized economy. England was urban; so Ireland had to create an image of itself that was exclusively rustic. The English were scientific rationalists; so we Irish had to be the mystical dreamers of dreams. They were Anglo-Saxons; we were Celts. They had a monarchy, so we had to have a republic. They developed a welfare state; so we relied on the tender mercies of charity. In other words, I know exactly what an either/or identity looks and feels like.

Without a transfer of power, Brexit confronts an insoluble problem: who is to inflict the pain and who is to feel it most? Because it can never supply those answers, Brexit can never create a sustainable meaning from the pain. For at its heart, it replays the old Dublin music hall song: ‘We had sham pain that night, and real pain next morning.’ It is a release, not from the real anguish of life in deindustrialized communities, but from the phantom agony inflicted by the long campaign to make the English think of themselves as Submissives to the EU’s Dominant. Brexit is a strange hybrid – a genuine national revolution against a phoney oppressor. It has the form of a moment of liberation without the content. The people get out of the Red Room of Pain only to find themselves in the Red White and Blue Room of Pain.


pages: 559 words: 169,094