liberal world order

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pages: 281 words: 69,107

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order by Bruno Maçães

active measures, Admiral Zheng, autonomous vehicles, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, cloud computing, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, different worldview, Donald Trump, energy security, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global supply chain, global value chain, industrial cluster, industrial robot, Internet of things, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, liberal world order, Malacca Straits, one-China policy, Pearl River Delta, smart cities, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, trade liberalization, trade route, zero-sum game

In the first, China is gradually integrated into the liberal world order. Its political model converges with that of Western liberal democracies, even as it continues to show some distinctive traits. Its economy grows, reaching parity with the United States and approaching Western standards of living. The two countries effectively rule the world economy together, but on other dimensions of global power—political, military, cultural—China does not attempt to overturn American hegemony. In the second scenario, China replaces the United States as the center of global power, but everything else remains more or less the same. The Chinese political and economic model converges with Western patterns—but less drastically than in the first scenario—and, more importantly, the liberal world order survives unscathed: multilateral institutions, open trade, international cooperation on common challenges and even some form of individual and community rights.

We abandoned the opportunity and the idea was also dropped by Beijing. China has become ever more entrenched inside Europe and the question at present is whether and how European countries can regain some measure of control over the mechanisms of Chinese influence. As a recent report puts it, China remains convinced that it is Europe which stands at risk of leaving itself stranded in a world where even the United States may be moving away from the liberal world order. Increasingly isolated, the European Union will try to avoid conflict at all costs. Europe will have to come around to the essential goals and values of the Belt and Road or face isolation, not the reverse. As the initiative is gradually implemented, the EU’s ability to shape it in a particular direction will tend to disappear.13 Geographically, the sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe with which China has been developing closer ties form the last link in the complex future network linking Asia and Europe.

Instead of integrating into the existing world order, China could be creating a separate economic bloc, with different dominant companies and technologies, and governed by rules, institutions, and trade patterns dictated by Beijing.26 A balance between China and the United States may take place within the framework of common values and principles or it may be organized around fundamental differences on the question of the world order. Increasingly, it seems that Chinese leaders regard the ability to break with the liberal world order as a measure of their success and the Belt and Road as the main tool to bring about an alternative vision. Convergence was a powerful idea, perhaps the most powerful foreign policy idea of the last three decades. As Thomas Wright puts it, everyone or almost everyone believed that as countries embraced globalization their political systems would become more liberal and democratic. “Citizens of other nations believed it, too, including many Russians, Chinese, Indians, and Brazilians.


pages: 86 words: 26,489

This America: The Case for the Nation by Jill Lepore

Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, desegregation, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, immigration reform, liberal world order, mass immigration

Over that same stretch of time, the United States waged wars of conquest across the continent, fell into a civil war, fought two world wars, and entered a cold war, while a people held in bondage fought for their emancipation only to face a legal regime of segregation and a vigilante campaign of terrorism, leading to a decades-long struggle for civil rights, even as the United States became the leader of a liberal world order. If American historians didn’t always succeed in affirming a common history during these tumultuous years—and they didn’t—they nevertheless engaged in the struggle, offering appraisals and critiques of national aims and ends, advancing arguments, fostering debate, defending democracy, and celebrating, often lyrically, the beauty of the land, the inventiveness of the people, and the vitality of American ideals.

It was also the last of its kind. If love of the nation had driven American historians to the study of the past in the nineteenth century, hatred for nationalism drove American historians away from it in the second half of the twentieth century. That nationalism is a contrivance, an artifice, a fiction, had long been clear. After the Second World War, even as Roosevelt was helping to establish what came to be called the liberal world order, internationalists began predicting the end of the nation-state, Harvard political scientist Rupert Emerson declaring “that the nation and the nation-state are anachronisms in the atomic age.” By the 1960s, an era marked by a rising tide of anti-Americanism, the nation-state looked rather worse than an anachronism. “We don’t even have a country,” a young black man in San Francisco said to James Baldwin in 1963.


pages: 192

Kicking Awaythe Ladder by Ha-Joon Chang

Asian financial crisis, business cycle, central bank independence, clean water, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, fear of failure, income inequality, income per capita, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, land reform, liberal world order, moral hazard, open economy, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, short selling, Simon Kuznets, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, Washington Consensus

Through such policies, which unleashed the entrepreneurial energy of the nation, it overtook interventionist France, its main competitor at the time, establishing itself as the supreme world economic power. Britain was then able to play the role of the architect and hegemon of a new 'Liberal' world economic order, particularly once it had abandoned its deplorable agricultural protection (the Corn Laws) and other remnants of old mercantilist protectionist measures in 1846. In its quest for this Liberal world order, Britain's ultimate weapon was its economic success based on a free-market/free-trade system; this made other countries realize the limitations of their mercantilist policies and start to adopt free (or at least freer) trade from around 1860. However, Britain was also greatly helped in its project by the works of its classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who theoretically proved the superiority of laissez-faire policy, in particular free trade.

According to Willy de Clercq, the European Commissioner for External Economic Relations during the early days of the Uruguay Round (1985-9): Only as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time [in the late nineteenth century].2 This Liberal world order, perfected around 1870, was based on: laissezfaire industrial policies at home; low barriers to the international flows of goods, capital and labour; and the macroeconomic stability, both nationally and internationally, which was guaranteed by the Gold Standard and the principle of balanced budgets. A period of unprecedented prosperity followed. Unfortunately, according to this story, things started to go wrong with the onset of the First World War.

Nowadays, some economists even believe that the Great Depression was caused primarily by these tariffs'. 3 The likes of Germany and Japan erected high trade barriers and also started creating powerful cartels, which were closely linked with fascism and these countries' external aggression in the following decades.4 The world free trade system finally ended in 1932, when Britain, hitherto its champion, succumbed to temptation and reintroduced tariffs. The resulting contraction and instability in the world economy, and then the Second World War, destroyed the last remnants of the first Liberal world order. After the Second World War, so the story goes, some significant progress was made in trade liberalization through the early GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) talks. However, dirigiste approaches to economic management dominated the policy-making scene until the 1970s in the developed world, and until the early 1980s in developing countries (as well as the Communist world until its collapse in 1989).


State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century by Francis Fukuyama

Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, centre right, corporate governance, demand response, Doha Development Round, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Hernando de Soto, information asymmetry, liberal world order, Live Aid, Nick Leeson, Pareto efficiency, Potemkin village, price stability, principal–agent problem, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, Westphalian system

The Contested Role of the State It is safe to say that politics in the twentieth century were heavily shaped by controversies over the appropriate size and strength of the state. The century began with a liberal world order presided over by the world’s leading liberal state, Great Britain. The scope of state activity was not terribly broad in Britain or any of the other leading European powers, outside of the military realm, and in the United States, it was even narrower. There were no income taxes, poverty programs, or food safety regulations. As the century proceeded through war, revolution, depression, and war again, that liberal world order crumbled, and the minimalist liberal state was replaced throughout much of the world by a much more highly centralized and active one. One stream of development lead to what Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965) labeled the “totalitarian” state, which tried to abolish the whole of civil society and subordinate the remaining atomized individuals to its own political ends.


pages: 283 words: 87,166

Reaching for Utopia: Making Sense of an Age of Upheaval by Jason Cowley

anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, centre right, Charles Lindbergh, coherent worldview, Corn Laws, corporate governance, crony capitalism, David Brooks, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, Etonian, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, illegal immigration, liberal world order, Neil Kinnock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Right to Buy, Robert Mercer, Ronald Reagan, University of East Anglia

Because that will tell us a lot about what they’re prepared to concede in order to keep access to the single market.’ * * * Blair says that he has never met Donald Trump, although he knows his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, the real estate multimillionaire. Trump’s venality, belligerence, isolationist rhetoric and narrow definition of the national interest has alarmed the Anglo-American foreign policy establishment, which considers Trump to be a clear and present danger to the rules-based liberal world order. The urgent challenge facing the West in an age of intensifying nationalism, great power rivalry and demagogic plutocracy will be to hold together the alliance structure that has defined the world for the past seventy years. Under Trump’s presidency, the political scientist Robert Kagan has written, the US is likely to retreat into ‘national solipsism’. It could be much worse than that, but Blair’s response to Trump’s victory is to invoke realpolitik.

How does it feel to have spent three decades on the back benches pursuing various radical and fringe causes unconstrained by the usual career considerations or by the discipline of collective responsibility – only to find yourself in late middle age becoming the accidental leader of a great national political party at a time of profound crisis for the left? As Martin Jacques, the former editor of Marxism Today, put it to me, Corbyn has unlocked something long repressed on the left. His consistency, his uncompromising socialism and his hostility to American power and the liberal world order have inspired many who turned away from Labour after the Iraq War to re-engage with politics. He has awakened, too, the interest of young people who are angry about entrenched intergenerational inequalities of wealth. Why, in the era of the hipster beard, even the facial hair is working for him. But Corbyn is also an epiphenomenon: his election to the leadership is a symptom rather than the cause of Labour’s malaise, as well as more generally of the rejection of mainstream social democracy and what Tony Blair calls ‘muscular progressive centrism’ by voters throughout Europe.

The speech was misread by some at first as a statement of classic Tory foreign policy restraint and retreat. It was not. The speech made clear that her foreign policy would not be amoral or ethically neutral. Nor would it be ‘idealist’ or universalist, as Blair’s was. Rather, it would be cautiously ‘realist’: she reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to free trade, to multilateral institutions such as NATO and to the rules-based liberal world order, but conceded the limits of Western liberalism, which, she said, cannot be exported or imposed by military intervention. May and her advisers understand that liberal values are not absolutes but practices that evolve over a long time and can easily be disrupted, as is happening in Trump’s America. These values cannot be merely dropped like bombs on foreign lands, as Blair and Cameron seemed to believe.


Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism by Quinn Slobodian

Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, invisible hand, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mercator projection, Mont Pelerin Society, Norbert Wiener, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Pearl River Delta, Philip Mirowski, price mechanism, quantitative easing, random walk, rent control, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, special economic zone, statistical model, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, theory of mind, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck, zero-sum game

“Over, ­under and beside the state-­political borders of what appeared to be a purely po­liti­cal international law between states,” he wrote, “spread a f­ree, i.e. non-­state sphere of economy permeating every­thing: a global economy.” 44 Schmitt meant the doubled world as something negative, an impingement on the full exercise of national sovereignty. But neoliberals felt he had offered the best description of the world they wanted to conserve. Wilhelm Röpke, who taught in Geneva for nearly thirty years, believed that exactly this division would be the basis for a liberal world order. The ideal neoliberal order would maintain the balance between the two global spheres through an enforceable world law, creating a “minimum of constitutional order” and a “separation of the state-­ I n t r o d u ctio n 11 public sphere from the private domain.” 45 In a lecture he delivered at the Acad­emy of International Law at The Hague in 1955, Röpke emphasized the importance of the division while also pointing to its paradox.

He felt that adherence to the gold standard and the f­ ree movement of capital and goods had acted before 1914 as “a sort of unwritten ordre public international, a secularized Res Publica Christiana, A W o r l d of Rac e s 155 which for that reason spread all over the globe,” resulting in a “po­liti­cal and moral integration of the world.”50 As one scholar points out, the system relied as much on “informal constraints, that is, extralegal standards, conventions and moral codes of be­hav­ior” as on national laws.51 In Röpke’s view, membership in international society was synonymous with being a responsible actor in the f­ree market. The liberal world order, the heir of a Christian order, was defined as a system of formally ungoverned economic expectations and modes of interaction—it was a community of values, which individual economies could both join and leave, but which supranational institutions could not legislate into existence. Peripheral to Röpke’s account of the era before 1914 as the “glorious sunny day of the western world” was the fact that the nineteenth ­century was also the era of high imperialism, when much of the earth’s territory was partitioned among the Eu­ro­pean powers.52 What was to be done, then, in the postwar world, when both the religious basis of international society had been lost and the community of “the West” was splintered by decolonization?

Streissler (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 142. https://­mises​.­org​/­library​/­economics​-­colour​-­bar; W. H. Hutt to F. A. Hayek, June 21, 1948, Hayek Papers, box 76. W. H. Hutt, The Economics of the Color Bar (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964). F. A. Hayek, “Internationaler Rufmord,” Politische Studien, special issue no. 1 (1978): 45. On the escalation of criticism, see Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). A Special Committee on Apartheid was formed in the UN in 1963. Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International ­Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 60. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 124.


pages: 287 words: 95,152

The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order by Bruno Macaes

active measures, Berlin Wall, British Empire, computer vision, Deng Xiaoping, different worldview, digital map, Donald Trump, energy security, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global value chain, illegal immigration, intermodal, iterative process, land reform, liberal world order, Malacca Straits, mass immigration, megacity, open borders, Parag Khanna, savings glut, scientific worldview, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, speech recognition, trade liberalization, trade route, Transnistria, young professional, zero-sum game, éminence grise

Significantly, even when the European Union expresses the wish to treat Russia as an equal partner this means something entirely different from what the Russian leadership understands by it. For Europeans it means that Russia will subscribe to the same values and rules that are accepted in Europe, something notably distinct from what Moscow actually demands: sharing the power to create or set the rules at the heart of the world order.20 Russia does not want to replace the liberal world order with a world without rules, but it does believe that such a world is the natural state of mankind and, therefore, that chaos is only to be avoided by the creative exercise of power by a strong sovereign. This is the case for international affairs no less than for domestic politics. Chaos is never completely left behind. It continues to exist just beneath the veneer of civilization and the role of the sovereign consists in its proper management, so that it does not break up to the surface.

What was remarkable about the Brexit referendum was that the country which had invented free trade and taken it to the four corners of the world was now refusing to be part of the largest and freest economic bloc ever created. As for Trump, he has come to symbolize a precipitous retreat from the previous American foreign policy consensus. At times he seems to want to jettison the existing liberal world order and replace it with something else, defined around a strong national idea and appealing to a world of cut-throat competition. He has criticized a political culture that prizes the diffusion of power, in the belief that without a strong state, citizens will have no one to defend them against other countries. He seems to regard a firm commitment to liberal values as a hindrance to American power.


pages: 1,057 words: 239,915

The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931 by Adam Tooze

anti-communist, bank run, banking crisis, British Empire, centre right, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, credit crunch, failed state, fear of failure, first-past-the-post, floating exchange rates, German hyperinflation, imperial preference, labour mobility, liberal world order, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, negative equity, price stability, reserve currency, Right to Buy, the payments system, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, zero-sum game

A figure such as Ludendorff was under no illusion that his grand visions of the total redesign of Eurasia were expressions of traditional statecraft.49 He justified the scale of his ambition precisely on the basis that the world was entering a new and radical phase, the ultimate or the penultimate phase in a final global struggle for power. Men like these were no exponents of any kind of ‘ancien régime’. They were often highly critical of traditionalists who in the name of balance and legitimacy shrank from seizing the historic opportunity. Far from being exponents of the old world the most violent antagonists of the new liberal world order were themselves futuristic innovators. They were not, however, realists. The commonplace distinction between idealists and realists concedes too much to Wilson’s opponents. Though Wilson may have been humiliated, the imperialists also found themselves on the back foot. Already during the war the problems inherent in any truly grandiose programme of expansion had become amply apparent. As we shall see, within weeks of its ratification in March 1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the ultimate imperialist peace, was repudiated by its own creators who found themselves struggling to escape the contradictions of their own policy.

What discredited it was the failure of Berlin to sustain a consistently liberal policy. The suspicion of bad faith hanging over Berlin had the effect both of making the Bolsheviks appear as victims and of handing the initiative back to the Western Powers. In January 1918, in response to the German-Bolshevik talks at Brest, both Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson felt obliged to make powerful statements of the liberal world order they envisioned for the post-war period. Of the two statements it was Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points manifesto that would echo around the world. But far from challenging Lenin and Trotsky, as Cold War legend would have it, Wilson chose to conciliate them. In the process, by portraying Lenin and Trotsky as potential partners in a democratic peace and a unitary ‘Russian people’ as the victim of German aggression, Wilson helped to consolidate the black legend of Brest.

And the willingness of world opinion not only to give far greater attention to Wilson’s 14 Points, but to read into his text phrases that Lloyd George rather than Wilson had actually uttered, was a harbinger of things to come. But it should not be allowed to obscure the point that if the leaders of the British Empire emerged in a confident mood in November 1918, it was because they felt they had secured the foundations of the empire as a key pillar of the emerging, liberal world order. 10 The Arsenals of Democracy France, Britain and Italy contained the crisis of political legitimacy that felled Russia and would soon tear the Central Powers apart. But what kept the populations of the Entente off the streets and drove their armies across the line was a remarkable economic effort. Even the richest combatants in World War I were not affluent by modern standards.


pages: 334 words: 98,950

Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang

affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, mega-rich, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

According to this history, globalization has progressed over the last three centuries in the following way:6 Britain adopted free-market and free-trade policies in the 18th century, well ahead of other countries. By the middle of the 19th century, the superiority of these policies became so obvious, thanks to Britain’s spectacular economic success, that other countries started liberalizing their trade and deregulating their domestic economies. This liberal world order, perfected around 1870 under British hegemony, was based on: laissez-faire industrial policies at home; low barriers to the international flows of goods, capital and labour; and macroeconomic stability, both nationally and internationally, guaranteed by the principles of sound money (low inflation) and balanced budgets. A period of unprecedented prosperity followed. Unfortunately, things started to go wrong after the First World War.

Countries like Germany and Japan abandoned liberal policies and erected high trade barriers and created cartels, which were intimately associated with their fascism and external aggression. The world free trade system finally ended in 1932, when Britain, hitherto the champion of free trade, succumbed to temptation and itself re-introduced tariffs. The resulting contraction and instability in the world economy, and then, finally, the Second World War, destroyed the last remnants of the first liberal world order. After the Second World War, the world economy was re-organized on a more liberal line, this time under American hegemony. In particular, some significant progress was made in trade liberalization among the rich countries through the early GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) talks. But protectionism and state intervention still persisted in most developing countries and, needless to say, in the communist countries.


pages: 347 words: 99,317

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity by Ha-Joon Chang

affirmative action, Albert Einstein, banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, mega-rich, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

According to this history, globalization has progressed over the last three centuries in the following way.6 Britain adopted free-market and free-trade policies in the 18th century, well ahead of other countries. By the middle of the 19th century, the superiority of these policies became so obvious, thanks to Britain’s spectacular economic success, that other countries started liberalizing their trade and deregulating their domestic economies. This liberal world order, perfected around 1870 under British hegemony, was based on: laissez-faire industrial policies at home; low barriers to the international flows of goods, capital and labour; and macroeconomic stability, both nationally and internationally, guaranteed by the principles of sound money (low inflation) and balanced budgets. A period of unprecedented prosperity followed. Unfortunately, things started to go wrong after the First World War.

Countries like Germany and Japan abandoned liberal policies and erected high trade barriers and created cartels, which were intimately associated with their fascism and external aggression. The world free trade system finally ended in 1932, when Britain, hitherto the champion of free trade, succumbed to temptation and itself re-introduced tariffs. The resulting contraction and instability in the world economy, and then, finally, the Second World War, destroyed the last remnants of the first liberal world order. After the Second World War, the world economy was re-organized on a more liberal line, this time under American hegemony. In particular, some significant progress was made in trade liberalization among the rich countries through the early GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) talks. But protectionism and state intervention still persisted in most developing countries and, needless to say, in the communist countries.


pages: 708 words: 176,708

The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire by Wikileaks

affirmative action, anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, Chelsea Manning, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, drone strike, Edward Snowden, energy security, energy transition, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, experimental subject, F. W. de Klerk, facts on the ground, failed state, financial innovation, Food sovereignty, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of journalism, high net worth, invisible hand, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, liberal world order, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, Northern Rock, Philip Mirowski, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, zero-sum game, éminence grise

Nonetheless, if this behavior seems staggeringly at odds with the spaniel-eyed, apple-pie rhetoric of the Obama administration, it is clear that there is more to this posture than rhetoric. At the heart of postwar US policy-making is the doctrine of liberal internationalism. Pioneered by Woodrow Wilson, and embellished by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman, this doctrine is generally understood as the justification of military and other interventions by the US if they help produce a liberal world order: a global system consisting of liberal-democratic nation-states, connected by more or less free markets and ruled by international law. In this world-view, the goal of achieving a liberal world system trumps the commitment to state sovereignty. The US sees itself as the natural vanguard of such a global order, as well as the chief bearer of any right to suppress state sovereignty in the pursuit of liberal goals.

Third, by excluding pain or suffering arising from “lawful sanctions,” the convention opens up significant leeway for states to legitimize forms of torture as legal penalties. The vagueness of this definition of torture is not simply a matter of unfortunate phrasing in the convention, but derives from two facts external to the text. The first is that “torture” is inherently a prescriptive, normative term and, like any term in political language, is contested. The second is to do with the legal system itself. The US empire is based on a liberal world order under law. But these norms pull in opposing directions. The right to be free from torture comes into conflict here with the right of states to punish. This partially explains why, even though the American empire has always tortured, it has never had a coherent position on torture—those who torture have always had to confront those for whom torture is anathema by America’s own standards. Many polls find that most Americans view torture as an acceptable way of treating “those people,” believing that it generates actionable intelligence—a fact that the historian Greg Grandin relates to the long tradition of demonology that begins with the origins of the United States as a settler-colonial state based on slavery, always threatened by racial “others.”76 But even in the highly charged atmosphere of the “war on terror,” many CIA staff found the infliction of torture intolerable.

Indeed, one of the reasons why so much information has been disclosed is a struggle between factions of the US state, in which many argued that torture was counterproductive. But there has been no final resolution of this struggle, and the United States has still not ceased to torture: it seems likely that, as long as America is an empire, it will torture again.118 But that bind, between the normative claims attached to America’s stewardship of a liberal world order and the harsh realities of military domination, is one that has repeatedly caught its leaders out. Even as they authorize torture, they must seek to define it out of existence. This eBook is licensed to Edward Betts, edward@4angle.com on 04/01/2016 3. War and Terrorism Armies march, but they must have a destination. Empires go to war, but they must have a purpose. It is natural that when we think of empire, we think blood.


Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination by Adom Getachew

agricultural Revolution, Bretton Woods, British Empire, collective bargaining, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, failed state, financial independence, Gunnar Myrdal, land reform, land tenure, liberal world order, market fundamentalism, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, structural adjustment programs, trade liberalization, transatlantic slave trade

Joshua Simon, “José Martí’s Immanent Critique of American Imperialism,” unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, September 2015, San Francisco, CA. 39. Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 28–­29. 40. Asli Bâli and Aziz Rana, “Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination,” University of Chicago Law Review 85 (March 2018): 257–­92. 41. Martin Staniland, American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955–­1970 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 76–­78; Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 76. 42. Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1–­2. 43. Ibid., 211. 44. Rana, Two Faces of American Freedom, 134–­35. 45. In an examination of why early postcolonial federations—­the United States, Australia, and Canada—­succeeded while twentieth-­century versions failed, Thomas Franck identifies the absence of imperial expansion in the latter as an important contributing factor.

Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 102 (November 2008): 401–­16. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. Irwin, Ryan M. Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. ——— —. “Sovereignty in the Congo Crisis.” In Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence, edited by Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, 203–­18. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015. Isaac, Jeffrey C. “A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 90 (March 1996): 61–­73.


The New Class War: Saving Democracy From the Metropolitan Elite by Michael Lind

affirmative action, anti-communist, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, centre right, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, future of work, global supply chain, guest worker program, Haight Ashbury, illegal immigration, immigration reform, invisible hand, knowledge economy, liberal world order, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, moral panic, Nate Silver, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, union organizing, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, WikiLeaks, Wolfgang Streeck, working poor

In Europe, this means “Euroskepticism” and “sovereigntism,” the assertion of the sovereignty of the democratic nation-state and the democratic national legislature against the power of the transnational bureaucracies of the European Union. In the United States, the equivalent is the Trump administration’s transactional approach to treaties and international organizations, which tend to be venerated by technocratic neoliberals as pillars of a “liberal world order.” In the economy, today’s populist leaders tend to be economic nationalists, opposing global labor arbitrage policies of offshoring and mass immigration, which the overclass establishment claims are both inevitable and beneficial. Populist constituencies include many workers in manufacturing districts hit hard by foreign competition, including China’s subsidized “social dumping,” and others who view immigrants as competitors for jobs, public services, or status.


Global Governance and Financial Crises by Meghnad Desai, Yahia Said

Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency peg, deglobalization, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, German hyperinflation, information asymmetry, knowledge economy, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, moral hazard, Nick Leeson, oil shock, open economy, price mechanism, price stability, Real Time Gross Settlement, rent-seeking, short selling, special drawing rights, structural adjustment programs, Tobin tax, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

The supporters of new forms of regulation believe, however, that the neo-liberal view of regulation and state action, which has been dominant in the last three decades, is far too pessimistic about the possibilities of building on co-operation between states to create transnational regimes which can effectively regulate financial markets. They argue that unless steps are taken to control the effects of deregulated financial markets on employment and investment in those countries most susceptible to financial crisis, the future of a liberal world order will be put at risk, because pressure for protectionist and isolationist economic policies will revive, with grave consequences for world prosperity and world peace (Smith 2000). Without minimising the difficulties of securing the required co-operation from states to establish effective regulatory agencies, some economists believe that the past performance of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) gives some grounds for optimism that its remit could be extended (Eatwell 1999).


pages: 307 words: 88,745

War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers by Benjamin R. Teitelbaum

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bitcoin, Boris Johnson, creative destruction, crony capitalism, cryptocurrency, Donald Trump, Etonian, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, Joseph Schumpeter, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, mass immigration, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, Saturday Night Live, school choice, side project, Skype, South China Sea, Westphalian system, WikiLeaks

Trump didn’t even make an effort to conform to liberal standards, and he won anyway. They won. It scared some of them, and they struggled to believe it: in a poignant analogy, one white nationalist writer compared the sensation to that of an unattractive young man who grandly rejects future romance rather than be rejected himself, only to cower when against all odds opportunity knocks on his door one day. Could it really be true, the end of the liberal world order—the dying gasps of the tiger? Dare they open themselves up to hope? Might the radical right have become attractive instead of a pariah—a milieu that serious, powerful people want to be on good terms with and treat as an asset? Michael Bagley seemed to think so. He knocked; Jason planned to answer. * * * ON JANUARY 2, 2017, Bagley sent an email to Jason from his Jellyfish address: The USG [US government] funds for Jellyfish Media activities should be allocated in mid/late January but certainly by/before February 1, and that is the target date to set up the administrative and media platforms.


Corbyn by Richard Seymour

anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, credit crunch, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, first-past-the-post, full employment, gender pay gap, housing crisis, income inequality, knowledge economy, land value tax, liberal world order, mass immigration, means of production, moral panic, Naomi Klein, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, new economy, non-tariff barriers, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, pension reform, Philip Mirowski, precariat, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent control, Snapchat, stakhanovite, Washington Consensus, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, Wolfgang Streeck, working-age population, éminence grise

Now that Corbyn has, by depriving the Conservatives of their majority and setting Labour up for a future win, proved the critics wrong, what needs to be rethought? III The world, for a start. In the past few decades, it has been taken for granted among the majority of journalists and politicians that something miraculous was taking place: globalisation. The world was converging, under the relatively benign tutelage of Washington, toward a liberal world order. With the vast global expansion of trade availed by the global rollback of capital controls and tariffs, a series of institutions of global governance sprang up, as well as a patchwork of regional trading alliances rolling out property rights, and rolling back barriers to trade such as public ownership, and environmental or labour protections. It was, to coin a phrase, capitalism en marche: investor rights sans frontières.


pages: 364 words: 112,681

Moneyland: Why Thieves and Crooks Now Rule the World and How to Take It Back by Oliver Bullough

banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, bitcoin, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, dark matter, diversification, Donald Trump, energy security, failed state, Flash crash, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, high net worth, if you see hoof prints, think horses—not zebras, income inequality, joint-stock company, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, mass immigration, medical malpractice, offshore financial centre, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, rent-seeking, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, Sloane Ranger, sovereign wealth fund, WikiLeaks

Of course you take the bribe.’ His Mexican peers have a pithier formulation: ‘Do you want paying in silver or lead?’ Corruption has become so widespread that whole countries are unable to tax their wealthiest residents, meaning only those least able to pay are forced to support the government. This undermines democratic legitimacy, and angers the people who live under such governments. For people who believe in a liberal world order, there is no upside to this. Commentators from all sides of politics have expressed concerns about the effect of inequality on the fabric of society in the United States, where the share of wealth held by the richest 1 per cent of the country rose from a quarter to two-fifths between 1990 and 2012. But if you think that’s bad, look what’s happened to the world as a whole: in the ten years after 2000, the richest 1 per cent of the world’s population increased its wealth from one-third of everything to a half.


pages: 414 words: 121,243

What's Left?: How Liberals Lost Their Way by Nick Cohen

anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Boycotts of Israel, British Empire, centre right, Etonian, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Farzad Bazoft, feminist movement, haute couture, kremlinology, liberal world order, light touch regulation, mass immigration, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, profit motive, Ralph Nader, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, sensible shoes, the scientific method, union organizing, upwardly mobile, Yom Kippur War

You no more have to think of what they have suffered than an angry customer has to think of the hard life of a shop girl. You no more have to suggest how to improve their lives, than an angry customer has to suggest ways to repair faulty goods. We no longer believe in internationalism and fraternity. Sticking by your comrades is as absurd a notion as staying loyal to Microsoft when Apple has a better product. Join us, and revel in the righteousness of your solipsistic anger. Nothing the neo-liberal world order produced suited the consumer society as well as the thinkers who purported to oppose it. It took one more war and one more professor for protest’s new brand to go global. CHAPTER FIVE Tories Against the War Douglas, Douglas, you would make Neville Chamberlain look like a warmonger. Margaret Thatcher, 1993 BY THE WINTER OF 1991, the Baath’s slaughters of the Kurds and the Shia Arabs had ended – not least because there was hardly anyone left standing who could fight back.


pages: 443 words: 125,510

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities by John J. Mearsheimer

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Ayatollah Khomeini, Cass Sunstein, Chelsea Manning, Clive Stafford Smith, Donald Trump, drone strike, Edward Snowden, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, invisible hand, laissez-faire capitalism, liberal world order, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Peace of Westphalia, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, Ted Kaczynski, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs

Some scholars maintain that particular features of democracy, not liberalism, account for why liberal democracies do not war with each other. Those alternative accounts, in other words, do not emphasize the importance of inalienable rights, which is the liberal explanation for this purported phenomenon. In chapter 7, I assess those particular attributes of democracies that are said to prevent war between liberal democracies. 5. Quoted in G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (March 2009): 75. 6. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 324. Also see Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” pp. 1156–63. 7. Quoted in Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 111. Relatedly, Doyle writes: “Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes.”


pages: 756 words: 120,818

The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalization by Michael O’sullivan

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, Airbnb, algorithmic trading, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, Black Swan, blockchain, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, business process, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, cloud computing, continuation of politics by other means, corporate governance, credit crunch, cryptocurrency, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disruptive innovation, distributed ledger, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, fixed income, Geoffrey West, Santa Fe Institute, Gini coefficient, global value chain, housing crisis, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), knowledge economy, liberal world order, Long Term Capital Management, longitudinal study, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, pattern recognition, Peace of Westphalia, performance metric, private military company, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, Sinatra Doctrine, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, special drawing rights, supply-chain management, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, tulip mania, Valery Gerasimov, Washington Consensus

Many social trends—such as obesity, the overuse of social media, and the reemergence of developed-world poverty—are raising the level of concern that human-specific factors, to put it as dryly as that, are being neglected. In politics, cracks are appearing in the system as voters begin to act, gravitating toward radical parties and sanctioning extreme events. Geopolitically, the idea of the liberal world order is under attack, and China is now a clear rival to the United States. American foreign policy is seen as aggressive, whereas it was once seen as benevolent. More change will come. Another recession or geopolitical crisis would only compound the sense of confusion. We are still simply at the early part of the paradigm shift, when the existing or consensual order is crumbling and slowly being rejected.


pages: 518 words: 128,324

Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap by Graham Allison

9 dash line, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, conceptual framework, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, facts on the ground, Flash crash, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, game design, George Santayana, Haber-Bosch Process, industrial robot, Internet of things, Kenneth Rogoff, liberal world order, long peace, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Nelson Mandela, one-China policy, Paul Samuelson, Peace of Westphalia, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, selection bias, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, special economic zone, spice trade, the rule of 72, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade route, UNCLOS, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

According to Huntington, China and a few other states form the “Confucian” civilization, while the United States fits into a group of states that collectively comprise the “Western” civilization. Acknowledging that the “lines between [civilizations] are seldom sharp,” Huntington argued that they are nonetheless “real.”12 Huntington by no means ruled out future violent conflicts between groups within a common civilization. His point, rather, was that in a post–Cold War world, civilizational fault lines would not dissolve in a global convergence toward liberal world order—as one of Huntington’s former students, the political scholar Francis Fukuyama, had predicted in his 1989 article “The End of History?”13—but become more pronounced. “Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence,” Huntington allowed. “Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.”14 Huntington was keen to disabuse readers of the Western myth of universal values, which he said was not just naive but inimical to other civilizations, particularly the Confucian one with China at its center.


Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration by Kent E. Calder

3D printing, air freight, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, blockchain, Bretton Woods, business intelligence, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, cloud computing, colonial rule, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, energy transition, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Gini coefficient, housing crisis, income inequality, industrial cluster, industrial robot, interest rate swap, intermodal, Internet of things, invention of movable type, inventory management, John Markoff, liberal world order, Malacca Straits, Mikhail Gorbachev, mittelstand, money market fund, moral hazard, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, seigniorage, smart cities, smart grid, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, supply-chain management, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, trade route, transcontinental railway, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, union organizing, Washington Consensus, working-age population, zero-sum game

Premier Li Keqiang stressed similar themes in extensive meetings with European leaders in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s controversial visit to NATO headquarters and Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the historic COP-21 global environmental agreement. China’s distributive globalism, focused on providing connectivity infrastructure, is thus advancing into the vacuum created by Trump’s abdication of American global leadership, accelerating the coming of a Global Crossover Point, under which a Beijing consensus gradually and quietly subverts the already eroding legitimacy of the liberal world order, even as Chinese leadership ritually affirms many of its central tenets. In Conclusion The core institutions of the contemporary global political economy have proven to be remarkably durable. The most basic ones—the IMF and the World Bank—were born at the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944. They have been supplemented by other bodies, such as the regional development banks. Yet the underlying structure has not changed.


pages: 667 words: 149,811

Economic Dignity by Gene Sperling

active measures, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Cass Sunstein, collective bargaining, corporate governance, David Brooks, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Donald Trump, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Elon Musk, employer provided health coverage, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ferguson, Missouri, full employment, gender pay gap, ghettoisation, gig economy, Gini coefficient, guest worker program, Gunnar Myrdal, housing crisis, income inequality, invisible hand, job automation, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, late fees, liberal world order, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, mental accounting, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, obamacare, offshore financial centre, payday loans, price discrimination, profit motive, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, randomized controlled trial, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, speech recognition, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Toyota Production System, traffic fines, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, union organizing, universal basic income, War on Poverty, working poor, young professional, zero-sum game

President Clinton also worked to triple dislocated worker funding during even extremely low unemployment and to create several economic development policies for hard-hit areas. An all-Republican Congress for his last six years in office, however, made major reform a legislative impossibility. The core motivation for bringing China into the WTO was far less related to economics and far more part of a broader post–Cold War strategy aimed at bolstering the global rule of law and binding China to the liberal world order. Nonetheless, Clinton effectively held up the agreement for many months in part to secure an “anti-surge” provision to block or slow down imports if they were having severe impacts on jobs without having to prove any unfair trade practices. Had Al Gore followed Clinton as president, there is little question that the anti-surge provision would have been a powerful tool used again and again to both protect manufacturing communities and send a strong message to China.


How to Be a Liberal by Ian Dunt

4chan, Alfred Russel Wallace, bank run, battle of ideas, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, bounce rate, British Empire, Brixton riot, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, experimental subject, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Growth in a Time of Debt, illegal immigration, invisible hand, John Bercow, Kenneth Rogoff, liberal world order, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, Mohammed Bouazizi, Northern Rock, old-boy network, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, recommendation engine, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, Scientific racism, Silicon Valley, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, upwardly mobile, Winter of Discontent, working poor, zero-sum game

Whatever happened, it would be severely, perhaps fatally, weakened. In a sense it didn’t matter. Trump had already shown that the international rules didn’t matter to him. He had sent a signal to every other nationalist that they could do whatever they wanted. Simply by virtue of acting, he was creating the world he wanted. The size of the US, in terms of trading clout and political authority, meant that any action it took became a new norm. The liberal world order was falling down. Orbán was undermining the EU from within. Britain was undermining it from without. And Trump was humbling the WTO. Decades of delicate construction work were being dismantled. Inside these countries, the same process was undermining the institutions which kept executive power in check. Parliaments, the judiciary, civil society, the press. All were under sustained attack.


pages: 446 words: 578

The end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama

affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, business cycle, centre right, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, European colonialism, Exxon Valdez, F. W. de Klerk, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Joan Didion, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, life extension, linear programming, long peace, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, New Journalism, nuclear winter, old-boy network, open economy, post-industrial society, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Socratic dialogue, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, zero-sum game

Even Europe, which shares a common culture and historical experience, is having serious second thoughts about the project to create, in effect, a single European nation-state that would seriously undercut the sovereignty of its member states. It would therefore appear that we will not get beyond the nation-state any time soon as the fundamental source of legitimate democratic authority. In place of global government, we will have to be satisfied with global governance, that is, partial international institutions that promote collective action among nations and that create some degree of accountability among them. A liberal world order that is both just and feasible would have to be based not on a single, overarching global institution, but rather on a diversity of international institutions that could organize themselves around functional issues, regions, or specific problems. This kind of world order is in the process of being created, but there is still a great deal of productive work that can be done in this area. The third issue that remains as a problem in the “End of History” concerns what I would call the autonomy of politics.


Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism by Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Cass Sunstein, centre right, cognitive dissonance, conceptual framework, declining real wages, desegregation, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, job automation, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, liberal world order, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, mass immigration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, obamacare, open borders, open economy, post-industrial society, post-materialism, precariat, purchasing power parity, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, sexual politics, Silicon Valley, statistical model, stem cell, War on Poverty, white flight, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, working-age population, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

His ‘America First’ rhetoric has signaled US withdrawal from multilateral agreements and alliances, such as the TPP, the Paris climate accord, the Iran accord, and America’s leadership role of the free world, as well as tearing up the State Department’s investment in democracy promotion, human rights, and the United Nations. President Trump has sharply attacked the G7, NATO, and the European Union, breaking diplomatic norms and deeply undermining the pillars of the liberal world order. He has attacked and sought to destabilize some of America’s most stalwart allies, including leaders in Canada, Germany, and the UK, while expressing warm admiration for many authoritarians around the world, such as in Russia, China, North Korea, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia. Yet his administration has also maintained several foreign policies; for example, the Pentagon has signaled the continuing engagement of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.


pages: 767 words: 208,933

Liberalism at Large: The World According to the Economist by Alex Zevin

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, Chelsea Manning, collective bargaining, Columbine, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, desegregation, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, hiring and firing, imperial preference, income inequality, interest rate derivative, invisible hand, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Khartoum Gordon, land reform, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Journalism, Norman Macrae, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, Philip Mirowski, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, railway mania, rent control, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Snapchat, Socratic dialogue, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, unbanked and underbanked, underbanked, unorthodox policies, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, Yom Kippur War, young professional

The oil price quadrupled after the Yom Kippur War, and a new word was coined to describe the effects this had down the decade: stagflation. Perhaps most alarming of all, these very developments seemed to strengthen the Soviet Union, which gained hard currency from surging oil prices and a freer hand abroad after America’s geopolitical setback in Southeast Asia.63 At this moment of apparent crisis for the American-led liberal world order, Andrew Knight became editor of the Economist. In contrast to past occupants of this position, Knight found it more difficult to get hired in the first place than to obtain the top job. On his second try in 1964, Brian Beedham thought him ‘brooding’ but ‘with the large advantage of not being a smooth young man’, and ‘worth bearing in mind’. Two years later Fred Hirsch, the intellectually distinguished finance editor, was about to end a third interview, dismissing a bungled explanation of monetary policy with, ‘I don’t think much of that’, when Knight rejoined, ‘Well, what do you expect for £1250 a year?’