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The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined by Steven Pinker
1960s counterculture, affirmative action, Alan Turing: On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Albert Einstein, availability heuristic, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, British Empire, Broken windows theory, California gold rush, Cass Sunstein, citation needed, clean water, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, Columbine, computer age, conceptual framework, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, crack epidemic, cuban missile crisis, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, Doomsday Clock, Douglas Hofstadter, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, experimental subject, facts on the ground, failed state, first-past-the-post, Flynn Effect, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, fudge factor, full employment, George Santayana, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, global village, Henri Poincaré, Hobbesian trap, humanitarian revolution, impulse control, income inequality, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of the printing press, Isaac Newton, lake wobegon effect, libertarian paternalism, long peace, loss aversion, Marshall McLuhan, mass incarceration, McMansion, means of production, mental accounting, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral panic, mutually assured destruction, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Peter Singer: altruism, QWERTY keyboard, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, Republic of Letters, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Saturday Night Live, security theater, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, South China Sea, statistical model, stem cell, Steven Levy, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, theory of mind, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, Turing machine, ultimatum game, uranium enrichment, V2 rocket, Vilfredo Pareto, Walter Mischel, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, zero-sum game
Some experts on nuclear strategy, including Schelling, John Deutch, and Harold Brown, are skeptical that a nuclear-free world is attainable or even desirable, though others are working out timetables and safeguards designed to answer their objections.217 With all these uncertainties, no one should predict that nuclear weapons will go the way of poison gas anytime soon. But it is a sign of the momentum behind the Long Peace that abolition can even be discussed as a foreseeable prospect. If it happens, it would represent the ultimate decline in violence. A nuclear-free world! What realist would have dreamed it? IS THE LONG PEACE A DEMOCRATIC PEACE? If the Long Peace is not the sturdy child of terror and the twin brother of annihilation, then whose child is it? Can we identify an exogenous variable—some development that is not part of the peace itself—that blossomed in the postwar years and that we have reason to believe is a generic force against war?
A stock scammer can exploit the distinction by sending out newsletters with every possible prediction about the trajectory of the market. Several months later the fraction of recipients that got the lucky matching run will think he is a genius. A skeptic of the Long Peace could claim that anyone making a big deal of a long run of nonwars at the end of that very run is just as guilty of data snooping. But in fact there is a paper trail of scholars who, more than two decades ago, noticed that the war-free years were piling up and attributed it to a new mindset that they expected to last. Today we can say that their a priori predictions have been confirmed. The story can be told in titles and dates: Werner Levi’s The Coming End of War (1981), John Gaddis’s “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System” (1986), Kalevi Holsti’s “The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?”
The balance of nuclear terror deterred them from starting a war that would escalate to a holocaust and put an end to civilization, if not human life itself.188 As Winston Churchill said in his last major speech to Parliament, “It may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” 189 In the same vein, the foreign policy analyst Kenneth Waltz has suggested that we “thank our nuclear blessings,” and Elspeth Rostow proposed that the nuclear bomb be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.190 Let’s hope not. If the Long Peace were a nuclear peace, it would be a fool’s paradise, because an accident, a miscommunication, or an air force general obsessed with precious bodily fluids could set off an apocalypse. Thankfully, a closer look suggests that the threat of nuclear annihilation deserves little credit for the Long Peace.191 For one thing, weapons of mass destruction had never braked the march to war before. The benefactor of the Nobel Peace Prize wrote in the 1860s that his invention of dynamite would “sooner lead to peace than a thousand world conventions, [since] as soon as men will find that in one instant whole armies can be utterly destroyed, they will surely abide in golden peace.”192 Similar predictions have been made about submarines, artillery, smokeless powder, and the machine gun.193 The 1930s saw a widespread fear that poison gas dropped from airplanes could bring an end to civilization and human life, yet that dread did not come close to ending war either.194 As Luard puts it, “There is little evidence in history that the existence of supremely destructive weapons alone is capable of deterring war.
The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis
anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, European colonialism, full employment, land reform, long peace, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Potemkin village, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Sinatra Doctrine
., Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 225–26. 46 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (New York: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 411n. 47 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 158–59. 48 Pechatnov and Edmondson, “The Russian Perspective,” p. 139. 49 James V. Forrestal to Chan Gurney, December 8, 1947, in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 350–51. 50 Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 111–12. 51 PPS/39, “United States Policy Toward China,” September 7, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 148. 52 James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), p. 217. 53 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 50. 54 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 58–66. 55 Marc Selverstone, “ ‘All Roads Lead to Moscow’: The United States, Great Britain, and the Communist Monolith,” Ph.D.
., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 350–51. 50 Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 111–12. 51 PPS/39, “United States Policy Toward China,” September 7, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 148. 52 James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), p. 217. 53 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 50. 54 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 58–66. 55 Marc Selverstone, “ ‘All Roads Lead to Moscow’: The United States, Great Britain, and the Communist Monolith,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio University History Department, 2000, p. 380. 56 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 66–67. 57 Ibid., p. 94. 58 David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983), pp. 108–9. 59 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 96. 60 Kathryn Weathersby, “Stalin and the Korean War,” in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, pp. 274–75. 61 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 66–70, 158–61. 62 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 97. 63 Montefiore, Stalin, p. 608. 64 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 143. See also Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), pp. 55–86. 65 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 79–80. 66 Interview with Lt.
For the overall sequence of events, see Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 103–10. 27 There is extensive information on Soviet military involvement in the Korean War at: http://www.korean-war.com/ussr.html. 28 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, pp. 416–30; George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925–1950 (Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1967), pp. 471–76. 29 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 113. See also Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 230–32. 30 George Cowan and N. A. Vlasov, quoted in ibid., p. 224. 31 Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “ ‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” in Gaddis, et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, p. 101. 32 Ibid. 33 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 336–37. 34 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 109. 35 Jonathan Rosenberg, “Before the Bomb and After: Winston Churchill and the Use of Force,” in Gaddis, et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, p. 191. 36 James C. Hagerty diary, July 27, 1954, in FRUS: 1952–54, XV, 1844–45. 37 Erdmann, “Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” pp. 106–7, 113. 38 Ibid., p. 109. 39 My argument here has been strongly influenced by reading Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), especially pp. 67–70. 40 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 147–78. 41 Nikita S.
Necessary Illusions by Noam Chomsky
anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, British Empire, centre right, collective bargaining, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, full employment, Howard Zinn, Khyber Pass, land reform, long peace, New Journalism, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, union organizing
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, 1982, viiin), his emphasis; The Long Peace, 43. 3. Wm. Roger Lewis, Imperialism at Bay: the United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (Oxford, 1978, 481). On Grand Area planning, see Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. For remarks on this and competing models, and applications in the Far East, see Bruce Cumings, introduction, in Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict (Washington, 1983). 4. Lewis, op. cit., 550; Christopher Thome, The Issue of War (Oxford, 1985, 225, 211). 5. Gaddis, The Long Peace, 10-11, 21; Andy Thomas, Effects of Chemical Warfare (SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, 1985, 33f.), reviewing newly released British state archives. 6. Gaddis, The Long Peace, 37, 11. 7. In earlier years, military spending was selected as the major device to overcome the “dollar gap” of the U.S. allies and to ensure that they would remain securely within the U.S.
Thomas Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (Oxford, 1988, 82-83), quoting a Truman official and political scientist Gabriel Almond. 6. Melvyn Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,” International Security, Summer 1986. 7. Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, “America and the World 1988/89,” Winter 1989, featured lead article. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (Oxford, 1987, 129). The effort to liberate Indochina from the U.S.-backed French forces was in part a civil war, as is generally true of struggles against foreign occupation and colonial rule—the American revolution, for example. It should be clear that this fact adds no credibility to the bizarre notion that the U.S. was “deterring aggression” by aiding the French effort to reconquer Indochina, even contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for this purpose. 8.
A Chicago police captain, Schaack “was widely credited with having uncovered the anarchist conspiracy” (Davis). 14. See excerpts from Palmer in Davis, op. cit. On the role of the press, see Levin, op. cit. 15. Powers, Aronson, op. cit. 16. Davis, Powers, op. cit. 17. Robert J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America (Schenkman, 1978). 18. Levin, op. cit. 19. Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Princeton, 1945), cited by Levin, op. cit; Gaddis, The Long Peace, 37. 20. On the continuing FBI policies of subversion and repression, often they were allegedly terminated, see Ward Churchill and James Vander Wall Agents of Repression (South End, 1988) and Cointelpro Papers (South End, 1989). 21. The bombing of Cambodia did enter the proceedings, though not the final indictment, but in a specific form: not the murder of tens of thousands of people and the destruction of rural Cambodia, but the failure to notify Congress properly.
The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills, Alan Wolfe
affirmative action, Albert Einstein, anti-communist, Asilomar, collective bargaining, creative destruction, cuban missile crisis, desegregation, full employment, Joseph Schumpeter, long peace, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, one-China policy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, Thorstein Veblen, Vilfredo Pareto
At various times and places, of course, military men had been the servants of civilian decision, but this trend—which reached its climax in the nineteenth century and lasted until World War I—seemed then, and still seems, remarkable simply because it had never before happened on such a scale or never before seemed so firmly grounded. In the twentieth century, among the industrialized nations of the world, the great, brief, precarious fact of civilian dominance began to falter; and now—after the long peace from the Napoleonic era to World War I—the old march of world history once more asserts itself. All over the world, the warlord is returning. All over the world, reality is defined in his terms. And in America, too, into the political vacuum the warlords have marched. Alongside the corporate executives and the politicians, the generals and admirals—those uneasy cousins within the American elite—have gained and have been given increased power to make and to influence decisions of the gravest consequence. 1 All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.
Even nowadays, we often overlook these more or less common facts of world history because we inherit certain values which, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have flourished under a regime of civilian authority. Even if the ultimate form of power is coercion by violence, all power contests within and between nations of our tradition have not reached the ultimate point. Our theories of government have assumed and our constitution has led to institutions in which violence has been minimized and subjected to efficient checks in the balance of civilian dominance. During the long peace of the modern west, history has been referred more to the politician, to the rich and to the lawyer than to the general, the bandit, and the admiral. But how did that peace come about? How did civilians rather than men of violence become dominant? In his discusion of the military, Gaetano Mosca1 makes an assumption which we do not share, but which does not disturb our acceptance of his general line of reasoning.
Accordingly, at the top of this structure, the power elite has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence; from the decline of the professional politician and the rise to explicit political command of the corporate chieftains and the professional warlords; from the absence of any genuine civil service of skill and integrity, independent of vested interests. The power elite is composed of political, economic, and military men, but this instituted elite is frequently in some tension: it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of ‘crisis.’ In the long peace of the nineteenth century, the military were not in the high councils of state, not of the political directorate, and neither were the economic men—they made raids upon the state but they did not join its directorate. During the ‘thirties, the political man was ascendant. Now the military and the corporate men are in top positions. Of the three types of circle that compose the power elite today, it is the military that has benefited the most in its enhanced power, although the corporate circles have also become more explicitly intrenched in the more public decision-making circles.
Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism From Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda by John Mueller
airport security, Albert Einstein, Black Swan, Cass Sunstein, conceptual framework, cuban missile crisis, Doomsday Clock, energy security, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, long peace, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, nuclear winter, oil shock, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, side project, uranium enrichment, William Langewiesche, Yom Kippur War
Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown. London: Continuum. Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. 2006. Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York: Norton. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1974. “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” Foreign Affairs 52(2) January: 386–401. ______. 1982. Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 1987. The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 1992. The United States and the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 1997. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 1999. Conclusion. In Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945, ed.
Schilling, Warner R. 1961. “The H-Bomb Decision.” Political Science Quarterly 76(1) March: 24–46. Schlesinger, James. 1967. On Relating Non-Technical Elements to Systems Studies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-3545 (February). Schneier, Bruce. 2003. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. New York: Copernicus. Schroeder, Paul W. 2006. “The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763–1914.” In The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Väyryen. New York: Routledge, 33–63. Schuman, Howard, Jacob Ludwig, and Jon A. Krosnick. 1986. “The Perceived Threat of Nuclear War, Salience, and Open Questions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 50(4) Winter: 519–36. Seitz, Russell. 2004. “Weaker Than We Think.” American Conservative 6 December. Serwer, Andy, and Julia Boorstin. 2002.
Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide by Joshua S. Goldstein
Albert Einstein, Ayatollah Khomeini, Bartolomé de las Casas, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, Doomsday Clock, failed state, immigration reform, income inequality, invention of writing, invisible hand, land reform, long peace, microcredit, Mikhail Gorbachev, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, selection bias, Steven Pinker, Tobin tax, unemployed young men, Winter of Discontent, Y2K
Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003a: 25–54. Krasno, Jean. “The Group of Friends of the Secretary-General: A Useful Leveraging Tool.” In Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C. F. Daniel. Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003b: 171–200. Krech, Shepard III. “Genocide in Tribal Society.” Nature 371, Sep. 1, 1994: 14–15. Kriesberg, Louis. “Long Peace or Long War: A Conflict Resolution Perspective.” Negotiation Journal, April 2007: 97–116. Krippner, Stanley, and Teresa M. McIntyre. “Overview: In the Wake of War.” In Stanley Krippner and Teresa M. McIntyre, eds. The Psychological Impact of War Trauma on Civilians: An International Perspective. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003: 1–14. Kristof, Nicholas D. “Orphaned, Raped and Ignored.” New York Times, January 31, 2010a: 11.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010. Save the Children. State of the World’s Mothers 2003: Protecting Women and Children in War and Conflict. Westport, Conn.: Save the Children, 2003a. Save the Children. U.S. Congress Should Put Women and Children First in Setting Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance in War Zones. [Press Release.] October 14, 2003b. Schroeder, Paul W. The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763–1914. In Raimo Väyrynen, ed. The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates. London: Routledge, 2006: 33–63. Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Shanker, Thom. “Gates Warns Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan.” New York Times, February 26, 2011: A7. Shaw, Martin. The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq.
Year 501 by Noam Chomsky
anti-communist, Bartolomé de las Casas, Berlin Wall, Bolshevik threat, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, colonial rule, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, declining real wages, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, experimental subject, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Howard Zinn, invisible hand, land reform, land tenure, long peace, mass incarceration, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, Ralph Nader, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, union organizing, War on Poverty, working poor
DD, ch. 12; Wilbur Edel, “Diplomatic History—State Department Style,” Political Science Quarterly,106.4 1991/2. Notes to Chapter 3 1. Brenner, in Aston and Philpin, Brenner Debate, 277ff., 40ff. Stavrianos, Global Rift, cbs. 3, 16; Feffer, Shock Waves, 22; Shanin, Russia (quoting historian D. Mirsky). Zeman, Communist Europe, 15-16 (citing T. Masaryk), 57-8. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness. 2. Leffler, Preponderance, 359. Gaddis, Long Peace, 10. 3. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, 146, 150. Du Boff, Accumulation, 176, citing Kuznets. 4. See FRS, 51-2, for details on Indochina. Wood, 177, on Guatemala; US and Fascism-Nazism, Mexico, DD, chs. 1.3-4, 11. Sklar, Washington’s War, and a substantial further literature on Nicaragua. 5. DD, ch. 11. FDR, Zeman, Communist Europe, 172n.; Kimball, Juggler, 34. Truman, Garthoff, Détente, 6, citing NYT, June 24, 1941. 6.
AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame (California, 1992) Feffer, John. Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolution (South End, 1992) Fitzgerald, Tom. Between Life and Economics (1990 Boyer lectures of the Australian Broadcasting Company, ABC, 1990) Franklin, Bruce. M.I.A., or Mythmaking in America (Lawrence Hill, 1992) Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment (Oxford, 1982) —The Long Peace (Oxford, 1987) Garthoff, Raymond. Détente and Confrontation (Brookings, 1985) —Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Brookings, 1987) George, Alexander, ed. Westem State Terrorism (Polity, 1991) Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard, 1962) Ginger, Ann Pagan, and David Christiano, eds. The Cold War Against Labor (Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, 1987), two vols.
Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity by Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore, Elizabeth Truss
Airbnb, banking crisis, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, clockwatching, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, demographic dividend, Edward Glaeser, eurozone crisis, fear of failure, glass ceiling, informal economy, James Dyson, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, long peace, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Neil Kinnock, new economy, North Sea oil, oil shock, open economy, pension reform, price stability, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Walter Mischel, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, working-age population, Yom Kippur War
A quick examination of the history of the British debt might give some grounds for this easy complacency. Ever since its ﬁrst creation in the late seventeenth century, the British debt has followed a simple pattern. It has spiked dramatically with every war, and then gradually been paid back down in the years of peace that followed. By the end of the Napoleonic wars debt had peaked at 268 per cent of GDP.36 The long peace that followed gave Britain enough room to pay down the debt, until by 1914 it was only 26 per cent of GDP.37 The two world wars took debt back up to 250 per cent of GDP. This was once again paid down, until in 2001 debt stood at 29.7 per cent of GDP. Even after the ﬁnancial crisis, the UK’s debt is expected to peak at no more than around 80 per cent of GDP in 2015.38 A Tale of Two Nations 21 The trajectory of the debt seems to bear little relationship to the short-term deﬁcit.
asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, cuban missile crisis, disintermediation, diversification, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, global reserve currency, Home mortgage interest deduction, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, long peace, margin call, market clearing, mass immigration, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage tax deduction, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, pattern recognition, pension reform, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, pushing on a string, reserve currency, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, statistical model, The Great Moderation, the new new thing, the payments system, too big to fail, value at risk, very high income, War on Poverty, Y2K, yield curve
Merchant bankers like Rothschild filled this need and grew immensely wealthy in the process. Baring Brothers raised the money for Jefferson to buy Louisiana from Napoleon and helped finance Latin American independence. Later the Rothschilds advanced the money for Britain to buy the Suez Canal. The great London merchant bankers also financed the huge expansion of world trade and the building of railroads and factories around the globe that marked the long peace of 1815 through 1914. The number one destination for all this London money was the United States, not Britain or her empire. America was growing in territory, population, and industry at breakneck speed. It had a bottomless appetite for credit and money. What it didn’t have, for reasons we will address in the next chapter, was serious banks or financial markets. The merchant bankers brought American opportunity and British money together.
The end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama
affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, centre right, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labour mobility, land reform, long peace, Mikhail Gorbachev, nuclear winter, open economy, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Socratic dialogue, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, zero-sum game
Dueling in the modern world is an artifact of the master's morality, demonstrating his willingness to risk his life in a bloody battle. The root cause for the secular decline of slavery, dueling, and war is the same, i.e., the advent of rational recognition. 14. Many of these general points are made by Carl Kaysen in his excellent review essay of John Mueller, "Is War Obsolete?" International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 4 2 - 6 4 . 15. See for example John Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 99-142. 16. Of course, nuclear weapons were themselves responsible for the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold war, the Cuban missile crisis, but even here the prospect of nuclear war prevented the conflict from moving to actual armed conflict. 17. See for example Dean V.
The National Interest no. 18 (Winter): 2 1 - 2 8 . Fullerton, Kemper. 1924. "Calvinism and Capitalism." Harvard Theological Re view 2 1 : 1 6 3 - 1 9 1 . Furtado, Celso. 1970. Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colo nial Times to the Cuban Revolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Fussell, Paul. 1975. The Great War and Modern Memory. Oxford University Press, New York. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International Situation." International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring): 9 9 - 1 4 2 . Galston, William. 1975. Kant and the Problem of History. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Gellner, David. 1982. "Max Weber: Capitalism and the Religion of India." So ciology 16, no. 4 (November): 5 2 6 - 5 4 3 . Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance by Noam Chomsky
anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, cuban missile crisis, declining real wages, Doomsday Clock, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, invisible hand, liberation theology, long peace, market fundamentalism, Monroe Doctrine, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, Thomas L Friedman, uranium enrichment
Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1997). 37 Cited by Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 78. 38 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 10. 39 Mark Laffey, “Discerning the Patterns of World Order: Noam Chomsky and International Theory after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 29 (forthcoming, 2003), a critical account of the convention. NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 1 Michael Krepon, strategic analyst at the Henry L. Stimson Center, cited by Faye Bowers and Howard LaFranchi, “Risk Rises for a Reignited Arms Race,” Christian Science Monitor, 31 December 2002, p. 1.
Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst by Robert M. Sapolsky
autonomous vehicles, Bernie Madoff, biofilm, blood diamonds, British Empire, Broken windows theory, Brownian motion, car-free, clean water, cognitive dissonance, corporate personhood, corporate social responsibility, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, delayed gratification, desegregation, double helix, Drosophila, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, epigenetics, Flynn Effect, framing effect, fudge factor, George Santayana, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, impulse control, income inequality, John von Neumann, Loma Prieta earthquake, long peace, loss aversion, Mahatma Gandhi, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mohammed Bouazizi, mouse model, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, out of africa, Peter Singer: altruism, phenotype, placebo effect, publication bias, RAND corporation, risk tolerance, Rosa Parks, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), self-driving car, Silicon Valley, stem cell, Steven Pinker, strikebreaker, theory of mind, transatlantic slave trade, traveling salesman, trickle-down economics, ultimatum game, Walter Mischel, wikimedia commons, zero-sum game
Obviously, this many pages into the book, I feel that the interaction of reasoning and feeling is key. Have People Really Gotten Less Awful? This has been very contentious. Pinker offers the sound bite “We may be living in the most peaceful era in our species’ existence.” The fact most driving this optimism is that, except for the Balkan wars, Europe has been at peace since 1945, the longest stretch in history. For Pinker, this “Long Peace” represents the West coming to its senses after the ruin of World War II, seeing how the advantages of being a common market outweigh those of being a perpetually warring continent, plus some expanding empathy thrown in on the side. Critics characterize this as Eurocentrism. Western countries may kumbaya one another, but they’ve sure made war elsewhere—France in Indochina and Algeria, Britain in Malaya and Kenya, Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, the USSR in Afghanistan, the United States in Vietnam, Korea, and Latin America.
Moreover, parts of the developing world have been continuously at war for decades—consider the eastern Congo. Most important, such wars have been made bloodier because the West invented the idea of having client states fight proxy wars for them. After all, the late twentieth century saw the United States and USSR arm the warring Somalia and Ethiopia, only to switch to arming the other side within a few years. The Long Peace has been for Westerners. The claim of violence declining steadily over the last millennium also must accommodate the entire bloody twentieth century. World War II killed 55 million people, more than any conflict in history. Throw in World War I, Stalin, Mao, and the Russian and Chinese civil wars, and you’re up to 130 million. Pinker does something sensible that reflects his being a scientist.
Salt by Mark Kurlansky
British Empire, clean water, Deng Xiaoping, domestication of the camel, haute cuisine, Hernando de Soto, Honoré de Balzac, invention of movable type, long peace, Mahatma Gandhi, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route
Alexandre-Balthazar-Laurent Grimod de La Reynière, the eighteenth-century Frenchman said to be the first food journalist, claimed that cheese was a salty snack for drinking. “For those who need to provoke thirst Roquefort cheese deserves more than any other the epithet of the drunkard’s biscuit.” THE BASQUES LEARNED how to make hams in their long war with the Celts and then learned to market them in their long peace with the ham-loving Romans. Jambon de Bayonne, Bayonne ham, was never made in Bayonne but was shipped from the Basque port of Bayonne at the mouth of the Adour River. It has never been clear, however, if the ham is Basque, though the Basques surprise no one by insisting that it is. Modern France has defined the famous jambon de Bayonne, which was first written about in the sixth century, as a product made in the watershed of the Adour, an area including all of French Basque-land and bits of the neighboring regions of Landes, Béarn, and Bigorre.
The article, which also included provocative material, caused a sensation, coloring many of the interview questions that would be fired at Bobby for years after. When, on the heels of Harper’s, widely read British magazine Chess published the article in full, Bobby turned livid and screamed: “Those bastards!” Bobby insisted that most of the article had twisted what he said and used his quotes out of context. For example, he never told Ginzburg that he had to “get rid of his mother.” It’s true that Regina Fischer left the apartment to go on a long peace march, met a man, got married, and settled in England. She did say that Bobby, a highly independent adolescent, was probably better off without her living with him; like many mothers, she was doting and continually trying to help her son, sometimes to the point of exasperating him. She and Bobby both realized that living alone gave him more time to study according to his own time and pace, but Ginzburg’s negative interpretation of their relationship was totally incorrect.
No Such Thing as Society by Andy McSmith
anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Geldof, British Empire, Brixton riot, call centre, cuban missile crisis, Etonian, F. W. de Klerk, Farzad Bazoft, feminist movement, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, full employment, glass ceiling, God and Mammon, greed is good, illegal immigration, index card, John Bercow, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, Live Aid, loadsamoney, long peace, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, mortgage debt, mutually assured destruction, negative equity, Neil Kinnock, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, old-boy network, popular capitalism, Right to Buy, Ronald Reagan, Rubik’s Cube, Sloane Ranger, South Sea Bubble, spread of share-ownership, strikebreaker, The Chicago School, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban decay, Winter of Discontent, young professional
The same longing for something uncontroversial and unifying explains the astonishing popularity of the royal wedding of 1981, and the cult of Princess Diana. It also goes a long way towards explaining the phenomenon of Live Aid, which offered the young a way to be involved in one of the great issues of the time, without being divisive or dull. In 1980, the developed world was cut in two by the military border that ran through Germany, between the communist and capitalist blocs. They had learnt to coexist, but no one knew how long peaceful coexistence could last. The capitalist system was more dynamic and more successful economically than its rival, but once communism took hold of a country, it seemed that nothing could turn it back. No established communist system had ever been dismantled or overthrown from within. People expected this contest between rival systems to continue indefinitely. Instead, they saw it coming to a quick, decisive and non-violent end.
The Power of Gold: The History of an Obsession by Peter L. Bernstein
Albert Einstein, Atahualpa, Bretton Woods, British Empire, California gold rush, central bank independence, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Glaeser, falling living standards, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, Francisco Pizarro, German hyperinflation, Hernando de Soto, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, large denomination, liquidity trap, long peace, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, old-boy network, Paul Samuelson, price stability, profit motive, random walk, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, seigniorage, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route
Unlike the leaders responsible for putting the world back together after World War II, the statesmen and economists of the 1920s were in uncharted territory, without any guide or precedent to help them find their way through the dark wilderness before them. Not a single episode in the history of gold or money recounted so far in this book could have been of much)help. Nothing like the war of 1914-1918 had ever occurred before, in terms of scope, casualties, cost, or pain. It was natural to seek a return to the structure that most people believed had held the world together during the long peace and rising living standards of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, Disraeli's warning notwithstanding. In addition, experience had shown that mistrust in the value of money can have a powerful and destructive impact on social structures, the established order of property ownership, and economic progress. Newfangled experiments in the insecure environment of the postwar world had no attraction for the authorities, and for only a tiny number of the experts, especially in the world of finance.
1946: The Making of the Modern World by Victor Sebestyen
anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, Etonian, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, illegal immigration, imperial preference, land reform, long peace, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, operation paperclip
Allen Lane, London, 2008 French, Patrick, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division. Flamingo, London, 1998 Furet, François (trans. Deborah Furet), The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century. Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL, 1999 Gaddis, John, The Cold War. Allen Lane, London, 2006 ———, George Kennan: An American Life. Penguin, New York, 2011 ———, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. Oxford University Press, New York, 1984 ———, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford University Press, London, 1997 Gellately, Robert, Stalin’s Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 Gieseke, Jens (trans. Mary Carlene Forszt), The GDR State Security: Sword and Shield of the Party. Federal Commissioner, Berlin, 2002 Gleason, Abbot, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War.
Wool Omnibus Edition by Hugh Howey
All with the jangle of mean machines in hands not afraid to use them. It startled Knox, this sudden link to a mysterious past. And it wasn’t that terribly long ago, was it? Less than two hundred years? He imagined, if someone lived as long as Jahns had, or McLain for that matter, that three long lives could span that distance. Three handshakes to go from that uprising to this one. And what of the years between? That long peace sandwiched between two wars? Knox lifted his boots from one step to another, thinking on these things. Had he become the bad people he’d learned about in youth? Or had he been lied to? It hurt his head to consider, but here he was, leading a recreation of something awful. And yet it felt so right. So necessary. What if that former clash had felt the same? Had felt the same in the breasts of the men and women who’d waged it?
Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World by Deirdre N. McCloskey
Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, BRICs, British Empire, butterfly effect, Carmen Reinhart, clockwork universe, computer age, Corn Laws, creative destruction, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Donald Trump, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, endogenous growth, European colonialism, experimental economics, financial innovation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, George Akerlof, germ theory of disease, Gini coefficient, greed is good, Howard Zinn, income per capita, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, invention of air conditioning, invention of writing, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John Snow's cholera map, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, long peace, means of production, Naomi Klein, New Economic Geography, New Urbanism, Paul Samuelson, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Simon Kuznets, Slavoj Žižek, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, transaction costs, tulip mania, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, urban renewal, V2 rocket, very high income, working poor, World Values Survey, Yogi Berra
The average length of the thirteen “principal unified states” in the table of Chinese dynasties from the First Emperor in 221 B.C.E. until the Last in 1911 is 168 years. The three longest of the thirteen were all in the last (potentially innovative) millennium: the Song at 319 years, the Ming at 276, and the (final and in fact reactionary) Qing at 266.63 The long dynasties were not without Revolts of the Three Feudatories or extremely bloody Taiping Rebellions. But on the whole they make the allegedly long “peace” of England look disturbed, and they make the condition of Europe generally (a geographical area and population comparable at the time to China’s) look positively chaotic. The theorists, in the very footnote that inspired Clark (“the original hypothesis that sparked this study” as Clark writes in a paper with Hamilton), claim that “The theory is perfectly applicable for either social or genetic transmission of traits.
The Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge by Matt Ridley
affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Alfred Russel Wallace, altcoin, anthropic principle, anti-communist, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, bitcoin, blockchain, British Empire, Broken windows theory, Columbian Exchange, computer age, Corn Laws, cosmological constant, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of DNA, Donald Davies, double helix, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, Edward Snowden, endogenous growth, epigenetics, ethereum blockchain, facts on the ground, falling living standards, Ferguson, Missouri, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Frederick Winslow Taylor, Geoffrey West, Santa Fe Institute, George Gilder, George Santayana, Gunnar Myrdal, Henri Poincaré, hydraulic fracturing, imperial preference, income per capita, indoor plumbing, interchangeable parts, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kevin Kelly, Khan Academy, knowledge economy, land reform, Lao Tzu, long peace, Lyft, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, mobile money, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, Necker cube, obamacare, out of africa, packet switching, peer-to-peer, phenotype, Pierre-Simon Laplace, price mechanism, profit motive, RAND corporation, random walk, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Satoshi Nakamoto, Second Machine Age, sharing economy, smart contracts, South Sea Bubble, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, women in the workforce
Montesquieu’s phrase for the calming effect of trade on human violence, intolerance and enmity was ‘doux commerce’ – sweet commerce. And he has been amply vindicated in the centuries since. The richer and more market-oriented societies have become, the nicer people have behaved. Think of the Dutch after 1600, the Swedes after 1800, the Japanese after 1945, the Germans likewise, the Chinese after 1978. The long peace of the nineteenth century coincided with the growth of free trade. The paroxysm of violence that convulsed the world in the first half of the twentieth century coincided with protectionism. Countries where commerce thrives have far less violence than countries where it is suppressed. Does Syria suffer from a surfeit of commerce? Or Zimbabwe? Or Venezuela? Is Hong Kong largely peaceful because it eschews commerce?
The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War by Norman Stone
affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, British Empire, central bank independence, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, illegal immigration, income per capita, interchangeable parts, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, long peace, mass immigration, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, new economy, Norman Mailer, North Sea oil, oil shock, Paul Samuelson, Ponzi scheme, popular capitalism, price mechanism, price stability, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, Steve Jobs, strikebreaker, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, V2 rocket, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War, éminence grise
They should be put in the context of David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old (2006), which shows that ‘modernism’ is not what it purports to be. As a general account of the Cold War, I have mainly used a splendid French account, Georges-Henri Soutou’s La Guerre de Cinquante Ans (2001), but another French book, André Fontaine’s Après eux le Déluge, de Kaboul à Sarajevo (1995), covers the last decade or so of Communism, very readably. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (2005), is a very efficient survey, and his The Long Peace (1987) bears re-reading, but see also David Reynolds, One World Divisible (2000). The world of arms negotiations was covered in admirable and dogged fashion by Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era (1998). For the world of 1945, Tony Judt, Postwar (2005), and William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe (2003), complement each other. I wonder if the Communist takeovers can ever be satisfactorily covered.
The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature by Steven Pinker
affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Alfred Russel Wallace, anti-communist, British Empire, clean water, cognitive dissonance, Columbine, conceptual framework, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, cuban missile crisis, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Defenestration of Prague, desegregation, epigenetics, Exxon Valdez, George Akerlof, germ theory of disease, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, Hobbesian trap, income inequality, invention of agriculture, invisible hand, long peace, meta analysis, meta-analysis, More Guns, Less Crime, Murray Gell-Mann, mutually assured destruction, Norman Mailer, Peter Singer: altruism, phenotype, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Potemkin village, prisoner's dilemma, profit motive, QWERTY keyboard, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Bork, Rodney Brooks, Saturday Night Live, speech recognition, stem cell, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the new new thing, theory of mind, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, ultimatum game, urban renewal, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, Yogi Berra, zero-sum game
See also Murray’s afterword in the 1996 paperback edition. 54.Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Jones, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974. 55.Akerlof, 1984; Daly & Wilson, 1994; Jones, 2001; Rogers, 1994. 56.Frank, 1999; Frank, 1985. 57.Bowles & Gintis, 1998; Bowles & Gintis, 1999. 58.Gintis, 2000. 59.Wilkinson, 2000. 60.Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly, Wilson, & Vasdev, 2001; Wilson & Daly, 1997. Chapter 17: Violence 1.Quoted by R. Cooper in “The long peace,” Prospect, April 1999. 2.National Defense Council Foundation, Alexandria, Va., www.ndcf.org/index.htm. 3.Bamforth, 1994; Chagnon, 1996; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Ember, 1978; Ghiglieri, 1999; Gibbons, 1997; Keeley, 1996; Kingdon, 1993; Knauft, 1987; Krech, 1994; Krech, 1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996. 4.Keeley, 1996; Walker, 2001. 5.Gibbons, 1997; Holden, 2000. 6.Fernández-Jalvo et al., 1996. 7.FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1999: www.fbi.gov/ucr/99cius.htm. 8.Seville, 1990. 9.Ortega y Gasset, 1932/1985, epilogue. 10.New York Times, June 13, 1999. 11.Paul Billings, quoted in B.