labor-force participation

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pages: 126 words: 37,081

Men Without Work by Nicholas Eberstadt

business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, centre right, deindustrialization, financial innovation, full employment, illegal immigration, jobless men, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, mass immigration, moral hazard, post-work, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population

This, however, is exactly what the president’s CEA seems to have done in its recent report on declining LFPRs for prime-age men in America: SSDI receipt rates have been rising among prime-age men for the last 50 years. Today, 3.3 percent of prime-age men receive SSDI payments. A number of research papers find that increases in the number of people receiving SSDI led to lower labor force participation among the general population . . . and to lower earnings . . . However, from 1967 until 2014, the percentage of prime-age men receiving disability insurance rose from 1 percent to 3 percent, not nearly enough to explain the 7.5-percentage-point decline in the labor force participation rate over that period . . . So while SSDI receipt’s impact on prime-age male labor force participation is negative, under reasonable assumptions it is small and cannot explain more than a portion of the overall decline in participation.7 The CEA’s conclusion hinges on the assumption that SSDI is the only source of disability support available to un-workers today.

., “Long-Term Unemployment and the Great Recession: The Role of Composition, Duration Dependence, and Non-Participation” (working paper, National Bureau of Economc Research, Washington, DC). http://www.nber.org/papers/w20273. 17.Rand Ghayad, “The Jobless Trap,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.692.6736&rep=rep1&type=pdf. CHAPTER 7 1.“The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation,” whitehouse.gov, last modified June 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_cea_primeage_male_lfp.pdf. 2.Ibid., 26–27. 3.Donald O. Parsons, “The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 1. (February 1980), pp. 117–34; Chinhui Juhn “Decline of Male Labor Market Participation: The Role of Declining Market Opportunities,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 79–121, Published by Oxford University Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/211832. 4.Ravi Balakrishnan et al., “Recent U.S.

This same general trend holds for broader groupings of working-age men. For men twenty-to-sixty-four, for example, the numbers not in the labor force more than quintupled between 1965 and 2015, soaring from 3 million to 16 million. While the overall male twenty-to-sixty-four labor force grew by about 1 percent a year over these decades, the ranks of their economically inactive counterparts were swelling more than three times that fast. The labor force participation rate (LFPR)—job holders and job seekers relative to the population from which they are drawn—for prime-age men fell from a monthly average of 96.6 percent in 1965 to just 88.2 percent in 2015. Expressed another way, the proportion of economically inactive men of prime working age leapt from 3.4 percent in 1965 to 11.8 percent in 2015. And for men twenty-to-sixty-four years of age, LFPRs fell from 92.9 percent to 78.8 percent—meaning the economically inactive share of prime-age males tripled, rocketing up from 7 percent to 21 percent.


pages: 397 words: 121,211

Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010 by Charles Murray

affirmative action, assortative mating, blue-collar work, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate governance, David Brooks, en.wikipedia.org, feminist movement, George Gilder, Haight Ashbury, happiness index / gross national happiness, helicopter parent, illegal immigration, income inequality, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Menlo Park, new economy, Ralph Nader, Richard Florida, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Unsafe at Any Speed, War on Poverty, working-age population, young professional

But the rest of the trendline reflects in part an increase in the number of people seeking to get benefits who aren’t really unable to work—an increase in Americans for whom the founding virtue of industriousness is not a big deal anymore. Labor Force Participation More evidence for the weakening of the work ethic among males comes from the data on labor force participation—the economist’s term for being available for work if anyone offers you a job. When the average labor force participation rate in 1960–64 is compared with the rate from 2004 through 2008 (before the recession began), as shown in Figure 9.2, white male labor-force participation fell across the entire age range.1 FIGURE 9.2. WHITE MALES NOT IN THE LABOR FORCE: 1960–64 COMPARED TO 2004–8 Source: IPUMS. Sample limited to civilian white males ages 20–60. The differences weren’t large for men in their early twenties, and even those small differences are largely explained by increases in post–high school education that delay entry into the labor force.

Once again, I must divide whites ages 30–49 by educational level instead of dividing the sample into Belmont and Fishtown, for the same reason that applied to males out of the labor force. I begin with married women, shown in Figure 9.8. FIGURE 9.8. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AMONG MARRIED WOMEN BY EDUCATION Source: IPUMS. Sample limited to married white women ages 30–49. The short story is that married women in Belmont and Fishtown behaved similarly, starting out within 6 percentage points of each other in 1960 and ending up within 7 percentage points of each other in 2008. Married women in both neighborhoods roughly doubled their labor force participation. It was a revolution indeed, transforming the labor force participation of married women. Creaming had a trivial effect. Now turn to single women, who exhibit the different pattern shown in Figure 9.9. The gap between Belmont and Fishtown unmarried women was already wide in 1960, and the feminist revolution made little difference subsequently.

The main story line is that the baseline figures in 1960 were 95 percent and 95 percent, respectively, and that the disaster has struck Fishtown no matter which racial aggregation is used—and that the intact family remained strong in Belmont, no matter which racial aggregation is used. Industriousness Figure 16.3 shows the story for labor force participation among males ages 30–49. FIGURE 16.3. MALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY EDUCATION FOR ALL PRIME-AGE MEN Source: IPUMS CPS. Samples limited to persons ages 30–49. As you may recall from chapter 9, the Belmont-Fishtown breakdown for analyzing labor force participation isn’t feasible because so many people who are out of the labor force have no occupation. Figure 16.3 therefore compares men with no more than twelve years of education with those who have at least sixteen years of education. Once again, the percentage for whites as of 2010 was virtually identical with the percentage for the whole population, and for the same reason that the marriage rates were so close: Blacks have a much higher proportion of low-education males out of the labor force than whites, but the growing proportion of Latinos, who have higher labor force participation than whites, made up the difference.


pages: 555 words: 80,635

Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital by Kimberly Clausing

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, active measures, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, battle of ideas, Bernie Sanders, business climate, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Donald Trump, floating exchange rates, full employment, gig economy, global supply chain, global value chain, guest worker program, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, index fund, investor state dispute settlement, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, offshore financial centre, open economy, Paul Samuelson, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, uber lyft, winner-take-all economy, working-age population, zero-sum game

It is clear that the Great Recession drove some workers out of the labor force, but demographic factors also contributed. Much of the recent decline in labor force participation is due to the aging of the population, since older workers are more likely to retire early. One factor that does not, however, appear to be a meaningful driver of labor force participation is international trade.4 In years of rapid import growth, labor force participation has often grown, whereas labor force participation has fallen most in years of flatter import trends. Thus, considering our low unemployment rate as well as the insensitivity of labor force participation to trade, even draconian reductions in imports would be unlikely to increase the number of jobs in the economy by more than a percent or two. Yet it would take far more labor than one or two percent of the labor force to produce the goods that we currently import.

Historical data support this idea; there are few years in the United States (or elsewhere) where unemployment has been lower than 4 percent.3 Therefore, there is probably not much room to lower the unemployment rate further. Some argue that labor force participation could be changed. Many people who are not in the labor force, however, have reasons for their nonparticipation. They are in school, or have retired early, or have chosen to stay home with children. These workers are unlikely to be lured into the labor force by the prospect of jobs making T-shirts or home furnishings. Still, labor force participation is not constant over time. Over the period of 1980 to 1995, it rose about 2.5 percent in the United States (from about 64 percent to about 66.5 percent), in part due to women’s increasing participation in the labor force. Since 2000, labor force participation has dropped by more than 4 percent (from about 67 percent to under 63 percent), with the steepest part of that decline happening during the Great Recession, and a more level trend in recent years (fig. 3.1).

In fact, one of the reasons we import the goods we do is that these goods use labor intensively. Because of higher US wages, making these products abroad is far less expensive than it would be at home. To produce these labor-intensive goods here, we would need to move labor away from its current occupations and toward those industries where we would no longer be importing goods. Figure 3.1: Labor Force Participation is Not Driven Down by Imports Notes: Data show labor force participation relative to the working-age population. Data sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data; World Development Indicators, World Bank. Which industries would shrink as a result, and would that be a good thing? Natural candidates would be export industries, since the very policies that reduced our imports would also reduce our exports. Our trading partners would be unlikely to sit on their hands while we raised trade barriers.


pages: 484 words: 104,873

Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future by Martin Ford

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, additive manufacturing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, AI winter, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, artificial general intelligence, assortative mating, autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, basic income, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, Bernie Madoff, Bill Joy: nanobots, business cycle, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Chris Urmson, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, commoditize, computer age, creative destruction, debt deflation, deskilling, disruptive innovation, diversified portfolio, Erik Brynjolfsson, factory automation, financial innovation, Flash crash, Fractional reserve banking, Freestyle chess, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gunnar Myrdal, High speed trading, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, informal economy, iterative process, Jaron Lanier, job automation, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Kenneth Arrow, Khan Academy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, McJob, moral hazard, Narrative Science, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, optical character recognition, passive income, Paul Samuelson, performance metric, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, precision agriculture, price mechanism, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, rent-seeking, reshoring, RFID, Richard Feynman, Rodney Brooks, Sam Peltzman, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, single-payer health, software is eating the world, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, stealth mode startup, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Steven Pinker, strong AI, Stuxnet, technological singularity, telepresence, telepresence robot, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Coming Technological Singularity, The Future of Employment, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, uber lyft, union organizing, Vernor Vinge, very high income, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, women in the workforce

The participation rate for women peaked at 60 percent in 2000; the overall labor force participation rate peaked at about 67 percent that same year.26 Figure 2.5. Labor Force Participation Rate SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).25 Labor force participation has been falling ever since, and although this is due in part to the retirement of the baby boom generation, and in part because younger workers are pursuing more education, those demographic trends do not fully explain the decline. The labor force participation rate for adults between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four—those old enough to have completed college and even graduate school, yet too young to retire—has declined from about 84.5 percent in 2000 to just over 81 percent in 2013.27 In other words, both the overall labor force participation rate and the participation rate for prime working-age adults have fallen by about three percentage points since 2000—and about half of that decline came before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis.

Karabarbounis and Neiman concluded that these global declines in labor’s share resulted from “efficiency gains in capital producing sectors, often attributed to advances in information technology and the computer age.”23 The authors also noted that a stable labor share of income continues to be “a fundamental feature of macro-economic models.”24 In other words, just as economists do not seem to have fully assimilated the implications of the circa-1973 divergence of productivity and wage growth, they are apparently still quite happy to build Bowley’s Law into the equations they use to model the economy. Declining Labor Force Participation A separate trend has been the decline in labor force participation. In the wake of the 2008–9 economic crisis, it was often the case that the unemployment rate fell not because large numbers of new jobs were being created, but because discouraged workers exited the workforce. Unlike the unemployment rate, which counts only those people actively seeking jobs, labor-force participation offers a graphic illustration that captures workers who have given up. As Figure 2.5 shows, the labor force participation rate rose sharply between 1970 and 1990 as women flooded into the workforce. The overall trend disguises the crucial fact that the percentage of men in the labor force has been in consistent decline since 1950, falling from a high of about 86 percent to 70 percent as of 2013.

Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, “The Global Decline of the Labor Share,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19136, issued in June 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19136.pdf; see also http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/loukas.karabarbounis/research/labor_share.pdf. 23. Ibid., p. 1. 24. Ibid. 25. Labor Force Participation Rate Graph, Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent, Seasonally Adjusted [CIVPART]; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?id=CIVPART; accessed April 29, 2014. 26. Graphs showing the participation rates for men and women can be found at the Federal Reserve Economic Data website; see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LNS11300001 and http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LNS11300002, respectively. 27. A graph of the labor force participation rate for adults twenty-five to fifty-four years of age can be found at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?


pages: 1,104 words: 302,176

The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World) by Robert J. Gordon

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, airline deregulation, airport security, Apple II, barriers to entry, big-box store, blue-collar work, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Charles Lindbergh, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Detroit bankruptcy, discovery of penicillin, Donner party, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, feminist movement, financial innovation, full employment, George Akerlof, germ theory of disease, glass ceiling, high net worth, housing crisis, immigration reform, impulse control, income inequality, income per capita, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflight wifi, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, invention of air conditioning, invention of the sewing machine, invention of the telegraph, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, jitney, job automation, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, labor-force participation, Loma Prieta earthquake, Louis Daguerre, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market fragmentation, Mason jar, mass immigration, mass incarceration, McMansion, Menlo Park, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, occupational segregation, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, payday loans, Peter Thiel, pink-collar, Productivity paradox, Ralph Nader, Ralph Waldo Emerson, refrigerator car, rent control, Robert X Cringely, Ronald Coase, school choice, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, Skype, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Pinker, The Market for Lemons, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, undersea cable, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban sprawl, washing machines reduced drudgery, Washington Consensus, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration, yellow journalism, yield management

Although more than half of federal government employees were women, they made up 1.4 percent of civil-service workers in the top four pay grades.17 Starting in the mid-1960s, the end of the baby boom resulted in a prolonged period of growth in female labor force participation, as shown in figure 15–2. Despite the baby boom the labor force participation rate (LFPR) for “prime-age” females (aged 25–54) had already inched up from 34.9 percent in 1948 to 44.5 percent in 1964. Then began the period of most rapid growth to 69.6 percent in 1985 and then to a peak of 76.8 percent in 1999, followed by a slow decline to 73.9 percent in 2014. Figure 15–2. Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender, Ages 25 to 54, 1950–2015 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, LNS11300061 and LNS 11300062. Also shown in figure 15–2 is the contrast between the male and female LFPR. After a period of stability between 1948 and 1964, the prime-age male LFPR began to decline very slowly, from 96.8 percent in 1964 to 93.9 percent in 1984, 91.7 percent in 1999, and 88.2 percent in 2014.

Schooling in 1870 was generally limited to elementary school, with few young people extending their education beyond age 12, and even then often dependent on parental willingness to pay for private schooling. Labor-force participation was high for males aged 16–19. The difference between male and female teenagers should be underlined, with 1870 participation rates for ages 16–19 at 76.1 percent for male teenagers but only 29 percent for females. Furthermore, female participation was relatively short-lived and was terminated by the first pregnancy, whereas male participation was continuous from age 15, or even age 12, to the end of the working life. High labor force participation of male teenagers was a matter of necessity. The nuclear family had to provide all the labor needed to raise the crops and maintain the household. Male teenagers worked with their fathers in the fields, and female teenagers helped their mothers with the unending household chores (charts showing the evolution of child labor after 1870 are presented in chapter 8).

The rising share of clerks, sales people, managers, and professionals made the working hours—if not delightful fun—at least less physically taxing than before. And those working hours steadily declined, from a typical sixty-hour work week in 1900 to a typical forty-hour week after 1940. The chapter begins by describing changes in the average work experience of Americans. Labor force participation of adult males declined even as that of females increased. As more people lived beyond age 65 thanks to increasing life expectancy, the concept of retirement was invented.3 For the few males who survived past age 65 in 1870, the male labor force participation rate in the age group 65–75 was an astonishing 88 percent. And as life expectancy was extended, the transformation of life at ages older than 65 took on new importance. The percentage of the population living past their sixty-fifth birthday was only 34 percent in 1870 but jumped to 56 percent in 1940 and then to 77 percent in 2000.4 Just as old age was transformed, so was youth.


pages: 976 words: 235,576

The Meritocracy Trap: How America's Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite by Daniel Markovits

"Robert Solow", 8-hour work day, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, Anton Chekhov, asset-backed security, assortative mating, basic income, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, computer age, corporate governance, corporate raider, crony capitalism, David Brooks, deskilling, Detroit bankruptcy, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Emanuel Derman, equity premium, European colonialism, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, fear of failure, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Ford paid five dollars a day, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, future of work, gender pay gap, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, high net worth, hiring and firing, income inequality, industrial robot, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, mass incarceration, medical residency, minimum wage unemployment, Myron Scholes, Nate Silver, New Economic Geography, new economy, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, payday loans, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, precariat, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, Richard Florida, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, school choice, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, six sigma, Skype, stakhanovite, stem cell, Steve Jobs, supply-chain management, telemarketer, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Thomas Davenport, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, transaction costs, traveling salesman, universal basic income, unpaid internship, Vanguard fund, War on Poverty, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor, young professional, zero-sum game

Census Bureau, “American Community Survey (ACS),” www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/. Both trends are predicted to continue. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Projections to 2022: The Labor Force Participation Rate Continues to Fall,” Monthly Labor Review (December 2013), www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/labor-force-projections-to-2022-the-labor-force-participation-rate-continues-to-fall.htm; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Recession of 2007–2009 (February 2012), www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/; and Executive Office of the President of the United States, The Labor Force Participation Rate Since 2007: Causes and Policy Implications (July 2014), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stock/files/labor_force_participation.pdf. with a BA only: Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah, “The College Payoff,” 6. Joan Williams, using less comprehensive data, reports slightly different shares: 19.4 percent of male college grads and 14 percent of female college grads earn less than the average high school grad.

In 1970, the shares were 4 percent of men and 50 percent of women. The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that both falling trends will continue. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Projections to 2022: The Labor Force Participation Rate Continues to Fall,” Monthly Labor Review (December 2013), www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/labor-force-projections-to-2022-the-labor-force-participation-rate-continues-to-fall.htm. Melinda Pitts, John Robertson, and Ellyn Terry, “Reasons for the Decline in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Macroblog, April 10, 2014, http://macroblog.typepad.com/macroblog/2014/04/reasons-for-the-decline-in-prime-age-labor-force-participation-.html. See also Martin Wolf, “America’s Labor Market Is Not Working,” Financial Times, November 3, 2015. The share of U.S. prime-aged adults to have left the labor force is large, compared to advanced economies.

imposed on women at midcentury: For prime-aged men, the labor force participation rate has fallen substantially, from roughly 96 percent in 1970 to roughly 88 percent today (the second-lowest rate of any advanced industrialized country, ahead only of Italy). See Melinda Pitts, John Robertson, and Ellyn Terry, “Reasons for the Decline in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Macroblog, April 10, 2014, http://macroblog.typepad.com/macroblog/2014/04/reasons-for-the-decline-in-prime-age-labor-force-participation-.html; Nicholas Eberstadt, “Where Did All the Men Go?,” Milken Institute Review, April 28, 2017, www.milkenreview.org/articles/where-did-all-the-men-go. Hereafter cited as Eberstadt, “Where Did All the Men Go?” For prime-aged women, by contrast, the labor force participation rate rose by an almost equal amount (although from a lower baseline) between 1970 and 2000, and has fallen slightly since.


Social Capital and Civil Society by Francis Fukuyama

Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, p-value, Pareto efficiency, postindustrial economy, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, transaction costs, World Values Survey

Black male rates of unemployment relative to female rates are higher than comparable rates for whites, further accentuating the relative disadvantages of black men. What happens if we broaden our survey to other OECD countries? Chart 22 plots changes in female labor force participation 422 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values [FUKUYAMA] Social Capital 42 3 against changes in the divorce rate between approximately 1970 and 1990 for eight selected OECD countries. The chart indicates that there is a broad correlation between women moving into the labor force and changes in divorce rates. Chart 23 plots changes in female labor force participation against the 1993 illegitimacy rate for nine OECD countries. The fit here is a bit less good than for divorces, but once again there is a broad correlation between female labor force participation and change in family structure. In both cases the Netherlands and Sweden are outliers. T H E SPECIAL CASE OF J A P A N In the OECD world, Japan presents an interesting case because it has up to this point not experienced the Great Disruption, despite the fact that today it has the world’s second highest per capita income.

The weakening norm of male responsibility reinforced, in turn, the need for women to arm themselves with job skills so as not to be dependent on decreasingly reliable husbands. There is considerable empirical evidence that Becker is right about the importance, to put it crudely, of husbands as economic commodities in marriage markets. Chart 18 shows the changing rate of male v. female labor force participation in the United 57Becker, A Treatise on the Family, pp . 347–61. 4420 2 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values States 1960 and 1995. Not only does female participation jump from 35 to 55 percent in this 35-year period, but male participation actually drops from 7 9 to 71 percent. Chart 19 shows changes in male and female median incomes in the United States between 1947 and 1995. It is interesting to note that male median incomes, after dropping slightly in the immediate postwar period, rise steadily through the late 1960s, after which they stagnate.

As indicated in the previous charts, Japanese divorce rates have edged up slightly over the past two generations, while illegitimacy rates have actually fallen. Crime rates, low to begin with by OECD standards, have also fallen over the same period, as have other social deviance indicators. 424 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Why the Japanese have escaped the disruptions experienced by other developed countries emerges clearly from the data. While Japanese rates of female labor force participation are not unusually low for an OECD country, they mask a much greater economic disparity between men and women. A woman’s decision either to remain unmarried or to raise a family without the benefit of a husband depends not simply on her having a job, but also on her prospects for being self-supporting over a lifetime. A great deal of Japanese female employment is temporary or else represents a form of underemployment.


pages: 440 words: 108,137

The Meritocracy Myth by Stephen J. McNamee

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, American ideology, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, business cycle, collective bargaining, computer age, conceptual framework, corporate governance, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, estate planning, failed state, fixed income, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, joint-stock company, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low-wage service sector, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, occupational segregation, old-boy network, pink-collar, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, prediction markets, profit motive, race to the bottom, random walk, school choice, Scientific racism, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, white flight, young professional

As with women working outside the home, increasing the number of hours worked per wage earner has upper limits. Delaying Retirement Not only are Americans working more, but they are also working longer over a lifetime. Demographer Murray Gendall (2008) documents that rates of labor-force participation for Americans over sixty-five have sharply increased since the mid-1980s, especially for women. Between 1985 and 2007, Gendall shows that rates of labor-force participation increased among men aged sixty-five to sixty-nine (25 to 34 percent), seventy to seventy-four (15 to 21 percent), and seventy-five and older (7 to 10 percent).[3] Labor-force participation increased among women aged sixty to sixty-four (33 to 48 percent), sixty-five to sixty-nine (14 to 26 percent), seventy to seventy-four (8 to 14 percent), and seventy-five and older (2 to 5 percent). In addition, since 1994, a higher proportion of workers sixty-five or older are working full time.

Relying on Multiple Wage Earners Between 1970 and 2010, the percentage of women aged sixteen and older in the labor force increased from 43 percent to 59 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2011, 1, 8). There are many reasons for the dramatic increase in female labor-force participation, including declining fertility; increasing divorce rates; growth of the service sector, in which women have been historically overrepresented; increasing levels of educational attainment among women; and the changing role of women in society. Another generally acknowledged factor is that women work for the same reason men do: to make ends meet. As prices have increased and wages have remained stagnant, more women have been drawn into the labor force to help make ends meet. Besides a sharp rise in female labor-force participation, there has also been a sharp increase in dual-income families. Among all married couples, those in which both husband and wife work increased from 44 percent of married couples in 1967 to 55 percent of married couples in 2009 (U.S.

That is, in agrarian societies it makes sense to have large families in order to have more potential workers available to work on the family farm. But as societies shift to industrial economies, children become net economic liabilities instead of potential economic assets. In a reinforcing pattern, reduced fertility is also associated with increased labor-force participation among women. That is, as more women work outside the home, they tend to have fewer children, and as women have fewer children, they tend to increase their rates of labor-force participation. While reduced fertility rates have many potential causes, demographers generally agree that economic factors are paramount. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2012, 23), the estimated cost of raising one child to age eighteen without college in 2011 for middle-income husband-wife families was $234,900.[1] Adding the average cost of a four-year public college education for in-state residents in the 2011–2012 academic year of $68,544[2] (College Board 2012) brings the total tab per child to slightly over $303,444.


pages: 424 words: 119,679

It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear by Gregg Easterbrook

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, air freight, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, coronavirus, David Brooks, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Exxon Valdez, factory automation, failed state, full employment, Gini coefficient, Google Earth, Home mortgage interest deduction, hydraulic fracturing, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, impulse control, income inequality, Indoor air pollution, interchangeable parts, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, longitudinal study, Lyft, mandatory minimum, manufacturing employment, Mikhail Gorbachev, minimum wage unemployment, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, Paul Samuelson, peak oil, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post scarcity, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, self-driving car, short selling, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Slavoj Žižek, South China Sea, Steve Wozniak, Steven Pinker, supervolcano, The Chicago School, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, There's no reason for any individual to have a computer in his home - Ken Olsen, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, transaction costs, uber lyft, universal basic income, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, working poor, Works Progress Administration

On the Internet, one encounters elaborate rumors about crashed UFOs; on talk radio, a standby is that the impressive employment rates of the United States are instead a cover-up. The numbers, this conspiracy theory goes, are manipulated to mask labor-force participation, the fraction of prime-aged, healthy adults with jobs. In December 2016, just before Barack Obama left office, radio host Rush Limbaugh told listeners that labor-force participation “is at an all-time low.” The actual postwar low for labor-force participation came in 1966, when 60 percent of prime-aged, healthy Americans held jobs. In January 2017, 63 percent of prime-aged, healthy Americans held jobs. Adjusting for population growth, had the labor-force participation rate of 1966 been in effect in 2017, there would have been 117 million Americans employed; instead, the number for 2017 was 152 million with jobs. Compared to population increase, that’s 35 million more Americans working than in those Good Old Days.

Louis, the labor-force participation rate for men has indeed fallen in recent decades, from 86 percent in 1950 to 69 percent in 2015. Simultaneously, labor-force participation for women has risen sharply, from 33 percent in 1950 to 57 percent in 2015. Summing these trends—moderate decline in laboring men, a larger increase in women working for wages—results in a solid employment picture for the United States, though of course improvement is needed. When commentators say that US labor-force participation is some kind of economic disaster, what they are saying in effect is that men having jobs is more important than women having jobs. Or that white men having jobs is more important than African American and Hispanic men working. Since about 2000, white male labor-force participation is down while African American and Hispanic male labor-force participation is up.

., “Income and Poverty in the United States” (Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, 2016). The Labor Department reports that 2016 hourly wages rose at 2.9 percent: “Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings of Employees on Private Nonfarm Payrolls” (Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics). In January 2017, 63 percent of prime-aged, healthy Americans held jobs: “Labor Force Participation Rate Timeseries” (Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics). the labor-force participation rate for men has indeed fallen: Economic Research Division, “Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate” (St. Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). As the social scientist Charles Murray showed: Charles Murray, Coming Apart (New York: Crown, 2011). The writer Anne Kim has noted: Anne Kim, “Why Is Marriage Thriving Only Among the Affluent?” Washington Monthly, Spring 2016. At this writing, unemployment was 4.4 percent: “Employment Situation Summary, June 2017” (Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics).


Not Working by Blanchflower, David G.

active measures, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, Boris Johnson, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, Clapham omnibus, collective bargaining, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, estate planning, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, George Akerlof, gig economy, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, illegal immigration, income inequality, indoor plumbing, inflation targeting, job satisfaction, John Bercow, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, Martin Wolf, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, Nate Silver, negative equity, new economy, Northern Rock, obamacare, oil shock, open borders, Own Your Own Home, p-value, Panamax, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-materialism, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, quantitative easing, rent control, Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, selection bias, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, universal basic income, University of East Anglia, urban planning, working poor, working-age population, yield curve

Rising Inequality: Let Them Eat Cake The CEA (2016a) concludes that the trends in the labor force participation rate for prime-age men are associated with other economic trends such as rising inequality. They modeled the association between a $1,000 increase in annual wages at different percentiles of the wage distribution in a state and its prime- age male labor force participation rate, controlling for time-invariant state differences as well as national time trends. The correlation they found was strongest at the bottom of the wage distribution: at the 10th percentile, a $1,000 increase in annual wages, or a roughly $0.50 increase in hourly wages for a full-time, full-year worker, is associated with a 0.17-percentage-point increase in the state labor force participation rate for prime-age men. Higher up in the wage distribution, the correlation between wages and participation, the CEA found, becomes weaker, with a $1,000 increase in annual wages at the median corresponding to just a 0.05percentage-point higher participation rate.

The likelihood is that as the wages of available jobs rise, the attractiveness of those jobs increases. The most obvious example of that relates to young people who turn to education when job opportunities are not available. As labor market slack has fallen since 2009 the participation rates of prime-age and young workers have risen. At the same time the continuing upward trend of more labor force participation of those 55 and older has continued. The very different post-recession trends in the United States versus those of other advanced countries can be shown in another way via the labor force participation rate (LFPR), or activity rate. The LFPR rose steadily from the end of World War II in the United States and elsewhere postwar as an increasing proportion of women joined the labor force. For example, the monthly LFPR in the United States for those of working age (16 and over) was 58.6 percent in January 1948, rising to 67.3 percent between February and April 2000.

The corresponding percentages for less-educated women of the same age were lower and showed little change (12.8% and 12.7%, respectively). The number of people who reported being NILF because they were ill or disabled rose over this period by just under 4 million (+32%). There is scant evidence of any pickup in the U.S. prime-age male rate of labor force participation. For women, LFPRs have risen in every country except the United States. Notable is the rise in the LFPR in Japan, which was targeted in Abenomics to get women back into the labor force. Krueger has claimed that “the labor force participation rate has stopped rising for cohorts of women born after 1960”; but that doesn’t seem to be right.18 The latest data from the BLS suggest that isn’t the case and show a rise for the younger two prime-age groups since the start of 2012. In the case of ages 25– 34, the participation rate is now higher than it was at the start of the Great Recession.


pages: 462 words: 129,022

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent by Joseph E. Stiglitz

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, basic income, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, central bank independence, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, gig economy, global supply chain, greed is good, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, late fees, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Peter Thiel, postindustrial economy, price discrimination, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, shareholder value, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, two-sided market, universal basic income, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, working-age population

Of course, what matters is not just growth in national output, but in living standards of ordinary Americans,2 and that requires not just increases in productivity, but that ordinary citizens get a fair share of that increase. The trouble in recent decades is that neither labor force participation nor productivity have been doing well—and the benefits of what gains have occurred have gone to the top. Labor force growth and participation Labor force growth is related in part to demographics about which government can’t do much: the aging of the baby boomers and the decline in birthrates.3 But the government can do something about immigration and labor force participation. Trump is set to lower the former—thus slowing growth—and has no agenda for the latter even though there are some attractive options. We could get more women into the labor force with more family-friendly policies (greater flexibility of hours, better family leave policies, more support for child care).

Obviously, a country where there is such despair, where so many are on drugs or drinking too much alcohol, won’t have a healthy labor force. A good measure of how well society does in creating good jobs and healthy workers is the fraction of working-age population that is participating in the labor force and working. Here, the US does far worse than many other countries. At least some of our poor labor force participation can be directly linked to our poor health statistics. A recent study by Alan Krueger, former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, found that nearly half of “prime-age men” not in the labor force suffer from a serious health condition, and two-thirds of those are also taking some prescription pain medication.36 But America’s poor health is not the result of an unhealthy climate, nor is it because sickly people have migrated to these shores.

It helps that some of the efforts to increase flexibility (for instance, more flexible hours, more scope for part-time work, and more opportunities for working from home, much easier in today’s world of the internet) will work for both. Again, unfortunately, these are reforms that the market won’t make on its own. The power of corporations over workers is just too great; they don’t need to do these things; and they don’t care about the greater benefits to our society. That’s why government will have to take an active role in pushing these changes. Our labor force participation would be higher too if we had a healthier population. It’s not the climate, and it’s not the air we breathe or the water we drink that has led America to have a less healthy population living shorter lives than in other advanced countries, less able and willing to be active participants in the labor force. We need better regulations to protect us from the food industry, which has been doing what it can to ply us with addictive, unhealthful foods.


pages: 204 words: 67,922

Elsewhere, U.S.A: How We Got From the Company Man, Family Dinners, and the Affluent Society to the Home Office, BlackBerry Moms,and Economic Anxiety by Dalton Conley

assortative mating, call centre, clean water, commoditize, dematerialisation, demographic transition, Edward Glaeser, extreme commuting, feminist movement, financial independence, Firefox, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, Joan Didion, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, late capitalism, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, McMansion, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, off grid, oil shock, PageRank, Ponzi scheme, positional goods, post-industrial society, post-materialism, principal–agent problem, recommendation engine, Richard Florida, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, statistical model, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, women in the workforce, Yom Kippur War

Add in divorce—and even more important, the formation and demise of cohabiting relationships—and you’ve got a lot of household income drops having nothing to do with employers wielding the ax more often. According to Dr. Jeffrey Timberlake, for example, about a quarter of American children experience two or more mothers’ partners by the time they are fifteen!7 Over 8 percent experience three or more maternal domestic partners! That’s a lot of earning power coming and going (not to mention emotional turmoil). Over and above the part that female labor force participation plays in family income fluctuation, the increasingly important role that women play in the economic life of a family forms the bedrock of the real story of middle-class anxiety. That’s because household labor—most notably child care—has not gotten any easier in the meantime. Blending work and home responsibilities is no easy feat, especially in a 24/7 service economy that allows many of us to work from home at all hours.

Perhaps more critically, this dynamic contributes to the intravidualism phenomenon by fragmenting and dispersing one’s attentions—physical, emotional, familial. And as we all know, it’s hard to put something back together once it has shattered into a million pieces. The next chapter details the concrete changes that led us little by little from the social ethic of the 1950s to the Elsewhere Ethic of intravidualism today. As we shall see, there is no one trend— the rise of computers, increasing female labor force participation, suburbanization—that can get us from there to here. Just as it is the intersection of the economic red shift, the portable workshop, and the price society—and not any of these alone— that creates this new social landscape, so it is a series of parallel and interrelated historical steps that has fundamentally altered the everyday experience of many professionals in America over the last fifty years.

Today, almost two thirds of women with children under six years of age work (63 percent); by contrast, the figure was just over one third (39 percent) in 1975.39 Instead of cooking for their families, many low-wage women now reheat preprocessed food for other families in the restaurant industry. Instead of waiting on their own husband and kids, many women without college degrees wait on your kids. (Waitressing is, in fact, the number one profession for women without a college education.)40 This story of women’s rising labor force participation has the potential to increase economic inequality when it combines with what demographers call assortative mating—otherwise known as like-marrying-like. That is, since 1967, the demographer Christine Schwartz demonstrates that among two-earner couples, the similarity in their wages has risen by about threefold. In other words, whereas women used to look for good earners to marry, now men do so, too.


pages: 98 words: 27,609

The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It) by Michael R. Strain

Bernie Sanders, business cycle, centre right, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, feminist movement, full employment, gig economy, Gini coefficient, income inequality, job automation, labor-force participation, market clearing, market fundamentalism, new economy, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, social intelligence, Steven Pinker, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, upwardly mobile, working poor

For many, work is about more than a paycheck. It is how we contribute to society—and, importantly, how we can (correctly) be made to feel that we are contributing. It is a cure for boredom, which is one of the worst parts of life in a safe, modern, comfortable society. Work creates community. It emancipates us from our passions by directing them to productive ends. FIGURE 1. PRIME-AGE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE. Properly understood, work is deeply spiritual. Pope John Paul II wrote that man is “called to work.” “Man is the image of God,” wrote the late Pope, “partly through the mandate received from his Creator to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, every human being, reflects the very action of the Creator of the universe.” John Paul pointed out that we find “in the very first pages of the Book of Genesis” the “conviction that work is a fundamental dimension of human existence on earth.”11 Our economic challenges are hardly limited to workforce participation.

Whether Americans today earn more in the labor market than their parents did is critical if you believe that earnings are a uniquely important source of income to a sense of contribution and personal dignity. To examine this, I compare the earnings of fathers and sons. It is common not to include females in this type of analysis, because their patterns of labor supply are less steady than for men, and because the effects of the significant increase in female labor force participation over this time period would be difficult to separate from earnings mobility. I also do not size-adjust these comparisons, as they are one to one. Finally, the earnings number includes wages, salaries, commissions, tips, bonuses, and the like—earnings from the labor market. Other than those items, the analysis here is the same as for income. The patterns of relative, rank-based mobility for father-son earnings are similar to family income.

Policy should encourage entrepreneurship and economic dynamism, advance free trade and the efficiencies and productivity gains (and thus wage gains) it brings over time, increase high-skilled immigration, and put the national debt on a downward trajectory by reforming middle-class entitlement programs. Economic opportunity and earned success are critical to the American Dream, so public policy should work aggressively to increase labor force participation. More generous earnings subsidies can pull more people into the workforce and can lift the incomes of the working poor and working class. Relocation assistance targeted to long-term unemployed workers in struggling local labor markets can offer those workers a hand up to better employment opportunities. Work-based learning programs, like apprenticeship programs, can build skills and increase wages by allowing market forces, rather than government bureaucrats, to determine which skills are taught to apprentices and can provide apprentices with marketable credentials.


pages: 291 words: 81,703

Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation by Tyler Cowen

Amazon Mechanical Turk, Black Swan, brain emulation, Brownian motion, business cycle, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, complexity theory, computer age, computer vision, computerized trading, cosmological constant, crowdsourcing, dark matter, David Brooks, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deliberate practice, Drosophila, en.wikipedia.org, endowment effect, epigenetics, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Flynn Effect, Freestyle chess, full employment, future of work, game design, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, John Markoff, Khan Academy, labor-force participation, Loebner Prize, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microcredit, Myron Scholes, Narrative Science, Netflix Prize, Nicholas Carr, P = NP, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, reshoring, Richard Florida, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, statistical model, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Turing test, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, Yogi Berra

On the importance of wage gains for advanced-degree holders, see David Wessel, “Only Advanced-Degree Holders See Wage Gains,” Real Time Economics blog, The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2011, based on work by Matthew Slaughter and related to Census data, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, Current Population Reports,” September 2011, http://www .census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. Chapter 3: Why Are So Many People Out of Work? On these and other factors behind labor force participation, see Willem Van Zandweghe, “Interpreting the Recent Decline in Labor Force Participation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2012. On Belle, see Joe Condon and Ken Thompson, “Belle Chess Hardware,” reprinted in, Computer Chess Compendium (New York: Ishi Press International, 2009), 286–92, David Levy, editor. On nonhuman DJs, see John Roach, “Non-Human DJ Gets Radio Gig,” NBC News,www.today.com/tech/non-human-dj-gets-radio-gig-121286. On various points concerning unemployment and labor force participation, see David Wessel, “What’s Wrong with America’s Job Engine,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2011. See also Brad Plumer, “The Incredible Shrinking Labor Force,” The Washington Post, May 4, 2012.

We may have accepted that machines won’t put everyone out of work, and that the rise of intelligent machines will benefit a lot of us greatly, but there can be little doubt that they will also put a few percent of us out of work for some time to come. Consider what economists call the “labor force participation rate.” It refers to the percentage of people—other than the very young and old—who in fact have jobs. You can see clearly in the chart that it has been going down for some time. Human labor suddenly doesn’t appear so indispensable, does it? Labor force participation depends on numerous factors, including the business cycle, savings, availability of benefits, and lifecycle and gender considerations. But let’s focus on how intelligent machines are likely to make a big difference across the next few decades. And to do that, let’s look at the development of one small subsector in the age of the computer

Our population is growing, but the number of people working continues to fall. This trend was underway well before the recession. Just how rewarding is work these days? The single best number to look at is the labor force participation rate, which circa 2012 showed that around 63 percent of the labor force was looking for work. Yet not all of these individuals have jobs, so the percentage of individuals in the labor force with jobs stands at around 58 percent. That figure hasn’t been so low since the early 1980s. (In those days the number was so low because fewer women wanted to work or had the opportunity to work.) Those numbers on labor force participation are telling us that, for whatever reason, over 40 percent of adult, non-senior Americans don’t consider it worthwhile to have a job. They can’t find a deal that suits them.


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The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World by Ruchir Sharma

Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business cycle, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Markoff, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, lateral thinking, liberal capitalism, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, mass immigration, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, pets.com, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Future of Employment, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population

To drill down into likely changes in the size and talent of the labor pool, watch mainly for shifts in the number of senior citizens, women, migrants, and even robots entering the workforce. Free the Forced Retirees In recent decades the widening impact of population decline has been magnified by a worldwide decline in the labor force participation rate—or the share of working-age adults who are in a job or looking for one. There are some major exceptions to this drop-off in workers, including Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, but the United States is seeing one of the more dramatic declines. In the last fifteen years, the labor force participation rate in the United States has fallen from 67 to 62 percent, much of it coming after the global financial crisis. Without that decline in participation, the U.S. labor force would have had twelve million more workers in 2015. Though some of this shift may be a passing phenomenon, reflecting the millions of unemployed workers who gave up on looking for a job in the frustrating depths of the great recession, the decline in participation would have happened anyway because of aging.

That is true even in Russia, which has a relatively high female labor force participation rate despite Soviet-era laws that close over 450 occupations as “too strenuous for women.” Vladimir Putin signed off on these restrictions when he took power in 2000, and Russian courts upheld them as recently as 2009. In a 2014 survey of 143 emerging countries, the World Bank found that 90 percent have at least one law that limits the economic opportunities available to women. These laws include bans or limitations on women owning property, opening a bank account, signing a contract, entering a courtroom, traveling alone, driving, or controlling family finances.6 Such restrictions are particularly prevalent in the Middle East and South Asia, the regions with the world’s lowest rates of female labor force participation, 26 and 35 percent respectively.

Between 1990 and 2013 only five countries increased their female labor force participation rate by more than 10 percentage points, and all were Latin countries. In first place was Colombia, where the share of adult women active in the workforce rose by 26 percentage points, followed by Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. The reasons for this boom are complex, but one is that Latin educational systems have opened up to women; in Colombia, Profamilia, a private group founded in the 1970s by wealthy women, has played a major role. Profamilia took on the powerful Catholic Church and lobbied for wider access to contraception, so that women could choose to delay childbirth in favor of a career. The fertility rate has dropped sharply, while the female labor force participation rate has skyrocketed. In many countries, all the leaders need to do to reap the economic boost from working women is to lift existing restrictions, which is a lot easier than providing costly new childcare services or generous parental leave.


pages: 241 words: 78,508

Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sandberg

affirmative action, business process, Cass Sunstein, constrained optimization, experimental economics, fear of failure, gender pay gap, glass ceiling, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, old-boy network, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Silicon Valley, social graph, women in the workforce, young professional

Still, the rate appears to be stabilizing and has not returned to the rates seen thirty or forty years ago (Stone and Hernandez 2012). This pattern of opting out maps broadly onto trends in women’s employment rates since the 1960s. From the 1960s to the 1990s, there was a dramatic increase in women’s labor force participation, which peaked in 1999 when 60 percent of women were working. Since 1999, there has been a slow decline in women’s employment rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007 and 2011). Mirroring these historical employment patterns among women, opting out reached a low in 1993, the decade that recorded the highest rates of women’s labor force participation, and saw its sharpest increase from 1999 to 2002, the same years that marked the beginning of the decline in women’s overall employment rates (Stone and Hernandez 2012). Thus, the recent decrease in the employment rates of highly educated mothers needs to be reconciled with employment declines among other groups, including declines for nonmothers and men.

Thus, the recent decrease in the employment rates of highly educated mothers needs to be reconciled with employment declines among other groups, including declines for nonmothers and men. All are likely linked in part to a weak labor market (Boushey 2008). Despite this dip in employment, college-educated women have the highest labor force participation rates of all mothers (Stone and Hernandez 2012). According to recent research from the U.S. Census Bureau, young, less-educated, and Hispanic women are more likely to be stay-at-home mothers (Kreider and Elliott 2010). For studies on opting out and women’s labor force participation rates, see Pamela Stone and Lisa Ackerly Hernandez, “The Rhetoric and Reality of ‘Opting Out,’ ” in Women Who Opt Out: The Debate over Working Mothers and Work-Family Balance, ed. Bernie D. Jones (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 33–56; Heather Boushey, “ ‘Opting Out?’

Sullivan, “Kaleidoscope Careers: An Alternate Explanation for the ‘Opt-Out’ Revolution,” The Academy of Management Executive 19, no. 1 (2005): 106–23. Other research has found that the employment participation rates of women vary across professions. A study of women from the Harvard graduating classes of 1988 to 1991 found that fifteen years after graduation, married women with children who had become M.D.s had the highest labor force participation rate (94.2%), while married women with children who went on to get other degrees had much lower labor force participation rates: Ph.D.s (85.5%), J.D.s (77.6%), MBAs (71.7%). These findings suggest professional cultures play a role in women’s rates of employment. See Jane Leber Herr and Catherine Wolfram, “Work Environment and ‘Opt-Out’ Rates at Motherhood Across Higher-Education Career Paths” (November 2011), http://​faculty.​haas.​berkeley.​edu/​wolfram/​Papers/​OptOut_​ILRRNov11.​pdf. 12.


Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador: Stability, Growth, and Social Equity by Paul Ely Beckerman, Andrés Solimano

banking crisis, banks create money, barriers to entry, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, central bank independence, centre right, clean water, currency peg, declining real wages, disintermediation, financial intermediation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, land reform, London Interbank Offered Rate, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, open economy, pension reform, price stability, rent-seeking, school vouchers, seigniorage, trade liberalization, women in the workforce

During periods of insecurity and uncertainty, important household coping strategies include increasing family members’ labor-force participation either by working longer hours at the same job or by mobilizing new household members—mostly women and boys—to enter the paid labor force. Economically Active Population In Ecuador, women’s participation in the labor force remains lower than that of men, even though female participation has increased over the decades. From 1970 to 1990, the female proportion of the economically active population (EAP) increased from 14 to 19 percent, whereas the male proportion decreased from 74 percent to 69 percent. Women’s labor-force participation is greater in urban areas. By 1998, 46 percent of urban women were economically active, the proportion having increased from 44 percent in 1993 according to INEC.

Of all children age 12 to 14 years in the bottom quintile, 34 percent work and attend CRISIS AND DOLLARIZATION IN ECUADOR 144 Figure 4.7 Ecuador: Gender Gap in Education Years of school attainment 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Per-capita expenditure quintiles Female Q5 Male Note: Refers to years of school attainment of population 24 years and older. Source: ECV 1999. school, and another 26 percent only work, resulting in an overall labor force participation rate of 60 percent (as shown in figure 4.9), up from 54 percent in 1998. Child labor undoubtedly contributes to the high rate of school absenteeism for children in the bottom quintile. Even before the most recent crisis, children age 12 to 14 years reported missing classes more than half the time, and even children age 6 to 11 years reported missing classes about one-third of the time.

According to Cunningham’s analysis of the Mexican labor force, single mothers begin to work in response to realized negative shocks to income, but their entry is less elastic than that of wives. On the other hand, similar to husbands, single women’s labor-force entry is not subject to economic fluctuations. In the case of Argentina, Gill and Pessino (1998) used aggregate data to show that labor-force participation rates of Argentine women, especially young women, are counter-cyclical, that is, women are more likely to be in the labor market when male unemployment rates are higher (cited in World Bank 2000c).27 Ecuadoran households unable to mobilize wives’ labor tend to be poorer (World Bank 1996). According to the most recent poverty study in CRISIS AND DOLLARIZATION IN ECUADOR 198 Table 5.5 Unemployed Population by Relationship with Household Head (Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca Averages from March 1998 to March 2000) Relation Men (percent) Household head Spouse Son/daughter Son/daughter-in-law Parents or in-laws Grandson/daughter Other relative Not related Total 27.0 1.2 57.4 2.3 0.1 3.5 6.5 1.9 100.0 Women (percent) 8.8 33.1 44.6 3.6 0.4 1.2 6.7 1.5 100.0 Total (percent) 17.0 18.7 50.4 3.0 0.3 2.3 6.6 1.7 100.0 Source: INFOPLAN based on Urban Employment Survey (Larrea and Sánchez 2001).


pages: 295 words: 90,821

Fully Grown: Why a Stagnant Economy Is a Sign of Success by Dietrich Vollrath

"Robert Solow", active measures, additive manufacturing, American Legislative Exchange Council, barriers to entry, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, creative destruction, Deng Xiaoping, endogenous growth, falling living standards, hiring and firing, income inequality, intangible asset, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, light touch regulation, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, old age dependency ratio, patent troll, Peter Thiel, profit maximization, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, total factor productivity, women in the workforce, working-age population

After that, though, the effect dissipated. By the 1990s, there was basically zero growth in the ratio of workers to population, and then in the twenty-first century this turned negative, to −0.35%. That twenty-first-century effect is not just a remnant of the financial crisis. Harris Eppsteiner, Jason Furman, and Wilson Powell calculated that population aging alone accounts for four-fifths of the decline in the labor force participation rate from 2007 to 2017, just since the crisis. A different study by Nicole Maestas, Kathleen Mullen, and David Powell identified the effect of population aging by comparing US states with relatively old populations to those with relatively young populations. Their results imply an effect of aging on growth of about 1 percentage point, in line with my numbers here. For the twenty-first century as a whole, the growth slowdown reflects the long-run effect of demographic changes, and not the lingering effects of the recent recession.

Over the longer period from 1990 to 2007, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson calculate that trade accounted for about 21% of the decline in manufacturing employment. Over either period, trade with China had a significant effect on manufacturing employment. In addition, these direct losses also led to indirect losses of employment in these commuting zones. Across the United States, increased trade from 1990 to 2007 lowered the percentage of people in the labor force, regardless of industry, by about 1 percentage point. The labor force participation rate was about 66% in 2007, so it would have been 67% without trade. Rather than 153 million workers in the labor force in 2007, there would have been 155 million. Trade with China also raised the unemployment rate by about 0.37 percentage points. In 2007, the unemployment rate was 5.0%, so it would have been 4.63% without that trade. Thus, rather than having 145.3 million employed workers in 2007, we would have had 147.8 million.

It accounts for a huge portion of the growth slowdown and was the result of falling fertility rates. In general, lower fertility rates are associated with higher living standards. Would you sacrifice the level of living standards and go back to the real GDP per capita of 1930 or 1920 to generate more rapid population growth? Remember, associated with the drop in family size was an increase in the age of marriage, higher female labor force participation, higher education levels, better household technologies, and improved reproductive rights for women. Which of those would you be willing to sacrifice to jump-start growth? Would you restrict the ability of women to work or roll back access to contraception? Would you accept thousands of unplanned births every year to add a few tenths of a percentage point to the growth rate of real GDP per capita?


pages: 336 words: 95,773

The Theft of a Decade: How the Baby Boomers Stole the Millennials' Economic Future by Joseph C. Sternberg

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, American Legislative Exchange Council, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Basel III, Bernie Sanders, blue-collar work, centre right, corporate raider, Detroit bankruptcy, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, employer provided health coverage, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, future of work, gig economy, Gordon Gekko, hiring and firing, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, job satisfaction, job-hopping, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Lyft, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Nate Silver, new economy, obamacare, oil shock, payday loans, pension reform, quantitative easing, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, Second Machine Age, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, TaskRabbit, total factor productivity, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, uber lyft, unpaid internship, women in the workforce

We don’t want you to tell us how wonderful we are. We want you to tell us how to get better at our jobs. And yet this rosy picture is only half of the story. For too many Millennials, the wide array of job opportunities that exists in theory is just that, a theory. The Bureau of Labor Statistics again offers some insight into what’s going on, by looking at two key indicators: the unemployment rate and the labor-force participation rate. The unemployment rate shows the percentage of people who want to find a job but can’t, and throughout the post-2008 decade the unemployment rate for young workers has been higher than for the population as a whole. In October 2009, when the overall unemployment rate reached its Great Recession peak of 10 percent, the unemployment rate for people ages twenty-five to thirty-four (born 1975–1984, so the youngest Gen Xers and oldest Millennials) was 10.6 percent, and the unemployment rate for the bulk of Millennials then in the workforce (ages twenty to twenty-four, with birth years from 1985 to 1989) was 15.8 percent.

In October 2009, when the overall unemployment rate reached its Great Recession peak of 10 percent, the unemployment rate for people ages twenty-five to thirty-four (born 1975–1984, so the youngest Gen Xers and oldest Millennials) was 10.6 percent, and the unemployment rate for the bulk of Millennials then in the workforce (ages twenty to twenty-four, with birth years from 1985 to 1989) was 15.8 percent. Only in mid-2018, a decade after the Great Recession, did the unemployment rate for those ages twenty-five to thirty-four approach parity with the unemployment rate for the overall labor force. And that unemployment situation is actually worse than it looks, because fewer young adults are trying their luck with job hunting at all. The other key piece of data is the labor-force participation rate: the percentage of people of a given age who either are working or have made some effort to find work in the recent past, excluding those who are in school (or prison). The long-term trend since the mid-1980s has been a decline in labor participation for people ages twenty to twenty-four as college attendance has become more common, and an increase in the labor participation rate for people ages twenty-five to fifty-four as economic growth recovered from its 1970s malaise and more women entered the workforce.

At most supermarkets I’ve ever shopped in, in the United States or in Britain, the lines for registers staffed by human cashiers are generally as long as the lines for self-checkout machines. Clearly a nontrivial number of consumers are still prepared to sacrifice some time in exchange for interacting with a live person. § Focusing on men makes it easier to compare changes over time since their labor-force participation has been higher over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, whereas women’s labor participation only started to increase significantly in the last quarter of the twentieth century. ¶ The researchers found that the median age of workers at the very smallest companies, with one to nineteen employees, was forty-two years, a fact they attributed to the higher likelihood that this group of companies would include sole proprietorships established by older entrepreneurs.


pages: 257 words: 64,285

The End of Traffic and the Future of Transport: Second Edition by David Levinson, Kevin Krizek

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, 3D printing, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, Bay Area Rapid Transit, big-box store, Chris Urmson, collaborative consumption, commoditize, crowdsourcing, DARPA: Urban Challenge, dematerialisation, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, Google Hangouts, Induced demand, intermodal, invention of the printing press, jitney, John Markoff, labor-force participation, lifelogging, Lyft, means of production, megacity, Menlo Park, Network effects, Occam's razor, oil shock, place-making, post-work, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Gordon, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, smart cities, technological singularity, Tesla Model S, the built environment, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, transaction costs, transportation-network company, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, urban renewal, women in the workforce, working-age population, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game, Zipcar

But there are a number of important trends and developments relevant for understanding the changes in participation of different subgroups of the population: • Increased participation by older Americans, which may be attributable to an increase in skills among this population and also to changes in Social Security retirement benefits; • Reduced participation by younger Americans as they stay in school longer; • Continuation of an at least 65-year long trend of declining male labor force participation, which is especially stark for young minority men; and • Tapering of the long-term trend of increasing female labor force participation, which dates back to before World War II." http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_2015_erp.pdf 55 Figure 3.2 Source; US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000. 56 Women and the US workforce, see: US Department of Labor - Women's Bureau (n.d.) "Women in the Labor Force in 2010" http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-laborforce-10.htm 57 Even recent decreases of labor force participation are a consequence of productivity gains among those remaining, as the long-standing connection between productivity and workforce participation has severed.

Starting in 2008 in the US, unemployment increased sharply, and though it has since declined, employment participation rates remain much lower as shown in Figure 3.2.55 Demographics are also part of this. Many employees have dropped out of the labor market as their skills have been devalued by the economy; older workers are choosing, or having imposed on them, early retirement, while younger workers are deferring entry into the workforce, choosing to accumulate more education. The rise in female labor force participation from the 1930s through the 1990s has also run its course; labor force participation is roughly equal by gender.56 The percentage of women in the workforce has plateaued since the turn of the century. The percentage of men has dropped.57 There is no indicator suggesting that this is likely to reverse significantly, and certainly not pass the previous peak. Americans now work fewer hours over their career than their working grandparents, and probably their parents (for annual hours, see Figure 3.3,58 which shows little change over the past 7 decades).

Even when multiple years of data are available, such models are typically only estimated on the most recent survey, rather than on trends or changes. The underlying behavior is not permitted to change, only what it responds to. Yet we now have evidence that some underlying preferences do change over time. It is not simply a matter of getting the demographics or incomes correct. For instance from the 1960s to the 1990s female labor force participation increased. Thus the number of work trips and non-work trips (substituting out-of-home for in-home production) both increased in that period. But that increase has played itself out. Thus the increases it was associated with have peaked. This reflected changing preferences. While hindsight is 20/20, we don't know if underlying preferences can be modeled accurately prospectively (we are doubtful), but we do know failure to account for them will lead to model inaccuracies.


pages: 196 words: 53,627

Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders by Jason L. Riley

affirmative action, business cycle, creative destruction, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, guest worker program, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, mass immigration, open borders, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, school choice, Silicon Valley, trade liberalization, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population, zero-sum game

“To what extent did the influx of immigrants entering Southern California in the 1970s reduce the jobs available to nonimmigrant workers?” wrote Thomas Muller, the study’s author. “The answer for the 1970s is little if at all,” he concluded. “Despite mass immigration to Southern California, unemployment rates rose less rapidly than in the remainder of the nation.” Muller also found that labor-force participation rates among natives seemed to be unaffected, and “the participation rate for both blacks and whites was higher in Southern California [where the bulk of immigrants settled] than elsewhere in the state and the nation.” In 1994 economist Richard Vedder of Ohio University, working with Lowell Gallaway and Stephen Moore, conducted a historical analysis of immigration’s impact on the entire U.S. labor force.

Even so, it would be foolhardy to argue that 60 percent of Americans are fiscally expendable and that the United States would be better off without them because they don’t “pay their way.” Such reductionism ignores the propensity of foreign workers to save and start new businesses at higher rates than natives, which contributes to the economic welfare of the nation. Low-skill immigrants also have a higher labor-force participation rate than natives and a lower rate of unemployment. Lower-income workers, whether foreign-born or American, enable large sectors of the economy—farming, construction, manufacturing, health care—to function and grow. And in the process they create job opportunities for the rest of us. SNOUTS AT THE TROUGH? We sometimes refer in the United States to the presence of the “welfare state,” but that term needs context.

Most do not come in the expectation of living on welfare.” After all, says Jacoby, “if you’re going to be unemployed, it’s much better to be unemployed at home than in the United States. It’s usually warmer at home and less expensive to live, and you are likely to be surrounded by a network of supportive family and friends.” Jacoby is spot-on, according to the economic data used to gauge an immigrant’s intentions. The labor force participation rate, which measures the percent of the working-age population that is employed or seeking employment, is the strongest indication that immigrants come here to work and not to idle. Among foreign nationals generally, labor participation rates are higher than that of natives (69 percent versus 66 percent in 2006) and jobless rates are lower (4.0 percent versus 4.7 percent in 2006). This disparity only increases with respect to Hispanic males, who boast the highest labor-participation rate of any group in the country.


Investment: A History by Norton Reamer, Jesse Downing

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Albert Einstein, algorithmic trading, asset allocation, backtesting, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, break the buck, Brownian motion, business cycle, buttonwood tree, buy and hold, California gold rush, capital asset pricing model, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, colonial rule, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, discounted cash flows, diversified portfolio, dogs of the Dow, equity premium, estate planning, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, family office, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial innovation, fixed income, Gordon Gekko, Henri Poincaré, high net worth, index fund, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, invention of the telegraph, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, land tenure, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, Louis Bachelier, margin call, means of production, Menlo Park, merger arbitrage, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, negative equity, Network effects, new economy, Nick Leeson, Own Your Own Home, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, random walk, Renaissance Technologies, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Sand Hill Road, Sharpe ratio, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, statistical arbitrage, survivorship bias, technology bubble, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, time value of money, too big to fail, transaction costs, underbanked, Vanguard fund, working poor, yield curve

Perhaps it is that urban labor caused more distinct physical strain than that faced in agriculture, or perhaps it is a greater breadth of opportunities available to an older individual in urban environments. Whatever the reason, it is true that the labor force participation rates for those on farms were higher than for those not on farms. As the number of individuals involved in the agricultural sector declined over this period, there was a resultant aggregate level increase in retirement. Estimating the degree to which declines in the agricultural sector were responsible essentially involves comparing the actual aggregate labor force participation rate to the theoretical value if the proportions of men in agriculture and nonagriculture had not changed from 1880 to 1940. Retirement and Its Funding 105 This exercise suggests that about 22 percent of the decrease in labor force participation rate among elderly males is attributable to agriculture, an important but not exclusive driver of this trend.12 A second explanation, and even more pronounced in effect, is that higher incomes over this period drove the ability of individuals to retire.

There has also been growth in the length of retirement. This, too, is a worthwhile trend to study, as it is the length of retirement that determines what one needs to have saved. What has driven the elongation of retirement? Is it a drop in labor force participation rate at ever-earlier ages, or is it the decreases in mortality? To begin to answer this question, there are two noteworthy points to consider: average total life expectancy for those who had reached twenty years of age grew from less than sixty-two years in 1900 to more than seventy-three years in 1990. Over this same interval, there was a drastic drop in the labor force participation rate of older Americans, from 65 percent to just 15 percent of men over the age of sixtyfive by 1993. Both aspects—increased life expectancy and an earlier exit from work—have contributed to longer retirement.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE What, then, precipitated the shift from this premodern retirement to today’s form? The seeds were sown in large part by a series of changes, both economic and demographic. There is no clear consensus on precisely what drove the large increases in retirement rates observed from 1880 to 1940, though a variety of explanations have been offered. What is known is that the rate of retirement increased quite materially over this time period. In 1880, the labor force participation rate for males between sixty and seventy-nine years of age was 86.7 percent, and by 1940 this declined to 59.4 percent.11 We offer two possible explanations for this important shift. One trend that is partly responsible is the decline in the agricultural sector over this period. The argument in support of the importance of this explanation is that retirement is, on average, more of an urban industrial phenomenon than a rural farming phenomenon.


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No More Work: Why Full Employment Is a Bad Idea by James Livingston

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, business cycle, collective bargaining, delayed gratification, full employment, future of work, Internet of things, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, labor-force participation, late capitalism, liberal capitalism, obamacare, post-work, Project for a New American Century, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, surplus humans, The Future of Employment, union organizing, working poor

Once upon a time, in the nineteenth century, economic growth was driven by net additions to the capital stock and to the labor force. In other words, growth was built on more machines—“physical plant and equipment,” they call it—and more workers operating those machines. In the parlance of economists, net private investment rose, capital stock per worker increased, and both employment and labor force participation rates did, too. Much of that investment took the material form of labor-saving machinery—plant and equipment that displaced workers—but somebody had to build the machinery, so overall demand for labor kept rising. Since 1919, growth has worked differently. Thereafter, net private investment declined, and employment in goods production did, too, but growth didn’t stop, not even in the 1930s.

In the New Jersey Experiment, for example, the husbands cut their work week by slightly less than an hour (and the proportional reductions were the same for Gary, Seattle, and Denver). The wives cut five hours off their work week, but they spent that “free” time with their many children—the average family size in the New Jersey study was 5.8—particularly, it seems, to help them with homework after school. The women reduced their labor force participation rates as nominal family income rose, in other words, choosing more time over more income, in an exact inversion of what has happened in the workplace since the 1980s. When given a choice, the working mothers leaned in to spend time with their children, probably because their husbands weren’t going to pitch in with household chores anyway. All the while, at the OEO, Rumsfeld and Cheney were running interference for Nixon’s Family Assistance Program, which included substantial provisions for subsidized day care and job training, as well as income-support payments for low-income households.

Nobody’s paying you to teach those fast-food workers how to tell their stories. If our labor time has become worthless—it can’t be “monetized,” in the parlance of our time—then how do we explain or justify working for a living? VI Hanna Rosin has recently predicted the “end of men” as a result of the Great Recession. The phrase is playful hyperbole, of course, but the empirical groundwork of her argument is the significant decline of labor-force participation by men since 2008. What happens when men become useless because they don’t work? Are women taking over the world because jobs of the traditional, masculine kind—you know, in factories, in manufacturing—are disappearing? Does the world turn upside down when the absence of work makes men superfluous? Ask the question another way. As men are laid off from old-fashioned, goods-producing jobs because they lost their race against the machine, and as traditionally women’s work—social work, health care, education—becomes the norm in the labor market, does the market price of labor time regress to the mean determined by the long-standing wage gap between males and females?


pages: 409 words: 125,611

The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them by Joseph E. Stiglitz

"Robert Solow", accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, computer age, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, Detroit bankruptcy, discovery of DNA, Doha Development Round, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, full employment, George Akerlof, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, global supply chain, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, income inequality, income per capita, information asymmetry, job automation, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, labor-force participation, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, The Chicago School, the payments system, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Turing machine, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, urban sprawl, very high income, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, white flight, winner-take-all economy, working poor, working-age population

Though the structural policies have not been fully fleshed out, they are likely to include measures aimed at increasing labor-force participation, especially among women, and hopefully by facilitating employment for the large number of healthy elderly. Some have suggested encouraging immigration as well. These are areas in which the United States has done well in the past, and are crucial for Japan to address, for the sake of both growth and inequality. Though Japan has long prioritized equal access to education for women—with a result that Japanese girls score higher in science than boys, and are not as far behind boys in math as American girls are—it still has a relatively low labor-force participation rate for women (49 percent, according to the World Bank, compared with 58 percent for the United States).

And if we had better public transportation systems that made it easier and more affordable for working-class people to commute to where jobs are available, then a higher percentage of our population would be working and paying taxes. If, like the Scandinavian countries, we provided better child care and had more active labor market policies that assisted workers in moving from one job to another, we would have a higher labor-force participation rate—and the enhanced growth would yield more tax revenues. It pays to invest in people. This brings me to the final point: we could impose a fair tax system, raising more revenue, improving equity, and boosting economic growth while reducing distortions in our economy and our society. (That was the central finding of my 2014 Roosevelt Institute white paper, “Reforming Taxation to Promote Growth and Equity.”)

If the UK continues on its current course, imitating the American model, it is likely that the results will be like those of the U.S.—where the typical family has seen its income stagnate for a quarter-century, even as the rich get richer. Independence may have its costs, although these have yet to be demonstrated convincingly, but it will also have its benefits. Scotland can make investments in tidal energy, or in its young people; it can strive to increase female labor-force participation and provide for early-years education—both essential for creating a fairer society. It can make these investments, knowing that the country will recapture more of the benefits from them through taxation. Under current arrangements, while Scotland bears the cost of these social investments, the extra tax revenue resulting from the additional growth from these investments will go overwhelming south of the border.


pages: 306 words: 78,893

After the New Economy: The Binge . . . And the Hangover That Won't Go Away by Doug Henwood

"Robert Solow", accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, corporate governance, corporate raider, correlation coefficient, credit crunch, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, ending welfare as we know it, feminist movement, full employment, gender pay gap, George Gilder, glass ceiling, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, half of the world's population has never made a phone call, income inequality, indoor plumbing, intangible asset, Internet Archive, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, manufacturing employment, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Naomi Klein, new economy, occupational segregation, pets.com, post-work, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, Telecommunications Act of 1996, telemarketer, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, union organizing, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

Of course, it's not just individual workers who are putting in longer hours; an ever-larger share of the adult population has entered the paid workforce—mainly women, who aren't getting much relief in their household labors to compensate for their increased presence in factories and offices. labor force participation rates, 1890 1 007or 0% 1 907o 857o 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 r men, 1955-2003 707o«— >■ 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 The labor force participation rate is the share of the population either at work or actively looking for work—the sum of the employed and officially unemployed. Dots and broken lines in the first chart signify that the readings were only taken at long intervals and that pre-1950 readings are not strictly comparable to post-1 950.

See GDP Grubman,Jack, 197-198 happiness, 168 Hardt, Michael, 180-186 Harris, Jerry, 175—176 Hayek, Friedrich, 174 hedonic pricing, 44 Henderson, David, 179 Hilferding, Rudolf, 181 HITEK2, 52-54 household structures and poverty, 112 household vs. family, 237 Huws, Ursula, 28 idealab, 201 imperialism Lenin on, 181 privatized, 169 import-substitution industrialization, 170, 220 income household, median, 87-88 and productivity, 45, 56 income distribution discrimination and, 94-101 educational attainment and, 99—100 global, 127-133 health consequences, 81—82 historical perspective, 82-90 long view, 82—84 recent view, 84—90 increasing returns to skill, 86—87 international comparisons, 133—141 in New Economy hotbeds, 103 productivity and, 46 race and, 90-91, 93,98-99 race and sex together, 93—94 sex and, 91-93,95-97 voting and, 81 see also poverty income mobility, 80,114-118 international comparisons of, 136-138 inequality globahzation and, 152—155 increase in, ubiquity of, 116—117 as poUtical issue, 79-81 265 see also income distribution; wealth distribution inflation, 42 pobticaJ analysis, 204—206 initial pubUc offerings (IPOs), 187-188 fees, 201 innovation, 17 historical perspective, 54—55 intangibles, 204 accounting for, 17—22,232 intellectual property, 229, 231 interest, source of, 203 International Fonim on Globalization, 160-162 Internet bubble, natural history, 188-189 and New Economy, 24—26 public subsidy, 6 IQ, corporate America's, 21-22 irrational exuberance, 7 Jameson, Fredric, 27-28 Jencks, Christopher, 75 Jensen, Michael, 203 Jessop, Bob, 147 jobs of the future, 71—74 job skills, 73-77 Jorgenson, Dale, 51, 57 Kahn, Lawrence, 97 Kaldor paradox, 158 Kalecki, Michal, 206 KeUy Kevin, 24, 79 Kemp, Jack, 230 Kennedy Ted, 208 Kennickell, Arthur, 119 Kenworthy, Lane, 135—136 Keynes, John Maynard, 148-149,188,219 Klein, Naomi, 18 Knight, Phil, 159 Korten, David, 162-169,173 Kovel,Joel, 174 Krueger,Anne O., 149 Kuznets, Simon, 83 labor class war, 208-209,227 fear among workers, 206-207, 215—216 inputs, 45, 57 quality, 58 war on, 208-209 labor force participation rate, 40 Labor Notes, 25 Lawrence, Robert Z., 145 Lay, Kenneth, 33 Lenin, V. I., 181 Lev, Baruch, 17-22,232 leveraged buyouts, 214 Hberal welfare states, 139-143 Uteracy, 165 localist critiques of globahzation, 159—165 Lovink, Geert, 38 low-wage work, international comparisons, 137-138 Lucas, Adrian, 38 Luxembourg Income Study, 133 Mahathir, 170 Malthusianism, 161,166 management by stress, 25 Mander, Jerry, 162 market democracy, 22 Martin, William McChesney, 7 Mason, Patrick, 99 Mayer, Susan, 75 McKinsey Global Institute, 64-68 McNeU,John, 100,110 Means, Gardiner, 212 means-testing, politics of, 141—142 measurement issues, 42-45, 58—60 Meeker, Mary, 199-200 Mexico Index default, 1982,209 external finance and 1994 crisis, 222 Milanovic, Branko, 128,130-132 Milken, Michael, 199 Milliken, Roger, 170 mobility.

See income Wal-Mart, 64-67 war and income distribution, 83 and mflation, 205 wealth distribution, 118-127 forfee5 400,119-121 historical perspective, 121 race and, 125—126 residence and, 122 staying power of savings and, 124-125 stock options and, 126-127 weighdessness, 27—28 Enron and, 33—34 vs. need for infrastructure, 16-17, 30-31 Welch, Finis, 80 welfare states economic growth and, 135—136 and poverty, 138 typology, 139-143 White, Harry Dexter, 219 Whitman, Meg, 199 wholesale trade, 64—66 widgets, 42 Wildlands Project, 161 Williams, Raymond, 164-165 Wired, failed IPO, 188 women labor force participation, 40 lesser quaHty of, 58 work, end of, 68-71 workers. See labor workload international comparisons, 40—41 productivity, 39-41 work hours, 67 WorldCom, 197 Worldwatch Institute, 166 World Economic Forum, 6,175—178 World Social Forum, 185 World Trade Orgamzation, 32,160,170 WorldWarII,205 Wriston, Walter, 22 X4HTK2, 53-54 Young & Rubicam, 18 J^i ^0 LONr^pp .^ '. i.iinued from front flap) After the New Economy offers an accessible and entertaining account of the less-than-lustrous reality beneath the gloss of the 1990s boom, stripping bare the extravagant pretension of unrestrained entrepreneurial hubris and revealing how it contributed to the making of a new anti-capitalist global movement.


pages: 183 words: 17,571

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy by Kevin Mellyn

banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, buy and hold, call centre, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, disintermediation, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Home mortgage interest deduction, index fund, information asymmetry, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, mobile money, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, negative equity, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, Real Time Gross Settlement, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Coase, seigniorage, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Steve Jobs, The Great Moderation, the payments system, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, underbanked, Works Progress Administration, yield curve, Yogi Berra, zero-sum game

This consensus led to the landmark welfare reforms of that decade. However, that was against the background of an economic boom driven by the financial economy, a “dot-com” bubble in new technologies, and pro-market reforms of the 1980s. Record labor-force participation during the dot-com boom made the so-called “welfare to work” requirements embedded in the reforms aimed at limiting the time people could receive benefits without seeking work or training appear feasible and in the best interest of people mired in poverty. Indeed, welfare rolls fell sharply in the boom economy of the 1990s. The picture today could scarcely be more different. Labor-force participation rates have fallen to levels not seen in over three decades—down to 64 percent from 67.4 percent—with perhaps one potential worker in five unemployed or underemployed. These realities are hidden from the public by the perverse way the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates unemployment, which is based only on persons actively seeking work during the survey period.

In countries such as Italy and France, the chance for these outsiders to become insiders is very small, but the liberalization of labor markets needed to change this is politically toxic. Below the outsiders, large swaths of the working-age Broken Markets population live on government assistance programs, partially because benefits are generous enough to make such a life about as comfortable as the employed life of the outsiders with far less effort. A statistic called the labor force participation rate is telling. In the United States before 2008, this often ran as high as 68 percent, meaning that the nearly seven out of ten adults below retirement age were in the labor market. By contrast, many European countries had only between five and six out of ten adults working. The rest lived off the state or in the shadows. Of course, this structure is only possible because the insiders paid very high direct taxes (so called value-added taxes of 20 percent or more are common) and income taxes at rates well above US levels.

w 163 I Index A C Anglo-Saxon capitalism, 84 Card Act, 68, 70 Anglo-Saxon-type banking systems, 156 CHIPS.See Clearing House Interbank Payment System Asset securitization, 66 Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now (ACORN), 65 Austerity definition, 98 Euro, real unification, 99 Germany, 99–101 B BankAmericard, 29 Bankcard association/card scheme, 29 Bank-centric system, 110 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 108 Basel III process, 50–51 Basel process, 27–28 Basel standards, 61 Bipartisan government policy, 72 Boom optimistic entrepreneurs, 77 Bretton Woods system, 26, 111 Bureaucracies, 21 Civilization, 64 Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), 106, 107 Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 108 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 65–66 Consumer banking BankAmericard, 29 bankcard association/card scheme, 29 branch-based customer relationship, 29 credit card industry, 30 Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, 33 “diseconomies of scale”, 35 FDIC, 34 four-party model, 29 institutional investors, 34 “market-centric” financial system, 33 merchant/customer relationship, 29 Pac-Man banking, 34 risky business, 31–33 RTC, 31 SEC, 33 S&L industry, 28, 30 1 166 Index Consumer banking (continued) statistical analysis, 30 US “flow-of-funds” data, 28 usury laws, 30 Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), 68 Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), 108 Creative destruction, 85 Credit-driven economy, 76–77 Crony capitalism, 85 Cross-Pacific economy, 97 D Debtor Nation, 64 Dirigisme, 83 Dollar-centric financial system, 112 Durbin Amendment, 70 E ECB.See European Central Bank Economic consequences, financial regulation, 55 bank P & Ls and balance sheets bureaucratic regulation, 59 capital allocation, 57 capitalism, 57 clearinghouse/transaction switch, 58 contradictory rules, 59 creative destruction, 63 free-market capitalism, 57 full-blown panic leading, 57 lender-of-last-resort function, 58 payments system, 58–59 private-sector banks, 58 consumer protection vs. access, 67–68 financial access restriction brick-and-mortar branches, 66 civilization, 64 clearinghouse, 63 CRA, 65–66 credit judgments, 65 economic enfranchisement, 64 government paternalism, 65 joint-stock banks, 63 loan securitization, 66 mass-market retail banking, 66 national and multilateral development agencies, 65 non-credit worthy segments, 66 ownership society, 66 paychecks, 64 premium/reward cards, 66 individual banker accountability, 55 interest reduction, 56 predatory lending, 56 product differentiation, 68–69 public utility, 55, 56 regulatory, capital, and litigation costs, 56 regulatory compliance and fraud losses, 56 savers and investors, 71–73 shell game asset-securitization process, 61 commercial and industrial loans, 62 credible assessment, 62 Dodd-Frank Act, 63 Federal Reserve Bank, 63 free-market creative destruction, 63 globalization, 62–63 Great Depression, 61 Great Moderation, 61 least-regulated jurisdictions, 61 regulatory arbitrage, 61 relationship banking, 62 retail banking revolution, 63 return-on-equity business, 62 rules-based regulation, 61 securitization and market-based funding, 63 supervision vs. rule making, 59–60 unbanking, 70–71 utility-style banking, 56 European Central Bank (ECB), 6, 99, 102–103 F Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 34 Index Federal Reserve, 101 Finance consumers, 117 American Revolutionary War song, 118 bondholders and money market funds, 138 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 126 business-to-business commerce, 119 consumerism, 118 credit score, 120–121 debt free, 138–139 “dot-com” bubble, 1264 employment and consumer credit, 121–122 Gallup polling organization, 127 Great Society, 126 house prices, 133 “infrastructure”, 119 innovation and education, America advantage, 129 American living standards, 129 global success, 128 high-stakes examinations, 130 industrial policy, 128 student loans, 131 mass-market pottery, 119 money saving, 136–137 New Class, new elite educated caste, 132–133 non-tradable private sector, 127 one’s station in life, 118 overseas trade, 119 pent-up demand, 119 private-sector employment, 125 property taxes, 127 “self-liquidating”, definition, 119 shelter asset bubbles and distorts markets, 133 electoral process, 134 Japanese economy, 135–136 retirement plans and financial advisors, 134 Travellers Club, 133 wealth effect, 133 short-term insurance scheme, unemployment assistance, 127 stock market, 137–138 structural unemployment American economy, 123–125 labor force participation rate, 123 labor markets, Europe, 122 solidarity, 123 three-tiered system, 122 subsidy-based industries, 125 super-safe government debt, 125 technological creativity and economic progress, 117 unionized public-service employees, 125 US job growth, 126 “welfare to work” requirements, 126 You, Inc., 139 Finance-driven economy, 1, 72 anti-capitalism, 2 capitalism, 1 chronic debt crisis, 22 corporate America, 20 current movie artificial bank earnings, 7 asset prices, 6 banking implosions, 6 borrowers and investors connection, 10 borrowing demand, 7 catastrophic financial bubble, 10 civilization, 10 corporatism, 9 democratic crony capitalism, 9 Dodd-Frank act, 8 economic growth and social stability, 10 financial repression, 9 Glass-Steagall Act, 8 human ingenuity, 10 interbank funding markets, 6 low interest rates and easy money, 6 market collapse, 10 money market, 6 overexuberence, 6 overinvestment and speculation, 6 pre-crisis conditions, 8 printing money, 7 private capital, 7 167 168 Index Finance-driven economy (continued) profitability, 7 quantitative easing, 8 recovery, 8 regulation, 8 regulatory capital rules, 8 resources and tools, 9 shell-shocked enterprises and households, 8 end of employment, 21–22 financial leverage magic and poison CEO class, 14–15 consumer debt, 15–16 disconnection problem, 11–12 market bargain, 10 real economy, 10 wealth financialization, 13–14 working capital, 11 global financial crisis, 2 Great Moderation, 16–18 Great Panic, 18–19 household sector agony, 19–20 investor class, 22 Marx, Karl asset bubble, 5 cash nexus, 4 dot-com bubble, 5 economic revolution, 3 First World War, 4 free markets, 3 French Revolution, 3 globalization, 3 Great Depression, 5 liberalism, 3 normalcy, 4 overproduction and speculation, 3 Wall Street, 4, 5 revolutionary socialism, 2 sovereign debt, 8, 22 Finance reconstruction, 142 bank bashing, 146 “bankers”, 142 business model, challenges, 145 Citigroup, 145 cyclical businesses, 143 government management, 142 legitimacy bonus culture, 148–150 privileged opportunity, longestablished bank, 146 short-term share-price manipulation, 148 state and legal systems, 147 stock price, 147 mark-to-market price, 144 “producers”, 143 profession, definition, 163 prudence, 145, 161–163 root-and-branch transformation, 145 talent pool, 144 “the race for talent”, 143 trust cash management, 160 Financial Market Meltdown, 159 FSA, 159 hackneyed term, 159 information asymmetry, 159 non-bank financial service provider, 161 oversold/up-sold products, 159 utility Anglo-Saxon-type banking systems, 156 big data tools, 158 bills-of-exchange market, 150 branch and payment services, 157 clearinghouse creation, 158 core banking, 154 economic value transmission, 150 exchange of claims, 151 fee-income growth, 155 fiat money system, 151 financial intermediation, 150 financial transactions, 157 flexible contractor/subcontractor relationship, 158 information technology, 156 “liquidity premium”, 152 multidivisional/M-form organization, 153 non-interest income, 155 old-media companies, 157 Index overhead value analysis, 154 “privileged opportunity”, 152 quill pen–era practice, 158 sheer utility value, 155 silos, product business, 153 transaction accounts, 152 venture capital industry, 142 “War for Talent”, 143 Financial crises, 23 affordable housing, 24 banking “transmission” mechanism, 43 Basel III process, 50–51 basel process, 27–28 consumer banking(see Consumer banking) Dodd-Frank, 49–50 domestic banking system, 38 European Union, 51–53 FDIC, 40 finance-driven economy’s leverage machine, 43 Financial Market Meltdown, 25 GDP, 38 Government Policy and Central Banks, market meltdown(see Regulation process) government policy failure, 45 “government-sponsored” public companies, 24 Great Depression, 44 GSEs, 24 legal missteps, 47–48 New Deal, 43 panic-stricken markets, 40 political missteps, 45–47 Ponzi scheme, 42 postwar financial order, 25–27 printing money, 38 private profits and socialized losses, 40 private-sector demand, 43 public-sector demand, 42 quantitative approach, 25 TARP, 39 too-big-to-fail institutions, 41 Triple A bonds, 41 US Federal Reserve System, 38 Financial liberalization, 89 Financial Market Meltdown, 25, 61, 89, 109, 159 Financial repression, 9, 78, 111 Financial Services Authority (FSA), 60, 159 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 69 Fordism, 68 Free-market capitalism, 89 Free markets, 3 French Revolution, 3 Front-end trading systems, 107 FSA.See Financial Services Authority G GDP, 11 “Giro” payments systems, 151 Global imbalance, 96 Globalization, 3 Global whirlwinds, 93 Asia, finance movement cultural differences, 110–111 Financial Market Meltdown, 109 Interest Equalization Tax, 109 language, law, and business culture, 109 primacy, 109 austerity(see Austerity) British Empire, 30 Chimerica, 97 China and United States cross-Pacific economy, 97 foreign interference and aggression, 98 headline growth rates, 97 repression revolution and series, 97–98 Second World War, 98 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 98 surpluse trade, 97 sustainable development, 98 Chinese ascendancy, 113 clearing and settlement bottleneck, 106–107 Dynastic China, 112 169 Download from Wow!


pages: 300 words: 76,638

The War on Normal People: The Truth About America's Disappearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future by Andrew Yang

3D printing, Airbnb, assortative mating, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Ben Horowitz, Bernie Sanders, call centre, corporate governance, cryptocurrency, David Brooks, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, falling living standards, financial deregulation, full employment, future of work, global reserve currency, income inequality, Internet of things, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Khan Academy, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, Narrative Science, new economy, passive income, performance metric, post-work, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Richard Florida, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, Sam Altman, self-driving car, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, single-payer health, Stephen Hawking, Steve Ballmer, supercomputer in your pocket, technoutopianism, telemarketer, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, unemployed young men, universal basic income, urban renewal, white flight, winner-take-all economy, Y Combinator

Self-driving vehicles are one of the most obvious job-destroying technologies, but there are similar innovations ahead that will displace cashiers, fast food workers, customer service representatives, administrative assistants, and even well-paid white-collar jobs like wealth managers, lawyers, and insurance agents, all within the span of a few short years. Suddenly out of work, millions will struggle to find a new job, particularly those at the lower end of the skill ladder. Automation has already eliminated about 4 million manufacturing jobs in the United States since 2000. Instead of finding new jobs, a lot of those people left the workforce and didn’t come back. The U.S. labor force participation rate is now at only 62.9 percent, a rate below that of nearly all other industrialized economies and about the same as that of El Salvador and the Ukraine. Some of this is driven by an aging population, which presents its own set of problems, but much of it is driven by automation and a lower demand for labor. Each 1 percent decline in the labor participation rate equates to approximately 2.5 million Americans dropping out.

The New York Federal Reserve recently measured the underemployment rate of recent college graduates and came up with 44 percent. The U-6 unemployment rate was 8.4 percent in May 2017, almost twice the headline number. The U-6 rate is a much more revealing measurement and has ranged between 9 percent and 16 percent for the past 10 years. The unemployment rate is a terribly misleading number that we should stop relying on unless it’s accompanied by a discussion of both the rate of underemployment and the labor force participation rate. “If we were undergoing a technological revolution, wouldn’t we be seeing it appear in increased productivity?” You probably weren’t thinking about this one. But it’s a question that economists and academics have been debating. The thought is that we’d see a productivity spike if we were doing a ton more with technology and fewer people. Productivity numbers are actually lower now than they have been in quite some time, leading people to say that any automation-related job displacement concern is misplaced.

Marriage has declined for all classes in the past 40 years, with the decline being most extreme among the non–college educated. The proportion of working-class adults who get married has plummeted from 70 percent in 1970 to only 45 percent today. The decline really accelerated in 2000, around the same time as manufacturing jobs started to disappear. There are a host of reasons for the decline of marriage. Some cite increased labor force participation and more options for women, who are now less reliant on men. Others discuss it in light of shifting cultural norms. However, the reduction in opportunities for working-class men is doubtless contributing to fewer people getting married. The problems among men have been well documented. An Atlantic article in 2016 called “The Missing Men” noted that one in six men in America of prime age (25–54) are either unemployed or out of the workforce—10 million men in total.


pages: 257 words: 76,785

Shorter by Alex Soojung-Kim Pang

8-hour work day, airport security, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, business process, call centre, carbon footprint, centre right, cloud computing, colonial rule, disruptive innovation, Erik Brynjolfsson, future of work, game design, gig economy, Henri Poincaré, IKEA effect, iterative process, job automation, job satisfaction, job-hopping, Johannes Kepler, Kickstarter, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, means of production, neurotypical, performance metric, race to the bottom, remote working, Second Machine Age, side project, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, telemarketer, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, women in the workforce, young professional, zero-sum game

On women and stress in part-time work, see Tarani Chandola et al., “Are Flexible Work Arrangements Associated with Lower Levels of Chronic Stress–Related Biomarkers? A Study of 6025 Employees in the UK Household Longitudinal Study,” Sociology 53, no. 4 (August 2019): 779–799, https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038519826014. On labor force participation rates of mothers, see “Labor Force Participation: What Has Happened Since the Peak?” Monthly Labor Review (September 2016), figure 8, www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/pdf/labor-force-participation-what-has-happened-since-the-peak.pdf. CHAPTER 1 Sowol-Ro, Seoul, South Korea. Bong-Jin Kim talks with Sam Kim in “Coming Soon to Seoul: Robot-Delivered Jajangmyeon Noodles,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/coming-soon-to-seoul-robot-delivered-jajangmyeon-noodles; he talks about being a designer-CEO in Digital Insight Today, www.ditoday.com/articles/articles_view.html?

Despite decades of corporate policies for improved maternity leave, flexible work schedules, and exhortations for women to lean in or manage their time better, solutions to the problem of work-life balance remain elusive. In the United States, mothers flocked to the labor force in growing numbers between the 1970s and late 1990s. For the last twenty years, though, those participation rates have stalled, suggesting that family-friendly policies have not had as large an impact as their designers, and many users, would have liked. Labor force participation of mothers, by age of youngest child, 1975–2015. Participation rates rose steadily through the 1990s, but in the last twenty years have barely improved—and sometimes have dropped. To different degrees, in the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, women’s full-time participation rates in the workforce decline when they have young children and take years to recover; even after they return to work full-time, they often earn less than men (including fathers with dependent children) and have lower lifetime earnings.


pages: 626 words: 167,836

The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation by Carl Benedikt Frey

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, business cycle, business process, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, collective bargaining, computer age, computer vision, Corn Laws, creative destruction, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, Donald Trump, easy for humans, difficult for computers, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, factory automation, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, future of work, game design, Gini coefficient, Hyperloop, income inequality, income per capita, industrial cluster, industrial robot, intangible asset, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, invention of agriculture, invention of movable type, invention of the steam engine, invention of the wheel, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job satisfaction, job-hopping, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Loebner Prize, low skilled workers, Malcom McLean invented shipping containers, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, minimum wage unemployment, natural language processing, new economy, New Urbanism, Norbert Wiener, oil shock, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, Pareto efficiency, pattern recognition, pink-collar, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, Renaissance Technologies, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, robot derives from the Czech word robota Czech, meaning slave, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, social intelligence, speech recognition, spinning jenny, Stephen Hawking, The Future of Employment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade route, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Turing test, union organizing, universal basic income, washing machines reduced drudgery, wealth creators, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

Of course, it is true that the size of the American household also declined over this period, but to suggest that hours per person of in-home production did not fall ignores economies of scale.40 It doesn’t make much difference if dinner is prepared for a family of two or five. Research showing that female labor force participation expanded much more rapidly in areas where electric appliances were used more extensively provides evidence in favor of this view. Figure 7 shows the staggering increase in female labor force participation over the course of the twentieth century. In the period 1900–80, the female workforce expanded by 51 percentage points. An influential study by the economists Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri, and Mehmet Yorukoglu, published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, estimates that the household revolution alone can account for 55 percent of this increase.41 As the home became increasingly mechanized, more women entered the labor market to take on paid and often more fulfilling jobs, and more families suddenly had two incomes, making many American households richer in the process.

An influential study by the economists Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri, and Mehmet Yorukoglu, published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, estimates that the household revolution alone can account for 55 percent of this increase.41 As the home became increasingly mechanized, more women entered the labor market to take on paid and often more fulfilling jobs, and more families suddenly had two incomes, making many American households richer in the process. FIGURE 7: U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for People Ages 25–64 by Sex, 1870–2010 Sources: 1870–1990: Historical Statistics of the United States (HSUS), Millennial Edition Online, 2006, ed. S. B. Carter, S. Gartner, M. R. Haines, A. L. Olmstead, R. Sutch, and G. Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Table Ba393-400, Ba406-413, Aa226-237, Aa260-271, http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/HSUS EntryServlet; 2000–2010: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012 (SAUS) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Table 7 and 587.

Large numbers of women were employed in offices as a direct result of the introduction of the typewriter.42 But as we shall see in chapter 8, most of the growth of the clerical workforce happened after 1900, when the proliferation of office machines, the mechanization of in-home production, and the desire to boost family income allowed women to make a great leap forward. In the period 1950–70 in particular, about 11.4 million women newly took up clerical occupations, while only 1.5 million men did so. The term “pink collar,” which became increasingly common in the 1970s, referred to the growth in the female, machine-tending clerical workforce.43 Much of the rise in labor force participation over the twentieth century, in other words, was due to mechanization, not just despite it. The Ride to Modernity As essential a part of this story as the transformation of the home and the factory was the revolution in the movement of goods and people. Indeed, the economic historian Alexander Field has argued that productivity growth in the period 1919–73 can be thought of as “a tale of two transitions.”44 The first involved the redesign of the factory to take advantage of the virtues of electricity, whereas the second constituted a shift toward the horseless age, as motorized vehicles revolutionized transportation and distribution.


pages: 667 words: 149,811

Economic Dignity by Gene Sperling

active measures, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Cass Sunstein, collective bargaining, corporate governance, David Brooks, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Donald Trump, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Elon Musk, employer provided health coverage, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ferguson, Missouri, full employment, gender pay gap, ghettoisation, gig economy, Gini coefficient, guest worker program, Gunnar Myrdal, housing crisis, income inequality, invisible hand, job automation, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, late fees, liberal world order, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, mental accounting, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, obamacare, offshore financial centre, payday loans, price discrimination, profit motive, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, randomized controlled trial, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, speech recognition, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Toyota Production System, traffic fines, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, union organizing, universal basic income, War on Poverty, working poor, young professional, zero-sum game

Aliya Alimujian, Ashley Wiensch, and Jonathan Boss, “Association Between Life Purpose and Mortality Among US Adults Older Than 50 Years,” Journal of the American Medical Association Network Open 2, no. 5 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.4270. 92. Eleanor Krause and Isabel Sawhill, “What We Know and Don’t Know about Declining Labor Force Participation: A Review,” Brookings Institution, May 2017, 21, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ccf_20170517_declining_labor_force_participation_sawhill1.pdf. 93. Alan B. Krueger, “Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiry into the Decline of the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, BPEA Conference Drafts, September 7–8, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1_krueger.pdf. 94. Sabrina Tavernise, “Black Americans See Gains in Life Expectancy,” New York Times, May 8, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/health/blacks-see-gains-in-life-expectancy.html. 95.

Whites with low levels of education—a group that has suffered from deaths of despair at high rates, though far from the only demographic to be affected—report a lack of hope and optimism, and low satisfaction in life, even when compared with other demographic groups that are objectively worse off economically.90 As economists Carol Graham and Sergio Pinto note, “Lack of hope for the future stands out as the most important sign of vulnerability to deaths of despair,” and the declining life expectancy of less-educated whites due to suicides and opioids is only the most recent “marker of this desperation.”91 Economists Eleanor Krause and Isabel Sawhill found that in the ten counties with the highest rates of deaths of despair, the male labor force participation rate (those who are working or looking for work) was only 73 percent—compared with 88 percent nationally at that time in 2014.92 Alan Krueger found that prime-age men who are out of the labor force, about half of whom take medication for pain on a daily basis, report having low levels of emotional well-being and find little meaning from their daily activities.93 While the rise in mortality rates of low-educated white Americans is a critical development that deserves national attention, no one should see the tragedy of deaths of despair as new or limited to any racial group.

It also has a stringent application process; more than half of applicants are ultimately denied SSDI benefits, and 10,000 people a year die waiting to get approved for benefits.18 Research on those who barely lose their appeals seeking SSDI, and therefore do not receive benefits, shows that the vast majority do not then go out and get jobs—undercutting the core premise that but for SSDI, such workers would be economically self-sufficient or at least holding down gainful employment. Even accepting the very worst assumptions, SSDI has been found to account for at most one-fifteenth of the recent decline in male labor force participation for workers ages twenty-five to fifty-four.19 While conservatives like Rand Paul belittle those who go on SSDI for disabilities such as mental illness or musculoskeletal issues as being “either anxious or their back hurts,”20 in reality most SSDI recipients are like Jeanetta Smith. Ms. Smith is a fifty-one-year-old SSDI recipient who lives in Robbins, Tennessee, and worked for twenty-five years, first in a textile factory, then after the factory closed down as a certified nursing assistant at a nursing home.


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The Captured Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality by Brink Lindsey

"Robert Solow", Airbnb, Asian financial crisis, bank run, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, Build a better mousetrap, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, collective bargaining, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, endogenous growth, experimental economics, experimental subject, facts on the ground, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, hiring and firing, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, income inequality, informal economy, information asymmetry, intangible asset, inventory management, invisible hand, Jones Act, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kevin Kelly, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, mass incarceration, medical malpractice, Menlo Park, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Network effects, patent troll, plutocrats, Plutocrats, principal–agent problem, regulatory arbitrage, rent control, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Metcalfe, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, smart cities, software patent, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, tulip mania, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, Washington Consensus, white picket fence, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce

The fluctuations, however, tended to offset each other, so that the long-term trend line of growth overall remained stable. In the twenty-first century, however, this pattern of offsetting fluctuations has come to a halt as all growth components have fallen off simultaneously. Hours worked per capita surged from the mid-1960s until 2000, thanks to the entry of baby boomers into the workforce and rapidly rising labor force participation by women. Since 2000, however, hours worked have fallen as labor force participation has dropped sharply for both sexes. Meanwhile, growth in the skill level of the workforce has tapered off after decades of sharp increases in the average years of schooling completed. Net national investment (investment net of depreciation charges) as a percentage of net national product has been falling for decades, dragged down by the more widely reported drop in the national savings rate.

Homeowners in those cities would have profited handsomely in any event, but they have multiplied their winnings by pulling up the drawbridge with increasingly restrictive land-use regulations, The opportunistic parasitism of regressive rent-seeking has hit the twenty-first-century American economy at its most vulnerable points—namely, its twin susceptibilities to slowing growth and rising inequality. Even if rent-seeking could be eliminated altogether, deep-seated and powerful forces would still cause the economic pie to grow more slowly and its sustenance to be shared less evenly. The aging of the population and the exhaustion of possibilities for rapid improvement in educational attainment and women’s labor force participation already meant that growth would slow in the absence of a surge in productivity growth. With the rise of policies that suppress and distort competition in key sectors, productivity growth has been hampered instead of encouraged; consequently, the country’s growth outlook is now even cloudier. At the same time, increasing inequality was powered by a number of different factors, including the rise of IT, women’s increasing labor market opportunities, and the return of mass immigration.


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Everydata: The Misinformation Hidden in the Little Data You Consume Every Day by John H. Johnson

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Black Swan, business intelligence, Carmen Reinhart, cognitive bias, correlation does not imply causation, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, lake wobegon effect, Long Term Capital Management, Mercator projection, Mercator projection distort size, especially Greenland and Africa, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Nate Silver, obamacare, p-value, PageRank, pattern recognition, publication bias, QR code, randomized controlled trial, risk-adjusted returns, Ronald Reagan, selection bias, statistical model, The Signal and the Noise by Nate Silver, Thomas Bayes, Tim Cook: Apple, wikimedia commons, Yogi Berra

But that’s not what some people want to hear—they just want a number. As Brown explained, “most economists understand that what we are really doing is making ‘projections’ rather than ‘predictions.’ In other words, we can be reasonably comfortable in modeling how the system’s finances will evolve if fertility or mortality or labor force participation evolves in a particular way. But we are much less comfortable stating with any certainty that fertility or mortality or labor force participation will move in a particular way.” But unless someone has been trained in statistics (or has read this book!) these types of subtleties and nuances may not mean much to them. “As a result,” noted Brown, “we often see situations in which people express surprise or disappointment or even anger when a policy does not have exactly the predicted effect, even in cases where the outcome is well within the confidence interval that would have applied to the initial estimate.”

In fact, when she and a colleague looked into this further, they found “no evidence that groups with more exposure to the stock market (like college-educated workers) were retiring later than other workers during bust years and earlier during boom years.” They also found that the number of workers who had enough stock assets for the decline in the market to affect their retirement decision was too small to explain changes in the size of the labor force. In the end, explained Coile, “even though the story sounded plausible, the stock market was less important than other factors in explaining changes in labor force participation during this time.” As you’re consuming your everydata, keep in mind that skilled magazine writers, TV producers, and advertising copywriters know how to manipulate words, because their job is to get your attention. Don’t fall for it. Read every word. Think about what they’re saying—and what they’re not saying. For example, let’s say you’re a reporter at a magazine. One day, you read about a study that finds a correlation between eating brownies and gaining weight.


pages: 421 words: 110,272

Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism by Anne Case, Angus Deaton

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, basic income, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, business cycle, call centre, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, crack epidemic, creative destruction, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, germ theory of disease, income inequality, Jeff Bezos, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, obamacare, pensions crisis, randomized controlled trial, refrigerator car, rent-seeking, risk tolerance, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, trade liberalization, universal basic income, working-age population, zero-sum game

Perhaps the troubles of the working class have nothing to do with wages and jobs, or any other external circumstance, but rather, as argued by the political scientist Charles Murray, come from a loss of industriousness and other American virtues among less educated white Americans.36 If so, it is not clear that policies can help; a moral or religious revival is needed. We do not share this view. In chapter 11 on the labor market, we saw that both labor force participation and wage rates were declining for less educated whites, for men for many years, and more recently for women. That participation and wages should decline together is a clear indication that employers want fewer less skilled workers; there are fewer jobs, and workers are reacting either by withdrawing from the market (lower participation) or by taking worse jobs (lower wages). If lower participation is to be explained by falling industriousness—a lower willingness to work—wages should rise as employers compete for the smaller number of available workers.

SMA 17-5044, NSDUH Series H-52, Center for Behavioral Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health Services Administration, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR1-2016/NSDUH-FFR1-2016.pdf. 8. Dionissi Aliprantis, Kyle Fee, and Mark Schweitzer, 2019, “Opioids and the labor market,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 1807R; Alan B. Krueger, 2017, “Where have all the workers gone? An inquiry into the decline of the U.S. labor force participation rate,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, 1–87. 9. Jared S. Hopkins and Andrew Scurria, 2019, “Sacklers received as much as $13 billion in profits from Purdue Pharma,” Wall Street Journal, October 4. 10. Sam Quinones, 2015, Dreamland: The true tale of America’s opiate epidemic, Bloomsbury. 11. David T. Courtwright, 2001, A history of opiate addiction in America, Harvard University Press, Kindle. 12.

Nikki Graf, 2016, “Most Americans say that children are better off with a parent at home,” Pew Research Center, October 10, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/10/most-americans-say-children-are-better-off-with-a-parent-at-home/. 10. Katharine G. Abraham and Melissa S. Kearny, 2019, “Explaining the decline in the US employment to population ratio: A review of the evidence,” NBER Working Paper 24333, revised August. 11. Not everyone sees a ratchet effect in figure 11.2. Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute argues that “there is a remarkable linearity of the decline in labor-force participation rates for prime-age American men over the past fifty years. This great male flight from work has been almost totally un-influenced by economic fluctuations.” Eberstadt, 2018, “Men without work,” American Consequences, January 30, http://www.aei.org/publication/men-without-work-2/. 12. Other reasons include the aging of the labor force and the greater fraction of covered female workers, given that women have more sickness than men.


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The Case Against Education: Why the Education System Is a Waste of Time and Money by Bryan Caplan

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, assortative mating, conceptual framework, correlation does not imply causation, deliberate practice, deskilling, disruptive innovation, en.wikipedia.org, endogenous growth, experimental subject, fear of failure, Flynn Effect, future of work, George Akerlof, ghettoisation, hive mind, job satisfaction, Kenneth Arrow, Khan Academy, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, market bubble, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Peter Thiel, price discrimination, profit maximization, publication bias, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, school choice, selection bias, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, trickle-down economics, twin studies, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce, yield curve, zero-sum game

Table 4.1: Sheepskin Effects in the General Social Survey (1972–2012) Effect on Earnings Education If Only Years of Education Matter If Diplomas Matter Too Years of Education +10.9% +4.5% High School Diploma – +31.7% Junior College Diploma – +16.6% Bachelor’s Degree – +31.4% Graduate Degree – +18.2% All results correct for age, age squared, race, and sex; are limited to labor force participants; and are converted from log dollars to percentages. In the good old days, when the reality of the sheepskin effect was still in doubt, economists took the sheepskin-signaling connection for granted. Every paper that found sheepskin effects scored a point for signaling; every paper that failed to find sheepskin effects scored a point for human capital. But now that the sheepskin effect is undeniable, some economists reinterpret the evidence to deny signaling a victory.

Absolute payoffs for high school diplomas, bachelor’s degrees, and graduate degrees barely budge—and their relative payoffs actually rise.11 Table 4.2: Sheepskin Effects and Ability Bias in the General Social Survey (1972–2012) Effect on Earnings Education Only Years of Education Matter Diplomas Matter Too Years of Education +10.3% +4.2% High School Diploma – +32.0% Junior College Diploma – +10.4% Bachelor’s Degree – +29.8% Graduate Degree – +17.8% All results adjust for age, age squared, race, sex, and cognitive ability; are limited to labor force participants; and are converted from log dollars to percentages. Ability bias explanations for sheepskin effects aren’t just hard to square with the statistical evidence; they’re hard to square with the glaring fact that education spikes in degree years. If the labor market ignores credentials, why do so many high school grads opt for zero college—and so many college grads opt for zero graduate education?

The private sector benefit/income ratio is .46 for workers with high school or less, .43 for workers with bachelor’s degrees, and .41 for workers with master’s degrees. 17. In the CPS, “full-time” workers can be unemployed, but “year-round workers” must work 50–52 weeks per year. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015j, p. 3. 18. See especially Greenstone and Looney 2011, 2012. 19. For further discussion, see Caplan 2014a. 20. All rates come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) website for unemployment of labor force participants aged 25–64. Variable identifiers LNU04027675, LNU04027676, CGBD2564M, and CGMD2564M for men, and LNU04027679, LNU04027680, CGBD2564W, and CGMD2564W for women. Calculations continue to assume a 50/50 gender balance. I use average 2000–2013 unemployment because 2011 unemployment was atypically high owing to the Great Recession. 21. See Ritter and Taylor 2011 and Riddell and Song 2011. 22.


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What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right by George R. Tyler

8-hour work day, active measures, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Black Swan, blood diamonds, blue-collar work, Bolshevik threat, bonus culture, British Empire, business cycle, business process, buy and hold, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate governance, corporate personhood, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Brooks, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Diane Coyle, disruptive innovation, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, Gordon Gekko, hiring and firing, income inequality, invisible hand, job satisfaction, John Markoff, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, lake wobegon effect, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, moral hazard, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, performance metric, pirate software, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, precariat, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transcontinental railway, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

As depicted in Chart 25.1, labor force participation rates for both men and women age 65 to 69 ceased dropping early in the Reagan era, and reversed course thereafter. Now nearly one in every three seniors works, competing for jobs with their grandchildren. This rise in delayed retirements is quite a contrast to the experience of our parents or grandparents during the golden age, particularly men. Rising real wages back then enabled them to substitute leisure for labor like northern Europeans now, a happy phenomenon which caused the annual work effort of Americans to decline to about 1,800 hours, where it has been stuck ever since. Chart 25.1. Sources: Floyd Norris, “The Number of Those Working Past 65 Is at a Record High,” New York Times, May 12, 2012. “Labor Force Participation Rates of Persons 50 years and Over by Age, Sex, and Race, 1950-1990,” table 4–2, US Bureau of Census, Washington.

Their broad middle-class societies have not overtaken America economically by sitting in cafés drinking Pilsner lager, Foster’s VB, or sipping espresso while smoking Gauloises. We know that because a greater share of their population than America’s works. Even though 2005 was a boom year in America, the labor-force participation rate was higher in every family capitalism country than in America. These statistics are reproduced from OECD data in Table 9. Note that the gap is actually larger than these statistics suggest, because they include Europeans aged 60–64, many of whom are happily retired. Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 25-64 Men and Women, 2005 High school graduates College graduates Australia 82.6% 86.6% Austria 77.3% 86.8% Belgium 79.5% 87.4% France 80.9% 86.8% Germany 79.3% 87.7% Netherlands 81.3% 88.1% United States 76.7% 84.7% Table 9.

In addition, five out of six French women retired early, by age 60, while little better than one-half of American women chose (or could afford) to stop working before age 65. These trends are starker for older cohorts. Between ages 65–69, the share of American men working in these traditional retirement years was over eight times greater than Frenchmen, and nearly four times greater than in Germany. Early Ret rement in Northern Europe and U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates, 2006 Men Women Ages 25-54 60-64 65-69 25-54 60-64 65-69 Austria 93% 22% 10% 81% 10% 5% Belgium 92% 21% 7% 77% 11% 2% France 94% 19% 4% 81% 17% 2% Germany 94% 43% 9% 80% 25% 5% Netherlands 92% 34% 14% 78% 20% 5% United States 91% 59% 34% 76% 47% 24% Table 8. Source: “Labor Force Statistics by Sex and Age,” Employment Outlook 2007, Statistical Annex table C, OECD, Paris.


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The Politics Industry: How Political Innovation Can Break Partisan Gridlock and Save Our Democracy by Katherine M. Gehl, Michael E. Porter

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, business cycle, capital controls, carbon footprint, collective bargaining, coronavirus, COVID-19, Covid-19, David Brooks, deindustrialization, disintermediation, Donald Trump, first-past-the-post, future of work, guest worker program, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, immigration reform, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, labor-force participation, Menlo Park, new economy, obamacare, pension reform, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Upton Sinclair, zero-sum game

Established firms are investing less, and our economy is becoming less dynamic as the rate of new-businesses formation has slowed. Workers—our most valuable national asset—are underutilized. Recent job gains and headlines that tout a low unemployment rate hide the millions of Americans who have been forced into part-time jobs, are not earning a living wage, or have stopped searching for work all together. After decades of steady gains, labor-force participation has shrunk since 2000 to levels not seen since the 1980s. This falloff reflects the fact that American companies are creating fewer jobs than before. The new jobs that are created are disproportionately concentrated in low-skill sectors shielded from international competition. All these forces have combined to depress wages. The average family makes little more than it did two decades ago.

Reed, 146 Democratic Study Group, 56 Diamond, Larry, 155 Diner, Steven, 200n25 Dingell, John, 192n56 direct democracy, 112 citizens’ influence over policy using, 111, 112, 174 Final-Five Voting and, 145–146 Founders and, 94 personal agency supporting, 174 Progressive movement and, 112, 121, 143–144, 145 Direct Legislation by the Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum (Sullivan), 112 Direct Legislation League (DLL), 110, 112, 206n71 direct primaries, 111–112, 205n66, 206n69 discharge petitions, 193–194n65 Dodson, David, 184n18 Dole, Bob, 43 donors barriers to new competition and, 35 currency of votes and, 22 divisive legislation and, 66 duopoly in politics industry and, 7, 35 fundraising rules and, 35 paid advertising control by, 29 power of, as customers in politics industry, 24, 25, 25–27 See also campaign contributions Dorgan, Bryan, 197n19 Drutman, Lee, 52, 132, 183n14 dual political currency, 22–23 Dunlap, Matthew, 152, 154 duopoly arenas of competition for, 12, 22 average voters’ usefulness for, 27 ballot access rules and, 204n63 barriers of entry and, 23, 105 California primary reform opposition from, 149–150 candidates’ running as a supposed “outsider” within a party and, 36–37 channels used by, 28 competition and rules written by, 21 Congress and power of, 118, 209n2 direct voter contact and, 29 donor fundraising rules and, 35 elected officials beholden to, 120 elections and, 12, 23–24, 45, 118–119, 121 emergence of, after the Civil War, 103 Federal Election Commission members and, 35 Gilded Age and, 96–97 Hayes-Tilden 1876 election and, 101–102 idea suppliers and, 33 immigration as a wedge issue and, 75 immigration reform and, 73–75 individual candidate platforms and party line and 31 lack of accountability and, 72 large-dollar donors and, 26 legislative machinery and, 12, 41, 45, 118, 134 lobbyists used by, 33 Maine’s ranked-choice voting and, 153, 154, 155 paid advertising and, 29 party primaries and, 46, 49 Perot’s independent campaign and, 119 political-industrial complex and, 24, 38 politics industry and power of, 7, 39, 95–96, 103 presidential debate rules from, 42–43 pushback against political innovation by, 160 Reconstruction changes and, 101–102 rivalry and control in, 23–24 rules and power of, 44, 45, 118 state primary reform and, 155, 156 suppliers controlled by, 23, 31, 32, 33, 184n18 talent in politics and, 31–32 traditional independent media and 29 Trump as hybrid substitute to, 36 use of term, 12 voter data and, 32 voters’ rejection of, in 2016 election, 36 “Dutch Treat” Club, Boston, 204n61, 204–205n64 economic competitiveness, 75–78 definition of, 75 economic performance deterioration and, 76 government policy and, xiv impact on families and communities of decline in, 77 labor-force participation and, 76–77 as a politics problem, 78 productivity growth and, 76 survey (2016) on, 77–78, 79 economic conditions Americans’ views on democracy and, 196n10 Gilded Age political dysfunction and, 99–100, 107, 108, 115, 201n46 globalization and, 115–116 government policy and, xiv impact of industrialization on, 100 new wave of immigration and, 116 Progressive reforms and, 98, 203n57 Economist, 149 Edison, Thomas, 143 Edwards, Mickey, 3 Eighteenth Amendment, 206–207n76 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 37–38 election laws Federal Election Commission and, 35 Massachusetts ballot reform and, 204–205n64 election rules and practices.

See electoral innovation; political innovation Institute of Politics, Harvard University, 188n3 Interstate Commerce Act (1887), 107 Issue One, 215n79 i360, 360 Jefferson, Thomas, 18, 19, 20, 95, 126–127 Jim Crow laws, 102, 108 Johnson, Gary, 51 Johnson, Lyndon, 85 Joint Committee on Direct Legislation, 206n71 Joint Committee on the Reorganization of Congress, 140 Justice Department, 35 Kennedy, John F., 163 Kennedy, Ted, 73, 74, 196n15, 196–197n18, 197n19 Khanna, Ro, 124 King, Angus, 151 Ku Klux Klan, 100 labor-force participation, 76–77 La Follette, Robert “Fighting Bob,” 110, 166 Lamont, Ned, 48 lawmaking. See legislative machinery Lawrence, Eric, 206n69 Lawrence, Jennifer, 155 laws anti-immigration sentiment and passage of, 100 Bismarck on making of, 134 Gilded Age passage of, 107 Progressive movement and, 114, 202n49 See also specific laws leadership, in solutions, 87 Leadership Now, 174 League of Women Voters, 41–42, 213n65 Lee, Frances E., 193n63 legislative machinery, 52–60 Affordable Care Act and, 53–54, 85–86, 194–195n1, 198n37 barriers to entry and partisanship in, 35 Cannon Revolt to decentralize committee power in, 113, 121, 163 commission for designing new blueprint for, 137–139 Congress as focus in, 12–13 current state of, 4–7 declining bipartisan support in, 66, 67 declining percentage of moderates in, 67, 68 description of, 45 direct democracy circumventing, 112, 145 duopolistic competition and, 12, 22 duopoly’s power in, 12, 41, 45, 118, 134 elections machinery combined with, 120–121, 141 electoral innovation and, 133, 161 Final-Five Voting and need for change in, 10, 133 former regulators and congressional staffers as lobbyists and, 27 Gilded Age and, 106, 113, 201nn33, 45 gridlock on important issues in, 67, 68 Hastert Rule and, 54–55 idea suppliers and, 32 identity politics in, 69–70 as key rule and practice, 41 lobbyists and, 33–34 member fundraising and power in, 59–60 model, modern legislative machinery proposed for, 10, 13, 120, 134–136 Nebraska’s Model Legislature Committee on, 163–164, 165 need for changes in, 120, 134–135, 141 nonpartisan, 213–214n66 nonurgent crises bypassed in, 69 partisan takeover of Congress and, 55–59 party bosses in, 46, 104, 106, 111, 112, 202–203n55, 203n57, 205nn66, 69 party primaries’ influence on legislators in, 49, 88 path of a bill in, 60–63 perception of as a corrupted system, 4 political disillusionment of public and, 70–71 political machines in, 104, 201n33, 202n54, 202–203n55, 204n61, 205n67, 205–206n69, 206n72, 213n60 political messaging in, 194–195n1, 198n36 political parties’ control of, 3, 200n24 Politics Industry Theory on, 10 problem solving decline in, 66 Progressive reforms of, 113, 114, 121 public desire for third party and, 71, 72 public trust in government and, 70, 70 reimagining new process for, 170 rules used in, 136 Select Committee for modernizing, 137–138 show votes in, 86, 194–195n1 single party control for passage in, 66–67 textbook Congress and in, 55–56, 113, 163 urgent crises and deficit financing in, 67–69 use of term, 12 volatile swings of voter sentiment in, 71–72 Washington State’s reengineering of, 215n79 zero-based rule making and, 135–136 Legislative Machinery Innovation Commission proposal earlier commission proposals and, 137–138 earlier successful models and, 139–141 functions of, 138–139 purpose of, 137–138 zero-based approach used by, 136 Legislative Reorganization Act (1946), 113, 138, 140–141 legislative staffers.


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Dopesick: Dealers, Doctors, and the Drug Company That Addicted America by Beth Macy

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, centre right, crack epidemic, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, invisible hand, labor-force participation, mandatory minimum, mass incarceration, McMansion, medical residency, meta analysis, meta-analysis, obamacare, offshore financial centre, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, single-payer health, urban renewal, War on Poverty, working poor

journalist Sam Quinones: Sam Quinones, Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 327–28. Declining workforce participation wasn’t just: Author interview, Monnat. Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger’s 2017 study also backs Monnat’s thesis: “The opioid crisis and depressed labor force participation are now intertwined in many parts of the U.S.,” he said, in the Brookings Institution paper “Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiring into the Decline of the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate,” Sept. 7, 2017, found here: https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/where-have-all-the-workers-gone-an-inquiry-into-the-decline-of-the-u-s-labor-force-participation-rate/. Related: Fred Dews, “How the Opioid Epidemic Has Affected the U.S. Labor Force, County-by-County,” Brookings Institution, Sept. 7, 2017. Packaged in Harlem, the heroin was shaped: Details of the FUBI ring were gleaned from interviews with numerous law enforcement officers who worked the case, 2016–2017, including Lutz, Stafford County drug task force officer Kevin Coffman, ATF agent Bill Metcalf, and Wolthuis, along with numerous users and their relatives, and with Ronnie Jones.

Don’t want to drive all the way to Baltimore? Your returns won’t be as high, but you could now drive in just twenty minutes to Little Baltimore: Martinsburg, West Virginia. That’s what happens when rural America becomes the new inner city, ranking dead last behind cities, suburbs, and small metro areas in measures of socioeconomic well-being that include college attendance, income, and male labor-force participation. “They can make all the task forces they want, but they’re never gonna stop it because the profits are just too great,” Dennis said. “And the heroin is only getting closer and closer and closer.” Dennis’s plan, when I talked to him the summer after Santiago went to prison, was to take what some call the geographic cure. He wanted to move to a bigger city with a younger and more ingrained sober-living culture, along with better jobs.


No Slack: The Financial Lives of Low-Income Americans by Michael S. Barr

active measures, asset allocation, Bayesian statistics, business cycle, Cass Sunstein, conceptual framework, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, financial exclusion, financial innovation, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, information asymmetry, labor-force participation, late fees, London Interbank Offered Rate, loss aversion, market friction, mental accounting, Milgram experiment, mobile money, money market fund, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, New Urbanism, p-value, payday loans, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, the payments system, transaction costs, unbanked and underbanked, underbanked

Estimated Relationship between Bank-Account Ownership and Socioeconomic Outcomes Using Linear Probability Model a Dependent variable is individual bank-account ownership Age Black Female Married Citizen (1) (2) (3) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.100*** (0.037) 0.037 (0.044) 0.136*** (0.036) -0.062 (0.132) 0.005*** (0.001) -0.111*** (0.035) 0.059 (0.043) 0.079** (0.035) 0.035 (0.119) 0.005*** (0.001) -0.121*** (0.036) 0.045 (0.043) 0.076** (0.037) 0.041 (0.115) -0.115*** (0.031) -0.174*** (0.048) 0.001** (0.000) -0.090 (0.055) -0.103*** (0.032) -0.164*** (0.049) 0.001** (0.000) -0.080 (0.055) 0.115*** (0.058) -0.018 (0.051) 0.119*** (0.055) -0.002 (0.049) Education Less than high school High school or GED Income Living below poverty line Employment status Employed Unemployed Financial participation A lot 0.225*** (0.060) 0.169** (0.071) Some Shopping around A lot A little Constant R2 Sample size 0.615*** (0.151) 0.05 930 0.480*** (0.161) 0.15 925 -0.010 (0.046) -0.059* (0.033) 0.298* (0.159) 0.17 921 Source: Detroit Area Household Financial Services study. a. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are weighted. Clustered standard errors are reported to account for stratified sampling design. Reference category consists of individuals who are not black, male, not married, not U.S. citizens, have some college or more, are not in poverty, are out of the labor force, participate in financial decisionmaking “a little,” and shop around for financial services “some.” *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test. **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test. 12864-03_CH03_3rdPgs.indd 63 3/23/12 11:55 AM 64 michael s. barr, jane k. dokko, and benjamin j. keys Table 3-3.

For OLS regressions, clustered standard errors are reported to account for the stratified sampling design. For LAD regressions, bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported to account for the stratified sampling design. Pseudo R 2 reported for LAD regressions. Reference category consists of individuals who are not black, male, not married, not U.S. citizens, have some college or more, are not in poverty, are out of the labor force, participate in financial decision making “a little,” and shop around for financial services “some.” *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test. **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test. 1ST PAGES 12864-03_CH03_3rdPgs.indd 72 3/23/12 11:55 AM Table 3-7. Regression-Adjusted Differences in Annual Transactional Outlays for Banked and Unbanked Respondents a Dependent variable is total annual transactional outlays Has bank account Age Black Female Married Citizen OLS (1) LAD (2) OLS (3) LAD (4) OLS (5) LAD (6) 34.4** (14.3) -2.40*** (0.311) 29.6*** (13.2) 2.21 (12.5) 22.7* (12.6) -6.92 (56.5) 17.8 (13.1) -1.97*** (0.313) 22.6** (11.0) -0.85 (11.6) 38.0*** (13.8) 15.2 (91.6) 10.0 (13.2) -2.09*** (0.411) 24.6* (12.9) 13.50 (12.1) -0.1 (13.7) 3.0 (68.4) -6.14 (12.5) -1.34*** (0.335) 22.0** (10.5) 13.10 (10.8) 6.4 (11.2) 31.3 (116.0) 4.4 (13.4) -2.11*** (0.400) 21.3* (12.6) 9.54 (12.0) -0.7 (13.6) 1.03 (74.2) -10.6 (10.8) -1.56*** (0.359) 18.2* (10.0) 6.40 (10.1) 9.7 (10.3) 10.2 (118.0) -6.9 (15.1) -2.0 (16.2) 1.03*** (0.316) -13.8 (14.7) -23.8 (10.5) -14.0 (10.5) 0.64** (0.380) -23.0 (13.9) -2.2 (15.8) 1.8 (15.8) 1.03*** (0.319) -12.8 (14.7) -10.4 (11.1) -13.4 (11.3) 0.64 (0.427) -25.0 (15.5) 18.7 (20.3) -20.5 (21.0) 37.4** (15.8) -10.3 (13.6) 16.8 (21.2) -19.8 (21.9) 22.3 (16.5) -25.1* (14.6) 55.7*** (17.5) 31.7 (23.7) 45.8*** (15.7) 18.4 (18.5) Education Less than high school High school or GED Income Living below poverty line Employment status Employed Unemployed Financial participation A lot Some Shopping around A lot A little Constant R2 Sample size 218*** (56.5) 0.05 930 152* (89.6) 0.04 930 187*** (66.5) 0.09 925 106 (113.0) 0.08 925 18.4 (20.3) -15.0 (10.4) 150** (73.8) 0.10 921 12.1 (15.9) -15.1 (9.4) 123 (107.0) 0.09 921 Source: Detroit Area Household Financial Services study. a.

For OLS regressions, clustered standard errors are reported to account for the stratified sampling design. For LAD regressions, bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported to account for the stratified sampling design. Pseudo R 2 reported for LAD regressions. Reference category consists of individuals who are not black, male, not married, not U.S. citizens, have some college or more, are not in poverty, are out of the labor force, participate in financial decisionmaking “a little,” and shop around for financial services “some.” *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test. **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test. 12864-03_CH03_3rdPgs.indd 73 3/23/12 11:55 AM Table 3-8. Regression-Adjusted Differences in Annual Short-Term Credit Outlays for Banked and Unbanked Respondents a Dependent variable is total annual short-term credit outlays Has bank account Age Black Female Married Citizen OLS (1) LAD (2) OLS (3) LAD (4) OLS (5) LAD (6) 99.0*** (17.60) -0.797** (0.371) 52.5*** (15.9) -19.0 (22.5) 51.0** (20.1) -23.9 (121.0) 37.5*** (9.61) 0.000 (0.047) -0.0 (7.9) 0.0 (1.1) 17.7 (14.1) 20.7 (28.1) 84.0*** (16.90) -0.543 (0.463) 49.8*** (16.1) -15.7 (22.7) 42.6* (22.6) -14.6 (135.0) 18.6** (7.34) 0.082 (0.107) 8.4 (6.5) 5.8 (4.7) 25.4** (11.0) 25.1 (19.3) 82.5*** (16.70) -0.750* (0.417) 47.6*** (15.3) -15.1 (23.1) 46.5** (23.1) -20.0 (133.0) 15.7** (6.39) 0.005 (0.115) 8.3 (6.5) 4.8 (4.9) 28.5*** (10.1) 28.7 (18.6) -45.3* (23.3) -28.2 (24.5) 0.482* (0.493) 5.51 (28.50) -13.4* (6.9) -10.6 (6.8) 0.307 (0.283) 21.23 (7.04) -48.5** (23.7) -30.9 (24.1) 0.560** (0.506) 6.69 (27.80) -13.3** (5.9) -11.7* (6.1) 0.359 (0.295) 3.15 (7.47) Education Less than high school diploma High school diploma or GED Income Living below poverty line Employment status Employed 1.69 (26.2) -3.11 (31.4) Unemployed 11.10 (6.3) 2.62 (4.3) Financial participation A lot Some Shopping around A lot A little Constant R2 Sample size 70.3 (131.0) 0.034 930 -20.7 (27.8) 67.2 (143.0) -36.8 (20.0) 0.034 930 0.041 925 0.039 925 -4.33 (26.0) -5.08 (31.6) 13.70** (6.2) 2.64 (4.6) 48.20** (19.80) 23.6 (21.60) -1.49 (7.41) -11.8 (7.38) 44.10* (24.50) 51.20** (21.30) 2.85 (6.41) 3.41 (4.95) 21.8 (140.0) 0.049 921 -37.3* (20.2) 0.040 921 Source: Detroit Area Household Financial Services study. a.


pages: 389 words: 87,758

No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends by Richard Dobbs, James Manyika

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, access to a mobile phone, additive manufacturing, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, autonomous vehicles, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, business cycle, business intelligence, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, cloud computing, corporate governance, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, demographic dividend, deskilling, disintermediation, disruptive innovation, distributed generation, Erik Brynjolfsson, financial innovation, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, global village, hydraulic fracturing, illegal immigration, income inequality, index fund, industrial robot, intangible asset, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, inventory management, job automation, Just-in-time delivery, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Lyft, M-Pesa, mass immigration, megacity, mobile money, Mohammed Bouazizi, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, old age dependency ratio, openstreetmap, peer-to-peer lending, pension reform, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, recommendation engine, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, RFID, ride hailing / ride sharing, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, smart cities, Snapchat, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, stem cell, Steve Jobs, supply-chain management, TaskRabbit, The Great Moderation, trade route, transaction costs, Travis Kalanick, uber lyft, urban sprawl, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, working-age population, Zipcar

In January 2014, the International Labor Organization warned that global unemployment was climbing despite an uptick in business activity. In the United States, the grinding years of low job growth have taken their toll on the dynamic American labor market. Real median household income has been essentially flat for twenty-five years.2 Youth unemployment is at record levels. Lower-skilled workers have faced the brunt of these changes. Many have left the workforce altogether; America’s labor force participation in 2014 was lower than at any time in the past thirty-six years.3 What happened? Armed with new technologies—information tools and machines that substitute for labor—and the ability to tap into the vast, newly engaged labor pools of China and India, companies in advanced countries have been able to maintain or even increase productivity during times of growth and in downturns. In the two most recent US recessions, in 2001 and 2008–2009, reduced employment accounted for 98 percent of the decline in GDP, while productivity was barely affected.

Under the so-called Hartz reforms, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder revamped the German labor market by improving vocational education, creating new job types, and changing unemployment and welfare benefits. The wide-ranging reforms were deeply unpopular. More than one hundred thousand people marched in the Monday demonstrations of 2003 to protest cuts to social welfare benefits.4 Older workers—whose labor force participation rose after the reforms—were not always interested in extending their careers. Chancellor Schröder’s party lost the 2005 elections to Merkel, who subsequently benefited from the German miracle. In the era of trend breaks, the primary challenge for policy makers is the one Germany’s government faced in the early 2000s. How can governments respond faster and develop the political maturity and leadership needed to help societies navigate changes and ensure their own survival in the process?

Huiyao Wang, “China’s return migration and its impact on home development,” UN Chronicle L, no. 3, September 2013, http://unchronicle.un.org/article/chinas-return-migration-and-its-impact-home-development. 38. World development indicators. 39. Starting strong II: Early childhood education and care, OECD, September 2006, www.oecd.org/edu/school/startingstrongiiearlychildhoodeducationandcare.htm. 40. “Table 1368: Female labor force participation rates by country: 1980 to 2010,” Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012, United States Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce, www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1368.pdf. 41. Denmark in Figures 2013, Statistics Denmark, February 2013, www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/Publikationer/VisPub.aspx?cid=17953. 42. Theresa Braine, “Reaching Mexico’s poorest,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 84, no. 8, August 2006, www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/8/news10806/en. 43.


pages: 173 words: 53,564

Fair Shot: Rethinking Inequality and How We Earn by Chris Hughes

"side hustle", basic income, Donald Trump, effective altruism, Elon Musk, end world poverty, full employment, future of journalism, gig economy, high net worth, income inequality, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, job automation, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Lyft, M-Pesa, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, new economy, oil rush, payday loans, Peter Singer: altruism, Potemkin village, precariat, randomized controlled trial, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, side project, Silicon Valley, TaskRabbit, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, traveling salesman, trickle-down economics, uber lyft, universal basic income, winner-take-all economy, working poor, working-age population, zero-sum game

The infamous “welfare queens” invoked by Ronald Reagan are a mythological figure in American consciousness with deep roots in racist stereotypes. The dignity of work is often used to invoke imagery of white men on assembly lines, demonstrating determination and resilience to provide for their families, in implied contrast to images of black women who passively rely on government handouts. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, labor force participation rates are higher for single black mothers (76 percent) than for white men (72 percent). And that doesn’t even take into account any nontraditional work like caregiving that many women do. The malicious ways work requirements have been used in the past make me suspicious of some calls on the left for a federal job guarantee in lieu of a guaranteed income. Its basic premise is that the tens of millions of people who aren’t participating in the formal workforce can only be guaranteed economic security if they sign up for newly created, but still undefined, government jobs.

104 Someone who is unemployed is more than twice as likely to use illegal drugs: Badel and Greaney, “Exploring the Link”; Dooley, Catalano, and Wilson, “Depression and Unemployment.” 104 The correlation between unemployment rates and opioid abuse in particular is staggering: Hollingsworth, Ruhm, and Simon, “Macroeconomic Conditions and Opioid Abuse.” 105 “If a man is called to be a street sweeper”: Fassler, “‘All Labor Has Dignity.’” 106 “AFDC mothers, for example, are often forced to answer questions about their sexual behavior”: Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor, Loc. 2959. 108 labor force participation rates are higher for single black mothers: U.S. Department of Labor, “Working Mothers Issue Brief”; Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment Status of the Civilian Population.” 108 “People seeking jobs would come to these local offices”: Spross, “You’re Hired!” 108 The cost would be significantly higher than a guaranteed income: Paul et al., “Returning to the Promise of Full Employment.” 109 subsidized public-sector employment programs consistently came in last: Card et al., “What Works?”


pages: 209 words: 53,175

The Psychology of Money: Timeless Lessons on Wealth, Greed, and Happiness by Morgan Housel

"side hustle", airport security, Amazon Web Services, Bernie Madoff, business cycle, computer age, coronavirus, discounted cash flows, diversification, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, financial independence, Hans Rosling, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index fund, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, new economy, Paul Graham, payday loans, Ponzi scheme, quantitative easing, Renaissance Technologies, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Stephen Hawking, Steven Levy, stocks for the long run, the scientific method, traffic fines, Vanguard fund, working-age population

But the modern foundation of money decisions—saving and investing—is based around concepts that are practically infants. Take retirement. At the end of 2018 there was $27 trillion in U.S. retirement accounts, making it the main driver of the common investor’s saving and investing decisions.⁵ But the entire concept of being entitled to retirement is, at most, two generations old. Before World War II most Americans worked until they died. That was the expectation and the reality. The labor force participation rate of men age 65 and over was above 50% until the 1940s: Social Security aimed to change this. But its initial benefits were nothing close to a proper pension. When Ida May Fuller cashed the first Social Security check in 1940, it was for $22.54, or $416 adjusted for inflation. It was not until the 1980s that the average Social Security check for retirees exceeded $1,000 a month adjusted for inflation.

As for the top one percent, the really well-to-do and the rich, whom we might classify very roughly indeed as the $16,000-and-over group, their share of the total national income, after taxes, had come down by 1945 from 13 percent to 7 percent. This was not a short-term trend. Real income for the bottom 20% of wage-earners grew by a nearly identical amount as the top 5% from 1950 to 1980. The equality went beyond wages. Women held jobs outside the home in record numbers. Their labor force participation rate went from 31% after the war to 37% by 1955, and to 40% by 1965. Minorities gained, too. After the 1945 inauguration Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about an African American reporter who told her: Do you realize what twelve years have done? If at the 1933 reception a number of colored people had gone down the line and mixed with everyone else in the way they did today, every paper in the country would have reported it.


The Origins of the Urban Crisis by Sugrue, Thomas J.

affirmative action, business climate, collective bargaining, correlation coefficient, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Ford paid five dollars a day, George Gilder, ghettoisation, Gunnar Myrdal, hiring and firing, housing crisis, income inequality, indoor plumbing, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, jobless men, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, mass incarceration, New Urbanism, oil shock, pink-collar, postindustrial economy, rent control, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, side project, Silicon Valley, strikebreaker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, white flight, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

On the family wage, see Martha May, “The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor Company and the Five Dollar Day,” Feminist Studies 8 (1982): 399–424; Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering and Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). On female labor force participation and changing ideas about women and work, see the important article by Susan M. Hartmann, “Women’s Work and the Domestic Ideal in the Early Cold War Years,” in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, ed. Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 84–100. 62. On female labor force participation in Detroit, see Table 9.1 above. There is an enormous literature on female networks in urban America. The work of John R. Logan and Harvey Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 106–7, cites recent sociological literature on women’s networks in recent America; for a longer-term historical view, see Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1780–1860 (New York: Knopf, 1986). 63.

But the fiercest resistance to black movement occurred in three predominantly working-class sections of the city (Map 9.1) whose residents were members of the city’s most powerful homeowners’ organizations: the Northeast Side (represented by the Courville District and Seven Mile-Fenelon Improvement Associations), the Wyoming Corridor (represented by the Ruritan Park, De Witt-Clinton, and States-Lawn Neighborhood Associations), and the Lower West Side (represented by the Property Owners’ Association). These defended neighborhoods had several important characteristics in common. All of them had predominantly blue-collar populations with median incomes slightly above the city average (Table 9.1). Skilled workers were overrepresented in each neighborhood: all had above-average percentages of craftsmen. Defended neighborhoods also had lower rates of female labor force participation than the city as a whole. The neighborhoods were bastions of single-family homeownership. With the exception of the Lower West Side, the percentage of owner occupancy far exceeded the citywide average. The residential architecture in these communities was undistinguished. Most homes were modest two- or three-bedroom bungalows of frame construction, built in the 1920s and 1940s, crowded together on forty-foot lots.

Young people coming of age in Detroit in the mid- and late 1950s and 1960s faced a very different economic world from that of the previous generation. A black male in Detroit in 1945 or 1950 could realistically expect factory employment, even if his opportunities were seriously limited by discrimination. Blacks continued to suffer levels of unemployment disproportionate to those of Detroit residents in general, although labor force participation rates fluctuated with economic cycles. Still, even in the most flush of times, somewhere close to 10 percent of Detroit’s black population was unemployed. Over the next three decades, with the exception of a cyclical boom in automobile employment in the mid- and late 1960s, few could rely on steady employment. A survey of over three hundred young people in one of Detroit’s most depressed inner-city neighborhoods in the early 1960s revealed the extent to which limited opportunities in Detroit’s job market had narrowed the horizon of Detroit’s young African Americans.


pages: 402 words: 126,835

The Job: The Future of Work in the Modern Era by Ellen Ruppel Shell

3D printing, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, airport security, Albert Einstein, Amazon Mechanical Turk, basic income, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, big-box store, blue-collar work, Buckminster Fuller, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer vision, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, deskilling, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, factory automation, follow your passion, Frederick Winslow Taylor, future of work, game design, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, immigration reform, income inequality, industrial robot, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, move fast and break things, move fast and break things, new economy, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, precariat, Ralph Waldo Emerson, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Rodney Brooks, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Snapchat, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, Thomas L Friedman, Thorstein Veblen, Tim Cook: Apple, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, urban renewal, white picket fence, working poor, Y Combinator, young professional, zero-sum game

Abel, Richard Deitz, and Yaqin Su, “Are Recent College Graduates Finding Good Jobs?” Current Issues in Economics and Finance (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 20, no. 1 (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/​medialib­rary/​media/​research/​current_issues/​ci20-1.pdf. the United States had the lowest Maximiliano Dvorkin and Hannah Shell, “A Cross-Country Comparison of Labor Force Participation,” Economic Synopses (St. Louis Fed), no. 17 (2015), https://research.stlouisfed.org/​publications/​economic-synopses/​2015/​07/​31/​a-cross-country-comparison-of-labor-force-particip­ation. the United States lagged behind Poland “Employment Rate by Age Group,” OECD Data, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, last modified 2016, https://data.oecd.org/​emp/​employment-rate-by-age-group.htm#indicator-chart. According to this data, the United States had a prime-age (ages twenty-five to fifty-four) labor participation rate of 78.2 percent in 2016; however, this figure represents not only employed workers but workers looking for work and workers who labored as little as one hour the previous week, or in some cases no hours thanks to an illness or temporary layoff.

Workers Testing Positive for Illicit Drugs,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/​articles/​greater-share-of-u-s-workers-testing-positive-for-illicit-drugs-1473901202. More recently, in testimony on the impact of opioid abuse before the Senate Banking Committee in July 2017, then Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen opined, “I do think it is related to declining labor force participation among prime-age workers. I don’t know if it’s causal or if it’s a symptom of long-running economic maladies that have affected these communities and particularly affected workers who have seen their job opportunities decline.” Jeanna Smialek, “Yellen Says Opioid Use Is Tied to Declining Labor Participation,” Bloomberg.com, July 13, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2017-07-13/​yellen-says-opioid-use-is-tied-to-declining-labor-participa­tion.


pages: 267 words: 72,552

Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Thomas Ramge

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Air France Flight 447, Airbnb, Alvin Roth, Atul Gawande, augmented reality, banking crisis, basic income, Bayesian statistics, bitcoin, blockchain, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, centralized clearinghouse, Checklist Manifesto, cloud computing, cognitive bias, conceptual framework, creative destruction, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, double entry bookkeeping, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ford paid five dollars a day, Frederick Winslow Taylor, fundamental attribution error, George Akerlof, gig economy, Google Glasses, information asymmetry, interchangeable parts, invention of the telegraph, inventory management, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, land reform, lone genius, low cost airline, low cost carrier, Marc Andreessen, market bubble, market design, market fundamentalism, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Moneyball by Michael Lewis explains big data, multi-sided market, natural language processing, Network effects, Norbert Wiener, offshore financial centre, Parag Khanna, payday loans, peer-to-peer lending, Peter Thiel, Ponzi scheme, prediction markets, price anchoring, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, random walk, recommendation engine, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, Sam Altman, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, six sigma, smart grid, smart meter, Snapchat, statistical model, Steve Jobs, technoutopianism, The Future of Employment, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, transaction costs, universal basic income, William Langewiesche, Y Combinator

With a well-developed services sector that itself may face the challenge of increasing automation, what is there to employ the middle-class workers displaced in data-rich markets? Is this the advent of a “second machine age”—the neat phrase to describe the coming displacement through automation of white-collar jobs coined by MIT professors Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee? It is likely, as we suggested in Chapter 6, that there will be less work for humans in the future; but no matter what happens to overall labor force participation, it is almost certain that the types of jobs available will be quite different from the jobs people hold today. The situation is actually even more dramatic when we look not just at the number of people participating in the workforce but also at the amount of the nation’s income allocated to worker and employee compensation. In the United States, this “labor share” has declined considerably since the 1980s, from 67 percent of value added to 47 percent, much of that drop happening after 2000.

middle-income desk jobs that… will disappear: Michael Chui, James Manyika, and Mehdi Miremadi, “Where Machines Could Replace Humans—and Where They Can’t (Yet),” McKinsey Quarterly (July 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet. labor force has declined from its peak: The participation rate in 2017 was around 63 percent, down from over 67 percent in 2000, and below the level it had been in more than three decades; see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Participation Rates, data sets and graphs available at https://data.bls.gov. forecast depressing employment figures: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016); Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? (Oxford, UK: Oxford Martin School, September 17, 2013), http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of _Employment.pdf.


pages: 242 words: 73,728

Give People Money by Annie Lowrey

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, airport security, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, ending welfare as we know it, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, full employment, gender pay gap, gig economy, Google Earth, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, indoor plumbing, information asymmetry, Jaron Lanier, jitney, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kickstarter, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, late capitalism, Lyft, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, mass incarceration, McMansion, Menlo Park, mobile money, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, obamacare, Peter Thiel, post scarcity, post-work, Potemkin village, precariat, randomized controlled trial, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Bork, Ronald Reagan, Sam Altman, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, Steve Jobs, TaskRabbit, The Future of Employment, theory of mind, total factor productivity, Turing test, two tier labour market, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, women in the workforce, working poor, World Values Survey, Y Combinator

(NBER Working Paper no. 18702, Jan. 2013). one in three stay-at-home moms: D’Vera Cohn and Andrea Caumont, “7 Key Findings About Stay-at-Home Moms,” FactTank (blog), Pew Research Center, Apr. 8, 2014. 5 percent drop in employment: So Kubota, “Child Care Costs and Stagnating Female Labor Force Participation in the US” (white paper, Princeton University, July 9, 2017). the United States’ female labor participation rate: Eleanor Krause and Isabel Sawhill, “What We Know and Don’t Know About Declining Labor Force Participation: A Review” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, May 17, 2017). the United States’ fastest-growing job: Karsten Strauss, “Predicting the Fastest-Growing Jobs of the Future,” Forbes, Nov. 7, 2017. “By the time a woman earns her first dollar”: Jessica Schieder and Elise Gould, “ ‘Women’s Work’ and the Gender Pay Gap: How Discrimination, Societal Norms, and Other Forces Affect Women’s Occupational Choices—and Their Pay” (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, July 20, 2016).


pages: 319 words: 75,257

Trumpocalypse: Restoring American Democracy by David Frum

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, anti-globalists, Bernie Sanders, centre right, coronavirus, currency manipulation / currency intervention, decarbonisation, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, employer provided health coverage, illegal immigration, immigration reform, labor-force participation, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nate Silver, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, QAnon, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, Silicon Valley

Restoring democracy becomes harder when voters credit bygone autocrats with vanished prosperity and blame responsible liberals for the subsequent austerity. Flashpoint: The gaps between city and country are widening fast. “Rural America is the new inner city,” the Wall Street Journal proclaimed in May 2017. In terms of poverty, college attainment, teenage births, divorce, death rates from heart disease and cancer, reliance on federal disability insurance and male labor-force participation, rural counties now rank the worst among the four major U.S. population groupings (the others are big cities, suburbs and medium or small metro areas).5 No progress was made in Trump’s first two years in bringing broadband Internet to the 39 percent of rural Americans who lacked it. Net farm income peaked in 2013 at $136 billion. By the end of 2018, it had tumbled to about $60 billion.6 The $28 billion of subsidies Trump poured into the farm belt to compensate it for his trade war is more than double the aid given to the auto industry in 2009.7 The auto money was repaid.

., 82 manufacturing, 12, 102 Mar-a-Lago, 26 Marciano, Paul, 117 Marine Corps, 92–93, 101 Marist Institute, 110 marriage, 13–14, 148 Maryland, 83, 117 masculinism, 65 Massachusetts, 117, 129 mass shootings, 53–58 Mateen, Omar, 54–55 Mattis, James, 88, 93, 100–101, 165, 174 McCabe, Andrew, 125 McCain, John, 19, 73, 183 McConnell, Mitch, 121 McGahn, Don, 85, 90 McKenzie, Frank, 97 media, 15, 67, 189–91, 194 Medicaid, 132–33, 138 Medi-Cal, 144 Medicare, 112, 130, 133–35, 142, 148 Medicare for All, 106, 118, 130, 134 men labor-force participation and, 13 political attitudes, 14 sexual anger and, 5, 65–66 #MeToo movement, 117 Mexico, 46, 108, 145–46, 159, 178–79 border wall and, 21–22 NAFTA/USMCA and, 178 Michigan, 75–76, 78, 186 Middle East, 157, 171–74 “Might Is Right” (racist tract), 57 Milano, Alyssa, 117 military, 90–94, 100–101, 165, 191 parade and, 90–91 spending, 133, 165 Military Times, 91, 93 Milley, Mark, 92 Ming dynasty, 156 Minnesota, 76 misogyny, 57, 65–66, 118 Mississippi, 80, 121–23 Missouri, 137 Mitchell, John, 125 Monmouth polls, 139 Montenegro, 63 Moonves, Les, 117 Morocco, 172 Morris, Gouverneur, 98 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 131 Mueller, Robert, 1, 29–33, 59, 125 Mulvaney, Mick, 189 Muslims, 51, 54, 61, 63–64, 179 Mussolini, Benito, 86 Naipaul, V.S., 18 Napoleon, 65 National Enquirer, 109 National Guard, 93 nationalism, 50–51, 62–63, 196 National Lynching Memorial, 117 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 126 National Rifle Association (NRA), 59, 61 National Security Agency (NSA), 45 National Security staff, 88, 96–97 Navajo Generating Station, 118 Naval Operations Chief, 92 Nazism, 64, 145 NBC, 24, 59 Nebraska, 184 Neller, Robert, 92 Netherlands, 133 Never Trumpers, 90 New Black Panthers, 69 New Hampshire, 76 New Jersey, 75 New Orleans, 80 Newton, Isaac, 157 New York City, 83, 163 New York magazine, 109 New York State, 75, 118, 184–86 New York Times, 41, 43, 46, 61, 65, 95, 102, 111, 118, 194 New Zealand, 55–56, 162, 177 Nicaragua, 108 Nixon, Richard, 62, 82, 85, 99–100, 105, 125, 198 No Child Left Behind Act (2002), 140 Nolte, John, 149 Noonan, Peggy, 196 Norquist, Grover, 196 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 41, 112, 178 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 45, 63, 93–94 North Carolina, 76, 78, 80, 123 North Dakota, 122, 164 Northeastern University, 55 North Korea, 44–46, 48–49, 169, 171–72 nuclear energy, 164, 166–67 nuclear weapons, 93–94, 180 Oak Ridge nuclear complex, 167 Obama, Barack, 12, 15, 64, 130–31, 136, 178, 183, 196–97 ACA and, 134–35 bin Laden and, 95–96 China and, 177 climate change and, 152 elections of 2010 and, 79 foreign policy and, 171, 179 immigration and, 21, 24, 106 Iran and, 172 Islamic world and, 53–54, 179 Obama, Michelle, 26 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria, 147, 167 oceans, 155–56 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 102 offshore tax havens, 102, 174 Ohio, 78, 82–83 oil and gas (fossil fuels), 42, 94, 127, 150, 153–56, 161, 163–64 One American News Network (OANN), 15 O’Neill, Brendan, 149 O’Neill, Tip, 127 Orbán, Viktor, 67, 69, 143 Oregon, 118 O’Reilly, Bill, 15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 132 Ornstein, Norman, 77 Owens, Candace, 64 Paddock, Stephen, 55 Pakistan, 88–89, 95, 173–75, 180 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 60 Palin, Sarah, 83, 84 Panama, 45, 108 Paris Bastille Day parade, 90–91 Paris climate accords, 41, 162 Parnas, Lev, 89, 190 Patriot Prayer, 60 Pegler, Westbrook, 83 Pence, Mike, 4, 26, 35, 63 Pennsylvania, 82–83, 118, 186 Perkins, Tony, 3, 75 Perón, Eva, 18 pharmaceutical companies, 133 Philadelphia, 184, 186 Philippines, 44–45, 146 Pierce, William, 60 Pittsburgh, 186 synagogue shooting, 56, 61 plastics, 118, 156, 160 Playboy, 49 Poland, 50, 66–67, 89, 93, 193 polarization, 15, 130–31, 137–38, 187 political correctness, 15, 110 poll taxes, 71 pollution, 159–61 Pompeo, Michael, 47, 171 population distribution, 75–79, 83, 121–22 Prager, Dennis, 149 progressives, 107–8, 110–13 protectionism, 3, 50, 161 Proud Boys, 60–61 public schools, 136–37, 140–41 Pulse nightclub shootings, 53–55 Putin, Vladimir, 3, 32–33, 44, 48, 63–64, 89, 176, 197 QAnon, 34 Quartz, 156 race and racism, 5–6, 43, 56–58, 62–63, 65–66, 107, 111–12, 127, 140–41, 191 voting and, 71, 80–81 Reagan, Ronald, 18, 39, 51, 62, 105–6, 181, 191 real estate, 120 recessions, 12, 127, 144 recycling, 159–60 red flag laws, 117 redistricting, 84 red meat consumption, 163 reform, recommendations for consensus and, 118–19 DC statehood and, 122–23 filibuster and, 120–22 gerrymandering and, 124–25 law enforcement and, 125–26 presidential tax returns and, 119–20 regulation, 127, 188 Reid, Harry, 121 Republican National Convention 2008 (St.


pages: 280 words: 83,299

Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline by Darrell Bricker, John Ibbitson

affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, Columbian Exchange, commoditize, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, full employment, gender pay gap, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, global reserve currency, Gunnar Myrdal, Hans Rosling, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Snow's cholera map, Kibera, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, New Urbanism, nuclear winter, off grid, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Potemkin village, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, statistical model, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile, urban planning, working-age population, young professional, zero-sum game

So we care about what the parents on the other side think, and especially about the mother-in-law. There is a special relationship between a wife and a mother-in-law.” With few benefits, wage policies that punish women who take maternal leave, and social norms that let men get away with doing less work, you might think Japanese and Korean women would stay home and make babies. But they don’t. Labor force participation by Japanese and Korean women is lower, but not that much lower, than for non-Asian developed countries: 49 percent for Japan and 50 percent for Korea, compared to 56 percent for the United States and 55 percent for Germany.144 With little support from the state, the employer, or the husband, and yet determined to work (and probably needing the money), many Asian women put off having babies until they’re almost out of time.

The United Nations estimate is 1.2. 139 Kelsey Chong, “South Korea’s Troubled Millennial Generation,” BerkeleyHaas, 27 April 2016. http://cmr.berkeley.edu/blog/2016/4/south-korea/#fn4 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Garnova, “Japan’s Birthrate.” 143 Takao Komine, “Effective Measures to Halt Birthrate Decline,” Discuss Japan (Japan Foreign Policy Forum, Vol. 22, undated). http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/pdf/2014/no22/DJweb_22_eco_01.pdf 144 “Labor Force Participation Rate: Female,” Data (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2016). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS 145 “Mother’s Mean Age at First Birth,” World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). https://www.cia.gov/library /publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2256.html 146 “S. Korea’s Marriage Rate Hits Record Low Level Last Year Amid Economic Slowdown,” Pulse by Maeil Business News Korea, 7 April 7 2016. https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?


pages: 590 words: 153,208

Wealth and Poverty: A New Edition for the Twenty-First Century by George Gilder

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, cleantech, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equal pay for equal work, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Gilder, Gunnar Myrdal, Home mortgage interest deduction, Howard Zinn, income inequality, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, medical malpractice, minimum wage unemployment, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, non-fiction novel, North Sea oil, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, price stability, Ralph Nader, rent control, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, skunkworks, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, volatility arbitrage, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, yield curve, zero-sum game

But the leading young blacks of 1957 did not choose these arduous routes. There was some problem of motivation or psychology, and like most such problems it originates not at the job but in the family, specifically with their wives, a group that suffered far less from credentialism. Black women in 1957 had substantially higher IQs, more years in school, more college degrees, and much lower labor force participation than black men. During the next twenty years, they increased their labor force participation by 40 percent. At the same time, they improved their median incomes, occupational status, and penetration of high-level positions at a rate more than three times as fast as black men did. Beginning with incomes around 50 percent of the incomes of black men and 57 percent of the incomes of white women, black women ended the period by earning more than 80 percent of black male incomes and 99 percent of the white female level.15 In the class of blacks represented by the leading male earners of 1957, black women increased their number of college faculty positions by a factor of four, to a level just 15 percent below the number of male faculty, and they moved massively into nursing, teaching, and government work.

Credentialism moved through the American work place and entrenched itself ever more deeply in the government bureaucracies where many blacks were employed. This fifties generation had been educated mostly in Southern schools, which were often closed as much as one-third more days than white schools. Most blacks of that generation left high school to work. As teenagers in the late forties, their labor force participation levels were higher and their unemployment rates were lower than those of their white contemporaries. Their long years in the work force were paying off for some of them by the mid-fifties. But they had received far fewer and less intensive years of education. When the mystique of civil rights lured many into government work, they were trapped by civil service in much the way the Irish before them had been trapped by the seductions of patronage.


pages: 843 words: 223,858

The Rise of the Network Society by Manuel Castells

"Robert Solow", Apple II, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bob Noyce, borderless world, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, complexity theory, computer age, computerized trading, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, declining real wages, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, dematerialisation, deskilling, disintermediation, double helix, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, edge city, experimental subject, financial deregulation, financial independence, floating exchange rates, future of work, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, Hacker Ethic, hiring and firing, Howard Rheingold, illegal immigration, income inequality, Induced demand, industrial robot, informal economy, information retrieval, intermodal, invention of the steam engine, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job-hopping, John Markoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, Leonard Kleinrock, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, megacity, Menlo Park, moral panic, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, packet switching, Pearl River Delta, peer-to-peer, planetary scale, popular capitalism, popular electronics, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Robert Gordon, Robert Metcalfe, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, social software, South China Sea, South of Market, San Francisco, special economic zone, spinning jenny, statistical model, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, the medium is the message, the new new thing, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, urban renewal, urban sprawl, zero-sum game

For Emma Kiselyova-Castells, without whose love, work, and support this book would not exist Figures 2.1 Productivity growth in the United States, 1995–1999 2.2 Estimate of evolution of productivity in the United States, 1972–1999 93 2.3 Growth in trade and capital flows, 1970–1995 2.4 Goods in international trade by level of technological intensity, 1976/1996 2.5 Foreign direct investment 2.6 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 1992–1997 2.7 Export shares 2.8 Share of growth from high-tech sector in the United States, 1986–1998 2.9 Declining dividends payments 4.1 Percentage of the United States’ population that is foreign-born, 1900–1994 4.2 Total fertility rates for nationals and foreigners in selected OECD countries 4.3 Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999 4.4 Part-time workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1998 4.5 Self-employed workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1993 4.6 Temporary workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1997 4.7 Non-standard forms of employment in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1994 4.8 Employment in the temporary help industry in the United States, 1982–1997 4.9 Percentage of working-age Californians employed in “traditional” jobs, 1999 4.10 Distribution of working-age Californians by “traditional” job status and length of tenure in the job, 1999 4.11 The Japanese labor market in the postwar period 4.12 Annual growth of productivity, employment, and earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998 5.1 Media sales in 1998 for major media groups 5.2 Strategic alliances between media groups in Europe, 1999 5.3 Internet hosts, 1989–2006 5.4 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city worldwide, July 1999 5.5 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in North America, July 1999 5.6 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in Europe, July 1999 5.7 Internet CONE and country code domain names by city in Asia, July 1999 6.1 Largest absolute growth in information flows, 1982 and 1990 6.2 Exports of information from the United States to major world regions and centers 6.3 System of relationships between the characteristics of information technology manufacturing and the industry’s spatial pattern 6.4 The world’s largest urban agglomerations (>10 million inhabitants in 1992) 6.5 Diagrammatic representation of major nodes and links in the urban region of the Pearl River Delta 6.6 Downtown Kaoshiung 6.7 The entrance hall of Barcelona airport 6.8 The waiting room at D.E. Shaw and Company 6.9 Belleville, 1999 6.10 Las Ramblas, Barcelona, 1999 6.11 Barcelona: Paseo de Gracia 6.12 Irvine, California: business complex 7.1 Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64 years old in eight countries, 1970–1998 7.2 Ratio of hospitalized deaths to total deaths (%), by year, 1947–1987, in Japan 7.3 War deaths relative to world population, by decade, 1720–2000 Tables 2.1 Productivity rate: growth rates of output per worker 2.2 Productivity in the business sector 2.3 Evolution of the productivity of business sectors 2.4 Evolution of productivity in sectors not open to free trade 2.5 Evolution of US productivity by industrial sectors and periods 2.6 Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities, 1970–1996 2.7 Foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of total assets and liabilities of commercial banks for selected countries, 1960–1997 2.8 Direction of world exports, 1965–1995 2.9 Parent corporations and foreign affiliates by area and country 2.10 Stocks valuation, 1995–1999 4.1 United States: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1920–1991 4.2 Japan: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1920–1990 4.3 Germany: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1925–1987 4.4 France: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1989 4.5 Italy: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1990 4.6 United Kingdom: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1992 4.7 Canada: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group, 1921–1992 4.8 United States: employment statistics by industry, 1920–1991 4.9 Japan: employment statistics by industry, 1920–1990 4.10 Germany: employment statistics by industry, 1925–1987 4.11 France: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1989 4.12 Italy: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1990 4.13 United Kingdom: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1990 4.14 Canada: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1992 4.15 Occupational structure of selected countries 4.16 United States: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1960–1991 4.17 Japan: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1955–1990 4.18 Germany: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1976–1989 4.19 France: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1982–1989 4.20 Great Britain: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1961–1990 4.21 Canada: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1950–1992 4.22 Foreign resident population in Western Europe, 1950–1990 4.23 Employment in manufacturing by major countries and regions, 1970–1997 4.24 Employment shares by industry/occupation and ethnic/gender group of all workers in the United States, 1960–1998 4.25 Information technology spending per worker (1987–1994), employment growth (1987–1994), and unemployment rate (1995) by country 4.26 Main telephone lines per employee (1986 and 1993) and Internet hosts per 1,000 population (January 1996) by country 4.27 Men’s and women’s employment ratios, 15–64 years old, 1973–1998 4.28 Percentage of standard workers in the chuki koyo system of Japanese firms 4.29 Concentration of stock ownership by income level in the United States, 1995 7.1 Annual hours worked per person, 1870–1979 7.2 Potential lifelong working hours, 1950–1985 7.3 Duration and reduction of working time, 1970–1987 7.4 Principal demographic characteristics by main regions of the world, 1970–1995 7.5 Total fertility rates of some industrialized countries, 1901–1985 7.6 First live births per 1,000 women by age group of mother (30–49 years) and by race in the United States, 1960 and 1990 7.7 Comparisons of infant mortality rates, selected countries, 1990–1995 (estimates) Preface to the 2010 Edition of The Rise of the Network Society We live in confusing times, as is often the case in periods of historical transition between different forms of society.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.12 “Annual growth of productivity, employment, and earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998;” data from OECD, compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation. Harvard University Press: Fig. 7.1 “Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64 years old in eight countries, 1970–1998,” A. M. Guillemard, “Travailleurs vieillissants et marché du travail en Europe,” Travail et emploi, September 1993, and Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation. Harvard University Press: Table 4.23 “Employment in manufacturing, major countries and regions, 1970–1997 (thousands),” International Labor Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997; OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 1977–1997 (Paris: OECD, 1998); OECD, Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics, 1962–1991 (Paris: OECD, 1993), compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

A study conducted in 1999 by the US Labor Department on the profile of new jobs created in the 1990s found that a great majority of the new jobs were in occupations that paid more than the national median wage of $13 an hour.70 According to an OECD study, the variation in percentage in net job creation in 1980–95 for OECD countries, was of 3.3 percent in high-technology sectors, of –8.2 percent in medium-technology sectors, and of –10.9 percent in low-technology sectors.71 Looking into the future, the 1997 Tregouet report, commissioned by the French Senate’s Commission of Finance concluded that “as the information society gains strength, half of the occupations needing to be filled 20 years from now do not yet exist; they will essentially involve adding knowledge and information.”72 Figure 4.3 Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999 Source: Data from OECD, compiled and elaborated by Carnoy (2000) A fundamental feature characterizing the new labor market of the past two decades is the massive incorporation of women into paid work: the rate of participation of women in the labor force for ages 15–64 increased from 51.1 percent in 1973 to 70.7 percent in 1998, for the United States; from 53.2 to 67.8 percent for the UK; from 50.1 to 60.8 percent for France; from 54 to 59.8 percent for Japan; from 50.3 to 60.9 percent for Germany; from 33.4 to 48.7 percent for Spain; from 33.7 to 43.9 percent for Italy; from 63.6 to 69.7 percent for Finland; and from 62.6 to 75.5 percent for Sweden, the country with the largest women’s labor force participation rate in the world.73 Yet the pressure of this substantial increase in labor supply did not create high unemployment in the US and Japan as it did in some Western European countries. The US, in the midst of a dramatic technological retooling, registered in November 1999 its lowest unemployment rate in 30 years at 4.1 percent. Japan, in spite of a prolonged recession in the 1990s, was still keeping its unemployment rate below 5 percent, while modifying its traditional pattern of labor relations, as I will discuss below.


pages: 332 words: 89,668

Two Nations, Indivisible: A History of Inequality in America: A History of Inequality in America by Jamie Bronstein

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, blue-collar work, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate personhood, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, ending welfare as we know it, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, income inequality, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, mandatory minimum, mass incarceration, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, moral panic, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, obamacare, occupational segregation, Occupy movement, oil shock, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price discrimination, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Sam Peltzman, Scientific racism, Simon Kuznets, single-payer health, strikebreaker, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, wage slave, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Works Progress Administration

Huston, the United States has become what it once despised: Europeans come to the United States to witness the social distance between rich and poor, to observe homelessness and unendurable poverty, to see a political system of republicanism that elicits either apathy or outright hostility from the majority of its citizens, to research rampant crime and the world’s largest population of prison inmates, to record the antics and frivolities of the inordinately wealthy.2 Despite the growth of labor-force participation by new groups, including women; better access to higher education than at other times in American history; and transfers from the federal government, income and wealth inequality have worsened since 1983, particularly for the bottom 40 percent of the population.3 Members of one family, the heirs to the Walton fortune, had amassed $90 billion in wealth by 2012, the same as the bottom 30 percent of the U.S. population.4 As the Figure I.1 indicates, America’s poorest suffer under a much less progressive tax system than their European counterparts or than Americans in 1960 when payroll taxes, state and local sales taxes, the cap on taxation of incomes for Social Security, and the lower rate assessed on capital gains are all taken into consideration.

A 1974 plan to conduct intelligence testing of children in three Appalachian counties, to see whether mandatory sterilization of the unfit should be recommended, was never put into action due to lack of funds.59 Libertarian political scientist Charles Murray argued that the Great Society was a net negative, and that poverty rates were declining in the postwar period not because of anything the government did but rather because the economy was growing. According to Murray, while poverty rates fell from 33 percent in 1949 to 28 percent by 1952, to 22 percent under Eisenhower and 18 percent by 1964, by the 1970s the Great Society caused these improvements to halt. Murray also claimed that falling labor force participation and marriage rates among the poorest black and white workers were signs of cultural decay fueled by the availability of various forms of income support.60 Economists Martha Bailey and Nicholas Duquette argue that the War on Poverty failed because the programs were, in a sense, too purely targeted; federal funds were not used strategically to build support for Democrats, as had been the case during the New Deal.


The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Hardback) - Common by Alan Greenspan

"Robert Solow", addicted to oil, air freight, airline deregulation, Albert Einstein, asset-backed security, bank run, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business cycle, business process, buy and hold, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate raider, correlation coefficient, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, cuban missile crisis, currency peg, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, double entry bookkeeping, equity premium, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, market bubble, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, Nelson Mandela, new economy, North Sea oil, oil shock, open economy, Pearl River Delta, pets.com, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, random walk, reserve currency, Right to Buy, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, stocks for the long run, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, urban renewal, working-age population, Y2K, zero-sum game

By 1970, that proportion had doubled, and today those types of jobs account for about one-third of our workforce. An inevitable consequence, then, of the aging of America will be that more of our elderly population will have both the ability and the incentive to work later and later into old age. Workers in their sixties have accumulated many years of valuable experience, so extending labor force participation by just a few years could have a sizable impact on economic output. But there is no getting around it: almost all of the baby-boom generation will have retired by 2030. And their retirement will be unmatched in length by any previous generation. Will those "golden years" be truly golden? How will the more slowly growing U.S. workforce that will follow the baby boomers produce goods and services for themselves and their families as well as for a retired population whose size is without precedent?

The fact that a greater share of the dependents will be elderly rather than children will put an additional burden on society's resources, as the elderly, per capita, consume a relatively large share of resources, while children consume relatively little. 412 More ebooks visit: http://www.ccebook.cn ccebook-orginal english ebooks This file was collected by ccebook.cn form the internet, the author keeps the copyright. THE W O R L D RETIRES. BUT CAN I T A F F O R D TO? After receding for years, labor force participation among older Americans has edged somewhat higher recently owing to rising pressures on retirement incomes and a growing scarcity of experienced labor.* As I noted earlier, it will no doubt continue to rise. Nonetheless, the most effective way to boost future standards of living, and thereby accommodate the aspirations of both workers and retirees, is to increase the nation's saving and the productiveness of its uses.1" We need significant additional saving in the decades ahead if we are to finance the construction of capital facilities—for example, cutting-edge high-tech plant and equipment—that will produce the additional real resources to ensure that the promised retirement benefits for the baby boomers will be redeemable in real terms.

Our next step is to set the proportion of the total labor force that will likely be employed in 2030 (or in a contiguous year if 2030 happens to be a year of recession). Given our assumptions and the economy's historical record, it is difficult to imagine the employment rate of the civilian labor force being outside the rather narrow range of 90 to 96 percent (that is, an unemployment rate between 4 and 10 percent). America's fifty-year average is more than 94 percent, with nonrecession years (the assumption for 2030) near 95 percent. Combining labor force participation rates, population projections, a near 5 percent unemployment rate, and a stable workweek yields an annual growth rate in hours worked in the United States through 2030 of 0.5 percent.* The most encouraging aspect of productivity growth is how remarkably stable it has been for the last century and more. Over much of that period, a substantial boost in U.S. productivity reflected the shift of workers from farms to urban factories and service establishments. 1 But gains in national productivity owing to farmworkers moving into higher-productivity nonfarm jobs are essentially over.


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The Price of Everything: And the Hidden Logic of Value by Eduardo Porter

Alvin Roth, Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, clean water, Credit Default Swap, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Ford paid five dollars a day, full employment, George Akerlof, Gordon Gekko, guest worker program, happiness index / gross national happiness, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, Jean Tirole, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joshua Gans and Andrew Leigh, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, longitudinal study, loss aversion, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, means of production, Menlo Park, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, new economy, New Urbanism, peer-to-peer, pension reform, Peter Singer: altruism, pets.com, placebo effect, price discrimination, price stability, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, superstar cities, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, ultimatum game, unpaid internship, urban planning, Veblen good, women in the workforce, World Values Survey, Yom Kippur War, young professional, zero-sum game

The narrative of women’s march into the workplace in the United States is drawn from Betsey Stevenson, “Divorce Law and Women’s Labor Supply,” NBER Working Paper, September 2008; Claudia Goldin, “The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education and Family,” Ely Lecture, American Economic Association Annual Meeting, January 2006; Paul Douglas and Erika Schoenberg, “Studies in the Supply Curve of Labor: The Relation in 1929 Between Average Earnings in American Cities and the Proportions Seeking Employment,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 45, No. 1, February 1937, pp. 45-79; Jacob Mincer, “Labor Force Participation of Married Women: A Study of Labor Supply,” in H. Gregg Lewis, ed., Aspects of Labor Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 63-97. The description of Sandra Day O’Connor’s job search is in Kamil Dada, “Supreme Court Justice Pushes Public Service,” Stanford Daily, April 22, 2008. The impact of changes in the labor force on women’s bodies is drawn from Nigel Barber, “The Slender Ideal and Eating Disorders: An Interdisciplinary ‘Telescope’ Model,” International Journal of Eating Disorders, Vol. 23, 1998, pp. 295-307; Brett Silverstein, Lauren Perdue, Barbara Peterson, Linda Vogel, and Deborah A.

Data on increased marriage rates among college graduates come from Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson, “Marriage and Divorce, Changes and Their Driving Forces,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 27-52; and Adam Isen and Betsey Stevenson, “Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage, Divorce and Fertility,” NBER Working Paper, February 2010. Evidence of mothers’ recent change in attitudes toward work is found in Pew Research Center, “Fewer Mothers Prefer Full-time Work,” July 2007; and Sharon R. Cohany and Emy Sok, “Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants,” Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review, February 2007 (www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2abs.htm, accessed 08/08/2010). The data on American fertility are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm, accessed 07/18/2010). Data on growing numbers of forty-year-old mothers come from Claudia Goldin, personal communication. 101-104 The Cheapest Women: Indian men’s preference for women from the same caste is discussed in Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune, “Marry for What?


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The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming by David Wallace-Wells

"Robert Solow", agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, anthropic principle, Asian financial crisis, augmented reality, basic income, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, British Empire, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, carbon-based life, cognitive bias, computer age, correlation does not imply causation, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, decarbonisation, Donald Trump, effective altruism, Elon Musk, endowment effect, energy transition, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, failed state, fiat currency, global pandemic, global supply chain, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of agriculture, Joan Didion, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, labor-force participation, life extension, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, megacity, megastructure, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, nuclear winter, Pearl River Delta, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, postindustrial economy, quantitative easing, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Sam Altman, Silicon Valley, Skype, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, Steven Pinker, Stewart Brand, the built environment, the scientific method, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, universal basic income, University of East Anglia, Whole Earth Catalog, William Langewiesche, Y Combinator

Small-particulate pollution, for instance, lowers cognitive performance over time so much that researchers call the effect “huge”: reducing Chinese pollution to the EPA standard, for instance, would improve the country’s verbal test scores by 13 percent and its math scores by 8 percent. (Simple temperature rise has a robust and negative impact on test taking, too: scores go down when it’s hotter out.) Pollution has been linked with increased mental illness in children and the likelihood of dementia in adults. A higher pollution level in the year a baby is born has been shown to reduce earnings and labor force participation at age thirty, and the relationship of pollution to premature births and low birth weight of babies is so strong that the simple introduction of E-ZPass in American cities reduced both problems, in the vicinity of toll plazas, by 10.8 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively, just by cutting down on the exhaust expelled when cars slowed to pay the toll. Then there is the more familiar health threat from pollution.

., “Association Between Neighbourhood Air Pollution Concentrations and Dispensed Medication for Psychiatric Disorders in a Large Longitudinal Cohort of Swedish Children and Adolescents,” BMJ Open 6, no. 6 (June 2016), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2015-010004. likelihood of dementia in adults: Hong Chen et al., “Living near Major Roads and the Incidence of Dementia, Parkinson’s Disease, and Multiple Sclerosis: A Population-Based Cohort Study,” The Lancet 389, no. 10070 (February 2017), pp. 718–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)32399-6. reduce earnings and labor force participation: Adam Isen et al., “Every Breath You Take—Every Dollar You’ll Make: The Long-Term Consequences of the Clean Air Act of 1970” (National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 19858, September 2015), https://doi.org/10.3386/w19858. E-ZPass: Janet Currie and W. Reed Walker, “Traffic Congestion and Infant Health: Evidence from E-ZPass” (National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 15413, April 2012), https://doi.org/10.3386/w15413.


pages: 436 words: 98,538

The Upside of Inequality by Edward Conard

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, assortative mating, bank run, Berlin Wall, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, Climatic Research Unit, cloud computing, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, disruptive innovation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, future of work, Gini coefficient, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, informal economy, information asymmetry, intangible asset, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of the telephone, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, new economy, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, Paul Samuelson, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, randomized controlled trial, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, selection bias, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Snapchat, Steve Jobs, survivorship bias, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, total factor productivity, twin studies, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, University of East Anglia, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, zero-sum game

After comparing geographically distinct U.S. labor markets affected differently by trade, MIT labor economist David Autor concludes: Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize.27 It is an ominous finding, especially when the trade deficit simultaneously flooded the U.S. economy with offshore savings that businesses could have used to fund new investment.

“Growth in Means-Tested Programs and Tax Credits for Low-Income Households,” CBO Report, Congressional Budget Office, February 11, 2013, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43934#title0. 35. Carmen DeNavas-Walt and Bernadette D. Proctor, “Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014,” United States Census Bureau, September 2015, http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf. 36. “Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate,” Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed September 16, 2015, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000. 37. Robert Frank, “Darwin, the Market Whiz,” New York Times, September 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/business/darwin-the-market-whiz.html. Robert Frank, “The Invisible Hand Trumped by Darwin?” New York Times, July 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/business/economy/12view.html?


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Better, Stronger, Faster: The Myth of American Decline . . . And the Rise of a New Economy by Daniel Gross

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, asset-backed security, Bakken shale, banking crisis, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, Carmen Reinhart, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, commoditize, creative destruction, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, demand response, Donald Trump, Frederick Winslow Taylor, high net worth, housing crisis, hydraulic fracturing, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop - Herbert Stein's Law, illegal immigration, index fund, intangible asset, intermodal, inventory management, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, LNG terminal, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, Maui Hawaii, McMansion, money market fund, mortgage debt, Network effects, new economy, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, reserve currency, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, risk tolerance, risk/return, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, six sigma, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, superstar cities, the High Line, transit-oriented development, Wall-E, Yogi Berra, zero-sum game, Zipcar

If the other forty-nine states had been able to match this pace, the country would have created 6.5 million jobs in a year. North Dakota is one of the smallest states by population (about 670,000) and one of the largest geographically, with 70,000 square miles. It had 0.7 unemployed persons for every job opening, compared with 4.25 for the United States at large. In May 2011 the state jobs office had 15,205 listings, up 64 percent from May 2010. In the entire United States the labor force participation rate—the proportion of able-bodied adults between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five who are working or seeking work—was an anemic 64.2 percent. In North Dakota it stood at a high-octane 74 percent.1 But while its citizens are more hardy, friendly, and prone to using the word “shucks” and fishing for walleye than their fellow Americans, North Dakotans aren’t superhuman. Rather, the state enjoys some built-in advantages that have allowed it to prosper in the emerging global economy.

And they’re hard ones that, in many instances, don’t pay all that well. The positions Cavendish is trying to fill are shift work: three twelve-hour days on, followed by two days off, paying anywhere from $12 to $17 per hour. Across the state employers are casting their rods more deeply into the labor pool, and older and disabled workers are able to find opportunities in North Dakota that may be unavailable to them in other states. The labor force participation rate is 74 percent, compared with 62 percent in the country at large. Even at that rate, you can still get good, friendly service at Starbucks. And North Dakota, which exports so much food and energy, is dealing with its labor shortage by importing people. Oil field workers come from out of state for a few weeks at a time, and foreign students have been brought in for fast-food jobs as part of work-exchange programs sanctioned by the government.


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Tightrope: Americans Reaching for Hope by Nicholas D. Kristof, Sheryl Wudunn

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, basic income, Bernie Sanders, carried interest, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, David Brooks, Donald Trump, dumpster diving, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, epigenetics, full employment, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, impulse control, income inequality, Jeff Bezos, job automation, jobless men, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, mandatory minimum, Martin Wolf, mass incarceration, Mikhail Gorbachev, offshore financial centre, randomized controlled trial, rent control, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Shai Danziger, single-payer health, Steven Pinker, The Spirit Level, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, Vanguard fund, War on Poverty, working poor

For families living under the poverty level, childcare now consumes almost one-third of family income, and the United States hasn’t done nearly as well as other countries in providing childcare options. New York City mayor Bill de Blasio told us that he initially advocated universal pre-kindergarten solely to help the children but later realized that this granted a huge boon as well to working parents by providing high-quality childcare. One factor holding back the U.S. economy as a whole is that we have gone from a leader in female labor force participation in 1990 to a laggard (we now rank number 20 out of 22 rich countries), partly because other nations have developed better childcare options. It’s promising that support for early childhood education is bipartisan, with red states like Oklahoma among the leaders. 2. Universal high-school graduation. One child in seven doesn’t graduate from high school on time (including almost one-fourth of black students), and these dropouts rarely have much of a future.

Williamson, “Chaos in the Family, Chaos in the State: The White Working Class’s Dysfunction,” National Review, March 17, 2016. 3. WHEN JOBS DISAPPEAR a lifeline: The federal disability program is a lifeline for some but traps other people in perpetual poverty and makes it more difficult for them to return to the labor force when economic conditions or their own circumstances improve. After bottoming out in September 2015, labor force participation rates in the United States have risen, partly because some people who had been on disability returned to work, but they often lose benefits when they do. Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell has suggested that people on disability be allowed to work while losing fewer benefits. Another approach would be to give people a holiday so that they could return to the job market without losing disability payments for a certain number of years, or by allowing them to work more hours without facing a penalty.


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Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society by Eric Posner, E. Weyl

3D printing, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, anti-communist, augmented reality, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, business process, buy and hold, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, commoditize, Corn Laws, corporate governance, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, endowment effect, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ethereum, feminist movement, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, guest worker program, hydraulic fracturing, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, index fund, informal economy, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, Landlord’s Game, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Lyft, market bubble, market design, market friction, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, negative equity, Network effects, obamacare, offshore financial centre, open borders, Pareto efficiency, passive investing, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, performance metric, plutocrats, Plutocrats, pre–internet, random walk, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Rory Sutherland, Second Machine Age, second-price auction, self-driving car, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, spectrum auction, speech recognition, statistical model, stem cell, telepresence, Thales and the olive presses, Thales of Miletus, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Future of Employment, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, urban planning, Vanguard fund, women in the workforce, Zipcar

This aspect of sluggish economic growth has independent significance because unemployment and low wages cause social and political conflict. Unemployment and misemployment differ from country to country, depending on the treatment of the long-term unemployed. In Europe, unemployment rates have risen, while in the United States, prime-aged males are dropping out of the labor force. For example, the labor force participation rate of prime-aged US men fell from 96% in 1970 to 88% in 2015. In most countries in Europe, unemployment has risen from rates of 4% to 6% midcentury to a persistent 10% or higher rate.12 And it is not only labor that is underused in today’s economy. Recent research indicates that capital assets are misallocated across firms as well, in the sense that capital is not employed by the firms, sectors, or cities that could make most valuable use of it.13 This suggests that reallocating capital and employment from less productive entities to more productive ones could dramatically increase aggregate output.14 Together, the trends of rising inequality and stagnating growth mean that typical citizens in wealthy countries are no longer living much better than their parents did.

Paying people for their data might make them feel like more useful members of society. In recent years, economists have begun to wonder whether large segments of the population will be unable to find work in an economy that places the most value on technical work that requires advanced education. Recent research suggests that the rise of video gaming is an important cause of the decline in labor force participation among young men.50 Given current attitudes toward such activities, it seems plausible that such young men, some of them Internet trolls or bullies, may have a less than healthy relationship to the broader society. Most people derive a sense of self-worth from making a contribution to society. In a world where individual digital contributions were appropriately valued by society, many video gaming young men could convert their enjoyment of gaming into a productive skill.


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The Gated City (Kindle Single) by Ryan Avent

big-box store, carbon footprint, deindustrialization, edge city, Edward Glaeser, income inequality, industrial cluster, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, offshore financial centre, profit maximization, rent-seeking, Silicon Valley, Thorstein Veblen, transit-oriented development, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Veblen good, white picket fence, zero-sum game

Recent growth rates -- overall and per person -- slowed from their scorching postwar pace in the 1970s, then downshifted again from 2000. The decade that followed, the 2000s, was by some measures America's worst economic performance in a century. The income of the typical American has been stagnating for years. The top 1% of earners control a larger share of national income than at any time since the years immediately prior to the Great Depression. And even before the Great Recession, labor force participation rates for the American economy were falling. The American economy isn't running like it used to. And when it does run, a huge share of the American population doesn't share in the benefits. Something has changed. Something has gone wrong. But what? There's no shortage of potential explanations. Here are a few: - Worker bargaining power has declined. In this view, articulated most clearly by economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman, the great political shifts of the last 30 years changed the American growth model.


pages: 354 words: 105,322

The Road to Ruin: The Global Elites' Secret Plan for the Next Financial Crisis by James Rickards

"Robert Solow", Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, asset allocation, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bayesian statistics, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bitcoin, Black Swan, blockchain, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, butterfly effect, buy and hold, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, cellular automata, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, complexity theory, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, disintermediation, distributed ledger, diversification, diversified portfolio, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial repression, fixed income, Flash crash, floating exchange rates, forward guidance, Fractional reserve banking, G4S, George Akerlof, global reserve currency, high net worth, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, Isaac Newton, jitney, John Meriwether, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, large denomination, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money market fund, mutually assured destruction, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, nuclear winter, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, Peace of Westphalia, Pierre-Simon Laplace, plutocrats, Plutocrats, prediction markets, price anchoring, price stability, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, random walk, reserve currency, RFID, risk-adjusted returns, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, stocks for the long run, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, theory of mind, Thomas Bayes, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, too big to fail, transfer pricing, value at risk, Washington Consensus, Westphalian system

Elite neoliberal free traders are relaxed about U.S. job losses because their mind-set lets them imagine jobs being created elsewhere in the economy where the United States retains comparative advantage. The United States leads the world in higher education and high tech. Yet total jobs in both fields are paltry compared with lost manufacturing jobs in recent decades. Even if one accepts that there will be winners and losers in a global trading system, what happens when the number of winners is few, and the losers are many? The answer is lower labor force participation, lower productivity, stagnant wage gains, and greater income inequality—exactly what the United States has experienced since the 1990s ascent of NAFTA and the WTO. Even if jobs won and lost from trade are comparable in numbers (they’re not), all jobs are not created equal. Certain jobs persist yet go nowhere, and do not drive growth. A barista may have a steady job at decent wages, but that’s all.

America’s wealth is diverted to a few instead of shared among many. In pre-debate, I considered reciting the dismal litany of debt and deficits that undermine America’s future. It would have been easy to list CBO projections on U.S. debt-to-GDP ratios, the coming insolvency of Social Security, pathetic growth in the current recovery compared with robust recoveries from the 1950s to the 1990s, declining labor force participation, stagnant real wages, growing income inequality, and more. These trends are not more of the same as Joffe would have it. These trends are new and threatening. In the event, I took a different, more theoretical approach. I did not posit a long, slow decline. My warning was about instantaneous decline, what I refer to in this book as catastrophic collapse. This type of decline made Joffe’s and Zeihan’s cases irrelevant.


pages: 482 words: 117,962

Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future by Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron, Meera Balarajan

Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, conceptual framework, creative destruction, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, endogenous growth, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Gini coefficient, global pandemic, global supply chain, guest worker program, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Lao Tzu, life extension, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, Malacca Straits, mass immigration, microcredit, Nelson Mandela, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, old age dependency ratio, open borders, out of africa, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, Richard Florida, selection bias, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, spice trade, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, women in the workforce, working-age population

The research found that the longer the migrants stay in the UK and are able to occupy jobs in line with their educational qualifications, the more they contribute. The study concluded that “from the fiscal point of view, the immigration has not been at all a burden on the welfare system. Rather it has contributed to strengthen the fiscal position.” 46 The migrants most likely to generate fiscal burdens are those who are unemployed (i.e., not paying taxes) and drawing on social benefits. In general, labor force participation among foreign-born men actually exceeds that of the native born.47 Those who are more likely to be outside the workforce are women who have migrated through family channels or asylum seekers whose participation in the labor market is limited by law or due to trauma or language barriers. In the UK, levels of inactivity and unemployment vary dramatically from one expatriate group to the next, even if the overall fiscal impacts of migration are “minimal, or at least equal to the contributions made by migrants.”48 Eighty-five percent of Poles and Canadians are employed, whereas around 50 percent of migrants from Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh are employed—reflecting the cultural constraints on many female migrants from these countries.49 Furthermore, while about 1 percent of Poles and Filipinos in Britain claim income support, about 39 percent of Somali migrants (many of whom are refugees) do.50 Although their conclusion has been contested as reflecting a static view of migration, a UK House of Lords report noted that “the positive contribution of some immigrants is largely or wholly offset by negative contributions of others.”51 Paradoxically—given public concerns about the potential social burdens they bring—undocumented workers make significant contributions to the public purse.

See also Jews; Jews, historic migration influences Italy: as future migration policy example social impacts of modern migration Italy, historic migration influences: decolonization during mass migration era post-World War II economic boom, trade network development, between world wars Italy, modern regulatory channels: border control technologies economic policy approaches social categories Ivory Coast, economic impacts of modern migration Jamaica Japan: economic impact of modern migration in economic regulatory channel; future migration pressures, in migrant decision-making models Japan, historic migration influences: imperialistic commerce; indentured labor international restriction policies, during mass migration era Jaspers, Karl Jefferson, Thomas Jews: impacts of modern migration in social regulatory channel Jews, historic migration influences: civilization development, diaspora networks during mass migration era refugee policies restrictive policies trade network development Johnson, Albert Johnson, Simon Johnson-Lodge Act Johnson-Reed Immigration Act Johnston, Richard Jordan Kangani system Kazakhstan, in economic regulatory channel, Keeley, Charles Kenya Kerr, William Kindleberger, Charles knowledge development/culture sharing: agricultural communities, civilization developments in closed borders scenario early humans with exploration activity from global trade networks, with war and conquest. See also innovation benefits, modern migration Korea See also South Korea Koslowski, Rey Kuznetsov, Yevgeny labor coercion: human trafficking indenture contracts slavery labor force participation. See economic impacts of modern migration; high-skilled category; low-skilled category Lahav, Gallya languages Laos Latin America. See specific countries Latvia Laughlin, Harry League of Nations Lebanon legal framework objective, future migration policy legal perspectives, free movement . See also managed migration era, policies; regulatory channels, modern migration Levitt, Peggy Liberia, historic migration influences Libya, border control technologies life expectancy Lincoln, William literacy tests Lithuania Losch, Bruno low-skilled category: economic impact in economic regulatory channel future demand for integration objective risk factors Luxembourg Luzhokov, Yuri macro-level analysis, migration decision-making Malawi Malaysia: in economic regulatory channel, future migration pressures in migrant decision-making model Malaysia, historic migration influences: exploration activity indentured labor, during mass migration era; trade network development Maldives, climate change pressures Malta managed migration era, policies: ethnic/ race-based approaches identification documents nationalism pressures overview Manchuria Manning, Patrick Marrus, Michael Marshall, T.


pages: 399 words: 116,828

When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor by William Julius Wilson

affirmative action, business cycle, citizen journalism, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deliberate practice, desegregation, Donald Trump, edge city, ending welfare as we know it, fixed income, full employment, George Gilder, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, informal economy, jobless men, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, mass immigration, new economy, New Urbanism, pink-collar, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, school choice, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban renewal, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

The wage gap between low-skilled men and women shrank not because of gains made by female workers but mainly because of the decline in real wages for men. The unemployment rates among low-skilled women are slightly lower than those among their male counterparts. However, over the past decade their rates of participation in the labor force have stagnated and have fallen further behind the labor-force-participation rates among more highly educated women, which continue to rise. The unemployment rates among both low-skilled men and women are five times that among their college-educated counterparts. Among the factors that have contributed to the growing gap in employment and wages between low-skilled and college-educated workers is the increased internationalization of the U.S. economy. As the economists Richard B.

Indeed, Lemann, in an otherwise perceptive article, went so far as to suggest that “every aspect of the underclass culture in the ghetto is directly traceable to roots in the South.” Yet systematic research on poverty and urban migration, including three major studies since 1975, consistently shows that southern-born blacks who have migrated to the North have lower unemployment rates, higher labor-force-participation rates, and lower welfare rates than northern blacks. Kaus refers to the Dash articles when stating that teenage girls in the inner-city ghetto “are often ridiculed by other girls if they remain virgins too long into their teens.” Kaus argues that “once AFDC benefits reach a certain threshold that allow poor single mothers to survive, the culture of the underclass can start growing as women have babies for all the various nonwelfare reasons they have them.”


pages: 147 words: 45,890

Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future by Robert B. Reich

Berlin Wall, business cycle, declining real wages, delayed gratification, Doha Development Round, endowment effect, full employment, George Akerlof, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, job automation, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, mortgage debt, new economy, offshore financial centre, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, sovereign wealth fund, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, World Values Survey

.: Economic Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 220–24. 6 More than half of all the money: See Lawrence Bebchuk, “The Growth of Executive Pay,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21, no. 2 (2005): 283–303. 7 By 2007, financial and insurance companies: See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables, Section I: Domestic Product and Incomes, “Real Gross Value Added by Industry,” 2009. 8 In 2009, the twenty-five best-paid hedge-fund managers: See AR: Absolute Return + Alpha, annual survey, 2009. 9 in 2007, Ford’s financial division: Securities and Exchange Commission Filings. 10 according to presidential candidate Ronald Reagan: Ronald Reagan campaign address, “A Vital Economy: Jobs, Growth, and Progress for Americans,” October 24, 1980. 11 Moreover, they had no clear memory: See Technology Triumphs, Morality Falters, Section 5: “America’s Collective Memory,” the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, January 3, 1999. 8. HOW AMERICANS KEPT BUYING ANYWAY: THE THREE COPING MECHANISMS 1 Coping mechanism #1: See U.S. Department of Labor Women’s Bureau, “Labor Force Participation of Women and Mothers,” Historical Data Tables, October 9, 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2009/ted_20091009.htm). 2 Coping mechanism #2: See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008 American Time Use Survey, “Working and Work Related Activities Tables,” 2008 (http://www.bls.gov/tus/current/work.htm). 3 Coping mechanism #3: See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 2.1, “Personal Income and Its Distribution,” January 29, 2010 (http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?


pages: 466 words: 127,728

The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System by James Rickards

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, bitcoin, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business climate, business cycle, buy and hold, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, complexity theory, computer age, credit crunch, currency peg, David Graeber, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, diversification, Edward Snowden, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, fixed income, Flash crash, floating exchange rates, forward guidance, G4S, George Akerlof, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, invisible hand, jitney, John Meriwether, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, Lao Tzu, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market bubble, market clearing, market design, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mutually assured destruction, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, reserve currency, risk-adjusted returns, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, Satoshi Nakamoto, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, Stuxnet, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trade route, undersea cable, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, working-age population, yield curve

Dynamic processes such as economic growth are subject to abrupt changes, for better or worse, based on the utilization or exhaustion of factors of production. This was pointed out in a classic 1994 article by Princeton professor Paul Krugman called “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” This article was widely criticized upon publication for predicting a slowdown in Chinese growth, but it has proved prophetic. Krugman began with the basic point that growth in any economy is the result of increases in labor force participation and productivity. If an economy has a stagnant labor force operating at a constant level of productivity, it will have constant output but no growth. The main drivers of labor force expansion are demographics and education, while the main drivers of productivity are capital and technology. Without those factor inputs, an economy cannot expand. But when those factor inputs are available in abundance, rapid growth is well within reach.

Within a few years the working age population will reach a historical peak, and will then begin a precipitous decline. The core of this working age population, those aged 20–39 years, has already begun to shrink. With this, the vast supply of low-cost workers—a core engine of China’s growth model—will dissipate, with potentially far-reaching implications domestically and externally. Importantly, when labor force participation levels off, technology is the only driver of growth. The United States also faces demographic headwinds due to declining birth rates, but it is still able to expand the labor force 1.5 percent per year, partly through immigration, and it retains the potential to grow even faster through its technological prowess. In contrast, China has not proved adept at inventing new technologies despite its success at stealing existing ones.


pages: 455 words: 133,719

Overwhelmed: Work, Love, and Play When No One Has the Time by Brigid Schulte

8-hour work day, affirmative action, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, blue-collar work, Burning Man, business cycle, call centre, cognitive dissonance, David Brooks, deliberate practice, desegregation, DevOps, East Village, Edward Glaeser, epigenetics, fear of failure, feminist movement, financial independence, game design, gender pay gap, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, hiring and firing, income inequality, job satisfaction, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, meta analysis, meta-analysis, new economy, profit maximization, Results Only Work Environment, Richard Feynman, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, sensible shoes, sexual politics, Silicon Valley, Skype, Steve Jobs, Thorstein Veblen, women in the workforce, working poor, Zipcar, éminence grise

Italy: Carla Power, “Staying Home with Mamma,” Newsweek, August 13, 2000, www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2000/08/13/staying-home-with-mamma.html; Japan and South Korea: Veerle Miranda, “Cooking, Caring and Volunteering: Unpaid Work Around the World,” OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Papers, No. 116 (OECD Publishing, 2011), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/cooking-caring-and-volunteering-unpaid-work-around-the-world_5kghrjm8s142-en, 13. 32. Mario S. Floro and Hitomi Komatsu, “Labor Force Participation, Gender and Work in South Africa: What Can Time Use Data Reveal?” Journal of Feminist Economics 17, Issue 4, November 3, 2011, www.american.edu/cas/economics/pdf/upload/2011-2.pdf. The “onerous share” of domestic work, the researchers argue, “influences not only women’s availability for labor market work, but also their ability to seek employment, to take up learning, and/or to socialize outside the family.”

Census Bureau, “Married Couple Family Groups, by Labor Force Status of Both Spouses, and Race and Hispanic Origin of the Reference Person: 2012,” table FG1, www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/cps2012/tabFG1-all.xls. 15. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, “Families with Own Children: Employment Status of Parents by Age of Youngest Child and Family Type, 2011–2012 Annual Averages,” April 26, 2013, www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t04.htm. 16. Sharon R. Cohany and Emy Sok, “Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants,” Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review, February 2007, www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf. See Chart 1. 17. Schor, Overworked American, 114. 18. “Gender and Global Differences in Work-Life Effectiveness” (paper presented at the Families and Work Institute/SHRM Work-Life Focus: 2012 and Beyond conference, Washington, D.C., November 8–10, 2011).


pages: 515 words: 132,295

Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business by Rana Foroohar

accounting loophole / creative accounting, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, additive manufacturing, Airbnb, algorithmic trading, Alvin Roth, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, bank run, Basel III, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, buy and hold, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, centralized clearinghouse, clean water, collateralized debt obligation, commoditize, computerized trading, corporate governance, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, David Graeber, deskilling, Detroit bankruptcy, diversification, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, Emanuel Derman, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Akerlof, gig economy, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, High speed trading, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, Howard Rheingold, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index fund, information asymmetry, interest rate derivative, interest rate swap, Internet of things, invisible hand, John Markoff, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market design, Martin Wolf, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, passive investing, Paul Samuelson, pensions crisis, Ponzi scheme, principal–agent problem, quantitative easing, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Rana Plaza, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Satyajit Das, Second Machine Age, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Snapchat, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, technology bubble, The Chicago School, the new new thing, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Vanguard fund, zero-sum game

The figure is for companies that appeared in the S&P 500 index in February 2015 and that had been publicly listed between 2005 and 2014. See William Lazonick, “Cash Distributions to Shareholders (2005–2014) & Corporate Executive Pay (2006–2014), Research Update #2,” Academic-Industry Research Network, August 2015. 3. Ted Berg, Office of Financial Research, “Quicksilver Markets,” March 2015. 4. Labor force participation rate hovered at 62.4 percent in September 2015, below the 1978 level of 62.8 percent. See US Department of Labor, “Economic News Release: Employment Situation Summary,” October 2, 2015; US Department of Labor, “Labor Force Participation Rate,” Statistics from Population Surveys, BLS Data Viewer, online at http://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery. See also Irene Tung, Paul K. Sonn, and Yannet Lathrop, National Employment Law Project, “The Growing Movement for $15,” November 4, 2015. 5. Carl C. Icahn, “Sale: Apple Shares at Half Price” (an open letter to Tim Cook), carlicahn.com, October 9, 2014; William Lazonick, Mariana Mazzucato, and Oner Tulum, “Apple’s Changing Business Model: What Should the World’s Richest Company Do with All Those Profits?”


Off the Books by Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh

business climate, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, new economy, refrigerator car, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, urban renewal, working poor, Y2K

They are vagabonds who move through short periods of homelessness, squatting, and temporary stays in rental units.2 They are also laboring nomads. James and his peers work in short stints. They do not focus on long-term employment, but instead pursue short-term opportunities to gain income, whether legal or illegal. Because they do not look for work at employment and job-training centers, they do not show up in conventional measures of unemployment and labor force participation. Finally, their physical movements span fairly limited geographic areas. Those in Maquis Park rarely leave the city's Southside, and most are recognizable figures—the exceptions being the small migratory population that travels regionally to find seasonal and temporary work in the steel mills, minor league baseball stadiums, and agricultural farms and plants. All street hustlers interact to varying degrees with city agencies, most notably the police but also the local elected officials who tolerate their commerce, sanitation workers who permit them to sift through collected trash, and Chicago Parks and Recreation employees who look past their makeshift shelters.

Much of the reason for lending to one another, hiring off the books, and solving crimes without the aid of the police is that banks discriminate against the poor, mainstream employers and unions do not do effective outreach to the poor and minorities, and law enforcement does not provide adequate service to the inner city. On the other hand, however meaningful and satisfactory it may be for those involved, this kind of adjustment does little over time to bring about improvement in credit availability, labor force participation, and policing. It does little to leverage more stable and productive relationships with the institutions of the wider world.4 There are many reasons why this partly adaptive, partly efficacious behavior does not lead to social integration in the mainstream through improved relationships with institutional actors. For people in ghetto communities, living underground largely means creating ties of dependency to other actors who are equally hard up.


pages: 809 words: 237,921

The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty by Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, AltaVista, Andrei Shleifer, bank run, Berlin Wall, British Empire, California gold rush, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Computer Numeric Control, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, Dava Sobel, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Ferguson, Missouri, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, invention of movable type, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, Kula ring, labor-force participation, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, mass incarceration, Maui Hawaii, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, obamacare, openstreetmap, out of africa, PageRank, pattern recognition, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Skype, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, the market place, transcontinental railway, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks

Judges allowed their guardian to speak on their behalf. But what happens when women are abused by their guardians or husbands? One ranking of gender parity by the World Economic Forum puts Saudi Arabia 141 out of 149 countries (the United Arab Emirates, despite its gender equality awards we saw in the Preface, ranks only a little above Saudi Arabia, 121). This ranking combines many things; one is labor force participation, which stands at just 22 percent in Saudi Arabia compared to 56 percent in the United States. The guardianship system and systematic discrimination against women have been consistently upheld by religious authorities. In the 1990s when the Grand Ulama was asked to make a ruling about the appropriateness of a woman’s delaying marriage to finish her university education, it issued a fatwa decreeing that for a woman to progress through university education, which is something we have no need for, is an issue that needs examination.

Male paramedics: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/02/06/Death-of-Saudi-female-student-raises-uproar.html. A nice summary of restrictions on women in Saudi Arabia is on CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/middleeast/saudi-women-still-cant-do-this/index.html. “For a woman,” “God Almighty,” and “deficient reasoning and rationality” from Human Rights Watch (2016); see also Human Rights Watch (2008). Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2018) on men’s attitudes to female labor force participation in Saudi Arabia. On the issue of women driving, see https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html. “A grief-stricken Saddam” quoted from Mortimer (1990). Saddam “the banner of jihad and faith” quoted from Baram (2014, 207–208). Platteau (2017) has an incisive analysis of the relationship between Saddam and religion; see also Baram (2014), Helfont (2014), and Dawisha (2009).

Buringh, Eltjo, and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2009). “Charting the ‘Rise of the West’: Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe, A Long-Term Perspective from the Sixth Through Eighteenth Centuries.” Journal of Economic History 69, no. 2: 409–45. Buruma, Ian (2003). Inventing Japan: 1853–1964. New York: Modern Library. Bursztyn, Leonardo, Alessandra González, and David Yanagizawa-Drott (2018). “Misperceived Social Norms: Female Labor Force Participation in Saudi Arabia.” http://home.uchicago.edu/bursztyn/Misperceived_Norms_2018_06_20.pdf. Byrhtferth of Ramsey (2009). “Vita S. Oswaldi.” In Byrhtferth of Ramsey: The Lives of St. Oswald and St. Ecgwine, edited by Michael Lapidge. New York: Oxford University Press. Çağaptay, Soner (2017). The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey. New York: I.B. Tauris. Camic, Charles, Philip S.


pages: 190 words: 53,409

Success and Luck: Good Fortune and the Myth of Meritocracy by Robert H. Frank

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Amazon Mechanical Turk, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, attribution theory, availability heuristic, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, deliberate practice, en.wikipedia.org, endowment effect, experimental subject, framing effect, full employment, hindsight bias, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop - Herbert Stein's Law, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, lake wobegon effect, loss aversion, minimum wage unemployment, Network effects, Paul Samuelson, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, Richard Thaler, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, Rory Sutherland, selection bias, side project, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, ultimatum game, Vincenzo Peruggia: Mona Lisa, winner-take-all economy

Recent trends in the distributions of income represent a substantial departure from those observed during the first three decades after WWII, when pretax incomes in America grew at roughly the same rate—slightly less than 3 percent a year—for households up and down the income ladder. Since the late 1960s, this pattern has changed. The inflation-adjusted median hourly wage for American men is actually lower now than it was then. Real median household incomes grew by roughly 19 percent between 1967 and 2012, primarily because of large increases in female labor force participation. Only those in the top quintile, whose incomes have roughly doubled since the mid-1970s, have escaped the income slowdown. Similar, if less dramatic, changes have been observed in most other countries. The income growth picture is much the same within each subgroup of the population as for the population as a whole. For example, those at the bottom of the top quintile have seen little real income growth, the lion’s share of which has been concentrated among top earners in the group.


Firefighting by Ben S. Bernanke, Timothy F. Geithner, Henry M. Paulson, Jr.

Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, Basel III, break the buck, Build a better mousetrap, business cycle, Carmen Reinhart, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, Doomsday Book, financial deregulation, financial innovation, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, light touch regulation, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, negative equity, Northern Rock, pets.com, price stability, quantitative easing, regulatory arbitrage, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, savings glut, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, too big to fail

ANTECEDENTS Because the growth of productivity and the labor force had slowed in the decade before the crisis, the potential economic growth rate was falling. Growth in real potential GDP Sources: Congressional Budget Office, “An Update to the Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028”; authors’ calculations ANTECEDENTS Overall prime-age participation in the labor force had been falling, as the participation of women slowed and men’s continued a decades-long decline. Civilian labor force participation rates for people ages 25–54, indexed to January 1990=100 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics ANTECEDENTS Income growth for the top 1 percent had risen sharply, driving income inequality to levels not seen since the 1920s. Cumulative growth in average income since 1979, before transfers and taxes, by income group Source: Congressional Budget Office, “The Distribution of Household Income, 2014” ANTECEDENTS Meanwhile, the financial system was becoming increasingly fragile.


pages: 585 words: 151,239

Capitalism in America: A History by Adrian Wooldridge, Alan Greenspan

"Robert Solow", 2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, air freight, Airbnb, airline deregulation, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, Asian financial crisis, bank run, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, business process, California gold rush, Charles Lindbergh, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, credit crunch, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, edge city, Elon Musk, equal pay for equal work, Everybody Ought to Be Rich, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, full employment, George Gilder, germ theory of disease, global supply chain, hiring and firing, income per capita, indoor plumbing, informal economy, interchangeable parts, invention of the telegraph, invention of the telephone, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, jimmy wales, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kitchen Debate, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Mason jar, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage debt, Myron Scholes, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, refrigerator car, reserve currency, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, savings glut, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, strikebreaker, supply-chain management, The Great Moderation, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade route, transcontinental railway, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, urban sprawl, Vannevar Bush, War on Poverty, washing machines reduced drudgery, Washington Consensus, white flight, wikimedia commons, William Shockley: the traitorous eight, women in the workforce, Works Progress Administration, Yom Kippur War, young professional

Quite simply, I do not see highly educated women making startling strides in contributing to our society in the foreseeable future. They are not, in my opinion, going to stop getting married and/or having children. They will fail in their present role as women if they do.”13 Yet these long entrenched attitudes changed with remarkable speed. With the waning of the baby boom in the mid-1960s, women started entering the labor force in growing numbers. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) of “prime age” females (those twenty-five to fifty-four years of age) increased from 44.5 percent in 1964, to 69.6 percent in 1985, to 76.8 percent in 1999. With numbers came quality: women quickly moved up the professional scale and earned higher salaries. The percentage of annual median female wages to male wages jumped from 58 percent in 1975, to 71.6 percent in 1990, to 77.4 percent in 2010, and is continuing to go up, if not as fast as women would like.

., 240, 279–80, 302–3, 363 Kennedy, Joseph, 221 Kensho, 403 Kerkorian, Kirk, 286–87 kerosene, 49, 102–3 Keynes, John Maynard, 174, 218, 227, 229, 279, 294 Keynesianism, 275, 285, 302–3, 309 Kipling, Rudyard, 168–69 Kirkman, Marshall, 137 Kissinger, Henry, 309 Klamer, Arjo, 389, 392 Kleiner, Morris, 414 KnIT (Knowledge Integration Toolkit), 402–3 “knowledge worker,” 281, 360 Koch, Robert, 430 Koch Industries, 391 Kohlberg, Jerome, 341 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), 341 Kohrs, Conrad, 115 Kravis, Henry, 341 Kroc, Ray, 293, 390, 443 Kromer, Tom, 224 Kubrick, Stanley, 350 Ku Klux Klan, 89 Kuznets, Simon, 13, 236, 438, 451 labor force participation rate (LFPR), 364 labor strikes, 160, 173–74, 193, 193, 250, 261, 289, 314–15, 327–28 labor unions. See trade unions La Follette, Robert, 245 laissez-faire, 25–26, 163–65, 196, 241 capitalism vs., 165–71 cult of government, 176–79 Lamont, Thomas, 230, 231, 238 Lamoreaux, Naomi, 144, 431–32 Landon, Alf, 248 land surveying, 58 Laski, Harold, 190 Latrobe, Benjamin, 138 Lawrence, William, 163 League of Nations, 232 Lease, Mary Elizabeth, 172 Lebergott, Stanley, 431 Lehman, Henry, Emanuel, and Mayer, 79 Lehman, Herbert, 373–74 Lehman Brothers, 341, 373–74, 378, 381, 385, 444–45 Lenin, Vladimir, 241, 306 leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 340–41 Levi Strauss & Co., 291 Levitt, William and Alfred, 291–92 Levittown, 291–92, 296 Lewis, John L., 261 Lewis, Michael, 338 Lewis, Sinclair, 205–6 Lewis and Clark Expedition, 67 Liberty ships, 269–70 Licence Raj, 376, 414 Licklider, J.


pages: 850 words: 254,117

Basic Economics by Thomas Sowell

affirmative action, air freight, airline deregulation, American Legislative Exchange Council, bank run, barriers to entry, big-box store, British Empire, business cycle, clean water, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, cross-subsidies, David Brooks, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, diversified portfolio, European colonialism, fixed income, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, housing crisis, income inequality, income per capita, index fund, informal economy, inventory management, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, Just-in-time delivery, Kenneth Arrow, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, late fees, low cost airline, low cost carrier, low skilled workers, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, payday loans, price discrimination, price stability, profit motive, quantitative easing, Ralph Nader, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, surplus humans, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, transcontinental railway, Vanguard fund, War on Poverty

Unemployability, like shortages and surpluses, is not independent of price. In a free market, low-productivity workers are just as employable at a low wage rate as high-productivity workers are at a high wage rate. During the long era from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, when black Americans received lower quantities and lower qualities of education than whites in the South where most lived, the labor force participation rates of black workers were nevertheless slightly higher than those of white workers.{367} For most of that era, there were no minimum wage laws to price them out of jobs and, even after a nationwide minimum wage law was passed in 1938, the wartime inflation of the 1940s raised wages in the free market above the legally prescribed minimum wage level, making the law largely irrelevant by the late 1940s.

Indeed, minimum wage laws were once advocated explicitly because of the likelihood that such laws would reduce or eliminate the competition of particular minorities, whether they were Japanese in Canada during the 1920s or blacks in the United States{375} and South Africa during the same era. Such expressions of overt racial discrimination were both legal and socially accepted in all three countries at that time. The history of black workers in the United States illustrates the point. As already noted, from the late nineteenth-century on through the middle of the twentieth century, the labor force participation rate of black Americans was slightly higher than that of white Americans. In other words, blacks were just as employable at the wages they received as whites were at their very different wages. The minimum wage law changed that. Before federal minimum wage laws were instituted in the 1930s, the black unemployment rate was slightly lower than the white unemployment rate in 1930.{376} But, then followed the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938—all of which imposed government-mandated minimum wages, either on a particular sector or more broadly.

Since such people are no longer counted as being in the labor force, their exodus will reduce the unemployment rate, even if the proportion of people without jobs has not been reduced at all. In the wake of the downturn of the American economy in the early twenty-first century, the unemployment rate rose to just over 10 percent. Then the unemployment rate began to decline—as more and more people stopped looking for jobs, and thus dropped out of the labor force. The labor force participation rate declined to levels not seen in decades. Although some saw the declining unemployment rate as an indication of the success of government policies, much of that decline represented people who had simply given up looking for jobs, and subsisted on resources provided by various government programs. For example, more than 3.7 million workers went on Social Security disability payments from the middle of 2009 to early 2013, “the fastest enrollment pace ever,” according to Investor’s Business Daily.{382} Rather than relying solely on the unemployment rate, an alternative way of measuring unemployment is to compare what percentage of the adult population outside of institutions (colleges, the military, hospitals, prisons, etc.) are working.


pages: 226 words: 59,080

Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science by Dani Rodrik

airline deregulation, Albert Einstein, bank run, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, business cycle, butterfly effect, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, distributed generation, Donald Davies, Edward Glaeser, endogenous growth, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Everything should be made as simple as possible, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, fudge factor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loss aversion, low skilled workers, market design, market fundamentalism, minimum wage unemployment, oil shock, open economy, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, quantitative easing, randomized controlled trial, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, school vouchers, South Sea Bubble, spectrum auction, The Market for Lemons, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, ultimatum game, University of East Anglia, unorthodox policies, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, white flight

Kranton Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Alberto Alesina and George-Marios Angeletos, “Fairness and Redistribution,” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 960–80; Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (2001): 187–254; Raquel Fernandez, “Cultural Change as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century,” American Economic Review 103, no. 1 (2013): 472–500; Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, “Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth” (unpublished paper, Princeton University, December 2013). 4. Neil Gandal et al., “Personal Value Priorities of Economists,” Human Relations 58, no. 10 (October 2005): 1227–52; Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, “Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists?”


pages: 221 words: 55,901

The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon

Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, Pareto efficiency, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus

I have already discussed the way in which economic development can create more inequality before bringing it back down as the modern high-­productivity sector expands and the traditional low-­income sector shrinks. There are also the effects of changing demographics: declining birth rates can improve the standard of living of the poorest members of the population; a rise in the number of single-­parent households or an increase in female labor force participation can substantially modify the distribution of household monetary standards of living in opposite directions; and by pairing people of comparable potential incomes together, a rise in endogamy may contribute to a rise in inequality. The reason that I have not emphasized these dynamics is that they seem relatively independent of globalization and are more The Forces behind R ising Inequality 115 country-­specific than those forces that could potentially affect national inequality levels in general.


pages: 526 words: 160,601

A Generation of Sociopaths: How the Baby Boomers Betrayed America by Bruce Cannon Gibney

1960s counterculture, 2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, business cycle, buy and hold, carbon footprint, Charles Lindbergh, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate personhood, Corrections Corporation of America, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, dark matter, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, ending welfare as we know it, equal pay for equal work, failed state, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, gender pay gap, gig economy, Haight Ashbury, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, impulse control, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Kitchen Debate, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, mass immigration, mass incarceration, McMansion, medical bankruptcy, Menlo Park, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, neoliberal agenda, Network effects, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shock, operation paperclip, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, rent control, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Rubik’s Cube, school choice, secular stagnation, self-driving car, shareholder value, short selling, side project, Silicon Valley, smart grid, Snapchat, source of truth, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, survivorship bias, TaskRabbit, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, War on Poverty, white picket fence, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce, Y2K, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Part of this is natural: Households should be wealthier as they get older, but the striking thing is how the dynamics of old vs. young mirror the much more politically prominent dynamic of rich vs. middle class.12 The Many Flavors of Unemployment The recovery since 2008 has been one of the weakest and slowest recorded, so fragile and with so much risk of reversal that it hardly seems a recovery at all, notwithstanding the perky jobs reports the Obama administration routinely issued. We have already seen that the official unemployment rate, which hovered around 5 percent in Obama’s last year, has been driven in part by declining labor force participation. The official unemployment rate is called “U-3,” and measures total unemployed, but counts only those without jobs who are still looking for work—not the permanently discouraged or the underemployed, two categories of increasing importance in the recent and iffy recovery.*,13 Broader measures of unemployment offer a less heartening picture, one that squares more easily with the rage of certain populists (the Trumpenproletariat and unreconstructed Bernie fanatics, e.g.).

The problem will get worse given that Boomers will be selling their homes roughly simultaneously, to say nothing of the negative effects of higher mortgage rates or property tax reforms, should those ever come to pass. By facilitating reverse mortgages, the government has again used the credit of younger taxpayers to subsidize the elderly. * The data on women is less robust due to their lower labor force participation in earlier decades; it has been rising, but they still retire slightly earlier than men (62 versus 64 in 2011) and, being longer lived, their retirements are even more extended. * Especially if there are gaps between discount rates and cost-of-living adjustments. * The S&P’s annualized returns, assuming all dividends were reinvested, were under 5 percent from 2000 to 2015, and for much of 2000 to 2010, they were actually negative.


pages: 245 words: 64,288

Robots Will Steal Your Job, But That's OK: How to Survive the Economic Collapse and Be Happy by Pistono, Federico

3D printing, Albert Einstein, autonomous vehicles, bioinformatics, Buckminster Fuller, cloud computing, computer vision, correlation does not imply causation, en.wikipedia.org, epigenetics, Erik Brynjolfsson, Firefox, future of work, George Santayana, global village, Google Chrome, happiness index / gross national happiness, hedonic treadmill, illegal immigration, income inequality, information retrieval, Internet of things, invention of the printing press, jimmy wales, job automation, John Markoff, Kevin Kelly, Khan Academy, Kickstarter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Lao Tzu, Law of Accelerating Returns, life extension, Loebner Prize, longitudinal study, means of production, Narrative Science, natural language processing, new economy, Occupy movement, patent troll, pattern recognition, peak oil, post scarcity, QR code, race to the bottom, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, RFID, Rodney Brooks, selection bias, self-driving car, slashdot, smart cities, software as a service, software is eating the world, speech recognition, Steven Pinker, strong AI, technological singularity, Turing test, Vernor Vinge, women in the workforce

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/private-sector-up-government-down/ 4 Jobs Deficit, Investment Deficit, Fiscal Deficit, Laura D’Andrea Tyson, 2011. The New York Times. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/jobs-deficit-investment-deficit-fiscal-deficit/ 5 The Employment Situation, 2012. Bureau Of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 6 Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate. Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000 7 Race Against The Machine: How the Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, 2011. Digital Frontier Press. http://raceagainstthemachine.com 8 The End of Work Website, Jeremy Rifkin. http://www.foet.org/books/end-work.html 9 The End of Work, Wikipedia.


pages: 222 words: 70,132

Move Fast and Break Things: How Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy by Jonathan Taplin

1960s counterculture, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, American Legislative Exchange Council, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, basic income, battle of ideas, big data - Walmart - Pop Tarts, bitcoin, Brewster Kahle, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, Clayton Christensen, commoditize, creative destruction, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, data is the new oil, David Brooks, David Graeber, don't be evil, Donald Trump, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, Dynabook, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, equal pay for equal work, Erik Brynjolfsson, future of journalism, future of work, George Akerlof, George Gilder, Google bus, Hacker Ethic, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, information asymmetry, information retrieval, Internet Archive, Internet of things, invisible hand, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, labor-force participation, life extension, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, Menlo Park, Metcalfe’s law, Mother of all demos, move fast and break things, move fast and break things, natural language processing, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, offshore financial centre, packet switching, Paul Graham, paypal mafia, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, rent-seeking, revision control, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Metcalfe, Ronald Reagan, Ross Ulbricht, Sam Altman, Sand Hill Road, secular stagnation, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, smart grid, Snapchat, software is eating the world, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, The Chicago School, The Market for Lemons, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Tim Cook: Apple, trade route, transfer pricing, Travis Kalanick, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, unpaid internship, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, web application, Whole Earth Catalog, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, Y Combinator

Graeber notes, “Huge swaths of people, in Europe and North America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they believe to be unnecessary. The moral and spiritual damage that comes from this situation is profound. It is a scar across our collective soul. Yet virtually no one talks about it.” This is not a world any of us wants to live in, let alone work in. Already in the United States we know that the labor-force participation rate for men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four who have only a high school diploma is at historic lows as this chart demonstrates. The only way out of this crisis—to realize Andreessen’s vision of six billion people dabbling in art, science, and culture—is to have some version of a universal basic income (UBI), free health care, and a deep reduction in the length of the workday.


pages: 232 words: 70,361

The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay by Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, business cycle, Cass Sunstein, collective bargaining, corporate governance, Donald Trump, financial deregulation, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, intangible asset, Jeff Bezos, labor-force participation, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shock, patent troll, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, Skype, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, uber lyft, very high income, We are the 99%

Complete details at taxjusticenow.org. Although it is difficult to quantify the economic effects of a healthier and more educated workforce, the evidence suggests that the effect on growth would be positive. Freed of the risk of losing their employer-provided health insurance, more people might start businesses. More college graduates would boost productivity. Universal child care would increase women’s labor force participation. In turn, higher incomes would increase tax collection, eventually reducing the government deficit. If a 6% national income tax was used to fund health care, here is how it would work. A rate of 4.5% would be enough to fund standard health insurance covering all medical needs for all workers who currently pay contributions through their employers. It would also allow the extension of Affordable Care Act exchange subsidies to all participants regardless of their family income.


pages: 270 words: 71,659

The Right Side of History by Ben Shapiro

Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Filter Bubble, illegal immigration, income inequality, Internet Archive, Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, means of production, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, white picket fence, women in the workforce

CHAPTER 9: THE RETURN TO PAGANISM 1.Voltaire, “Jeannot and Colin,” in The Oxford Magazine, volume I (1768), 190 2.Frank Newport, “Five Key Findings on Religion in the US,” Gallup.com, December 23, 2016, http://news.gallup.com/poll/200186/five-key-findings-religion.aspx. 3.Thomas E. Woods Jr., “Race, Inequality, and the Market,” FEE.org, October 1, 2002, https://fee.org/articles/race-inequality-and-the-market/. 4.“Changes in Women’s Labor Force Participation in the 20th Century,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 16, 2000, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2000/feb/wk3/art03.htm. 5.Donald M. Fisk, “American Labor in the 20th Century,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 30, 2003, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20th-century.pdf. 6.Fred Siegel, The Revolt against the Masses (New York: Encounter Books, 2013), 112–13. 7.Giuseppe Fiori, Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), 103. 8.Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 2002), 207. 9.Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 135. 10.


pages: 283 words: 73,093

Social Democratic America by Lane Kenworthy

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, basic income, business cycle, Celtic Tiger, centre right, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, David Brooks, desegregation, Edward Glaeser, endogenous growth, full employment, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, Home mortgage interest deduction, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, Kenneth Arrow, labor-force participation, manufacturing employment, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, new economy, postindustrial economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, school choice, shareholder value, sharing economy, Skype, Steve Jobs, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, universal basic income, War on Poverty, working poor, zero day

By 1970, 99 percent of Americans had a television, up from just 32 percent in 1940. In music, the “album” originated in the late 1940s, and rock ‘n’ roll began in the 1950s. Other innovations that made life easier or more pleasurable include photocopiers, disposable diapers, and the bikini. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed gender and race discrimination in public places, education, and employment. For women, life changed in myriad ways. Female labor force participation rose from 30 percent in 1940 to 49 percent in 1970. Norms inhibiting divorce relaxed in the 1960s. The pill was introduced in 1960. Abortion was legalized in the early 1970s. Access to college increased massively in the mid-1960s. Comparing these changes in quality of life is difficult, but I see no reason to conclude that the pace of advance, or of innovation, has been more rapid in recent decades than before.66 Yes, there have been significant improvements in quality of life in the United States since the 1970s.


pages: 277 words: 80,703

Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle by Silvia Federici

Community Supported Agriculture, declining real wages, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, financial independence, fixed income, global village, illegal immigration, informal economy, invisible hand, labor-force participation, land tenure, mass incarceration, means of production, microcredit, neoliberal agenda, new economy, Occupy movement, planetary scale, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, the market place, trade liberalization, UNCLOS, wages for housework, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

Food and Agriculture Association, Gender and Agriculture, http://www.fao.org/Gender/agrib4-e.htm. 4. The social and economic impact of colonialism varied greatly, depending (in part) on the duration of direct colonial control. We may even interpret the present differences in women’s participation in subsistence and cash-crop agriculture as a measure of the extent of colonial appropriation of land. Using the UN-ILO labor force participation statistics, and remembering the measurement problem concerning subsistence farming, we see that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest percentage of the female labor force in agriculture (75 percent); while in Southern Asia it is 55 percent; South-East Asia, 42 percent; and East Asia, 35 percent. By contrast, South and Central America have low women’s participation rates in agriculture similar to those found in “developed” regions like Europe between 7 and 10 percent.


pages: 232

Planet of Slums by Mike Davis

barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, centre right, clean water, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, failed state, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet Archive, jitney, jobless men, Kibera, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, liberation theology, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, megacity, microcredit, Nelson Mandela, New Urbanism, Pearl River Delta, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent control, structural adjustment programs, surplus humans, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor

Africa and most of Latin, America (Mexico's northern border cities excepted), this option did not exist. Instead, deindustrialization and the decimation of male formal-sector jobs, often followed by male emigration, compelled women to improvise new livelihoods as piece-workers, liquor sellers, street vendors, lottery ticket sellers, hairdressers, sewing operators, cleaners, washers, ragpickers, nannies, and prostitutes. In a region where urban women's labor-force participation had always been lower than in other continents, the surge of Latin American women into tertiary informal activities during the 1980s was especially dramatic. In her detailed study of "adjustment from below," social anthropologist Caroline Moser describes the impact of eight successive SAPs between 1982 and 1988 on a formerly upwardly mobile shantytown on the swampy edge of Guayaquil. Although open unemployment doubled in Ecuador, the major impact of the 1980s crisis was an explosion of underemployment estimated at fully half the workforce in both Guayaquil and Quito.


pages: 231 words: 76,283

Work Optional: Retire Early the Non-Penny-Pinching Way by Tanja Hester

"side hustle", Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, anti-work, asset allocation, barriers to entry, buy and hold, crowdsourcing, diversification, estate planning, financial independence, full employment, gig economy, hedonic treadmill, high net worth, index fund, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, medical bankruptcy, mortgage debt, obamacare, passive income, post-work, remote working, rent control, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, stocks for the long run, Vanguard fund

Retirement itself has only existed since the late 1800s, and even then, very few people actually retired. For most of human history, people have worked until they died, though that work looked almost nothing like the always-reachable, can’t-get-everything-done work of today. Even in the 21st century, with more economic prosperity than ever before and more people retiring than ever before, many people don’t quit working when they retire. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor force participation for adults aged 65 to 74 is increasing and will hit 32% by 2022, and 11% for those 75 and older.1 Some of those workers are people who never retired, but many more are folks working “second acts,” jobs that are often part-time and that may feel fun or purposeful. Many other retirees are redefining the term by focusing on volunteering and service, giving their retirements meaning but spending their time in ways that look an awful lot like work.


The Rise of Carry: The Dangerous Consequences of Volatility Suppression and the New Financial Order of Decaying Growth and Recurring Crisis by Tim Lee, Jamie Lee, Kevin Coldiron

active measures, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, backtesting, bank run, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, cryptocurrency, debt deflation, distributed ledger, diversification, financial intermediation, Flash crash, global reserve currency, implied volatility, income inequality, inflation targeting, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, Lyft, margin call, market bubble, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, negative equity, Network effects, Ponzi scheme, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, risk/return, sharing economy, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, yield curve

In 2015, with the Fed having kept the funds rate at close to zero for more than six years, financial commentary and debate was obsessed with the timing of an expected Fed rate increase. Many market participants questioned why interest rates were still at zero given that the financial crisis was long since over—in their opinion. On the other side of the debate, others argued that the US inflation rate was still low and labor force participation levels still weak, so there was no rush to raise interest rates. This type of discussion continues to be couched in the context of a traditional monetary framework; higher short-term interest rates would slow credit demand (and money supply growth), except to the extent that the economy was picking up, and would put downward pressure on inflation unless the economy was strong enough. So in 2015 the question in economists’ minds revolved around whether economic growth was strong and sustainable enough to merit an interest rate increase.


Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism by Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Cass Sunstein, centre right, cognitive dissonance, conceptual framework, declining real wages, desegregation, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, job automation, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, liberal world order, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, mass immigration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, obamacare, open borders, open economy, post-industrial society, post-materialism, precariat, purchasing power parity, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, sexual politics, Silicon Valley, statistical model, stem cell, War on Poverty, white flight, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, working-age population, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

A wealth of research in sociology, public opinion, and gender studies has documented birth-cohort-linked change in sex role attitudes, in the US and Europe.13 These studies report that a gender gap can be observed among the more egalitarian younger generations, with women’s views shifting further and faster than men’s, due in part to women’s experience of rising educational levels (see Figure 2.4), growing labor force participation, the ideological impact of the second-­wave women’s movement, and declining religiosity and marriage rates. Finally, racial, national, and ethnic identities also predict values. Authoritarian-­ populist rhetoric is closely associated with rejection of the ‘Other,’ directed toward diverse targets – thus heightening racism, Islamophobia, misogyny, homophobia, anti-­Semitism, and ethnocentrism.

This argument gains support from American evidence showing widening political–geographic divisions between the Republican heartland and the Democratic coastal cities. Thus, in the 2016 election, the Part II Authoritarian-Populist Values 161 white rural counties in key Mid-­West states such as Pennsylvania and Michigan swung disproportionately toward Trump, while the Democrats performed better in large metropolitan areas and surrounding suburbs.77 Socio-­economic indicators – poverty levels, median earnings, labor force participation, longevity, and unemployment rates – are generally worse in American counties dependent upon farming, mining, and manufacturing than in urban areas.78 Trump also strongly outperformed the Romney vote in counties with severe social and economic problems, including substance abuse, alcoholism, and suicide rates, exemplified by the scourge of soaring white opioid addiction and its devastating effects on local communities.79 Trump performed best in places where the economy was at its worst, beating Clinton in counties with slower job growth and lower wages, and far outperforming her in counties where jobs were most threatened by automation or offshoring.


pages: 285 words: 81,743

Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle by Dan Senor, Saul Singer

"Robert Solow", agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, Boycotts of Israel, call centre, Celtic Tiger, cleantech, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, friendly fire, immigration reform, labor-force participation, mass immigration, new economy, pez dispenser, post scarcity, profit motive, Silicon Valley, smart grid, social graph, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Ballmer, web application, women in the workforce, Yom Kippur War

They see it as in their interest as much as anyone else’s,” she said.9 Yet because of the high birth rates in both the haredi and the Arab sectors, efforts to increase workforce participation in these sectors are racing against the demographic clock. According to Israel 2028, the report issued by an official blue-ribbon commission, the haredi and Arab sectors are projected to increase from 29 percent of Israel’s total population in 2007 to 39 percent by 2028. Without dramatic changes in workforce patterns, this shift will reduce labor-force participation rates even further. “The existing trends are working in stark opposition to the desired development,” the report warns.10 As he was campaigning to return to the premiership, Bibi Netanyahu made getting Israel to number among the top ten largest (per capita) economies in the world a centerpiece of his agenda. An independent think tank, the Reut Institute, has been pursuing a similar campaign called Israel 15.


pages: 309 words: 86,909

The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger by Richard Wilkinson, Kate Pickett

basic income, Berlin Wall, clean water, Diane Coyle, epigenetics, experimental economics, experimental subject, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, germ theory of disease, Gini coefficient, God and Mammon, impulse control, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, longitudinal study, Louis Pasteur, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Milgram experiment, moral panic, offshore financial centre, phenotype, plutocrats, Plutocrats, profit maximization, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, statistical model, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, ultimatum game, upwardly mobile, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007. 352. S. Bowles and Y. Park, ‘Emulation, inequality, and work hours: was Thorsten Veblen right?’ Economic Journal (2005) 115: F397–F412. 353. D. Neumark and A. Postlethwaite, ‘Relative income concerns and the rise in married women’s employment’, Journal of Public Economics (1998) 70: 157–83. 354. Y. Park, Veblen Effects on Labor Supply: Male earnings inequality increases women’s labor force participation. New London, CT: Department of Economics, Connecticut College, 2004. 355. S. J. Solnick and D. Hemenway, ‘Is more always better? A survey on positional concerns’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (1998) 37: 373–83. 356. T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 357. Planet Ark, The Recycling Olympic Report. Sydney: Planet Ark Environmental Foundation, 2004. 358.


pages: 284 words: 85,643

What's the Matter with White People by Joan Walsh

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, banking crisis, clean water, collective bargaining, David Brooks, desegregation, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, full employment, global village, Golden Gate Park, hiring and firing, impulse control, income inequality, invisible hand, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, mass immigration, new economy, obamacare, Occupy movement, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, upwardly mobile, urban decay, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, white flight, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

In eight years, under the Bush supply side experiment, the United States saw a series of historic economic lows and, overall, the slowest overall rate of economic growth since World War II. Although wages for certain groups, such as working-class men, had declined since the seventies, household income had mostly held steady, mainly because women surged into the workplace, and most “households” now had two earners. Under Bush, household income declined, too, for the first time since the Census Bureau tracked that data in 1967. Labor force participation had reached an all-time high in 2000 but dropped steadily under Bush; relatedly, the economy created fewer jobs than at any time since World War II. Unemployment jumped from 3.9 percent when Clinton left office to 7.2 percent at the end of 2008. Clinton left Bush a $236 billion budget surplus; Bush would leave his successor saddled with a $1.2 trillion deficit. Dick Cheney, of course, famously declared that “Reagan showed deficits don’t matter” (although he should have added, “unless there’s a Democrat in the White House”).


pages: 299 words: 83,854

Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy by Howard Karger

big-box store, blue-collar work, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, delayed gratification, financial deregulation, fixed income, illegal immigration, labor-force participation, late fees, London Interbank Offered Rate, low skilled workers, microcredit, mortgage debt, negative equity, New Journalism, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, payday loans, predatory finance, race to the bottom, Silicon Valley, Telecommunications Act of 1996, telemarketer, underbanked, working poor

Indeed, it’s no coincidence that 60% of payday lending customers are women.1924 Providing for the needs of the poor is like the game of hot potatoes. Government discharges the responsibility for the poor to the labor market through compulsory TANF work requirements, while the private sector employs them in low-wage jobs without benefits. The hot potato is then passed back to government, which institutes the benefit portions of labor-force participation—CHIPS for children; Medicaid; and EITC and CTC, for supplementing low wages. In the end, taxpayers continue to subsidize the poor, indirectly. In that sense, the major beneficiaries of welfare reform are not the poor or American taxpayers, but low-wage employers who can hire cheap hourly workers without the responsibility of providing anything beyond a weekly paycheck. In large measure, this represents the adoption of Third World labor standards into the American context.


pages: 362 words: 83,464

The New Class Conflict by Joel Kotkin

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, Bob Noyce, California gold rush, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, creative destruction, crony capitalism, David Graeber, deindustrialization, don't be evil, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, energy security, falling living standards, future of work, Gini coefficient, Google bus, housing crisis, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Markoff, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, mass affluent, McJob, McMansion, medical bankruptcy, Nate Silver, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Buchheit, payday loans, Peter Calthorpe, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, rent-seeking, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, Richard Florida, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Steve Jobs, technoutopianism, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban sprawl, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, young professional

Melanie Hicken, “Many Middle-Class Americans Plan to Work until They Die,” CNN Money, October 23, 2013, http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/23/retirement/middle-class-retirement. 10. Catherine Rampell, “More Young Americans Out of High School Are Also Out of Work,” New York Times, June 6, 2012. 11. Spencer Jakab, “Help Wanted: A Better Jobs Gauge for the Fed,” Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2014; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “Labor Force Participation Projected to Fall for People under Age 55 and Rise for Older Age Groups,” January 6, 2014, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140106.htm. 12. Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Liz Alerman, “Young and Educated in Europe, but Desperate for Jobs,” New York Times, November 16, 2013. 13. Neil Howe, “‘Dear Graduating Class of 2012: You Are So Not Special,’” The Saeculum Decoded, June 20, 2012, http://blog.lifecourse.com/2012/06/dear-graduating-class-of-2012-you-are-so-not-special. 14.


pages: 324 words: 86,056

The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality by Bhaskar Sunkara

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Bernie Sanders, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, Charles Lindbergh, collective bargaining, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Donald Trump, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, Ferguson, Missouri, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gig economy, Gunnar Myrdal, happiness index / gross national happiness, Honoré de Balzac, income inequality, inventory management, labor-force participation, land reform, land value tax, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Neil Kinnock, new economy, Occupy movement, postindustrial economy, precariat, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, telemarketer, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, urban renewal, We are the 99%

Beyond such legislation, “equal pay for equal work” and industry-level bargaining that favored the lowest-paid sectors disproportionately helped women. Still, as late as 1966, two-thirds of Swedish women stayed at home. A popular 1961 pamphlet pointed out that now women had the right to compete with men in the labor market but also had to maintain their household duties, making it difficult to do both in practice.24 Amid debate over this question, the state took steps to facilitate women’s labor force participation. An advisory council on sexual equality working directly with the prime minister’s office was created to generate policy that encouraged “free development” for women and challenged traditional gender roles. Palme committed himself wholeheartedly to the effort, writing in a thoughtful essay called “The Emancipation of Man” that women’s struggle for equality meant taking on the “pressure of thousand years old traditions.”


pages: 403 words: 87,035

The New Geography of Jobs by Enrico Moretti

assortative mating, Bill Gates: Altair 8800, business climate, call centre, cleantech, cloud computing, corporate raider, creative destruction, desegregation, Edward Glaeser, financial innovation, global village, hiring and firing, income inequality, industrial cluster, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, medical residency, Menlo Park, new economy, peer-to-peer lending, Peter Thiel, Productivity paradox, Richard Florida, Sand Hill Road, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, Startup school, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, thinkpad, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Wall-E, Y Combinator, zero-sum game

Cities like Providence and Buffalo have manufacturing sectors that are heavily skewed toward traditional, low-value-added productions similar to those of China, and they have experienced large negative effects from the increased competition. By contrast, cities like Washington, D.C., and Houston are engaged in very different kinds of manufacturing and have experienced much smaller effects. In cities that directly compete with China, imports were found to cause rising local unemployment, decreased labor-force participation, and lower local wages. Interestingly, not all of these costs are borne by the workers directly displaced: a part of the cost is borne by other Americans in the form of government aid. The study finds that imports from China increased the use of welfare payments such as unemployment insurance, food stamps, and even disability insurance, which is often used as a hidden form of welfare. In essence, while the direct effect of trade was highly localized, the ultimate costs were at least in part shouldered by taxpayers in the rest of the country through federally funded programs.


pages: 312 words: 84,421

This Chair Rocks: A Manifiesto Against Ageism by Ashton Applewhite

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, Atul Gawande, Buckminster Fuller, clean water, cognitive dissonance, crowdsourcing, desegregation, Downton Abbey, fixed income, follow your passion, ghettoisation, Google Hangouts, hiring and firing, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, invention of the printing press, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, life extension, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, Naomi Klein, obamacare, old age dependency ratio, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, sensible shoes, Silicon Valley, Skype, smart cities, Snapchat, stem cell, the built environment, urban decay, urban planning, white picket fence, women in the workforce

Describing “a new stage of human history,” Linda Fried, Dean of Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, referred to “the only natural resource that’s actually increasing: the social capital of millions more healthy, well-educated adults.” A growing body of knowledge from very different schools of thought—including the Rand Corporation and Chicago, Belfast, Harvard, and Yale Universities—now acknowledges that health, along with the longevity it brings, are important economic drivers that generate wealth, by affecting health care costs, labor-force participation rates (given the appropriate incentives), worker productivity, and the financing of pension systems.9 Yet there’s more hand-wringing than back-patting going on A little less worried about the tug of time on your own prospects? It’s no time to relax! Journalist Paul Kleyman’s witty coinage—”global wrinkling”—evokes both the scale of this massive demographic shift and the free-floating anxiety that accompanies it.


pages: 287 words: 82,576

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream by Tyler Cowen

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Alvin Roth, assortative mating, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, business climate, business cycle, circulation of elites, clean water, David Graeber, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, drone strike, East Village, Elon Musk, Ferguson, Missouri, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gig economy, Google Glasses, Hyman Minsky, Hyperloop, income inequality, intangible asset, Internet of things, inventory management, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, medical residency, meta analysis, meta-analysis, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, purchasing power parity, Richard Florida, security theater, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Skype, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, Stuxnet, The Great Moderation, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, total factor productivity, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, Vilfredo Pareto, working-age population, World Values Survey

Graif, Corina. “(Un)natural Disaster; Vulnerability, Long-Distance Displacement, and the Extended Geography of Neighborhood Distress and Attainment after Katrina.” Population and Environment (August 2015): 1–31. Greenwood, Jeremy, Nezih Guner, Georgi Kocharkov, and Cezar Santos. “Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 8, no. 1 (December 2015): 1–41. Grönqvist, Erik, Jonas Vlachos, and Björn Öckert. “The Intergenerational Transmission of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive abilities.” IFAU—Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation working paper, 2010. Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson, “After the ‘Master Theory’: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis.”


pages: 398 words: 86,855

Bad Data Handbook by Q. Ethan McCallum

Amazon Mechanical Turk, asset allocation, barriers to entry, Benoit Mandelbrot, business intelligence, cellular automata, chief data officer, Chuck Templeton: OpenTable:, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, combinatorial explosion, commoditize, conceptual framework, database schema, DevOps, en.wikipedia.org, Firefox, Flash crash, Gini coefficient, illegal immigration, iterative process, labor-force participation, loose coupling, natural language processing, Netflix Prize, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, recommendation engine, selection bias, sentiment analysis, statistical model, supply-chain management, survivorship bias, text mining, too big to fail, web application

The comparisons researchers can make between survey and administrative data, which are becoming more widely available (at least in the field of economics), allow researchers to look at people’s behavior in ways that were not available in the past. But those advances have also led to new questions about the accuracy of survey data and the results researchers can reach from models based on that data. I’ve tried to show you a number of things to be aware of in your data. I typically work with economic data, which contains information on earnings, labor force participation, and other similar behaviors, but the strategies extend to any survey. Methods that firms or institutions use to produce data from surveys—such as imputations, topcoding, and proxy reporting—should always be documented, and as the researcher, you should always be aware of those methods and then decide how they might affect your results. Similarly, respondents may simply make an error in answering the survey, but it is your job to try to determine—or at least to understand—whether those errors impart bias to your results or are simply a hazard of using the best information you have at your disposal.


pages: 288 words: 92,175

Rise of the Rocket Girls: The Women Who Propelled Us, From Missiles to the Moon to Mars by Nathalia Holt

Bill Gates: Altair 8800, British Empire, computer age, cuban missile crisis, desegregation, financial independence, Grace Hopper, Isaac Newton, labor-force participation, low earth orbit, Mars Rover, music of the spheres, new economy, operation paperclip, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman: Challenger O-ring, Steve Jobs, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, women in the workforce, Works Progress Administration, Yogi Berra

Cargill Hall, Project Ranger: A Chronology (Pasadena, CA: JPL/California Institute of Technology, 1971). The thrilling 1960 World Series is chronicled in Michael Shapiro, Bottom of the Ninth: Branch Rickey, Casey Stengel, and the Daring Scheme to Save Baseball from Itself (New York: Henry Holt, 2010). In 1960, 25 percent of married mothers with children under the age of eighteen entered the workforce, as reported in Sharon R. Cohany and Emy Sok, “Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants,” Monthly Labor Review, February 2007. Birth control became available in 1960 in the United States, as described in James Reed, The Birth Control Movement and American Society: From Private Vice to Public Virtue (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). A history of FORTRAN, along with descriptions of how early keypunch computers worked and the IBM 1620, can be found in Paul E.


pages: 372 words: 92,477

The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State by John Micklethwait, Adrian Wooldridge

Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, banking crisis, barriers to entry, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, cashless society, central bank independence, Chelsea Manning, circulation of elites, Clayton Christensen, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, Detroit bankruptcy, disintermediation, Edward Snowden, Etonian, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, Khan Academy, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, liberal capitalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, mobile money, Mont Pelerin Society, Nelson Mandela, night-watchman state, Norman Macrae, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, old age dependency ratio, open economy, Parag Khanna, Peace of Westphalia, pension reform, pensions crisis, personalized medicine, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, profit maximization, rent control, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school choice, school vouchers, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, too big to fail, total factor productivity, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working-age population, zero-sum game

Not all these innovations work: A fat tax, which was supposed to “nudge” people into leading healthier lives, had to be withdrawn. But like the Swedes (and the Singaporeans), the Danes are experimenting—attempting to preserve what is best about their welfare state while trying new ways of delivering services. So far the experiment seems to be working remarkably well. The Nordics dominate indices of social inclusion as well as competitiveness and well-being. They have exceptionally high rates of female labor-force participation and the world’s highest rates of social mobility.1 They continue to pride themselves on the generosity of their welfare states. About 30 percent of their labor force works in the public sector, twice the average in the OECD. They continue to believe in combining open economies with public investment in human capital. But the new Nordic model begins with serving the individual rather than ­expanding the state.


pages: 312 words: 91,835

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization by Branko Milanovic

"Robert Solow", Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, means of production, mittelstand, moral hazard, Nash equilibrium, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, Paul Samuelson, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, post-industrial society, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, Second Machine Age, seigniorage, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, special economic zone, stakhanovite, trade route, transfer pricing, very high income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

It is paradoxical that increasing inequality has resulted from a change in social norms that has seen the labor participation rate of women almost catch up with that of men (73 percent for women, 84 percent for men in 2010) and has encouraged marriages that are based on a model of equal partnership between people with similarities of interests and backgrounds rather than a hierarchical model where the husband is the breadwinner and the wife a homemaker. This trend may continue in the future, as the gap in both educational achievement and labor force participation between men and women disappears. It will, however socially desirable in some ways, add to interpersonal income inequality.26 Finally, we come to the fifth element that makes the reversal of inequality in the United State particularly difficult: the growing importance of money in electoral politics. No political campaign can nowadays be run without huge amounts of money. The 2012 US presidential elections are estimated to have cost $2.6 billion.27 While the amounts spent in state and local elections are smaller, money is no less indispensable for winning, or even participating.


Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution by Wendy Brown

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, corporate governance, credit crunch, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, Food sovereignty, haute couture, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, late capitalism, means of production, new economy, obamacare, occupational segregation, Philip Mirowski, Ronald Reagan, sexual politics, shareholder value, sharing economy, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck, young professional, zero-sum game

The volume setting out the general parameters of the argument is Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). 71. See, for example, this argument by Becker: “The responsibility of married women for childcare and other housework has major implications for earnings and occupational differences between men and women, even aside from the effect on the labor force participation of married women. I submit that this is an important reason why the earnings of married women typically are considerably below those of married men, and why substantial occupational segregation persists.” Becker, A Treatise on the Family, p. 78. 72. Some have argued that gender stratification is reduced by neoliberalism, insofar as it involves a shift from an economy based on private property economy to an economy based on human capital.


pages: 318 words: 93,502

The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Parents Are Going Broke by Elizabeth Warren, Amelia Warren Tyagi

activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, business climate, Columbine, declining real wages, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, financial independence, labor-force participation, late fees, McMansion, mortgage debt, new economy, New Journalism, payday loans, school choice, school vouchers, telemarketer, urban sprawl, women in the workforce

Department of Labor, “Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2000,” August 2001, Table 13. 3 Unemployment Insurance Fact Sheet, Department of Labor. Available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp. 4 There have been conflicting studies of what sociologists call “the added worker effect,” that is, the magnitude and direction of changes in workforce participation of wives of unemployed men. For example, some researchers have examined whether a wife’s labor force participation increases in the same year of or in the year immediately following the husband’s unemployment, and found no significant effect. See, for example, Tim Maloney, “Unobserved Variables and the Elusive Added Worker Effect,” Economica 58 (May 1991): 173-187; see also W. Jean Yeung and Sandra L. Hofferth, “Family Adaptations to Income and Job Loss in the U.S.,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues 19 (Fall 1998): 255-283.


pages: 321 words: 92,828

Late Bloomers: The Power of Patience in a World Obsessed With Early Achievement by Rich Karlgaard

Airbnb, Albert Einstein, Amazon Web Services, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, Bernie Madoff, Bob Noyce, Brownian motion, Captain Sullenberger Hudson, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, deliberate practice, Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, experimental economics, fear of failure, financial independence, follow your passion, Frederick Winslow Taylor, hiring and firing, Internet of things, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Moneyball by Michael Lewis explains big data, move fast and break things, move fast and break things, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, Sand Hill Road, science of happiness, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Snapchat, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, theory of mind, Tim Cook: Apple, Toyota Production System, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce, working poor

And according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, age is cited in 26 percent of total complaints in California, 22 percent in New York, 21 percent in Texas, and 37 percent in Illinois, which has the highest ratio of age-related complaints. At first glance, older workers wouldn’t seem to have it all that bad in today’s economy. The unemployment rate among workers over fifty-five hovered around 4 percent in 2018, and labor force participation among older workers has been rising since the early 1990s. But the headline statistics obscure a bleaker situation: Older workers who do lose a job spend more time out of work. And when they do find another job, it tends to pay less than the one they left. A 2015 AARP study highlights the challenges of long-term unemployment still facing many older workers. Extended unemployment, coupled with age discrimination, can add to the challenges older workers face in finding a job.


pages: 289 words: 99,936

Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age by Virginia Eubanks

affirmative action, Berlin Wall, call centre, cognitive dissonance, creative destruction, desegregation, Fall of the Berlin Wall, future of work, game design, global village, index card, informal economy, invisible hand, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, microcredit, new economy, post-industrial society, race to the bottom, rent control, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, South of Market, San Francisco, telemarketer, Thomas L Friedman, trickle-down economics, union organizing, urban planning, web application, white flight, women in the workforce, working poor

As Guy Standing argues, “The era of flexibility is . . . an era of more generalized insecurity and precariousness, in which many more men as well as women have been pushed into precarious forms of labor” (Standing 1999, 583). Rather than illustrating women “catching up” to men in the region’s high-tech workforce, the data suggest that work in the region is being feminized, both in the sense that a larger share of employment is going to women and in the sense that employment itself has shifted to have characteristics associated with women’s labor force participation: lower pay, contingent and temporary work arrangements, and little or no job training (ibid.).20 Generalized imputations of “women’s economic interests” and “men’s economic interests,” which underlie prescriptions to fill the high-tech pipeline with marginalized people or empower women to break into the boys’ club of science and technology, overlook the feminization of work and obscure and marginalize important differences among women by race.


pages: 347 words: 97,721

Only Humans Need Apply: Winners and Losers in the Age of Smart Machines by Thomas H. Davenport, Julia Kirby

AI winter, Andy Kessler, artificial general intelligence, asset allocation, Automated Insights, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, business intelligence, business process, call centre, carbon-based life, Clayton Christensen, clockwork universe, commoditize, conceptual framework, dark matter, David Brooks, deliberate practice, deskilling, digital map, disruptive innovation, Douglas Engelbart, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, estate planning, fixed income, follow your passion, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, Freestyle chess, game design, general-purpose programming language, global pandemic, Google Glasses, Hans Lippershey, haute cuisine, income inequality, index fund, industrial robot, information retrieval, intermodal, Internet of things, inventory management, Isaac Newton, job automation, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joi Ito, Khan Academy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, lifelogging, longitudinal study, loss aversion, Mark Zuckerberg, Narrative Science, natural language processing, Norbert Wiener, nuclear winter, pattern recognition, performance metric, Peter Thiel, precariat, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Rodney Brooks, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, six sigma, Skype, social intelligence, speech recognition, spinning jenny, statistical model, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, strong AI, superintelligent machines, supply-chain management, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, Works Progress Administration, Zipcar

Income inequality is a growing concern in an economy that has fewer good jobs to allocate. There is already evidence that the big payoffs in today’s economy are going not to the bulk of knowledge workers, but to a small segment of “superstars”—CEOs, hedge fund and private equity managers, investment bankers, and so forth—almost all of whom are very well leveraged by automated decision-making. Meanwhile, labor force participation rates in developed economies steadily fall. Silicon Valley investor Bill Davidow and tech journalist Mike Malone, writing recently for Harvard Business Review, declared that “we will soon be looking at hordes of citizens of zero economic value.”6 They say figuring out how to deal with the impacts of this development will be the greatest challenge facing free market economies in this century.


pages: 361 words: 97,787

The Curse of Cash by Kenneth S Rogoff

Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, blockchain, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, cashless society, central bank independence, cryptocurrency, debt deflation, disruptive innovation, distributed ledger, Edward Snowden, Ethereum, ethereum blockchain, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial exclusion, financial intermediation, financial repression, forward guidance, frictionless, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, illegal immigration, inflation targeting, informal economy, interest rate swap, Isaac Newton, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johannes Kepler, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, large denomination, liquidity trap, money market fund, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, moveable type in China, New Economic Geography, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, payday loans, price stability, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, RFID, savings glut, secular stagnation, seigniorage, The Great Moderation, the payments system, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, transaction costs, unbanked and underbanked, unconventional monetary instruments, underbanked, unorthodox policies, Y2K, yield curve

Definitions also differ across studies of the underground economy, for example, whether or not it includes all criminal activity or just tax and regulatory evasion. One influential methododology15 has been developed by Austrian professor Friedrich Schneider, a pioneer in efforts to measure the underground economy. Schneider’s empirical approach forms estimates based on a variety of monetary and labor market indicators, including the labor force participation rate, tax rates, the quality of public service delivery, and other indicators. Figure 5.1 shows the results. It is important to note that the particular definition of underground economy underlying these estimates is a narrow one that does not include illegal or nonmarket activities. Rather, the measure aims to capture all (otherwise) legal market-based production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from authorities to avoid income, sales, or value-added taxes; social security contributions; certain labor standards like minimum wage or maximum working hours; certain administrative inconveniences; or any combination of these.16 Under this narrower definition of underground economy that does not include many types of illegal activities, the United States and Switzerland are estimated to have among the smallest underground economies, at 7.1% and 7.9% of GDP, respectively.


The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us by Robert H. Frank, Philip J. Cook

accounting loophole / creative accounting, air freight, Alvin Roth, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, business cycle, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, delayed gratification, global village, haute couture, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, Marshall McLuhan, medical malpractice, Network effects, positional goods, prisoner's dilemma, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, school choice, Shoshana Zuboff, Stephen Hawking, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, winner-take-all economy

All this came to an end with the Arab oil embargo of 1974. Since then, wages and salaries have generally lagged behind inflation, espe­ cially for males of average skills and education. So accustomed had most of us become to steadily rising living standards that it remains something of a shock to realize that the all-time peak in the average wage rate occurred more than two decades ago. Since then the in­ crease in labor force participation by women has mitigated the loss in male earnings, but despite this, median family income has grown little since the early 1970s. Yet while members of the middle class have struggled to hold their own, the rich have grown considerably richer. The increasing polariza­ tion of household incomes is a trend every bit as troubling as the lack of growth in the middle. Economist Paul Krugman has estimated that the top 1 percent of households claimed 70 percent of overall growth in personal income between 1977 and 1989. 1 By the end of the Rea­ gan presidency, this elite had average income nearly twenty times as large as that of the median household.2 These trends in household income are largely the result of corre­ sponding movements in wages and salaries, which constitute roughly 70 percent of personal income.


pages: 358 words: 106,729

Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy by Raghuram Rajan

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, assortative mating, bank run, barriers to entry, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, business climate, business cycle, Clayton Christensen, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, diversification, Edward Glaeser, financial innovation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, full employment, global supply chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, illegal immigration, implied volatility, income inequality, index fund, interest rate swap, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, Long Term Capital Management, longitudinal study, market bubble, Martin Wolf, medical malpractice, microcredit, money market fund, moral hazard, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, price stability, profit motive, Real Time Gross Settlement, Richard Florida, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, The Great Moderation, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, upwardly mobile, Vanguard fund, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

See United Progressive Alliance Vanguard venture capital Volcker, Paul wages: effects of immigration inequality in in managed capitalist systems minimum,See also incomes Wallison, Peter J. Wall Street Journal Wang, Y. C. Washington Mutual wealth See also income inequality Weber, Max Weimar Republic welfare programs. See safety net Willumstad, Robert women, labor force participation of work, motivations in, See also employment World Bank World Trade Organization (WTO) Yin, K. Y. Zedillo, Ernesto


pages: 565 words: 122,605

The Human City: Urbanism for the Rest of Us by Joel Kotkin

autonomous vehicles, blue-collar work, British Empire, carbon footprint, Celebration, Florida, citizen journalism, colonial rule, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Downton Abbey, edge city, Edward Glaeser, financial independence, Frank Gehry, Gini coefficient, Google bus, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, labor-force participation, land reform, life extension, market bubble, mass immigration, McMansion, megacity, new economy, New Urbanism, Own Your Own Home, peak oil, pensions crisis, Peter Calthorpe, post-industrial society, RAND corporation, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Seaside, Florida, self-driving car, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, starchitect, Stewart Brand, Ted Nelson, the built environment, trade route, transit-oriented development, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce, young professional

Debbie Soon at the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore suggests that societies need to reevaluate what constitutes success in order to gain an understanding that “a healthy family life is just as much a form of success as is good standing in one’s chosen profession.”135 Certainly an adjustment is needed if cities hope to develop future generations of urbanites. Demographer Wolfgang Lutz notes that Singapore, despite its host of pro-natalist policies, works at cross-purposes to these policies by insisting on long hours for employees, many of whom are women. Singapore’s labor force participation rate for women is almost 60 percent. “In Singapore,” Lutz points out, “women work an average of 53 hours a week. Of course they are not going to have children. They don’t have the time.”136 WHERE WILL FUTURE URBANITES COME FROM? ELSEWHERE Once fertility rates reach extremely low levels, Lutz notes, this trend could prove irreversible. In his estimation, the shift toward an increasingly childless society creates “self-reinforcing mechanisms” that help make single, childless, or one-child households increasingly predominant.137 Lutz describes this as the closing of the “low fertility trap”—that is, the tendency for countries with very low birth rates to remain well below the replacement rate, even in the face of government efforts to increase marriage and birth rates.


pages: 408 words: 108,985

Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity by Joseph E. Stiglitz

Airbnb, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Basel III, basic income, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, business cycle, business process, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, deindustrialization, discovery of DNA, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial intermediation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gender pay gap, George Akerlof, gig economy, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, information asymmetry, intangible asset, investor state dispute settlement, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, market fundamentalism, mini-job, moral hazard, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, open economy, patent troll, pension reform, price mechanism, price stability, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, selection bias, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, TaskRabbit, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, tulip mania, universal basic income, unorthodox policies, zero-sum game

Some European governments have done particularly well in this regard for these more flexible jobs by requiring family leave, paternity and maternity leave, and by providing child day care facilities.** IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND SECURITY Active Labor Market Programs, Industrial Policies, and Place-Based Assistance Current EU active labor market programs place a strong emphasis on activation, which focuses on increasing labor-force participation rates. There are two sides of activation: a demand side, ensuring that there is not an insufficiency of demand, and a supply side, ensuring that workers have the skills required by the labor market. Modern economies are very dynamic, with jobs being created and destroyed all the time. Unfortunately, the new jobs are often not in the same places as the old jobs and often require different skills than the old ones.


Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World by Branko Milanovic

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, barriers to entry, basic income, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, colonial rule, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, gig economy, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, global value chain, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Lyft, means of production, new economy, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-materialism, purchasing power parity, remote working, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, uber lyft, universal basic income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Xiaogang Anhui farmers

It is also possible (although it is entirely speculative) that people’s preferences have changed, and that both men and women now prefer to be in a union with someone who is similar to them. Whatever the reasons for it, increasing homogamy is yet another factor that will push income inequality up. However, it will only push inequality up during the period of transition from nonassortative mating (or assortative mating with nonparticipation of wives in the labor force) to assortative mating. Once assortative mating and labor force participation rates have reached their limits, the inequality-enhancing effect disappears. Inequality stabilizes, albeit at a high level. Intergenerational transmission of inequality The final characteristic of capitalism that we will examine is the transmission of acquired advantages, notably wealth and “human capital,” across generations, often measured by the correlation between parents’ and children’s incomes (Table 2.1, row 6).


pages: 401 words: 109,892

The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets by Thomas Philippon

airline deregulation, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Amazon Web Services, Andrei Shleifer, barriers to entry, bitcoin, blockchain, business cycle, business process, buy and hold, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, central bank independence, commoditize, crack epidemic, cross-subsidies, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, gig economy, income inequality, income per capita, index fund, intangible asset, inventory management, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, law of one price, liquidity trap, low cost airline, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, money market fund, moral hazard, natural language processing, Network effects, new economy, offshore financial centre, Pareto efficiency, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, price discrimination, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Snapchat, spinning jenny, statistical model, Steve Jobs, supply-chain management, Telecommunications Act of 1996, The Chicago School, the payments system, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, total factor productivity, transaction costs, Travis Kalanick, Vilfredo Pareto, zero-sum game

Analyzing the extent and influence of occupational licensing on the labor market. Journal of Labor Economics 31(S1), S173–S202. Kroszner, R. S., and T. Stratmann (2005). Corporate campaign contributions, repeat giving, and the rewards to legislator reputation. Journal of Law and Economics 48(1), 41–71. Krueger, A. B. (2017). Where have all the workers gone? An inquiry into the decline of the U.S. labor force participation rate. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring). Krueger, A. B., and O. Ashenfelter (2018). Theory and evidence on employer collusion in the franchise sector. NBER Working Paper No. 24831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, July. Krugman, P. (1998). It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 137–187.


pages: 492 words: 70,082

Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends by Uma Anand Segal, Doreen Elliott, Nazneen S. Mayadas

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, borderless world, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, centre right, conceptual framework, credit crunch, demographic transition, deskilling, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial independence, full employment, global village, guest worker program, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour mobility, longitudinal study, low skilled workers, mass immigration, minimum wage unemployment, moral panic, Nelson Mandela, New Urbanism, open borders, phenotype, South China Sea, structural adjustment programs, trade route, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, urban planning, women in the workforce

Given the events that were to follow post 9/11, it might be wise to examine Australia’s humanitarian record at a time when its refugee policy remained relatively uncontroversial (Jupp 2002) 160 Table 11-2. Characteristics of Immigrant Arrivals (1997–2007) by Top Ten Source Countries ~Percentage Intake 1997–98 ~Percentage Intake 2006–07 #No. of arrivals 1997–2007 #Percentage intake 1997–2007 * Census count 2006 * Median Age in Years * Qualifications * Labor Force Participation * Unemployment Rate * Citizenship * English Proficiency Total Australian Population Total Overseas born N/A New Zealand United Kingdom N/A 19 12 6 4 5 4 2 1 .05 3 N/A N/A 17 17 9 10 3 4 1 2 2 2 N/A N/A 183 187 140 478 81 883 69 515 49 459 37 205 26 590 23 365 23 129 22 287 N/A N/A 17.4 13.4 04.7 03.5 02.5 02.2 02.2 02.1 N/A 37.1 N/A 46.8 389 470 39.5 1 038 160 53.7 206 590 147 110 104 130 39.3 35.8 38.4 120 540 40.3 50 970 32.2 92 330 39.5 52.5 64.6 N/A N/A 51.2 76.3 56.8 58.8 55.0 56.3 76.1 72.3 68.1 75.1 64.9 73.1 62.7 62.1 66.8 67.3 38.8 40.3 35.1 61.9 5.2 N/A 04.9 03.9 11.2 07.3 4.1 05.2 09.0 05.7 28.5 11.4 N/A N/A 75.6 N/A 40 94.1 70.2 E/S 73.2 64.7 74.6 94.0 80.1 97.6 92.1 95.5 47.5 89.8 59.7 92.1 70.9 67.0 95.1 56.1 China 07.8 India 06.6 South Africa Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Sudan Vietnam 19 050 159 850 24.6 41.0 Note: The characteristics cited in this section of the table represent the characteristics of all immigrants from this source country in 2007, not just the immigrants from 1997 to 2007.

It was the government’s hope that more jobs for native workers could be generated and the speed of upgrading of Taiwan’s economic structure enhanced due to the rapid expansion of these two types of industries. By the late 1990s, the government had also started to admit large numbers of foreign workers into the area of household work and healthcare services. The main purpose behind this policy was to release the better-educated native Taiwanese women from their household duties, and thereby raise their labor force participation rate and thus their labor supply, while simultaneously alleviating the problem of a growing shortage of child care and health care service workers. Since the admission of foreign health care workers has been determined by need and not by quotas, the number of these workers has increased rapidly and by 2007 its share among all foreign workers had quickly risen to 45%. Up to that time, the government had an informal agreement with trade unions and the public in general that it would not admit more than 300,000 foreign workers into Taiwan because it was deemed that at that level native workers’ jobs would not be displaced by the presence of foreign workers.


pages: 411 words: 114,717

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles by Ruchir Sharma

3D printing, affirmative action, Albert Einstein, American energy revolution, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, eurozone crisis, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, housing crisis, income inequality, indoor plumbing, inflation targeting, informal economy, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, land reform, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, Marc Andreessen, market bubble, mass immigration, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Nelson Mandela, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, Peter Thiel, planetary scale, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, software is eating the world, sovereign wealth fund, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, working-age population, zero-sum game

When the 2008 crisis hit, and demand from the United States and Europe started to collapse, export-dependent nations like Thailand and Malaysia (where exports also account for about 70 percent of GDP) saw much sharper downturns than the Philippines and Indonesia (exports for both represent less than 30 percent of GDP). One of the more unusual signs of stagnation is that Thailand has failed to enjoy the standard payoff when women work. Thailand has a very large population of working women, which normally translates into a higher level of economic development. It stands to reason that the more people there are earning incomes, the richer the society will be. But Thailand’s high rate of female labor-force participation (66 percent) has produced no boost in growth. This is perhaps particularly surprising given that in Thailand the groom’s family must pay a dowry to the bride, and not the other way around as in many Asian cultures. The male dowry would seem to suggest a society that traditionally puts a high value on the earning power of women. One reason why women have little impact on national growth in Thailand may be that they land mainly in low-end or temporary jobs, with little chance to make an impact on productivity.


pages: 446 words: 117,660

Arguing With Zombies: Economics, Politics, and the Fight for a Better Future by Paul Krugman

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, bitcoin, blockchain, Bonfire of the Vanities, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, carbon footprint, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, Climategate, cognitive dissonance, cryptocurrency, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, different worldview, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, employer provided health coverage, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial repression, frictionless, frictionless market, fudge factor, full employment, Growth in a Time of Debt, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, income inequality, index fund, indoor plumbing, invisible hand, job automation, John Snow's cholera map, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, large denomination, liquidity trap, London Whale, market bubble, market clearing, market fundamentalism, means of production, New Urbanism, obamacare, oil shock, open borders, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transaction costs, universal basic income, very high income, working-age population

Never mind wage stagnation and all that, the real problem is the collapse of working-class family values, which is somehow the fault of liberals. But is it really all about morals? No, it’s mainly about money. To be fair, the new book at the heart of the conservative pushback, Charles Murray’s Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010, does highlight some striking trends. Among white Americans with a high school education or less, marriage rates and male labor force participation are down, while births out of wedlock are up. Clearly, white working-class society has changed in ways that don’t sound good. But the first question one should ask is: Are things really that bad on the values front? Mr. Murray and other conservatives often seem to assume that the decline of the traditional family has terrible implications for society as a whole. This is, of course, a longstanding position.


pages: 421 words: 125,417

Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet by Jeffrey Sachs

agricultural Revolution, air freight, back-to-the-land, British Empire, business process, carbon footprint, clean water, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, demographic transition, Diane Coyle, Edward Glaeser, energy security, failed state, Gini coefficient, global pandemic, Haber-Bosch Process, income inequality, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), intermodal, invention of agriculture, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, mass immigration, microcredit, oil shale / tar sands, old age dependency ratio, peak oil, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, Skype, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, unemployed young men, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population

Yet these arguments are not supported by the evidence. The surprising fact is that the social-welfare states have an even higher employment rate (number of workers as a share of the working-age population) than the free-market countries. The free-market countries in turn have a higher employment rate than the mixed economies. The key here is that the social-welfare states have very high rates of female labor-force participation. The social-welfare system ensures day care and schooling for the children, so mothers have the time and means to enter the labor market. The social-welfare states have been successful in maintaining very high employment rates for two other reasons. First, social support for the working-age population has been tied to specific policies that require those receiving benefits to seek employment with the assistance of government programs.


pages: 413 words: 119,587

Machines of Loving Grace: The Quest for Common Ground Between Humans and Robots by John Markoff

"Robert Solow", A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, AI winter, airport security, Apple II, artificial general intelligence, Asilomar, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Baxter: Rethink Robotics, Bill Duvall, bioinformatics, Brewster Kahle, Burning Man, call centre, cellular automata, Chris Urmson, Claude Shannon: information theory, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, computer vision, crowdsourcing, Danny Hillis, DARPA: Urban Challenge, data acquisition, Dean Kamen, deskilling, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Hofstadter, Dynabook, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, factory automation, From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death, future of work, Galaxy Zoo, Google Glasses, Google X / Alphabet X, Grace Hopper, Gunnar Myrdal, Gödel, Escher, Bach, Hacker Ethic, haute couture, hive mind, hypertext link, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, information retrieval, Internet Archive, Internet of things, invention of the wheel, Jacques de Vaucanson, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Conway, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, John von Neumann, Kevin Kelly, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, loose coupling, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, medical residency, Menlo Park, Mitch Kapor, Mother of all demos, natural language processing, new economy, Norbert Wiener, PageRank, pattern recognition, pre–internet, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Stallman, Robert Gordon, Rodney Brooks, Sand Hill Road, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, semantic web, shareholder value, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Singularitarianism, skunkworks, Skype, social software, speech recognition, stealth mode startup, Stephen Hawking, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, strong AI, superintelligent machines, technological singularity, Ted Nelson, telemarketer, telepresence, telepresence robot, Tenerife airport disaster, The Coming Technological Singularity, the medium is the message, Thorstein Veblen, Turing test, Vannevar Bush, Vernor Vinge, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, Whole Earth Catalog, William Shockley: the traitorous eight, zero-sum game

“The restructuring of production practices and the permanent replacement of machines for human laborers has begun to take a tragic toll on the lives of millions of workers,” he wrote.22 The challenge to his thesis was that employment in the United States actually grew from 115 million to 137 million during the decade following the publication of his book. That meant that the size of the workforce would grow by over 19 percent while the nation’s population grew by only 11 percent. Moreover, key economic indicators such as the labor force participation rate, employment to working population ratio, and the unemployment rate showed no evidence of technological unemployment. The situation, then, was more nuanced than the impending black-and-white labor calamity Rifkin had forecast. For example, from the 1970s, the outsourcing of jobs internationally, as multinational corporations fled to low-cost manufacturing regions and used telecommunications networks to relocate white-collar jobs, had a far more significant impact on domestic employment than the deployment of automation technologies.


pages: 550 words: 124,073

Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century by Torben Iversen, David Soskice

Andrei Shleifer, assortative mating, augmented reality, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, centre right, cleantech, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, deskilling, Donald Trump, first-past-the-post, full employment, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, implied volatility, income inequality, industrial cluster, inflation targeting, invisible hand, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, means of production, mittelstand, Network effects, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, passive investing, precariat, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, RFID, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, smart cities, speech recognition, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, too big to fail, trade liberalization, union organizing, urban decay, Washington Consensus, winner-take-all economy, working-age population, World Values Survey, young professional, zero-sum game

By including a control for spending “mandated” by replacement rates that were in place in the year before the shock, we focus attention on the discretionary elements of the budget. The replacement data are from Vliet and Caminada’s (2012) updated version of Scruggs’s (2004) widely used dataset.2 We also tried to include measures for economic openness (imports plus exports as a percent of GDP), female labor force participation (as a percent of the working age population), and voter turnout. None of these register a significant effect, and leave our substantive results unaltered. They have been omitted in the regression results reported below. Finally, there are two technical issues that we need to address. Since the shock variable is estimated rather than observed directly, the estimate of the effect of shocks will contain measurement error.


pages: 458 words: 134,028

Microtrends: The Small Forces Behind Tomorrow's Big Changes by Mark Penn, E. Kinney Zalesne

addicted to oil, affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, big-box store, call centre, corporate governance, David Brooks, Donald Trump, extreme commuting, Exxon Valdez, feminist movement, glass ceiling, God and Mammon, Gordon Gekko, haute couture, hygiene hypothesis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, index card, Isaac Newton, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, late fees, life extension, low cost airline, low skilled workers, mobile money, new economy, RAND corporation, Renaissance Technologies, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Rubik’s Cube, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Superbowl ad, the payments system, Thomas L Friedman, upwardly mobile, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, War on Poverty, white picket fence, women in the workforce, Y2K

The online dating magazine Web site was accessed March 2007, at www.onlinedatingmagazine.com. Marriage data come from National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 54, No. 8, “Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, Provisional Data for June 2006.” The PSB poll of Internet Marrieds was conducted online on March 27–28, 2007. II. Work Life Working Retired The data on seniors in the workforce come from “Labor Force Participation of Persons Ages 62 and Over, 1982–2005,” Current Population Survey (CPS), Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data on vacation days worldwide come from the World Tourism Organization, whose Web site is http://www.world-tourism.org/. For more on unused vacation and working while on vacation, see Stephanie Armour, “U.S. Workers Feel Burn of Long Hours, Less Leisure,” USA Today, December 18, 2003; and “Annual Expedia.com Survey Reveals 51.2 Million American Workers Are Vacation Deprived,” April 25, 2007, accessed May 2007, at http://press.expedia.com/index.php?


pages: 511 words: 132,682

Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us From Citizen Kings to Market Servants by Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

affirmative action, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, Andrei Shleifer, Bernie Sanders, Boeing 737 MAX, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, cloud computing, commoditize, corporate governance, Corrections Corporation of America, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, delayed gratification, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, George Akerlof, gig economy, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Google Chrome, greed is good, hedonic treadmill, income inequality, income per capita, information asymmetry, invisible hand, job satisfaction, labor-force participation, late fees, loss aversion, low skilled workers, Lyft, mandatory minimum, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Milgram experiment, mortgage debt, Network effects, out of africa, payday loans, Ponzi scheme, precariat, price anchoring, price discrimination, profit maximization, profit motive, race to the bottom, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Bork, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Snapchat, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, Stanford prison experiment, Stephen Hawking, The Chicago School, The Market for Lemons, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Davenport, Thorstein Veblen, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, transaction costs, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, ultimatum game, Vanguard fund, winner-take-all economy

The United States has one of the highest poverty and inequality levels among the OECD countries,” and also ranks near the bottom among wealthy countries in terms of labor markets, safety nets, and economic mobility.5 The middle class, in the United States and in much of Europe, is shrinking—down to just over 50 percent in the United States and 60 percent in the European Union.6 Once-thriving manufacturing centers where workers could earn a decent living have been reduced to a state of rusting decay brought about by declines in labor’s share of profits, low-skilled workers’ wages, labor force participation, and the start-up rate of new firms (due to barriers erected by powerful incumbents).7 Yet, our elected officials continue to defend the competition ideology, to insist that it will pay off, even as our pocketbooks, health care, and social rights tell us otherwise. What has happened is that the idealized perfect competition portrayed in the economic textbooks has been squeezed out by the bad forms of competition—monopolistic or toxic or both.


pages: 487 words: 151,810

The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement by David Brooks

Albert Einstein, asset allocation, assortative mating, Atul Gawande, Bernie Madoff, business process, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, clean water, creative destruction, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, delayed gratification, deliberate practice, disintermediation, Donald Trump, Douglas Hofstadter, Emanuel Derman, en.wikipedia.org, fear of failure, financial deregulation, financial independence, Flynn Effect, George Akerlof, Henri Poincaré, hiring and firing, impulse control, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, longitudinal study, loss aversion, medical residency, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Monroe Doctrine, Paul Samuelson, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, school vouchers, six sigma, social intelligence, Stanford marshmallow experiment, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Walter Mischel, young professional

Heckman of the University of Chicago and others compared the workplace performance of high-school graduates with those who dropped out of high school but took the GED exams. The GED recipients are as smart as high-school grads who do not go on to college, but they earn less than these high-school grads. In fact, they have lower hourly wages than do high-school dropouts, because they possess fewer of the so-called noncognitive traits like motivation and self-discipline. GED recipients are much more likely to switch jobs. Their labor-force participation rates are lower than that of high-school grads. At the very top of intellectual accomplishment, intelligence is nearly useless in separating outstanding geniuses from everybody else. The greatest thinkers seem to possess mental abilities that go beyond rational thinking narrowly defined. Their abilities are fluid and thoroughly cloudlike. Albert Einstein, for example, would seem to be an exemplar of scientific or mathematical intelligence.


pages: 586 words: 159,901

Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom by Doug Henwood

accounting loophole / creative accounting, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, Andrei Shleifer, asset allocation, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, central bank independence, computerized trading, corporate governance, corporate raider, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, diversification, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equity premium, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental subject, facts on the ground, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, implied volatility, index arbitrage, index fund, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, Internet Archive, invisible hand, Irwin Jacobs, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labor-force participation, late capitalism, law of one price, liberal capitalism, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, London Interbank Offered Rate, Louis Bachelier, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, minimum wage unemployment, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Myron Scholes, oil shock, Paul Samuelson, payday loans, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, publication bias, Ralph Nader, random walk, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, selection bias, shareholder value, short selling, Slavoj Žižek, South Sea Bubble, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Predators' Ball, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, women in the workforce, yield curve, zero-coupon bond

In other words, if next year is pretty much like this year, the forecast will be accurate. Economists from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (FuUerton 1992, Saunders 1992, Rosenthal 1992) reviewed the Bureau's own employment projections and found similar failings. The 1973 forecast for 1990 greatly underestimated the continuing surge of women into the workforce. Projections of the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) in 1990 made in 1978, 1980, 1983, and 1985 were a lot closer to the mark, but by 1978, women's LFPR had already risen sharply enough to be noticeable. In its macroeconomic projections, the 1978 and 1981 GNP forecasts for 1990 were too optimistic — the 1978 forecast by a margin of 11.5%, a not inconsiderable $386 billion. Though the error got smaller as time went on, there was a persistent tendency to overestimate the growth of labor productivity.


pages: 519