52 results back to index
Men Without Work by Nicholas Eberstadt
Carmen Reinhart, centre right, deindustrialization, financial innovation, full employment, illegal immigration, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, moral hazard, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population
This, however, is exactly what the president’s CEA seems to have done in its recent report on declining LFPRs for prime-age men in America: SSDI receipt rates have been rising among prime-age men for the last 50 years. Today, 3.3 percent of prime-age men receive SSDI payments. A number of research papers find that increases in the number of people receiving SSDI led to lower labor force participation among the general population . . . and to lower earnings . . . However, from 1967 until 2014, the percentage of prime-age men receiving disability insurance rose from 1 percent to 3 percent, not nearly enough to explain the 7.5-percentage-point decline in the labor force participation rate over that period . . . So while SSDI receipt’s impact on prime-age male labor force participation is negative, under reasonable assumptions it is small and cannot explain more than a portion of the overall decline in participation.7 The CEA’s conclusion hinges on the assumption that SSDI is the only source of disability support available to un-workers today.
., “Long-Term Unemployment and the Great Recession: The Role of Composition, Duration Dependence, and Non-Participation” (working paper, National Bureau of Economc Research, Washington, DC). http://www.nber.org/papers/w20273. 17.Rand Ghayad, “The Jobless Trap,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.692.6736&rep=rep1&type=pdf. CHAPTER 7 1.“The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation,” whitehouse.gov, last modified June 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_cea_primeage_male_lfp.pdf. 2.Ibid., 26–27. 3.Donald O. Parsons, “The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 1. (February 1980), pp. 117–34; Chinhui Juhn “Decline of Male Labor Market Participation: The Role of Declining Market Opportunities,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 79–121, Published by Oxford University Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/211832. 4.Ravi Balakrishnan et al., “Recent U.S.
This same general trend holds for broader groupings of working-age men. For men twenty-to-sixty-four, for example, the numbers not in the labor force more than quintupled between 1965 and 2015, soaring from 3 million to 16 million. While the overall male twenty-to-sixty-four labor force grew by about 1 percent a year over these decades, the ranks of their economically inactive counterparts were swelling more than three times that fast. The labor force participation rate (LFPR)—job holders and job seekers relative to the population from which they are drawn—for prime-age men fell from a monthly average of 96.6 percent in 1965 to just 88.2 percent in 2015. Expressed another way, the proportion of economically inactive men of prime working age leapt from 3.4 percent in 1965 to 11.8 percent in 2015. And for men twenty-to-sixty-four years of age, LFPRs fell from 92.9 percent to 78.8 percent—meaning the economically inactive share of prime-age males tripled, rocketing up from 7 percent to 21 percent.
3D printing, additive manufacturing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, AI winter, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, artificial general intelligence, autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, Bernie Madoff, Bill Joy: nanobots, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Chris Urmson, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, computer age, debt deflation, deskilling, diversified portfolio, Erik Brynjolfsson, factory automation, financial innovation, Flash crash, Fractional reserve banking, Freestyle chess, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, High speed trading, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, informal economy, iterative process, Jaron Lanier, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Khan Academy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour mobility, liquidity trap, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, Lyft, manufacturing employment, McJob, moral hazard, Narrative Science, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, optical character recognition, passive income, performance metric, Peter Thiel, Plutocrats, plutocrats, post scarcity, precision agriculture, price mechanism, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, rent-seeking, reshoring, RFID, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Rodney Brooks, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, single-payer health, software is eating the world, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, stealth mode startup, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Steven Pinker, strong AI, Stuxnet, technological singularity, telepresence, telepresence robot, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Coming Technological Singularity, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, Vernor Vinge, very high income, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, women in the workforce
The participation rate for women peaked at 60 percent in 2000; the overall labor force participation rate peaked at about 67 percent that same year.26 Figure 2.5. Labor Force Participation Rate SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).25 Labor force participation has been falling ever since, and although this is due in part to the retirement of the baby boom generation, and in part because younger workers are pursuing more education, those demographic trends do not fully explain the decline. The labor force participation rate for adults between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four—those old enough to have completed college and even graduate school, yet too young to retire—has declined from about 84.5 percent in 2000 to just over 81 percent in 2013.27 In other words, both the overall labor force participation rate and the participation rate for prime working-age adults have fallen by about three percentage points since 2000—and about half of that decline came before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis.
Karabarbounis and Neiman concluded that these global declines in labor’s share resulted from “efficiency gains in capital producing sectors, often attributed to advances in information technology and the computer age.”23 The authors also noted that a stable labor share of income continues to be “a fundamental feature of macro-economic models.”24 In other words, just as economists do not seem to have fully assimilated the implications of the circa-1973 divergence of productivity and wage growth, they are apparently still quite happy to build Bowley’s Law into the equations they use to model the economy. Declining Labor Force Participation A separate trend has been the decline in labor force participation. In the wake of the 2008–9 economic crisis, it was often the case that the unemployment rate fell not because large numbers of new jobs were being created, but because discouraged workers exited the workforce. Unlike the unemployment rate, which counts only those people actively seeking jobs, labor-force participation offers a graphic illustration that captures workers who have given up. As Figure 2.5 shows, the labor force participation rate rose sharply between 1970 and 1990 as women flooded into the workforce. The overall trend disguises the crucial fact that the percentage of men in the labor force has been in consistent decline since 1950, falling from a high of about 86 percent to 70 percent as of 2013.
Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, “The Global Decline of the Labor Share,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19136, issued in June 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19136.pdf; see also http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/loukas.karabarbounis/research/labor_share.pdf. 23. Ibid., p. 1. 24. Ibid. 25. Labor Force Participation Rate Graph, Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent, Seasonally Adjusted [CIVPART]; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?id=CIVPART; accessed April 29, 2014. 26. Graphs showing the participation rates for men and women can be found at the Federal Reserve Economic Data website; see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LNS11300001 and http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LNS11300002, respectively. 27. A graph of the labor force participation rate for adults twenty-five to fifty-four years of age can be found at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?
3D printing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, airline deregulation, airport security, Apple II, barriers to entry, big-box store, blue-collar work, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, deindustrialization, Detroit bankruptcy, discovery of penicillin, Donner party, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, feminist movement, financial innovation, full employment, George Akerlof, germ theory of disease, glass ceiling, high net worth, housing crisis, immigration reform, impulse control, income inequality, income per capita, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflight wifi, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, invention of air conditioning, invention of the telegraph, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, jitney, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, labor-force participation, Loma Prieta earthquake, Louis Daguerre, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market fragmentation, Mason jar, McMansion, Menlo Park, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, occupational segregation, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, payday loans, Peter Thiel, pink-collar, Productivity paradox, Ralph Nader, Ralph Waldo Emerson, refrigerator car, rent control, Robert X Cringely, Ronald Coase, school choice, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, Skype, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Pinker, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban sprawl, washing machines reduced drudgery, Washington Consensus, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration, yield management
Although more than half of federal government employees were women, they made up 1.4 percent of civil-service workers in the top four pay grades.17 Starting in the mid-1960s, the end of the baby boom resulted in a prolonged period of growth in female labor force participation, as shown in figure 15–2. Despite the baby boom the labor force participation rate (LFPR) for “prime-age” females (aged 25–54) had already inched up from 34.9 percent in 1948 to 44.5 percent in 1964. Then began the period of most rapid growth to 69.6 percent in 1985 and then to a peak of 76.8 percent in 1999, followed by a slow decline to 73.9 percent in 2014. Figure 15–2. Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender, Ages 25 to 54, 1950–2015 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, LNS11300061 and LNS 11300062. Also shown in figure 15–2 is the contrast between the male and female LFPR. After a period of stability between 1948 and 1964, the prime-age male LFPR began to decline very slowly, from 96.8 percent in 1964 to 93.9 percent in 1984, 91.7 percent in 1999, and 88.2 percent in 2014.
Schooling in 1870 was generally limited to elementary school, with few young people extending their education beyond age 12, and even then often dependent on parental willingness to pay for private schooling. Labor-force participation was high for males aged 16–19. The difference between male and female teenagers should be underlined, with 1870 participation rates for ages 16–19 at 76.1 percent for male teenagers but only 29 percent for females. Furthermore, female participation was relatively short-lived and was terminated by the first pregnancy, whereas male participation was continuous from age 15, or even age 12, to the end of the working life. High labor force participation of male teenagers was a matter of necessity. The nuclear family had to provide all the labor needed to raise the crops and maintain the household. Male teenagers worked with their fathers in the fields, and female teenagers helped their mothers with the unending household chores (charts showing the evolution of child labor after 1870 are presented in chapter 8).
The rising share of clerks, sales people, managers, and professionals made the working hours—if not delightful fun—at least less physically taxing than before. And those working hours steadily declined, from a typical sixty-hour work week in 1900 to a typical forty-hour week after 1940. The chapter begins by describing changes in the average work experience of Americans. Labor force participation of adult males declined even as that of females increased. As more people lived beyond age 65 thanks to increasing life expectancy, the concept of retirement was invented.3 For the few males who survived past age 65 in 1870, the male labor force participation rate in the age group 65–75 was an astonishing 88 percent. And as life expectancy was extended, the transformation of life at ages older than 65 took on new importance. The percentage of the population living past their sixty-fifth birthday was only 34 percent in 1870 but jumped to 56 percent in 1940 and then to 77 percent in 2000.4 Just as old age was transformed, so was youth.
The Meritocracy Myth by Stephen J. McNamee
affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, collective bargaining, computer age, conceptual framework, corporate governance, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, estate planning, failed state, fixed income, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, joint-stock company, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, occupational segregation, pink-collar, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, prediction markets, profit motive, race to the bottom, random walk, school choice, Scientific racism, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, white flight, young professional
As with women working outside the home, increasing the number of hours worked per wage earner has upper limits. Delaying Retirement Not only are Americans working more, but they are also working longer over a lifetime. Demographer Murray Gendall (2008) documents that rates of labor-force participation for Americans over sixty-five have sharply increased since the mid-1980s, especially for women. Between 1985 and 2007, Gendall shows that rates of labor-force participation increased among men aged sixty-five to sixty-nine (25 to 34 percent), seventy to seventy-four (15 to 21 percent), and seventy-five and older (7 to 10 percent). Labor-force participation increased among women aged sixty to sixty-four (33 to 48 percent), sixty-five to sixty-nine (14 to 26 percent), seventy to seventy-four (8 to 14 percent), and seventy-five and older (2 to 5 percent). In addition, since 1994, a higher proportion of workers sixty-five or older are working full time.
Relying on Multiple Wage Earners Between 1970 and 2010, the percentage of women aged sixteen and older in the labor force increased from 43 percent to 59 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2011, 1, 8). There are many reasons for the dramatic increase in female labor-force participation, including declining fertility; increasing divorce rates; growth of the service sector, in which women have been historically overrepresented; increasing levels of educational attainment among women; and the changing role of women in society. Another generally acknowledged factor is that women work for the same reason men do: to make ends meet. As prices have increased and wages have remained stagnant, more women have been drawn into the labor force to help make ends meet. Besides a sharp rise in female labor-force participation, there has also been a sharp increase in dual-income families. Among all married couples, those in which both husband and wife work increased from 44 percent of married couples in 1967 to 55 percent of married couples in 2009 (U.S.
That is, in agrarian societies it makes sense to have large families in order to have more potential workers available to work on the family farm. But as societies shift to industrial economies, children become net economic liabilities instead of potential economic assets. In a reinforcing pattern, reduced fertility is also associated with increased labor-force participation among women. That is, as more women work outside the home, they tend to have fewer children, and as women have fewer children, they tend to increase their rates of labor-force participation. While reduced fertility rates have many potential causes, demographers generally agree that economic factors are paramount. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2012, 23), the estimated cost of raising one child to age eighteen without college in 2011 for middle-income husband-wife families was $234,900. Adding the average cost of a four-year public college education for in-state residents in the 2011–2012 academic year of $68,544 (College Board 2012) brings the total tab per child to slightly over $303,444.
Social Capital and Civil Society by Francis Fukuyama
Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, p-value, postindustrial economy, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, transaction costs, World Values Survey
Black male rates of unemployment relative to female rates are higher than comparable rates for whites, further accentuating the relative disadvantages of black men. What happens if we broaden our survey to other OECD countries? Chart 22 plots changes in female labor force participation 422 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values [FUKUYAMA] Social Capital 42 3 against changes in the divorce rate between approximately 1970 and 1990 for eight selected OECD countries. The chart indicates that there is a broad correlation between women moving into the labor force and changes in divorce rates. Chart 23 plots changes in female labor force participation against the 1993 illegitimacy rate for nine OECD countries. The fit here is a bit less good than for divorces, but once again there is a broad correlation between female labor force participation and change in family structure. In both cases the Netherlands and Sweden are outliers. T H E SPECIAL CASE OF J A P A N In the OECD world, Japan presents an interesting case because it has up to this point not experienced the Great Disruption, despite the fact that today it has the world’s second highest per capita income.
The weakening norm of male responsibility reinforced, in turn, the need for women to arm themselves with job skills so as not to be dependent on decreasingly reliable husbands. There is considerable empirical evidence that Becker is right about the importance, to put it crudely, of husbands as economic commodities in marriage markets. Chart 18 shows the changing rate of male v. female labor force participation in the United 57Becker, A Treatise on the Family, pp . 347–61. 4420 2 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values States 1960 and 1995. Not only does female participation jump from 35 to 55 percent in this 35-year period, but male participation actually drops from 7 9 to 71 percent. Chart 19 shows changes in male and female median incomes in the United States between 1947 and 1995. It is interesting to note that male median incomes, after dropping slightly in the immediate postwar period, rise steadily through the late 1960s, after which they stagnate.
As indicated in the previous charts, Japanese divorce rates have edged up slightly over the past two generations, while illegitimacy rates have actually fallen. Crime rates, low to begin with by OECD standards, have also fallen over the same period, as have other social deviance indicators. 424 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Why the Japanese have escaped the disruptions experienced by other developed countries emerges clearly from the data. While Japanese rates of female labor force participation are not unusually low for an OECD country, they mask a much greater economic disparity between men and women. A woman’s decision either to remain unmarried or to raise a family without the benefit of a husband depends not simply on her having a job, but also on her prospects for being self-supporting over a lifetime. A great deal of Japanese female employment is temporary or else represents a form of underemployment.
3D printing, Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population
To drill down into likely changes in the size and talent of the labor pool, watch mainly for shifts in the number of senior citizens, women, migrants, and even robots entering the workforce. Free the Forced Retirees In recent decades the widening impact of population decline has been magnified by a worldwide decline in the labor force participation rate—or the share of working-age adults who are in a job or looking for one. There are some major exceptions to this drop-off in workers, including Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, but the United States is seeing one of the more dramatic declines. In the last fifteen years, the labor force participation rate in the United States has fallen from 67 to 62 percent, much of it coming after the global financial crisis. Without that decline in participation, the U.S. labor force would have had twelve million more workers in 2015. Though some of this shift may be a passing phenomenon, reflecting the millions of unemployed workers who gave up on looking for a job in the frustrating depths of the great recession, the decline in participation would have happened anyway because of aging.
That is true even in Russia, which has a relatively high female labor force participation rate despite Soviet-era laws that close over 450 occupations as “too strenuous for women.” Vladimir Putin signed off on these restrictions when he took power in 2000, and Russian courts upheld them as recently as 2009. In a 2014 survey of 143 emerging countries, the World Bank found that 90 percent have at least one law that limits the economic opportunities available to women. These laws include bans or limitations on women owning property, opening a bank account, signing a contract, entering a courtroom, traveling alone, driving, or controlling family finances.6 Such restrictions are particularly prevalent in the Middle East and South Asia, the regions with the world’s lowest rates of female labor force participation, 26 and 35 percent respectively.
Between 1990 and 2013 only five countries increased their female labor force participation rate by more than 10 percentage points, and all were Latin countries. In first place was Colombia, where the share of adult women active in the workforce rose by 26 percentage points, followed by Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. The reasons for this boom are complex, but one is that Latin educational systems have opened up to women; in Colombia, Profamilia, a private group founded in the 1970s by wealthy women, has played a major role. Profamilia took on the powerful Catholic Church and lobbied for wider access to contraception, so that women could choose to delay childbirth in favor of a career. The fertility rate has dropped sharply, while the female labor force participation rate has skyrocketed. In many countries, all the leaders need to do to reap the economic boost from working women is to lift existing restrictions, which is a lot easier than providing costly new childcare services or generous parental leave.
Amazon Mechanical Turk, Black Swan, brain emulation, Brownian motion, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, complexity theory, computer age, computer vision, cosmological constant, crowdsourcing, dark matter, David Brooks, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deliberate practice, Drosophila, en.wikipedia.org, endowment effect, epigenetics, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Flynn Effect, Freestyle chess, full employment, future of work, game design, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, Isaac Newton, Khan Academy, labor-force participation, Loebner Prize, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microcredit, Narrative Science, Netflix Prize, Nicholas Carr, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, reshoring, Richard Florida, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, statistical model, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Turing test, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, Yogi Berra
On the importance of wage gains for advanced-degree holders, see David Wessel, “Only Advanced-Degree Holders See Wage Gains,” Real Time Economics blog, The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2011, based on work by Matthew Slaughter and related to Census data, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, Current Population Reports,” September 2011, http://www .census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. Chapter 3: Why Are So Many People Out of Work? On these and other factors behind labor force participation, see Willem Van Zandweghe, “Interpreting the Recent Decline in Labor Force Participation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2012. On Belle, see Joe Condon and Ken Thompson, “Belle Chess Hardware,” reprinted in, Computer Chess Compendium (New York: Ishi Press International, 2009), 286–92, David Levy, editor. On nonhuman DJs, see John Roach, “Non-Human DJ Gets Radio Gig,” NBC News,www.today.com/tech/non-human-dj-gets-radio-gig-121286. On various points concerning unemployment and labor force participation, see David Wessel, “What’s Wrong with America’s Job Engine,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2011. See also Brad Plumer, “The Incredible Shrinking Labor Force,” The Washington Post, May 4, 2012.
We may have accepted that machines won’t put everyone out of work, and that the rise of intelligent machines will benefit a lot of us greatly, but there can be little doubt that they will also put a few percent of us out of work for some time to come. Consider what economists call the “labor force participation rate.” It refers to the percentage of people—other than the very young and old—who in fact have jobs. You can see clearly in the chart that it has been going down for some time. Human labor suddenly doesn’t appear so indispensable, does it? Labor force participation depends on numerous factors, including the business cycle, savings, availability of benefits, and lifecycle and gender considerations. But let’s focus on how intelligent machines are likely to make a big difference across the next few decades. And to do that, let’s look at the development of one small subsector in the age of the computer
Our population is growing, but the number of people working continues to fall. This trend was underway well before the recession. Just how rewarding is work these days? The single best number to look at is the labor force participation rate, which circa 2012 showed that around 63 percent of the labor force was looking for work. Yet not all of these individuals have jobs, so the percentage of individuals in the labor force with jobs stands at around 58 percent. That figure hasn’t been so low since the early 1980s. (In those days the number was so low because fewer women wanted to work or had the opportunity to work.) Those numbers on labor force participation are telling us that, for whatever reason, over 40 percent of adult, non-senior Americans don’t consider it worthwhile to have a job. They can’t find a deal that suits them.
3D printing, call centre, clean water, dematerialisation, demographic transition, Edward Glaeser, extreme commuting, feminist movement, financial independence, Firefox, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, late capitalism, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, McMansion, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, oil shock, PageRank, Ponzi scheme, positional goods, post-industrial society, Post-materialism, post-materialism, principal–agent problem, recommendation engine, Richard Florida, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, statistical model, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, women in the workforce, Yom Kippur War
Add in divorce—and even more important, the formation and demise of cohabiting relationships—and you’ve got a lot of household income drops having nothing to do with employers wielding the ax more often. According to Dr. Jeffrey Timberlake, for example, about a quarter of American children experience two or more mothers’ partners by the time they are fifteen!7 Over 8 percent experience three or more maternal domestic partners! That’s a lot of earning power coming and going (not to mention emotional turmoil). Over and above the part that female labor force participation plays in family income fluctuation, the increasingly important role that women play in the economic life of a family forms the bedrock of the real story of middle-class anxiety. That’s because household labor—most notably child care—has not gotten any easier in the meantime. Blending work and home responsibilities is no easy feat, especially in a 24/7 service economy that allows many of us to work from home at all hours.
Perhaps more critically, this dynamic contributes to the intravidualism phenomenon by fragmenting and dispersing one’s attentions—physical, emotional, familial. And as we all know, it’s hard to put something back together once it has shattered into a million pieces. The next chapter details the concrete changes that led us little by little from the social ethic of the 1950s to the Elsewhere Ethic of intravidualism today. As we shall see, there is no one trend— the rise of computers, increasing female labor force participation, suburbanization—that can get us from there to here. Just as it is the intersection of the economic red shift, the portable workshop, and the price society—and not any of these alone— that creates this new social landscape, so it is a series of parallel and interrelated historical steps that has fundamentally altered the everyday experience of many professionals in America over the last fifty years.
Today, almost two thirds of women with children under six years of age work (63 percent); by contrast, the figure was just over one third (39 percent) in 1975.39 Instead of cooking for their families, many low-wage women now reheat preprocessed food for other families in the restaurant industry. Instead of waiting on their own husband and kids, many women without college degrees wait on your kids. (Waitressing is, in fact, the number one profession for women without a college education.)40 This story of women’s rising labor force participation has the potential to increase economic inequality when it combines with what demographers call assortative mating—otherwise known as like-marrying-like. That is, since 1967, the demographer Christine Schwartz demonstrates that among two-earner couples, the similarity in their wages has risen by about threefold. In other words, whereas women used to look for good earners to marry, now men do so, too.
Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador: Stability, Growth, and Social Equity by Paul Ely Beckerman, Andrés Solimano
banking crisis, banks create money, barriers to entry, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, central bank independence, centre right, clean water, currency peg, declining real wages, disintermediation, financial intermediation, floating exchange rates, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, land reform, London Interbank Offered Rate, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, offshore financial centre, open economy, pension reform, price stability, rent-seeking, school vouchers, seigniorage, trade liberalization, women in the workforce
During periods of insecurity and uncertainty, important household coping strategies include increasing family members’ labor-force participation either by working longer hours at the same job or by mobilizing new household members—mostly women and boys—to enter the paid labor force. Economically Active Population In Ecuador, women’s participation in the labor force remains lower than that of men, even though female participation has increased over the decades. From 1970 to 1990, the female proportion of the economically active population (EAP) increased from 14 to 19 percent, whereas the male proportion decreased from 74 percent to 69 percent. Women’s labor-force participation is greater in urban areas. By 1998, 46 percent of urban women were economically active, the proportion having increased from 44 percent in 1993 according to INEC.
Of all children age 12 to 14 years in the bottom quintile, 34 percent work and attend CRISIS AND DOLLARIZATION IN ECUADOR 144 Figure 4.7 Ecuador: Gender Gap in Education Years of school attainment 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Per-capita expenditure quintiles Female Q5 Male Note: Refers to years of school attainment of population 24 years and older. Source: ECV 1999. school, and another 26 percent only work, resulting in an overall labor force participation rate of 60 percent (as shown in figure 4.9), up from 54 percent in 1998. Child labor undoubtedly contributes to the high rate of school absenteeism for children in the bottom quintile. Even before the most recent crisis, children age 12 to 14 years reported missing classes more than half the time, and even children age 6 to 11 years reported missing classes about one-third of the time.
According to Cunningham’s analysis of the Mexican labor force, single mothers begin to work in response to realized negative shocks to income, but their entry is less elastic than that of wives. On the other hand, similar to husbands, single women’s labor-force entry is not subject to economic fluctuations. In the case of Argentina, Gill and Pessino (1998) used aggregate data to show that labor-force participation rates of Argentine women, especially young women, are counter-cyclical, that is, women are more likely to be in the labor market when male unemployment rates are higher (cited in World Bank 2000c).27 Ecuadoran households unable to mobilize wives’ labor tend to be poorer (World Bank 1996). According to the most recent poverty study in CRISIS AND DOLLARIZATION IN ECUADOR 198 Table 5.5 Unemployed Population by Relationship with Household Head (Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca Averages from March 1998 to March 2000) Relation Men (percent) Household head Spouse Son/daughter Son/daughter-in-law Parents or in-laws Grandson/daughter Other relative Not related Total 27.0 1.2 57.4 2.3 0.1 3.5 6.5 1.9 100.0 Women (percent) 8.8 33.1 44.6 3.6 0.4 1.2 6.7 1.5 100.0 Total (percent) 17.0 18.7 50.4 3.0 0.3 2.3 6.6 1.7 100.0 Source: INFOPLAN based on Urban Employment Survey (Larrea and Sánchez 2001).
Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders by Jason L. Riley
affirmative action, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, guest worker program, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, lump of labour, open borders, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, school choice, Silicon Valley, trade liberalization, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population
“To what extent did the influx of immigrants entering Southern California in the 1970s reduce the jobs available to nonimmigrant workers?” wrote Thomas Muller, the study’s author. “The answer for the 1970s is little if at all,” he concluded. “Despite mass immigration to Southern California, unemployment rates rose less rapidly than in the remainder of the nation.” Muller also found that labor-force participation rates among natives seemed to be unaffected, and “the participation rate for both blacks and whites was higher in Southern California [where the bulk of immigrants settled] than elsewhere in the state and the nation.” In 1994 economist Richard Vedder of Ohio University, working with Lowell Gallaway and Stephen Moore, conducted a historical analysis of immigration’s impact on the entire U.S. labor force.
Even so, it would be foolhardy to argue that 60 percent of Americans are fiscally expendable and that the United States would be better off without them because they don’t “pay their way.” Such reductionism ignores the propensity of foreign workers to save and start new businesses at higher rates than natives, which contributes to the economic welfare of the nation. Low-skill immigrants also have a higher labor-force participation rate than natives and a lower rate of unemployment. Lower-income workers, whether foreign-born or American, enable large sectors of the economy—farming, construction, manufacturing, health care—to function and grow. And in the process they create job opportunities for the rest of us. SNOUTS AT THE TROUGH? We sometimes refer in the United States to the presence of the “welfare state,” but that term needs context.
Most do not come in the expectation of living on welfare.” After all, says Jacoby, “if you’re going to be unemployed, it’s much better to be unemployed at home than in the United States. It’s usually warmer at home and less expensive to live, and you are likely to be surrounded by a network of supportive family and friends.” Jacoby is spot-on, according to the economic data used to gauge an immigrant’s intentions. The labor force participation rate, which measures the percent of the working-age population that is employed or seeking employment, is the strongest indication that immigrants come here to work and not to idle. Among foreign nationals generally, labor participation rates are higher than that of natives (69 percent versus 66 percent in 2006) and jobless rates are lower (4.0 percent versus 4.7 percent in 2006). This disparity only increases with respect to Hispanic males, who boast the highest labor-participation rate of any group in the country.
Investment: A History by Norton Reamer, Jesse Downing
Albert Einstein, algorithmic trading, asset allocation, backtesting, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Brownian motion, buttonwood tree, California gold rush, capital asset pricing model, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, colonial rule, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, discounted cash flows, diversified portfolio, equity premium, estate planning, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, family office, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial innovation, fixed income, Gordon Gekko, Henri Poincaré, high net worth, index fund, interest rate swap, invention of the telegraph, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, land tenure, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, Louis Bachelier, margin call, means of production, Menlo Park, merger arbitrage, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Network effects, new economy, Nick Leeson, Own Your Own Home, pension reform, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, random walk, Renaissance Technologies, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Sand Hill Road, Sharpe ratio, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, statistical arbitrage, technology bubble, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, time value of money, too big to fail, transaction costs, underbanked, Vanguard fund, working poor, yield curve
Perhaps it is that urban labor caused more distinct physical strain than that faced in agriculture, or perhaps it is a greater breadth of opportunities available to an older individual in urban environments. Whatever the reason, it is true that the labor force participation rates for those on farms were higher than for those not on farms. As the number of individuals involved in the agricultural sector declined over this period, there was a resultant aggregate level increase in retirement. Estimating the degree to which declines in the agricultural sector were responsible essentially involves comparing the actual aggregate labor force participation rate to the theoretical value if the proportions of men in agriculture and nonagriculture had not changed from 1880 to 1940. Retirement and Its Funding 105 This exercise suggests that about 22 percent of the decrease in labor force participation rate among elderly males is attributable to agriculture, an important but not exclusive driver of this trend.12 A second explanation, and even more pronounced in effect, is that higher incomes over this period drove the ability of individuals to retire.
There has also been growth in the length of retirement. This, too, is a worthwhile trend to study, as it is the length of retirement that determines what one needs to have saved. What has driven the elongation of retirement? Is it a drop in labor force participation rate at ever-earlier ages, or is it the decreases in mortality? To begin to answer this question, there are two noteworthy points to consider: average total life expectancy for those who had reached twenty years of age grew from less than sixty-two years in 1900 to more than seventy-three years in 1990. Over this same interval, there was a drastic drop in the labor force participation rate of older Americans, from 65 percent to just 15 percent of men over the age of sixtyﬁve by 1993. Both aspects—increased life expectancy and an earlier exit from work—have contributed to longer retirement.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE What, then, precipitated the shift from this premodern retirement to today’s form? The seeds were sown in large part by a series of changes, both economic and demographic. There is no clear consensus on precisely what drove the large increases in retirement rates observed from 1880 to 1940, though a variety of explanations have been offered. What is known is that the rate of retirement increased quite materially over this time period. In 1880, the labor force participation rate for males between sixty and seventy-nine years of age was 86.7 percent, and by 1940 this declined to 59.4 percent.11 We offer two possible explanations for this important shift. One trend that is partly responsible is the decline in the agricultural sector over this period. The argument in support of the importance of this explanation is that retirement is, on average, more of an urban industrial phenomenon than a rural farming phenomenon.
accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, capital controls, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, credit crunch, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, ending welfare as we know it, feminist movement, full employment, gender pay gap, George Gilder, glass ceiling, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, half of the world's population has never made a phone call, income inequality, indoor plumbing, Internet Archive, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, manufacturing employment, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Naomi Klein, new economy, occupational segregation, pets.com, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, Telecommunications Act of 1996, telemarketer, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, union organizing, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Y2K
Of course, it's not just individual workers who are putting in longer hours; an ever-larger share of the adult population has entered the paid workforce—mainly women, who aren't getting much relief in their household labors to compensate for their increased presence in factories and offices. labor force participation rates, 1890 1 007or 0% 1 907o 857o 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 r men, 1955-2003 707o«— >■ 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 The labor force participation rate is the share of the population either at work or actively looking for work—the sum of the employed and officially unemployed. Dots and broken lines in the first chart signify that the readings were only taken at long intervals and that pre-1950 readings are not strictly comparable to post-1 950.
See GDP Grubman,Jack, 197-198 happiness, 168 Hardt, Michael, 180-186 Harris, Jerry, 175—176 Hayek, Friedrich, 174 hedonic pricing, 44 Henderson, David, 179 Hilferding, Rudolf, 181 HITEK2, 52-54 household structures and poverty, 112 household vs. family, 237 Huws, Ursula, 28 idealab, 201 imperialism Lenin on, 181 privatized, 169 import-substitution industrialization, 170, 220 income household, median, 87-88 and productivity, 45, 56 income distribution discrimination and, 94-101 educational attainment and, 99—100 global, 127-133 health consequences, 81—82 historical perspective, 82-90 long view, 82—84 recent view, 84—90 increasing returns to skill, 86—87 international comparisons, 133—141 in New Economy hotbeds, 103 productivity and, 46 race and, 90-91, 93,98-99 race and sex together, 93—94 sex and, 91-93,95-97 voting and, 81 see also poverty income mobility, 80,114-118 international comparisons of, 136-138 inequality globahzation and, 152—155 increase in, ubiquity of, 116—117 as poUtical issue, 79-81 265 see also income distribution; wealth distribution inflation, 42 pobticaJ analysis, 204—206 initial pubUc offerings (IPOs), 187-188 fees, 201 innovation, 17 historical perspective, 54—55 intangibles, 204 accounting for, 17—22,232 intellectual property, 229, 231 interest, source of, 203 International Fonim on Globalization, 160-162 Internet bubble, natural history, 188-189 and New Economy, 24—26 public subsidy, 6 IQ, corporate America's, 21-22 irrational exuberance, 7 Jameson, Fredric, 27-28 Jencks, Christopher, 75 Jensen, Michael, 203 Jessop, Bob, 147 jobs of the future, 71—74 job skills, 73-77 Jorgenson, Dale, 51, 57 Kahn, Lawrence, 97 Kaldor paradox, 158 Kalecki, Michal, 206 KeUy Kevin, 24, 79 Kemp, Jack, 230 Kennedy Ted, 208 Kennickell, Arthur, 119 Kenworthy, Lane, 135—136 Keynes, John Maynard, 148-149,188,219 Klein, Naomi, 18 Knight, Phil, 159 Korten, David, 162-169,173 Kovel,Joel, 174 Krueger,Anne O., 149 Kuznets, Simon, 83 labor class war, 208-209,227 fear among workers, 206-207, 215—216 inputs, 45, 57 quality, 58 war on, 208-209 labor force participation rate, 40 Labor Notes, 25 Lawrence, Robert Z., 145 Lay, Kenneth, 33 Lenin, V. I., 181 Lev, Baruch, 17-22,232 leveraged buyouts, 214 Hberal welfare states, 139-143 Uteracy, 165 localist critiques of globahzation, 159—165 Lovink, Geert, 38 low-wage work, international comparisons, 137-138 Lucas, Adrian, 38 Luxembourg Income Study, 133 Mahathir, 170 Malthusianism, 161,166 management by stress, 25 Mander, Jerry, 162 market democracy, 22 Martin, William McChesney, 7 Mason, Patrick, 99 Mayer, Susan, 75 McKinsey Global Institute, 64-68 McNeU,John, 100,110 Means, Gardiner, 212 means-testing, politics of, 141—142 measurement issues, 42-45, 58—60 Meeker, Mary, 199-200 Mexico Index default, 1982,209 external finance and 1994 crisis, 222 Milanovic, Branko, 128,130-132 Milken, Michael, 199 Milliken, Roger, 170 mobility.
See income Wal-Mart, 64-67 war and income distribution, 83 and mflation, 205 wealth distribution, 118-127 forfee5 400,119-121 historical perspective, 121 race and, 125—126 residence and, 122 staying power of savings and, 124-125 stock options and, 126-127 weighdessness, 27—28 Enron and, 33—34 vs. need for infrastructure, 16-17, 30-31 Welch, Finis, 80 welfare states economic growth and, 135—136 and poverty, 138 typology, 139-143 White, Harry Dexter, 219 Whitman, Meg, 199 wholesale trade, 64—66 widgets, 42 Wildlands Project, 161 Williams, Raymond, 164-165 Wired, failed IPO, 188 women labor force participation, 40 lesser quaHty of, 58 work, end of, 68-71 workers. See labor workload international comparisons, 40—41 productivity, 39-41 work hours, 67 WorldCom, 197 Worldwatch Institute, 166 World Economic Forum, 6,175—178 World Social Forum, 185 World Trade Orgamzation, 32,160,170 WorldWarII,205 Wriston, Walter, 22 X4HTK2, 53-54 Young & Rubicam, 18 J^i ^0 LONr^pp .^ '. i.iinued from front flap) After the New Economy offers an accessible and entertaining account of the less-than-lustrous reality beneath the gloss of the 1990s boom, stripping bare the extravagant pretension of unrestrained entrepreneurial hubris and revealing how it contributed to the making of a new anti-capitalist global movement.
Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy by Kevin Mellyn
banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, disintermediation, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Home mortgage interest deduction, index fund, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, lump of labour, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, mobile money, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, Real Time Gross Settlement, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Coase, seigniorage, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Steve Jobs, The Great Moderation, the payments system, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, underbanked, Works Progress Administration, yield curve, Yogi Berra
This consensus led to the landmark welfare reforms of that decade. However, that was against the background of an economic boom driven by the ﬁnancial economy, a “dot-com” bubble in new technologies, and pro-market reforms of the 1980s. Record labor-force participation during the dot-com boom made the so-called “welfare to work” requirements embedded in the reforms aimed at limiting the time people could receive beneﬁts without seeking work or training appear feasible and in the best interest of people mired in poverty. Indeed, welfare rolls fell sharply in the boom economy of the 1990s. The picture today could scarcely be more different. Labor-force participation rates have fallen to levels not seen in over three decades—down to 64 percent from 67.4 percent—with perhaps one potential worker in ﬁve unemployed or underemployed. These realities are hidden from the public by the perverse way the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates unemployment, which is based only on persons actively seeking work during the survey period.
In countries such as Italy and France, the chance for these outsiders to become insiders is very small, but the liberalization of labor markets needed to change this is politically toxic. Below the outsiders, large swaths of the working-age Broken Markets population live on government assistance programs, partially because beneﬁts are generous enough to make such a life about as comfortable as the employed life of the outsiders with far less effort. A statistic called the labor force participation rate is telling. In the United States before 2008, this often ran as high as 68 percent, meaning that the nearly seven out of ten adults below retirement age were in the labor market. By contrast, many European countries had only between ﬁve and six out of ten adults working. The rest lived off the state or in the shadows. Of course, this structure is only possible because the insiders paid very high direct taxes (so called value-added taxes of 20 percent or more are common) and income taxes at rates well above US levels.
w 163 I Index A C Anglo-Saxon capitalism, 84 Card Act, 68, 70 Anglo-Saxon-type banking systems, 156 CHIPS.See Clearing House Interbank Payment System Asset securitization, 66 Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now (ACORN), 65 Austerity deﬁnition, 98 Euro, real uniﬁcation, 99 Germany, 99–101 B BankAmericard, 29 Bankcard association/card scheme, 29 Bank-centric system, 110 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 108 Basel III process, 50–51 Basel process, 27–28 Basel standards, 61 Bipartisan government policy, 72 Boom optimistic entrepreneurs, 77 Bretton Woods system, 26, 111 Bureaucracies, 21 Civilization, 64 Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), 106, 107 Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 108 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 65–66 Consumer banking BankAmericard, 29 bankcard association/card scheme, 29 branch-based customer relationship, 29 credit card industry, 30 Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, 33 “diseconomies of scale”, 35 FDIC, 34 four-party model, 29 institutional investors, 34 “market-centric” ﬁnancial system, 33 merchant/customer relationship, 29 Pac-Man banking, 34 risky business, 31–33 RTC, 31 SEC, 33 S&L industry, 28, 30 1 166 Index Consumer banking (continued) statistical analysis, 30 US “ﬂow-of-funds” data, 28 usury laws, 30 Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), 68 Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), 108 Creative destruction, 85 Credit-driven economy, 76–77 Crony capitalism, 85 Cross-Paciﬁc economy, 97 D Debtor Nation, 64 Dirigisme, 83 Dollar-centric ﬁnancial system, 112 Durbin Amendment, 70 E ECB.See European Central Bank Economic consequences, ﬁnancial regulation, 55 bank P & Ls and balance sheets bureaucratic regulation, 59 capital allocation, 57 capitalism, 57 clearinghouse/transaction switch, 58 contradictory rules, 59 creative destruction, 63 free-market capitalism, 57 full-blown panic leading, 57 lender-of-last-resort function, 58 payments system, 58–59 private-sector banks, 58 consumer protection vs. access, 67–68 ﬁnancial access restriction brick-and-mortar branches, 66 civilization, 64 clearinghouse, 63 CRA, 65–66 credit judgments, 65 economic enfranchisement, 64 government paternalism, 65 joint-stock banks, 63 loan securitization, 66 mass-market retail banking, 66 national and multilateral development agencies, 65 non-credit worthy segments, 66 ownership society, 66 paychecks, 64 premium/reward cards, 66 individual banker accountability, 55 interest reduction, 56 predatory lending, 56 product differentiation, 68–69 public utility, 55, 56 regulatory, capital, and litigation costs, 56 regulatory compliance and fraud losses, 56 savers and investors, 71–73 shell game asset-securitization process, 61 commercial and industrial loans, 62 credible assessment, 62 Dodd-Frank Act, 63 Federal Reserve Bank, 63 free-market creative destruction, 63 globalization, 62–63 Great Depression, 61 Great Moderation, 61 least-regulated jurisdictions, 61 regulatory arbitrage, 61 relationship banking, 62 retail banking revolution, 63 return-on-equity business, 62 rules-based regulation, 61 securitization and market-based funding, 63 supervision vs. rule making, 59–60 unbanking, 70–71 utility-style banking, 56 European Central Bank (ECB), 6, 99, 102–103 F Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 34 Index Federal Reserve, 101 Finance consumers, 117 American Revolutionary War song, 118 bondholders and money market funds, 138 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 126 business-to-business commerce, 119 consumerism, 118 credit score, 120–121 debt free, 138–139 “dot-com” bubble, 1264 employment and consumer credit, 121–122 Gallup polling organization, 127 Great Society, 126 house prices, 133 “infrastructure”, 119 innovation and education, America advantage, 129 American living standards, 129 global success, 128 high-stakes examinations, 130 industrial policy, 128 student loans, 131 mass-market pottery, 119 money saving, 136–137 New Class, new elite educated caste, 132–133 non-tradable private sector, 127 one’s station in life, 118 overseas trade, 119 pent-up demand, 119 private-sector employment, 125 property taxes, 127 “self-liquidating”, deﬁnition, 119 shelter asset bubbles and distorts markets, 133 electoral process, 134 Japanese economy, 135–136 retirement plans and ﬁnancial advisors, 134 Travellers Club, 133 wealth effect, 133 short-term insurance scheme, unemployment assistance, 127 stock market, 137–138 structural unemployment American economy, 123–125 labor force participation rate, 123 labor markets, Europe, 122 solidarity, 123 three-tiered system, 122 subsidy-based industries, 125 super-safe government debt, 125 technological creativity and economic progress, 117 unionized public-service employees, 125 US job growth, 126 “welfare to work” requirements, 126 You, Inc., 139 Finance-driven economy, 1, 72 anti-capitalism, 2 capitalism, 1 chronic debt crisis, 22 corporate America, 20 current movie artiﬁcial bank earnings, 7 asset prices, 6 banking implosions, 6 borrowers and investors connection, 10 borrowing demand, 7 catastrophic ﬁnancial bubble, 10 civilization, 10 corporatism, 9 democratic crony capitalism, 9 Dodd-Frank act, 8 economic growth and social stability, 10 ﬁnancial repression, 9 Glass-Steagall Act, 8 human ingenuity, 10 interbank funding markets, 6 low interest rates and easy money, 6 market collapse, 10 money market, 6 overexuberence, 6 overinvestment and speculation, 6 pre-crisis conditions, 8 printing money, 7 private capital, 7 167 168 Index Finance-driven economy (continued) proﬁtability, 7 quantitative easing, 8 recovery, 8 regulation, 8 regulatory capital rules, 8 resources and tools, 9 shell-shocked enterprises and households, 8 end of employment, 21–22 ﬁnancial leverage magic and poison CEO class, 14–15 consumer debt, 15–16 disconnection problem, 11–12 market bargain, 10 real economy, 10 wealth ﬁnancialization, 13–14 working capital, 11 global ﬁnancial crisis, 2 Great Moderation, 16–18 Great Panic, 18–19 household sector agony, 19–20 investor class, 22 Marx, Karl asset bubble, 5 cash nexus, 4 dot-com bubble, 5 economic revolution, 3 First World War, 4 free markets, 3 French Revolution, 3 globalization, 3 Great Depression, 5 liberalism, 3 normalcy, 4 overproduction and speculation, 3 Wall Street, 4, 5 revolutionary socialism, 2 sovereign debt, 8, 22 Finance reconstruction, 142 bank bashing, 146 “bankers”, 142 business model, challenges, 145 Citigroup, 145 cyclical businesses, 143 government management, 142 legitimacy bonus culture, 148–150 privileged opportunity, longestablished bank, 146 short-term share-price manipulation, 148 state and legal systems, 147 stock price, 147 mark-to-market price, 144 “producers”, 143 profession, deﬁnition, 163 prudence, 145, 161–163 root-and-branch transformation, 145 talent pool, 144 “the race for talent”, 143 trust cash management, 160 Financial Market Meltdown, 159 FSA, 159 hackneyed term, 159 information asymmetry, 159 non-bank ﬁnancial service provider, 161 oversold/up-sold products, 159 utility Anglo-Saxon-type banking systems, 156 big data tools, 158 bills-of-exchange market, 150 branch and payment services, 157 clearinghouse creation, 158 core banking, 154 economic value transmission, 150 exchange of claims, 151 fee-income growth, 155 ﬁat money system, 151 ﬁnancial intermediation, 150 ﬁnancial transactions, 157 ﬂexible contractor/subcontractor relationship, 158 information technology, 156 “liquidity premium”, 152 multidivisional/M-form organization, 153 non-interest income, 155 old-media companies, 157 Index overhead value analysis, 154 “privileged opportunity”, 152 quill pen–era practice, 158 sheer utility value, 155 silos, product business, 153 transaction accounts, 152 venture capital industry, 142 “War for Talent”, 143 Financial crises, 23 affordable housing, 24 banking “transmission” mechanism, 43 Basel III process, 50–51 basel process, 27–28 consumer banking(see Consumer banking) Dodd-Frank, 49–50 domestic banking system, 38 European Union, 51–53 FDIC, 40 ﬁnance-driven economy’s leverage machine, 43 Financial Market Meltdown, 25 GDP, 38 Government Policy and Central Banks, market meltdown(see Regulation process) government policy failure, 45 “government-sponsored” public companies, 24 Great Depression, 44 GSEs, 24 legal missteps, 47–48 New Deal, 43 panic-stricken markets, 40 political missteps, 45–47 Ponzi scheme, 42 postwar ﬁnancial order, 25–27 printing money, 38 private proﬁts and socialized losses, 40 private-sector demand, 43 public-sector demand, 42 quantitative approach, 25 TARP, 39 too-big-to-fail institutions, 41 Triple A bonds, 41 US Federal Reserve System, 38 Financial liberalization, 89 Financial Market Meltdown, 25, 61, 89, 109, 159 Financial repression, 9, 78, 111 Financial Services Authority (FSA), 60, 159 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 69 Fordism, 68 Free-market capitalism, 89 Free markets, 3 French Revolution, 3 Front-end trading systems, 107 FSA.See Financial Services Authority G GDP, 11 “Giro” payments systems, 151 Global imbalance, 96 Globalization, 3 Global whirlwinds, 93 Asia, ﬁnance movement cultural differences, 110–111 Financial Market Meltdown, 109 Interest Equalization Tax, 109 language, law, and business culture, 109 primacy, 109 austerity(see Austerity) British Empire, 30 Chimerica, 97 China and United States cross-Paciﬁc economy, 97 foreign interference and aggression, 98 headline growth rates, 97 repression revolution and series, 97–98 Second World War, 98 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 98 surpluse trade, 97 sustainable development, 98 Chinese ascendancy, 113 clearing and settlement bottleneck, 106–107 Dynastic China, 112 169 Download from Wow!
Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Black Swan, business intelligence, Carmen Reinhart, cognitive bias, correlation does not imply causation, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, lake wobegon effect, Long Term Capital Management, Mercator projection, Mercator projection distort size, especially Greenland and Africa, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Nate Silver, obamacare, p-value, PageRank, pattern recognition, randomized controlled trial, risk-adjusted returns, Ronald Reagan, statistical model, The Signal and the Noise by Nate Silver, Tim Cook: Apple, wikimedia commons, Yogi Berra
But that’s not what some people want to hear—they just want a number. As Brown explained, “most economists understand that what we are really doing is making ‘projections’ rather than ‘predictions.’ In other words, we can be reasonably comfortable in modeling how the system’s finances will evolve if fertility or mortality or labor force participation evolves in a particular way. But we are much less comfortable stating with any certainty that fertility or mortality or labor force participation will move in a particular way.” But unless someone has been trained in statistics (or has read this book!) these types of subtleties and nuances may not mean much to them. “As a result,” noted Brown, “we often see situations in which people express surprise or disappointment or even anger when a policy does not have exactly the predicted effect, even in cases where the outcome is well within the confidence interval that would have applied to the initial estimate.” 221158 i-xiv 1-210 r4ga.indd 130 2/8/16 5:58:50 PM Predicting Disaster 131 Heads I Win, Tails You Lose Many of the forecasts we have discussed so far are deterministic: forecasts in which you determine a precise outcome.
In fact, when she and a colleague looked into this further, they found “no evidence that groups with more exposure to the stock market (like college-educated workers) were retiring later than other workers during bust years and earlier during boom years.” They also found that the number of workers who had enough stock assets for the decline in the market to affect their retirement decision was too small to explain changes in the size of the labor force. In the end, explained Coile, “even though the story sounded plausible, the stock market was less important than other factors in explaining changes in labor force participation during this time.” As you’re consuming your everydata, keep in mind that skilled magazine writers, TV producers, and advertising copywriters know how to manipulate words, because their job is to get your attention. Don’t fall for it. Read every word. Think about what they’re saying—and what they’re not saying. For example, let’s say you’re a reporter at a magazine. One day, you read about a study that finds a correlation between eating brownies and gaining weight.
Wealth and Poverty: A New Edition for the Twenty-First Century by George Gilder
affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, capital controls, cleantech, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equal pay for equal work, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Gilder, Home mortgage interest deduction, Howard Zinn, income inequality, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, medical malpractice, minimum wage unemployment, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, non-fiction novel, North Sea oil, paradox of thrift, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, price stability, Ralph Nader, rent control, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, skunkworks, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, volatility arbitrage, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, yield curve
But the leading young blacks of 1957 did not choose these arduous routes. There was some problem of motivation or psychology, and like most such problems it originates not at the job but in the family, specifically with their wives, a group that suffered far less from credentialism. Black women in 1957 had substantially higher IQs, more years in school, more college degrees, and much lower labor force participation than black men. During the next twenty years, they increased their labor force participation by 40 percent. At the same time, they improved their median incomes, occupational status, and penetration of high-level positions at a rate more than three times as fast as black men did. Beginning with incomes around 50 percent of the incomes of black men and 57 percent of the incomes of white women, black women ended the period by earning more than 80 percent of black male incomes and 99 percent of the white female level.15 In the class of blacks represented by the leading male earners of 1957, black women increased their number of college faculty positions by a factor of four, to a level just 15 percent below the number of male faculty, and they moved massively into nursing, teaching, and government work.
Credentialism moved through the American work place and entrenched itself ever more deeply in the government bureaucracies where many blacks were employed. This fifties generation had been educated mostly in Southern schools, which were often closed as much as one-third more days than white schools. Most blacks of that generation left high school to work. As teenagers in the late forties, their labor force participation levels were higher and their unemployment rates were lower than those of their white contemporaries. Their long years in the work force were paying off for some of them by the mid-fifties. But they had received far fewer and less intensive years of education. When the mystique of civil rights lured many into government work, they were trapped by civil service in much the way the Irish before them had been trapped by the seductions of patronage.
The Rise of the Network Society by Manuel Castells
Apple II, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, borderless world, British Empire, capital controls, complexity theory, computer age, Credit Default Swap, declining real wages, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, dematerialisation, deskilling, disintermediation, double helix, Douglas Engelbart, edge city, experimental subject, financial deregulation, financial independence, floating exchange rates, future of work, global village, Hacker Ethic, hiring and firing, Howard Rheingold, illegal immigration, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, information retrieval, intermodal, invention of the steam engine, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job-hopping, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, megacity, Menlo Park, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, packet switching, planetary scale, popular electronics, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, social software, South China Sea, South of Market, San Francisco, special economic zone, spinning jenny, statistical model, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, the medium is the message, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, urban renewal, urban sprawl
For Emma Kiselyova-Castells, without whose love, work, and support this book would not exist Figures 2.1 Productivity growth in the United States, 1995–1999 2.2 Estimate of evolution of productivity in the United States, 1972–1999 93 2.3 Growth in trade and capital flows, 1970–1995 2.4 Goods in international trade by level of technological intensity, 1976/1996 2.5 Foreign direct investment 2.6 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 1992–1997 2.7 Export shares 2.8 Share of growth from high-tech sector in the United States, 1986–1998 2.9 Declining dividends payments 4.1 Percentage of the United States’ population that is foreign-born, 1900–1994 4.2 Total fertility rates for nationals and foreigners in selected OECD countries 4.3 Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999 4.4 Part-time workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1998 4.5 Self-employed workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1993 4.6 Temporary workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1997 4.7 Non-standard forms of employment in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1994 4.8 Employment in the temporary help industry in the United States, 1982–1997 4.9 Percentage of working-age Californians employed in “traditional” jobs, 1999 4.10 Distribution of working-age Californians by “traditional” job status and length of tenure in the job, 1999 4.11 The Japanese labor market in the postwar period 4.12 Annual growth of productivity, employment, and earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998 5.1 Media sales in 1998 for major media groups 5.2 Strategic alliances between media groups in Europe, 1999 5.3 Internet hosts, 1989–2006 5.4 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city worldwide, July 1999 5.5 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in North America, July 1999 5.6 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in Europe, July 1999 5.7 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in Asia, July 1999 6.1 Largest absolute growth in information flows, 1982 and 1990 6.2 Exports of information from the United States to major world regions and centers 6.3 System of relationships between the characteristics of information technology manufacturing and the industry’s spatial pattern 6.4 The world’s largest urban agglomerations (>10 million inhabitants in 1992) 6.5 Diagrammatic representation of major nodes and links in the urban region of the Pearl River Delta 6.6 Downtown Kaoshiung 6.7 The entrance hall of Barcelona airport 6.8 The waiting room at D.E. Shaw and Company 6.9 Belleville, 1999 6.10 Las Ramblas, Barcelona, 1999 6.11 Barcelona: Paseo de Gracia 6.12 Irvine, California: business complex 7.1 Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64 years old in eight countries, 1970–1998 7.2 Ratio of hospitalized deaths to total deaths (%), by year, 1947–1987, in Japan 7.3 War deaths relative to world population, by decade, 1720–2000 Tables 2.1 Productivity rate: growth rates of output per worker 2.2 Productivity in the business sector 2.3 Evolution of the productivity of business sectors 2.4 Evolution of productivity in sectors not open to free trade 2.5 Evolution of US productivity by industrial sectors and periods 2.6 Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities, 1970–1996 2.7 Foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of total assets and liabilities of commercial banks for selected countries, 1960–1997 2.8 Direction of world exports, 1965–1995 2.9 Parent corporations and foreign affiliates by area and country 2.10 Stocks valuation, 1995–1999 4.1 United States: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1920–1991 4.2 Japan: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1920–1990 4.3 Germany: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1925–1987 4.4 France: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1989 4.5 Italy: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1990 4.6 United Kingdom: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1992 4.7 Canada: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1992 4.8 United States: employment statistics by industry, 1920–1991 4.9 Japan: employment statistics by industry, 1920–1990 4.10 Germany: employment statistics by industry, 1925–1987 4.11 France: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1989 4.12 Italy: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1990 4.13 United Kingdom: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1990 4.14 Canada: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1992 4.15 Occupational structure of selected countries 4.16 United States: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1960–1991 4.17 Japan: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1955–1990 4.18 Germany: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1976–1989 4.19 France: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1982–1989 4.20 Great Britain: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1961–1990 4.21 Canada: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1950–1992 4.22 Foreign resident population in Western Europe, 1950–1990 4.23 Employment in manufacturing by major countries and regions, 1970–1997 4.24 Employment shares by industry/occupation and ethnic/gender group of all workers in the United States, 1960–1998 4.25 Information technology spending per worker (1987–1994), employment growth (1987–1994), and unemployment rate (1995) by country 4.26 Main telephone lines per employee (1986 and 1993) and Internet hosts per 1,000 population (January 1996) by country 4.27 Men’s and women’s employment ratios, 15–64 years old, 1973–1998 4.28 Percentage of standard workers in the chuki koyo system of Japanese firms 4.29 Concentration of stock ownership by income level in the United States, 1995 7.1 Annual hours worked per person, 1870–1979 7.2 Potential lifelong working hours, 1950–1985 7.3 Duration and reduction of working time, 1970–1987 7.4 Principal demographic characteristics by main regions of the world, 1970–1995 7.5 Total fertility rates of some industrialized countries, 1901–1985 7.6 First live births per 1,000 women by age group of mother (30–49 years) and by race in the United States, 1960 and 1990 7.7 Comparisons of infant mortality rates, selected countries, 1990–1995 (estimates) Preface to the 2010 Edition of The Rise of the Network Society We live in confusing times, as is often the case in periods of historical transition between different forms of society.
Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.12 “Annual growth of productivity, employment, and earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998;” data from OECD, compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation. Harvard University Press: Fig. 7.1 “Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64 years old in eight countries, 1970–1998,” A. M. Guillemard, “Travailleurs vieillissants et marché du travail en Europe,” Travail et emploi, September 1993, and Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation. Harvard University Press: Table 4.23 “Employment in manufacturing, major countries and regions, 1970–1997 (thousands),” International Labor Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997; OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 1977–1997 (Paris: OECD, 1998); OECD, Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics, 1962–1991 (Paris: OECD, 1993), compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.
A study conducted in 1999 by the US Labor Department on the profile of new jobs created in the 1990s found that a great majority of the new jobs were in occupations that paid more than the national median wage of $13 an hour.70 According to an OECD study, the variation in percentage in net job creation in 1980–95 for OECD countries, was of 3.3 percent in high-technology sectors, of –8.2 percent in medium-technology sectors, and of –10.9 percent in low-technology sectors.71 Looking into the future, the 1997 Tregouet report, commissioned by the French Senate’s Commission of Finance concluded that “as the information society gains strength, half of the occupations needing to be filled 20 years from now do not yet exist; they will essentially involve adding knowledge and information.”72 Figure 4.3 Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999 Source: Data from OECD, compiled and elaborated by Carnoy (2000) A fundamental feature characterizing the new labor market of the past two decades is the massive incorporation of women into paid work: the rate of participation of women in the labor force for ages 15–64 increased from 51.1 percent in 1973 to 70.7 percent in 1998, for the United States; from 53.2 to 67.8 percent for the UK; from 50.1 to 60.8 percent for France; from 54 to 59.8 percent for Japan; from 50.3 to 60.9 percent for Germany; from 33.4 to 48.7 percent for Spain; from 33.7 to 43.9 percent for Italy; from 63.6 to 69.7 percent for Finland; and from 62.6 to 75.5 percent for Sweden, the country with the largest women’s labor force participation rate in the world.73 Yet the pressure of this substantial increase in labor supply did not create high unemployment in the US and Japan as it did in some Western European countries. The US, in the midst of a dramatic technological retooling, registered in November 1999 its lowest unemployment rate in 30 years at 4.1 percent. Japan, in spite of a prolonged recession in the 1990s, was still keeping its unemployment rate below 5 percent, while modifying its traditional pattern of labor relations, as I will discuss below.
The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Hardback) - Common by Alan Greenspan
air freight, airline deregulation, Albert Einstein, asset-backed security, bank run, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business process, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, cuban missile crisis, currency peg, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, double entry bookkeeping, equity premium, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, market bubble, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, North Sea oil, oil shock, open economy, pets.com, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, random walk, reserve currency, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, urban renewal, working-age population, Y2K
By 1970, that proportion had doubled, and today those types of jobs account for about one-third of our workforce. An inevitable consequence, then, of the aging of America will be that more of our elderly population will have both the ability and the incentive to work later and later into old age. Workers in their sixties have accumulated many years of valuable experience, so extending labor force participation by just a few years could have a sizable impact on economic output. But there is no getting around it: almost all of the baby-boom generation will have retired by 2030. And their retirement will be unmatched in length by any previous generation. Will those "golden years" be truly golden? How will the more slowly growing U.S. workforce that will follow the baby boomers produce goods and services for themselves and their families as well as for a retired population whose size is without precedent?
The fact that a greater share of the dependents will be elderly rather than children will put an additional burden on society's resources, as the elderly, per capita, consume a relatively large share of resources, while children consume relatively little. 412 More ebooks visit: http://www.ccebook.cn ccebook-orginal english ebooks This file was collected by ccebook.cn form the internet, the author keeps the copyright. THE W O R L D RETIRES. BUT CAN I T A F F O R D TO? After receding for years, labor force participation among older Americans has edged somewhat higher recently owing to rising pressures on retirement incomes and a growing scarcity of experienced labor.* As I noted earlier, it will no doubt continue to rise. Nonetheless, the most effective way to boost future standards of living, and thereby accommodate the aspirations of both workers and retirees, is to increase the nation's saving and the productiveness of its uses.1" We need significant additional saving in the decades ahead if we are to finance the construction of capital facilities—for example, cutting-edge high-tech plant and equipment—that will produce the additional real resources to ensure that the promised retirement benefits for the baby boomers will be redeemable in real terms.
Our next step is to set the proportion of the total labor force that will likely be employed in 2030 (or in a contiguous year if 2030 happens to be a year of recession). Given our assumptions and the economy's historical record, it is difficult to imagine the employment rate of the civilian labor force being outside the rather narrow range of 90 to 96 percent (that is, an unemployment rate between 4 and 10 percent). America's fifty-year average is more than 94 percent, with nonrecession years (the assumption for 2030) near 95 percent. Combining labor force participation rates, population projections, a near 5 percent unemployment rate, and a stable workweek yields an annual growth rate in hours worked in the United States through 2030 of 0.5 percent.* The most encouraging aspect of productivity growth is how remarkably stable it has been for the last century and more. Over much of that period, a substantial boost in U.S. productivity reflected the shift of workers from farms to urban factories and service establishments. 1 But gains in national productivity owing to farmworkers moving into higher-productivity nonfarm jobs are essentially over.
The Price of Everything: And the Hidden Logic of Value by Eduardo Porter
Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, clean water, Credit Default Swap, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Ford paid five dollars a day, full employment, George Akerlof, Gordon Gekko, guest worker program, happiness index / gross national happiness, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, loss aversion, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, means of production, Menlo Park, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, new economy, New Urbanism, pension reform, Peter Singer: altruism, pets.com, placebo effect, price discrimination, price stability, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, superstar cities, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, ultimatum game, unpaid internship, urban planning, women in the workforce, World Values Survey, Yom Kippur War, young professional
The narrative of women’s march into the workplace in the United States is drawn from Betsey Stevenson, “Divorce Law and Women’s Labor Supply,” NBER Working Paper, September 2008; Claudia Goldin, “The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education and Family,” Ely Lecture, American Economic Association Annual Meeting, January 2006; Paul Douglas and Erika Schoenberg, “Studies in the Supply Curve of Labor: The Relation in 1929 Between Average Earnings in American Cities and the Proportions Seeking Employment,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 45, No. 1, February 1937, pp. 45-79; Jacob Mincer, “Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply,” in H. Gregg Lewis, ed., Aspects of Labor Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 63-97. The description of Sandra Day O’Connor’s job search is in Kamil Dada, “Supreme Court Justice Pushes Public Service,” Stanford Daily, April 22, 2008. The impact of changes in the labor force on women’s bodies is drawn from Nigel Barber, “The Slender Ideal and Eating Disorders: An Interdisciplinary ‘Telescope’ Model,” International Journal of Eating Disorders, Vol. 23, 1998, pp. 295-307; Brett Silverstein, Lauren Perdue, Barbara Peterson, Linda Vogel, and Deborah A.
Data on increased marriage rates among college graduates come from Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson, “Marriage and Divorce, Changes and Their Driving Forces,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 27-52; and Adam Isen and Betsey Stevenson, “Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage, Divorce and Fertility,” NBER Working Paper, February 2010. Evidence of mothers’ recent change in attitudes toward work is found in Pew Research Center, “Fewer Mothers Prefer Full-time Work,” July 2007; and Sharon R. Cohany and Emy Sok, “Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants,” Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review, February 2007 (www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2abs.htm, accessed 08/08/2010). The data on American fertility are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm, accessed 07/18/2010). Data on growing numbers of forty-year-old mothers come from Claudia Goldin, personal communication. 101-104 The Cheapest Women: Indian men’s preference for women from the same caste is discussed in Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune, “Marry for What?
2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, asset-backed security, Bakken shale, banking crisis, BRICs, British Empire, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, Carmen Reinhart, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, demand response, Donald Trump, Frederick Winslow Taylor, high net worth, housing crisis, hydraulic fracturing, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop, illegal immigration, index fund, intermodal, inventory management, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, LNG terminal, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, Maui Hawaii, McMansion, mortgage debt, Network effects, new economy, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, reserve currency, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, risk tolerance, risk/return, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, six sigma, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, superstar cities, the High Line, transit-oriented development, Wall-E, Yogi Berra, Zipcar
If the other forty-nine states had been able to match this pace, the country would have created 6.5 million jobs in a year. North Dakota is one of the smallest states by population (about 670,000) and one of the largest geographically, with 70,000 square miles. It had 0.7 unemployed persons for every job opening, compared with 4.25 for the United States at large. In May 2011 the state jobs office had 15,205 listings, up 64 percent from May 2010. In the entire United States the labor force participation rate—the proportion of able-bodied adults between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five who are working or seeking work—was an anemic 64.2 percent. In North Dakota it stood at a high-octane 74 percent.1 But while its citizens are more hardy, friendly, and prone to using the word “shucks” and fishing for walleye than their fellow Americans, North Dakotans aren’t superhuman. Rather, the state enjoys some built-in advantages that have allowed it to prosper in the emerging global economy.
And they’re hard ones that, in many instances, don’t pay all that well. The positions Cavendish is trying to fill are shift work: three twelve-hour days on, followed by two days off, paying anywhere from $12 to $17 per hour. Across the state employers are casting their rods more deeply into the labor pool, and older and disabled workers are able to find opportunities in North Dakota that may be unavailable to them in other states. The labor force participation rate is 74 percent, compared with 62 percent in the country at large. Even at that rate, you can still get good, friendly service at Starbucks. And North Dakota, which exports so much food and energy, is dealing with its labor shortage by importing people. Oil field workers come from out of state for a few weeks at a time, and foreign students have been brought in for fast-food jobs as part of work-exchange programs sanctioned by the government.
Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, blue-collar work, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate personhood, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, ending welfare as we know it, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, income inequality, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, obamacare, occupational segregation, Occupy movement, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price discrimination, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Simon Kuznets, single-payer health, strikebreaker, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, wage slave, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Works Progress Administration
Huston, the United States has become what it once despised: Europeans come to the United States to witness the social distance between rich and poor, to observe homelessness and unendurable poverty, to see a political system of republicanism that elicits either apathy or outright hostility from the majority of its citizens, to research rampant crime and the world’s largest population of prison inmates, to record the antics and frivolities of the inordinately wealthy.2 Despite the growth of labor-force participation by new groups, including women; better access to higher education than at other times in American history; and transfers from the federal government, income and wealth inequality have worsened since 1983, particularly for the bottom 40 percent of the population.3 Members of one family, the heirs to the Walton fortune, had amassed $90 billion in wealth by 2012, the same as the bottom 30 percent of the U.S. population.4 As the Figure I.1 indicates, America’s poorest suffer under a much less progressive tax system than their European counterparts or than Americans in 1960 when payroll taxes, state and local sales taxes, the cap on taxation of incomes for Social Security, and the lower rate assessed on capital gains are all taken into consideration.
A 1974 plan to conduct intelligence testing of children in three Appalachian counties, to see whether mandatory sterilization of the unfit should be recommended, was never put into action due to lack of funds.59 Libertarian political scientist Charles Murray argued that the Great Society was a net negative, and that poverty rates were declining in the postwar period not because of anything the government did but rather because the economy was growing. According to Murray, while poverty rates fell from 33 percent in 1949 to 28 percent by 1952, to 22 percent under Eisenhower and 18 percent by 1964, by the 1970s the Great Society caused these improvements to halt. Murray also claimed that falling labor force participation and marriage rates among the poorest black and white workers were signs of cultural decay fueled by the availability of various forms of income support.60 Economists Martha Bailey and Nicholas Duquette argue that the War on Poverty failed because the programs were, in a sense, too purely targeted; federal funds were not used strategically to build support for Democrats, as had been the case during the New Deal.
The Gated City (Kindle Single) by Ryan Avent
big-box store, carbon footprint, deindustrialization, edge city, Edward Glaeser, income inequality, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, offshore financial centre, profit maximization, rent-seeking, Silicon Valley, Thorstein Veblen, transit-oriented development, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation
Recent growth rates -- overall and per person -- slowed from their scorching postwar pace in the 1970s, then downshifted again from 2000. The decade that followed, the 2000s, was by some measures America's worst economic performance in a century. The income of the typical American has been stagnating for years. The top 1% of earners control a larger share of national income than at any time since the years immediately prior to the Great Depression. And even before the Great Recession, labor force participation rates for the American economy were falling. The American economy isn't running like it used to. And when it does run, a huge share of the American population doesn't share in the benefits. Something has changed. Something has gone wrong. But what? There's no shortage of potential explanations. Here are a few: - Worker bargaining power has declined. In this view, articulated most clearly by economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman, the great political shifts of the last 30 years changed the American growth model.
Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future by Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron, Meera Balarajan
Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, conceptual framework, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, guest worker program, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Lao Tzu, life extension, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, Malacca Straits, microcredit, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, open borders, out of africa, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, Richard Florida, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, spice trade, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, women in the workforce, working-age population
The research found that the longer the migrants stay in the UK and are able to occupy jobs in line with their educational qualifications, the more they contribute. The study concluded that “from the fiscal point of view, the immigration has not been at all a burden on the welfare system. Rather it has contributed to strengthen the fiscal position.” 46 The migrants most likely to generate fiscal burdens are those who are unemployed (i.e., not paying taxes) and drawing on social benefits. In general, labor force participation among foreign-born men actually exceeds that of the native born.47 Those who are more likely to be outside the workforce are women who have migrated through family channels or asylum seekers whose participation in the labor market is limited by law or due to trauma or language barriers. In the UK, levels of inactivity and unemployment vary dramatically from one expatriate group to the next, even if the overall fiscal impacts of migration are “minimal, or at least equal to the contributions made by migrants.”48 Eighty-five percent of Poles and Canadians are employed, whereas around 50 percent of migrants from Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh are employed—reflecting the cultural constraints on many female migrants from these countries.49 Furthermore, while about 1 percent of Poles and Filipinos in Britain claim income support, about 39 percent of Somali migrants (many of whom are refugees) do.50 Although their conclusion has been contested as reflecting a static view of migration, a UK House of Lords report noted that “the positive contribution of some immigrants is largely or wholly offset by negative contributions of others.”51 Paradoxically—given public concerns about the potential social burdens they bring—undocumented workers make significant contributions to the public purse.
See also Jews; Jews, historic migration influences Italy: as future migration policy example social impacts of modern migration Italy, historic migration influences: decolonization during mass migration era post-World War II economic boom, trade network development, between world wars Italy, modern regulatory channels: border control technologies economic policy approaches social categories Ivory Coast, economic impacts of modern migration Jamaica Japan: economic impact of modern migration in economic regulatory channel; future migration pressures, in migrant decision-making models Japan, historic migration influences: imperialistic commerce; indentured labor international restriction policies, during mass migration era Jaspers, Karl Jefferson, Thomas Jews: impacts of modern migration in social regulatory channel Jews, historic migration influences: civilization development, diaspora networks during mass migration era refugee policies restrictive policies trade network development Johnson, Albert Johnson, Simon Johnson-Lodge Act Johnson-Reed Immigration Act Johnston, Richard Jordan Kangani system Kazakhstan, in economic regulatory channel, Keeley, Charles Kenya Kerr, William Kindleberger, Charles knowledge development/culture sharing: agricultural communities, civilization developments in closed borders scenario early humans with exploration activity from global trade networks, with war and conquest. See also innovation benefits, modern migration Korea See also South Korea Koslowski, Rey Kuznetsov, Yevgeny labor coercion: human trafficking indenture contracts slavery labor force participation. See economic impacts of modern migration; high-skilled category; low-skilled category Lahav, Gallya languages Laos Latin America. See specific countries Latvia Laughlin, Harry League of Nations Lebanon legal framework objective, future migration policy legal perspectives, free movement . See also managed migration era, policies; regulatory channels, modern migration Levitt, Peggy Liberia, historic migration influences Libya, border control technologies life expectancy Lincoln, William literacy tests Lithuania Losch, Bruno low-skilled category: economic impact in economic regulatory channel future demand for integration objective risk factors Luxembourg Luzhokov, Yuri macro-level analysis, migration decision-making Malawi Malaysia: in economic regulatory channel, future migration pressures in migrant decision-making model Malaysia, historic migration influences: exploration activity indentured labor, during mass migration era; trade network development Maldives, climate change pressures Malta managed migration era, policies: ethnic/ race-based approaches identification documents nationalism pressures overview Manchuria Manning, Patrick Marrus, Michael Marshall, T.
Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, bitcoin, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business climate, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, complexity theory, computer age, credit crunch, currency peg, David Graeber, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, diversification, Edward Snowden, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, Flash crash, floating exchange rates, forward guidance, George Akerlof, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, invisible hand, jitney, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Lao Tzu, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market bubble, market clearing, market design, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mutually assured destruction, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, reserve currency, risk-adjusted returns, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, Satoshi Nakamoto, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, Stuxnet, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trade route, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, working-age population, yield curve
Dynamic processes such as economic growth are subject to abrupt changes, for better or worse, based on the utilization or exhaustion of factors of production. This was pointed out in a classic 1994 article by Princeton professor Paul Krugman called “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” This article was widely criticized upon publication for predicting a slowdown in Chinese growth, but it has proved prophetic. Krugman began with the basic point that growth in any economy is the result of increases in labor force participation and productivity. If an economy has a stagnant labor force operating at a constant level of productivity, it will have constant output but no growth. The main drivers of labor force expansion are demographics and education, while the main drivers of productivity are capital and technology. Without those factor inputs, an economy cannot expand. But when those factor inputs are available in abundance, rapid growth is well within reach.
Within a few years the working age population will reach a historical peak, and will then begin a precipitous decline. The core of this working age population, those aged 20–39 years, has already begun to shrink. With this, the vast supply of low-cost workers—a core engine of China’s growth model—will dissipate, with potentially far-reaching implications domestically and externally. Importantly, when labor force participation levels off, technology is the only driver of growth. The United States also faces demographic headwinds due to declining birth rates, but it is still able to expand the labor force 1.5 percent per year, partly through immigration, and it retains the potential to grow even faster through its technological prowess. In contrast, China has not proved adept at inventing new technologies despite its success at stealing existing ones.
When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor by William Julius Wilson
affirmative action, citizen journalism, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deliberate practice, desegregation, Donald Trump, edge city, ending welfare as we know it, full employment, George Gilder, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, income inequality, informal economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, new economy, New Urbanism, pink-collar, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, school choice, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban renewal, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration
The wage gap between low-skilled men and women shrank not because of gains made by female workers but mainly because of the decline in real wages for men. The unemployment rates among low-skilled women are slightly lower than those among their male counterparts. However, over the past decade their rates of participation in the labor force have stagnated and have fallen further behind the labor-force-participation rates among more highly educated women, which continue to rise. The unemployment rates among both low-skilled men and women are five times that among their college-educated counterparts. Among the factors that have contributed to the growing gap in employment and wages between low-skilled and college-educated workers is the increased internationalization of the U.S. economy. As the economists Richard B.
Indeed, Lemann, in an otherwise perceptive article, went so far as to suggest that “every aspect of the underclass culture in the ghetto is directly traceable to roots in the South.” Yet systematic research on poverty and urban migration, including three major studies since 1975, consistently shows that southern-born blacks who have migrated to the North have lower unemployment rates, higher labor-force-participation rates, and lower welfare rates than northern blacks. Kaus refers to the Dash articles when stating that teenage girls in the inner-city ghetto “are often ridiculed by other girls if they remain virgins too long into their teens.” Kaus argues that “once AFDC benefits reach a certain threshold that allow poor single mothers to survive, the culture of the underclass can start growing as women have babies for all the various nonwelfare reasons they have them.”
3D printing, accounting loophole / creative accounting, additive manufacturing, Airbnb, algorithmic trading, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, bank run, Basel III, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, centralized clearinghouse, clean water, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, David Graeber, deskilling, Detroit bankruptcy, diversification, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Emanuel Derman, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Akerlof, gig economy, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, High speed trading, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, Howard Rheingold, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index fund, interest rate derivative, interest rate swap, Internet of things, invisible hand, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour mobility, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market design, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, passive investing, pensions crisis, Ponzi scheme, principal–agent problem, quantitative easing, quantitative trading / quantitative ﬁnance, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Rana Plaza, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Snapchat, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, technology bubble, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Vanguard fund
The figure is for companies that appeared in the S&P 500 index in February 2015 and that had been publicly listed between 2005 and 2014. See William Lazonick, “Cash Distributions to Shareholders (2005–2014) & Corporate Executive Pay (2006–2014), Research Update #2,” Academic-Industry Research Network, August 2015. 3. Ted Berg, Office of Financial Research, “Quicksilver Markets,” March 2015. 4. Labor force participation rate hovered at 62.4 percent in September 2015, below the 1978 level of 62.8 percent. See US Department of Labor, “Economic News Release: Employment Situation Summary,” October 2, 2015; US Department of Labor, “Labor Force Participation Rate,” Statistics from Population Surveys, BLS Data Viewer, online at http://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery. See also Irene Tung, Paul K. Sonn, and Yannet Lathrop, National Employment Law Project, “The Growing Movement for $15,” November 4, 2015. 5. Carl C. Icahn, “Sale: Apple Shares at Half Price” (an open letter to Tim Cook), carlicahn.com, October 9, 2014; William Lazonick, Mariana Mazzucato, and Oner Tulum, “Apple’s Changing Business Model: What Should the World’s Richest Company Do with All Those Profits?”
Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future by Robert B. Reich
Berlin Wall, declining real wages, delayed gratification, Doha Development Round, endowment effect, full employment, George Akerlof, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, job automation, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, mortgage debt, new economy, offshore financial centre, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, sovereign wealth fund, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, World Values Survey
.: Economic Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 220–24. 6 More than half of all the money: See Lawrence Bebchuk, “The Growth of Executive Pay,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21, no. 2 (2005): 283–303. 7 By 2007, financial and insurance companies: See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables, Section I: Domestic Product and Incomes, “Real Gross Value Added by Industry,” 2009. 8 In 2009, the twenty-five best-paid hedge-fund managers: See AR: Absolute Return + Alpha, annual survey, 2009. 9 in 2007, Ford’s financial division: Securities and Exchange Commission Filings. 10 according to presidential candidate Ronald Reagan: Ronald Reagan campaign address, “A Vital Economy: Jobs, Growth, and Progress for Americans,” October 24, 1980. 11 Moreover, they had no clear memory: See Technology Triumphs, Morality Falters, Section 5: “America’s Collective Memory,” the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, January 3, 1999. 8. HOW AMERICANS KEPT BUYING ANYWAY: THE THREE COPING MECHANISMS 1 Coping mechanism #1: See U.S. Department of Labor Women’s Bureau, “Labor Force Participation of Women and Mothers,” Historical Data Tables, October 9, 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2009/ted_20091009.htm). 2 Coping mechanism #2: See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008 American Time Use Survey, “Working and Work Related Activities Tables,” 2008 (http://www.bls.gov/tus/current/work.htm). 3 Coping mechanism #3: See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 2.1, “Personal Income and Its Distribution,” January 29, 2010 (http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?
The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon
Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus
I have already discussed the way in which economic development can create more inequality before bringing it back down as the modern high-productivity sector expands and the traditional low-income sector shrinks. There are also the effects of changing demographics: declining birth rates can improve the standard of living of the poorest members of the population; a rise in the number of single-parent households or an increase in female labor force participation can substantially modify the distribution of household monetary standards of living in opposite directions; and by pairing people of comparable potential incomes together, a rise in endogamy may contribute to a rise in inequality. The reason that I have not emphasized these dynamics is that they seem relatively independent of globalization and are more The Forces behind R ising Inequality 115 country-specific than those forces that could potentially affect national inequality levels in general.
Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science by Dani Rodrik
airline deregulation, Albert Einstein, bank run, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, butterfly effect, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, distributed generation, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, fudge factor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loss aversion, low skilled workers, market design, market fundamentalism, minimum wage unemployment, oil shock, open economy, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, quantitative easing, randomized controlled trial, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, school vouchers, South Sea Bubble, spectrum auction, The Market for Lemons, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, ultimatum game, University of East Anglia, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, white flight
Kranton Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Alberto Alesina and George-Marios Angeletos, “Fairness and Redistribution,” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 960–80; Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (2001): 187–254; Raquel Fernandez, “Cultural Change as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century,” American Economic Review 103, no. 1 (2013): 472–500; Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, “Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth” (unpublished paper, Princeton University, December 2013). 4. Neil Gandal et al., “Personal Value Priorities of Economists,” Human Relations 58, no. 10 (October 2005): 1227–52; Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, “Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists?”
Success and Luck: Good Fortune and the Myth of Meritocracy by Robert H. Frank
2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Amazon Mechanical Turk, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, attribution theory, availability heuristic, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, deliberate practice, en.wikipedia.org, endowment effect, experimental subject, framing effect, full employment, hindsight bias, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, labour mobility, lake wobegon effect, loss aversion, minimum wage unemployment, Network effects, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, Richard Thaler, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, Rory Sutherland, side project, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, ultimatum game, Vincenzo Peruggia: Mona Lisa, winner-take-all economy
Recent trends in the distributions of income represent a substantial departure from those observed during the first three decades after WWII, when pretax incomes in America grew at roughly the same rate—slightly less than 3 percent a year—for households up and down the income ladder. Since the late 1960s, this pattern has changed. The inflation-adjusted median hourly wage for American men is actually lower now than it was then. Real median household incomes grew by roughly 19 percent between 1967 and 2012, primarily because of large increases in female labor force participation. Only those in the top quintile, whose incomes have roughly doubled since the mid-1970s, have escaped the income slowdown. Similar, if less dramatic, changes have been observed in most other countries. The income growth picture is much the same within each subgroup of the population as for the population as a whole. For example, those at the bottom of the top quintile have seen little real income growth, the lion’s share of which has been concentrated among top earners in the group.
Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle by Dan Senor; Saul Singer
agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, Boycotts of Israel, call centre, Celtic Tiger, cleantech, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, friendly fire, immigration reform, labor-force participation, new economy, pez dispenser, post scarcity, profit motive, Silicon Valley, smart grid, social graph, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Ballmer, web application, women in the workforce, Yom Kippur War
They see it as in their interest as much as anyone else’s,” she said.9 Yet because of the high birth rates in both the haredi and the Arab sectors, efforts to increase workforce participation in these sectors are racing against the demographic clock. According to Israel 2028, the report issued by an official blue-ribbon commission, the haredi and Arab sectors are projected to increase from 29 percent of Israel’s total population in 2007 to 39 percent by 2028. Without dramatic changes in workforce patterns, this shift will reduce labor-force participation rates even further. “The existing trends are working in stark opposition to the desired development,” the report warns.10 As he was campaigning to return to the premiership, Bibi Netanyahu made getting Israel to number among the top ten largest (per capita) economies in the world a centerpiece of his agenda. An independent think tank, the Reut Institute, has been pursuing a similar campaign called Israel 15.
Social Democratic America by Lane Kenworthy
affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, Celtic Tiger, centre right, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, David Brooks, desegregation, Edward Glaeser, full employment, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, Home mortgage interest deduction, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, manufacturing employment, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, new economy, postindustrial economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, school choice, shareholder value, sharing economy, Skype, Steve Jobs, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, universal basic income, War on Poverty, working poor, zero day
By 1970, 99 percent of Americans had a television, up from just 32 percent in 1940. In music, the “album” originated in the late 1940s, and rock ‘n’ roll began in the 1950s. Other innovations that made life easier or more pleasurable include photocopiers, disposable diapers, and the bikini. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed gender and race discrimination in public places, education, and employment. For women, life changed in myriad ways. Female labor force participation rose from 30 percent in 1940 to 49 percent in 1970. Norms inhibiting divorce relaxed in the 1960s. The pill was introduced in 1960. Abortion was legalized in the early 1970s. Access to college increased massively in the mid-1960s. Comparing these changes in quality of life is difficult, but I see no reason to conclude that the pace of advance, or of innovation, has been more rapid in recent decades than before.66 Yes, there have been significant improvements in quality of life in the United States since the 1970s.
Planet of Slums by Mike Davis
barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, centre right, clean water, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, failed state, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Internet Archive, jitney, Kibera, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, megacity, microcredit, New Urbanism, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent control, structural adjustment programs, surplus humans, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor
Africa and most of Latin, America (Mexico's northern border cities excepted), this option did not exist. Instead, deindustrialization and the decimation of male formal-sector jobs, often followed by male emigration, compelled women to improvise new livelihoods as piece-workers, liquor sellers, street vendors, lottery ticket sellers, hairdressers, sewing operators, cleaners, washers, ragpickers, nannies, and prostitutes. In a region where urban women's labor-force participation had always been lower than in other continents, the surge of Latin American women into tertiary informal activities during the 1980s was especially dramatic. In her detailed study of "adjustment from below," social anthropologist Caroline Moser describes the impact of eight successive SAPs between 1982 and 1988 on a formerly upwardly mobile shantytown on the swampy edge of Guayaquil. Although open unemployment doubled in Ecuador, the major impact of the 1980s crisis was an explosion of underemployment estimated at fully half the workforce in both Guayaquil and Quito.
Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle by Silvia Federici
Community Supported Agriculture, declining real wages, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, financial independence, global village, illegal immigration, informal economy, invisible hand, labor-force participation, land tenure, means of production, microcredit, neoliberal agenda, new economy, Occupy movement, planetary scale, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, the market place, trade liberalization, UNCLOS, wages for housework, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, World Values Survey
Food and Agriculture Association, Gender and Agriculture, http://www.fao.org/Gender/agrib4-e.htm. 4. The social and economic impact of colonialism varied greatly, depending (in part) on the duration of direct colonial control. We may even interpret the present differences in women’s participation in subsistence and cash-crop agriculture as a measure of the extent of colonial appropriation of land. Using the UN-ILO labor force participation statistics, and remembering the measurement problem concerning subsistence farming, we see that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest percentage of the female labor force in agriculture (75 percent); while in Southern Asia it is 55 percent; South-East Asia, 42 percent; and East Asia, 35 percent. By contrast, South and Central America have low women’s participation rates in agriculture similar to those found in “developed” regions like Europe between 7 and 10 percent.
Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy by Raghuram Rajan
accounting loophole / creative accounting, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, business climate, Clayton Christensen, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, diversification, Edward Glaeser, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, full employment, global supply chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, illegal immigration, implied volatility, income inequality, index fund, interest rate swap, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Martin Wolf, medical malpractice, microcredit, moral hazard, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, price stability, profit motive, Real Time Gross Settlement, Richard Florida, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, The Great Moderation, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, upwardly mobile, Vanguard fund, women in the workforce, World Values Survey
See United Progressive Alliance Vanguard venture capital Volcker, Paul wages: effects of immigration inequality in in managed capitalist systems minimum,See also incomes Wallison, Peter J. Wall Street Journal Wang, Y. C. Washington Mutual wealth See also income inequality Weber, Max Weimar Republic welfare programs. See safety net Willumstad, Robert women, labor force participation of work, motivations in, See also employment World Bank World Trade Organization (WTO) Yin, K. Y. Zedillo, Ernesto
Bad Data Handbook by Q. Ethan McCallum
Amazon Mechanical Turk, asset allocation, barriers to entry, Benoit Mandelbrot, business intelligence, cellular automata, chief data officer, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, combinatorial explosion, conceptual framework, database schema, en.wikipedia.org, Firefox, Flash crash, Gini coefficient, illegal immigration, iterative process, labor-force participation, loose coupling, natural language processing, Netflix Prize, quantitative trading / quantitative ﬁnance, recommendation engine, sentiment analysis, statistical model, supply-chain management, text mining, too big to fail, web application
The comparisons researchers can make between survey and administrative data, which are becoming more widely available (at least in the field of economics), allow researchers to look at people’s behavior in ways that were not available in the past. But those advances have also led to new questions about the accuracy of survey data and the results researchers can reach from models based on that data. I’ve tried to show you a number of things to be aware of in your data. I typically work with economic data, which contains information on earnings, labor force participation, and other similar behaviors, but the strategies extend to any survey. Methods that firms or institutions use to produce data from surveys—such as imputations, topcoding, and proxy reporting—should always be documented, and as the researcher, you should always be aware of those methods and then decide how they might affect your results. Similarly, respondents may simply make an error in answering the survey, but it is your job to try to determine—or at least to understand—whether those errors impart bias to your results or are simply a hazard of using the best information you have at your disposal.
The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger by Richard Wilkinson; Kate Pickett
Berlin Wall, clean water, Diane Coyle, epigenetics, experimental economics, experimental subject, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, germ theory of disease, Gini coefficient, impulse control, income inequality, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, Louis Pasteur, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Milgram experiment, offshore financial centre, phenotype, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit maximization, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, statistical model, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, ultimatum game, upwardly mobile, World Values Survey
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007. 352. S. Bowles and Y. Park, ‘Emulation, inequality, and work hours: was Thorsten Veblen right?’ Economic Journal (2005) 115: F397–F412. 353. D. Neumark and A. Postlethwaite, ‘Relative income concerns and the rise in married women’s employment’, Journal of Public Economics (1998) 70: 157–83. 354. Y. Park, Veblen Effects on Labor Supply: Male earnings inequality increases women’s labor force participation. New London, CT: Department of Economics, Connecticut College, 2004. 355. S. J. Solnick and D. Hemenway, ‘Is more always better? A survey on positional concerns’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (1998) 37: 373–83. 356. T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 357. Planet Ark, The Recycling Olympic Report. Sydney: Planet Ark Environmental Foundation, 2004. 358.
What's the Matter with White People by Joan Walsh
affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, banking crisis, clean water, collective bargaining, David Brooks, desegregation, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, full employment, global village, Golden Gate Park, hiring and firing, impulse control, income inequality, invisible hand, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, new economy, obamacare, Occupy movement, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, upwardly mobile, urban decay, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, white flight, women in the workforce
In eight years, under the Bush supply side experiment, the United States saw a series of historic economic lows and, overall, the slowest overall rate of economic growth since World War II. Although wages for certain groups, such as working-class men, had declined since the seventies, household income had mostly held steady, mainly because women surged into the workplace, and most “households” now had two earners. Under Bush, household income declined, too, for the first time since the Census Bureau tracked that data in 1967. Labor force participation had reached an all-time high in 2000 but dropped steadily under Bush; relatedly, the economy created fewer jobs than at any time since World War II. Unemployment jumped from 3.9 percent when Clinton left office to 7.2 percent at the end of 2008. Clinton left Bush a $236 billion budget surplus; Bush would leave his successor saddled with a $1.2 trillion deficit. Dick Cheney, of course, famously declared that “Reagan showed deficits don’t matter” (although he should have added, “unless there’s a Democrat in the White House”).
Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age by Virginia Eubanks
affirmative action, Berlin Wall, call centre, cognitive dissonance, desegregation, Fall of the Berlin Wall, future of work, game design, global village, index card, informal economy, invisible hand, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, low-wage service sector, microcredit, new economy, post-industrial society, race to the bottom, rent control, Silicon Valley, South of Market, San Francisco, telemarketer, Thomas L Friedman, trickle-down economics, union organizing, urban planning, web application, white flight, women in the workforce, working poor
As Guy Standing argues, “The era of ﬂexibility is . . . an era of more generalized insecurity and precariousness, in which many more men as well as women have been pushed into precarious forms of labor” (Standing 1999, 583). Rather than illustrating women “catching up” to men in the region’s high-tech workforce, the data suggest that work in the region is being feminized, both in the sense that a larger share of employment is going to women and in the sense that employment itself has shifted to have characteristics associated with women’s labor force participation: lower pay, contingent and temporary work arrangements, and little or no job training (ibid.).20 Generalized imputations of “women’s economic interests” and “men’s economic interests,” which underlie prescriptions to ﬁll the high-tech pipeline with marginalized people or empower women to break into the boys’ club of science and technology, overlook the feminization of work and obscure and marginalize important differences among women by race.
Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy by Howard Karger
big-box store, blue-collar work, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, delayed gratification, financial deregulation, illegal immigration, labor-force participation, late fees, London Interbank Offered Rate, low skilled workers, microcredit, mortgage debt, New Journalism, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, payday loans, predatory finance, race to the bottom, Silicon Valley, Telecommunications Act of 1996, telemarketer, underbanked, working poor
Indeed, it’s no coincidence that 60% of payday lending customers are women.1924 Providing for the needs of the poor is like the game of hot potatoes. Government discharges the responsibility for the poor to the labor market through compulsory TANF work requirements, while the private sector employs them in low-wage jobs without benefits. The hot potato is then passed back to government, which institutes the benefit portions of labor-force participation—CHIPS for children; Medicaid; and EITC and CTC, for supplementing low wages. In the end, taxpayers continue to subsidize the poor, indirectly. In that sense, the major beneficiaries of welfare reform are not the poor or American taxpayers, but low-wage employers who can hire cheap hourly workers without the responsibility of providing anything beyond a weekly paycheck. In large measure, this represents the adoption of Third World labor standards into the American context.
Only Humans Need Apply: Winners and Losers in the Age of Smart Machines by Thomas H. Davenport, Julia Kirby
AI winter, Andy Kessler, artificial general intelligence, asset allocation, Automated Insights, autonomous vehicles, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, business intelligence, business process, call centre, carbon-based life, Clayton Christensen, clockwork universe, conceptual framework, dark matter, David Brooks, deliberate practice, deskilling, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, estate planning, follow your passion, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, Freestyle chess, game design, general-purpose programming language, Google Glasses, Hans Lippershey, haute cuisine, income inequality, index fund, industrial robot, information retrieval, intermodal, Internet of things, inventory management, Isaac Newton, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Khan Academy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, loss aversion, Mark Zuckerberg, Narrative Science, natural language processing, Norbert Wiener, nuclear winter, pattern recognition, performance metric, Peter Thiel, precariat, quantitative trading / quantitative ﬁnance, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Rodney Brooks, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, six sigma, Skype, speech recognition, spinning jenny, statistical model, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, strong AI, superintelligent machines, supply-chain management, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, Works Progress Administration, Zipcar
Income inequality is a growing concern in an economy that has fewer good jobs to allocate. There is already evidence that the big payoffs in today’s economy are going not to the bulk of knowledge workers, but to a small segment of “superstars”—CEOs, hedge fund and private equity managers, investment bankers, and so forth—almost all of whom are very well leveraged by automated decision-making. Meanwhile, labor force participation rates in developed economies steadily fall. Silicon Valley investor Bill Davidow and tech journalist Mike Malone, writing recently for Harvard Business Review, declared that “we will soon be looking at hordes of citizens of zero economic value.”6 They say figuring out how to deal with the impacts of this development will be the greatest challenge facing free market economies in this century.
The Curse of Cash by Kenneth S Rogoff
Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, blockchain, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, cashless society, central bank independence, cryptocurrency, debt deflation, distributed ledger, Edward Snowden, ethereum blockchain, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial intermediation, financial repression, forward guidance, frictionless, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, illegal immigration, inflation targeting, informal economy, interest rate swap, Isaac Newton, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, large denomination, liquidity trap, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, moveable type in China, New Economic Geography, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, payday loans, price stability, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, RFID, savings glut, secular stagnation, seigniorage, The Great Moderation, the payments system, transaction costs, unbanked and underbanked, unconventional monetary instruments, underbanked, unorthodox policies, Y2K, yield curve
Definitions also differ across studies of the underground economy, for example, whether or not it includes all criminal activity or just tax and regulatory evasion. One influential methododology15 has been developed by Austrian professor Friedrich Schneider, a pioneer in efforts to measure the underground economy. Schneider’s empirical approach forms estimates based on a variety of monetary and labor market indicators, including the labor force participation rate, tax rates, the quality of public service delivery, and other indicators. Figure 5.1 shows the results. It is important to note that the particular definition of underground economy underlying these estimates is a narrow one that does not include illegal or nonmarket activities. Rather, the measure aims to capture all (otherwise) legal market-based production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from authorities to avoid income, sales, or value-added taxes; social security contributions; certain labor standards like minimum wage or maximum working hours; certain administrative inconveniences; or any combination of these.16 Under this narrower definition of underground economy that does not include many types of illegal activities, the United States and Switzerland are estimated to have among the smallest underground economies, at 7.1% and 7.9% of GDP, respectively.
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution by Wendy Brown
Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, corporate governance, credit crunch, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, Food sovereignty, haute couture, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, late capitalism, means of production, new economy, obamacare, occupational segregation, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, sharing economy, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck, young professional
The volume setting out the general parameters of the argument is Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). 71. See, for example, this argument by Becker: “The responsibility of married women for childcare and other housework has major implications for earnings and occupational differences between men and women, even aside from the effect on the labor force participation of married women. I submit that this is an important reason why the earnings of married women typically are considerably below those of married men, and why substantial occupational segregation persists.” Becker, A Treatise on the Family, p. 78. 72. Some have argued that gender stratification is reduced by neoliberalism, insofar as it involves a shift from an economy based on private property economy to an economy based on human capital.
The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Parents Are Going Broke by Elizabeth Warren, Amelia Warren Tyagi
business climate, Columbine, declining real wages, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, financial independence, labor-force participation, late fees, McMansion, mortgage debt, new economy, New Journalism, payday loans, school choice, school vouchers, telemarketer, urban sprawl, women in the workforce
Department of Labor, “Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2000,” August 2001, Table 13. 3 Unemployment Insurance Fact Sheet, Department of Labor. Available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp. 4 There have been conflicting studies of what sociologists call “the added worker effect,” that is, the magnitude and direction of changes in workforce participation of wives of unemployed men. For example, some researchers have examined whether a wife’s labor force participation increases in the same year of or in the year immediately following the husband’s unemployment, and found no significant effect. See, for example, Tim Maloney, “Unobserved Variables and the Elusive Added Worker Effect,” Economica 58 (May 1991): 173-187; see also W. Jean Yeung and Sandra L. Hofferth, “Family Adaptations to Income and Job Loss in the U.S.,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues 19 (Fall 1998): 255-283.
Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends by Uma Anand Segal, Doreen Elliott, Nazneen S. Mayadas
affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, borderless world, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, centre right, conceptual framework, credit crunch, demographic transition, deskilling, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial independence, full employment, global village, guest worker program, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, low skilled workers, minimum wage unemployment, New Urbanism, open borders, phenotype, South China Sea, structural adjustment programs, trade route, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, urban planning, women in the workforce
Given the events that were to follow post 9/11, it might be wise to examine Australia’s humanitarian record at a time when its refugee policy remained relatively uncontroversial (Jupp 2002) 160 Table 11-2. Characteristics of Immigrant Arrivals (1997–2007) by Top Ten Source Countries ~Percentage Intake 1997–98 ~Percentage Intake 2006–07 #No. of arrivals 1997–2007 #Percentage intake 1997–2007 * Census count 2006 * Median Age in Years * Qualifications * Labor Force Participation * Unemployment Rate * Citizenship * English Proficiency Total Australian Population Total Overseas born N/A New Zealand United Kingdom N/A 19 12 6 4 5 4 2 1 .05 3 N/A N/A 17 17 9 10 3 4 1 2 2 2 N/A N/A 183 187 140 478 81 883 69 515 49 459 37 205 26 590 23 365 23 129 22 287 N/A N/A 17.4 13.4 04.7 03.5 02.5 02.2 02.2 02.1 N/A 37.1 N/A 46.8 389 470 39.5 1 038 160 53.7 206 590 147 110 104 130 39.3 35.8 38.4 120 540 40.3 50 970 32.2 92 330 39.5 52.5 64.6 N/A N/A 51.2 76.3 56.8 58.8 55.0 56.3 76.1 72.3 68.1 75.1 64.9 73.1 62.7 62.1 66.8 67.3 38.8 40.3 35.1 61.9 5.2 N/A 04.9 03.9 11.2 07.3 4.1 05.2 09.0 05.7 28.5 11.4 N/A N/A 75.6 N/A 40 94.1 70.2 E/S 73.2 64.7 74.6 94.0 80.1 97.6 92.1 95.5 47.5 89.8 59.7 92.1 70.9 67.0 95.1 56.1 China 07.8 India 06.6 South Africa Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Sudan Vietnam 19 050 159 850 24.6 41.0 Note: The characteristics cited in this section of the table represent the characteristics of all immigrants from this source country in 2007, not just the immigrants from 1997 to 2007.
It was the government’s hope that more jobs for native workers could be generated and the speed of upgrading of Taiwan’s economic structure enhanced due to the rapid expansion of these two types of industries. By the late 1990s, the government had also started to admit large numbers of foreign workers into the area of household work and healthcare services. The main purpose behind this policy was to release the better-educated native Taiwanese women from their household duties, and thereby raise their labor force participation rate and thus their labor supply, while simultaneously alleviating the problem of a growing shortage of child care and health care service workers. Since the admission of foreign health care workers has been determined by need and not by quotas, the number of these workers has increased rapidly and by 2007 its share among all foreign workers had quickly risen to 45%. Up to that time, the government had an informal agreement with trade unions and the public in general that it would not admit more than 300,000 foreign workers into Taiwan because it was deemed that at that level native workers’ jobs would not be displaced by the presence of foreign workers.
Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom by Doug Henwood
accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Andrei Shleifer, asset allocation, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, diversification, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equity premium, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental subject, facts on the ground, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, implied volatility, index arbitrage, index fund, interest rate swap, Internet Archive, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labor-force participation, late capitalism, law of one price, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, London Interbank Offered Rate, Louis Bachelier, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, oil shock, payday loans, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, random walk, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, shareholder value, short selling, Slavoj Žižek, South Sea Bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Predators' Ball, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, women in the workforce, yield curve, zero-coupon bond
In other words, if next year is pretty much like this year, the forecast will be accurate. Economists from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (FuUerton 1992, Saunders 1992, Rosenthal 1992) reviewed the Bureau's own employment projections and found similar failings. The 1973 forecast for 1990 greatly underestimated the continuing surge of women into the workforce. Projections of the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) in 1990 made in 1978, 1980, 1983, and 1985 were a lot closer to the mark, but by 1978, women's LFPR had already risen sharply enough to be noticeable. In its macroeconomic projections, the 1978 and 1981 GNP forecasts for 1990 were too optimistic — the 1978 forecast by a margin of 11.5%, a not inconsiderable $386 billion. Though the error got smaller as time went on, there was a persistent tendency to overestimate the growth of labor productivity.
Albert Einstein, asset allocation, Atul Gawande, Bernie Madoff, business process, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, clean water, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, delayed gratification, deliberate practice, disintermediation, Donald Trump, Douglas Hofstadter, Emanuel Derman, en.wikipedia.org, fear of failure, financial deregulation, financial independence, Flynn Effect, George Akerlof, Henri Poincaré, hiring and firing, impulse control, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, loss aversion, medical residency, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Monroe Doctrine, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, school vouchers, six sigma, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Walter Mischel, young professional
Heckman of the University of Chicago and others compared the workplace performance of high-school graduates with those who dropped out of high school but took the GED exams. The GED recipients are as smart as high-school grads who do not go on to college, but they earn less than these high-school grads. In fact, they have lower hourly wages than do high-school dropouts, because they possess fewer of the so-called noncognitive traits like motivation and self-discipline. GED recipients are much more likely to switch jobs. Their labor-force participation rates are lower than that of high-school grads. At the very top of intellectual accomplishment, intelligence is nearly useless in separating outstanding geniuses from everybody else. The greatest thinkers seem to possess mental abilities that go beyond rational thinking narrowly defined. Their abilities are fluid and thoroughly cloudlike. Albert Einstein, for example, would seem to be an exemplar of scientific or mathematical intelligence.
Microtrends: The Small Forces Behind Tomorrow's Big Changes by Mark Penn, E. Kinney Zalesne
affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, big-box store, call centre, corporate governance, David Brooks, Donald Trump, extreme commuting, Exxon Valdez, feminist movement, glass ceiling, Gordon Gekko, haute couture, illegal immigration, immigration reform, index card, Isaac Newton, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, late fees, life extension, low skilled workers, mobile money, new economy, RAND corporation, Renaissance Technologies, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Superbowl ad, the payments system, Thomas L Friedman, upwardly mobile, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, Y2K
The online dating magazine Web site was accessed March 2007, at www.onlinedatingmagazine.com. Marriage data come from National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 54, No. 8, “Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, Provisional Data for June 2006.” The PSB poll of Internet Marrieds was conducted online on March 27–28, 2007. II. Work Life Working Retired The data on seniors in the workforce come from “Labor Force Participation of Persons Ages 62 and Over, 1982–2005,” Current Population Survey (CPS), Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data on vacation days worldwide come from the World Tourism Organization, whose Web site is http://www.world-tourism.org/. For more on unused vacation and working while on vacation, see Stephanie Armour, “U.S. Workers Feel Burn of Long Hours, Less Leisure,” USA Today, December 18, 2003; and “Annual Expedia.com Survey Reveals 51.2 Million American Workers Are Vacation Deprived,” April 25, 2007, accessed May 2007, at http://press.expedia.com/index.php?
Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet by Jeffrey Sachs
agricultural Revolution, air freight, back-to-the-land, British Empire, business process, carbon footprint, clean water, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, demographic transition, Diane Coyle, Edward Glaeser, energy security, failed state, Gini coefficient, Haber-Bosch Process, income inequality, income per capita, intermodal, invention of agriculture, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour mobility, low skilled workers, microcredit, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, Skype, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, unemployed young men, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population
Yet these arguments are not supported by the evidence. The surprising fact is that the social-welfare states have an even higher employment rate (number of workers as a share of the working-age population) than the free-market countries. The free-market countries in turn have a higher employment rate than the mixed economies. The key here is that the social-welfare states have very high rates of female labor-force participation. The social-welfare system ensures day care and schooling for the children, so mothers have the time and means to enter the labor market. The social-welfare states have been successful in maintaining very high employment rates for two other reasons. First, social support for the working-age population has been tied to specific policies that require those receiving benefits to seek employment with the assistance of government programs.
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, AI winter, airport security, Apple II, artificial general intelligence, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, Bill Duvall, bioinformatics, Brewster Kahle, Burning Man, call centre, cellular automata, Chris Urmson, Claude Shannon: information theory, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, computer vision, crowdsourcing, Danny Hillis, DARPA: Urban Challenge, data acquisition, Dean Kamen, deskilling, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Hofstadter, Dynabook, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, factory automation, From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death, future of work, Galaxy Zoo, Google Glasses, Google X / Alphabet X, Grace Hopper, Gödel, Escher, Bach, Hacker Ethic, haute couture, hive mind, hypertext link, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, information retrieval, Internet Archive, Internet of things, invention of the wheel, Jacques de Vaucanson, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Conway, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Kevin Kelly, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, loose coupling, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, medical residency, Menlo Park, Mother of all demos, natural language processing, new economy, Norbert Wiener, PageRank, pattern recognition, pre–internet, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Stallman, Robert Gordon, Rodney Brooks, Sand Hill Road, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, semantic web, shareholder value, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Singularitarianism, skunkworks, Skype, social software, speech recognition, stealth mode startup, Stephen Hawking, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, strong AI, superintelligent machines, technological singularity, Ted Nelson, telemarketer, telepresence, telepresence robot, Tenerife airport disaster, The Coming Technological Singularity, the medium is the message, Thorstein Veblen, Turing test, Vannevar Bush, Vernor Vinge, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, Whole Earth Catalog, William Shockley: the traitorous eight
“The restructuring of production practices and the permanent replacement of machines for human laborers has begun to take a tragic toll on the lives of millions of workers,” he wrote.22 The challenge to his thesis was that employment in the United States actually grew from 115 million to 137 million during the decade following the publication of his book. That meant that the size of the workforce would grow by over 19 percent while the nation’s population grew by only 11 percent. Moreover, key economic indicators such as the labor force participation rate, employment to working population ratio, and the unemployment rate showed no evidence of technological unemployment. The situation, then, was more nuanced than the impending black-and-white labor calamity Rifkin had forecast. For example, from the 1970s, the outsourcing of jobs internationally, as multinational corporations fled to low-cost manufacturing regions and used telecommunications networks to relocate white-collar jobs, had a far more significant impact on domestic employment than the deployment of automation technologies.
Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles by Ruchir Sharma
3D printing, affirmative action, Albert Einstein, American energy revolution, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, eurozone crisis, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, housing crisis, income inequality, indoor plumbing, inflation targeting, informal economy, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, land reform, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, Peter Thiel, planetary scale, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, software is eating the world, sovereign wealth fund, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, working-age population
When the 2008 crisis hit, and demand from the United States and Europe started to collapse, export-dependent nations like Thailand and Malaysia (where exports also account for about 70 percent of GDP) saw much sharper downturns than the Philippines and Indonesia (exports for both represent less than 30 percent of GDP). One of the more unusual signs of stagnation is that Thailand has failed to enjoy the standard payoff when women work. Thailand has a very large population of working women, which normally translates into a higher level of economic development. It stands to reason that the more people there are earning incomes, the richer the society will be. But Thailand’s high rate of female labor-force participation (66 percent) has produced no boost in growth. This is perhaps particularly surprising given that in Thailand the groom’s family must pay a dowry to the bride, and not the other way around as in many Asian cultures. The male dowry would seem to suggest a society that traditionally puts a high value on the earning power of women. One reason why women have little impact on national growth in Thailand may be that they land mainly in low-end or temporary jobs, with little chance to make an impact on productivity.
Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, Brownian motion, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, constrained optimization, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, dark matter, David Brooks, David Graeber, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental economics, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Flash crash, full employment, George Akerlof, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, incomplete markets, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, l'esprit de l'escalier, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loose coupling, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market design, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, Nash equilibrium, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shock, payday loans, Ponzi scheme, precariat, prediction markets, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, random walk, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, school choice, sealed-bid auction, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Steven Levy, technoutopianism, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Myth of the Rational Market, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, theory of mind, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, working poor
For instance, Lord Peter Bauer wrote a pamphlet, Class on the Brain: The Cost of a British Obsession (1997), which asserted, “for about eight centuries Britain has not been a closed society, much less a caste society,” that there have been few class barriers to wealth in Britain, and that to the extent that Britain became less open and flexible in the postwar years, “it needed the reforms of Mrs. Thatcher’s governments to re-open the road of opportunity.” 50 O. Jones, Chavs, p. 167. 51 Data from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. Last consulted August 7, 2011. The mean was so far below the median because the distribution of income had become so skewed to the bottom, and expanded labor force participation: see the data presented at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/. 52 Linden, “Addictive Personality?” 53 Ailon, “The Discursive Management of Financial Risk Scandals,” pp. 264–65. 54 Ibid., p. 267. 55 The narrative that blamed the crisis on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and improvident home owners is covered below in chapter 5. However, even Payne admits that parts of this story comes perilously close to that propounded by the American Enterprise Institute and Peter Wallison (Payne, The Consumer, Credit and Neoliberalism, p. 169). 56 Gravois, “Too Important to Fail.” 57 “The only problem is that, in all likelihood, such a world would be one where banks only get more sophisticated, powerful, and centralized.
A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy by Joel Mokyr
Andrei Shleifer, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, clockwork universe, cognitive dissonance, Copley Medal, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, delayed gratification, deliberate practice, Deng Xiaoping, Edmond Halley, epigenetics, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial independence, framing effect, germ theory of disease, Haber-Bosch Process, hindsight bias, income inequality, invention of movable type, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jacquard loom, Jacquard loom, Jacques de Vaucanson, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land tenure, law of one price, Menlo Park, moveable type in China, new economy, phenotype, price stability, principal–agent problem, rent-seeking, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, statistical model, the market place, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, ultimatum game, World Values Survey, Wunderkammern
Among the theoretical works by economists on the origins of culture are the pathbreaking papers by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2011), which for the first time brought to economics the important work on cultural evolution done by scholars of cultural anthropology and population dynamics. The empirical work on the economics of culture depends heavily on data from the World Values Survey, Gallup World Poll, and similar data (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006; Tabellini, 2008, 2010; Deaton, 2011). This work has successfully addressed a whole set of issues of supreme importance to economists such as household behavior and female labor force participation, corruption, and migration (Fernández, 2011). It also draws heavily on experimental data, which suggest that culture modifies behavior in many ways that qualify and nuance the standard economic assumptions of individual utility maximization in such obvious set-ups as simple ultimatum games (Bowles, 2004, pp. 110–19). A recent essay by Rodrik (2014, p. 189) complains that ideas are “strangely absent” from modern models of political econom—but the same might be said about models of economic growth and innovation, though recent work has made a beginning at coming to grips with the cultural roots of these phenomena (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013).