deglobalization

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The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History by David Edgerton

active measures, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, blue-collar work, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, centre right, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, Corn Laws, corporate governance, deglobalization, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, Donald Davies, double helix, endogenous growth, Etonian, European colonialism, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, full employment, imperial preference, James Dyson, knowledge economy, labour mobility, land reform, land value tax, manufacturing employment, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Neil Kinnock, new economy, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, packet switching, Philip Mirowski, Piper Alpha, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, trade liberalization, union organizing, very high income, wages for housework, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor

Chatterjee, ‘Business and Politics in the 1930s: Lancashire and the Making of the Indo-British Trade Agreement’, Modern Asian Studies15.3 (1981), pp. 527–73; Muldoon, Empire, Politics; Martin Pugh, ‘Lancashire, Cotton, and Indian Reform: Conservative Controversies in the 1930s’, Twentieth Century British History 15 (2004), pp. 143–51. See also for the politics of jute, Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Deglobalisation of Dundee, c. 1900–2000’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 29 (2009), pp. 123–40, and ‘De-globalization and Its Significance: From the Particular to the General’, Contemporary British History 26 (2012), pp. 213–30. 25. This Is the Road: The Conservative and Unionist Party’s Policy, Conservative Party, 1950, available at http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con50.htm, accessed 12 January 2018. 26. Richard Toye, ‘The Attlee Government, the Imperial Preference System and the Creation of the GATT’, English Historical Review 118 (2003), pp. 912–39, though there were also free-trading tendencies in Labour still. 27.

. —, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–1951 (Cambridge, 1997). —, ‘Why So Austere? The British Welfare State of the 1940s’, Journal of Social Policy 27 (1998), pp. 63–7. —, The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain (Abingdon, 2000). —, ‘Marshall Aid and the “Shortage Economy” in Britain in the 1940s’, Contemporary European History 9 (2000), pp. 137–55. —, ‘The Deglobalisation of Dundee, c. 1900–2000’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 29 (2009), pp. 123–40. —, ‘De-globalization and Its Significance: From the Particular to the General’, Contemporary British History 26 (2012), pp. 213–30. —, ‘The Empire/Commonwealth in British Economic Thinking and Policy’, in Andrew Thompson (ed.), Britain’s Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2012), pp. 211–50. —, Dundee and the Empire: ‘Juteopolis’ 1850–1939 (Edinburgh, 2014). —, ‘De-industrialization Not Decline: A New Meta-narrative for Post-war British History’, Twentieth Century British History 27 (2016), pp. 76–9.


pages: 353 words: 91,211

The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 by David Edgerton

agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, British Empire, Computer Numeric Control, conceptual framework, creative destruction, deglobalization, dematerialisation, desegregation, deskilling, endogenous growth, global village, Haber-Bosch Process, interchangeable parts, knowledge economy, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, means of production, megacity, microcredit, new economy, post-industrial society, Productivity paradox, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, spinning jenny, Upton Sinclair, urban planning

Cotton was processed thousands of miles from where it was grown and was exported from a few industrial centres to the whole world. The hub of the industry was free-trading Britain, and particularly Cottonopolis itself, the city of Manchester. The peak year of the British cotton industry was 1913 when it was not only the largest, but also the most efficient cotton industry in the world.13 In the interwar years, as trade de-globalised and Japan emerged as a major competitor, Manchester’s exports slumped. In 1931, the worst year of the depression, output was half what it had been in 1913. It was not to recover very much, and from the early 1950s a long steady decline continued, though this declining industry remained important. In the 1930s it had around 30 per cent of world textiles exports, and 15 per cent in the early 1950s.

In the case of beef, the technologies of killing would hardly change at all from one end of the century to the next – the big changes were the introduction of the captive-bolt pistol to replace the pole-axe and the chain-saw to replace the axe.32 In the years after the Second World War, however, the vast New World slaughterhouses of the early part of the century went out of fashion, and much smaller and more dispersed operations took over. The great plants of the River Plate and Chicago closed. The old Anglo plant in Fray Bentos struggled into the 1970s, long enough to be preserved as a museum, the appropriately named Museum of the Industrial Revolution, a place which figures in tourist guides to the Southern Cone. European self-sufficiency in meat, particularly in the British case, and the rise of the Common Market, which de-globalised the trade in meat, put paid to it. In the USA the great meatpackers of Chicago lost markets to new rural, nonunionised, low-skill, single-storey meatpackers, which sent out boxed meat to supermarkets instead of sides of beef to butchers (and of course to the new giant mass producers of beefburgers and the like). Since the 1970s, and especially the 1980s, new plants and new meatpackers, more concentrated even than those of Chicago’s prime, appeared.

This necessitates an account of the global technological landscape that is very different from those found implicitly and explicitly in existing global histories and histories of technology – and an account that might help revise our views about world history. It is a measure of the importance of technology to the twentieth century, and to our understanding of it, that to rethink the history of technology is necessarily to rethink the history of the world. For example, we should no longer assume that there was ineluctable globalisation thanks to new technology; on the contrary the world went through a process of de-globalisation in which technologies of self-sufficiency and empire had a powerful role. Culture has not lagged behind technology, rather the reverse; the idea that culture has lagged behind technology is itself very old and has existed under many different technological regimes. Technology has not generally been a revolutionary force; it has been responsible for keeping things the same as much as changing them.


pages: 389 words: 119,487

21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari

1960s counterculture, accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, algorithmic trading, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, Ayatollah Khomeini, basic income, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, blockchain, Boris Johnson, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon-based life, cognitive dissonance, computer age, computer vision, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, decarbonisation, deglobalization, Donald Trump, failed state, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, gig economy, glass ceiling, Google Glasses, illegal immigration, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, invisible hand, job automation, knowledge economy, liberation theology, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mohammed Bouazizi, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, obamacare, pattern recognition, post-work, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Scramble for Africa, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, transatlantic slave trade, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, uranium enrichment, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, zero-sum game

We need a new global identity because national institutions are incapable of handling a set of unprecedented global predicaments. We now have a global ecology, a global economy and a global science – but we are still stuck with only national politics. This mismatch prevents the political system from effectively countering our main problems. To have effective politics, we must either de-globalise the ecology, the economy and the march of science – or we must globalise our politics. Since it is impossible to de-globalise the ecology and the march of science, and since the cost of de-globalising the economy would probably be prohibitive, the only real solution is to globalise politics. This does not mean establishing a global government – a doubtful and unrealistic vision. Rather, to globalise politics means that political dynamics within countries and even cities should give far more weight to global problems and interests.

Ruling oligarchies in countries as diverse as the United States and Russia might merge and make common cause against the mass of ordinary Sapiens. From this perspective, current populist resentment of ‘the elites’ is well founded. If we are not careful, the grandchildren of Silicon Valley tycoons and Moscow billionaires might become a superior species to the grandchildren of Appalachian hillbillies and Siberian villagers. In the long run, such a scenario might even de-globalise the world, as the upper caste congregates inside a self-proclaimed ‘civilisation’ and builds walls and moats to separate it from the hordes of ‘barbarians’ outside. In the twentieth century, industrial civilisation depended on the ‘barbarians’ for cheap labour, raw materials and markets. Therefore it conquered and absorbed them. But in the twenty-first century, a post-industrial civilisation relying on AI, bioengineering and nanotechnology might be far more self-contained and self-sustaining.


pages: 566 words: 163,322

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World by Ruchir Sharma

Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business cycle, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Markoff, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, lateral thinking, liberal capitalism, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, mass immigration, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, pets.com, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Future of Employment, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population

“IMF Chief Says Global Growth Still Too Weak.” USA Today, April 2, 2014. “Don’t Catch Falling Knives.” BCA Research, July 29, 2015. “EM Macro Daily: China Capital Outflow Risk—The Curious Case of the Missing $300 Billions.” Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, January 13, 2015. Forbes, Kristin. “Financial ‘Deglobalization’?: Capital Flows, Banks, and the Beatles.” Bank of England, 2014. Freund, Caroline. “Current Account Adjustment in Industrialized Countries.” International Finance Discussion Papers, 2000. “Global Macro Jottings: Financial Deglobalization.” VTB Capital, November 20, 2014. Harvey, Oliver, and Robin Winkler. “Dark Matter: The Hidden Capital Flows That Drive G10 Exchange Rates.” Deutsche Bank Markets Research, March 6, 2015). Hyman, Ed. “Bond Yields Up But S&P Advances.” Evercore ISI, February 18, 2015. “Is That a Kleptocrat in Your Balance of Payments?”

With their newfound clout, the rising global middle class would put pressure on dictatorships to loosen censorship, hold genuine elections, and open up new opportunities. Rising wealth would beget political freedom and democracy, which would beget greater prosperity. Then came 2008. The years BC gave way to the years AC. After the Crisis, the expectation of a golden age gave way to a new reality. Hype for globalization yielded to mutterings about “deglobalization.” The big picture is complicated and contradictory, because not all the flows that globalization traditionally describes have slowed or reversed. The flow of information, as measured by Internet traffic, for example, is still surging. The flow of people, as measured by the number of tourists and airline passengers, is rising sharply. But overall the number of economic migrants moving from poor countries to rich ones has fallen, despite the heated controversy that broke out in 2015 over Muslim refugees from Syria and Iraq.

Its 2012 free trade deal with the United States was the first of its kind in South America; it is part of one of the more promising new regional trade alliances along with its Andean neighbors and Mexico, and it has encouraged the transformation of Medellín from murder capital to model second city. In Africa, Morocco and Rwanda are carving out export success stories in very rough neighborhoods. Location still matters. Economic growth has long tended to flower along the trade routes that carry manufactured goods; now it is flourishing in service industry capitals as well, and this trend may be gaining momentum in a period of deglobalization. In recent years, as growth in global trade leveled off and global capital flows have fallen sharply, the process of globalization nonetheless has accelerated in two important categories. The number of international travelers and tourists has continued to rise rapidly, and Internet communications have continued to explode, which could open up new opportunities for countries that can exploit these trends.


pages: 251 words: 69,245

The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality by Branko Milanovic

Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, colonial rule, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, endogenous growth, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, full employment, Gini coefficient, high net worth, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, Joseph Schumpeter, means of production, open borders, Pareto efficiency, plutocrats, Plutocrats, purchasing power parity, Simon Kuznets, very high income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

We have seen in Essay II that these simple predictions were found quite wrong when it came to explaining the growth of the world during Globalization 2.0. This fact is by now generally acknowledged, and alternative theories of economic growth have been proposed to account for it. It is also accepted that since the Industrial Revolution, the average incomes of the countries of the world have diverged (see Vignette 2.1). But what has happened during the period of deglobalization when, if the theory is correct, we should observe an increase in the differences between poor and rich countries? The period of deglobalization, conventionally considered as spanning the years from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, is one of the least studied by economists. The problem, from the economists’ point of view, is that it is a political period par excellence. The October Revolution in 1917 “subtracted” from under the capitalist control one of the key countries in the world with the largest landmass.

Vignette 1.10 - Two Students of Inequality: Vilfredo Pareto and Simon Kuznets CHAPTER 2 Vignette 2.1 - Why Was Marx Led Astray? Vignette 2.2 - How Unequal Is Today’s World? Vignette 2.3 - How Much of Your Income Is Determined at Birth? Vignette 2.4 - Should the Whole World Be Composed of Gated Communities? Vignette 2.5 - Who Are the Harraga? Vignette 2.6 - The Three Generations of Obamas Vignette 2.7 - Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? CHAPTER 3 Vignette 3.1 - Where in the Global Income Distribution Are YOU? Vignette 3.2 - Does the World Have a Middle Class? Vignette 3.3 - How Different Are the United States and the European Union? Vignette 3.4 - Why Are Asia and Latin America Mirror Images of Each Other? Vignette 3.5 - Do You Want to Know the Winner Before the Game Begins? Vignette 3.6 - Income Inequality and the Global Financial Crisis Vignette 3.7 - Did Colonizers Exploit as Much as They Could?

She had taught me to disdain the blend of ignorance and arrogance that too often characterized Americans abroad. But she now learned ... the chasm that separated the life chances of an American from those of an Indonesian. She knew which side of the divide she wanted her child to be on. I was an American, she decided, and my true life lay elsewhere [outside of Indonesia].6 Vignette 2.7 Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? One of the truisms of simple neoclassical economics is that openness to the movement of labor, capital, and goods—that is, globalization—should not only benefit all participating countries but benefit more the poor ones.1 This is based essentially on three assumptions. First, poor countries are “producing” a higher marginal return to each successive addition of capital than the rich countries.


pages: 378 words: 110,518

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future by Paul Mason

Alfred Russel Wallace, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, basic income, Bernie Madoff, Bill Gates: Altair 8800, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, business process, butterfly effect, call centre, capital controls, Cesare Marchetti: Marchetti’s constant, Claude Shannon: information theory, collaborative economy, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Graeber, deglobalization, deindustrialization, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Downton Abbey, drone strike, en.wikipedia.org, energy security, eurozone crisis, factory automation, financial repression, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, future of work, game design, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, information asymmetry, intangible asset, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, late capitalism, low skilled workers, market clearing, means of production, Metcalfe's law, microservices, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage debt, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, Paul Samuelson, payday loans, Pearl River Delta, post-industrial society, precariat, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, reserve currency, RFID, Richard Stallman, Robert Gordon, Robert Metcalfe, secular stagnation, sharing economy, Stewart Brand, structural adjustment programs, supply-chain management, The Future of Employment, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Transnistria, union organizing, universal basic income, urban decay, urban planning, Vilfredo Pareto, wages for housework, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

If things do not change, says the OECD, it is realistic to expect stagnation in the West, a slowing pace of growth in emerging markets and the likely bankruptcy of many states. So what’s more likely is that at some point one or more countries will quit globalization, via protectionism, debt write-offs and currency manipulation. Or that a de-globalization crisis originating in diplomatic and military conflict spills over into the world economy and produces the same results. The lesson from the OECD’s report is that we need a complete system redesign. The most highly educated generation in the history of the human race, and the best connected, will not accept a future of high inequality and stagnant growth. Instead of a chaotic race to de-globalize the world, and decades of stagnation combined with rising inequality, we need a new economic model. To design it will involve more than an effort of utopian thinking. Keynes’s genius in the mid-1930s was to understand what the crisis had revealed about the existing system: that a workable new model would have to be built around the permanent inefficiencies of the old one, which mainstream economics could not see.

In January 2014, John Ashton, a career diplomat and formerly the British government’s special representative on climate change, delivered the blunt truth to the 1 per cent: ‘The market left to itself will not reconfigure the energy system and transform the economy within a generation.’3 According to the International Energy Agency, even if all the announced emissions-reduction plans, all the carbon taxes and all the renewables targets are achieved – that is, if consumers don’t revolt against higher taxes, and the world does not de-globalize – then CO2 emissions will still rise by 20 per cent by 2035. Instead of limiting the warming of the earth to only a two-degree increase, the temperature will rise 3.6 degrees.4 Faced with a clear warning that a 4.5-billion-year-old planet is being destabilized, those in power decided that a 25-year-old economic doctrine held the solution. They resolved to incentivize lower carbon use by rationing it, taxing it and subsidizing the alternatives.

These are, as we saw in chapter 9, projected to become stratospheric as a result of ageing populations. Over time, there is a danger that austerity plus stagnation will shrink the size of the economies from which the debts have to be repaid. Therefore governments have to do something clear and progressive about debts. They could be written off unilaterally – and in countries like Greece, where they are unpayable, that might be required. But the outcome would be de-globalization, as countries and investors holding the worthless debt retaliated, cutting off market access or kicking the defaulting countries out of various currency and trading zones. Some of the quantitative easing money could be used to buy and bury the debts – but even this so-called ‘monetization’ of debt, using the $12 trillion created so far, would not reduce global sovereign debts enough compared to GDP as these stand at $54 trillion and rising, and the global stock of all debts is approaching $300 trillion.


pages: 339 words: 95,270

Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace by Matthew C. Klein

Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial innovation, financial repression, fixed income, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, global value chain, illegal immigration, income inequality, intangible asset, invention of the telegraph, joint-stock company, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, Malcom McLean invented shipping containers, manufacturing employment, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, money market fund, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, paradox of thrift, passive income, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, sovereign wealth fund, The Nature of the Firm, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, trade liberalization, Wolfgang Streeck

People’s Bank of China, “Aggregate Financing to the Real Economy (Stock),” http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/resource/cms/2018/12/2018121716010887709.htm; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Investment Actually Completed in Fixed Assets, Accumulated Growth Rate,” http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01. 18. Gabriel Wildau and Yizhen Jia, “China’s Subway Building Binge Is Back on Track,” Financial Times, December 18, 2018. 19. China, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, “The Time Series of the Balance of Payments of China”; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Annual Data”; Brad W. Setser, “President Xi, Still the Deglobalizer in Chief . . .,” CFR (blog), June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/president-xi-still-deglobalizer-chief. 20. Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal 57, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 261–324; Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wenton Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” Georgetown Law Journal 103 (2015): 668; “The Communist Party’s Influence Is Expanding—in China and Beyond,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-11/it-s-all-xi-all-the-time-in-china-as-party-influence-expands; Matthew C.

Compounding the immediate impact of the collapse in business activity and cross-border finance was the wave of protectionism unleashed by the United States with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930. Punitive American taxes on imports from the rest of the world prompted global retaliation, breaking whatever had been left of an international economic system and unleashing competitive currency devaluations, rising tariffs, and deglobalization. Fittingly, the United States, which had been reliant on foreign customers to absorb its excess production since the end of the nineteenth century and was at that time running one of the largest trade surpluses in world history, was among the biggest victims of the protectionism it had helped encourage as it lost access to many of its export markets. This is the great lesson of Smoot-Hawley: countries with large trade surpluses have them only because they cannot consume all they produce, which makes them extremely vulnerable to a decline in international trade.


The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America's Future by Michael Levi

addicted to oil, American energy revolution, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, crony capitalism, deglobalization, energy security, Exxon Valdez, fixed income, full employment, global supply chain, hiring and firing, hydraulic fracturing, Induced demand, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Kenneth Rogoff, manufacturing employment, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea

The prospect of surprisingly high climate sensitivity does, however, add marginally to the downside of boosting fossil-fuel emissions. Yet natural gas, for the time being, is lowering emissions because it’s displacing coal. Rising U.S. oil production, meanwhile, will be offset substantially by lower oil production elsewhere, and it remains relatively small in the context of global emissions. T he big wild cards facing the future of U.S. energy—peak oil, major war, deglobalization, a stalled economic recovery, and surprisingly high climate sensitivity—all have something in common: they largely reinforce the benefits of the changes currently sweeping the American energy scene. There are modest exceptions, like somewhat greater climate risks from new oil production if climate sensitivity turns out to be surprisingly large, and bigger economic risks from some new environmental rules meant to foster efficiency and alternatives if economic growth continues to falter.

See renewable energy; solar energy; wind energy Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) summit, 148 climate change Arctic ice and, 84, 86, 91 biofuels and, 111, 138–139 cap-and-trade and, 97, 101, 155, 171, 206 carbon dioxide emissions and, 85, 87, 89–100, 102–103, 136, 139 carbon tax and, 101, 155, 202 clean energy standard (CES) and, 101, 155, 202 coal and, 97–101, 170, 182, 194 Copenhagen climate summit and, 104–106 deforestation and, 85, 91, 105, 140 geoengineering and, 193–194 globalization and, 188 international treaties and, 104–107, 204 introduction to the science of, 84–88 methane and, 102 mountain pine beetles and, 83–84, 87–88 natural gas and, 97–103, 107, 155, 177, 200, 204, 208 nuclear energy and, 97–99, 101, 173, 175 oil and, 80, 83, 85–86, 88–90, 93–97, 101, 107–108, 110, 136–137, 182, 194, 196, 200 renewable energy and, 170, 178, 194, 196–197 social cost of carbon, 89–90 Clinton (Pennsylvania), 161–162 Clinton, Bill, 15, 116 coal carbon capture and sequestration and, 100, 158, 172 China and, 96 climate change and, 97–101, 170, 182, 194 land use and, 22, 175–176 power plants and, 3, 17, 88, 98–100, 103, 107, 141, 153, 158, 160–161, 168, 170, 196 Coal Question, The (Jevons), 137 cobalt, 133 Colbert, Stephen, 48 Cold War, 10, 16, 64, 169, 185 Colorado climate change in, 83–85, 87–88 mountain pine beetles in, 83–84, 87–88 252 • INDEX Colorado (Cont.) natural gas production in, 102–104 tight oil in, 51, 56, 61, 80, 93–94 Columbus (Ohio), antifracking protest in, 3–4, 22, 92 compressed natural gas (CNG), 37–39 Congo, 133 Copenhagen climate summit, 104–106 Dawe, Justin, 170–172 Day, Roger, 62 Dearing, Becky, 26 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 52, 56–58 defense spending, innovation and, 169, 201 deglobalization, 189–190, 194 Delaware, 56 Department of Defense, 169, 200–201 Department of Energy, 15, 115, 146 Detroit automakers, 5, 18, 109–110, 113–116, 118–119, 122–123, 129–130, 136 Deutch, John, 24 Diaoyu Islands, 132 Dix, Bill, 20–22, 25, 46, 48 Dukakis, Michael, 14 E.ON, 32 Eagle Ford shale (Texas), 55 Earth Summit (1993), 15 earthquakes, natural gas production and, 44–45, 47 economic development natural gas and, 27–29, 47, 49, 192 oil and, 74–75, 127, 192 renewable energy and, 147, 162–163, 166, 191–192 Economides, Michael, 41 Edelstein, Paul, 129–130 EGL Oil Shale company, 51, 62 el-Badri, Abdallah Salem, 69 electric cars, 5, 114, 116, 118–119, 132, 135, 141–142, 200 electricity.

See also energy security; national security Arab-Israeli War (1973), 7, 76 Cold War, 10, 16, 64, 169, 185 globalization and, 35, 186–190, 194, 204–205 Gulf War (1991), 13–14, 76, 112 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 7, 13, 66–69, 90, 95–96 sea lanes and, 78, 183–184, 205 South China Sea confl ict, 132–134 Germany, 156, 173, 183 global warming. See climate change globalization Asian tiger economies and, 187 China and, 187–188 climate change regulation and, 188 254 • INDEX globalization (Cont.) deglobalization, 189–190, 194 energy trade and, 35, 188–190, 204–205 Great Depression and, 187 multinational corporations and, 187–188 trade agreements and, 186–187 United States and, 186 Gore, Al, 96–97, 146 Grant County (Kansas), 24 Grape, Steven, 54 Great Depression, 187, 190 Great Illusion, The (Angell), 183 Great Recession climate change initiatives and, 206 Congressional Budget Office projections and, 190–191 natural gas production and, 23, 25–26, 28 oil consumption and, 110 oil prices and, 16 renewable energy and, 145–146, 191 unemployment and, 190–191 Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 52, 56–58 oil production in, 3, 56–57, 180 Gulf War (1991), 13–14, 76, 112 Halliburton, 4, 24 Hamilton, Jim, 70 Hammond, Allen, 9 Hanergy, 167 Hansen, James, 82, 92 Hart, Gary, 10 Herrington, John S., 14 Honda GX, 38 Horizon Wind, 170 horizontal drilling, 23–24, 47, 52, 54 Hot, Flat, and Crowded (Friedman), 163 House, Kurt Zenz, 170–172 Howarth, Robert, 101–104 Hubbert, M.


pages: 462 words: 129,022

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent by Joseph E. Stiglitz

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, basic income, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, central bank independence, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, gig economy, global supply chain, greed is good, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, late fees, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Peter Thiel, postindustrial economy, price discrimination, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, shareholder value, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, two-sided market, universal basic income, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, working-age population

Predictions that tariffs would lead to less employment in these green jobs seem to have been borne out, and that means environmentally friendly energy production has been reduced. Jobs were certainly destroyed in the process of globalization, but they will be destroyed again in the process of the reckless deglobalization proposed by Trump. The world has created efficient global supply chains, and wise nations take advantage of them. For America to walk away from these supply chains will make our firms less competitive. Most importantly, there are large costs of adjustment. Adjusting to globalization was hard, and we—and especially our workers—paid a high price. But we will pay another high price as we try to adjust to deglobalization.32 Global Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century While protectionism won’t help the US, or even those who have suffered from deindustrialization, it can have profoundly negative effects on America’s trading partners and the global economy.

., 226–28 Constitution of the United States collective action reference in preamble, 138–39 economic changes since writing of, 227 “General Welfare” in Preamble, 242 individual liberties vs. collective interest in, 229 and minority rights, 6 as product of reasoning and argumentation, 229 three-fifths clause, 161 consumer demand, See demand consumer surplus, 64 cooperatives, 245 Copenhagen Agreement, 207 copyright extensions, 74 Copyright Term Extension Act (1998), 74 corporate taxes, 108, 206, 269n44 corporate tax rates, globalization and, 84–85 corporate welfare, 107 corporations and labor force participation, 182 and money in politics, 172–73 as people, 169–70 rights as endowed by the State, 172 corruption, 50 cost-benefit analysis, 146, 204–5 Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), xii credit, 102, 145, 186, 220 credit cards, 59–60, 70, 105 credit default swaps, 106 credit unions, 245 culture, economic behavior and, 30 customer targeting, 125–26 cybersecurity, 127–28 cybertheft, 308n35 Daraprim, 296n72 data exclusivity, 288n40 data ownership, 129–30 Deaton, Angus, 41–42 debt, 220; See also credit DeepMind, 315n1 defense contractors, 173 deficits, See budget deficits deglobalization, 92 deindustrialization early days of, xix effect on average citizens, 4, 21 facilitating transition to postindustrial world, 186–88 failure to manage, xxvi in Gary, Indiana, xi globalization and, 4, 79, 87 place-based policies and, 188 deliberation, 228–29 demand automation and, 120 and job creation, 268n41 Keynesian economics and, xv market power’s effect on, 63 demand for labor, technological suppression of, 122 democracy, 159–78 agenda for reducing power of money in politics, 171–74 curbing the influence of wealth on, 176–78 fragility of norms and institutions, 230–36 inequality as threat to, 27–28 maintaining system of checks and balances, 163–67 need for a new movement, 174–76 new technologies’ threat to, 131–35 and power of money, 167–70 as shared value, 228 suppression by minority, xx Trump’s disdain for, xvii voting reforms, 161–63 democratic institutions, fragility of, 230–36 Democratic Party gerrymandering’s effect on, 159 and Great Recession, 152 need for reinvention of, 175 popular support for, 6 renewal of, 242 and voter disenfranchisement, 162 demographics, xx, 181 “deplorables,” 4 deregulation, 25, 105, 143–44, 152, 239; See also supply-side economics derivatives, 80, 88, 106–7, 144 Detroit, Michigan, 188 Dickens, Charles, 12 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 320–21n32 disadvantage, intergenerational transmission of, 199–201 disclosure laws, 171 discourse, governance and, 11 discrimination, 201–4; See also gender discrimination; racial discrimination by banks, 115 and economics texts, 23 forms of, 202 under GI Bill, 210 and inequality, 40–41, 198–99 and labor force participation, 183 means of addressing, 203–4 and myths about affirmative action, 225 reducing to improve economy, 201–4 diseases of despair, 42–43 disenfranchisement, 27, 161–62 disintermediation, 109 Disney, 65, 74 dispute resolution, 56–57, 309n40 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 70, 102, 107 driverless cars, 118 drug overdoses, 42 Durbin Amendment, 70 East Asia, 149 economic justice historical perspectives, 241–42 intergenerational justice, 204–5 racial justice and, 176, 203–4 tax system and, 205–8 economics, assumptions about individuals in, 29–30, 223 economic segregation, 200 economies of scale, 72 economies of scope, 347–48n15 economy and collective action, 153–54 decent jobs with good working conditions, 192–97 deterioration since early 1980s, 32–46 failure’s effect on individuals and society, 29–31 failure since late 1980s, 3–5 government involvement in, 141–42, 150–55 intergenerational transmission of advantage/disadvantage, 199–201 reducing discrimination in, 201–4 restoring fairness to tax system, 205–8 restoring growth and productivity, 181–86 restoring justice across generations, 204–5 restoring opportunity and social justice, 197–201 social protection, 188–91 “sugar high” from Trump’s tax cut, 236–38 transition to postindustrial world, 186–88 education equalizing opportunity of, xxv–xxvi, 219–20 improving access to, 203 returns on government investment in, 232 taxation and, 25 undermining of institutions, 233–34 Eggers, Dave, 128 Eisenhower, Dwight, and administration, 210 elderly, labor force growth and, 181–82 election of 1992, 4 election of 2000, 165–66 election of 2012, 159, 178 election of 2016, xix, 132, 178 elections, campaign spending in, 171–73 elite control of economy by, 5–6 and distrust in government, 151 and 2008 financial crisis, 5 promises of growth from market liberalization, 21–22 rules written by, 230 employers, market power over workers, 64–67 employment, See full employment; jobs; labor force participation End of History, The (Fukuyama), 3 Enlightenment, the, 10–12 attack on ideals of, 14–22 and standard of living, 264n24 environment carbon tax, 194, 206–7 and collective action, 153 economic growth and, 176 economists’ failure to address, 34 markets’ failure to protect, 24 and true economic health, 34 environmental justice, economic justice and, 176 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 267n38 epistemology, 10, 234 equality as basis for well-running economy, xxiv–xxv economic agenda for, xxvii as shared value, 228 Equifax, 130 equity value, rents as portion of, 54 ethnic discrimination, 201–4 Europe data regulation, 128–29 globalization, 81 infrastructure investment, 195–96 privacy protections, 135 trade agreements favoring, 80 unity against Trump, 235 European Investment Bank, 195–96 evergreening, 60 excess profits, as rent, 54 exchange rate, 89, 307n28, 307n32 exploitation in current economy, 26 in economics texts, 23 financial sector and, 113 market power and, 47–78 reducing, 197 as source of wealth, 144–45 wealth creation vs., 34 and wealth redistribution, 50 exports, See globalization; trade wars Facebook anticompetitive practices, 70 and Big Data, 123, 124, 127–28 competition for ad revenue, 56 and conflicts of interest, 124 market power in relaxed antitrust environment, 62 as natural monopoly, 134 and preemptive mergers, 60, 73 reducing market power of, 124 regulation of advertising on, 132 fact-checking, 132, 177 “Fading American Dream, The” (Opportunity Insights report), 44–45 “fake news,” 167 family leave, 197 Farhi, Emmanuel, 62 farmers, Great Depression and, 120 fascism, 15–16, 18, 235 Federal Communication Commission (FCC), 147 Federal Reserve Board, 70, 112 Federal Reserve System, 121, 214–15 Federal Trade Commission, 69 fees bank profits from, 105, 110 credit card, 60, 70, 105 for mergers and acquisitions, 108 mortgages and, 107, 218 “originate-to-distribute” banking model, 110 private retirement accounts and, 215 fiduciary standard, 314n21, 347n10 finance (financial sector); See also banks and American crisis, 101–16 contagion of maladies to rest of economy, 112 disintermediation, 109 dysfunctional economy created by, 105–9 gambling by, 106–8 and government guarantees, 110–11 history of dysfunctionality, 109–12 as microcosm of larger economy, 113 mortgage reform opposed by, 216–18 private vs. social interests, 111–12 and public option, 215–16 shortsightedness of, 104–5 stopping societal harm created by, 103–5 and trade agreements, 80 financial crisis (2008), 101; See also Great Recession bank bailout, See bank bailout [2008] China and, 95 deregulation and, 25, 143–44 as failure of capitalism, 3 government response to, 5 housing and, 216 as man-made failure, 153–54 market liberalization and, 4 and moral turpitude of bankers, 7 regulation in response to, 101–2 as symptomatic of larger economic failures, 32–33 and unsustainable growth, 35 financial liberalization, See market liberalization First National Bank, 101 “fiscal paradises,” 85–86 fiscal policy, 121, 194–96 fiscal responsibility, 237 food industry, 182 forced retirement, 181–82 Ford Motor Company, 120 Fox News, 18, 133, 167, 177 fractional reserve banking, 110–11 fraud, 103, 105, 216, 217 freedom, regulation and, 144 free-rider problem, 67, 155–56, 225–26 Friedman, Milton, 68, 314–15n22 FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt), 58 Fukuyama, Francis, 3, 259n1 full employment, 83, 193–94, 196–97 Galbraith, John K., 67 gambling, by banks, 106–7, 207 Garland, Merrick, 166–67 Gates, Bill, 5, 117 GDP elites and, 22 as false measure of prosperity, 33, 227 financial sector’s increasing portion of, 109 Geithner, Tim, 102 gender discrimination, 41, 200–204 gene patents, 74–75 general welfare, 242–47 generic medicines, 60, 89 genetically modified food (GMO), 88 genetics, 126–27 George, Henry, 206 Germany, 132, 152 gerrymandering, 6, 159, 162 GI Bill, 210 Gilded Age, 12, 246 Glass-Steagall Act, 315n25, 341n39 globalization, 79–100 budget deficits and trade imbalances, 90 collective action to address, 154–55 effect on average citizens, 4, 21 in era of AI, 135 failure to manage, xxvi false premises about, 97–98 and global cooperation in 21st century, 92–97 and intellectual property, 88–89 and internet legal frameworks, 135 and low-skilled workers, 21, 82, 86, 267n39 and market power, 61 pain of, 82–87 and protectionism, 89–92 and 21st-century trade agreements, 87–89 and tax revenue, 84–86 technology vs., 86–87 and trade wars, 93–94 value systems and, 94–97 GMO (genetically modified food), 88 Goebbels, Joseph, 266n35 Goldman Sachs, 104 Google AlphaGo, 315n1 antipoaching conspiracy, 65 and Big Data, 123, 127, 128 conflicts of interest, 124 European restrictions on data use, 129 gaming of tax laws by, 85 market power, 56, 58, 62, 128 and preemptive mergers, 60 Gordon, Robert, 118–19 Gore, Al, 6 government, 138–56 assumption of mortgage risk, 107 Chicago School’s view of, 68–69 debate over role of, 150–52 and educational system, 220 failure of, 148–52 in finance, 115–16 and fractional reserve banking, 111 and Great Depression, 120 hiring of workers by, 196–97 increasing need for, 152–55 interventions during economic downturns, 23, 120 lack of trust in, 151 lending guarantees, 110–11 managing technological change, 122–23 and need for collective action, 140–42 and political reform, xxvi pre-distribution/redistribution by, xxv in progressive agenda, 243–44 public–private partnerships, 142 regulation and rules, 143–48 restoring growth and social justice, 179–208 social protection by, 231 government bonds, 215 Great Britain, wealth from colonialism, 9 Great Depression, xiii, xxii, 13, 23, 120 “great moderation,” 32 Great Recession, xxvi; See also financial crisis (2008) deregulation and, 25 diseases of despair, 42 elites and, 151 employment recovery after, 193 inadequate fiscal stimulus after, 121 as market failure, 23 pace of recovery from, 39–40 productivity growth after, 37 and retirement incomes, 214–15 weak social safety net and, 190 Greenspan, Alan, 112 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 271n4 gross investment, 271n4 growth after 2008 financial crisis, 103 in China, 95 decline since 1980, 35–37 economic agenda for, xxvii failure of financial sector to support, 115 and inequality, 19 international living standard comparisons, 35–37 knowledge and, 183–86 labor force, 181–82 market power as inimical to, 62–64 in post-1970s US economy, 32 restoring, 181–86 taxation and, 25 guaranteed jobs, 196–97 Harvard University, 16 Hastert Rule, 333n31 health inequality in, 41–43 and labor force participation, 182 health care and American exceptionalism, 211–12 improving access to services, 203 public option, 210–11 in UK and Europe, 13 universal access to, 212–13 hedonic pricing, 347n13 higher education, 219–20; See also universities Hispanic Americans, 41 hi-tech companies, 54, 56, 60, 73 Hitler, Adolf, 152, 266n35 Hobbes, Thomas, 12 home ownership, 216–18 hours worked per week, US ranking among developed economies, 36–37 House of Representatives, 6, 159 housing, as barrier to finding new jobs, 186 housing bubble, 21 housing finance, 216–18 human capital index (World Bank), 36 Human Development Index, 36 Human Genome Project, 126 hurricanes, 207 IA (intelligence-assisting) innovations, 119 identity, capitalism’s effect on, xxvi ideology, science replaced by, 20 immigrants/immigration, 16, 181, 185 imports, See globalization; trade wars incarceration, 161, 163, 193, 201, 202 incentive payments for teachers, 201 voting reform and, 162–63 income; See also wages average US pretax income (1974-2014), 33t universal basic income, 190–91 income inequality, 37, 177, 200, 206 income of capital, 53 India, guaranteed jobs in, 196–97 individualism, 139, 225–26 individual mandate, 212, 213 industrial policies, 187 industrial revolution, 9, 12, 264–65n24 inequality; See also income inequality; wealth inequality benefits of reducing, xxiv–xxv and current politics, 246 in early years after WWII, xix economists’ failure to address, 33 education system as perpetuator of, 219 and election of 2016, xix–xxi and excess profits, 49 and financial system design, 198 growth of, xii–xiii, 37–45 in health, 41–43 in opportunity, 44–45 in race, ethnicity, and gender, 40–41 and 2017 tax bill, 236–37 technology’s effect on, 122–23 in 19th and early 20th century, 12–13 20th-century attempts to address, 13–14 tolerance of, 19 infrastructure European Investment Bank and, 195–96 fiscal policy and, 195 government employment and, 196–97 public–private partnerships, 142 returns on investment in, 195, 232 taxation and, 25 and 2017 tax bill, 183 inheritance tax, 20 inherited wealth, 43, 278n38 innovation intellectual property rights and, 74–75 market power and, 57–60, 63–64 net neutrality and, 148 regulation and, 134 slowing pace of, 118–19 and unemployment, 120, 121 innovation economy, 153–54 insecurity, social protection to address, 188–91 Instagram, 70, 73, 124 institutions fragility of, 230–36 in progressive agenda, 245 undermining of, 231–33 insurance companies, 125 Intel, 65 intellectual property rights (IPR) China and, 95–96 globalization and, 88–89, 99 and stifling of innovation, 74–75 and technological change, 122 in trade agreements, 80, 89 intelligence-assisting (IA) innovations, 119 interest rates, 83, 110, 215 intergenerational justice, 204–5 intergenerational transmission of advantage/disadvantage, xxv–xxvi, 199–201, 219 intermediation, 105, 106 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 217 International Monetary Fund, xix internet, 58, 147 Internet Explorer, 58 inversions, 302n10 investment buybacks vs., 109 corporate tax cuts and, 269n44 and intergenerational justice, 204 long-term, 106 weakening by monopoly power, 63 “invisible hand,” 76 iPhone, 139 IPR, See intellectual property rights Ireland, 108 IRS (Internal Revenue Service), 217 Italy, 133 IT sector, 54; See also hi-tech companies Jackson, Andrew, 101, 241 Janus v.


pages: 193 words: 63,618

The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich by Ndongo Sylla

British Empire, carbon footprint, corporate social responsibility, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Doha Development Round, Food sovereignty, global value chain, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, Naomi Klein, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, open economy, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, selection bias, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

The economist and historian Jeffrey Williamson, as well as many of his colleagues, distinguish a first ‘wave’ of globalisation, which they place between 1870 and 1913 and refer to as the ‘age of mass migration’. In contrast, the second ‘wave’ of globalisation would have started in the 1950s and continues to the present. From their point of view, the intervening period (1913–45) would be one of de-globalisation. See for example Williamson (1996). 28. According to Rodrik (2007b: 8), with a 3 per cent increase in their share of the labour force of rich countries, immigrants from the South would enjoy net gains of $265 billion per year. This is considerably higher than gain estimates as part of the Doha round of negotiations ($30 billion according to Rodrik). 29. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are the five countries that reached this target of 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income in 2009 (United Nations, 2010). 162 Sylla T02779 01 text 162 28/11/2013 13:04 notes Conclusion 1.


Global Governance and Financial Crises by Meghnad Desai, Yahia Said

Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency peg, deglobalization, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, German hyperinflation, information asymmetry, knowledge economy, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, moral hazard, Nick Leeson, oil shock, open economy, price mechanism, price stability, Real Time Gross Settlement, rent-seeking, short selling, special drawing rights, structural adjustment programs, Tobin tax, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

The half-century preceding 1914 had witnessed a globalised world with free movement of capital and labour and Gold Standard which meant that except for Great Britain, no other country had monetary sovereignty. Over the period, the cycles in 1864–1914 became more interlinked across the developed countries of the globe and there was a rough regularity about their frequency. In the 1919–39 period the world deglobalised. The free movement of labour came to a stop and the movements of capital became difficult across national barriers. Great Britain lost its hegemony of the world economy and the USA was not yet ready to take it up. The cycles became irregular and uncorrelated. There was an upswing and inflation in the immediate postwar period but by 1922/23 the deflationary phase began in major European economies.


pages: 318 words: 85,824

A Brief History of Neoliberalism by David Harvey

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, creative destruction, crony capitalism, debt deflation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, financial repression, full employment, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, labour market flexibility, land tenure, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, neoliberal agenda, new economy, Pearl River Delta, phenotype, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, The Chicago School, transaction costs, union organizing, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999); see also the Afterword to the paperback edition of Harvey , The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 19. Cited in Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 168–70. 20. S. Amin, ‘Social Movements at the Periphery’, in Wignaraja (ed.), New Social Movements in the South, 76–100. 21. W. Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2002); Bello, Bullard, and Malhotra (eds.), Global Finance; S. George , Another World is Possible IF… (London: Verso, 2003); W. Fisher and T. Ponniah (eds.), Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum (London: Zed Books, 2003); P. Bond, Talk Left Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004); Mertes, A Movement of Movements; Gill, Teetering on the Rim; Brecher, Costello, and Smith, Globalization from Below. 22.

., Capitalism Since World War II: The Making and Breaking of the Long Boom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). Arrighi, G., and Silver, B., Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999). Bales, K., Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Bartholomew, A., and Breakspear, J., ‘Human Rights as Swords of Empire’, Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 2003), 124–45. Bello, W., Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2002). ——Bullard, N., and Malhotra, K. (eds.), Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Markets (London: Zed Books, 2000). Benn, T., The Benn Diaries, 1940–1990, ed. R. Winstone (London: Arrow, 1996). Blyth, M., Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


pages: 312 words: 91,835

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization by Branko Milanovic

"Robert Solow", Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, means of production, mittelstand, moral hazard, Nash equilibrium, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, Paul Samuelson, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, post-industrial society, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, Second Machine Age, seigniorage, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, special economic zone, stakhanovite, trade route, transfer pricing, very high income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

Not only was centrally planned socialism eliminated as a competitor only recently, but nowhere in the world do we now find unfree labor playing an important economic role, as it did until some 150 years ago. Such is the hegemony of capitalism as a worldwide system that even those who are unhappy with it and with rising inequality, whether locally, nationally, or globally, have no realistic alternatives to propose. “Deglobalization” with a return to the “local” is impossible because it would do away with the division of labor, a key factor of economic growth. Surely, those who argue for localism do not wish to propose a major drop in living standards or a Khmer Rouge solution to inequality. Forms of state capitalism, as in Russia and China, do exist, but this is capitalism nevertheless: the private profit motive and private companies are dominant.

See also imperialism; individual colonial powers Commercial Revolution, 65, 69 communism: end of, 3, 6, 123; Piketty on, 94; capital and, 99; mistaken predictions and, 157, 159; Chinese, 179, 180; globalization and, 214 consumption: data sources, 12–13, 16; discrepancies in data and, 16; rich countries and, 39, 197; labor demand and, 64; “mal-distribution of consuming power” and, 96; middle class and, 195, 197; climate change and, 233; as metric, 244n21; Marx on, 251n39. See also scalable jobs convergence. See economic convergence; income convergence, global cosmopolitanism, 141 currencies, 14–15, 236, 239, 244n24, 263n9, 263n11 decolonization, 100 deglobalization, 192 democracy, 7, 164, 189–90, 193–194, 199–203, 210, 255n18. See also global governance Democratic Republic of Congo, 173 demographic forces, 248n23. See also age and aging; marriages; migration; populations, global and national de Soto, Hernando, 221 dictatorships, 99 discoveries, 69 distribution. See Coase theorem; welfare regimes domain exclusion, 150 economic convergence, 5, 48, 132, 161–191, 212–213.


pages: 414 words: 101,285

The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It by Ian Goldin, Mike Mariathasan

"Robert Solow", air freight, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, butterfly effect, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, connected car, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of penicillin, diversification, diversified portfolio, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, energy security, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Gini coefficient, global pandemic, global supply chain, global value chain, global village, income inequality, information asymmetry, Jean Tirole, John Snow's cholera map, Kenneth Rogoff, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, mass immigration, megacity, moral hazard, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, open economy, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, regulatory arbitrage, reshoring, Silicon Valley, six sigma, Stuxnet, supply-chain management, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, Toyota Production System, trade liberalization, transaction costs, uranium enrichment

The recent financial crisis exemplifies the new form of systemic risk that will characterize the coming decades, and the authors provide the first framework for understanding how such risk will function in the twenty-first century. Goldin and Mariathasan demonstrate that systemic risk issues are now endemic everywhere—in supply chains, pandemics, infrastructure, ecology and climate change, economics, and politics. Unless we are better able to address these concerns, they will lead to greater protectionism, xenophobia, nationalism, and, inevitably, deglobalization, rising conflict, and slower growth. The Butterfly Defect shows that mitigating uncertainty and systemic risk in an interconnected world is an essential task for our future.”—Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-691-15470-1 (hardback) 1. Risk management. 2. Crisis management. 3. Globalization. I. Mariathasan, Mike, 1982– II. Title. HD61.G643 2014 658.15’5—dc23 2013039405 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Aldus with Gill Sans display by Princeton Editorial Associates Inc., Scottsdale, Arizona.

Politicians, business people, and civil society have done a bad job in explaining the wide-ranging benefits of international connections and why these connections imply more, not less, joined-up global action. But we face not only a political backlash. We face the real threats posed by systemic risks. Financial crises, pandemics, and cyber and other threats could overwhelm the ties that bind us. Deglobalization and slowing global growth would be the consequences. These would be disasters for the global economy, particularly for poor people, who are always the most vulnerable. Everyone stands to gain through better management of systemic risk. Poor people suffer most when there are shocks. They also have the most to gain through greater connection. This is particularly the case for those who are not yet connected due to their geographical or social isolation.


pages: 382 words: 100,127

The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics by David Goodhart

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, assortative mating, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, borderless world, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, central bank independence, centre right, coherent worldview, corporate governance, credit crunch, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, first-past-the-post, gender pay gap, gig economy, glass ceiling, global supply chain, global village, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, market friction, mass immigration, mittelstand, Neil Kinnock, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, North Sea oil, obamacare, old-boy network, open borders, Peter Singer: altruism, post-industrial society, post-materialism, postnationalism / post nation state, race to the bottom, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, selection bias, shareholder value, Skype, Sloane Ranger, stem cell, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, ultimatum game, upwardly mobile, wages for housework, white flight, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, World Values Survey

This reflected the political settlement of the Thatcher-Reagan era in which the right won the economic argument and the liberal-left won the cultural argument. There are exceptions to this rule, of course: the left did not win the cultural argument so clearly in the US, hence the long ‘culture wars’. And the right may now be partly losing the economic argument as markets are more constrained and the world experiences a limited deglobalisation. This ‘double liberalism’ is the reason for that familiar refrain ‘they are all the same, what’s the point in voting?’ And almost everywhere that convergence left a ‘missing majority’, or at least a substantial minority, of lower income, less well-educated people who remain significantly less liberal than the graduate Anywhere class but still prefer moderately social democratic economic and tax-spend policies and better protection from globalisation.


pages: 524 words: 143,993

The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned--And Have Still to Learn--From the Financial Crisis by Martin Wolf

air freight, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, bonus culture, break the buck, Bretton Woods, business cycle, call centre, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, debt deflation, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, diversification, double entry bookkeeping, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, forward guidance, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, global rebalancing, global reserve currency, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, light touch regulation, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandatory minimum, margin call, market bubble, market clearing, market fragmentation, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, new economy, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, open economy, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, price stability, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, Real Time Gross Settlement, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, Richard Feynman, risk-adjusted returns, risk/return, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Myth of the Rational Market, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, very high income, winner-take-all economy, zero-sum game

This is because financial markets are more integrated and the autonomy of national policy is more limited than elsewhere.10 In practice, the outcome in Europe is likely to be some mixture of the two. The same is also true for the world as a whole, where tension arises between a desire to agree at least a minimum level of common regulatory standards and a parallel desire to preserve domestic regulatory autonomy.11 Such pressure for ‘de-globalization’ may not be limited to finance. The combination of slow growth with widening inequality, higher unemployment, financial instability, so-called ‘currency wars’ and fiscal defaults may yet undermine the political legitimacy of globalization in many other respects. Inevitably, the legacy of the crises includes large-scale institutional changes in many areas of policy, at national, regional and global levels.

Taylor, ‘Financial Crises, Credit Booms and External Imbalances’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16567, December 2010, www.nber.org, and Alan M. Taylor, ‘The Great Leveraging’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18290, August 2012, www.nber.org. 10. Adair Turner, ‘Financial Risk and Regulation: Do we Need More Europe or Less?’, 27 April 2012, Financial Services Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0427-at.shtml. 11. Another example of ‘de-globalization’ is the proposed ring-fencing of domestic retail banking from global investment banking proposed by the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking, of which I was a member. This was set up by the incoming coalition government under the chairmanship of Sir John Vickers. See Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations, September 2011, London, http://bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ICB-Final-Report.pdf, ch. 3.


pages: 497 words: 144,283

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization by Parag Khanna

"Robert Solow", 1919 Motor Transport Corps convoy, 2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, 9 dash line, additive manufacturing, Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, blockchain, borderless world, Boycotts of Israel, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, British Empire, business intelligence, call centre, capital controls, charter city, clean water, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, commoditize, complexity theory, continuation of politics by other means, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, data is the new oil, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, Detroit bankruptcy, digital map, disruptive innovation, diversification, Doha Development Round, edge city, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, energy security, Ethereum, ethereum blockchain, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, family office, Ferguson, Missouri, financial innovation, financial repression, fixed income, forward guidance, global supply chain, global value chain, global village, Google Earth, Hernando de Soto, high net worth, Hyperloop, ice-free Arctic, if you build it, they will come, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, industrial robot, informal economy, Infrastructure as a Service, interest rate swap, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, Isaac Newton, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, John von Neumann, Julian Assange, Just-in-time delivery, Kevin Kelly, Khyber Pass, Kibera, Kickstarter, LNG terminal, low cost airline, low cost carrier, low earth orbit, manufacturing employment, mass affluent, mass immigration, megacity, Mercator projection, Metcalfe’s law, microcredit, mittelstand, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, off grid, offshore financial centre, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, openstreetmap, out of africa, Panamax, Parag Khanna, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, Pearl River Delta, Peter Thiel, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-oil, post-Panamax, private military company, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, race to the bottom, Rana Plaza, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, sharing economy, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, six sigma, Skype, smart cities, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spice trade, Stuxnet, supply-chain management, sustainable-tourism, TaskRabbit, telepresence, the built environment, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, Tim Cook: Apple, trade route, transaction costs, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, urban planning, urban sprawl, WikiLeaks, young professional, zero day

Then came the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of negotiations in 2006, when it was argued that without an agreement on a single overarching global framework of rules, global trade would unwind, retrench, or contract. And most recently with the financial crisis of 2007–8, exports slumped, international lending diminished, and the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism came under attack, all cited as evidence of “de-globalization.” A fourth front of “end of globalization” hyperbole is now under way as American interest rates rise, Chinese growth slows, and cheap energy and advanced manufacturing technologies together enable the near-shoring and automation of production. But I argue that globalization is entering a new golden age. Driven by the confluence of strategic ambitions, new technologies, cheap money, and global migration, globalization continues to widen and deepen in almost every conceivable dimension.

American multinationals have added over two million jobs across Asia and Latin America and cut nearly one million jobs at home, but they have also created many new high-skill jobs domestically in engineering, consulting, and finance.*1 Furthermore, the more jobs and wealth American companies create abroad, the more foreigners buy American goods: U.S. exports to emerging markets doubled from 1990 to 2012. Cutting off American investment (and thus profits) overseas will therefore lead to reduced investment at home too. Remember tug-of-war: Be careful when untangling the rope. Even what looks like de-globalization is actually still globalization. Apple is a perfect example of these complex realities. The Berkeley economist Enrico Moretti estimates that Apple is substantially responsible for sixty thousand jobs in Silicon Valley, only twelve thousand of which are employees in its Cupertino headquarters. “In Silicon Valley,” Moretti claims, “high-tech jobs are the cause of local prosperity, and the doctors, lawyers, roofers and yoga teachers are the effect.”2 What appears a thriving community is primarily the result of corporate innovation and global growth—not public investment.


pages: 221 words: 55,901

The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon

Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, Pareto efficiency, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus

If the question itself is simple, the answer is anything but, primarily because it involves the interplay between the global economy as a whole and individual national economies, particularly those of rich countries. For example, if we believe that the increase in national inequalities is due above all to the globalization of trade, it would be tempting Policies for a Fairer Globalization 147 to try to remedy it by taking protectionist measures. Several figures in France and elsewhere in the world have come out in favor of this policy. Some have even advocated a policy of “de-­globalization.”1 The problem is that even if such a policy did lead to a reduction in inequalities in some countries—which, as we will see later on, is itself doubtful—it would also be a hindrance to the development of other countries and would ultimately slow down the reduction of poverty in the world. This is exactly the kind of trade-­off that a community that cares about global well-­ being must avoid.


pages: 504 words: 143,303

Why We Can't Afford the Rich by Andrew Sayer

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Albert Einstein, anti-globalists, asset-backed security, banking crisis, banks create money, basic income, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, collective bargaining, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demand response, don't be evil, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, G4S, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, income inequality, information asymmetry, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, job automation, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, land value tax, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, means of production, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, neoliberal agenda, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, patent troll, payday loans, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, predatory finance, price stability, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus, wealth creators, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, working poor, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Certainly we need to raise the incomes of the poorest in the rich countries and support growth in poor countries, but if we want to stand any chance of stopping global warming, rich countries have to consume less, starting with the richest – the least green of all. Hence the necessity of contraction and convergence. We are told by politicians that globalisation is the future – ever-increasing integration of different economies, more imports and exports, more travel, both freight and passenger. The total distance travelled by all the parts in a computer or car may be equivalent to the distance from the earth to the moon. The politicians are wrong: de-globalisation is necessary for a sustainable future. Unless and until we can devise low-carbon forms of travel, which means, in effect, an alternative to petroleum-based fuel, there will have to be much less of it, and much more local production. And in more localised economies we are much less likely to harm the environment because any damage and waste are less likely to be out of sight and mind. A new geography Cutting back on travel – both freight and passenger, including commuting – would change the geography of our societies, both within and between countries.


pages: 262 words: 83,548

The End of Growth by Jeff Rubin

Ayatollah Khomeini, Bakken shale, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business cycle, call centre, carbon footprint, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, decarbonisation, deglobalization, energy security, eurozone crisis, Exxon Valdez, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, flex fuel, full employment, ghettoisation, global supply chain, Hans Island, happiness index / gross national happiness, housing crisis, hydraulic fracturing, illegal immigration, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Jane Jacobs, Kickstarter, McMansion, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, new economy, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, Ponzi scheme, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, uranium enrichment, urban planning, urban sprawl, women in the workforce, working poor, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

I can’t say I was surprised when the bank’s lawyers sent down word four months later that permission would be denied. Economists at big banks do publish books, but most often the subject matter is along the lines of how your retirement savings can outperform the stock market. Mine was about how triple-digit oil prices were going to reverse globalization. CIBC doesn’t sell oil, and it sure doesn’t sell de-globalization. Looking back, I realize that McCaughey was only doing his job, which was to protect the bank’s interests. But I didn’t write the book so that it wouldn’t get read. I’d been preaching its themes to whoever would listen at CIBC for years. It was time to take the message to a broader audience. By the time I stepped away from the job, CIBC had much bigger things to worry about than my literary ambitions.


pages: 252 words: 13,581

Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City by Tony Roshan Samara

conceptual framework, deglobalization, ghettoisation, global village, illegal immigration, late capitalism, moral panic, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, structural adjustment programs, unemployed young men, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, working poor

For a discussion of the rise of urban neoliberalism in the United States, see Alice O’Conner, “The Privatized City: The Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the Conservative Counterrevolution in New York,” Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (January 2008): 333–53; Jamie Peck, “Liberating the City: Between New York and New Orleans, Urban Geography 27, no. 8 (2006): 681–713. 23.╯Walden Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2005). 24.╯Bryn Hughes, “The ‘Fundamental’ Threat of (Neo)Liberal Democracy: An Unlikely Source of Legitimation for Political Violence, Dialogue 3, no. 2 (2005): 43–85. http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/3-2-4.pdf (accessed November 11, 2010); Leys, Market Driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest; Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999). 25.╯Walden Bello, “The Post-Washington Consensus: The Unraveling of a Doctrine of Development” (Focus on the Global South, October 18, 2008). http://focusweb.org/the-post-washington-dissensus.html?


Future Files: A Brief History of the Next 50 Years by Richard Watson

Albert Einstein, bank run, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Black Swan, call centre, carbon footprint, cashless society, citizen journalism, commoditize, computer age, computer vision, congestion charging, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, deglobalization, digital Maoism, disintermediation, epigenetics, failed state, financial innovation, Firefox, food miles, future of work, global pandemic, global supply chain, global village, hive mind, industrial robot, invention of the telegraph, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, knowledge economy, lateral thinking, linked data, low cost airline, low skilled workers, M-Pesa, mass immigration, Northern Rock, peak oil, pensions crisis, precision agriculture, prediction markets, Ralph Nader, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, RFID, Richard Florida, self-driving car, speech recognition, telepresence, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Turing test, Victor Gruen, white flight, women in the workforce, Zipcar

Regardless of that, ordinary voters will demand it in the future and opportunistic politicians will pledge to deliver it. Obvious implications will include a focus on green and community issues and various promises of free time and family-friendly policies. Of course, this trend could go out of the window the moment there’s a flu pandemic, major war or economic downturn. Global or national? Another wildcard is globalization, or perhaps more accurately de-globalization. While most people assume that globalization is here to stay, I’d argue that this is far from certain. Globalization will probably last for at least another decade or two but there are a number of worrying signs. First, the rise of China and India could result in economic protectionism in regions like the US and Europe, putting a few speed-bumps in the road to further globalization. It’s interesting to note that in 1990 there were 50 regional trade agreements around the world but by 2005 there were 250.


pages: 471 words: 109,267

The Verdict: Did Labour Change Britain? by Polly Toynbee, David Walker

banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Geldof, Boris Johnson, call centre, central bank independence, congestion charging, Corn Laws, Credit Default Swap, decarbonisation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Etonian, failed state, first-past-the-post, Frank Gehry, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, high net worth, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, market bubble, mass immigration, millennium bug, moral panic, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, Right to Buy, shareholder value, Skype, smart meter, stem cell, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, University of East Anglia, working-age population, Y2K

One reason why unemployment did not rise as sharply in the recession as in previous downturns was the public sector. In the three months to October 2009, for example, an extra 23,000 NHS jobs pushed up employment opportunities, in many cases for women. Another academic study, looking at Dundee – the jam and jute city once famously dependent on international trade – remarked that with four out of ten jobs in the public sector, the city had been ‘de-globalized’, making its regional economy both less open and more stable. Labour’s trick was to detach living standards from incomes. During stable, low-inflationary growth, people readily took on more debt while running down their savings. When nearly seven out of ten households owned their own homes, property inflation created a widespread sense of being better off, with added ease of borrowing. The wealth illusion depended on the banks lending on higher multiples of income to finance consumption.


pages: 424 words: 115,035

How Will Capitalism End? by Wolfgang Streeck

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Airbnb, basic income, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, Clayton Christensen, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, David Brooks, David Graeber, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, en.wikipedia.org, eurozone crisis, failed state, financial deregulation, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, fixed income, full employment, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, Google Glasses, haute cuisine, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, late capitalism, liberal capitalism, market bubble, means of production, moral hazard, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, open borders, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, post-industrial society, private sector deleveraging, profit maximization, profit motive, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, savings glut, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, sovereign wealth fund, The Future of Employment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transaction costs, Uber for X, upwardly mobile, Vilfredo Pareto, winner-take-all economy, Wolfgang Streeck

If there is nothing in supranational ‘Europe’ that could provide for the sort of social cohesion and solidarity and governability that would be required, of the kind that was over two centuries more or less successfully established in European nation states – if all there is at supranational level are the Junckers and Draghis and their fellow financial functionaries – then the general answer is that rather than, like latter-day Don Quixotes, trying to extend the scale of democracy to that of capitalist markets, to do what you can to reduce the scale of the latter to fit the former. Bringing capitalism back into the ambit of democratic government, and thereby saving the latter from extinction, means de-globalizing capitalism; it is as simple and as difficult as that. There is no denying that this would be a huge agenda, and in certain respects, perhaps, also a costly one, with no guarantee of success. But it would at least be a goal worth fighting for. Restoring embedded democracy means re-embedding capitalism. In this context, thinking about a monetary regime less destructive of democracy than the pitiful monstrosity that is EMU would be a task that would justify the sweat of the best and brightest.


pages: 463 words: 115,103

Head, Hand, Heart: Why Intelligence Is Over-Rewarded, Manual Workers Matter, and Caregivers Deserve More Respect by David Goodhart

active measures, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, assortative mating, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, call centre, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, centre right, computer age, corporate social responsibility, COVID-19, Covid-19, David Attenborough, David Brooks, deglobalization, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, desegregation, deskilling, different worldview, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Etonian, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Flynn Effect, Frederick Winslow Taylor, future of work, gender pay gap, gig economy, glass ceiling, illegal immigration, income inequality, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, new economy, Nicholas Carr, oil shock, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, pink-collar, post-industrial society, post-materialism, postindustrial economy, precariat, reshoring, Richard Florida, Scientific racism, Skype, social intelligence, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, superintelligent machines, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thorstein Veblen, twin studies, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, wages for housework, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, young professional

There are several ways in which the crisis will enable, in the language of this book, Hand (manual work) and Heart (care work) to claim back some of the prestige and reward they have lost to Head (cognitive work) in recent decades. At the most macro level a new version of globalization is now possible, summed up in one of the wittier slogans of the crisis: workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your supply chains. Full-scale deglobalization is highly undesirable and is not going to happen; we have learned the lessons of 1930s protectionism. But some restraints on what economist Dani Rodrik has called “hyper-globalization”—the globalization that has favored large corporations, financial markets, and mobile skilled professionals—can be put in place. The crisis has been the hour of the nation state and national social contracts at least in Europe, though in the United States it is the relative weakness of the central state that has been exposed.


pages: 421 words: 120,332

The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future by Laurence C. Smith

Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, clean water, Climategate, colonial rule, deglobalization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, energy security, flex fuel, G4S, global supply chain, Google Earth, guest worker program, Hans Island, hydrogen economy, ice-free Arctic, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of agriculture, invisible hand, land tenure, Martin Wolf, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, New Urbanism, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, Pearl River Delta, purchasing power parity, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, side project, Silicon Valley, smart grid, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, standardized shipping container, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Y2K

It is even conceivable that well-meaning carbon-reduction policies, by penalizing emissions by different amounts in different countries, could trigger tariff wars if countries respond by imposing border taxes to recoup their losses.515 A second possibility is the rising cost of oil. Global trade is fueled by cheap energy, and container ships and long-haul cargo trucks cannot readily be electrified like passenger cars as described in Chapter 3. And as environmental damages, too, are increasingly priced into production costs in manufacturing countries like China, the apparent profit margin of a global versus local trade network will narrow. A deglobalized world with extremely high energy prices might be an oddly familiar one, with local farmers feeding compact walking cities, a return to domestic manufacturing, and airplane travel afforded only by rich elites. One could even imagine a reversal of the urbanization trend as farming returns to being a labor-intensive industry, no longer propped by cheap hydrocarbon for fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides.


pages: 471 words: 124,585

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World by Niall Ferguson

Admiral Zheng, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, Atahualpa, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Black Swan, Black-Scholes formula, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial exploitation, commoditize, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, deglobalization, diversification, diversified portfolio, double entry bookkeeping, Edmond Halley, Edward Glaeser, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, German hyperinflation, Hernando de Soto, high net worth, hindsight bias, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Isaac Newton, iterative process, John Meriwether, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour mobility, Landlord’s Game, liberal capitalism, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, negative equity, Nelson Mandela, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Parag Khanna, pension reform, price anchoring, price stability, principal–agent problem, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit motive, quantitative hedge fund, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, seigniorage, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, stocks for the long run, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Bayes, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transaction costs, undersea cable, value at risk, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War

On 19 October 1921, for example, the Chinese government declared bankruptcy, and proceeded to default on nearly all China’s external debts. It was a story repeated all over the world, from Shanghai to Santiago, from Moscow to Mexico City. By the end of the 1930s, most states in the world, including those that retained political freedoms, had imposed restrictions on trade, migration and investment as a matter of course. Some achieved near-total economic self-sufficiency (autarky), the ideal of a de-globalized society. Consciously or unconsciously, all governments applied in peacetime the economic restrictions that had first been imposed between 1914 and 1918. The origins of the First World War became clearly visible - as soon as it had broken out. Only then did the Bolshevik leader Lenin see that war was an inevitable consequence of imperialist rivalries. Only then did American liberals grasp that secret diplomacy and the tangle of European alliances were the principal causes of conflict.


pages: 497 words: 123,718

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins

addicted to oil, airline deregulation, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bob Geldof, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, corporate governance, corporate personhood, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, financial deregulation, financial independence, full employment, global village, high net worth, land reform, large denomination, liberal capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transatlantic slave trade, transfer pricing, union organizing, Washington Consensus, working-age population, Yom Kippur War

America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. Balanyá, Belén, Brid Brennan, Olivier Hoedeman, Satoko Kishimoto and Philipp Terhorst. Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World, 2nd edn. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory, March 2005. Bello, Walden. Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy. London: Zed, 2004. Black, Maggie. The No-Nonsense Guide to International Development. London: Verso/New Internationalist, 2004. Brecher, Jeremy, and Tim Costello. Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up. Boston: South End, 1998. Chang, Ha-Joon, and Ilene Grabel, Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual.


pages: 756 words: 120,818

The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalization by Michael O’sullivan

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, Airbnb, algorithmic trading, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, Black Swan, blockchain, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, business process, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, cloud computing, continuation of politics by other means, corporate governance, credit crunch, cryptocurrency, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, distributed ledger, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, fixed income, Geoffrey West, Santa Fe Institute, Gini coefficient, global value chain, housing crisis, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), knowledge economy, liberal world order, Long Term Capital Management, longitudinal study, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, pattern recognition, Peace of Westphalia, performance metric, private military company, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, Sinatra Doctrine, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, special drawing rights, supply-chain management, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, tulip mania, Valery Gerasimov, Washington Consensus

Flows within China are dynamic and are perhaps more managed than before, but flows of foreigners into China are miniscule by comparison to other countries, and China has only recently established an agency (the State Immigration Administration created at the 2018 Party Congress) to cultivate inward flows. So as China has become a major pole, it has become less globalized and arguably is contributing to the trend toward deglobalization. On a broader scale, without picking on individual countries, we can measure the extent to which the world is becoming multipolar by examining aggregate trends in trade, GDP, foreign direct investment, government budget size, and population. All of these are much less concentrated, or more dispersed, than they used to be, and increasingly they are collecting around several poles. For example, in the five years from 2012 to 2017, total foreign direct investment into Australia from China increased at a rate of 21 percent per annum, compared to 6 percent from the United States to Australia, suggesting that Asian investment in Australia is picking up.6 Several trends show that population flows are becoming more regional.


pages: 484 words: 136,735

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis by Anatole Kaletsky

"Robert Solow", bank run, banking crisis, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business cycle, buy and hold, Carmen Reinhart, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, global rebalancing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, market design, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Nelson Mandela, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, paradox of thrift, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, peak oil, pets.com, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, statistical model, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, too big to fail, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

But as these countries move back toward full employment, the rebalancing of global growth will make them more prone to inflation than they were in the precrisis years. From this point of view, the sooner the world economy can be rebalanced, eliminating excessive trade surpluses and deficits worldwide, the smaller the risk of dangerous inflationary pressures. Unfortunately, as discussed previously in this chapter, the prospects of such a global rebalancing occurring quickly and smoothly do not seem bright. Protectionism and deglobalization therefore could create the conditions for stagflation to return. Big Government From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, the world experienced a large upsurge of government spending and employment. This was clearly one of the major causes of stagflation. Whatever one’s political outlook about the virtues or vices of public spending, there can be no denying that government-administered activities are generally insensitive to competition.


pages: 650 words: 203,191

After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405 by John Darwin

agricultural Revolution, Atahualpa, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, Columbian Exchange, cuban missile crisis, deglobalization, deindustrialization, European colonialism, failed state, Francisco Pizarro, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Malacca Straits, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, price mechanism, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade

But governments and rulers also had to agree to permit free(ish) trade – or any trade at all. Politics and geopolitics were a vital part of the equation. The outbreak of wars and their unpredictable course could shatter one equilibrium and impose another. Thus the great expansion of trade in the late nineteenth century and the kinds of globalization it helped to promote came to a shuddering halt with the First World War. After 1929, ‘deglobalization’ set in with catastrophic results. Europe’s original breakthrough to a position of primacy in its global relations is much better seen as the unexpected result of a revolution in Eurasia than as the outcome of a steady advance in Columbus’s footsteps. The appropriate imagery is not of rivers or tides, but of earthquakes and floods. The second assumption is that we must set Europe’s age of expansion firmly in its Eurasian context.


pages: 1,088 words: 228,743

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards by Antti Ilmanen

Andrei Shleifer, asset allocation, asset-backed security, availability heuristic, backtesting, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bernie Madoff, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, business cycle, buy and hold, buy low sell high, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, commoditize, commodity trading advisor, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, debt deflation, deglobalization, delta neutral, demand response, discounted cash flows, disintermediation, diversification, diversified portfolio, dividend-yielding stocks, equity premium, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Flash crash, framing effect, frictionless, frictionless market, G4S, George Akerlof, global reserve currency, Google Earth, high net worth, hindsight bias, Hyman Minsky, implied volatility, income inequality, incomplete markets, index fund, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, laissez-faire capitalism, law of one price, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, margin call, market bubble, market clearing, market friction, market fundamentalism, market microstructure, mental accounting, merger arbitrage, mittelstand, moral hazard, Myron Scholes, negative equity, New Journalism, oil shock, p-value, passive investing, Paul Samuelson, performance metric, Ponzi scheme, prediction markets, price anchoring, price stability, principal–agent problem, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, random walk, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, risk/return, riskless arbitrage, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, savings glut, selection bias, Sharpe ratio, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, statistical arbitrage, statistical model, stochastic volatility, stocks for the long run, survivorship bias, systematic trading, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, too big to fail, transaction costs, tulip mania, value at risk, volatility arbitrage, volatility smile, working-age population, Y2K, yield curve, zero-coupon bond, zero-sum game

Source: Haver Analytics. 27.3 THE NEXT 20 YEARS The shadow of the crisis Many of the trends listed above contributed to the 2007–2008 financial crisis; and their reversals are, in part, consequences of the crisis. In this spirit, PIMCO’s Bill Gross and Mohamed El-Erian characterize the post-crisis years as the “new normal” environment of slower economic growth and greater government involvement, in which de-leveraging, de-globalization, and re-regulation are key features. Like many others, I expected the crisis to have a long-lasting impact on this generation’s risk appetite—echoing that of the conservative “depression babies”—but the sharp risky asset rally in 2009 and early 2010 suggests that the lessons were not very memorable. The mother of all stimulus efforts succeeded in reviving animal spirits in 2009. Asset reflation was the key policy for pulling the economy back from the edge of the precipice.


pages: 903 words: 235,753

The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty by Benjamin H. Bratton

1960s counterculture, 3D printing, 4chan, Ada Lovelace, additive manufacturing, airport security, Alan Turing: On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Amazon Web Services, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Benevolent Dictator For Life (BDFL), Berlin Wall, bioinformatics, bitcoin, blockchain, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, call centre, carbon footprint, carbon-based life, Cass Sunstein, Celebration, Florida, charter city, clean water, cloud computing, connected car, corporate governance, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, dark matter, David Graeber, deglobalization, dematerialisation, disintermediation, distributed generation, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, Eratosthenes, Ethereum, ethereum blockchain, facts on the ground, Flash crash, Frank Gehry, Frederick Winslow Taylor, future of work, Georg Cantor, gig economy, global supply chain, Google Earth, Google Glasses, Guggenheim Bilbao, High speed trading, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, industrial robot, information retrieval, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), intermodal, Internet of things, invisible hand, Jacob Appelbaum, Jaron Lanier, Joan Didion, John Markoff, Joi Ito, Jony Ive, Julian Assange, Khan Academy, liberal capitalism, lifelogging, linked data, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, Masdar, McMansion, means of production, megacity, megastructure, Menlo Park, Minecraft, MITM: man-in-the-middle, Monroe Doctrine, Network effects, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, packet switching, PageRank, pattern recognition, peak oil, peer-to-peer, performance metric, personalized medicine, Peter Eisenman, Peter Thiel, phenotype, Philip Mirowski, Pierre-Simon Laplace, place-making, planetary scale, RAND corporation, recommendation engine, reserve currency, RFID, Robert Bork, Sand Hill Road, self-driving car, semantic web, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Slavoj Žižek, smart cities, smart grid, smart meter, social graph, software studies, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Startup school, statistical arbitrage, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, Stuxnet, Superbowl ad, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, the built environment, The Chicago School, the scientific method, Torches of Freedom, transaction costs, Turing complete, Turing machine, Turing test, undersea cable, universal basic income, urban planning, Vernor Vinge, Washington Consensus, web application, Westphalian system, WikiLeaks, working poor, Y Combinator

For their part, Schmidt and Cohen also warn against “Internet balkanization” whereby authoritarian state actors (China, Russia, Iran, federations of Sunni states, Texas, and so on) build virtual borders around their citizens, keeping them trapped in a closed bubble of sanctioned concepts, and sheltered from the enlightening waters of the global Internet provided by open platforms, such as Google. Under this deglobalization, the cosmopolitan potential of the Google Cloud model would be subverted and inverted by local “traditional states” jealous of their citizens’ wandering attention. They explain the dynamic of Cloud versus state in the gentlest possible terms for a Western audience. The negative scenarios drawn include alternative DNS (Domain Name System) addressing systems allowing any state bloc to contain its own map of the online world, separate from others, and in principle to wipe other locations off their particular map.