deindustrialization

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Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work by Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams

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Mediation by the market distinguishes these postcolonial subsistence economies from pre-capitalist subsistence economies,104 even though they both function as a desperate means of survival.105 But while primitive accumulation is responsible for the origins of these slums, it is ‘premature deindustrialisation’ that looks set to consolidate their existence. If previous periods of industrialisation at least had the benefit of providing enough factory jobs for the new proletariat, premature deindustrialisation threatens to eliminate this traditional pathway entirely. Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic.

Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic. Deindustrialisation can also be seen in ‘reshoring’, where manufacturing returns to developed economies in jobless, automated forms.112 These deindustrialisation trends are taking hold across the developing economies of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and most of Asia.113 Even in countries where manufacturing employment has increased in absolute terms, there have been significant decreases in the labour-intensity of the process.114 The result of all of this is not only an incomplete transition to a significant working class, but also the stymying of the expected employment path for the workforce.

From its origins, the proletariat was riven by divisions – between the waged male worker and the unwaged female labourer, between the ‘free’ worker and the unfree slave, between skilled craftsmen and unskilled labourers, between the core and periphery, and between nation-states.13 The tendency to unify was always a limited phenomenon, and these differences persist today, exacerbated under conditions of a globalised division of labour. Perhaps more fundamentally, if deindustrialisation (the automation of manufacturing) is a necessary stage along the path towards a postcapitalist society, then the industrial working class could never have been the agent of change. Its existence was predicated upon economic conditions that would have to be eliminated in the transition to postcapitalism. If deindustrialisation is required for the transition to postcapitalism, then the industrial working class was inevitably going to lose its power in the process – fragmenting and falling apart, just as we have seen in recent decades. Who, then, can be the transformative subject today?

 

pages: 385 words: 111,807

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide by Ha-Joon Chang

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, discovery of the americas, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global value chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, inventory management, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, post-industrial society, precariat, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working-age population, World Values Survey

During the last two decades, in some rich countries, such as Germany, Italy and France, the fall in the share of manufacturing in GDP has been quite large in current prices (by 20 per cent in Germany, 30 per cent in Italy and 40 per cent in France), but not been so large in constant prices (by less than 10 per cent in all three).11 In several rich countries, the share of manufacturing has actually risen, if calculated in constant prices: in the US and Switzerland, its share has risen by around 5 per cent in the last couple of decades;12 in Finland and Sweden, the share has actually risen by as much as 50 per cent over the last few decades.13 An important exception is the UK, in which the share of manufacturing has fallen dramatically in the last couple of decades, even in constant prices.14 This suggests that the UK’s deindustrialization has largely been the result of the absolute decline of its manufacturing industry due to loss of competitiveness, rather than the relative price effect due to differential productivity growth rates. ‘Premature’ deindustrialization in developing countries In the last three decades, many developing countries have experienced ‘premature’ deindustrialization. That is, the share of manufacturing (and industry in general) in their outputs and employments started falling at a much earlier stage of economic development than had been the case for the rich countries. Latin America’s share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 25 per cent in the mid-1960s to 27 per cent in the late 1980s but has fallen dramatically since then.

The data in this paragraph and the next are from H.-J. Chang, ‘Rethinking public policy in agriculture: lessons from history, distant and recent’, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (2009), unless otherwise stated. 10. If we expand it to the industrial sector, the share in GDP was 30–40 per cent. Today, in none of them does it account for more than 25 per cent. The data are from O. Debande, ‘De-industrialisation’, EIB Papers, vol. 11, no. 1 (2006); downloadable at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2006_v11_n01_en.pdf. 11. In Germany, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell from 27 per cent to 22 per cent in current prices between 1991 and 2012. In constant prices, the fall was from 24 per cent to 22 per cent. Corresponding numbers in Italy were 22 per cent to 16 per cent in current prices and 19 per cent to 17 per cent in constant prices.

Between 1990 and 2012, the share of manufacturing in the UK’s GDP fell from 19 per cent to 11 per cent in current prices, representing a 42 per cent decline. It fell from 17 per cent to 11 per cent in constant prices, representing a 35 per cent decline. The data are from Eurostats, issued by the European Union. 15. All the data are from the World Bank. 16. For a more in-depth discussion, see G. Palma, ‘Four sources of “de-industrialisation” and a new concept of the “Dutch Disease” ’, paper presented at the EGDI (Economic Growth and Development Initiative) Roundtable of the HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) of South Africa, 21 May 2007, downloadable at: http://intranet.hsrc.ac.za/Document-2458.phtml. 17. The GDR framework identifies the share of burden for each country in reducing greenhouse gases to prevent the potentially catastrophic ‘two-degree warming’, considering both historical responsibility for global warming and capacity to bear the burden of adjustments. 18.

 

pages: 868 words: 147,152

How Asia Works by Joe Studwell

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, crony capitalism, cross-subsidies, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, failed state, financial deregulation, financial repression, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, land tenure, large denomination, market fragmentation, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, passive investing, purchasing power parity, rent control, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, working-age population

Paul Bairoch, Mythes et paradoxes de l’histoire économique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2005). 2. The academic debate over the relative productivity performance of manufacturing versus services revolves around the reasons for the ‘de-industrialisation’ of rich countries. However, many of the theoretical considerations are the same as for developing states. See, for instance, Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28: 5, 2004, p. 767 and Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). 3. Share of services trade in total international trade from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Separately, it is notable in east Asia that even the offshore port financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore had considerable manufacturing sectors in the early stages of their economic take-off, and Singapore still does today.

Rodrik, ‘Industrial Organization and Product Quality: Evidence from South Korean and Taiwanese Exports’, mimeo, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June 1988). James Rorty, ‘The Dossier of Wolf Ladejinsky: The Fair Rewards of Distinguished Civil Service’, Commentary, April 1955. Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 28, no. 5 (2004). Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). Rosanne Rutten (ed.), Brokering a Revolution: Cadres in a Philippine Insurgency (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008). Jeffrey Sachs and Susan Collins (eds.), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3: Country Studies – Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1989).

 

Powers and Prospects by Noam Chomsky

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anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, colonial rule, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deskilling, Fall of the Berlin Wall, invisible hand, Jacques de Vaucanson, John von Neumann, Monroe Doctrine, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, theory of mind, Tobin tax, Turing test

They also may have had the highest real wages in the world at the time and the best conditions for working class organisation, so the most detailed recent scholarship indicates, contrary to long-standing beliefs. ‘Britain itself would have been deindustrialized by the cheapness of Indian calicoes if protectionist policies had not been adopted’, the same work concludes.7 Contemporaries saw matters much in that light. A century after Defoe, liberal historian Horace Wilson observed ruefully that without protection, ‘the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers’. It was India, not Britain, that was deindustrialised, including steel, ship-building, and other manufactures. Britain showed the same ‘constant face’ when Egypt tried to undertake an industrial revolution under Mohammed Ali; with rich agricultural resources and domestic cotton, Egyptian development might have succeeded, as France and Britain feared, had it not been for British financial and military power, which intervened to bar unwanted competition and interference with British imperial strategy.

One reason for the enormous difference since is that the rulers were able to avoid the market discipline rammed down the throats of their dependencies. ‘There is no doubt’, Bairoch concludes in his detailed refutation of the leading ‘myth of economic science’, ‘that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialisation’, in fact, its ‘de-industrialisation’, a story that continues to the present under various guises. Bairoch in fact considerably understates the role of state intervention for the wealthy, because he limits himself in conventional manner to a narrow category of market interferences: protection. But that is only a small part of the story. To mention only one omission, the early industrial revolution in England and the US was fuelled by cotton, which was cheap and accessible thanks to the expulsion or extermination of the native population of the southeast United States and the import of slaves, departures from market orthodoxy that do not enter the odes to its wonders.

 

pages: 369 words: 94,588

The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism by David Harvey

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, call centre, capital controls, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, failed state, financial innovation, Frank Gehry, full employment, global reserve currency, Google Earth, Guggenheim Bilbao, illegal immigration, indoor plumbing, interest rate swap, invention of the steam engine, Jane Jacobs, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Just-in-time delivery, land reform, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, means of production, megacity, microcredit, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, place-making, Ponzi scheme, precariat, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, statistical arbitrage, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, urban renewal, urban sprawl, white flight, women in the workforce

Finance capital, both internally within the US and internationally, had to move to the fore to allocate surplus capital to wherever the profit rate was highest. In many industries that turned out not to be in the United States, and especially not in the traditional centres of production in the north-east and the mid-west, but in the west and the south. The result was the wrenching and relentless reorganisation and relocation of production throughout the world. Deindustrialisation of older production centres occurred everywhere from Pittsburgh’s, Sheffield’s and Essen’s steel industry to Mumbai’s textile industry. This was paralleled by an astonishing spurt in the industrialisation of entirely new spaces in the global economy, particularly those with specific resource or organisational advantages – Taiwan, South Korea, Bangladesh and the special production zones such as Mexico’s maquiladoras (tax-free assembly plants) or the export platforms created in China’s Pearl River delta.

The space and time configurations of social life are periodically revolutionised (witness what happened with the coming of the railroads in the nineteenth century and the current impact of the worldwide web). Movement becomes ever faster and space relations ever closer. But this trend is neither smooth nor irreversible. Protectionism can return, barriers can be refortified, civil wars can disrupt flows. Furthermore, revolutions in spatial and temporal relations produce stresses and crises (witness the difficult adjustments forced on many cities by widespread deindustrialisation in the heartlands of capitalist production in the 1980s as production moved to east Asia). The geography this produces will be examined later. Why do capitalists reinvest in expansion rather than consume away their profits in pleasures? This is where ‘the coercive laws of competition’ play a decisive role. If I, as a capitalist, do not reinvest in expansion and a rival does, then after a while I am likely to be driven out of business.

New landscapes and new geographies have been created within which capital circulates in ways that are frequently haunted by deep contradictions. If the vast amount of fixed capital embedded in the land (look down upon the land next time you fly just to get a sense of how vast this is) is to be realised, then it must be used and paid for by capitalist producers in the here and now. Abandoning all those assets, as happened to many older industrial cities in the huge wave of deindustrialisation of the 1980s, incurs losses (social as well as infrastructural) and can itself be a source of crises that affect not only those that hold the debt on many of these infrastructural investments but also the economy at large. It is here that Marx’s thesis that capitalism inevitably encounters barriers within its own nature (in this case, within the spaces, places and environments it has produced) becomes most visible. ——— The relations between capital and labour as well as those between capital and nature are mediated by the choice of technologies and organisational forms.

 

pages: 464 words: 116,945

Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism by David Harvey

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, California gold rush, call centre, central bank independence, clean water, cloud computing, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, falling living standards, fiat currency, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Food sovereignty, Frank Gehry, future of work, global reserve currency, Guggenheim Bilbao, income inequality, informal economy, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jane Jacobs, Jarndyce and Jarndyce, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Just-in-time delivery, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, market clearing, Martin Wolf, means of production, microcredit, new economy, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, peak oil, phenotype, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, short selling, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, wages for housework, Wall-E, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population

The long and painful history of deindustrialisation has left whole cities, like Detroit, bereft of activity and therefore sinks of lost value even as other cities, like Shenzhen or Dhaka, become hubs of activity that demand massive investments in fixed capital coupled with rental extractions and property market booms if they are to succeed. The history of capital is rife with stories of localised booms and crashes in which the contradiction between fixed and circulating capital, between fixity and motion, is strongly implicated. This is the world where capital as a force of creative destruction becomes most visible in the physical landscape we inhabit. The balance between creativity and destruction is often hard to discern, but the costs imposed on whole populations through deindustrialisation, gyrations in property values and land rents, disinvestment and speculative building all emanate from the underlying and perpetual tension between fixity and motion which periodically and in specific geographical locations heightens to the point of an absolute contradiction and, hence, produces a serious crisis.

While the bundling of new technologies and organisational forms has always played an important role in facilitating an exit from crises, it has never played a determinate one. The hopeful focus these days is on a ‘knowledge-based’ capitalism (with biomedical and genetic engineering and artificial intelligence at the forefront). But innovation is always a double-edged sword. The 1980s, after all, gave us deindustrialisation through automation such that the likes of General Motors (which employed well-paid unionised labour in the 1960s) have now been supplanted by the likes of Walmart (with its vast non-unionised low-wage labour force) as the largest private employers in the United States. If the current burst of innovation points in any direction at all, it is towards decreasing employment opportunities for labour and the increasing significance of rents extracted from intellectual property rights for capital.

It is always unsatisfied … The economy is perpetually constructing itself.6 New technological configurations displace the old and in so doing initiate phases of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter famously dubbed ‘gales of creative destruction’.7 Whole ways of life and modes of being and thinking have to drastically alter to embrace the new at the expense of the old. The recent history of deindustrialisation and its association with dramatic technological reconfigurations is an obvious case in point. Technological change is neither costless nor painless and the cost and the pain are not evenly shared. The question always to be asked is: who gains from the creation and who bears the brunt of the destruction. So what role do the distinctive needs and requirements of capital play in this process?

 

pages: 209 words: 89,619

The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class by Guy Standing

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8-hour work day, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, call centre, Cass Sunstein, centre right, collective bargaining, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, deskilling, fear of failure, full employment, hiring and firing, Honoré de Balzac, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, libertarian paternalism, low skilled workers, lump of labour, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, mini-job, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, nudge unit, pensions crisis, placebo effect, post-industrial society, precariat, presumed consent, quantitative easing, remote working, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, science of happiness, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, Tobin tax, transaction costs, universal basic income, unpaid internship, winner-take-all economy, working poor, working-age population, young professional

(Maltby) 138 Canada 79, 114 capital funds 176–7 Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman) 156 care work 61, 86, 125–6 careers, leisure 129 cash transfers 177 see also conditional cash transfers (CCTs) CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 Cerasa, Claudio 149 Channel 4, call centre programme (UK) 16 charities 53 children, care for 125 China 28 and contractualisation 37 criminalisation 88 deliberative democracy 181 education 73 immigrants to Italy 4–5 invasion of privacy 135 migrants 96, 106–9, 109–10 old agers 83 191 192 INDEX China 28 (Continued) Shenzhen 133, 137 and time 115 wages 43 youth 76 see also Chindia China Plus One 28 Chindia 26, 27–9, 83 see also China Chrysler Group LLC 43 circulants 90, 92 Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission (US) 152–3 civil rights 14, 94 class, social 6–8, 66–7 Coase, Ronald 29 Cohen, Daniel 57, 66, 69 collaborative bargaining 168 collective attention deficit syndrome 127 commodification of companies 29–31 of education 67–72 and globalisation 26 labour 161–2 of management 40 of politics 148–53 re- 41–2 conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 140 see also cash transfers conditionality 140, 175 and basic income 172–3 and workfare 143–5, 166–7 connectivity, and youth 127 contract status 35, 36, 37, 44, 51, 61 contractors, independent/ dependent 15–16 contractualisation 37 counselling for stress 126 Crawford, Matthew 70 credit 44 crime 5, 129–30 criminalisation 14, 145, 146 crystallised intelligence 85 cultural rights 14 de Tocqueville, Alexis 145 de-industrialisation 5, 37–8 debt, and youth 73–4 Delfanti, Alessandro 78 deliberative democracy 180–1, 182 denizens 14, 93–102, 105, 113, 117, 157–8 Denmark 150 dependent/independent contractors 15–16 deskilling 17, 33, 40, 124 developing countries 12, 27, 60, 65, 105–9 disabled people 86–7, 89, 170 discrimination age 84–5 disability 81 gender 60, 123 genetic profiling 136–7 and migrants 99, 101–2 disengagement, political 24 distance working 38, 53 dole (UK) 45 Duncan Smith, Iain 143 Durkeim, Emile 20 economic security 157, 171, 173–6 The Economist 17–18, 33, 52, 137 economy, shadow 56–7 education 10, 67–73, 135–6, 159–60 Ehrenreich, Barbara 21, 170–1 elites 7, 22, 24, 40, 50 criminality 152 and democracy 181 ethics 165 Italian 148 and the Tea Party (US) 151 empathy 22–3, 137 employment agencies 33 employment security 10b, 11, 17, 36, 51, 117 Endarkenment 70 Enlightenment 24, 70 enterprise benefits 11, 12 environmental issues 167 environmental refugees 93 Esping-Andersen, G. 41 ethics 23–4, 121–2, 165 ethnic minorities 86 EuroMayDay 1, 2, 3, 167 European Union (EU) 2, 39, 146, 147 and migrants 97, 103, 105 and pensions 80 see also individual countries export processing zones 105–6 Facebook 127, 134, 135 failed occupationality 21 INDEX family 27, 44, 60, 65, 126 fear, used for control 32 fictitious decommodification 41 financial capital 171, 176–7 financial sector jobs 39–40 financial shock 2008-9 see Great Recession Financial Times 44, 55, 121, 155 firing workers 31–2 Fishkin, James 180 Fletcher, Bill 170–1 flexibility 18 labour 23–4, 31–6, 53, 60, 61, 65 labour market 6, 120–1, 170 Ford Motor Company 42, 43 Foucault, Michel 88, 133 Foxconn 28–9, 43, 105, 137 see also Shenzhen France criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 education 69 leisure 129 migrants 95, 97, 101–2, 114 neo-fascism 149 and old agers 85 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 Telecom 11 youth 65–6 fraternity 12, 22, 155 freedom 155, 167–70, 172 freelance see temporary employment freeter unions 9 Friedman, Milton 39, 156 functional flexibility 36–8, 52 furloughs 36, 50 gays 63–4 General Motors (GM) 42, 43, 54 genetic profiling 136 Germany 9 de-industrialisation 38 disengagement with jobs 24 migrants 91, 95, 100–1, 114 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 temporary employment 15, 35 wages 40 and women 62 youth and apprenticeships 72–3 193 Glen Beck’s Common Sense (Beck) 151 Global Transformation 26, 27–31, 91, 115 globalisation 5–7, 27–31, 116, 148 and commodification 26 and criminalisation 87–8 and temporary employment 34 Google Street View 134 Gorz, Andre 7 grants, leisure 180–2 Great Recession 4, 49–51, 63, 176 and education 71 and migrants 102 and old agers 82 and pensions 80 and youth 77–8 Greece 52, 56, 117, 181 grinners/groaners 59, 83–4 Habermas, Jürgen 179 Haidt, J. 23 Hamburg (Germany) 3 happiness 140–1, 162 Hardt, M. 130 Hayek, Friedrich 39 health 51, 70, 120, 126 Hitachi 84 Hobsbawm, Eric 3 hormones 136 hot desking 53 Howker, Ed 65 Human Rights Watch 106 Hungary 149 Hurst, Erik 128 Hyatt Hotels 32 IBM 38, 137 identity 9 digital 134–5 work-based 12, 15–16, 23, 158–9, 163 Ignatieff, Michael 88 illegal migrants 96–8 In Praise of Idleness (Russell) 141, 161 income security 10b, 30, 40, 44 independent/dependent contractors 15–16 India 50, 83, 112, 140 see also Chindia individuality 3, 19, 122 informal status 6–7, 57, 60, 96, 119 inshored/offshored labour 30, 36, 37 194 INDEX International Herald Tribune 21 internet 18, 127, 139, 180, 181 surveillance 134–5, 138 interns 16, 36, 75–6 invasion of privacy 133–5, 167 Ireland 52–3, 77 isolation of workers 38 Italy education 69 neo-fascism 148–9 pensions 79 Prato 4–5 and the public sector 52, 53 shadow economy 56 and temporary employment 34 youth 64 Japan 2, 30 and Chinese migrants 110 commodification of companies 30 and migrants 102, 103 multiple job holding 119–20 neo-fascism 152 pensions 80 salariat 17 subsidies 84 and temporary employment 15, 32–3, 34–5, 41 and youth 66, 74, 76, 77 job security 10b, 11, 36–8 Kellaway, Lucy 83–4 Keynes, John Maynard 161 Kierkegaard, Søren 155 Klein, Naomi 148 knowledge 32, 117, 124–5, 171 labour 13, 115, 161–2 labour brokers 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 labour flexibility 23–4, 31–45 labour intensification 119–20 labour market flexibility 6 labour security 10–11, 10b, 31 Laos 112 lay-offs see furloughs Lee Changshik 21 legal knowledge 124–5 legal processing 50 Legal Services Act of 2007 (UK) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 13, 128–30 see also play lesbians 63–4 Liberal Republic, The 181 Lloyds Banking Group 50–1 localism 181–2 long-term migrants 100–2 loyalty 53, 58, 74–5 McDonald’s 33 McNealy, Scott 69 Malik, Shiv 65 Maltby, Lewis 138 Manafort, Paul 152 management, commodification of 40 Mandelson, Peter, Baron 68 Maroni, Roberto 97 marriage 64–5, 92 Martin, Paul 141 Marx, Karl 161 masculinity, role models for youth 63–5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 68–9 Mayhew, Les 81 Mead, Lawrence 143 mergers, triangular 30 Mexico 91 Middle East 109 migrants 2, 13–14, 25, 90–3, 145–6 and basic income 172 and conditionality 144 denizens 93–102, 157–8 government organised 109–13 internal 105–9 and queuing systems 103–5 and recession 102–3 Mill, John Stuart 160 Morris, William 160, 161 Morrison, Catriona 127 multinational corporations 28, 92 multitasking 19, 126–7 National Broadband Plan 134 near-sourcing/shoring 36 Negri, A. 130 neo-fascism 25, 147–53, 159, 175, 183 Netherlands 39, 79, 114, 149–50 New Thought Movement 21 New York Times 69, 119 News from Nowhere (Morris) 161 Niemöller, Martin 182 INDEX non-refoulement 93 Nudge (Sunstein/Thaler) 138–9 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 numerical flexibility 31–6 Obama, Barack 73, 138–9, 147, 148 Observer, The 20 occupations associations of 169–70 dismantling of 38–40 freedom in 162–4 obsolescence in 124 offshored/inshored labour 30, 36, 37 old agers 59, 79– 86, 89 old-age dependency ratio 80–1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 27 origins of the precariat 1–5 outsourcing 29, 30, 33, 36, 37, 49 Paine, Thomas 173 panopticon society 132–40, 142–3 Parent Motivators (UK) 139–40 part-time employment 15, 35–6, 51, 61, 82 Pasona 33 paternalism 17, 29, 137, 153, 178, 182 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 pensions 42, 51, 52, 76–7, 79–81, 84–6 PepsiCo 137 personal deportment skills 123 Philippines 109 Phoenix, University of 71 Pigou, Arthur 117, 125 play 13, 115, 117, 128, 141 pleasure 141 Polanyi, K. 163, 169 political engagement/disengagement 24, 147 Portugal 52, 56 positive thinking 21, 86 Prato (Italy) 4–5 precariat (definition) 6, 7–13 precariato 9 precariatisation 16–18 precarity traps 48–9, 73–5, 114, 129, 144, 178 pride 22 prisoners 112, 146 privacy, invasion of 133–5, 167 private benefits 11 productivity, and old age 85 proficians 7–8, 15, 164 proletariat 7 protectionism 27, 54 public sector 51–4 qualifications 95 queuing systems 103–5 racism 97–8, 101, 114, 149 Randstad 49 re-commodification 41–2 recession see Great Recession refugees 92, 93, 96 regulation 23, 26, 39–40, 84, 171 Reimagining Socialism (Ehrenreich/ Fletcher) 170–1 remote working 38, 53 rentier economies 27, 176 representation security 10b, 31 retirement 42, 80–3 rights 14, 94, 145, 163, 164–5, 169 see also denizens risk management 178 Robin Hood gang 3 role models for youth 63–5 Roma 97, 149 Rossington, John 100 Rothman, David 88 Russell, Bertrand 141, 161 Russell, Lucie 64 Russia 88, 115 salariat 7, 8, 14, 17, 32 Santelli, Rick 150 Sarkozy, Nicolas 69, 97, 149 Sarrazin, Thilo 101 Schachar, Ayelet 177 Schneider, Friedrich 56 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 71 seasonal migrants 98–100 security, economic 157, 171, 173–6 self-employment 15–16, 66, 82 self-esteem 21 self-exploitation 20, 122–3 self-production 11 self-regulation 23, 39 self-service 125 services 37–8, 63 195 196 INDEX Sex, Drugs and Chocolate: The Science of Pleasure (Martin) 141 sex services 63 sexism, reverse 123 shadow economy 56–7, 91 Shenzhen (China) 133, 137 see also Foxconn Shop Class as Soulcraft (Crawford) 70 short-time compensation schemes 55–6 side-jobs 119–20 skill reproduction security 10b skills 157, 176 development of 30, 31, 40 personal deportment 123 tertiary 121–4 Skirbekk, Vegard 85 Smarsh 138 Smile or Die (Ehrenreich) 21 Smith, Adam 71 snowball theory 78 social class 6–8, 66–7 social factory 38, 118, 132 social income 11–12, 40–5, 51, 66 social insurance 22, 104 social memory 12, 23, 129 social mobility 23, 57–8, 175 social networking sites 137 see also Facebook social rights 14 social worth 21 sousveillance 134, 135 South Africa, and migrants 91, 98 South Korea 15, 55, 61, 75 space, public 171, 179–80 Spain BBVA 50 migrants 94 and migrants 102 pensions 79 and the public sector 53 shadow economy 55–6 temporary employment 35 Speenhamland system 55, 143 staffing agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 state benefits 11, 12 status 8, 21, 32–3, 94 status discord 10 status frustration 10, 21, 63, 67, 77, 78, 79, 89, 114, 123, 160 stress 19, 126, 141, 141–3 subsidies 44, 54–6, 83–6, 176 suicide, work-related 11, 29, 58, 105 Summers, Larry 148 Sun Microsystems 69 Sunstein, Cass 138–9 surveillance 132–6, 153, 167 see also sousveillance Suzuki, Kensuke 152 Sweden 68, 110–11, 135, 149 symbols 3 Taking of Rome, The (Cerasa) 149 taxes 26 and citizenship 177 France 85 and subsidies 54–5 Tobin 177 United States (US) 180–1 Tea Party movement 150–1 technology and the brain 18 internet 180, 181 surveillance 132–6 teleworking 38 temporary agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 temporary employment 14–15, 49 associations for 170 Japan 9 and numerical flexibility 32–6 and old agers 82 and the public sector 51 and youth 65 tertiarisation 37–8 tertiary skill 121–4 tertiary time 116, 119 tertiary workplace 116 Tesco Law (UK) 40 Thailand, migrants 106 Thaler, Richard 138–9 therapy state 141–3, 153 Thompson, E.P. 115 time 115–16, 163, 171, 178 labour intensification 119–20 tertiary 116, 119 use of 38 work-for-labour 120–1 titles of jobs 17–18 Tobin taxes 177 Tomkins, Richard 70 towns, company 137 INDEX toy-factory incident 108–9 trade unions 1, 2, 5, 10b, 26, 31, 168 and migration 91 public sector 51 and youth 77–8 see also yellow unions training 121–4 triangular mergers 30 triangulation 34 Trumka, Richard 78 trust relationships 8–9, 22 Twitter 127 Ukraine 152 undocumented migrants 96–8 unemployment 145 benefits 45–8, 99, 104 insurance for 175 voluntary 122 youth after recession 77 uniforms, to distinguish employment status 32–3 unions freeter 9 yellow 33 see also trade United Kingdom (UK) 102–3 benefit system 173 Channel 4 call centre programme 16 company loyalty 74–5 conditionality 143–5, 166–7 criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 disabled people 170 and education 67, 70, 71 financial shock (2008-9) 49–51, 71 labour intensification 119 Legal Services Act (2007) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 129 migrants 91, 95, 99, 103–5, 114, 146 neo-fascism 150 paternalism 139–40 pensions 43, 80 and the public sector 53 public spaces 179 and regulation of occupational bodies 39 shadow economy 56 and social mobility 56–8 and subsidies 55 197 temporary employment 15, 34, 35 as a therapy state 142 women 61–2, 162 workplace discipline 138 youth 64, 76 United States (US) care for children 125 criminalisation 88 education 69, 70–1, 73, 135–6 ethnic minorities 86 financial shock (2008-9) 49–50 migrants 90–1, 93, 94, 97, 103, 114 neo-fascism 150–1, 152–3 old agers 82–3, 85 pensions 42, 52, 80 public sector 52 regulation of occupational bodies 39 social mobility in 57–8 subsidies 55, 56 taxes 180–1 temporary employment 34, 35 volunteer work 163 wages and benefits 42 women 62, 63 youth 75, 77 universalism 155, 157, 162, 180 University of the People 69 University of Phoenix 71 unpaid furloughs 36 unpaid leave 50 uptitling 17–18 utilitarianism 88, 132, 141, 154 value of support 11 Vietnam 28, 111–12 voluntary unemployment 122 volunteer work 86, 163–4 voting 146, 147, 181 Wacquant, L. 132 wages 8, 11 and benefits 41–2 family 60 flexibility 40–5, 66 individualised 60 and migrants 103 and temporary workers 32, 33 Vietnam 28 see also basic income Waiting for Superman (documentary) 69 Wall Street Journal 35, 163 198 INDEX Walmart 33, 107 Wandering Tribe 73 Weber, Max 7 welfare claimants 245 welfare systems 44 Wen Jiabao 105 Whitehead, Alfred North 160 Williams, Rob 62 wiretapping 135 women 60–5 and care work 125–6 CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 labour commodification 161 and migration 92 multiple jobholding 119–20 reverse sexism 123 work 115, 117, 160–1 and identity 158–9 and labour 13 right to 145, 163, 164–5 security 10b work-for-labour 120–1, 178 work-for-reproduction 124–7 work–life balance 118 worker cooperatives 168–70 workfare 143–5, 166–7 working class 7, 8 workplace 116, 122, 130, 131 discipline 136–8 tertiary 116 Yanukovich, Victor 152 yellow unions 33 youth 59, 65–7, 89, 156 commodification of education 67–72 connectivity 127 and criminality 129–30 generational tension 76–7 and old agers 85 precarity traps 73–5 prospects for the future 78–9 and role models 63–5 streaming education 72–3 zero-hour contracts 36

They disliked the state, which they equated with centralised government, with its planning and regulatory apparatus. They saw the world as an increasingly open place, where investment, employment and income would flow to where conditions were most welcoming. They argued that unless European countries, in particular, rolled back the securities that had been built up since the Second World War for the industrial working class and the bureaucratic public sector, and unless the trades unions were ‘tamed’, de-industrialisation (a new concept at the time) would accelerate, unemployment would rise, economic growth would slow down, investment would flow out and poverty would escalate. It was a sobering assessment. They wanted drastic measures, and in politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan they had the sort of leaders willing to go along with their analysis. The tragedy was that, while their diagnosis made partial sense, their prognosis was callous.

As China is the world’s most dynamic and largest labour market, these developments mark a move to a multi-layered global labour force in which privileged salariats will work alongside a growing precariat. Individual contracts, casualisation and other forms of external flexibility come together in another clumsy term, ‘tertiarisation’. This is more than is conveyed by ‘the tertiary sector’, which implies a shift to services. For decades the world’s production and employment have been shifting to services. The popular term ‘de-industrialisation’ is misleading, since it implies an erosion 38 THE PRECARIAT and loss of capacity, whereas much of the change has been consistent with technological advances and the changing nature of production. Even in Germany, an export powerhouse, the share of manufacturing in output and employment has shrunk to under 20 per cent. In France, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is much lower.

 

pages: 223 words: 10,010

The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality Is Essential for Recovery by Stewart Lansley

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banking crisis, Basel III, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business process, call centre, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, James Dyson, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Martin Wolf, mittelstand, mobile money, Mont Pelerin Society, new economy, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, The Great Moderation, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working-age population

In that decade, Stoke-on-Trent was still the pottery capital of the world and Royal Doulton had 18 local factories. GEC was one of the world’s leading electronics companies and Raleigh’s Nottingham factory was still producing 100,000 bicycles a year. A decade later, large parts of the industrial landscape had been turned into a wasteland. Of course some decline in manufacturing was always inevitable while the process of de-industrialisation and the expansion of the service sector is in many ways a desirable hallmark of economic maturity. 94 Some industries in which Britain once had a comparative advantage such as steel, textiles and coalmining were in historic decline unable to compete with newly industrialising countries with cheaper labour. It is generally desirable for economies to adapt to changing global patterns by shifting low value production to areas which can produce the same goods more cheaply, replacing them with higher value production.

Between 1974 and 2001, manufacturing employment fell by a third across the nations which make up the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. What is significant is that the falls in the UK and the US have been much steeper. 95 In Mrs Thatcher’s first term alone, as the number of bankruptcies exploded, manufacturing output fell by a third. It is no coincidence that in both these countries finance became an increasingly dominant force as the process of de-industrialisation accelerated. Indeed the fortunes of these two sectors have been moving in opposite directions—as finance has triumphed, manufacturing has slumped. The economic policies pursued by both Mrs Thatcher and Ronald Reagan—from a high exchange rate to financial and labour market de-regulation—were highly favourable to finance. One of the effects of Reaganomics was an overvalued dollar, hardly dream conditions for exporters.

According to one cabinet member at the time, the leading ‘wet’ Sir Ian Gilmour, the Thatcherites displayed a ‘systematic belittling of manufacturing industry’s importance. They always put the interests of finance and commerce well before those of industry.’ 100 The view that manufacturing was dispensable also chimed with the views of the leading new right economists. As Milton Friedman said in 1980, Britain’s manufacturing should be allowed to fall to bits.101 When Labour came to power in 1997, they took no action to slow the pace of deindustrialisation. After its fall in 1992—one that proved the key to economic recovery —the pound strengthened again and stayed high for the duration of Gordon Brown’s Chancellorship. Even during the relative boom conditions from 1997 to 2007 a further 1.5 million manufacturing jobs were lost in the UK, as fast a rate as in the 1980s. Throughout the last twenty five years, industry has proved a largely powerless force.

 

pages: 370 words: 102,823

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth by Michael Jacobs, Mariana Mazzucato

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3D printing, balance sheet recession, banking crisis, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, business climate, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collaborative economy, complexity theory, conceptual framework, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Detroit bankruptcy, double entry bookkeeping, Elon Musk, energy security, eurozone crisis, factory automation, facts on the ground, fiat currency, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, forward guidance, full employment, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, Internet of things, investor state dispute settlement, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberal agenda, Network effects, new economy, non-tariff barriers, paradox of thrift, price stability, private sector deleveraging, quantitative easing, QWERTY keyboard, railway mania, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, the built environment, The Great Moderation, The Spirit Level, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, total factor productivity, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, very high income

Even above 2 degrees of warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns that we can expect a much higher incidence of extreme weather events (such as flooding, storm surges and droughts), which may lead to a breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services, particularly in coastal regions and cities; lower agricultural productivity, increasing the risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems; increased ill-health and mortality from extreme heat events and diseases; greater risks of displacement of peoples and conflict; and faster loss of ecosystems and species.32 Broadly speaking, the evidence on this has been known for a quarter of a century.33 But until very recently very little has been done to avoid it. The major reason is that the production of greenhouse gas emissions—particularly carbon dioxide—is so embedded in capitalism’s historic systems of production and consumption, which have been built on the use of fossil fuels. In total 80 per cent of the world’s energy still comes from oil, gas and coal. In developed economies, as a result both of structural deindustrialisation and recent climaterelated policies, emissions are now declining. But part of this is simply due to the effective transfer of production to the developing world as globalisation has occurred.34 Western economies are not yet reducing their emissions—either those they generate themselves or those embodied in the goods and services they import—at anything like the speed required to control global warming (see Figure 9).

In this chapter we argue that low investment is at the root of European stagnation, and that a sustained (and sustainable) recovery can only be investment-driven. Investment is necessary to cure insufficient demand and unemployment in the short run, but also to introduce innovative technologies and increase potential output in the long run. Moreover, only higher investment can reverse the disquieting trend of de-industrialisation that can be observed throughout Europe. However, the measures that the European institutions have so far put in place to revive investment—in particular the ‘Growth Compact’ and President Jean-Claude Juncker’s ‘Investment Plan for Europe’—are likely to prove inadequate to deliver the desired outcomes. This chapter argues that a two-pronged approach is needed to achieve a significant increase in European investment.

But in Germany, too, output growth averaged little more than 1 per cent per year in the same period. Recovery from the global and European crises was short-lived, as displayed in Figure 1, and there is little sign of a return to robust growth within the next decade. Figure 1: GDP growth (% change on same quarter of previous year) Source: Eurostat Another remarkable and disquieting trend is de-industrialisation, which has accelerated during the crisis. In 2013 alone, the share of industry in GDP fell by 1 percentage point at the EU level—from 15 per cent to 14 per cent. In Germany, Europe’s major industrial champion, in 2014 the share of industry was 25.1 per cent, or 30.7 per cent including construction activities. This is down from 30.2 per cent (36.8 per cent) in 1991, the first year of common statistics after German reunification: it has been decreasing, on average, by 0.2 per cent per year.

 

pages: 504 words: 143,303

Why We Can't Afford the Rich by Andrew Sayer

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, Albert Einstein, asset-backed security, banking crisis, banks create money, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, collective bargaining, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demand response, don't be evil, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, income inequality, investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, job automation, Julian Assange, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, moral hazard, mortgage debt, neoliberal agenda, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, patent troll, payday loans, Plutocrats, plutocrats, predatory finance, price stability, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working poor, Yom Kippur War

Because we are so dependent on each other, there are always likely to be questions of fairness and justice where economic activities are concerned. Are you being paid fairly? Is it right that some get so much/little, and pay so much/little tax? Should students pay for their university courses? Should you get interest on your savings? Should there be more/less/no child benefit? More money for carers, or none? Who should pick up the bill when a company goes bankrupt, and who should pay for clearing up a derelict site left by deindustrialisation? Who should pay for pollution? These and other such questions are about moral economy. I believe we need to think much more about them – about whether our familiar economic arrangements are fair and justifiable, instead of taking them simply as immutable facts of life – or equally bad, as matters of mere subjective ‘preferences’, or ‘values’, beyond the scope of reason.30 Individuals may sometimes give more than they get, or get more than they give, for justifiable reasons, as in the case of parent–child relations, but sometimes they do so for no good reason other than power.

Surveys of public opinion show that the majority judge those below them much more harshly than those above them,23 and although in recent years rich bankers in particular have come in for more criticism, hostility towards them is still less than towards those at the bottom. Neoliberal governments and media work hard to keep it that way, so resentment is directed downwards. Here the problem is not merely individual but structural – a consequence of job shortages. These are normal in capitalism – more in recessions than in booms, and more in areas of deindustrialisation, like Liverpool or Detroit. To the extent that such areas have any jobs at all, they tend to be low paid and unskilled. Right-wing politicians love to point to individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds who, through heroic struggle, find a job and then get ahead, and they castigate others for not doing the same. But where there are not enough jobs to go round, it’s a zero-sum game: if one person gets a job, it means that another does not.

Inflation reduced the real rate of interest, favouring debtors; debt payments become less onerous if the currency you have to pay them in is losing value fast. For a while, with a still-strong labour movement, many workers could continue to win wage rises to keep up with inflation but, as unemployment rose in the old industrialised countries, the post-war balance of power between capital and organised labour crumbled as deindustrialisation hit union membership. At the end of the decade, leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan seized the moment to attack the unions and weaken employment legislation. In effect they declared class war on organised labour, which was blamed for the high inflation. In both the US and the UK, the governments raised interest rates, making their currencies strong and hence making business difficult for export industry, as it drove up the prices of exports relative to those of goods from other countries.

 

pages: 355 words: 92,571

Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets by John Plender

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Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Black Swan, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, business climate, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, computer age, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, diversification, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, inflation targeting, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, labour market flexibility, London Interbank Offered Rate, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, market fundamentalism, means of production, Menlo Park, moral hazard, moveable type in China, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, principal–agent problem, profit motive, quantitative easing, railway mania, regulatory arbitrage, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, Steve Jobs, technology bubble, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, time value of money, too big to fail, tulip mania, Upton Sinclair, We are the 99%, Wolfgang Streeck

Many also feel instinctively that a nation’s strength can be measured by the amount of swarf on its boots – swarf being the metal chippings found on factory floors. And because this view is so widespread, the decline of manufacturing in countries such as the US and UK is generally perceived to be disturbing, especially when there is high unemployment in ‘rustbowl’ industries that are conspicuous victims of globalisation and de-industrialisation. According to this school of thought, advanced countries cannot live by services alone, not least because services have less export potential than manufactures. So a shrinking manufacturing base must be equated with national decline, as must the growing financialisation of the economy. No surprise, then, that the decline in manufacturing employment in the UK, from 31 per cent of the workforce in 1975 to 25 per cent in 1983 to 8 per cent today, causes much angst, as does the almost-as-severe percentage fall in the US, where manufacturing employment is down to 9 per cent.

You cannot go on watching with indifference the disappearance of your principal industries, and always hoping that you will be able to replace them by secondary and inferior industries.59 Chamberlain was echoing those who, in the debate on luxury in the eighteenth century, feared that the increasing production of goods designed to meet the whims and fancies of fashionable women would cause society to become decadent and effeminate. He in turn was echoed decades later by Lord Weinstock, chief executive of Britain’s General Electric Company, before the House of Lords committee on overseas trade in 1985, when Margaret Thatcher’s government presided over a painful period of de-industrialisation: What will the service industries be servicing when there is no hardware, when no wealth is actually being produced? We will be servicing, presumably, the production of wealth by others. We will supply the Changing of the Guard, we will supply the Beefeaters around the Tower of London. We will become a curiosity. I do not think that that is what Britain is about. I think that is rubbish.

 

pages: 221 words: 55,901

The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon

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Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus

See also emerging economies development aid, 148–53, 157 development gap, 34–35, 83 Di Bao program, 166 discrimination: ghettos and, 66– 67; immigrants and, 64, 66, 127; labor and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; non-­material inequalites and, 64–66, 69; racial, 65; women and, 64–65, 103 disinflation, 95, 102, 110 distribution, 10n1, 186; capital-­ labor split and, 55–58, 60; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71–72; fairer globalization and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; geographical disequilibria and, 83; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see also Gini coefficient); global, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 124–38, 141– 45, 156; growth and, 49–50, 188; international, 17–18, 30, 148; median of, 31; OECD countries and, 10–11, 12n3; policy and, 26, 72, 135, 188; range of, 16; real earnings loss and, 78; redistribution and, 4, 7, 37 (see also redistribution); rise in inequality and, 74, 77–79, 82, 85, 90–92, 94–96, 99, 103–4, 106–7, 112, 114–15; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 16, 18 (see also standard of living); taxes and, 37, 92–94 (see also taxes); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 194 distribution (cont.) 52; transfers and, 4, 14, 48, 105, 110, 130, 135–36, 142, 148, 153, 158–67, 170, 175, 181, 183, 187; wage, 3, 78–79, 107 Divided We Stand report, 52 Doha negotiations, 154 drugs, 66, 133 Dubai, 127 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 156 education, 34, 187; college, 132; evolution of inequality and, 61, 65–68; fairer globalization and, 149, 152, 167–73, 180–81; globalization and, 132, 140, 143; labor and, 168, 180; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50; national inequality and, 167–73; poverty and, 24; preschool, 169–70; redistribution and, 149, 152, 167–73; rise in inequality and, 111; taxes and, 167–73; tuition and, 170 efficiency: data transfer technology and, 78; deregulation and, 94, 96, 105, 108; economic, 1, 4, 6, 111, 116, 119, 129–33, 135, 140–45, 158, 164, 167, 171, 181; emerging economies and, 78; equality and, 116, 129–31; fairness and, 8, 129– 31; globalization and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; human capital and, 175; import substitution and, 34, 180; inefficiency and, 105, 129–30, 132–33, 135, 140, 170–71, 180, 188; labor Index and, 175; loss of, 142, 164; opportunity and, 142–45; Pareto, 130n5; privatization and, 94, 96, 105, 108; redistribution and, 142–45; rents and, 180; social tensions and, 188; spontaneous redistribution and, 133; taxes and, 170; technology and, 78; weak institutions and, 36; wealth of nations and, 1 elitism, 182; fairer globalization and, 151, 165; globalization and, 127n4, 136, 138; rise in inequality and, 4, 6–7 emerging economies: Africa and, 122–23 (see also Africa); competition and, 178, 187–88; conditional cash transfers and, 165– 66; credit cards and, 165; domestic markets and, 120, 125; efficient data transfer and, 78; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; global inequality and, 40, 77– 80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188–89; globalization and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; institutions and, 109– 12; Kuznets curve and, 113; labor and, 77; natural resources and, 127; profits and, 117; rise in inequality and, 109–12; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 165; trends in, 57; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 entrepreneurs, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188 equality: efficiency and, 116, 129– 31; policy for, 184–89; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31–32, 36 Ethiopia, 21–22, 46t, 155 Index195 European Union (EU), 24, 156, 174, 177 Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 155 evolution of inequality: Africa and, 46t, 54–55; Brazil and, 46t, 55, 59, 70; capital and, 55–58, 60, 73; China and, 47, 53, 57–60; consumption and, 42t, 44t; convergence and, 65, 69; credit and, 61; crises and, 48, 50, 54, 57, 73–74; developed countries and, 47, 52–53, 56, 59–64, 66; developing countries and, 47, 53–55, 57, 63, 68; distribution and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71– 72; education and, 61, 65–68; elitism and, 4, 6–7, 46t; emerging economies and, 57; exceptions and, 52–53; France and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; ghettos and, 66–67; Gini coefficient and, 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58–59; Great Depression and, 48; growth and, 33, 49–50, 54; India and, 54, 57, 59–60; institutions and, 55, 69; investment and, 56; labor and, 55–58, 60; markets and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; national income inequality and, 48–52; non-­monetary inequalities and, 49, 60–70; normalization and, 41, 43–44; opportunity and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; perceptions of inequality and, 69–73; policy and, 55, 72; primary income and, 48–50, 58; production and, 57; productivity and, 63; profit and, 56; reform and, 54, 72; rise in inequality in, 48–52, 73, 77–80, 91–95, 97–98, 102–8; risk and, 63, 66; standard of living and, 41, 43– 45, 46t, 53–55, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 73; surveys and, 42t, 43–45, 56, 68n17, 69–71; taxes and, 12–14, 37, 48, 50, 56n5; Theil coefficient and, 42; United Kingdom and, 46t, 50, 51f, 59, 67, 68n17; United States and, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 33, 46t, 47–50, 51f, 58, 59n9, 66–70, 73; wealth and, 58–60 executives, 73, 88–89, 97, 174 expenditure per capita, 13, 15, 42t, 44t exports: deindustrialization and, 76, 82; fairer globalization and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; globalization and, 124, 128; rise in inequality and, 76, 82–84 fairer globalization: Africa and, 147, 151, 154–56, 179, 183; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; Bolsa Familia and, 166; Brazil and, 150, 154, 166–68, 173; capital and, 158–62, 167, 171, 175, 182; China and, 150, 154, 165–66, 172, 178; competition and, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182; consumers and, 177–78; consumption and, 159, 177; convergence and, 146–47, 157; correcting national inequalities and, 158–80; credit and, 164–65, 172, 180; crises and, 163, 176; deregulation and, 173; developed countries and, 150, 154–57, 160, 162, 164, 168–72, 176, 178–79, 181; developing countries and, 154, 166; development aid and, 196 fairer globalization (cont.) 148–53, 157; Di Bao program and, 166; distribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; education and, 149, 152, 167–73; 180–81; elitism and, 151, 165; emerging economies and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and, 155; exports and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; France and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient and, 156, 166; goods and services sector and, 180; growth and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; health issues and, 152, 166; imports and, 154, 177–78, 180; India and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; inheritance and, 170– 73; institutions and, 151, 168, 174–75; international trade and, 176–77; investment and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; liberalization and, 156, 179; markets and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50; national inequality and, 147, 158; opportunity and, 155, 167, 170, 172; policy and, 147–53, 157, 167–73, 175, 177, 179–83; poverty and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; prices and, 147– 48, 176, 178, 182; primary income and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; production and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; productivity and, 155, 177–78; profit and, 173, 176; Progresa program and, Index 166; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; reform and, 151, 161, 163, 168–69; regulation and, 152, 173–76, 181–82; risk and, 148, 154, 156, 159, 164, 171, 174–75, 178; standard of living and, 146–48, 154, 156–58, 160, 165, 168–69; surveys and, 169; taxes and, 148, 158–73, 175, 181–83; technology and, 156, 173; TRIPS and, 156; United Kingdom and, 163, 169; United States and, 155, 159–61, 163– 64, 169, 174–75, 182; wealth and, 162, 164, 167, 170–73 Fitoussi, Jean-­Paul, 14 France: evolution of inequality and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient of, 20; global inequality and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; offshoring and, 81; rise in inequality and, 80, 88, 92–93, 95, 97, 99, 103; soccer and, 87; wage deductions and, 159 G7 countries, 56 G20 countries, 182 Garcia-­Panalosa, Cecilia, 107 Gates, Bill, 5–6, 70, 150 Germany, 2, 21, 46t, 50, 51f, 80, 88, 92 Ghana, 46t, 54 ghettos, 66–67 Giertz, Seth, 160–61 Gini coefficient: Brazil and, 22; Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, Index197 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58– 59; fairer globalization and, 156, 166; France and, 20; historical perspective on, 27–28; meaning of, 18–19; purchasing power parity and, 28; rise in inequality and, 110; United States and, 21; wealth inequality and, 58–60 Glass-­Steagall Act, 174n15 global distribution, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 156 global inequality: Africa and, 16, 21, 23, 30–31, 34, 36; between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38–39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90–91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; Brazil and, 21– 23; crises and, 20, 38–41; cross-­ country heterogeneity and, 13; definition of, 3–4, 9–10, 25–26, 30–32, 39; developed countries and, 10–11, 21, 34–39; developing countries and, 10–11, 13, 21, 32, 34–39; effects of, 38–40; emerging economies and, 40, 77–80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188– 89; at the end of the 2000s, 20– 25; evolution of inequality and, 41 (see also evolution of inequality); expenditure per capita and, 13, 15, 42t, 44t; France and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; globalization and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; great gap and, 33–36; historic turning point for, 25–32; Human Development Report and, 25; institutions and, 36; measuring, 10– 20; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50, 185; normalization and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; policy and, 185–89; Povcal database and, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t; prices and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; profit and, 13; reduction of, 2, 185–86; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30–32, 36; rise of, 2–4, 7; risk and, 20; standard of living and, 10–26, 29, 31–33, 36, 39; surveys on, 10, 12–15, 20n10, 21–22, 29, 42t, 43–45; technology and, 3–4, 34–35; trend reversal in, 37–38; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 35–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124– 29, 184–85, 189 globalization: Africa and, 122–23, 126–27; Asian dragons and, 34, 82; Brazil and, 127, 133; capital and, 117, 125–26, 132, 137; China and, 120–22, 128; competition and, 117–18, 130, 186 (see also competition); as complex historical phenomenon, 1–2; consumption and, 137–39; convergence and, 120–22, 125; credit and, 131–32, 137–40; crises and, 119–22, 125, 135–39, 142; debate over, 1; deindustrialization in developed countries and, 75–82; democratic societies and, 135–36; deregulation and, 95–99; developed countries and, 117, 119, 121, 127n4, 128, 133, 143; developing countries and, 121, 127n4, 128, 132, 143; education and, 132, 140, 143; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; elitism and, 127n4, 136, 138; 198 globalization (cont.) emerging economies and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; exports and, 124, 128; fairer, 146–83 (see also fairer globalization); future of inequality between countries and, 119–22; global inequality and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; goods and services sector and, 127, 130; growth and, 118–29, 134–39; health issues and, 140– 41, 144; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; imports and, 119, 124; inequality within countries and, 124–29; inheritance and, 144–45; institutions and, 124; as instrument for modernization, 1; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; investment and, 119, 130, 134–35, 143; laissez-­faire approach and, 118, 129; markets and, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; as moral threat, 1; national inequality and, 119; negative consequences of inequality and, 131–42; opportunity and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; as panacea, 1; policy and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; poverty and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; prices and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; primary income and, 135, 143–44; production and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; productivity and, 120, 125, 127, 144; profit and, 117; redistribution and, 121, 124–38, 141–45; reform and, 124, 126–27, 138; regulation and, 136; rise in inequality and, 117–18; risk and, 127–28, Index 137–39, 144; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 120–23, 126, 138, 143; surveys and, 127n4, 141n15; taxes and, 74, 89n10, 91–94, 104, 114–15, 129–30, 135–36, 142–45; technology and, 86–91, 118–20, 125; trends and, 118; United States and, 135–39; wealth and, 74, 95, 98, 125, 127, 129, 131–32, 139, 143–45 Great Depression, 48 Greece, 46t, 135 gross domestic product (GDP) measurement: Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, 41–45, 56–57; fairer globalization and, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; global inequality and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39; normalization and, 29, 41, 43–45; rise in inequality and, 94; Sen-­Stiglitz-­ Fitoussi report and, 14 Gross National Income (GNI), 148–49 Growing Unequal report, 52 growth, 4; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; constraints and, 35; consumption and, 13–15, 42t, 44t, 80, 137–39, 159, 177; convergence and, 16; determinants of, 34; distribution and, 49–50, 188; emerging economies and, 125 (see also emerging economies); evolution of inequality and, 33, 49–50, 54; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; GDP mea- Index199 surement of, 30, 39 (see also gross domestic product (GDP) measurement); globalization and, 118–29, 134–39; great gap in, 33–36; import substitution and, 34, 180; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; negative, 31; political reversals and, 36; poverty and, 28–29; production and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; rate of, 15, 29–35, 79, 125, 185; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; relative gap and, 18, 20, 30–32, 36; rise in inequality and, 75, 79, 82, 84, 109–12; trends in, 40, 121 health issues, 24, 187; fairer globalization and, 152, 166; globalization and, 140–41, 144; public healthcare and, 37, 111, 140 Heckscher-­Ohlin model, 76 Hong Kong, 34, 82, 174 housing, 12, 61, 137 human capital, 74, 167, 175 Human Development Report, 25 Ibrahimovich, Zlata, 87 IKEA, 172 immigrants, 64, 66, 127 imports: fairer globalization and, 154, 177–78, 180; globalization and, 119, 124; import substitution and, 34, 180; rise in inequality and, 80 income: average, 9, 18, 21, 29–30, 43, 72; bonuses and, 87, 174; convergence and, 16; currency conversion and, 11; definition of, 45; deindustrialization and, 75–82; developed/developing countries and, 5, 36; disposable, 20, 22, 24, 48, 50, 51f, 74, 91, 163; distribution of, 3 (see also distribution); executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; family, 10; financial operators and, 87–88, 90–91; gap in, 3, 5–6, 27f, 33– 36, 42t, 44t, 149; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; high, 50, 52, 56, 85–93, 97–99, 140, 143, 158–62, 164, 189; household, 10–12, 43, 45, 50, 58, 105, 107, 137, 163, 177; inequality in, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132– 34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; international scale for, 17–18, 23, 30; lawyers and, 89–90; mean, 17, 20n10, 27f, 42t, 44t; median, 6, 49, 71, 102–3, 106; minimum wage and, 52–53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; national, 7, 16–19, 30, 43, 48–52, 60, 73, 84n6, 125, 149, 153, 172; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11; opportunity and, 5; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; per capita, 20, 25, 29–30, 42t, 45, 48, 55–56, 120; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; primary, 48–50, 58, 135, 143–44, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; 200 income (cont.) purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; real earnings loss and, 78; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31– 32, 36; superstars and, 85–87, 89–90; taxes and, 37, 89n10, 92–93, 145, 159, 161–65, 170 (see also taxes); technology and, 34, 180; virtual, 12; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; wealth inequality and, 58–60; women and, 64– 65, 103 India: evolution of inequality and, 54, 57, 59–60; fairer globalization and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; household consumption and, 15; international trade and, 75; Kuznets hypothesis and, 113; rise in inequality and, 2, 15–16, 19, 30, 34, 46t, 75, 83, 90, 112–13; taxes and, 165 Indonesia, 30, 46t, 54, 111, 127 industrialization: deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; labor and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188 Industrial Revolution, 26, 29, 33, 35 inequality: between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38– 39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90– 91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118– 19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see Index also Gini coefficient); income, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132–34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; international, 17; inverted U curve and, 54, 113; measurement of, 18; negative consequences of, 131–42; non-­ monetary, 49, 60–70; perceptions of, 69–73; social tensions and, 188; standard of living and, 18 (see also standard of living); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 42; wealth, 58–60; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 37–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124–29, 184–85, 189 infant mortality, 150 inflation, 50, 95, 102, 110 inheritance: fairer globalization and, 170–73; globalization and, 144–45; rise in inequality and, 93 institutions: deregulation and, 91– 112 (see also deregulation); disinflation and, 95, 102, 110; emerging economies and, 109– 12; evolution of inequality and, 55, 69; fairer globalization and, 151, 168, 174–75; global inequality and, 36; globalization and, 124; markets and, 91–92; privatization and, 94–109; reform and, 91–112; rise in inequality and, 91–112, 114; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 92–94; “too big to fail” concept and, 174–75; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 International Development Association, 149 Index201 international income scale, 17–18, 23, 30 International Labor Organization, 51 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54, 57, 84, 90, 109–10 international trade: capital mobility and, 74; China and, 75; de­ industrialization and, 75–76, 78–79; effect of new players, 75–76; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; India and, 75; offshoring and, 81–82; rise in inequality and, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114; Soviet Union and, 75; theory of, 76; wage ladder effects and, 78–79 inverted U curve, 54, 113 investment: direct, 76, 79; evolution of inequality and, 56; fairer globalization and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; foreign, 83, 85, 112, 155, 157, 160, 179; globalization and, 119, 130, 134– 35, 143; production and, 119; public services and, 143; re-­ investment and, 56; rise in inequality and, 76, 79, 82–83, 85, 92, 97–98, 112; taxes and, 92 Ivory Coast, 54 Japan, 34, 46t, 51f, 103 job training, 34, 181, 187 Kenya, 46t, 54 kidnapping, 133 Kuznets, Simon, 113, 126 labor: agriculture and, 12, 82, 84, 122–23, 127–28, 132, 155; artists and, 86–87; bonuses and, 87, 174; capital and, 3–4, 55– 58, 60, 158, 161n7, 185; capital mobility and, 3; cheap, 77, 117; costs of, 81, 100, 104–5, 117, 176, 187; decline in share of national income and, 73; deindustrialization and, 75–82; demand for, 168; deregulation and, 99– 109; discrimination and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; distribution of income and, 175 (see also distribution); education and, 168, 180; efficiency and, 96–97, 175; emerging economies and, 77; entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 55–58, 60; excess, 81, 83; executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; goods and services sector and, 13, 73, 80, 85, 91, 102, 127, 130, 180; growth and, 154, 179; immigrant, 64, 66, 127; increased mobility and, 90–91; industrialization and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 80, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; International Labor Organization and, 51; job training and, 34, 181, 187; manufacturing and, 57, 80–82, 84, 123, 154–55, 157; median wage and, 49, 71, 102– 3, 106; minimum wage and, 52– 53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; mobility of, 185; offshoring and, 81–82; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19– 20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; 202 labor (cont.) privatization and, 99–109; productivity and, 63, 79, 81–82, 89, 100, 102, 104, 114, 120, 125, 127, 144, 155, 177–78; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; real earnings loss and, 78; reserve, 84; security and, 133; skilled, 76–78, 82–83, 86, 90, 114, 117, 126, 176; standard of living and, 69 (see also standard of living); superstars and, 85, 87, 89–90; supply of, 130– 31, 164; taxes and, 159–60, 171; technology and, 85–91 (see also technology); unemployment and, 37, 39, 53, 62–63, 66, 69, 77, 94, 100–108, 164, 175–76; unions and, 100–106, 108, 156, 179; unskilled, 3, 76–77, 79, 83, 105, 117, 154; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; women and, 64–65, 103, 114; writers and, 86–87 Lady Gaga, 5–6 laissez-­faire approach, 118, 129 Latin America, 9, 34, 36, 54–55, 58, 109–11, 155, 165–66, 168, 180 lawyers, 89–90 liberalization: capital and, 96; customs, 156; deregulation and, 96–99, 108–9, 112 (see also deregulation); fairer globalization and, 156, 179; mobility of capital and, 115; policy effects of, 97–99; Reagan administration and, 91; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; rise in inequality and, 76, 91, 93, 96–99, 108–9, 112, 115; tax rates and, 93 Luxembourg, 16, 19 Index Madonna, 71 Malaysia, 127 manufacturing: deindustrialization and, 75–82, 84, 123; emerging economies and, 57, 84; fairer globalization and, 154–55, 157; France and, 81; offshoring and, 81–82; United Kingdom and, 80; United States and, 80 markets: competition and, 76–77, 79–82, 84, 86, 94–98, 102, 104, 115–18, 130, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182, 186–88; credit, 131; deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; deregulation and, 91–92, 99–109 (see also deregulation); development gap and, 34–35, 83; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; effect of new players, 75–76; emerging economies and, 120 (see also emerging economies); entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; exports and, 76, 82–84, 124, 128, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; globalization and, 35, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; housing, 12, 61, 137; imports and, 1, 34, 80, 119, 124, 154, 177–78, 180; institutions and, 91–112; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; labor and, Index203 144 (see also labor); liberalization and, 112 (see also liberalization); monopolies and, 94, 111, 127, 136; offshoring and, 81– 82; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; reform and, 54 (see also reform); regulation and, 74 (see also regulation); rise in inequality and, 74, 76– 79, 83, 86, 90–112, 114; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; single market and, 76; South-­South exchange and, 35; TRIPS and, 156 median wage, 49, 71, 102–3, 106 Mexico, 46t, 57, 59, 109–10, 133, 166, 172 middle class, 51, 71, 93, 109, 133– 34, 136, 140 Milanovic, Branko, 4–5, 17n8, 29n16 Millennium Development Goals, 149–50, 185 minerals, 84, 127 minimum wage, 52–53, 100, 102– 8, 175, 177 monopolies, 94, 111, 127, 136 Morocco, 173 Morrisson, Christian, 28 movies, 87 Murtin, Fabrice, 28 national inequality, 2–4; correcting, 158–80; education and, 167–73; fairer globalization and, 147, 158; Gini coefficient and, 27 (see also Gini coefficient); globalization and, 119; market regulation and, 173–75; protectionism and, 147, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 158–73, 175, 178; rise in, 6, 48– 52, 115, 204; taxes and, 158–73, 175, 181–83 natural resources, 84–85, 92, 122, 126–28, 127, 151 Netherlands, 46t, 50, 66, 70, 102 Nigeria, 9, 46t, 54, 127, 151 non-­monetary inequalities: access and, 61, 67–68; capability and, 61; differences in environment and, 66–68; discrimination and, 64–66, 69; employment precariousness and, 63–64; evolution of inequality and, 49, 60–70; intergenerational mobility and, 68; opportunities and, 49, 60– 70; social justice and, 60, 70; unemployment and, 62–63 normalization: evolution of inequality and, 41, 43–44; GDP measurement and, 29, 41, 43– 45; global inequality and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29 Occupy Wall Street movement, 6, 135 OECD countries, 27t; evolution of inequality and, 42t, 43, 44t, 50– 52, 64, 65n13; fairer globalization and, 149, 159, 162, 164– 65; Gini coefficient and, 51; income distribution and, 51; relaxation of regulation and, 99; restrictive, 64; rise in inequality and, 50–51, 94, 99, 102, 106n18, 107; social programs and, 94; standard of living and, 11–12, 43, 50–52, 64, 94, 99, 102, 107, 120, 149, 159, 162, 164–65; U-­shaped curve on income and, 50 OECD Database on Household 204 Income Distribution and Poverty, 11–12 offshoring, 81–82 oil, 92, 127 opportunity, 5; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; as capability, 61; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 155, 167, 170, 172; globalization and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; redistribution and, 142–45; rise in inequality and, 102 Pakistan, 46t, 111 Pareto efficiency, 130n5 Pavarotti, Luciano, 86–87 payroll, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175 Pearson Commission, 149 pension systems, 167 Perotti, Roberto, 134 Philippines, 46t, 111 Pickett, Kate, 140 Piketty, Thomas, 4, 48, 59n8, 60, 89n10, 125, 160n4 PISA survey, 169–70 policy, 4; adjustment, 109, 153; Cold War and, 149, 153; convergence and, 147–48; development aid and, 148–53; distributive, 26, 72, 135, 188; educational, 149, 152, 167–73; evolution of inequality and, 55, 72; fairer globalization and, 147–53, 157–58, 167–73, 175–83; Glass-­Steagall Act and, 174n15; global inequality and, 185–89; globalization and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; globalizing equality and, 184–89; import substi- Index tution and, 34; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; poverty reduction and, 147–48; protectionist, 7, 99– 100, 107–8, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; reform and, 74 (see also reform); rise in inequality and, 34, 74–75, 85, 94, 97, 99– 100, 104, 106–11, 114–16; social, 7; standard of living and, 147–48 population growth, 28–29, 110, 183 portfolios, 88 Povcal database, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t poverty, 1, 44t, 109; Collier on, 23; convergence and, 147–48; criminal activity and, 133–34; definition of, 24; development aid and, 147–52; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; ghettos and, 66–67; global inequality and, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32; globalization and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; growth and, 28–29; measurement of, 23–24; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; reduction policies for, 147–48; traps of, 144, 150, 164 prices: commodity, 84, 182; exports and, 178; factor, 74, 126; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 176, 178, 182; global inequality and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; globalization and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; imports and, 80; international compari- Index205 sons of, 11; lower, 94, 137; oil, 92; rise in inequality and, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; rising, 110, 122, 178; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; statistics on, 11, 27; subsidies and, 109–10, 175 primary income: evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 58; fairer globalization and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; globalization and, 135, 143–44 privatization: deregulation and, 94–112; efficiency and, 94, 96, 105, 108; globalization of finance and, 95–99; institutions and, 94–109; labor market and, 99–109; reform and, 94–109; telecommunications and, 111 production: deindustrialization and, 75–82; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; globalization and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; growth and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; material investment and, 119; North vs.

Some believe it has contributed to the “wealth of nations” by making them on the whole more efficient. Others feel it has caused the majority of humanity to sink into poverty in order to benefit a privileged elite. Criticism has been heaped upon it. Globalization is said to be the cause of economic crises, the destruction of the environment, the excessive importance of finance and the financial sector, deindustrialization, the standardization of culture, and many other ills of contemporary society, including an explosive rise in inequality. My goal is to shed some light on this debate by focusing on one of the above points in particular, one that has arguably drawn the most attention: inequality. Globalization is a complex historical phenomenon that has existed, in some 2 Introduction form or another, since the beginning of human society, but which we can track with more precision over recent centuries.1 No one denies that it exists, and there is little doubt that it will continue.

To the extent that globalization enables better integration primarily of the developing world into the global economy, one might expect that its potential distributive effects have been different in developed and developing economies. As this also applies to the nature of policy reforms and the circumstances in which they have been undertaken, care will be taken throughout the chapter to distinguish the two sets of countries. The Effects of Globalization and Deindustrialization on Developed Countries The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a radical change in the world economy. Whole swaths of the world were opened up to international trade, most importantly China in the 1980s and the Soviet bloc and India at the turn of the 1990s. Simple economic reasoning suggests that the opening up of these giants to international trade was equiv- 76 Chapter 3 alent to the entrance of around a billion workers, for the most part unskilled, into international competition, with the simultaneous effect of creating a relative scarcity of other factors of production, particularly capital, skilled labor, and raw materials.

 

pages: 606 words: 87,358

The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization by Richard Baldwin

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3D printing, additive manufacturing, Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, air freight, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, Branko Milanovic, buy low sell high, call centre, Columbian Exchange, Commodity Super-Cycle, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, domestication of the camel, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, financial intermediation, George Gilder, global supply chain, global value chain, Henri Poincaré, imperial preference, industrial robot, invention of agriculture, invention of the telegraph, investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, Islamic Golden Age, James Dyson, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Lao Tzu, low skilled workers, market fragmentation, New Economic Geography, out of africa, paper trading, Pax Mongolica, profit motive, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Second Machine Age, Simon Kuznets, Skype, Snapchat, Stephen Hawking, telepresence, telerobotics, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, trade route, Washington Consensus

Understanding the First Unbundling’s Stylized Facts Chapter 2 identified five top-line facts that marked globalization’s first unbundling: The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized Trade boomed Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North than in the South The Great Divergence happened Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North. All these stylize facts can be easily understood as implications of globalization’s first unbundling. The explanation starts with the first two facts since they are tightly linked. Northern Industrialization, Southern Deindustrialization, and Trade In a deservedly famous paper on “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” Paul Krugman and Tony Venables explain the first two facts with the new economic geography (NEG) framework.

Understanding the Second Unbundling’s Stylized Facts Chapter 3 identified seven essential outcomes from Phase Four. The North deindustrialized while a small number of developing nations industrialized The rapid industrializers saw their growth soar Commodity prices experienced a super-cycle that initiated growth takeoffs in commodity exporting nations The Great Convergence occurred The nature of North-South trade changed to involve much more back-and-forth trade Most developing nations embraced trade liberalization The impacts were very geographically specific. The first four essential outcomes are closely entwined with the South’s industrialization, so they provide a good starting point. Southern Industrialization, Northern Deindustrialization, and Offshoring Phase Four was witness to a partial reversal of the reversal of fortune that occurred in Phase Three—at least for some of the ancient civilizations.

Since the cost of moving ideas fell much less, the innovations stayed in the North. The North industrialized and the South deindustrialized. Because of this uneven experience with industry, the Northern growth takeoff was earlier and faster than the South’s takeoff—and the result was the Great Divergence and rapid growth in international trade flows. When the ICT revolution lowered the cost of moving ideas inside the boundaries of international production chains, G7 firms started to arbitrage the gigantic imbalance in the planetary distribution of know-how by moving Northern knowledge to the South. The result was a rapid industrialization of the nations involved in these global value chains and a rapid deindustrialization of the G7 firms’ home nations. As before, rapid industrialization triggered rapid income growth, but this time the growth affected about half of humanity rather than just a fifth as it had done in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

 

pages: 232

Planet of Slums by Mike Davis

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barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, centre right, clean water, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, failed state, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Internet Archive, jitney, Kibera, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, megacity, microcredit, New Urbanism, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent control, structural adjustment programs, surplus humans, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor

Eighty percent of Marx's industrial proletariat now lives in China or somewhere outside of Western Europe and the United States.38 In most of the developing world, however, city growth lacks the powerful manufacturing export engines of China, Korea, and Taiwan, as well as China's vast inflow of foreign capital (currently equal to half | of total foreign investment in the entire developing world). Since the ! mid-1980s, the great industrial cities of the South — Bombay, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Belo Horizonte, and Sao Paulo — have all j suffered massive plant closures and tendential deindustrialization. ' Elsewhere, urbanization has been more radically decoupled from industrialization, even from development per se and, in sub-Saharan Africa, from that supposed sine qua non of urbanization, rising agricultural productivity. The size of a city's economy, as a result, often bears surprisingly little relationship to its population size, and vice versa. Figure 5 illustrates this disparity between population and GDP rankings for the largest metropolitan areas.

Cities — in spite of their stagnant or negative economic growth, and without necessary investment in new infrastructure, educational facilities or public-health systems — have simply harvested this world agrarian crisis. Rather than the classical stereotype of the labor-intensive countryside and the capital-intensive industrial metropolis, the Third World now contains many examples of capital-intensive countrysides and labor-intensive | deindustrialized cities. "Overurbanization," in other words, is driven by [ the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs. This is one of | the unexpected tracks down which a neoliberal world order is shunting 1 the future.48 From Karl Marx to Max Weber, classical social theory believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin, and Chicago — and indeed Los Angeles, Sao Paulo, Pusan, and today, Ciudad Juarez, Bangalore, and Guangzhou have roughly approximated this canonical trajectory.

This is one of | the unexpected tracks down which a neoliberal world order is shunting 1 the future.48 From Karl Marx to Max Weber, classical social theory believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin, and Chicago — and indeed Los Angeles, Sao Paulo, Pusan, and today, Ciudad Juarez, Bangalore, and Guangzhou have roughly approximated this canonical trajectory. Most cities of the South, however, more closely resemble Victorian Dublin, which, as historian Emmet Larkin has stressed, was unique amongst "all the slumdoms produced in the western world in the nineteenth century ... [because] its slums were not a product of the industrial revolution. Dublin, in fact, suffered more from the problems of de-industrialization than industrialization between 1800 and 1850."49 Likewise, Kinshasa, Luanda, Khartoum, Dar-es-Salaam, Guayaquil, and Lima continue to grow prodigiously despite ruined importsubstitution industries, shrunken public sectors, and downwardly mobile middle classes. The global forces "pushing" people from the countryside — mechanization of agriculture in Java and India, food imports in Mexico, Haiti, and Kenya, civil war and drought throughout Africa, and everywhere the consolidation of small holdings into 48 See Josef Gugler, "Overurbanization Reconsidered," in Gugler, Cities in the Developing World, pp. 114—23. 49 Foreword to Jacinta Prunty, Dublin Slums, 1800-1925: A Study in Urban Geography, Dublin 1998, p. ix.

 

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Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines by Richard Heinberg, James Howard (frw) Kunstler

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anti-communist, back-to-the-land, clean water, Community Supported Agriculture, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, ending welfare as we know it, energy transition, Fractional reserve banking, greed is good, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, land reform, means of production, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, Plutocrats, plutocrats, post-oil, reserve currency, ride hailing / ride sharing, Ronald Reagan, the built environment, the scientific method, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, urban planning

Nevertheless, the fact that we have reached the end of the era of cheap oil and gas demands that we re-examine the potential costs and benefits of our current trajectory and its alternatives. I believe we must and can de-industrialize agriculture. The general outline of what I mean by de-industrialization is simple enough: a radical reduction of fossil fuel inputs to agriculture, accompanied by an increase in labor inputs and a reduction of transport, with production being devoted primarily to local consumption. Once again, fossil fuel depletion almost ensures that this will happen. But at the same time, it is fairly obvious that if we don’t plan for de-industrialization, the result could be catastrophic. It’s worth taking a moment to think about how events might unfold if the process occurs without intelligent management, driven simply by oil and gas depletion.

Table of Contents Praise Title Page Join the Conversation Acknowledgements Foreword Preface Introduction ON TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ARTS Chapter 1 - Tools with a Life of Their Own Classy Tools It’s the Energy, Silly Peak Oil and the Limits of Technology Staring at Techno-Collapse Chapter 2 - Fifty Million Farmers Intensifying Food Production The 21 Century: De-Industrialization Examples and Strategies The Key: More Farmers! If We Do This Well Chapter 3 - (post-) Hydrocarbon Aesthetics Designing for the Tragic Interlude of Cheap Abundance Hydrocarbon Style: Big, Fast, and Ugly Oh, To Be Hip Again Manifesto for a Post-Carbon Aesthetic ON NATURE’S LIMITS AND THE HUMAN CONDITION Chapter 4 - Five Axioms of Sustainability History and Background Five Axioms Evaluation Chapter 5 - Parrots and Peoples Chapter 6 - Population, Resources, and Human Idealism THE END OF ONE ERA, THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER Chapter 7 - The Psychology of Peak Oil and Climate Change Explaining Our Incomprehension Acceptance and Beyond: Peak Oil Grief Collective PTSD A Model for Explanation and Treatment: Addiction and Dependency Proactive Application: Social Marketing Chapter 8 - Bridging Peak Oil and Climate Change Activism Differing Perspectives Differing Recommendations Supply Side, Demand Side Common Ground Chapter 9 - Boomers’ Last Chance?

Fortunately, during the past century or two we have also developed the disciplines of archaeology and ecology, which teach us how and why those ancient societies failed, and how the diversity of the web of life sustains us. In principle, if we avail ourselves of this knowledge, we need not mindlessly repeat yet again the time-worn tale of catastrophic civilizational collapse. The 21st Century: De-Industrialization How might we avoid such a fate? Surely the dilemmas we have outlined above are understood by the managers of the current industrial food system. They must have some solutions in mind. Indeed they do, and, perhaps predictably, those solutions involve a further intensification of the food production process. Since we cannot achieve much by applying more energy directly to that process, the most promising strategy on the horizon seems to be the genetic engineering of new crop varieties.

 

pages: 361 words: 83,886

Inside the Robot Kingdom: Japan, Mechatronics and the Coming Robotopia by Frederik L. Schodt

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carbon-based life, computer age, computer vision, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, factory automation, game design, guest worker program, industrial robot, Jacques de Vaucanson, Norbert Wiener, post-industrial society, robot derives from the Czech word robota Czech, meaning slave, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, telepresence, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, V2 rocket, Whole Earth Review, women in the workforce

To them, a Harley is more than a motorcycle; it is a symbol of the American ethos. Even free-trade advocate Ronald Reagan seemed to acknowledge this when, in 1983, without obvious economic or military reasons, he authorized whopping tariffs to protect the Harley-Davidson company and its 1,400 employees. Third, deindustrialization of the United States in particular has frightening implications both for the world economy and for Japan. Japanese labor unions have occasionally worried that their nation's robotization has aggravated unemployment overseas, but industrialists worry about deindustrialization, too. Hajime Karatsu in his 1985 article "Is U.S. Industry Going Down the Tubes?" wrote that "if present trends continue, U.S. industry will soon be in danger of complete collapse. World leaders must focus their attention on this impending crisis and consider what must be done to avert it."20 In the postwar period, the tremendous purchasing power of the American consumer has fueled the economic growth of Europe and Asia, especially Japan.

As Wiener imagined for India, roboticist Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, professor at the University of Tokyo's Mechanical Engineering Department, thinks one reason China is so interested in robotics, and especially in the training of software engineers for industry, is that a software engineer can be trained in three years, while it takes at least ten to train a skilled lathe operator.18 * * * * * * * * * * * * In the advanced, richer nations, robots have increasingly become a means of countering "deindustrialization," or what the Japanese call the "hollowing" of industry—the transformation of manufacturing concerns into marketing specialists who no longer make what they sell. According to Joseph Engelberger, Japan's success with robots is the real driving force behind their application in United States and European industry today. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom has in the past heaped scorn on British manufacturers who fail to robotize, contrasting Japan's high number of robots and low unemployment with the opposite situation in Britain and noting that "the people who object to new technology will use their pay packets to buy the products of new technology from other countries."19 The advantages of using robotics are obvious, but why should the advanced nations even bother?

Why not accept the world trend of specialization and international division of labor and become, as many experts suggest, post-industrial societies based on software, design, and the service industries? First, nations with strong manufacturing industries have historically dominated other areas as well. Process and product technology have become much more closely linked today, so that to remain technologically advanced an industry requires a mastery of manufacturing technology equal to or greater than its mastery of design technology. For the US., deindustrialization exposes a deep-rooted national schizophrenia—a political and military establishment fixated on the Soviet Union and committed to a defense policy that requires a maximum of industrial self-sufficiency, and an economic establishment increasingly dependent on Japanese and Asian manufacturing and technology. Second, manufacturing is more than making money; it can be an expression of culture.

 

pages: 317 words: 101,475

Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class by Owen Jones

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Asperger Syndrome, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, British Empire, call centre, collapse of Lehman Brothers, credit crunch, deindustrialization, Etonian, facts on the ground, falling living standards, first-past-the-post, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, housing crisis, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, Occupy movement, pension reform, place-making, Plutocrats, plutocrats, race to the bottom, rising living standards, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working-age population

The researchers' conclusion was that 'the UK's very high incapacity claimant numbers are an issue of jobs and of health: Glasgow is a particularly striking example of how the de-industrialization of Britain has left continuing-but disguised-mass unemployment inits wake. The city houses more incapacity benefit claimants than any other local authority. The number of people claiming some form of disability benefits peaked in 1995 at one in five of the working population, or almost three times the UK level. A group of Glasgow University and Glasgow City Council experts looked at how the number of recipients increased during the 1980s, and concluded: 'The main reason for the huge growth in sickness benefit claims was the city's rapid de-industrialization.' The number of manufacturing jobs in 1991 had collapsed to just a third of the 1971 figure. Staggeringly, Glasgow rose from 208'th to tenth place among local authorities for economic inactivity levels in the decade following 1981.

For the first time since the World War II,the next generation will be worse off than the generation before it. of course, we all have agency: we don't all respond to the same situation in the same way. But it only takes a small proportion of young people who have nothing much to lose to bring chaos to the streets. It is also impossible to ignore the fact that men featured so prominently among the rioters. Nine out of ten apprehended rioters were men. Britain's rapid de-industrialization and the disappearance of so many skilled middle-income jobs were particularly disruptive--given that such work often excluded women-to the lives of working-class men. Over a generation ago, a young working-class man could leave school at the age of sixteen and have a decent prospect of getting an apprenticeship, training that might open a gateway to a skilled, respected job that could give life some structure.

It would be wrong of me to portray Ashington as some sort of postapocalyptic hellhole or as a society in total meltdown. The town centre is studded with shops like Argos, Curry's, Carphone Warehouse and Gregg's bakery. There's a real community spirit in the air. People are warm towards one another-as they were towards me, a stranger asking them intrusive questions. Communities like Ashington were devastated by the whirlwind of de-industrialization unleashed by Thatcherism, but people do their best to adjust and get on with their lives, even in the toughest of circumstances. Father Ian Jackson has been the local Catholic priest in Ashington since 2002. 'It's a very warm, caring kind of community. People really look out for each other,' he told me. 'I think it was hit badly with the closure of the mines-there's very little work for people, so it's quite deprived in a lot of ways.

 

pages: 401 words: 112,784

Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic Slump by Tom Clark, Anthony Heath

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, British Empire, Carmen Reinhart, credit crunch, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Etonian, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, full employment, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, interest rate swap, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, obamacare, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, quantitative easing, Ronald Reagan, science of happiness, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, unconventional monetary instruments, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working poor

Summary results and fieldwork details at: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cu­mulus_uploads/document/u7f0cyctl1/YGCam-Archi­ve-results-040413-All-Countries.pdf 35. Borie-Holtz et al., No End in Sight, pp. 3–7. 36. Comparative data for the wider American workforce are drawn from another survey, conducted by the Heldrich Center in November 2009. See ibid., Table 2. 37. Valerie Walkerdine and Luis Jimenez, Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 137–8. 38. The satisfaction scores of the continually employed group was essentially unchanged over these years – rounding to 5.3 in both years. This updated analysis was kindly provided by James Laurence and Chaeyoon Lim. 39. Between the 2002/03 and the 2008/09 waves, the satisfaction scores of those who have moved into unemployment drop by just over 0.5 (a fractionally larger fall than in the most recent data) while the ‘newly re-employed’ actually experience a marginal increase in happiness.

‘Suicide in England and Wales 1861–2007: A time-trends analysis’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 39:6 (2010), pp. 1464–75, available at: http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/39/6/1464.full Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, Fontana/HarperCollins, London, 1994 [1840]. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases source’, Science, NS 185:4157 (1974), pp. 1124–31, available at: www.socsci.uci.edu/∼bskyrms/bio/readings/tversky_k_heuristics_biases.pdf Walkerdine, Valerie and Luis Jimenez. Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012. Whittaker, Matthew. On Borrowed Time? Dealing with household debt in an era of stagnant incomes, Resolution Foundation, London, 2012. Wilcox, W. Bradford (ed.). The State of Our Unions, 2009, National Marriage Project, University of Virginia and the Institute for American Values, Charlottesville, VA, 2009. Willetts, David.

 

pages: 519 words: 136,708

Vertical: The City From Satellites to Bunkers by Stephen Graham

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1960s counterculture, Berlin Wall, Buckminster Fuller, Chelsea Manning, Commodity Super-Cycle, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Edward Snowden, energy security, Frank Gehry, ghettoisation, Google Earth, high net worth, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, Indoor air pollution, Jane Jacobs, late capitalism, means of production, megacity, megastructure, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, nuclear winter, oil shale / tar sands, planetary scale, Plutocrats, plutocrats, post-industrial society, Project Plowshare, rent control, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Skype, South China Sea, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, trickle-down economics, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, white flight, WikiLeaks

‘Modern Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3:32 pm (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final coup de grâce by dynamite.’25 Built in the 1950s, the Pruitt-Igoe project became in the 1960s and 1970s a symbol of the racialised decay of inner urban cores and white flight as the middle classes rushed to the suburbs. Redlining, deindustrialisation and the growing emergence of racialised ghettos in Pruitt-Igoe and similar projects allowed mainstream media to demonise such places and their inhabitants. Pruitt-Igoe thus emerged as a symbol of urban decay, collapse and hopelessness. Its spectacular erasure was widely used as shorthand for a period in the US where ‘those who lived in cities no longer cared for them, and those who lived elsewhere feared and detested them.’26 The fact that communal housing was widely deemed to chime with socialist thinking didn’t help.

Poor housing management policies, racialised policing and catastrophic drugs policies must also be considered. We should also address the often shoddy and cheapskate design of the resulting tower blocks, the failure to deliver promised infrastructure, services or jobs, poor communication between architects and housing offices and the power of demonising stigma. Above all, we must recognise the systematic deindustrialisation of and disinvestment in many of the surrounding local economies imagined to sustain the towers and the severe problems of mass unemployment that followed. Perhaps more important, though, is the need to stress that many examples of high-rise social housing throughout Europe and North America – including modernist high-rise housing – have been extremely successful.33 In hundreds of cases, socially oriented and publicly built and managed vertical housing remains tremendously popular.

 

Global Financial Crisis by Noah Berlatsky

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, asset-backed security, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, centre right, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, energy security, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, Food sovereignty, George Akerlof, Gordon Gekko, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, market bubble, market fundamentalism, moral hazard, new economy, Northern Rock, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, South China Sea, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, working poor

In the name of ‘free trade’ and ‘comparative advantage’ [the ability of a country to produce a good at a lower relative cost than an192 Solutions to the Global Financial Crisis other] African countries were forced to accept sweeping trade liberalisation that has been very costly in economic and social terms. Trade liberalisation has increased Africa’s external dependence, destroyed domestic industries, accelerated deindustrialisation and led to the deterioration of its terms of trade. While African countries were being told about the virtues of ‘free trade’, OECD countries were provided huge agricultural subsidies erecting disguised or open protectionist policies, all of which have made ‘free trade’ a joke. Still in the name of ‘comparative advantage’, African countries were forced to give priority to cash crops at the expense of food production.

 

pages: 323 words: 90,868

The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century by Ryan Avent

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3D printing, Airbnb, American energy revolution, autonomous vehicles, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, gig economy, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, inventory management, invisible hand, Jacquard loom, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph-Marie Jacquard, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, lump of labour, Lyft, manufacturing employment, means of production, new economy, performance metric, pets.com, price mechanism, quantitative easing, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reshoring, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, software is eating the world, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, very high income, working-age population

Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s. Remarkably, manufacturing now accounts for less than 10 per cent of American employment. In the emerging world, deindustrialization is occurring at ever earlier stages of development: an ailment that economist Dani Rodrik has labelled ‘premature deindustrialization’.12 When manufacturing’s share of total value added in the South Korean economy peaked in 1988, real income per person in South Korea was about $10,000, or just less than half the American level at the time. When that same peak was reached in Indonesia in 2002, its real income per person was roughly $6,000, or about 15 per cent of the American level.

That knowledge would not be especially valuable at other publications, nor would it do the designer much good to try to rely on the corresponding social capital from her old employer at her new job. So, as social capital loomed larger within rich economies, it became clear that firms were not the only context in which social capital took on new salience. Its rise also boosted the fortunes of big cities with lots of skilled workers. By the end of the 1970s, deindustrialization and suburbanization had many of the rich world’s great industrial cities on the ropes. Populations were crashing. In 1975, New York City very nearly went bankrupt. Popular cinema was filled with dystopian visions of the urban future, in which street punks ruled the streets of gutted cities. But from the 1980s onwards, a turnaround was apparent in some of those very same distressed cities.

The digital revolution, which helped to establish the supply-chain revolution in the first place, continues to shape trade patterns and the ways in which trade enables development. This time, new technology seems to be making life harder for the emerging world. Supply-chain-powered development represented an accelerated – if somewhat superficial – form of industrialization. It seems to have also, as a side effect, accelerated deindustrialization. Readers in rich economies will be well aware of the phenomenon – the loss of manufacturing work to other locations – that hollowed out once-great cities like Detroit. Britain, the first industrializer, was the first to face this particular ill, quite early in the twentieth century. Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s.

 

pages: 332 words: 89,668

Two Nations, Indivisible: A History of Inequality in America: A History of Inequality in America by Jamie Bronstein

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, back-to-the-land, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, big-box store, blue-collar work, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate personhood, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, ending welfare as we know it, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, income inequality, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, non-tariff barriers, obamacare, occupational segregation, Occupy movement, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price discrimination, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Simon Kuznets, single-payer health, strikebreaker, too big to fail, trade route, transcontinental railway, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, wage slave, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Works Progress Administration

WHY INEQUALITY MATTERS The Great Recession and the social unrest of the Occupy movement and the Tea Party show that inequality matters, but there are other reasons to pay attention to inequality as well. The first reason is permanence. Deindustrialization has removed good manufacturing jobs from the economy, leaving low-wage service jobs that notoriously pay poverty-level wages. Although repairing the nation’s aging infrastructure might provide widespread employment at good wages, it has not been a priority, even in Great-Recession-linked stimulus packages.50 Trade unions, which, despite their flaws (including sclerotic leadership and deep-seated racism and Cold War ideology) once provided a measure of job protection, pensions, and other benefits for their members, ebbed with deindustrialization and the rise of low-paid, insecure labor.51 Trade globalization, it traditionally has been thought, lifts all boats, because even if well-paid manufacturing jobs are exported overseas, the price of goods and services becomes cheaper.

For Williamson and Lindert, the “Great Compression” of midcentury was based on the waning of unemployment during the Great Depression and World War II; government transfers, in the form of either taxation or direct transfer payments; and a reduction in the prices of necessities that made up the consumer basket of poorer people. The Great Depression may also have substantially eroded the wealth of the top 1 percent of the population, from about 36.6 percent of the national wealth in 1929 to around 25 percent in 1950.20 No matter what the cause of the Great Compression of the postwar years, inequality began increasing again in the 1980s, under pressure from both economic trends (deindustrialization and globalization) and government decision making (tax cuts for the wealthy and cuts to social and educational spending) and has now reached levels at or above those in the 1920s.21 In addition to showing that inequality has been a constant feature in American history, this book will also argue that inequality is not necessary for, and in fact undermines, national prosperity. The economist Simon Kutznets predicted in the 1950s that while industrialization invariably results in inequality in the short run, in the long run one can see an inverted “U-shaped” curve, as economic growth lifts all fortunes and helps to compress inequality.22 Kuznets’s supposition has not been borne out by experiences in the developed world since the 1980s.23 In contrast, Williamson and Lindert and Thomas Piketty have shown that inequality is not a necessary condition of economic growth.

Such critical turning-points include the end of the Civil War, when the government failed to consider stakeholding for freed African Americans; during World War II, when a proposal was on the table to make the nation responsible for the full employment of its citizens; during the Nixon administration, when a basic income guarantee came close to passage; and during the Reagan administration, when neoliberal promises distracted working people from deindustrialization and globalization. This book is divided into eight chronological chapters. Chapter 1 covers the period from the American Revolution to the late 1820s. It argues that like the classical civilizations that the Founders so much admired, a virtuous American republic was predicated on the theory that all and only white men were equal citizens, but that this did not mean they were entitled to equal standing or even equal political participation.

 

pages: 248 words: 57,419

The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy by Richard Duncan

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asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Bretton Woods, currency manipulation / currency intervention, debt deflation, deindustrialization, diversification, diversified portfolio, fiat currency, financial innovation, Flash crash, Fractional reserve banking, income inequality, inflation targeting, Joseph Schumpeter, laissez-faire capitalism, liquidity trap, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage debt, private sector deleveraging, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, trade liberalization

The country is deindustrializing because wage rates in the U.S. manufacturing sector are 30 to 40 times higher than the prevailing global wage rate for factory workers, which is $5 per day. Consequently, the nature of the economy has changed. An economic paradigm built on debt expansion, asset price bubbles, and the service industry replaced the previous paradigm that was centered on the production of tangible goods. In 2008, however, that new paradigm exhausted its potential to support asset prices or the demand for services, leaving the country deindustrialized and without the kind of capital structure capable of generating profits, savings, and new investments. That left the United States ripe for a brutal economic contraction. The crisis has caused the process of deindustrialization to accelerate.

Later, the United States promoted trade liberalization and cross-border capital flows with no concern for the very large U.S. trade deficits that emerged as a result. Finally, it failed to act when many of its trading partners blatantly manipulated the value of their currencies in a way that prevented the trade imbalances from correcting. When the U.S. credit bubble began in earnest in the 1980s, other countries expanded their industrial capacity to satisfy the United States’ rapidly expanding debt-financed demand. The United States began to deindustrialize and wage rates stagnated, but that did not matter so long as U.S. stock prices and home prices kept inflating, because American households were able to borrow more and to consume more. The United States was able to import more each year, and that demand absorbed the rest of the world’s rapidly increasing industrial supply. In the developing world where the most rapid economic expansion took place, wage rates were (and remain) far too low to allow domestic demand to absorb the supply of goods being produced in those countries.

This scenario is by no means guaranteed, however. Politics might make any additional increase in government spending impossible. The path described in Scenario three would certainly be the least painful way to reach 2015. Reaching 2015 in that way would not mean the issues at the core of the crisis had been resolved, however. Global supply would still greatly exceed global demand. The United States would continue to deindustrialize and that, in turn, would continue to depress wages and so prevent any new expansion of private sector credit growth. Moreover, the U.S. government would be more indebted and less creditworthy than it is now, and inflation would be on the rise. Large-scale deficit spending financed in large part by fiat money creation would be a fix, not a solution. The longer-term outlook would remain alarming.

 

pages: 318 words: 85,824

A Brief History of Neoliberalism by David Harvey

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business climate, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, crony capitalism, debt deflation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, financial repression, full employment, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, labour market flexibility, land tenure, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, neoliberal agenda, new economy, phenotype, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, The Chicago School, transaction costs, union organizing, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

The deregulation of everything from airlines and telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of untrammelled market freedoms for powerful corporate interests. Tax breaks on investment effectively subsidized the movement of capital away from the unionized north-east and midwest and into the non-union and weakly regulated south and west. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher rates of return. Deindustrialization at home and moves to take production abroad became much more common. The market, depicted ideologically as the way to foster competition and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 70 to 28 per cent in what was billed as ‘the largest tax cut in history’ (Figure 1.7). Figure 1.6 The attack on labour: real wages and productivity in the US, 1960–2000 Source: Pollin, Contours of Descent.

But business should ‘assiduously cultivate’ the state and when necessary use it ‘aggressively and with determination’.6 But exactly how was state power to be deployed to reshape common-sense understandings? One line of response to the double crisis of capital accumulation and class power arose in the trenches of the urban struggles of the 1970s. The New York City fiscal crisis was an iconic case. Capitalist restructuring and deindustrialization had for several years been eroding the economic base of the city, and rapid suburbanization had left much of the central city impoverished. The result was explosive social unrest on the part of marginalized populations during the 1960s, defining what came to be known as ‘the urban crisis’ (similar problems emerged in many US cities). The expansion of public employment and public provision—facilitated in part by generous federal funding—was seen as the solution.

With unemployment surging to 10 per cent in the mid-1980s, the moment was propitious to attack all forms of organized labour and to cut back on its privileges as well as its power. Transfer of industrial activity from the unionized north-east and midwest to the non-unionized and ‘right-to-work’ states of the south, if not beyond to Mexico and South-East Asia, became standard practice (subsidized by favourable taxation for new investment and aided by the shift in emphasis from production to finance as the centrepiece of capitalist class power). Deindustrialization of formerly unionized core industrial regions (the so-called ‘rust belt’) dis-empowered labour. Corporations could threaten plant closures, and risk—and usually win—strikes when necessary (for example in the coal industry). But here too it was not merely the use of the big stick that mattered, for there were a number of carrots that could be offered to labourers as individuals to break with collective action.

 

pages: 255 words: 75,172

Sleeping Giant: How the New Working Class Will Transform America by Tamara Draut

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affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, battle of ideas, big-box store, blue-collar work, collective bargaining, David Brooks, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, Detroit bankruptcy, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, ending welfare as we know it, Ferguson, Missouri, financial deregulation, full employment, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, obamacare, occupational segregation, payday loans, pink-collar, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit motive, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trickle-down economics, union organizing, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, white flight, women in the workforce, young professional

The pace of job losses was swift, a hard jerking away of people’s livelihoods and dignity, leaving a reverberating pain that would last for decades. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened up opportunities for black men to work in the reigning industrial sector of the time, but predominantly in the hardest, lowest-paid jobs—the very jobs that were most susceptible to being replaced by machines.43 As a result, black men experienced more than their fair share of dislocation as a result of deindustrialization. Thanks to a generation of discriminatory housing policies, black Americans were also more likely to be living in the central core of urban America. So when major steel factories on the outskirts of major cities—Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, Cleveland—shut down, the communities closest to these economic hubs faced severe economic isolation and collapse. The depth of the loss was substantial.

And the loss of her dad’s job quickly plummeted the family from “being working class to being super-poor,” Patrisse remembers. Instead of having access to private doctors and world-class care at Kaiser Permanente, she and her brothers now had to go to the public county hospital. Her dad was never able to rebound to his previous salary, instead relying on a series of low-paying jobs at auto-repair franchises like Midas. Cullors describes the connection between deindustrialization and mass incarceration as happening “fast, fast, fast.” Her neighborhood, Van Nuys, was poor in the 1990s, and right next door to the affluent community of Sherman Oaks, which made Van Nuys susceptible to gentrification and its black residents undesirable. “The neighborhood became super-surveilled and super-policed. I witnessed my brothers and their friends being harassed on a daily basis, stopped and frisked.

As Michelle Alexander observes in her stunning and critically acclaimed book The New Jim Crow, “Conservatives found they could finally justify an all-out war on an ‘enemy’ that had been racially defined years before.”47 By the time Reagan took office, two things were crystal-clear about the ideology of the Republican Party: 1) it would use race to divide the working class to win elections; and 2) it would use race to fuel antigovernment sentiment to shrink the role of government. So just when urban America was reeling from the economic upheaval of deindustrialization and black working-class men and women found themselves either jobless or underemployed, the narrative about what was happening in these neighborhoods depicted black people as morally and culturally defective, mired in a web of self-destruction that included drugs, out-of-wedlock births, and crime. Ronald Reagan masterfully spun dog-whistle narratives, turning racially coded language into electoral gold.

 

pages: 267 words: 82,580

The Dark Net by Jamie Bartlett

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3D printing, 4chan, bitcoin, blockchain, brain emulation, carbon footprint, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Chrome, Howard Rheingold, Internet of things, invention of writing, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Julian Assange, Kuwabatake Sanjuro: assassination market, life extension, litecoin, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, moral hazard, Occupy movement, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, Satoshi Nakamoto, Skype, slashdot, technological singularity, technoutopianism, Ted Kaczynski, The Coming Technological Singularity, Turing test, Vernor Vinge, WikiLeaks, Zimmermann PGP

By losing authentic, face-to-face communication, Zerzan thinks the internet encourages thoughtlessness, cruelty, a lack of reflection and short attention spans. He has a point. A growing number of writers have pointed to possible long-term detrimental health effects of online stimulation, such as technostress, data asphyxiation, information fatigue syndrome, cognitive overload and time famine. The only answer, he says, is to leave technology behind and return to a non-civilised way of life through large-scale deindus-trialisation and what he calls ‘rewilding’. If sci-fi writers like William Gibson inspire the transhumanists, the anarcho-primitivists prefer the writings of Henry David Thoreau: back to nature. I ask Zerzan how far back he’s willing to go in pursuit of a natural state of existence. Should we also rid ourselves of dialysis machines? Sewage plants? Bows and arrows? He won’t commit precisely on what he’d like to get rid of: he prefers to see it as a direction of travel.

 

pages: 467 words: 116,902

The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness by Michelle Alexander

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affirmative action, cognitive bias, Columbine, deindustrialization, desegregation, ending welfare as we know it, friendly fire, illegal immigration, land reform, large denomination, low skilled workers, means of production, new economy, New Urbanism, pink-collar, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, women in the workforce

The budget of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, for example, was reduced from $274 million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984, and antidrug funds allocated to the Department of Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million.74 Determined to ensure that the “new Republican majority” would continue to support the extraordinary expansion of the federal government’s law enforcement activities and that Congress would continue to fund it, the Reagan administration launched a media offensive to justify the War on Drugs.75 Central to the media campaign was an effort to sensationalize the emergence of crack cocaine in inner-city neighborhoods—communities devastated by deindustrialization and skyrocketing unemployment. The media frenzy the campaign inspired simply could not have come at a worse time for African Americans. In the early 1980s, just as the drug war was kicking off, inner-city communities were suffering from economic collapse. The blue-collar factory jobs that had been plentiful in urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s had suddenly disappeared.76 Prior to 1970, inner-city workers with relatively little formal education could find industrial employment close to home.

To make matters worse, dramatic technological changes revolutionized the workplace—changes that eliminated many of the jobs that less skilled workers once relied upon for their survival. Highly educated workers benefited from the pace of technological change and the increased use of computer-based technologies, but blue-collar workers often found themselves displaced in the sudden transition from an industrial to a service economy. The impact of globalization and deindustrialization was felt most strongly in black inner-city communities. As described by William Julius Wilson, in his book When Work Disappears, the overwhelming majority of African Americans in the 1970s lacked college educations and had attended racially segregated, underfunded schools lacking basic resources. Those residing in ghetto communities were particularly ill equipped to adapt to the seismic changes taking place in the U.S. economy; they were left isolated and jobless.

Adding to their troubles is the “spatial mismatch” between their residence and employment opportunities.25 Willingness to hire ex-offenders is greatest in construction or manufacturing—industries that require little customer contact—and weakest in retail trade and other service sector businesses.26 Manufacturing jobs, however, have all but disappeared from the urban core during the past thirty years. Not long ago, young, unskilled men could find decent, well-paying jobs at large factories in most major Northern cities. Today, due to globalization and deindustrialization, that is no longer the case. Jobs can be found in the suburbs—mostly service sector jobs—but employment for unskilled men with criminal convictions, while difficult to find anywhere, is especially hard to find close to home. An ex-offender whose driver’s license has been suspended or who does not have access to a car, often faces nearly insurmountable barriers to finding employment. Driving to the suburbs to pick up and drop off applications, attend interviews, and pursue employment leads may be perfectly feasible if you have a driver’s license and access to a vehicle, but attempting to do so by bus is another matter entirely.

 

pages: 394 words: 85,734

The Global Minotaur by Yanis Varoufakis, Paul Mason

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banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, business climate, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, full employment, Hyman Minsky, industrial robot, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, market fundamentalism, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, paper trading, planetary scale, post-oil, price stability, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, structural adjustment programs, systematic trading, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Yom Kippur War

This two-pronged effect is causing Latin America to deindustrialize and return to the status of a primary goods producer. These developments have a global reach. For if Brazil and Argentina turn their eyes toward Asia, as they have already started doing, they may abandon their long-term struggle to break into the food markets of the United States and Europe, from which they have been barred by severe protectionist measures in favour of American, German and French farmers. Already, Latin America’s shifting trade patterns are affecting the orientation of a region that was, until very recently, thought of as the United States’ backyard. Latin America’s governments are choosing not to resist their countries’ transformation into China’s primary goods producers. They may not like deindustrialization much, but it is preferable to the prospect of another crisis like that of 1998–2002, and another visit from an IMF seeking to exact more pounds of flesh from their people.

In the meantime, American households saw their debt share of national income rise from 66 per cent in 1997 to 100 per cent ten years later. Put together, aggregate US debt in 2008 exceeded 350 per cent of GDP, when in 1980 it had stood at an already inflated 160 per cent. As for Britain, the City of London (the financial sector in which British society had put most of its eggs, following the rapid deindustrialization of the early 1980s) sported a collective debt almost two and a half times Britain’s GDP, while, in addition, British families owed a sum greater than one annual GDP. So, if an accumulation of inordinate debt infused more risk than the world could bear, how come no one saw the crash coming? That was, after all, the Queen’s reasonable question. The British Academy’s answer grudgingly confessed to the combined sins of smug rhetoric and linear extrapolation.

Both countries had been rendered dependable (thanks to the overwhelming presence of the US military); both featured solid industrial bases; and both offered a highly skilled workforce and a people that would jump at the opportunity of rising, phoenix-like, from the ashes. Moreover, they both offered considerable geostrategic benefits vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there was a good deal of resistance to this idea to be overcome – resistance grounded in the urge to punish Germany and Japan by forcing them to deindustrialize and return to an almost pastoral state from which they would never again be able to launch an industrial-scale war. Indeed, Harry White, the US representative at Bretton Woods, had advocated the effective removal of Germany’s industry, forcing German living standards down to those of the country’s less-developed neighbours. In 1946, the Allies, under the auspices of the Allied Control Council, ordered the dismantling of steel plants with a view to reducing German steel production to less than 6 million tons annually, i.e. around 75 per cent of Germany’s pre-war steel output.

 

pages: 440 words: 108,137

The Meritocracy Myth by Stephen J. McNamee

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affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, collective bargaining, computer age, conceptual framework, corporate governance, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, deskilling, equal pay for equal work, estate planning, failed state, fixed income, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, helicopter parent, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, job automation, joint-stock company, labor-force participation, low-wage service sector, marginal employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, occupational segregation, pink-collar, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, prediction markets, profit motive, race to the bottom, random walk, school choice, Scientific racism, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, white flight, young professional

What is more, these forms of discrimination often become components of cumulative disadvantage, which have been referred to as “multiple jeopardy,” or the effects of intersectionalities. We conclude that discrimination trumps merit; the more forms of discrimination that are operative, the more effective the trump. In the concluding chapter, “Growing Inequality in the Twenty-First Century,” we outline the implications of globalization and deindustrialization, the long wage recession, and increasing economic inequality since the 1970s for the sustainability of the notions of meritocracy and the American Dream in the twenty-first century. We examine strategies that individual Americans have developed to cope with the problems created by these changes. Individual coping strategies, however, will not make the system more equal, more meritocratic, or more fair.

In addition, as part of the overall downsizing strategy, middle-level management jobs were trimmed while new computer technologies automated routine information-processing tasks. In the postwar period, it had been possible for many working-class Americans with only a high school diploma to realize the American Dream by working in factories and corporate offices with good pay, good benefits, and long-term job stability. With “deindustrialization” and “downsizing,” many of these workers were laid off (Uchitelle 2006). New jobs were created, but these were mostly in the “soft,” low-wage, low-skill service sector. Reflecting on her interviews with these workers, economist Paula Rayman put it this way: During the early 1980s, many workers in America who thought they had it made in the major industrial corporations of auto, steel, and aircraft found themselves unemployed. . . .

Economist Frank Levy points to several factors responsible for this change: the civil rights movement, which reduced economic discrimination; the extension of the interstate highway system and the development of network television, which helped link the South to other regions; and the spread of air-conditioning, making the South more amenable to the “climatically challenged” (1998, 133). The availability of cheap land, low wages, low taxes, and low levels of unionization also encouraged industrial development in the South. During the same period, deindustrialization of the Northeast and Midwest (the Rust Belt) depressed wages, especially in the manufacturing sectors. Despite these changes, significant regional gaps in income and poverty rates remain. Table 6.2 depicts median household income differences and family poverty rates among regions in the United States in 2011.[1] Median household income ranges from a high of $53,864 in the Northeast to a low of $46,899 in the South, representing a 12.9 percent gap.

 

pages: 75 words: 22,220

Occupy by Noam Chomsky

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corporate governance, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, Howard Zinn, income inequality, invisible hand, Martin Wolf, Nate Silver, Occupy movement, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, precariat, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, too big to fail, union organizing

The change took place in the 1970s. There are a lot of reasons for it. One of the underlying factors, discussed mainly by economic historian Robert Brenner, was the falling rate of profit in manufacturing. There were other factors. It led to major changes in the economy—a reversal of the several hundred years of progress towards industrialization and development and that turned to a process of de-industrialization and de-development. Of course, manufacturing production continued overseas—very profitable, but no good for the work force. Along with that came a significant shift of the economy from productive enterprise—producing things people need or could use—to financial manipulation. The financialization of the economy really took off at that time. On Banks Before the 1970s, banks were banks.

Lots of people moved into reasonable lifestyles. What’s called here “middle class.” “Working class,” as it’s called in other countries. But it was real. And the 1960s accelerated it. The activism of the 1960s, after a pretty dismal decade, really civilized the country in lots of ways that are permanent. They’re not changing. They’re staying on. When the 1970s came along there were sudden and sharp changes: de-industrialization, off-shoring of production, and shifting to financial institutions, which grew enormously. I should say that, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was also the development of what several decades later became the high-tech economy: computers, the Internet, the IT Revolution, mostly developed in the 1950s and 1960s, substantially in the state sector. It took a couple of decades before it took off, but it was developed there.

 

pages: 268 words: 112,708

Culture works: the political economy of culture by Richard Maxwell

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1960s counterculture, AltaVista, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, big-box store, business process, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, intermodal, late capitalism, Marshall McLuhan, medical malpractice, Network effects, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, refrigerator car, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, talking drums, telemarketer, the built environment, Thorstein Veblen, Unsafe at Any Speed, urban renewal, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce

A rapid rise in automobile ownership and the federal postwar highway building programs allowed large numbers of people—and retail businesses—to move out of the downtowns.26 At the same time, in some parts of the urban United States, the mobility of industrial capital had already begun pulling plants and businesses out of urban areas, setting off the racialized “urban crisis” of the 1960s and prefiguring the catastrophic deindustrialization of the 1980s.27 According to Lizabeth Cohen, “between 1947 and 1953 alone, the suburban population increased by 43 percent, in contrast to a general population increase of 11 percent,” and this population was increasingly racially and ethnically segregated.28 Tax and lending laws were changed at this time to favor the interests of large real-estate developers and investors. Tax write-offs, construction loan interest write-offs, low capital gains tax rates for real-estate profits, and especially a tax maneuver called “accelerated depreciation” added up reasons for the very wealthy to speculate in buildings and land.

Although this critique of the political economy of shopping has refused to embrace the ideals of consumerism or the practical realities of commercialization, it has shown the importance of analyzing consumption and production as parts of a single system. This is crucial for rethinking how activist consumers can shape demands for a more transparent shopping landscape—a clearer picture of where products come from and how they are made. There is abundant evidence that the same processes of capital flight, deindustrialization, and internationalization that have increased poverty, part-time work, and more stressful and unsafe working days have created the bounty that Wal-Mart, Target, and Westfield Villages celebrate. Indeed, megaretailers have played an important part in driving wages, job security, and working conditions downward for many people—and not just Americans—as they have helped flood the world with cheap goods.

Also during the 1980s, under the influence of the law and economics movement, the judiciary gradually shifted the burden of proof in intellectual property cases concerning the boundaries of the public domain: where previously the assumption was that things in the public domain should stay that way unless a compelling case could be made for privatization, these days the assumption is the reverse, that things should be privatized unless a compelling case can be made not to. Finally, faced with deindustrialization at home and the realization that intellectual property was the last remaining area of clear-cut U.S. industrial domination, the U.S. State Department embraced these trends and took on the expansion of intellectual property rights internationally as a key foreign-policy goal.23 In sum, it is significant that executives such as NBC’s Scott Sassa no longer refer to popular programs, films, or songs when discussing media strategy.

 

pages: 356 words: 103,944

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy by Dani Rodrik

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, full employment, George Akerlof, guest worker program, Hernando de Soto, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, night-watchman state, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, open economy, price stability, profit maximization, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, savings glut, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, tulip mania, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey

In the words of the economists Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford, commodity-exporting countries gave up productivity in exchange for population.8 The countries of the periphery not only failed to industrialize, they actually lost whatever industry they had. They deindustrialized. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, Asia and Latin America had levels of industrial activity roughly similar to Europe’s. Europe experienced a nearly sixfold increase in these levels between 1750 and 1913. Asia and Latin America meanwhile witnessed a decline to less than a third of their initial level.9 In 1900, developing nations produced only about half the quantity of manufactured goods that they did in 1830. As the economic historian Paul Bairoch, the source of these estimates, writes: “There cannot be any question but that the cause of de-industrialization in the Third World lay in the massive influx of European manufactured goods, especially textiles, on the markets of these countries.”10 Chalk up two against globalization.

It is difficult to know. No doubt some would fail, and others would need revision before they became fully effective. What matters ultimately is having a government that understands the nature of the challenge and is willing to try different solutions to overcome it. By 2009, South Africa had elected a new president, Jacob Zuma, and installed a new government. Government officials were warning about the risk of deindustrialization and talking about industrial policy as the central plank of South Africa’s response to the global financial crisis.36 A New Narrative for Development As early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton had argued that those who believed that modern industries would develop on their own, without support from government, were mistaken.37 There were too many obstacles, not the least competition from more advanced nations, for these industries to arise spontaneously and naturally in the United States.

Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 5 (December 2001), pp. 1369–1401. See also Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Huber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 6 evket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Ottoman De-Industrialization 1800–1913: Assessing the Shock, Its Impact, and the Response,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14763, March 2009. 7 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization and Under-development in the Pre-Modern Third World,” The Luca d’Agliano Lecture, Turin, Italy, March 31, 2006. 8 Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford, “Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 1143–1179. 9 I am referring here to manufacturing output levels in per capita terms. 10 Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History, 11 (Spring 1982), pp. 269–310. 11 The tale of the contrasting paths of Argentina and the United States is told in Alan Beattie, False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009), chap. 1. 12 Ichirou Inukai and Arlon R.

 

pages: 151 words: 38,153

With Liberty and Dividends for All: How to Save Our Middle Class When Jobs Don't Pay Enough by Peter Barnes

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Alfred Russel Wallace, banks create money, Buckminster Fuller, collective bargaining, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, en.wikipedia.org, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, Jaron Lanier, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, Mark Zuckerberg, Network effects, oil shale / tar sands, profit maximization, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, the map is not the territory, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Upton Sinclair, winner-take-all economy

Not only were foreign manufacturers outcompeting ours; American companies were moving factories overseas. Americans were told not to worry—we’d become a service economy, and white-collar jobs would fill the blue-collar void. But food servers, retail clerks, and health aides were paid considerably less than their industrial counterparts. A steadily tightening squeeze, with wages stagnating and prices of middle-class necessities rising, took hold. In addition to deindustrialization, three other long-term phenomena gained momentum after 1980: globalization, automation, and deunionization. Globalization. Since the early 1800s, economists have argued that trade is good and more trade is better. Their rationale is the theory of comparative advantage. As David Ricardo reasoned, if England could make textiles more efficiently than Portugal, and Portugal could make wine more efficiently than England, then both countries—including their workers—would benefit by trading woolens for port.

See also Dividends; Rent adjacent possible and, 121 audit of, 62 benefits, entitlement to, 62 components of, 60–61 defined, 11 at economy-wide level, 140–141 externalities and, 64 guidelines for creating, 89–92 management of, 62 mental ideas and, 122–127 one person, one share, 123–124 political environment and, 120 potential dividends and, 139–146 pre-distribution and, 125–127 quantity of assets needed for, 93–95 shared wealth dividends, 124–125 specific assets and, 141–146 user fees for, 85–86 Copyrights, rent from, 144 Cowen, Tyler, 135 Creative destruction, 120 Credo, 45 Crisis preparing for, 121–127 to-do lists and preparing for, 127–131 Currency trading, 92 D Dales, John, 98 Darwin, Charles, 120 Debt fractional reserve banking and, 90 leverage, 47 Debt-free money distribution, 90–91 Lincoln, Abraham and, 91 Defined-benefits pensions, 123 Deindustrialization, 17 Dell Computers, 25–26 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 109 Democrats and direct spending, 22 The Depression and the Townsend Plan, 133–134 Deregulation, 21 Derivatives, potential revenue from transaction fees, 143 Deunionization, 18–19 Distribution of wealth, 14 Dividends, 9–10. See also Alaska model cap-and-dividend system, 105–107 carbon taxing and, 115 from co-owned wealth, 3–4, 86 from electromagnetic spectrum, 145 Europe, plans in, 129–130 from intellectual property rights, 144 offshoots and, 75 perceptual advantage of, 77 potential dividends and co-owned wealth, 139–146 practical application of, 87–89 sources of money for, 93–94 for sustaining middle class, 75–76 universal dividend systems, 73–74 wind energy dividends in Oregon, 128 Dobbs, Lou, 86–87, 125 Dole, Bob, 79 E Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 81 Earth Day, 134 “The Economic Equivalent of War” (Barnes), 34–35 Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (Keynes), 135–136 Economic stimulus package, 37 The Economist on robots, 26 Education, 21, 24–25 80/20 rule, 30–31 Eldredge, Niles, 120 El Paso Natural Gas, 102 Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 81–82 Employment.

 

pages: 126 words: 37,081

Men Without Work by Nicholas Eberstadt

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Carmen Reinhart, centre right, deindustrialization, financial innovation, full employment, illegal immigration, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, moral hazard, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working-age population

Each recession following the 1979 one shows a drop in the employment-to-population ratio, which we would expect, but each one is followed by a recovery with an employment peak lower than the one immediately preceding. Even the nearly twenty-year Reagan-Clinton expansionary period showed a peak prime-age male employment-to-population ratio of about 90 percent, or about 5 percent lower than the peak that pertained during the 1948–73 period. This is a time of the deindustrialization of America. Manufacturing is closing down or streamlining, and the jobs that are being created are jobs for which less-well-educated, native-born males have no comparative advantage over females or, in many cases, less-well-educated immigrants. But the post-1999 period shows just how relevant these developments are. The recession of the early 2000s was relatively mild in aggregate terms, but it was devastating to prime-age male employment.

Figure 13.1 makes the case. Between 1970 and 2012, manufacturing jobs as a share of total employment in the United States dropped by about sixteen percentage points, to just over 10 percent. But that outcome was hardly unique: in France, for example, the drop was over fifteen points; in Sweden, sixteen points; in Australia sixteen points. France and Sweden follow closely the United States’ “de-industrial” trend line, and Australia now has a markedly lower share of employment in manufacturing than America—yet trends in labor force participation for prime-age men in the United States were uniquely disappointing when compared to other rich Western societies. Why this unwelcome “American exceptionalism”? Whatever the reason, it’s not because other advanced economies weren’t undergoing big structural transformations, too.

 

pages: 710 words: 164,527

The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order by Benn Steil

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, banks create money, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, deindustrialization, European colonialism, facts on the ground, fiat currency, financial independence, floating exchange rates, full employment, global reserve currency, imperial preference, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, margin call, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Monroe Doctrine, New Journalism, open economy, Potemkin village, price mechanism, price stability, psychological pricing, reserve currency, road to serfdom, seigniorage, South China Sea, special drawing rights, The Great Moderation, the market place, trade liberalization, Works Progress Administration

“As one who has played around with psychological warfare,” added State Department Press Division head Michael McDermott, “ … I wouldn’t be at all surprised if this Conference didn’t contribute a good deal” to ending the war. The Germans “couldn’t but say, ‘My God, what are we up against?’ and quit.” Tragically, this was not to be the case; the Germans would fight on another eight and a half months. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s own soon-to-be publicized ideas for deindustrializing postwar Germany would arguably serve to buttress rather than weaken German war morale, and thereby extend the war and its attendant carnage. Brown pledged to “do what I can to sell [the agreement] to the bankers of the country.” Morgenthau was grateful, “because they seem to be the only people who right now are vociferous [against] this thing.” “And Bob Taft,” corrected Senator Tobey. “I will leave Taft to you!”

White shared Morgenthau’s view that such a policy would leave Germany in a position to pursue catastrophic armed aggression yet again—a temptation to which a violent and troublesome nation would inevitably succumb. In a radio broadcast from London, the Secretary told British listeners: “It is not enough for us to say, ‘we will disarm Germany and Japan and hope that they will learn to behave themselves as decent people.’” He radically split both his British and American government interlocutors by arguing that Germany needed to be partitioned into two independent, deindustrialized states. The economy was to be remade around tiny agricultural provinces. Further, the Saar, Ruhr, and Upper Silesia regions were to be internationalized, and other areas hived off to neighboring countries. Angered that the State Department was proceeding against what he discovered to be the agreement among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to dismember Germany, made at the Tehran conference in November 1943, Morgenthau, on his return home from Europe, petitioned the president for his intervention.

“We either have to castrate the German people,” Morgenthau recorded the president saying, “or you have got to treat them in such manner so they can’t just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.”32 The Secretary took that as his cue to initiate Treasury’s own analysis—an analysis that he would shape, and for which White, as usual, would provide most of the substance. It was a mark of his desire for Keynes’s approbation that White offered as support for his work the claim that “Keynes seems to be wholly in our corner” on German partition.33 This was at best an exaggeration, as Keynes was sympathetic only to a temporary partition and rejected entirely the idea of deindustrializing the country.34 For his part, Morgenthau cared little what Keynes thought, and focused his energies on gaining the support of Stimson, Hull, and others in the administration who mattered. In this exercise, Morgenthau could not have resembled Keynes less, relying on unrefined instinct and emotion rather than facts and reason, at times straying into the realm of the bizarre. “Don’t you think the thing to do is to take a leaf from Hitler’s book,” he asked Stimson, “and completely remove [German] children from their parents and make them wards of the state, and have ex-US Army officers, English Army officers and Russian Army officers run these schools and have these children learn the true spirit of democracy?

 

pages: 391 words: 22,799

To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise by Bethany Moreton

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bretton Woods, Buckminster Fuller, collective bargaining, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, estate planning, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Gilder, global village, informal economy, invisible hand, market fundamentalism, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, price anchoring, Ralph Nader, RFID, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, walkable city, Washington Consensus, white flight, Whole Earth Catalog, Works Progress Administration

The federal power of the 49 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART court might again prove necessary to frog-Â�march them into the twenty-Â� first century. But thirty years ago, Â�women did not emerge from inequality at work into full economic citizenship in “men’s jobs”—the stable, well-Â�paid factory or professional-Â�managerial work that had been the backbone of€ postwar prosperity. Rather, under the stress of deindustrialization, men’s jobs came to look more like Â�women’s work. Casualization, “flexÂ�iÂ� bilÂ�ity,” part-Â�time or temp work, and the erosion of beneÂ�fits, seniority, and tenure—the conditions that had once best described most Â�women’s work in an industrial economy became generalized to the work force as€a whole. Unwaged household labor, personal relationships, and part-Â� time jobs had supported the American breadwinner all along.

And where sins against industrial production had galvanized some Christian activists 121 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART in€ the days of the temperance campaigns, sins against reproduction evoked the most impassioned responses in the new economic dispensation.100 The evangelical revival associated with the Bible Belt became a sigÂ� nifiÂ�cant national phenomenon in the later years of the twentieth century, and its growth paralleled that of Wal-Â�Mart itself into deindustrialized areas of the country. Thus in 1992, Janet Rugg at store #1378 wrote to Wal-Â�Mart’s Bentonville headquarters explaining exactly what she valued about working for a Christian serÂ�vice company, beyond merely her paycheck. I come from a factory background, which meant work came first, before family, church, or anything else. Also you were treated as a person hired just to do a job. They did not care about you as a person at all.

Haynes Bonner Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 113–15; George Gilder, Men and Marriage 311 NOTES TO PAGES 123 – 1 2 7 (Gretna, LA: Pelican, 1993; orig. pub. Sexual Suicide, 1973), 39, quoted in Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 169. 104. Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 157. 8. Making Christian Businessmen 1. Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 167–69; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 95; Bluestone and Harrison, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3–5; Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class (New York: Verso, 1999), 208–9; Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor, and Gavin Wright, “Introduction,” in The Mosaic of Economic Growth, ed.

 

pages: 565 words: 164,405

A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World by William J. Bernstein

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Admiral Zheng, asset allocation, bank run, Benoit Mandelbrot, British Empire, call centre, clean water, Columbian Exchange, Corn Laws, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, domestication of the camel, double entry bookkeeping, Eratosthenes, financial innovation, Gini coefficient, ice-free Arctic, imperial preference, income inequality, intermodal, James Hargreaves, John Harrison: Longitude, Khyber Pass, low skilled workers, non-tariff barriers, placebo effect, Port of Oakland, refrigerator car, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile, working poor

., The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-General of India, 1828-1835, 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Morris D. Morris, "Trends and Tendencies in Indian Economic History," in Indian Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Symposium (Delhi: Hindustan, 1969): 165. 49. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta: Signet, 1956): 316. 50. Colin Simmons, "'De-industrialization,' Industrialization, and the Indian Economy, c. 1850-1947," Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 3 (April 1985): 600. 51. B. R. Tomlinson, "The Economy of Modern India," The New Cambridge History of India, vol. 3, 3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 102. 52. Morris D. Morris, "Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian Economic History," Journal of Economic History 23, no. 4 (December 1963): 613. 53.

See, for example, Morris; Tomlinson; and Tirthankar Roy, "Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link," Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 109-130. 54. Paul Bairoch, "European Trade Policy, 1815-1914," in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Vill:109. 55. Jeffrey Williamson, working paper, "De-Industrialization and Underdevelopment: A Comparative Assessment around the Periphery 1750-1939" (December 2004): 15, accessed at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/papers/ DeIndEHW I 204.pdf, December 22, 2006. 56. Recent economic research shows a fairly strong relationship between length of European rule and subsequent economic progress; the longer the period of colonial governance, the higher a nation's modern GDP.

Schurz, William Lytle, "Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon," The American Historical Review 1, no. 4 (November 1918): 389-402. Schwartz, Stuart B., Tropical Babylons (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Scott, Philippa, The Book of Silk (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993). Serjeant, Robert B., The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). Silverberg, Robert, In the Realm of PresterJohn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972). Simmons, Colin, "'De-Industrialization,' Industrialization, and the Indian Economy, c. 1850-1947," Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 3 (April 1985): 593-622 Simpson, Donald, "The Treasure in the Vergulde Draek: A Sample of V. O. C. Bullion Exports in the 17th Century," The Great Circle 2, no. 1 (April 1980): 13-17. Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

 

pages: 217 words: 61,407

Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short by David Archibald

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Bakken shale, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income per capita, means of production, mutually assured destruction, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, out of africa, peak oil, price discovery process, rising living standards, South China Sea, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, Yom Kippur War

It has since fallen rapidly, to 0.9 million barrels per day in 2012. Peak coal production in that country was 292 million metric tons—a hundred years ago. It is now less than 10 million metric tons per annum. The UK is now importing almost all of the fossil fuel it burns. The British decided to move to wind power but recently found that turbines were lasting only about half as long as the wind industry said they would. The Climate Change Act, effectively de-industrializing the country, was passed in the House of Commons in October 2008 by 463 votes to 3, even as snow was falling outside. The winters since that act was passed have been particularly bitter, but that is only a taste of what is to come. The UK imports 40 percent of the food it consumes and has an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, but it is still accepting immigrants. The longest growing season in the past 241 years (which is as far back as we can calculate) was 300 days, in 2000.

Just how thin the veneer of civility over British society is was shown by the five days of riots in August 2011 in which criminal elements rampaged through parts of the major cities. Controlling criminality combined with hunger will require extreme measures by current standards, but they won’t seem extreme at the time in a world desensitized by death on a massive scale. The scientific establishment in the United States has also been corrupted by the climate change myth. But America is not so far down the path of feckless de-industrialization as Britain. Americans are in a far better position to prepare to face the real threats of the future, the dangers predicted by the actual data—but only if the United States can cast off the fashionable millenarianism that now holds sway in government and academia alike. Some parts of the dystopia really threatening the world cannot be avoided, only ameliorated by good preparation. Other parts could in theory be avoided with sufficient care, diligence, investment, and preparation.

 

pages: 165 words: 45,129

The Economics of Inequality by Thomas Piketty, Arthur Goldhammer

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affirmative action, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, deindustrialization, Gini coefficient, income inequality, low skilled workers, means of production, moral hazard, purchasing power parity, Simon Kuznets, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, very high income, working-age population

During the first phase of the Industrial Revolution, they argue, wage inequality increased as industry demanded more and more skilled labor and large numbers of unskilled laborers streamed in from the countryside. From the end of the nineteenth century to the 1970s, wage inequality decreased in all the developed countries. The phase of decreasing inequality occurred because skill gaps narrowed considerably thanks to rapid development of mass education and training, and growing demand for industrial workers with mid-level skills. Since the beginning of deindustrialization in the late 1960s, however, a new phase has ostensibly begun. New sectors (such as business services, computers, and communications) require workers with very high skill levels, but much of the population has been unable to acquire these skills through either the educational system or personal experience. These relatively unskilled workers find work in low-productivity sectors (such as personal services, the food service industry, and retailing) or else find themselves unemployed or underemployed.

The apparent ineffectiveness of affirmative action contributed greatly to the conservative reaction against social programs in general in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, it is likely that the deterioration of the relative position of African Americans in the labor market since the 1970s, which fueled this reaction, is more simply explained as a by-product of the general increase in wage inequality and of deindustrialization, which hit African American workers hard, especially in the northern United States (Wilson, 1987). The Social Determination of Wage Inequality Some wage inequalities cannot be explained solely in terms of an underlying inequality of human capital (whether efficient or inefficient). For example, certain economic actors (such as firms or trade unions) may attempt to manipulate the wage structure resulting from the supply and demand of human capital to their advantage.

 

pages: 160 words: 46,449

The Extreme Centre: A Warning by Tariq Ali

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bonus culture, BRICs, British Empire, centre right, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, first-past-the-post, full employment, labour market flexibility, land reform, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mortgage debt, North Sea oil, obamacare, offshore financial centre, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck

The astonishing development of technology, the third industrial revolution in the Western world and Japan, has undoubtedly created the material basis to satisfy the needs of all its citizens; but the economic structure based on maximizing profits at any cost is like a concrete wall that divides the top layers from the rest. The cost of production is now so low that the practical value of the commodity has to be ignored in order to keep prices artificially high. With the savage deindustrialization of the West, the parasitic marketing and advertising industries are amongst the largest in the world, second only to arms production. Consumerism has conquered all. Our needs are manipulated. Sixty-seven varieties of jeans, washing powders organic and non-organic, hi-tech gadgets and thousands of other commodities large and small, most of them unnecessary. Who decides? The market, chorus the neoliberals.

The huge social movements against privatizations and social restructuring in Venezuela (IMF impositions), Bolivia (water) and Peru (electricity) challenged this relegation and helped launch political parties which they then lifted into government. The movements had already pledged a series of anti-capitalist structural reforms to transform conditions. It was their successes in this field that enabled their repeated electoral triumphs. This process had no equivalent in Europe. Here, deindustrialization had broken the spinal cord of the old working classes. Neoliberal impositions completed the process. Defeated and demoralized, the official trade unions, linked to a segment of the extreme centre, capitulated to neoliberalism. Their protest now tends to be confined to ritual marches or one-day strikes that have virtually nil impact, ignored by both the rulers and the new generation of semi-employed or unemployed youth who want change but feel that none of the traditional parties can provide it.

 

pages: 843 words: 223,858

The Rise of the Network Society by Manuel Castells

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Apple II, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, borderless world, British Empire, capital controls, complexity theory, computer age, Credit Default Swap, declining real wages, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, dematerialisation, deskilling, disintermediation, double helix, Douglas Engelbart, edge city, experimental subject, financial deregulation, financial independence, floating exchange rates, future of work, global village, Hacker Ethic, hiring and firing, Howard Rheingold, illegal immigration, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, information retrieval, intermodal, invention of the steam engine, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, job automation, job-hopping, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, megacity, Menlo Park, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, packet switching, planetary scale, popular electronics, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, Productivity paradox, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Robert Gordon, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, social software, South China Sea, South of Market, San Francisco, special economic zone, spinning jenny, statistical model, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, the medium is the message, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, urban renewal, urban sprawl

The financial crisis of 1997–8 destroyed much of the newly acquired wealth of these countries. By the end of 1999, the Asian economies seemed to be on their path to recovery. But a substantial part of manufacturing, of the property market, and of the banking industry of these countries, and a large proportion of formal employment, had been wiped out by the crisis. Poverty and unemployment sky-rocketed. In Indonesia a process of de-industrialization, and de-urbanization took place, as millions of people returned to the countryside, looking for survival (see volume III, chapter 4). The fall-out of the Asian crisis, of the Mexican crisis, of the Brazilian crisis, of the Russian crisis, shows the destructive power of volatility in the global economy. The new economic system is at the same time highly dynamic, highly selective, highly exclusionary, and highly unstable in its boundaries.

For the United States, Cohen and Zysman estimate that 24 percent of GNP comes from the value added by manufacturing firms, and another 25 percent of GNP comes from the contribution of services directly linked to manufacturing. Thus, they argue that the post-industrial economy is a “myth,” and that we are in fact in a different kind of industrial economy. Much of the confusion comes from the artificial separation between advanced economies and developing economies which, under the conditions of globalization, are in fact part of the same productive structure. Thus, while analysts were proclaiming the de-industrialization of America, or of Europe in the 1980s, they simply overlooked what was happening in the rest of the world. And what was happening was that, according to studies from the ILO,6 global manufacturing employment was at its highest point in 1989, having increased by 72 percent between 1963 and 1989. The trend continued in the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1997, while manufacturing jobs declined slightly in the US (from 19,367 million to 18,657 million), and substantially in the European Union (from 38,400 to 29,919), they actually increased in Japan, and were multiplied by a factor of between 1.5 and 4 in major industrializing countries, so that, overall, new manufacturing jobs elsewhere largely exceeded the losses in the developed world.

The story is a very different one in the 1970–90 period, when the process of economic restructuring and technological transformation which took place during these two decades led to a reduction of manufacturing employment in all countries (see tables 4.1–4.14 in Appendix A). However, while this trend was general, the shrinkage of manufacturing employment was uneven, clearly indicating the fundamental variety of social structures according to differences in economic policies and in firms’ strategies. Thus, while the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy experienced rapid de-industrialization (reducing the share of their manufacturing employment in 1970–90 from 38.7 to 22.5 percent; from 25.9 to 17.5 percent; from 27.3 to 21.8 percent, respectively), Japan and Germany reduced their share of manufacturing labor force moderately: from 26.0 to 23.6 percent in the case of Japan, and from 38.6 percent to a still rather high level of 32.2 percent in 1987 in the case of Germany. Canada and France occupy an intermediate position, reducing manufacturing employment from 19.7 percent (in 1971) to 14.9 percent, and from 27.7 to 21.3 percent, respectively.

 

pages: 353 words: 81,436

Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism by Wolfgang Streeck

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banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, corporate governance, David Graeber, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, financial deregulation, financial repression, full employment, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, late capitalism, means of production, moral hazard, Occupy movement, open borders, open economy, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, profit maximization, risk tolerance, shareholder value, too big to fail, union organizing, winner-take-all economy, Wolfgang Streeck

Schmidt, Welfare and Work, vol. 1, Diverse Responses to Common Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; as well as the editors’ introduction to Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 1–15, and the articles in the same volume by M. Kautto (‘The Nordic Countries’, pp. 586–600) and B. Palier (‘Continental Western Europe’, pp. 601–15). 53 See, among many others, P. Emmenegger et al., The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; J. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; B. Palier and K. Thelen, ‘Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany’, Politics and Society, vol. 38/1, 2010, pp. 119–48. 54 See Martin Höpner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestimmung in Deutschland, Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2003. 55 Fig. 1.3 shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient, the most commonly used measure of income inequality, in the seven countries used as examples (see fn. 15 in this chapter).

Dahrendorf, Ralf, ‘Vom Sparkapitalismus zum Pumpkapitalismus’, Cicero online, 23 July 2009. Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm and Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2008. Durkheim, Émile, The Division of Labour in Society, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974 [1893]. Emmenegger, Patrick et al. (eds), The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Esping-Andersen, Gosta, Politics Against Markets: The Social-Democratic Road to Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Etzioni, Amitai, The Active Society, New York: The Free Press, 1968. ———. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, New York: The Free Press, 1988. Feldstein, Martin S., The Euro and European Economic Conditions, Working Paper 17617, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.

 

pages: 717 words: 150,288

Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism by Stephen Graham

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airport security, anti-communist, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, call centre, carbon footprint, clean water, congestion charging, credit crunch, DARPA: Urban Challenge, defense in depth, deindustrialization, edge city, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Food sovereignty, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Google Earth, illegal immigration, income inequality, knowledge economy, late capitalism, loose coupling, market fundamentalism, McMansion, megacity, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, pattern recognition, peak oil, planetary scale, private military company, RAND corporation, RFID, Richard Florida, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, smart transportation, surplus humans, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, white flight

Many of these, in turn, have stimulated not only vast migrations but also the construction of city-scale refugee camps to accommodate the displaced populations, who already numbered some fifty million by 2002.72 The permiation of organized, political violence within and through cities and systems of cities is complicated by the fact that much ‘planned’ urban change, even in times of relative peace, itself involves warlike levels of violence, destabilization, rupture, forced expulsion and place annihilation.73 Particularly within the dizzying peaks and troughs of capitalist and neoliberal urbanism or the implementation of programmes for large-scale urban ‘renewal’, ‘regeneration’ or ‘renaissance’, state-led planning often amounts to the legitimized clearance of vast tracts of cities in the name of the removal of decay, of modernization, improvement, or ordering, of economic competition, or of facilitating technological change and capital accumulation and speculation.74 While tracts of booming cities are often erased through state-engineered speculation, the many cities that are shrinking because of de-industrialization, global industrial relocation, and demographic emptying are also vulnerable to clean-sweep planning. ‘The economically, politically and socially driven processes of creative-destruction through abandonment and redevelopment’, suggests David Harvey, ‘are often every bit as destructive as arbitrary acts of war. Much of contemporary Baltimore, with its 40,000 abandoned houses, looks like a war zone to rival Sarajevo.’75 WAR UNBOUND In such a context, and given the increasingly extreme social inequalities, it is no surprise that Western military theorists and researchers are now particularly preoccupied with how the geographies of cities, especially the cities of the global South, are beginning to influence both the geopolitics and the technoscience of post–Cold War political violence.

Taking the logic of ‘malls without walls’ still further, certain districts in city centres, such as Liverpool’s Paradise St area, have now been completely privatized. Within the privatized urban streets, corporate owners may now stipulate rights of access and styles of security management more typical of purely commercial environments. In the UK, for instance, the widespread equation of privatization with ‘urban renaissance’ or ‘regeneration’ in de-industrialized cities has led to the wholesale transfer of city streets and districts to corporations. In a survey of the trend, the Guardian’s Paul Kingsnorth finds that ‘from parks to pedestrian streets, squares to market places, public spaces are being bought up and closed down, often with little consultation or publicity. Widening corporate ownership of public space means that legal norms now legitimize consumption whilst proscribing begging, homelessness, busking, skateboarding, cycling, and political activity.’54 Such trends are closely linked to the growth of ‘zero-tolerance’ urban policing.

Those that scored highest, such as the Marines’ Twentynine Palms facility in California or the Army’s billion-dollar mock Iraqi city at Fort Irwin, have ‘clutter/debris/filth’, ‘slums/shanty towns/ walled compounds’, ‘subterranean complexes’ and simulated ‘government, hospital/prison/asylum structures’.38 To address the need for more realistic physical simulations of whole cities and city districts, the RAND team recommends the construction of four new urban-warfare cities that would each include more than three hundred structures, one to be located in the Kentucky/North Carolina/Georgia region, another somewhere in the US Southwest, another at Fort Polk in Louisiana, and the fourth at Fort Hood in Texas. RAND also explored the possibility of appropriating entire ghost towns within the continental US – towns that have been de-industrialized and largely abandoned; the report states that ‘the use of abandoned towns [for urban warfare training] has moved beyond the concept phase into what might be considered the early test and development phase’.39 One such place is the virtually abandoned copper-mining town of Playas, in the southwestern corner of New Mexico (Figure 6.4), which has already been used for the training of anti-suicide bomb squads for the US Department of Homeland Security.

 

pages: 424 words: 115,035

How Will Capitalism End? by Wolfgang Streeck

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, Airbnb, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, Clayton Christensen, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, corporate governance, credit crunch, David Brooks, David Graeber, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, en.wikipedia.org, eurozone crisis, failed state, financial deregulation, financial innovation, first-past-the-post, full employment, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, Google Glasses, haute cuisine, income inequality, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, late capitalism, market bubble, means of production, moral hazard, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, open borders, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, post-industrial society, private sector deleveraging, profit maximization, profit motive, quantitative easing, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, savings glut, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, sovereign wealth fund, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transaction costs, Uber for X, upwardly mobile, winner-take-all economy, Wolfgang Streeck

While in the 1970s governments still had a choice, within limits, between inflation and public debt to bridge the gap between the combined distributional claims of capital and labour and what was available for distribution, after the end of inflation at the beginning of the 1980s the ‘tax state’ of modern capitalism began to change into a ‘debt state’. In this it was helped by the growth of a dynamic, increasingly global financial industry headquartered in the rapidly de-industrializing hegemonic country of global capitalism, the United States. Concerned about the power of its new clients – who were after all sovereign states – to unilaterally cancel their debt, the rising financial sector soon began to seek reassurance from governments with respect to their economic and political ability to service and repay their loans. The result was another transformation of the democratic state, this time into a ‘consolidation state’, which began in the mid-1990s.

In fact, with time, the crises of post-war OECD capitalism have become so pervasive that they have increasingly been perceived as more than just economic in nature, resulting in a rediscovery of the older notion of a capitalist society – of capitalism as a social order and way of life, vitally dependent on the uninterrupted progress of private capital accumulation. Crisis symptoms are many, but prominent among them are three long-term trends in the trajectories of rich, highly industrialized – or better, increasingly deindustrialized – capitalist countries. The first is a persistent decline in the rate of economic growth, recently aggravated by the events of 2008 (Figure 1.1). The second, associated with the first, is an equally persistent rise in overall indebtedness in leading capitalist states, where governments, private households and non-financial as well as financial firms have, over forty years, continued to pile up financial obligations (for the U.S., see Figure 1.2).

LOW INFLATION, HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT Inflation was conquered after 1979 (Figure 2.1) when Paul Volcker, newly appointed by President Carter as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, raised interest rates to an unprecedented height, causing unemployment to jump to levels not seen since the Great Depression. The Volcker ‘putsch’ was sealed when President Reagan, said to have initially been afraid of the political fallout of Volcker’s aggressive disinflation policies, was re-elected in 1984. Thatcher, who had followed the American lead, had won a second term in 1983, also in spite of high unemployment and rapid de-industrialization caused, among other things, by a restrictive monetary policy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, disinflation was accompanied by determined attacks on trade unions by governments and employers, epitomized by Reagan’s victory over the air traffic controllers and Thatcher’s breaking of the National Union of Mineworkers. In subsequent years, inflation rates throughout the capitalist world remained continuously low, while unemployment went more or less steadily up (Figure 2.2).

 

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The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World by Ruchir Sharma

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3D printing, Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population

In the key emerging nations, the share of manufacturing in the economy currently ranges from 10 percent of GDP in Chile to more than 30 percent in China; the commodity-driven economies of Russia and Brazil are in the low teens, near the bottom of the list. In Africa, despite the celebrations over its economic revival in the 2000s, manufacturing was actually shrinking as a share of GDP, continuing a decline from 18 percent in 1975 to 11 percent in 2014. Some of the largest African economies, including Nigeria and South Africa, were actually deindustrializing, slipping backward down the development ladder. While rising investment usually augurs well for economic growth, any strength taken too far can become a weakness. The trick is to stop short of overdoing it, which is why the ideal level of investment is capped at roughly 35 percent of GDP. Beyond that level, excess looms. In the postwar period, only ten countries have seen investment top 40 percent of GDP, a group that includes South Korea in the 1970s and Thailand and Malaysia in the 1990s.

Africa, on the other hand, prospered by riding the tide of global commodity prices: about 400 percent of the increase in its export revenues came mainly from rising global prices for commodities like cocoa, coffee, and oil. The region had made few new investments in manufacturing plants. In sub-Saharan Africa, commodities account for half of GDP, while manufacturing has been declining and was at just 11 percent of GDP in 2014, down from 16 percent in 1990. This deindustrialization process is the opposite of what any emerging market needs for stable growth and to establish a prosperous middle class. The “rise” of these economies would end when commodity prices turned, and that started to happen in 2011. As prices for gold, iron ore, and many other commodities slipped, many African nations found it increasingly difficult to balance government budgets and current accounts.

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012). 2 Antonia Ax:son Johnson and Stefan Persson, “Do Not Fight Free Trade—It Makes Countries Richer,” Financial Times, July 23, 2015. 3 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 546–79. 4 John Boudreau, “The Biggest Winner from TPP Trade Deal May Be Vietnam,” Bloomberg News, October 8, 2015; Eurasia, July 2015. 5 Victor Essien, “Regional Trade Agreements in Africa: A Historical and Bibliographic Account of ECOWAS and CEMAC,” NYU Global, 2006. 6 Moisés Naím, “The Most Important Alliance You’ve Never Heard Of,” Atlantic, February 17, 2014. 7 Ibid. 8 Peter Zeihan, The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder (New York: Twelve, 2014). 9 Sumana Manohar, Hugo Scott-Gall, and Megha Chaturvedi, “Small Dots, Big Picture: Is Trade Set to Fade?,” Goldman Sachs Research, September 24, 2015. Chapter 6: Factories First 1 Dani Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” Project Syndicate, 2013. 2 Ejaz Ghani, William Robert Kerr, and Alex Segura, “Informal Tradables and the Employment Growth of Indian Manufacturing,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 7206, March 2, 2015. 3 Jaithirth Rao, “How They Killed Our Factories,” Indian Express, January 20, 2014. 4 Ejaz Ghani and Stephen D. O’Connell, “Can Service Be a Growth Escalator in Low-Income Countries?

 

pages: 559 words: 169,094

The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America by George Packer

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, bank run, big-box store, citizen journalism, cleantech, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, East Village, El Camino Real, Elon Musk, family office, financial independence, financial innovation, Flash crash, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, housing crisis, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, life extension, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Maui Hawaii, Menlo Park, new economy, New Journalism, obamacare, Occupy movement, oil shock, peak oil, Peter Thiel, Ponzi scheme, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, shareholder value, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, single-payer health, smart grid, Steve Jobs, strikebreaker, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the scientific method, too big to fail, union organizing, urban planning, We are the 99%, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, white flight

But it happened in Youngstown first, fastest, and most completely, and because Youngstown had nothing else, no major-league baseball team or world-class symphony, the city became an icon of deindustrialization, a song title, a cliché. “It was one of the quietest revolutions we’ve ever had,” Russo said. “If a plague had taken away this many people in the Midwest, it would be considered a huge historical event.” But because it was caused by the loss of blue-collar jobs, not a bacterial infection, Youngstown’s demise was regarded as almost normal. * * * Tammy was eleven when the mills started closing. She was too young to know or care about Steeltown, the historic strikes, deindustrialization, or the specter of a whole city’s ruin. She had her hands full surviving her own life. The year after Black Monday, she moved back with her mother and stepfather to the east side.

Finally, a study at Harvard found that even a billion dollars in subsidies wouldn’t be enough to renovate the mills and make them competitive. The federal government—the essential institution for keeping the industry alive—bowed out, and the fate of the mills was sealed. If the institutions and the people who led them had understood what was about to happen to Youngstown, and then to the wider region, they might have worked out a policy to manage deindustrialization instead of simply allowing it to happen. Over the next five years, every major steel plant in Youngstown shut down: Sheet and Tube’s Brier Hill Works in 1980, U.S. Steel’s Ohio Works in 1980, its McDonald Mills in 1981, Republic Steel in 1982. And not just the mills. Higbee’s and Strouss’s, two of the shopping mainstays downtown, soon closed. Idora, the amusement park on the south side that dated back to 1899, went into a swift decline, before the Wildcat roller coaster caught fire in 1984, which closed Idora down; its spectacular carousel was auctioned off and ended up on the Brooklyn waterfront.

Joe Biden, Promises to Keep (New York: Random House, 2008). Jeff Connaughton, The Payoff: Why Wall Street Always Wins (Prospecta Press, 2012). The author generously shared an early draft. Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government (New York: Vintage Books, 2010). TAMMY THOMAS AND YOUNGSTOWN Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Terry F. Buss and F. Stevens Redburn, Shutdown at Youngstown: Public Policy for Mass Unemployment (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983). Stephen F. Diamond, “The Delphi ‘Bankruptcy’: The Continuation of Class War by Other Means,” Dissent (Spring 2006). David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

 

pages: 471 words: 109,267

The Verdict: Did Labour Change Britain? by Polly Toynbee, David Walker

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banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, call centre, central bank independence, congestion charging, Corn Laws, Credit Default Swap, decarbonisation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Etonian, failed state, first-past-the-post, Frank Gehry, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, high net worth, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, income inequality, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, market bubble, millennium bug, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, shareholder value, Skype, smart meter, stem cell, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, University of East Anglia, working-age population, Y2K

Which meant, to no one’s surprise, the end of vehicle manufacturing in MG Rover plants. With the tacit encouragement of ministers, careers advisers in schools told young people that factories were finished – to the chagrin of the UK’s manufacturers. Snake-oil merchants flogging the ‘weightless economy’ wafted into Downing Street seminars. As if willed by Labour, manufacturing declined faster than during the Thatcher years, when Labour had passionately deplored deindustrialization. Manufacturing amounted to 20 per cent of the economy in 1997 but 12 per cent in 2007, its decline fostered by sterling appreciation during Labour’s first term. Fittingly in Labour’s economy, construction, estate agency and property rose from 12.6 to 16.2 per cent. By 2010 only one in eight of Coventry’s working-age population of 194,000 was in manufacturing, compared with over one in two in the 1970s.

The practical and moral case for redistribution needed to be made, but never was. When Labour came to power, a third of all the poor children in the EU 15 countries were born in the UK. The 1980s had seen relative poverty shoot up; the health of the poor was bad and getting relatively worse; the gap in life expectancy between rich and poor was growing. These trends played out intensively where deindustrialization had gone furthest, in places such as Sheffield. Within the city, inequality took physical shape as poorer areas became even more concentrated, while in Hallam and the west of the city people with higher earnings clustered together even more closely. Increasingly, according to the geographer Professor Danny Dorling, ‘people in different parts of Britain and people living within different quarters of its cities are living in different worlds with different norms and expectations.

 

pages: 576 words: 105,655

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea by Mark Blyth

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency peg, debt deflation, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversification, en.wikipedia.org, ending welfare as we know it, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, financial repression, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, interest rate swap, invisible hand, Irish property bubble, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, price stability, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, savings glut, short selling, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tobin tax, too big to fail, unorthodox policies, value at risk, Washington Consensus

Rather than having three big banks that dominate all domestic lending, as in the Irish case, Spain’s largest banks are internationalized and are therefore somewhat hedged against domestic turbulence. In Spain the real problem, as became plain in the spring of 2012, lay in the regional savings banks: the cajas de ahorros. To understand where Spain is today, you have to start from the fact that in 1979 Spain was the eighth-largest industrial economy in the world. Today, it has slipped to seventeenth place. In between, Spain effectively deindustrialized, becoming a banking, services, and tourism hub. The problem is that the income streams such a growth model relies on come primarily from outside the country: when such people stop spending and lending, you are in serious trouble. It’s even more of a problem when what domestic growth you do have is debt-financed and based on little more than the swapping of houses. As John Mauldin puts it, “Spain had the mother of all housing bubbles,”31 which is true but also a little misleading since other countries had bigger bubbles.

The REBLL Growth Model By the eve of the 2008 crisis, the REBLLs had developed a unique growth model based on massive foreign investment, even more massive foreign borrowing, and economic institutions that could only be described as open to money coming in and people going out. The problem with this growth model was that it was extremely vulnerable to external shocks due to its high degree of dependence on transnational capital flows, its tendency to develop large current account deficits, and its chronically weak export performance. They ended up this way because the post-communist period of the 1990s was one of extensive deindustrialization in the REBLLs. This prompted the migration of between 10 percent and 30 percent of the most active part of their labor force to Western Europe. These losses compounded an already weak capacity to develop infrastructure, which in turn led to the concentration of investment in real estate and finance rather than manufacturing. As a consequence, exports were never a strong foreign currency earner, which meant a shortage of foreign exchange to cover imports.157 This led to increasing dependence on foreign capital inflows and remittances from all that expatriate labor to provide for the financing of these large deficits.

 

pages: 378 words: 110,518

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future by Paul Mason

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Alfred Russel Wallace, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Bill Gates: Altair 8800, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business process, butterfly effect, call centre, capital controls, Claude Shannon: information theory, collaborative economy, collective bargaining, Corn Laws, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Graeber, deglobalization, deindustrialization, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Downton Abbey, en.wikipedia.org, energy security, eurozone crisis, factory automation, financial repression, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, future of work, game design, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, Internet of things, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, late capitalism, low skilled workers, market clearing, means of production, Metcalfe's law, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage debt, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, payday loans, post-industrial society, precariat, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, reserve currency, RFID, Richard Stallman, Robert Gordon, secular stagnation, sharing economy, Stewart Brand, structural adjustment programs, supply-chain management, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Transnistria, union organizing, universal basic income, urban decay, urban planning, wages for housework, women in the workforce

A glance at Scotland’s poverty map gives the context: the town is dotted with areas of extreme deprivation and ill health.1 On the wall outside Gregg’s is a plaque marking the house where Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations. Nobody takes much notice. But this is where, in 1776, the economic principles of capitalism were first laid out. I’m not sure Smith would like the look of his home town today, blighted by de-industrialization, low pay and chronic sickness. But he would have understood the cause. The source of all wealth, said Smith, is work. ‘It was not by gold or by silver but by labour that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased,’ Smith wrote; ‘and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.’2 This is the classic labour theory of value: it says the work needed to make something determines how much it’s worth.

Outright working-class conservatism had never gone away: what it always wants is order and prosperity, and by 1979 it could no longer see these things being delivered by the Keynesian model. By the mid-1980s, the working class of the developed world had moved in the space of fifteen years from passivity to strikes and semi-revolutionary struggles to strategic defeat. Western capitalism, which had coexisted with organized labour and been shaped by it for nearly two centuries, could no longer live with a working-class culture of solidarity and resistance. Through offshoring, de-industrialization, anti-union laws and a relentless ideological warfare, it would be destroyed. DIGITAL REBELS, ANALOGUE SLAVES After more than thirty years of retreat and atomization, the working class survives, but massively transformed. In the developed world, the core-periphery model first envisaged in Japan has become the norm, replacing ‘unskilled vs skilled’ as the most important division within the working class.

 

pages: 281 words: 86,657

The Great Inversion and the Future of the American City by Alan Ehrenhalt

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anti-communist, big-box store, British Empire, crack epidemic, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Frank Gehry, haute cuisine, Honoré de Balzac, housing crisis, illegal immigration, Jane Jacobs, manufacturing employment, McMansion, New Urbanism, postindustrial economy, Richard Florida, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, too big to fail, transit-oriented development, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, walkable city, white flight, working poor, young professional

Take a walk down there some Saturday morning and you will see for yourself. The answer to the third question is one upon which reasonable people may differ. I think that in the coming decade, we will see that question answered in the affirmative as well. WHY HAS demographic inversion begun to happen? One might start by recounting the factors that seem obvious, or at least ought to be. The deindustrialization of the central city, for all the tragic human dislocations, has eliminated many of the things that made affluent people want to move away from it during much of the twentieth century. Since nothing much is manufactured downtown anymore (or anywhere near it), the noise and grime that prevailed through most of the twentieth century have gone away. Manhattan may seem like a gritty and noisy place now, but it is nothing like the city of tenement manufacturing, rumbling elevated trains, and horses and coal dust in the streets that confronted the inhabitants of a century ago.

Manhattan may seem like a gritty and noisy place now, but it is nothing like the city of tenement manufacturing, rumbling elevated trains, and horses and coal dust in the streets that confronted the inhabitants of a century ago. Third-floor factory lofts, whether in SoHo or in St. Louis, can be marketed as attractive and stylish places to live. The urban historian Robert Bruegmann goes so far as to claim that deindustrialization has on the whole been good for downtowns because it has permitted so many opportunities for creative reuse of the buildings. I wouldn’t go quite that far; I doubt most of the residents of Detroit would, either. But it is true that the environmental factors that made middle-class people leave the central city for streetcar suburbs in the 1920s, and for station-wagon suburbs in the 1950s and gated enclaves in the 1970s, do not apply anymore.

 

pages: 391 words: 102,301

Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety by Gideon Rachman

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Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, BRICs, capital controls, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, greed is good, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, laissez-faire capitalism, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Sinatra Doctrine, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

A few left-wing students rattled tins to collect money for the striking miners, but the spirit of the times seemed to be more accurately captured by the increasingly extravagant May balls, in which students flounced around in evening dress, looking like extras from Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited. (The Brideshead style, with its celebration of aristocratic dissipation, enjoyed a new vogue after Waugh’s book was turned into a television serial in 1981.) But the southern boom was just one aspect of the Thatcher era. The deindustrialization of much of northern Britain was the other side of the coin, leading to big job losses in traditional industries such as mining, steel, shipping, and manufacturing. The contrast between the boom in the south and the bust in the north became a theme of many of the most successful British films about the Thatcher era, from Billy Elliot to The Full Monty. Thatcher’s time in office began with a wrenching attack on inflation, which provoked a deep recession.

Friedman’s views on, 127–28, 304n U.S. faith in, 95, 291 Globalization and Its Discontents (Stiglitz), 159 global problems, 174–75, 197–213 Great Recession and, 200–201, 210 Obama’s views on, 9, 198–99, 210, 211, 212, 224–27, 244, 272 search for solutions to, 212–13, 243–44, 262, 272, 274–75, 286–92 see also climate change; failed states; government, global; nuclear proliferation; terrorism Global Redesign Initiative, 213 Goldgeier, James, 117 Goldman Sachs, 76–77, 110, 112, 182 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 35, 36, 59, 87, 279 reforms of, 15, 16, 25, 27, 42, 53–61, 68, 100, 297n Soviet bloc collapse and, 61, 64–65, 298n Gorbachev, Raisa, 53 Gordon, Philip, 251–52, 313n Gore, Al, 102, 125, 267 government, 94, 114, 138, 142 financial crisis and, 191–95 government, global, 52, 157, 160, 161, 174, 215–31 EU and, 152, 175, 215–17, 221, 222, 224, 228–29, 231, 270 G2 and, 223–25, 227 G20 and, 175, 217–25, 227 Grant, Charles, 48, 49, 280 Great Britain, 3, 38, 39–52, 54, 64, 74, 114–15, 147–48, 185, 199, 253 antiglobalization in, 160–61 China and, 24–25, 135–36, 294n climate change and, 201–2 colonialism of, 17, 25, 135–36 deindustrialization in, 33–34 democracy in, 101 euro and, 150, 280 Falklands War and, 34, 43, 75, 76 financial crisis and, 191, 192 France and, 45–46, 48 Germany’s relations with, 271, 274 global government and, 219, 226 Iraq War and, 165 southern boom in, 33, 34 Thatcherism in, 16–17, 29–36, 39–51, 84, 114, 191, 279 Great Depression, 3, 111, 188, 267, 270, 282, 292 Great Moderation, 116–17 Great Recession, 7, 97, 113, 188, 200–201, 210, 240, 244, 249, 256, 262–63, 265, 272, 285 Great Society, 38, 296n Greece, 8, 150, 188, 189, 228, 235, 270 Greenspan, Alan, 54, 94–95, 107–14, 116, 117–19, 205 as guru and lucky charm, 108, 114, 116 Rand and, 108–9, 110 Reagan and, 42, 107 on technology, 119, 122 Grove, Andy, 120 Guha, Ramachandra, 80 Gulf War: first (1991), 81, 87–90, 124, 132, 167 second, see Iraq War Haass, Richard, 90, 301n Haight, David, 253–54 Haiti, 73, 132, 209 Hatoyama, Yukio, 190 Havel, Vaclav, 66, 68 Hayden, Michael, 258 Hayek, Friedrich, 112, 118 Heath, Edward, 34 hedge funds, 111, 193 Hills, Carla, 74 Holbrooke, Richard, 132 Homeland Security, U.S., 268 Hong Kong, 25, 60, 135–36 House of Commons, British, 35, 51 House of Representatives, U.S., 266 housing, 33, 116 Hu Jintao, 6, 192, 237, 285 Hum, Christopher, 24–25, 294n human rights, 72, 75, 176, 184, 223, 231, 237, 240, 244–45, 281 Human Security Report project, 131 Hungary, 61, 68, 100, 148, 267 Hussein, Saddam, 19, 104, 164, 166, 167, 239 first Gulf War and, 88, 89, 90 IBM, 120 Ideas That Conquered the World, The (Mandelbaum), 188 Immelt, Jeff, 193 immigration, 8, 147, 149, 150, 209, 258, 260, 269 illegal, 9, 147, 260, 269 imperialism, 128, 168 India, 64, 79–85, 168–69, 187, 199, 261, 290, 311n antiglobalization in, 160 in BRICs, 76–77, 196 China’s relations with, 206–7, 237, 243, 274, 286 democracy in, 80, 85, 169, 240, 243 economic crisis in (1991), 16, 79–80, 81 economic growth in, 6, 7, 80, 83–85, 95, 116 G20 and, 217, 219 global government and, 224, 226, 227 global problems and, 202, 203, 206–7, 287 information technology and, 6, 84–85, 141 optimism in, 140 outsourcing to, 122, 168 rise of, 11, 46, 76, 77, 80–85, 90, 143, 181, 271, 284 Soviet collapse and, 17, 70 win-win world and, 129–30 zero-sum future and, 262, 273 Indonesia, 6, 36, 143, 176, 206, 217 inequality, 40, 157, 160 inflation, 32, 34, 38, 39, 40, 47, 122, 126, 183, 257 in Latin America, 72, 73, 75, 77 information age, 95, 123–24 information technology (IT), 122, 123, 167 Indian, 6, 84–85, 141 Infosys, 85, 141 International Court of Justice, 220 International Criminal Court, 220, 222, 223 International Energy Agency, 204 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 30, 74, 79, 142, 159, 220, 270, 301n Internet, 6, 93, 119, 122, 124, 238 investment, foreign, 52, 83, 151, 191, 247 in China, 24, 25, 27, 115, 151, 192 in Latin America, 72, 74 investment banks, 76–77, 110–11, 112, 114, 118, 182, 195, 201 technology and, 122–23 Iran, 168, 175, 193, 195, 223, 226–27, 236, 241–48 democracy in, 241, 244, 283 nuclear proliferation and, 10, 176, 199, 212, 223, 224, 226, 227, 229, 241, 242, 243, 249, 272, 273, 275, 287, 288 Iraq, 87–90, 104, 174, 199, 211, 241, 244, 248, 258 Iraq Liberation Act (1998), 166 Iraq War, 19, 43, 90, 104, 164–69, 174, 181, 185, 190, 209–10, 233, 239, 240, 249, 272, 275 Afghanistan war compared with, 253–54 European Union and, 151–52 U.S. invasion in, 96, 105, 125, 132, 165–68, 198, 205, 209, 245, 281 Irish, Ireland, 147, 270 irrational exuberance, 110, 281 Islamabad, 211, 251, 252 Islamists, 241, 244, 245, 252, 256, 257, 273 Israel, 207, 226, 234, 272, 311n Italy, Italians, 147, 188, 219, 226, 228, 269, 270 James, Harold, 32, 183–84, 271 Japan, 50, 60, 138, 143, 186, 187, 244, 265, 266, 269 as challenge to U.S., 18–19, 88–89, 102, 119, 261, 282, 284–85 China’s relations with, 190–91, 237, 238 global government and, 217, 218, 219, 224, 226 “lost decade” in, 141 stock market in, 18–19, 88–89 win-win world and, 129–30 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 65, 67 Jenkins, Peter, 41–42 Jiang Qing, 25 Jobs, Steve, 120 John Paul II, Pope, 67 Johnson, Lyndon, 38 Joseph, Sir Keith, 31–32 J.P.

 

pages: 319 words: 103,707

Against Everything: Essays by Mark Greif

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1960s counterculture, back-to-the-land, Bernie Madoff, citizen journalism, collateralized debt obligation, crack epidemic, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, Desert Island Discs, Donald Trump, income inequality, informal economy, Ponzi scheme, postindustrial economy, Ronald Reagan, technoutopianism, telemarketer, trickle-down economics, upwardly mobile, white flight

Six million moved north in the Great Migration between the two world wars. They came for industrial and manufacturing jobs. Yet starting in the years just after the great Civil Rights Act of 1964, the new migrants—shunted initially into ghettos in the least desirable parts of the Northern industrial cities, racing to reach the middle class—faced the cruelest Northern joke yet, at least since the withdrawal of federal troops during Reconstruction: sudden deindustrialization and factory job loss in the 1960s and 1970s. For former industrial-economy workers, the new service economy possessed codes that discriminated powerfully against poor black men particularly. They had been acceptable in industry, where a learned ethos of strength and toughness was favored; but their toughness was viewed as frightening and hostile in service jobs. The best-paid service jobs rewarded docility, Northern white English, fake intimacy, and a minimum of visible pride or independence.

And hipster motifs and styles, when you dig into them, are often directly taken from these adjacent countercultures. The fixed-gear bike came from bike messengers and the anarchist culture of groups like Critical Mass and Bikes Not Bombs. Hipster approval of locavore food (because local cheeses and grass-fed beef are expensive, rare, and knowledge-intensive) brings elitism to the left-environmentalist campaign for deindustrialized agriculture. Even those trucker hats were familiar to those of us who first saw them on the wrong heads in 1999; they’d been worn in punk rock in the late eighties and early nineties, through the Reagan-Bush recession, as an emblem of the “age of diminished expectations.” Can the hipster, by virtue of proximity if nothing else, be woken up? One can’t expect political efflorescence from an antipolitical group.

 

Industry 4.0: The Industrial Internet of Things by Alasdair Gilchrist

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3D printing, additive manufacturing, Amazon Web Services, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, barriers to entry, business intelligence, business process, chief data officer, cloud computing, connected car, cyber-physical system, deindustrialization, fault tolerance, global value chain, Google Glasses, hiring and firing, industrial robot, inflight wifi, Infrastructure as a Service, Internet of things, inventory management, job automation, low skilled workers, millennium bug, pattern recognition, platform as a service, pre–internet, race to the bottom, RFID, Skype, smart cities, smart grid, smart meter, smart transportation, software as a service, stealth mode startup, supply-chain management, trade route, web application, WebRTC, WebSocket, Y2K

Indeed, experts believe that in ten years our products will no longer be built by a Chinese or Indian worker, but rather by a US/European programmer. • Increased productivity: With the increase in efficiencies, lowering of operational costs that will lead to increased profits. This will also drive forward improvements in productivity levels. Feasibility studies conducted in Europe are forecasting vast productivity gains in de-industrialized nations such as France and the UK. • Increased revenue: The manufacturing sector will reap the benefit of an increase in its revenues. Industry 4.0 is one of the major drivers for the growth of revenue levels and government value-added GDP, even though its implementation will also require significant investment. However, return on investment is predicted as being extremely high, sometimes too optimistic (such as UK manufacturing expected to increase by 20% by 2020)

For example, in the EU and the United States, they have set up initiatives to fund and encourage smart manufacturing. The EU in particular is striving to re-industrialize and 221 222 Chapter 14 | Smart Factories create a level of parity across a very diverse manufacturing capability of member states. Germany and Italy are modern industrial powerhouses that have well developed Industry 4.0 programs. Britain and France, on the other hand, have been de-industrializing for the last three decades and require a massive effort to re-industrialize. Ironically, it is France and the UK that are most likely to benefit from smart factories, as they can bring their manufacturing back onshore and subsequently enjoy great savings in costs and efficiency. In fact, Germany is unlikely to contribute much to the EU targets for increased efficiency and value-add to GDP, as they are already near optimum efficiency levels.

 

Who Rules the World? by Noam Chomsky

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Albert Einstein, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, corporate governance, corporate personhood, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Doomsday Clock, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, invisible hand, Malacca Straits, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, nuclear winter, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, precariat, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, Stanislav Petrov, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, trade route, union organizing, uranium enrichment, wage slave, WikiLeaks, working-age population

Economic historians have argued that Egypt was well placed to undertake rapid economic development at the same time that the United States was in this period.12 Both had rich agriculture, including cotton, the fuel of the early industrial revolution—though unlike Egypt, the United States had to develop cotton production and a workforce through conquest, extermination, and slavery, with consequences that are evident now in the reservations for the survivors and the prisons that have rapidly expanded since the Reagan years to house the superfluous population left by deindustrialization. One fundamental difference between the two nations was that the United States had gained independence and was therefore free to ignore the prescriptions of economic theory, delivered at the time by Adam Smith in terms rather like those preached to developing societies today. Smith urged the liberated colonies to produce primary products for export and to import superior British manufactured goods, and certainly not to attempt to monopolize crucial goods, particularly cotton.

Collingwood, Charles Colombia Colombian Permanent Committee for Human Rights colonialism Columbia Journalism Review Columbus, Christopher Command and Control (Schlosser) Committee on Public Information commons communism Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Congo consent, manufacture of Constantine, Emperor Contras Copenhagen Global Climate Change Summit Corcoran, Paul corporations personhood and Costs of War Project counterinsurgency Counterterrorism Security Group Creveld, Martin van Crimea Crisis of Democracy, The (Crozier) Cruickshank, Paul Cruz, Ted Cuba Bay of Pigs and missile crisis and Cyprus Daily Mail (London) Damascus, Syria Danger and Survival (Bundy) Darwish, Mahmoud Davar Dayan, Moshe Debs, Eugene debt Declaration of Independence defense spending deindustrialization democracy Democratic Party Dempsey, Martin Depression deregulation Dewey, John Dhanapala, Jayantha Diem, Ngo Dinh Diskin, Yuval Dobbs, Michael Dole, Bob Domínguez, Jorge Dorman, William Dostum, Abdul Rashid Dower, John Dreazen, Yochi Dreyfus, Alfred drones Duarte, Sergio due process Dulles, John Foster E1 project East Asia Eastern Europe East Timor Ebadi, Shirin Economic Charter of the Americas economic crises crash of 2008 Economic Policy Institute Ecuador education efficient market hypothesis Egypt Israeli treaty with Israeli war of 1967 Einstein, Albert Eisenhower, Dwight D.

 

pages: 621 words: 157,263

How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism by Eric Hobsbawm

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anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, British Empire, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, discovery of the americas, experimental subject, Fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment, labour market flexibility, market fundamentalism, means of production, new economy, Simon Kuznets, Thorstein Veblen, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile

In practice, however, its short-term prospects were less encouraging, even for those who did not remember that the immediate political result of the Great Depression of 1929–33 was a dramatic shift away 415 How to Change the World from labour movements and the left almost everywhere in Europe. The socialists, traditional brains-trust of labour, do not know any more than anyone else how to overcome the current crisis. Unlike in the 1930s, they can point to no examples of communist or social-democratic regimes immune to the crisis, nor have they realistic proposals for socialist change. In the old capitalist countries of the West de-industrialisation had already shrunk and would continue to contract their main basis, both industrial and electoral: the industrial working class. In newly emergent countries where this was not so, labour movements might well expand, but there was no real basis for their alliance with the traditional ideologies of social liberation, either because these were linked to actual or former communist regimes or because the ‘red’-linked movements of earlier times had atrophied in the meantime.

 

pages: 475 words: 155,554

The Default Line: The Inside Story of People, Banks and Entire Nations on the Edge by Faisal Islam

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Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, capital controls, carbon footprint, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, centre right, collapse of Lehman Brothers, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, dark matter, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, disintermediation, energy security, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, forensic accounting, forward guidance, full employment, ghettoisation, global rebalancing, global reserve currency, hiring and firing, inflation targeting, Irish property bubble, Just-in-time delivery, labour market flexibility, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, market clearing, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, mini-job, mittelstand, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, mutually assured destruction, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, paradox of thrift, pension reform, price mechanism, price stability, profit motive, quantitative easing, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, reshoring, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, sovereign wealth fund, The Chicago School, the payments system, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, two tier labour market, unorthodox policies, uranium enrichment, urban planning, value at risk, working-age population

In 2012, a plan was hatched to lure them back. The promise was no less than the return of Manchester’s rag trade, but in a form less dark and less satanic than its nineteenth-century predecessor. Reshoring, rebalancing and reindustrialising Manchester’s textile industry was the call – the rag trade returning to its historic home. In theory, this was the reverse of offshoring, imbalances, and deindustrialisation: just what George Osborne said he wanted for the UK economy. At Headen & Quarmby in Middleton, the retail guru Mary Portas commissioned a range of upscale women’s underwear called ‘Kinky Knickers’. They started hand-making them in north Manchester this year, and the results have been incredible. ‘Lovingly Made in Britain’ is the label stitched into each pair of knickers. The company’s MD David Moore says that they have increased their staff fivefold, and they could increase by another tenfold again, such is the demand for homespun underwear.

 

pages: 104 words: 34,784

The Trouble With Brunch: Work, Class and the Pursuit of Leisure by Shawn Micallef

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big-box store, call centre, cognitive dissonance, David Brooks, deindustrialization, ghettoisation, Jane Jacobs, knowledge worker, Mason jar, McMansion, new economy, post scarcity, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, Thorstein Veblen, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

If such a state wasn’t so readily accepted as our collective identity, we might stop talking about it and do something meaningful to change it. This creative-class socio-economic subset of the middle class was identified and brought into popular thought by the academic Richard Florida in his 2002 book The Rise of the Creative Class. Published just over one hundred years after Veblen published Theory of the Leisure Class, Florida’s book came at a time when modern Western society had undergone major shifts since Veblen’s era with deindustrialization and the emergence of a service-based economy. The commonality of the creative class is creative work, with human creativity being the ‘ultimate economic resource,’ according to Florida, and one that has a broad spectrum of people toiling away in professions and vocations that include scientists, engineers, artists, musicians, designers and knowledge-based professionals. Florida points out that in 1900, fewer than 10 percent of American workers were doing creative work, but by 2000 they represented a third of the workforce, with numbers between 25 percent and 30 percent in advanced European economies, but they had not been grouped together as such.

 

pages: 112 words: 30,160

The Gated City (Kindle Single) by Ryan Avent

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big-box store, carbon footprint, deindustrialization, edge city, Edward Glaeser, income inequality, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, offshore financial centre, profit maximization, rent-seeking, Silicon Valley, Thorstein Veblen, transit-oriented development, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation

When we look closely at dynamic cities today, we find a positive relationship between city skill-levels, productivity, and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship and productivity rise with a city's skill level.[7] Why is this important? Entrepreneurship is the means by which metropolitan economies -- and ultimately national economies -- are remade. Regions with lots of high-skill, high-entrepreneurship areas are more resilient in the face of broad economic changes like deindustrialization. New firm creation facilitates the development and dispersion of technology, and young firms -- small, en route to becoming big -- are the economy's biggest job creators. Cities that foster a high level of entrepreneurship will be engines of job creation and centers of innovation and economic transformation. And national economies that support the development of these cities will themselves be richer and more resilient.

 

pages: 376 words: 121,254

Cocaine Nation: How the White Trade Took Over the World by Thomas Feiling

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anti-communist, barriers to entry, crack epidemic, deindustrialization, illegal immigration, informal economy, inventory management, land reform, Lao Tzu, offshore financial centre, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, trade route, upwardly mobile

Organized crime moved into the drugs business because it was the only entity able to absorb the rising human and financial costs of dealing in illegal drugs in New York City.8 Several developments in the 1980s made the drugs business more attractive to newcomers and encouraged them to join criminal organizations. First were the enormous changes in industry and employment in the United States. De-industrialization, a rusting process which had been gnawing its way through the inner cities since the 1960s, was gathering speed. Between 1967 and 1987, Chicago lost 60 per cent, New York City 58 per cent and Philadelphia 64 per cent of their manufacturing jobs.9 Employers left the cities for the suburbs, other parts of the United States, or overseas; others just disappeared. As inner-city steel mills, factories and car plants closed down, the neighbourhoods that had been built to house their workers were reduced to pools of low-wage or unemployed labour, what have been described as ‘warehouses for the poor’.

Atrophy left city halls with a much smaller tax base from which to raise the money needed to pay for the welfare services that their people now depended on. Republican party politicians didn’t want to pump money into urban communities, partly because the inner cities had always voted Democrat, and partly because Republicans proved unable to solve social problems they had played a large part in creating. Instead, President Ronald Reagan responded to de-industrialization by dramatically cutting back the very programmes that had alleviated some of the resultant poverty, as well as those that were training people to make the transition to any new jobs that were available. Baltimore is the last resting place of Edgar Allan Poe, America’s finest gothic fabulist. It also provides the setting for The Wire, an equally haunting depiction of American vice. In 1950, the biggest employer in Baltimore was Bethlehem Steel.

 

pages: 934 words: 135,736

The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990 by Mary Fulbrook

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Albert Einstein, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, centre right, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, first-past-the-post, full employment, joint-stock company, land reform, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, open borders, Peace of Westphalia, Sinatra Doctrine, union organizing, unorthodox policies

Just as in the sphere of denazification there was a switch from drastic notions of collective guilt to an eventual policy of rehabilitation, so in the sphere of economic policy there was a radical change in approach. It was obvious that a primary aim of the Allies must be to prevent a resurgence of German militarism as a threat to peace, but it was not clear as to how best this was to be achieved. The early Morgenthau plan for the deindustrialization of Germany, despite its mixed reception, found some echoes in the economic proposals in the Potsdam Agreement, as well as in the Level-of-Industry Plan of March 1946. According to this, Germany's standard of living was to be reduced to the 1932 level, and was not to exceed that of other European countries; industrial capacity was to be reduced to about 5055% of the 1938 level; about 1546 plants were to be dismantled in the western zones; and there were limits on the output of almost all industries, with some (armaments and war-related) banned entirely.

This plan was related to reparations agreements which, because of the deterioration of East-West relations, were not in practice effected; in particular, after a couple of months the agreement on partial exchange of food and raw materials from the Soviet zone for products of western dismantling was terminated. While opinion in the USA had been divided, Britain was always strongly conscious of the problems that a deindustrialization of Germany would bring, particularly with respect to feeding the German population. However, it was not only for practical reasons (the attempt to prevent mass starvation) but also because of the developing Cold War, that western approaches to the German economy changed. The change was signalled in the speech by US Secretary of State James Byrnes in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, when the German public learned for the first time explicitly that it was to receive more lenient treatment.

 

pages: 590 words: 153,208

Wealth and Poverty: A New Edition for the Twenty-First Century by George Gilder

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affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, capital controls, cleantech, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equal pay for equal work, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Gilder, Home mortgage interest deduction, Howard Zinn, income inequality, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, margin call, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, medical malpractice, minimum wage unemployment, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, non-fiction novel, North Sea oil, paradox of thrift, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, price stability, Ralph Nader, rent control, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, skunkworks, Steve Jobs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, volatility arbitrage, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, yield curve

Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Earnings Capacity, Poverty, and Inequality, Institute for Research on Poverty Monograph Series (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 32. 19 Ronald L. Oaxaca, “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,” Working Paper No. 23 (Princeton, NJ: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1971). Chapter Fourteen 1 Patrick Buchanan, quoted in Harper’s, vol. 259, no. 1554 (November 1979), p. 39. 2 David B. Wilson, “There’s a New Class in Our Society,” Boston Globe, July 16, 1979, p. 11. 3 Frances Cairncross, “‘Deindustrialization’—Odd Phenomenon,” Financier , vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1978), pp. 11–14. See also Walter Eltis and David Bacon, The British Problem: Too Few Producers, rev. American edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978). 4 Computed from OECD National Accounts Statistics, 1972 and OECD Revenue Statistics, 1965–1972, as tabulated by Alan T. Peacock and Martin Ricketts, “The Growth of the Public Sector and Inflation,” in Fred Hirsch and John H.

., 1968. Buchanan, James M., and Wagner, Richard E. Democracy in Deficit. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1977. Burnss, Scott. Home, Inc.: The Hidden Wealth and Power of the American Household. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1975. Cain, Glen G. “The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory.” Journal of Economic Literature (December 1976). Cairncross, Frances. “‘Deindustrialization’—Odd Phenomenon.” Financier 2 (4) April 1978. Campbell, Colin D., ed. Income Redistribution. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Cipolla, Carlo. The Economic History of World Population. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974. Cloward, Richard, and Piven, Frances Fox. Regulating the Poor. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1971. Commoner, Barry. The Politics of Energy.

 

pages: 572 words: 134,335

The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class by Kees Van der Pijl

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anti-communist, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, collective bargaining, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, deskilling, diversified portfolio, European colonialism, floating exchange rates, full employment, imperial preference, Joseph Schumpeter, means of production, North Sea oil, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit maximization, RAND corporation, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, trade route, union organizing, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, War on Poverty

Pioneer-spirited solidarity like Ambassador Joseph Davies’s proposal in the 1942 postscript to his Mission to Moscow to send American engineers to Russia here paved the way for long-term considerations of an apparently generous, but basically anti-communist nature. Sumner Welles in 1944 put the tremendous possibilities for trade with the Soviet Union in the perspective of a gradual abandoning by the Russians of ‘many of the more radical forms of political organization which time and experience have proved to be inefficient’.76 The Morgenthau Plan which envisioned the deindustrialization of Germany also had the aspect of depriving the USSR of German reparations, and thus driving it to seek American credits. Making the Soviet Union dependent on American aid was a constant concern of those who wanted to disburse it. ‘We should … enter the postwar years with a definite willingness to aid the USSR financially’, the expert on international creditor practices in the State Department, Herbert Feis, wrote in July 1945.

Buttenwieser, of Kuhn, Loeb.24 Among the American military authorities in Germany, Dillon, Read was represented by director William Draper, who first held the job of economic head of OMGUS, the American military government, and after 1952 became European head of the Mutual Security Administration. In the War and Navy Departments, Patterson, a Wall Street lawyer for US investors in Germany, and Forrestal, president of Dillon, Read, were the respective secretaries.25 In the period preceding the Marshall Plan, the old German hands in the American bourgeoisie exerted all their considerable influence against the spectres of German de-industrialization and neutralization. They lobbied strenuously against Soviet and French reparation demands in order to ensure that German industrial assets would be available to support the recovery of capitalist Europe. Their strategy was to make the heavy industries of the Ruhr a core of a new Western European economy: an idea first broached to Secretary Forrestal in 1945 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former Dillon, Read partner.26 John Foster Dulles, then a Republican advisor to the Democratic State Department (and capitalizing on the new weight of his party in Congress), vigorously endorsed the idea.

 

pages: 399 words: 116,828

When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor by William Julius Wilson

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affirmative action, citizen journalism, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, declining real wages, deindustrialization, deliberate practice, desegregation, Donald Trump, edge city, ending welfare as we know it, full employment, George Gilder, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, income inequality, informal economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, new economy, New Urbanism, pink-collar, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, school choice, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban renewal, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

Of the changes in the economy that have adversely affected low-skilled African-American workers, perhaps the most significant have been those in the manufacturing sector. One study revealed that in the 1970s “up to half of the huge employment declines for less-educated blacks might be explained by industrial shifts away from manufacturing toward other sectors.” Another study reported that since the 1960s “deindustrialization” and the “erosion in job opportunities especially in the Midwest and Northeast … bear responsibility for the growth of the ranks of the ‘truly disadvantaged.’ ” The manufacturing losses in some northern cities have been staggering. In the twenty-year period from 1967 to 1987, Philadelphia lost 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs; Chicago lost 60 percent; New York City, 58 percent; Detroit, 51 percent.

Studies measuring the effects of declining manufacturing on black male income, as opposed to employment, reach different conclusions. On the basis of these studies, declining manufacturing does not appear to have the same adverse effects on black income as it does on black employment. See Bartik (forthcoming) and Danziger and Gottschalk (1993). 28 Another study reported that since the 1960s “deindustrialization” and the “erosion in job opportunities”: Bluestone, Stevenson, and Tilly (1991), p. 25. 29 The manufacturing losses in some northern cities have been staggering: Kasarda (1995). 30 Another study examined the effects of economic restructuring: Gittleman and Howell (1993). 31 “The most common occupation reported by respondents”: Testa and Krogh (1989), p. 77. 32 changes in the percentage of Chicago’s inner-city black fathers in manufacturing industries: For a discussion of these findings, see Krogh (1993). 33 quotation from Kasarda: Kasarda (1995), p. 239. 34 the employment and earnings of young black men across the nation: Sum and Fogg (1990). 35 Young high school dropouts and even high school graduates “have faced a dwindling supply of career jobs”: Sum and Fogg (1990), p. 51. 36 John Kasarda examined employment changes: Kasarda (1995). 37 Kasarda’s study also documents the growing importance of education in nine … northern cities: Kasarda (1995).

 

Multicultural Cities: Toronto, New York, and Los Angeles by Mohammed Abdul Qadeer

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affirmative action, call centre, David Brooks, deindustrialization, desegregation, edge city, en.wikipedia.org, Frank Gehry, game design, ghettoisation, global village, immigration reform, Jane Jacobs, knowledge economy, market bubble, McMansion, new economy, New Urbanism, place-making, Richard Florida, risk tolerance, Silicon Valley, Skype, telemarketer, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the scientific method, urban planning, urban renewal, working-age population, young professional

There is a pattern of ethnic groups forming a network/niche in particular industries, somewhat in line with their human and cultural resources and opportunities. Black Americans in Los Angeles present a polarized outcome of their performance in the labour market. While the income gap has steadily closed in the professions, low-skilled Blacks, previously employed in manufacturing, have lost out owing to the deindustrialization of producer-goods industries. The new low-skill industries, small businesses forming immigrant niches, leave limited opportunities for poorly educated Blacks. Black women have moved almost completely out of domestic service into low-level clerical jobs, working in both the public and private sectors. Blacks also continue to have a niche in low- and midlevel public service jobs. One segment of the Black labour force has remained blocked, while another segment has gained and moved into new niches.38 The Convergence of Ethnic Strategies in the Three Cities Ethnic entrepreneurial profiles, reflected in self-employment rates, are similar in these three cities, where narratives about cultural diversity vary considerably.

US recognition of communist China (1979) opened the door to Chinese from the mainland. All these events brought new classes of Chinese immigrants to the gateway cities of Toronto, New York, and Los Angeles. They were professionals, entrepreneurs, and businessmen who joined workers from the traditional sources of Chinese immigration. In the same period, the economies of these cities also underwent extensive restructuring with the introduction of information technology, deindustrialization, the flourishing of producer and social services, and the opening of international trade and financial flows. The new talent pool of immigrants, combined with the changing opportunity structure of urban economies, realigned the Chinese economies in the three cities. The Chinese economy in the Toronto area grew new shoots, diversifying its sectoral composition and establishing new niches in the mainstream economy, for example in finances, real estate, fashion, and computer engineering.

 

Killing Hope: Us Military and Cia Interventions Since World War 2 by William Blum

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anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bolshevik threat, centre right, collective bargaining, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, kremlinology, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, nuremberg principles, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, trickle-down economics, union organizing

West Germany was to become "the showcase of Western democracy"— dramatic, living proof of the superiority of capitalism over socialism; (3) in American conservative circles, and some liberal ones as well, wherein a Soviet invasion of Western Europe remained perpetually imminent, the idea of tying West Germany's industrial hands was one which came perilously close to being "soft on communism", if not worse.3 Dwight Eisenhower echoed this last sentiment when he later wrote: Had certain officials in the Roosevelt administration had their way, Germany would have been far worse off, for there were those who advocated the flooding of the Ruhr mines, the wrecking of German factories, and the reducing of Germany from an industrial to an agricultural nation. Among others, Harry Dexter White, later named by Attorney General Brownell as one who had been heavily 60 involved in a Soviet espionage ring operating within our government... proposed exactly that.4 Thus it was that the de-industrialization of West Germany met the same fate as the demilitarization of the country would in the coming years, as the United States poured in massive economic assistance: $4 billion of Marshall Plan aid and an army of industrial and technical experts. At the same time, the Soviet Union was pouring massive economic assistance out of East Germany. The Soviets dismantled and moved back home entire factories with large amounts of equipment and machinery, and thousands of miles of railroad track.

Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (University of Chicago Press, 1960) ch. VII. 12. New York Times, 24 January 1952, p, 4. 13. Ibid., 30 August 1955, p. 1. 14. Ibid., 30 November 1976. 15. Stephen Ambrose, ike's Spies (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1981) pp. 235, 238. 227 8. GERMANY 1950s 1. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969) p. 260. 2. Ibid. 3. Failure of deindustrialization; for further discussion, see Richard J. Barnet, Allies: America. Europe and Japansince the War (London, 1984) pp. 33-9. 4. Dwight Eisenhower, The While House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York, 1963) pp. 79-80. 5. New York Times, 6 November 1952, p. 3 6. Democratic German Report, 13 February 1953; see description of this publication below. 7. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, {New York, 1975) p. 147.8.

 

pages: 468 words: 123,823

A People's History of Poverty in America by Stephen Pimpare

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affirmative action, British Empire, car-free, clean water, cognitive dissonance, Columbine, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, dumpster diving, East Village, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Gilder, hiring and firing, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, impulse control, income inequality, index card, Jane Jacobs, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Naomi Klein, New Urbanism, payday loans, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ronald Reagan, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, union organizing, urban renewal, War on Poverty, white flight, working poor, Works Progress Administration

Schools, for a variety of reasons, tend to be inferior, further reducing opportunities for upward mobility, given the close correlation between education and income.17 Crime tends to be higher, and residents are much more likely to be the victims of violence.18 Finally, physically isolating poor people results in fewer encounters between people who are not poor and people who are: poverty is therefore an abstraction, easily dismissed or understood only through the propaganda of the privileged, contributing again to so many forming “but the vaguest notion” of poverty.19 The causes of concentrated poverty today are less clear, although sociologist William Julius Wilson’s explanation, despite challenges and refinements, still predominates: middle-class “white flight” from the central cities to the suburbs sapped cities of tax revenue from higher earners and left behind a poorer population that contributed less in taxes and needed more in public services. Exacerbating the problem, with deindustrializa-tion the jobs available to less-skilled and less-educated urbanites moved away, creating a “spatial mismatch.”20 Even before, from at least 1864 to 1923, there was an American “ethnic cleansing,” in which entire counties were forcibly emptied of blacks.21 Government itself has fostered segregation: with the complicity of the Federal Housing Administration, banks and mortgage companies for many years engaged in redlining, a policy of refusing to extend loans to African Americans for homes in predominantly white neighborhoods, or at all.

Less than one-third thought that “everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed.”49 The causes of growing inequality are likely complex and varied—some combination of the declining value of the minimum wage, declining rates of unionization, regressive changes in tax policy, the declining value of welfare benefits, the effects of international trade and immigration, and changes in the labor market wrought by deindustrialization.50 One analysis even found a connection between whether states have lotteries and their levels of income inequality, perhaps not quite so surprising as it might at first appear, given how often lotteries are described by policy analysts as the most regressive tax.51 The effects of inequality are pernicious: as British sociologist T.H. Marshall asked, “How can equality of citizenship coexist with capitalism, a system based on social class inequality?”

 

pages: 219 words: 61,334

Brit-Myth: Who Do the British Think They Are? by Chris Rojek

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British Empire, business climate, colonial rule, deindustrialization, demand response, full employment, Gordon Gekko, Isaac Newton, Khartoum Gordon, Mahatma Gandhi, means of production, post-industrial society, Red Clydeside, Stephen Hawking, the market place, urban planning, Winter of Discontent

This mattered little to a government seeking not to represent a ‘one nation’ view of Britain but to discard the dependency culture it believed socialism engendered and supported. 48 BRIT-MYTH In cultural terms, Margaret Thatcher was very like an ostrich, and not just in respect of her deluded view that Britain was still central to world affairs. For example, she seemed genuinely astonished that the 1981 race riots in Brixton and Toxteth could possibly occur on British soil. Her public profile held no place for remorse in shredding the fabric of traditional communities by pursuing aggressive policies of de-industrialization. The Miners’ Strike (1984–5) was portrayed as a battle against what she, controversially, referred to as ‘the enemy within’, again invoking the elusive, damning and extremely divisive distinction between ‘us and them’. But this time the resonance is not primarily between the British people and other nations, or multi-ethnic migrants to Britain. It is between the values and beliefs of one section of the native working class and the so-called lawabiding, peaceful majority.

 

pages: 258 words: 63,367

Making the Future: The Unipolar Imperial Moment by Noam Chomsky

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Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Frank Gehry, full employment, Howard Zinn, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, Long Term Capital Management, market fundamentalism, Mikhail Gorbachev, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, precariat, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, working poor

During the 1930s, working people could anticipate that the jobs would come back. Today, if you’re a worker in manufacturing, with real unemployment practically at Depression levels, you know that those jobs may be gone forever if current policies persist. That change in popular understanding has evolved since the 1970s, when major changes took place in the social order. One was a sharp reversal as several centuries of industrialization turned to de-industrialization. Of course manufacturing continued, but overseas—very profitable, though harmful to the workforce. The economy shifted to financialization. Financial institutions expanded enormously. A vicious cycle was set in motion. Wealth concentrated in the financial sector. The cost of campaigns escalated sharply, driving political leaders ever deeper into the pockets of wealthy backers, increasingly in financial institutions.

 

pages: 184 words: 54,833

Why Orwell Matters by Christopher Hitchens

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anti-communist, British Empire, colonial rule, deindustrialization, Etonian, hiring and firing, land reform, Louis Pasteur, Mahatma Gandhi, nuclear winter, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, sensible shoes

In this dystopia, all hotels are run by Arabs, so we have the Al-Dorchester plus, I regret to say, the Al-Idayinn; feral predator gangs are called ‘Kumina’, the Swahili word for ‘teenager’; the population communicates in yob-speak. Even Robert Conquest wrote a poem entitled ‘1974: Ten Years to Go’, in which the menacing figures of Tony Benn, the TUC (again), student Sparts and the IRA were pressed into service. Not all that frightening even at the time, they seem almost quaint today. There is an aesthetic as well as an ideological difference between a deindustrialized banana republic and a hermetic terror state; Orwell’s insistence on the distinction was just and necessary. It is superfluous for Conservatives to claim Orwell as an ally in the Cold War. He was fighting it when most Tories were still hailing Britain’s gallant Soviet ally. Indeed, he is credited with coining the term ‘cold war’, in a paragraph that deserves quotation. On 19 October 1945, in an essay entitled ‘You and the Atom Bomb’, he drew attention to both the military and the political dangers inherent in a weapon that, not merely unprecedentedly destructive of the innocent, could also only be wielded by an elite:We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity.

 

pages: 196 words: 53,627

Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders by Jason L. Riley

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affirmative action, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, guest worker program, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, lump of labour, open borders, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, school choice, Silicon Valley, trade liberalization, War on Poverty, working poor, working-age population

There’s no doubt some correlation, since it’s these blacks who are most likely to compete for jobs with Mexicans. But given that black alienation from the workforce has not ebbed and flowed with Hispanic migration patterns but remained stubbornly consistent for decades, there’s probably more to the story. When William Julius Wilson was writing about black nonattachment to the labor force twenty years ago, immigration was scarcely mentioned. He was primarily concerned with the deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, the lack of job training for blacks, and a hellish, self-perpetuating ghetto culture that encouraged criminal behavior and left too many black men not simply unemployed but unemployable. The 1980s and 1990s saw two of the longest periods of sustained economic growth in U.S. history, yet the labor-force participation rates of less-educated young black men actually declined over that stretch.

 

Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order by Noam Chomsky

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Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, declining real wages, deindustrialization, full employment, invisible hand, joint-stock company, land reform, manufacturing employment, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, Telecommunications Act of 1996, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, union organizing, Washington Consensus

A related question is how the third world became what it is today. The issue is discussed by the eminent economic historian Paul Bairoch. In an important recent study he points out that there is no doubt that the third world’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization” and in the very revealing case of India, the “process of de-industrialization” that converted the industrial workshop and trading center of the world to a deeply impoverished agricultural society suffering a sharp decline in real wages, food consumption, and availability of other simple commodities. “India was only the first major casualty in a very long list,” Bairoch observes, including “even politically independent third world countries [that] were forced to open their markets to Western products.”

 

pages: 177 words: 50,167

The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics by John B. Judis

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affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, anti-communist, back-to-the-land, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, capital controls, centre right, collapse of Lehman Brothers, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, first-past-the-post, full employment, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, laissez-faire capitalism, means of production, neoliberal agenda, obamacare, Occupy movement, open borders, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Post-materialism, post-materialism, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, white flight, Winter of Discontent

On the contrary, in the old days immigrants entered France and blended in. They adopted the French language and traditions. Whereas now entire communities set themselves up within France, governed by their own codes and traditions,” she explained to an interviewer in 2011. Economic Nationalism: Le Pen’s biggest departure in policy was in her economics. She was influenced by having served as a regional councilor in an area devastated by deindustrialization whose-working class citizens felt abandoned by the major parties in Paris. Her views were also shaped by an advisor she hired to run her 2012 campaign. In 2009, she had met Florian Philippot, 30, a graduate of the super-elite École nationale d’administration. (Presidents Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac, and François Hollande were all graduates.) In 2002, Philippot had been an enthusiastic supporter of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a founder of the French Socialist Party in 1969.

 

pages: 278 words: 82,069

Meltdown: How Greed and Corruption Shattered Our Financial System and How We Can Recover by Katrina Vanden Heuvel, William Greider

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Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, carried interest, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, conceptual framework, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Exxon Valdez, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, fixed income, floating exchange rates, full employment, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, kremlinology, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, McMansion, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, new economy, offshore financial centre, payday loans, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, pushing on a string, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent control, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, sovereign wealth fund, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, union organizing, wage slave, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, Y2K

But even as Americans marveled at the infinite variety of the Internet and celebrated our ethnic diversity, we were at the same time in the grip of an intellectual consensus every bit as ironclad as that of the 1950s. Across the spectrum, American opinion leaders in the nineties were coming to an unprecedented agreement on the role of business in American life. The leaders of the left parties, both here and in Britain, accommodated themselves to the free-market faith and made spectacular public renunciations of their historic principles. Organized labor, pounded by years of unionbusting and deindustrialization, slipped below 10 percent of the U.S. private-sector workforce and seemed to disappear altogether from the popular consciousness. The opposition was ceasing to oppose, but the market was now safe, its supposedly endless array of choice substituting for the lack of choice on the ballot. Various names were applied to this state of affairs. In international circles the grand agreement was called the “Washington Consensus”; economics writer Daniel Yergin called it the “market consensus”; New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman coined the phrase “golden straitjacket” to describe the absence of political options.

 

pages: 306 words: 78,893

After the New Economy: The Binge . . . And the Hangover That Won't Go Away by Doug Henwood

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, capital controls, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, credit crunch, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, deskilling, ending welfare as we know it, feminist movement, full employment, gender pay gap, George Gilder, glass ceiling, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, half of the world's population has never made a phone call, income inequality, indoor plumbing, Internet Archive, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, manufacturing employment, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Naomi Klein, new economy, occupational segregation, pets.com, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, Telecommunications Act of 1996, telemarketer, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, union organizing, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, working poor, Y2K

As with the black-white gap, this narrowing is the joint product of sometimes stagnant, sometime eroding male incomes and rising female ones; men's real incomes in 1998 were just 1% above 1989 levels, while women's were 14% above. 93 The gender gap has been narrowing for several reasons. Men's earnings, especially of those at the bottom of the educational and pay scales, have been slipping. Deindustrialization destroyed a lot of high-paying male jobs, and what is delicately called "deunionization" has lowered the pay of others. And, more pleasingly, women's earnings have been rising across the spectrum, both because they entered high-paying and largely RACIAL CAPS: black and Hispanic men's earnings, percent of white men's 95% 907o 85% 80% - 75% hourly 807o 75% 70% 657o 60% weekly 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 male occupations, and because they've been closing the gender gap within occupations.

 

pages: 209 words: 80,086

The Global Auction: The Broken Promises of Education, Jobs, and Incomes by Phillip Brown, Hugh Lauder, David Ashton

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affirmative action, barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, collective bargaining, corporate governance, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, deskilling, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, future of work, glass ceiling, global supply chain, immigration reform, income inequality, industrial robot, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market bubble, market design, neoliberal agenda, new economy, pensions crisis, post-industrial society, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, race to the bottom, Richard Florida, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, stem cell, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, winner-take-all economy, working poor

The same free market policies that were supposed to lift the demand for American brainpower have in reality removed the constraints on American corporations to maximize returns to shareholders through increasing corporate profits, irrespective of its implications for American workers. The assumption that national champions such as Ford or DuPont shared the interests of American workers lost much of its political credibility in the 1980s when American corporations were moving production jobs to low-cost countries, leaving a rust belt of deindustrialization symbolized by the cities of Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland. These early stages of globalization were not widely seen to undermine the opportunity bargain because it was believed that the same global forces would increase the demand for high-skill Americans. As long as knowledge workers could not be sourced more cheaply elsewhere, companies remained limited in their use of offshoring. Trade barriers and low levels of investment in college education in emerging economies offered few prospects for cut-price expertise.

 

Chomsky on Mis-Education by Noam Chomsky

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deindustrialization, deskilling, Howard Zinn, invisible hand, means of production, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, union organizing, Washington Consensus

These are natural consequences of the specific design of “market democracy” under business rule. Natural and not unexpected. Neoliberalism is centuries old, and its effects should not be unfamiliar. The well-known economic historian Paul Bairoch points out that “there is no doubt that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization,” or even “deindustrialization,” while Europe and the regions that managed to stay free of its control developed by radical violation of these principles.46 Referring to the more recent past, Arthur Schlesinger’s secret report on Kennedy’s Latin American mission realistically criticized “the baleful influence of the International Monetary Fund,” then pursuing the 1950s version of today’s “Washington Consensus” (“structural adjustment,” “neoliberalism”).

 

pages: 251 words: 76,128

Borrow: The American Way of Debt by Louis Hyman

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asset-backed security, barriers to entry, big-box store, cashless society, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, deindustrialization, deskilling, diversified portfolio, financial innovation, Ford paid five dollars a day, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, income inequality, market bubble, McMansion, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Network effects, new economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, Ronald Reagan, statistical model, technology bubble, transaction costs, women in the workforce

The postwar period had been a time of remarkable growth and stability. Slowly, inexorably, that world fell apart in the 1970s, as the international economic order shifted from postwar recovery back to global competition. The seemingly unending demand for U.S. dollars in the postwar period, when the whole world wanted to buy U.S. goods, gave way to a dollar that was less in demand. The economic dislocations of the 1970s—inflation and deindustrialization—fundamentally stemmed from this return to normalcy. The stable growth of the postwar period that had rewarded budgeting and borrowing fell apart. With surging inflation and stagnating pay, real wages began to fall. Making up the gap, more married women than ever before entered the workforce, trying to make ends meet. But consumers also began to rely on borrowing to make up the widening gap.

 

pages: 446 words: 578

The end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, centre right, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labour mobility, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, nuclear winter, open economy, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Socratic dialogue, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions

T h e answer, for a variety of reasons, would appear to be no. 3 No Barbarians at the Gates 85 T h e first reason has to d o with the expectations created by current economic growth. W h i l e individuals and small communi­ ties can "return to nature," quitting their j o b s as investment bank­ ers o r real estate developers in o r d e r to live by a lake in the Adirondacks, a society-wide rejection of technology would mean the wholesale de-industrialization of a nation in Europe, America, or J a p a n , and its transformation, in effect, into an impoverished Third W o r l d country. T h e r e would p e r h a p s be less air pollution and toxic waste, but also less m o d e r n medicine and communica­ tions, less birth control and t h e r e f o r e less sexual liberation. Rather than freeing man f r o m the cycle of new wants, most people would become reacquainted with the life of a p o o r peasant tied to the land in an unending cycle o f back-breaking labor.

Many countries have, of course, existed at the level of subsistence agriculture for generations, and the people living in them have doubtless achieved considerable happiness; but the likelihood that they could do so having once experienced the consumerism of a tech­ nological society is doubtful, and that they could be persuaded as a society to exchange one for the o t h e r even m o r e so. M o r e o v e r , if there were other countries that chose not to de-industrialize, the citizens of the ones that did would have a constant standard of comparison against which to j u d g e themselves. Burma's decision after W o r l d W a r II to reject the goal of economic development common elsewhere in the T h i r d W o r l d and to remain interna­ tionally isolated might have w o r k e d in a pre-industrial world, but proved very difficult to sustain in a region full of booming Singapores and Thailands.

 

pages: 859 words: 204,092

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom by Martin Jacques

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Admiral Zheng, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, credit crunch, Dava Sobel, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, income per capita, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, land tenure, Malacca Straits, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, open economy, pension reform, price stability, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, spinning jenny, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, the scientific method, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Xiaogang Anhui farmers

At a conference in Beijing in 2005, Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, spelt out these fears: Africa sells raw materials to China and China sells manufactured products to Africa. This is a dangerous equation that reproduces Africa’s old relationship with colonial powers.45 The equation is not sustainable for a number of reasons. First, Africa needs to preserve its natural resources to use in the future for its own industrialization. Secondly, China’s export strategy is contributing to the deindustrialization of some middle-income countries . . . it is in the interests of both Africa and China to find solutions to these strategies.46 Perhaps the country that most exemplifies this inequality is Zimbabwe, where the Chinese enjoy a powerful presence in the economy, controlling key strategic areas like the railways, electricity supply, Air Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.47 The fact that China has a carefully worked-out and comprehensive strategic approach to its relationship with Africa, while the African response, in contrast, is fragmented between the many different nations, poorly informed about China, and based on an essentially pragmatic rather than strategic view, serves only to exacerbate this inequality.48 The danger is that African nations enter into agreements with China over the exploitation of their natural resources which are too favourable to China, or use the revenues gained in a short-term fashion, perhaps corruptly, to benefit various interest groups, or possibly both.

Chen Kuan-Hsing Chen Shui-bian Chery Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Mai Initiative China Investment Corporation Chinalco Chinese attitude, to the world Chinese citizens abroad Chinese cuisine Chinese diaspora see also overseas Chinese Chinese firms see also state enterprises Chinese hegemony attitude to the world culture economy geopolitical shifts racial order shared history values and education Chinese identity civilization-state see civilization-state as a continental system as a developed and developing country early emergence of reinforced by foreign occupation Chinese (language) Mandarin Chinese migration see overseas Chinese Chinese modernity emergence of characteristics of Chinese overseas direct investment Chinese traditional medicine Chow, Kai-wing Christian Dior Citic Securities cities citizenship, notion of civilization-state Cixi, Empress Dowager class structure clean-technology innovations climate change clothing CNPC CO2 emissions coal Cohen, Paul Cold War colonialism colonization role in industrialization Comme des Garçons commodities consumption exports from Africa prices Communism Communist Party 1949 Revolution political directions political reform race and class ruling system Confucianism and Communism and democracy and education harmony influence on Asian nations and politics and reforms on rulers and families Confucius Confucius Institutes consumer goods, falling price cooked barbarians corruption cotton credit crunch cricket Crystal, David Cultural Revolution Curtin, Michael Cwiertka, Katarzyna da zhongguo da zhonghua daimyo Dakar, Senegal Dalai Lama decentralization Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea decolonization deforestation deindustrialization democracy Greek influence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Deng Xiaoping on economic development international system ‘Southern Expedition’ dependency theory depoliticization depressionssee also economic recession developed world see the West developing world China as rise of and the West Diamond, Jared Diaoyu/Senkaku islands Dikötter, Frank Ding Xueliang dollar domestic/corporate savings Dreyer, Edward drugs East Asia and China see regional pre-eminence democracy Japan’s attitude to racism Sino-US relation in spread of Mandarin East Asia modernity cultural characteristics nature of rise of speed of Western influence see Westernization Western view of East Asian Economic Caucus East Asian Free Trade Area East India Company ecological deficit economic recessionsee also depressions Edo (laterTokyo) education Confucian classics expenditure in family language teaching overseas Chinese reforms on science and technology strengths universities value of elites Elvin, Mark employment, in European industry energy security strategy (2007) English (language) dominance of presence in East Asia potential decline Enlightenment principles environmental awareness ethnic minorities see also individual groups euro Europe and China decline of diaspora and the international system and modernity see modernity multi-state system overseas empires share of world population and United States European embargo European exceptionalism European Union evolution Fairbank, John K.

 

pages: 740 words: 161,563

The Discovery of France by Graham Robb

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Brownian motion, deindustrialization, Honoré de Balzac, Louis Pasteur, New Economic Geography, Peace of Westphalia, price stability, trade route, urban sprawl

There is no sign that Bie`vres would one day be the home of an industrial bakery, the Burospace technology park, the ‘RAID’ division of the riot police and the Victor Hugo car park. D’autres auront nos champs, nos sentiers, nos retraites. Ton bois, ma bien-aimée, est à des inconnus.35 * INDUSTRIAL COLONIZATION, too, left relatively few traces in French art and literature. Paris was already being deindustrialized in the 1830s as workshops moved out and property speculators moved in. Until quite late in the nineteenth century, mill chimneys and plumes of smoke drifting across the sky were described as interesting novelties. Wizened tribes of factory workers were seen as hellish exceptions rather than the face of the future. The valley of the Gier, between Lyon and Saint-É tienne, was once a ribbon of black debris dotted with flat, smoky hovels.

Aachen see Aix-la-Chapelle/Aachen Aas (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Abriès (Hautes-Alpes) ref Adour river ref, ref Agen (Lot-et-Garonne) ref, ref Agincourt, Battle of ref Agon-Coutainville (Manche) ref Aigues-Mortes (Gard) ref Aiguilles (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref Aiguillon (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Aiguines (Var) ref Aisne river ref, ref Aix-en-Provence (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Aix-la-Chapelle/Aachen ref Aix-les-Bains (Savoie) ref Algeria ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Algiers ref Aliermont (Seine-Maritime) ref Alise-Sainte-Reine (Côte-d’Or) ref Allier river ref, ref Alpes mancelles (Sarthe) ref Alps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in the ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref deforestation ref, ref education ref First World War ref livestock ref maps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref rivers ref roads ref touristes ref, ref travel ref, ref, ref Alps of Provence ref, ref Alps of Savoy ref, ref, ref Alsace, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Alsace-Lorraine ref, ref, ref, ref Alyscamps, Arles ref, ref Ambert (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Americas ref, ref, ref Amiens (Somme) ref, ref, ref Amiens Cathedral ref Ancenis (Loire-Atlantique) ref Les Andelys (Eure) ref Andorra ref Andrézieux (Loire) ref Ange Gardien, Col de l’ (Hautes-Alpes) ref Angers (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Angoulême (Charente) ref, ref, ref, ref Angoumois, province ref Anjou, province ref, ref, ref, ref Antibes (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Antony (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Aosta see Valle d’Aosta Aquitaine ref Aramits (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Arc de Triomphe, Paris ref Arcachon (Gironde) ref, ref, ref Arcachon Basin ref, ref Arcueil (Val-de-Marne) ref Ardèche gorges ref Ardennes region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Argelès-Gazost (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref Argoat, Brittany ref Argonne region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ariège département ref Aries (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Armagnac region ref, ref Armand, Aven (Lozère) ref Armor, Brittany ref Armorican peninsula ref Arpajon (Essonne) ref Arras (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref Arreau (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Arromanches (Calvados) ref Ars-sur-Formans (Ain) ref Art-sur-Meurthe (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Artois, province ref, ref Arve river ref Arvieux (Hautes-Alpes) ref Asnieres-sur-Seine, Dog Cemetery (Hauts-de-Seine) ref, ref Atlantic coast ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Atlantic Ocean ref, ref, ref Aubervilliers (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref, ref AuBêterre-sur-Dronne (Charente) ref Aubigny-sur-Nère (Cher) ref Aubin (Aveyron) ref, ref Aubisque, Col d’ (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Aubrac region ref, ref Aubry-en-Exmes (Orne) ref Auch (Gers) ref, ref Audressein (Ariège) ref Aulus-les-Bains (Ariège) ref Aumont (Lozère) ref Aunis, province ref Autun (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref Autun Cathedral ref, ref Auvergne, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bête du Gévaudan ref cuisine ref, ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref fashion ref healers of ref livestock ref maps ref rivers ref roads ref, ref Romans ref spas ref tourism ref, ref Auxerre (Yonne) ref, ref Auxois region ref Avesnes-sur-Helpe (Nord) ref Aveyron département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Avignon (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ayen, Col d’ (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Badger’s Eyes, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Bagnères-de-Bigorre (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Bagneux, dolmen (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref Balkans ref Barbary Coast ref Barbonville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Barcelona ref, ref Barcelonnette (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Barèges (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref, ref, ref Bas-Poitou, province ref Bas-Rhin département ref Basque Country ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Basses-Alpes département (now Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref, ref La Bastide, nr le Massegros (Lozère) ref Bastille, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Bauduen (Var) ref Baumes-Fères, Verdon Gorges ref Bauzon, forest (Ardèche) ref Bayard, Col (Hautes-Alpes) ref Bayeux (Calvados) ref Bayonne (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Béarn, province ref, ref Beaucaire (Gard) ref, ref Beauce region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Beaufortain Alps ref Beaujolais region ref Beaumont-en-Cambrésis (Nord) ref Beauvais (Oise) ref, ref, ref Bédoin (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref Bélesta (Ariège) ref Belfort (Territoire-de-Belfort) ref Belgium ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Belvédère, nr Saint-Amand-Montrond (Cher) ref Berck-Plage (Pas-de-Calais) ref Beresina, Crossing of the ref Berne ref Berneval (Seine-Maritime) ref Bérou-la-Mulotière (Eure-et-Loir) ref Berry, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Berthouville (Eure) ref Besançon (Doubs) ref, ref Bétharram (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref Béziers (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref Biarritz (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref, ref Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris ref Bielle (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Bièvres (Essonne) ref Blaye (Gironde) ref, ref Blois (Loir-et-Cher) ref, ref, ref, ref Bocage ref, ref Bois de Boulogne, Paris ref, ref Bonette, Col de la (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Borce (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Bordeaux (Gironde) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref cagots in ref, ref language ref roads ref, ref, ref trade ref, ref, ref, ref, ref travel ref, ref Bordelals region ref, ref Bordessoule (Creuse) ref Bort-les-Orgues (Corrèze) ref Bouches-de-l’Elbe département ref Le Bouchet-Saint-Nicolas (Haute-Loire) ref Bouillon, Duché de, Belgium ref, ref Boulogne (formerly Bourogne) (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Boulogne-sur-Mer (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Le Bouquet (Lozère) ref Bourbon-l’Archambault (Allier) ref Bourbon-Vendée see La Roche-sur-Yon Bourbonnais, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bourg d’Oisans (Isère) ref Bourg-la-Reine (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Bourges (Cher) ref, ref, ref Bourges Cathedral ref Bourget, Lac du (Savoie) ref Bourgogne (Burgundy), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref wines ref, ref Bourgogne, canal ref Braconne, Forêt de la (Charente) ref Bramabiau, Abime de (Gard) ref Brande region ref, ref Bray, Pays de ref Brenne region ref La Bresse (Vosges) ref Brest (Finistère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bretagne (Brittany), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref animals ref, ref art ref coast ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref fashion ref forests ref language ref laws ref livestock ref, ref maps ref, ref migrant workers ref moorland ref patron saint ref roads ref, ref, ref, ref, ref smuggling ref tourism ref, ref, ref, ref tribes/people ref, ref, ref, ref Briançon (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref Briare, canal ref Brie region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Brighton ref Britain ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Brittany see Bretagne Brive-la-Gaillarde (Corrèze) ref Broquies (Aveyron) ref Brouage (Charente-Maritime) ref Brousse-le-Château (Aveyron) ref Bruère-Allichamps (Cher) ref Brussels ref Buenos Aires ref Bugarach, Pech de ref, ref Bugarach (Aude) ref Buissoncourt-en-France (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Burgnac (Haute-Vienne) ref Burgundy see Bourgogne Cabourg-les-Bains (Calvados) ref, ref Cabrerets (Lot) ref Caen (Calvados) ref Les Cagots, quartier of Hagetmau (Landes) ref Cahors (Lot) ref, ref Cailhaou d’Arriba-Pardin, nr Poubeau (Haute-Garonne) ref Calais (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref California ref Californie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Calvados département ref Camargue delta ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cambrai (Nord) ref Canada (‘lieu-dit’) ref Canigou mountain ref Canjuers, Grand Plan de (Var) ref Canjuers military zone (Var) ref Cannes (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref Cantal département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cantal plateau ref, ref, ref, ref Cap Ferret (Gironde) ref Capbreton (Landes) ref Carcassonne (Aude) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Carnac (Morbihan) ref, ref, ref Carpentras (Vaucluse) ref Carpentras plain ref Casteljaloux (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Castellane (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Castetbon (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Castres (Tarn) ref Catalonia ref, ref, ref, ref Catus (Lot) ref Causse Noir ref Causses plateaux ref, ref, ref, ref Cauterets (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Caux, Pays de ref, ref Cayenne (‘lieu-dit’) ref La Caze, nr Aubin (Aveyron) ref Cellefrouin (Charente) ref Cemmenus see Cévennes Cenabum (Roman Orleans) ref Cercottes (Loiret) ref Cerdagne region ref Cevennes mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Chalindrey (Haute-Marne) ref Chalon-sur-Saône (Saône-et-Loire) ref Chalons-en-Champagne (Chalons-sur-Marne) (Marne) ref Chalosse region ref Chambon, Lac (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Chambre d’Amour, Biarritz ref Chamonix or Chamouni, village and valley (Haute-Savoie) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Champ de Mars, Palais du, Paris ref Champagne, province and region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Champagne pouilleuse ref, ref Champs-Élysées, Paris ref, ref, ref Channel Islands ref, ref Chanteloup pagoda, Amboise (Indre-et-Loire) ref Chantllly (Olse) ref, ref La Chapelle-Saint-Ursin (Cher) ref Charente region ref Charente river ref, ref La Charité-sur-Lolre (Nievre) ref, ref Charlieu (Loire) ref Charolais, canal ref Charost (Cher) ref Chartres (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Château-Ville-Vieille (Hautes-Alpes) ref Châteauroux (Indre) ref Châtelet, Paris ref Chaudun, Cirque de ref Chaudun (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref Chaussée d’Antin ref ‘La Chaussée’ (place name) ref ‘Chemin de la duchesse Anne’ ref Le Chêne, nr Saint-Philbert-de-Bouaine (Vendée) ref Cher département ref, ref Cher river ref, ref Cherbourg (Manche) ref, ref ‘Chestnut Belt’ ref Cheylard-l’Évêque (Lozère) ref Clermont d’Excideuil (Dordogne) ref Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-Dôme) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cloisters Museum, Manhattan ref Cluny, Abbaye de (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref Colmar (Haut-Rhin) ref, ref, ref Colombey-les-Belles(Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Combourg (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Comédie Française, Paris ref Compostela see Santiago de Compostela Conches-en-Ouche (Eure) ref Corbeil (Essonne) ref Corbières hills ref, ref, ref Cordouan lighthouse ref Corniche Sublime, Verdon Gorges ref Cornwall ref Corrèze département ref Corsica ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Corte (Haute-Corse) ref Côte d’Argent ref Côte d’Azur ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Côte Émeraude ref Côte Sauvage ref Côtentin peninsula ref, ref Côtes-du-Nord département (now Côtes-d’Armor) ref Couserans region (Ariège) ref Couvin, Belgium ref Cransac (Aveyron) ref Craponne canal ref Crau plain ref, ref, ref Creuse département ref, ref, ref Le Creusot (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Croissant language zone ref, ref Croisset, nr Rouen (Seine-Maritime) ref CUDL (Communauté Urbaine de Lille) ref Cuq (Tarn) ref Cure river ref Cyrano’s Nose, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Dammartin-en-Goële (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref, ref Dargilan, Grotte de (Lozère) ref Darnac (Haute-Vienne) ref Dauphiné, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dax (Landes) ref Deauville (Calvados) ref Decazeville (Aveyron) ref, ref Découverte mine, Decazeville ref Deux Mers, Canal des ref Devil’s Citadel, the see Montpellier-le- Vieux Devoluy massif, French Alps ref Dieppe (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Digne-les-Bains (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref, ref Dijon (Côte-d’Or) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dive river ref Dognen (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref ‘Le Dolmen’ café-bar ref Dombasle-en-Argonne (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Dombes plateau ref, ref, ref, ref Domrémy-la-Pucelle (Vosges) ref Dordogne département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dordogne river ref, ref, ref Dos du Loup hill (Ardennes) ref Douai (Nord) ref Double region ref, ref Dover ref, ref Doyenné, Quartier du, Paris ref Drac river ref Dreux (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Drôme département ref Dronne river ref Duhort (Landes) ref Dune du Pyla (Gironde) ref Dunkerque (Dunkirk) (Nord) ref, ref, ref Durance river ref, ref, ref Eaux-Bonnes (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Eaux-Chaudes (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Échourgnac (Dordogne) ref École des Mines, Paris ref École des Ponts et Chaussées ref Les Écossais (Allier) ref Écrins massif, French Alps ref Eiffel Tower ref, ref, ref, ref Elba, Island of ref, ref, ref, ref England ref, ref, ref English Channel ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Entre-Deux-Mers region ref Ercé (Ariège) ref Erdeven (Morbihan) ref, ref Ergué-Gabéric (Finistère) ref Escamps (Lot) ref Espère (Lot) ref Les Estables (Haute-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Estaque hills ref Esterel massif (Var) ref Étampes (Orne) ref Étaples (Pas-de-Calais) ref Étretat (Seine-Maritime) ref Étroit de la Quille, Verdon Gorges ref Eugénie-les-Bains (Landes) ref Eure river ref, ref Figeac (Lot) ref Finistère département ref, ref, ref, ref Flandres, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Flavignac (Haute-Vienne) ref Flers (Orne) ref Florae (Lozère) ref Florence ref La Folie, nr Sausset-les-Pins (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref La Folie, nr Soissons (Aisne) ref Fontaine-de-Vaucluse (Vaucluse) ref, ref Fontainebleau (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref Fontaygnes, Burning Mountain of (Puech que ard, Aveyron) ref Fontenay-le-Comte/Fontenay-le-Peuple (Vendee) ref Forêts département (Luxembourg) ref, ref, ref Forez region ref, ref, ref, ref ‘France Miniature’theme park ref Franche-Comte, province ref, ref, ref, ref Frankfurt am Main ref Fréjus (Var) ref, ref Fumade, ‘lieu-dit’ ref Gallia Narbonensis ref Gap (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref, ref Garabit Viaduct (Cantal) ref Gard département ref Gare du Nord, Paris ref Gare Montparnasse, Paris ref Garonne, Canal Latéral à la ref Garonne river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gascogne (Gascony), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gascon language ref ‘Gascon noir’ see Landais Gate of Mycenae, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Gâtebourse (‘lieu-dit’) ref Gâtefer (‘lieu-dit’) ref Gâtinais, region of Île-de-France ref Gâtine, region of Poitou ref Gaul (Gallia) xv-xvi, xvii, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gavarnie, Cirque de (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Gave de Pau river ref Genève (Geneva) ref, ref, ref Geneve, Lac de (Lac Léman) ref, ref Gènissiat, Barrage de (Ain) ref Gennevilliers (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Genoa ref Gérardmer (Vosges) ref Gerbier de Jonc, mountain ref, ref, ref Gergovie (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Germany ref, ref, ref, ref, ref annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 1870 ref, ref World War I ref Gers département ref, ref Gévaudan region ref, ref Gier valley ref Gironde département ref, ref, ref Gironde estuary ref, ref, ref Gironde peninsula ref, ref Gleize, Col de/Col de Chaudun (Hautes-Alpes) ref Golfe du Lion ref Goust (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref Gracay (Cher) ref Grand Ballon mountain ref Grand Canyon see Verdon Gorges ‘Grand Chemin de France au Piémont’ ref ‘Le Grand Chemin’ (place name) ref Grand Saint-Bernard, Col du ref, ref, ref Grande Crau ref Grande Lande region ref Granville (Manche) ref, ref Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref, ref Gravelines (Nord) ref Greece ref Grenelle, Paris ref Grenoble (Isère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Grenoble University ref Grosses-Saules ref Guadeloupe ref Guengat (Finistère) ref Gueret (Creuse) ref, ref, ref Guernsey ref Guingamp (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Guyenne, province ref Hagetmau (Landes) ref, ref Halles, Les, Paris ref, ref Ham (Somme) ref Hamburg ref Hastings ref Haudiomont (Meuse) ref Haut-Rhin département ref Haute-Loire département ref, ref Haute-Marne département ref, ref Hautes-Alpes département ref Hautpon, suburb of Saint-Omer ref Le Havre (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref Hennebont (Morbihan) ref Hoedic, Île d’ (Morbihan) ref, ref Houat, Île d’ (Morbihan) ref, ref Houlgate (Calvados) ref Hyères (Var) ref Île Saint-Louis, Paris ref Île-de-France ref, ref Île-et-Vilaine département ref Illiers-Combray (Eure-et-Loir) ref Inaccessible Mountain (Mont Aiguille) ref Indo-China ref Indre département ref, ref Iraty forest ref, ref Ireland ref, ref Iseran, Col de l’ (Savoie) ref Isère département ref, ref Isigny-sur-Mer (Calvados) ref Issaux forest (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Issoudun (Indre) ref, ref, ref, ref Italy ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Izoard, Col d’ (Hautes-Alpes) ref Jardin des Plantes, Paris ref, ref Jardin du Luxembourg, Paris ref Jemmapes département ref Jersey ref Jordanne river ref Jumièges Abbey (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref Jura département ref Jura mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Jurvielle (Haute-Garonne), talking stone of ref Kabylie xv, ref Kerfeunteun (Finistère) ref Labouheyre (Landes) ref Laffrey hill (Isère) ref Lafitte-sur-Lot (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Lagast hill (Aveyron) ref Lamalou-les-Bains (Hérault) ref Landais ref, ref, ref Landemer-Grèville (Manche) ref Landes département ref Landes region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref afforestation ref animals ref cuisine ref language ref maps ref, ref, ref migrant workers ref roads ref shepherds ref Landrecies (Nord) ref Langon (Ille-et-Vilaine), chapelle Sainte-Agathe ref Langres (Haute-Marne) ref, ref Languedoc, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref everyday life ref, ref language of ref, ref livestock ref, ref maps ref roads ref, ref spread of news ref travel ref, ref Laon (Aisne) ref Laon Cathedral ref, ref Lasalle (Gard) ref Latin Quarter, Paris ref, ref, ref Lauragais region ref, ref, ref Lautenbach (Haut-Rhin) ref Laval (Mayenne) ref Lavaur (Tarn) ref Lavignac (Haute-Vienne) ref Le Mans (Sarthe) ref Le Mans Cathedral ref Lens (Pas-de-Calais) ref Levant ref, ref Libournais region ref Libourne (Gironde) ref, ref, ref Liege, Belgium ref Lieusaint (Seine-et-Marne) ref Lille (Nord) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Limagne region ref Limoges (Haute-Vienne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Limousin, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref L’Isle-Adam (Val-d’Oise) ref Lodève (Hérault) ref Loin-du-bruit (‘lieu-dit’) ref Loir river ref Loir-et-Cher département ref Loire, Pays de la ref Loire river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref estuary of ref sources of ref Loire Valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Loire-Inférieure département ref Loiret département ref, ref Loiret river ref London ref, ref, ref, ref Longjumeau (Essonne) ref Longpont, nr Mortagne-au-Perche (Orne) ref Lorraine, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref annexation ref, ref Lot département ref, ref Lot river ref, ref, ref, ref Lotharingia ref ‘Lou Clapas’ see Montpellier-le-Vieux Louisiana ref Le Loup-garou (‘lieu-dit’) ref Lourdes (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Louvie, Col de ref Louvre, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Low Countries ref, ref Lozère département ref Ludres (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Lupcourt (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Lurbe (Landes) ref Luxembourg ref, ref, ref Luz-Saint-Sauveur (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Lyon (Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref civil order ref floods 1856 ref industry ref provincial pride ref tourism ref, ref transport ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Lyonnais, province and hills ref, ref, ref, ref Lys département ref Lysel, suburb of Saint-Omer ref Macon (Saône-et-Loire) ref Maine, province ref, ref Maintenon (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Maladetta mountain ref, ref Malcontent (‘lieu-dit’) ref Mandeure (Doubs) ref, ref Manhattan ref, ref Manna of Briançon ref Marais poitevin ref, ref, ref, ref La Marche, province ref Marly-le-Roi (Yvelines) ref, ref Marne river ref, ref, ref Marne-Rhine canal ref Marquèze (Landes) ref Mars-la-Tour (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref, ref Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref cabanons ref civil order ref factories ref language ref, ref migrant workers ref trade ref travel ref, ref, ref, ref Martineiche (Creuse) ref Mascaret tidal wave ref Massabielle cave, Lourdes (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Massif Central ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Matignon (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Maubert (Aveyron) ref Maubeuge (Nord) ref Maugué, Le, Verdon Gorges ref Mauléon-Licharre (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Mauvais-vent (‘lieu-dit’) ref Mayenne département ref Médaille Miraculeuse, Chapelle Notre-Dame de la, Paris ref Mediterranean ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mediterranean ports ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mediterranean Sea ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Melun (Seine-et-Marne) ref Mende (Lozère) ref Menton (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Mer de Glace ref, ref Merdogne see Gergovie Meridian of Greenwich ref Meridian of Paris ref, ref, ref Mers-les-Bains (Somme) ref Métro, Paris ref, ref Metz (Moselle) ref Meurthe river ref Meuse river ref, ref Mexico, Gulf of ref, ref Mézenc range ref see also Le Gerbier de Jonc (mountain) Middle East ref Midi, Canal du ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Milan ref Millau (Aveyron) ref, ref Millau Viaduct ref Millevaches, Plateau de ref Mimizan (Landes) ref, ref Miraculous Medal, Chapel ref Molac forest (Morbihan) ref Molines (Hautes-Alpes) ref Monaco ref Le Monastier-sur-Gazeille (Haute-Loire) ref, ref Moncel-sur-Seille (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Monein (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Mons, Belgium ref Mons (Var) ref Mont Aiguille see Inaccessible Mountain Mont Blanc ref, ref, ref Mont Blanc département (Savoie) ref, ref Mont Cenis pass and tunnel (Savoie) ref, ref, ref, ref ‘Mont Maudite’ (Mont Blanc) ref Mont Terri ref Mont Terrible département (Swiss Jura) ref, ref Mont Ventoux ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mont-de-Marsan (Landes) ref, ref, ref Le Mont-Dore (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Mont-Saint-Michel, Le (Manche) ref, ref, ref Mont-Sainte-Odile (Bas-Rhin) ref Montagne Noire ref, ref, ref Montagne Sainte-Victoire ref Montagnes Maudites ref Montauban (Tarn-et-Garonne) ref Montbéliard (Doubs) ref, ref Montceau-les-Mines (Saône-et-Loire) ref Montclar (Aveyron) ref Monte-Carlo, Monaco ref Montélimar (Drôme) ref Montenvers glacier ref, ref Montereau-Fault-Yonne (Seine-et-Marne) ref Montjay (Essonne) ref Montjean (Mayenne) ref Montjoie (Loiret) ref Montjoux (Drôme) ref Montluçon (Allier) ref, ref Montmartre, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Montmorency (Val-d’Oise) ref Montpellier (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Montpellier-le-Vieux (Aveyron) ref Montrouge (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Montségur (Ariège) ref Morbihan département ref, ref, ref Morlaix (Finistère) ref Mortagne-au-Perche (Orne) ref, ref Morvan region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Moscow, Retreat from (1812) ref, ref Moselle département ref Motte-de-Galaure (Drôme) ref Moulins (Allier) ref, ref, ref, ref Moumour (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Moustiers-de-Sainte-Marie (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Mouzon (Ardennes) ref Mulhouse (Haut-Rhin) ref Musée Grévin, Paris ref Musée National des Arts et Traditions Populaires, Paris ref Museum of Ethnography, Paris ref Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Nangis (Seine-et-Marne) ref Nant (Aveyron) ref Nantes (Loire-Atlantique) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Naples ref Napoléon, Napoléonville or Napoléon-Vendee see La Roche-sur-Yon Narbonne (Aude) ref Nasbinals (Lozère) ref Navarre ref, ref Navarrenx (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Nemours (Seine-et-Marne) ref Nérac (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Neuf-Brisach (Haut-Rhin) ref Neufchâtel-en-Bray (Seine-Maritime) ref Nevers (Nièvre) ref New Caledonia ref New Orleans ref Nez de Cyrano, Le, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Nice (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Nièvre département ref Nile, Battle of the ref Nîmes (Gard) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Niort (Deux-Sèvres) ref Niort (Deux-Sèvres) ref Nitry (Yonne) ref Nizonne river ref Nogent-sur-Seine (Aube) ref, ref Nonancourt (Eure) ref Nord département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Normandy, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref animals ref bicycle races ref coast ref, ref, ref, ref everyday life in ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref tribes/people ref North Africa ref, ref North America ref Notre-Dame-de-Brusc, nr Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Notre-Dame-de-Héas (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Notre-Dame-de-la-Grande, Poitiers ref Notre-Dame-de-Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Notre-Dame des Cyclistes (Landes) ref Nouveau Monde, Le (‘lieu-dit’) ref Le Nouvion-en-Thiérache (Aisne) ref La Nuaz (‘lieu-dit’) ref Observatoire, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Oisans region ref, ref, ref Oise river ref, ref Oléron, Île d’ (Charente-Maritime) ref Oloron-Sainte-Marie (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Opéra, Paris ref Orange (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Orléans (Loiret) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Orne département ref Ossau valley ref Ostend (Oostende, Ostende) ref Padirac, Gouffre de (Lot) ref Paimpont forest (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Pain-perdu (‘lieu-dit’) ref Palais des Papes, Avignon ref, ref Pantheon, Paris ref Panticosa (Spain) ref Parapluie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Paris xv, xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref abandoned children ref bicycle races ref, ref building of ref Chamoniards ref civil order ref cuisine ref deindustrialization ref département ref dogs ref, ref, ref expansion ref fashion ref ‘Grand Départ’ ref and Gustave Eiffel xvii illegitimacy ref life expectancy ref linguistic diversity ref, ref maps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref meridian ref, ref migrant populace ref, ref news ref, ref population ref, ref, ref prestige of ref professions of ref Revolutionary ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Merry massacre ref satellite towns ref slums ref social mobility ref suburbs xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref time ref tourism ref, ref, ref traffic ref transport ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref ‘winter swallows’ ref, ref Paris Basin ref, ref, ref, ref Paris-Lyon road ref Paris-Orléans road ref Paris-Toulouse road ref, ref Pas-de-Calais département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Le Pecq (Yvelines) ref Peira Dreita, Col de la (Aude) ref Perche region ref, ref Périgord, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Périgueux (Dordogne) ref Péronne (Somme) ref Perpignan (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Perte du Rhône (Ain) ref, ref, ref Perte-de-temps (‘lieu-dit’) ref Le Pertre forest (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Petit Saint-Bernard, Col du (Savoie) ref Petites Régions Agricoles ref Petrarch and Laura, House of ref Peyrelade (Haute-Garonne) ref Peyresourde, Col de (Haute-Garonne) ref, ref, ref Phalsbourg (Moselle) ref Picardy, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Pied-Mouillé (‘lieu-dit’) ref Piedmont ref, ref, ref, ref Pierrelatte canal ref Plague Wall (Mur de la Peste) (Vaucluse) ref Plan (Isère) ref Planès (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Plateau des Fossiles, Verdon Gorges ref Plénée (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Plombières-les-Bains (Vosges) ref Pluguffan (Finistère) ref Plymouth ref ‘Point Zéro’, Notre-Dame-de-Paris ref Poissy (Yvelines) ref Poitiers, Battle of ref Poitiers (Vienne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Poitou, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref see also Marais poitevin Pompey (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Pont du Gard ref, ref, ref Pont Neuf, Paris ref Pont Saint-Michel, Paris ref Pont-Aven (Finistère) ref Le Pont-de-Beauvoisin (Isère and Savoie) ref Pont-de-Soleils (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Pont-Saint-Esprit (Gard) ref Pontarion (Creuse) ref Pontarlier (Doubs) ref Pontoise (Val-d’Oise) ref Le Port (place name) ref Porte de Saint-Cloud, Paris ref Le Portel, suburb of Boulogne-sur-Mer ref Portugal ref Poubeau (Haute-Garonne) ref Pradelles (Haute-Loire) ref Prades (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Pré-alpes de Castellane ref Prends-toi-garde (‘lieu-dit’) ref Provence, province xv, xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref, ref livestock ref, ref, ref maps ref news ref people ref, ref roads ref, ref tourism ref, ref, ref travel ref, ref, ref, ref wildlife ref Provins (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref Prussia ref, ref Puech Cani, nr Broquiès (Aveyron) ref Puy Violent (Cantal) ref Le Puy-en-Velay (Haute-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Pyla see Dune du Pyla Pyrenees ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bears of ref, ref canals ref cuisine ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref deforestation ref languages ref, ref, ref livestock ref, ref, ref maps ref, ref, ref politics ref rivers ref roads ref, ref spas ref, ref, ref tourism ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref travel ref Treaty of the (1659) ref wildlife ref, ref, ref Quebec ref Quercy, province ref, ref, ref Queyras region ref, ref, ref, ref Quiberon (Morbihan) ref Quimper (Finistère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Raffetot (Seine-Maritime) ref Rambouillet forest ref Rambouillet (Yvelines) ref Regordane see Voie Regordane Reims Cathedral ref Reims (Marne) ref, ref, ref Réméréville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rennes-le-Château (Aude) ref Rennes-les-Bains (Aude) ref République, Col de la (Loire) ref Reventin hill (Isère) ref Revercourt (Eure-et-Loir) ref Reynier (Var) ref Rheims see Reims Rhine river ref, ref, ref, ref Rhineland ref, ref, ref, ref Rhodanus (Rhône) ref Rhône river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref floods (1856) ref Rhône Valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ribiers (Hautes-Alpes) ref Riquewihr (Haut-Rhin) ref, ref Ristolas (Hautes-Alpes) ref Rive-de-Gier (Loire) ref, ref Rivesaltes military zone (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Riviera, French ref Roanne (Loire) ref Rocamadour (Lot) ref La Roche-sur-Yon/Napoléon-Vendée (Vendée) ref, ref, ref Rochefort (Charente-Maritime) ref, ref, ref Rochefort-en-Valdaine (Drôme) ref La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rodez (Aveyron) ref Rodez Cathedral ref, ref Roissy – Charles-de-Gaulle airport ref Rome ref, ref, ref Rome, Faubourg de, Issoudun ref Roncevaux (Ronceval, Roncesvalles) ref Roquecezière, Battle of ref, ref, ref Roscoff (Finistère) ref, ref, ref Rosières-aux-Salines (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Roubaix (Nord) ref, ref Rouen, Généralité de ref Rouen (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rouergue, province ref, ref Rougon (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Rousseland, nr Brécy (Cher) ref Roussillon, province ref, ref, ref Roussillon plain ref Route des Grandes Alpes ref Route des Vins, Alsace ref Route du Grand Meaulnes (Cher) ref Route du Sacre, Paris-Reims ref, ref Route Thermale, Pyrénées ref Routes de Saint Jacques ref Royan (Charente-Maritime) ref Rozel (Manche) ref Le Rozier (Lozère) ref Russia ref, ref Ry (Seine-Maritime) ref Saarland ref Les Sables-d’Olonne (Vendée) ref Sabres (Landes) ref Sacy (Yonne) ref Sahara Desert ref Saint Bernard Pass see Grand Saint-Bernard, Col du; Petit Saint-Bernard, Col du (Savoie) Saint Cirice, nr Broquiès (Aveyron) ref, ref Saint Gengoult church, Toul ref Saint Helena ref Saint-Amand-Montrond (Cher) ref Saint-André (Morbihan) ref Saint-Bénezet bridge, Avignon ref Saint-Bonnet (place name) ref Saint-Brieuc (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Saint-Crépin (Aveyron) ref Saint-Denis basilica ref, ref, ref Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref, ref, ref Saint-Émilion (Gironde) ref Saint-Étienne (Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Étienne-d’Orthe (Landes) ref Saint-Forget (Yvelines) ref Saint-Germain dog market, Paris ref Saint-Gilles (Gard) ref Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle see Santiago de Compostela Saint-Jean-du-Gard (Gard) ref, ref Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Saint-Malo (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref, ref Saint-Maio-Geneva line ref, ref, ref Saint-Martin-de-Carnac, nr Cuq (Tarn) ref, ref Saint-Martin-du-Tertre (Val-d’Oise) ref Saint-Maurice, Verdon Gorges ref Saint-Maximin-la-Sainte-Baume (Var) ref Saint-Maymes (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Saint-Merry church, Paris ref Saint-Michel-de-Cuxa, abbey (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Saint-Nicolas-d’Aliermont see Aliermont (Seine-Maritime) Saint-Nicolas-de-Port (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref Saint-Oradoux-pres-Crocq (Creuse) ref Saint-Ouen (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref Saint-Pé-de-Bigorre (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Saint-Raphaël (Var) ref Saint-Remimont (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Saint-Sauveur-sur-Tinée (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Saint-Sernin-sur-Rance (Aveyron) ref Saint-Sever (Seine-Maritime) ref Saint-Tropez (Var) ref Saint-Véran (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Viâtre (Loir-et-Cher) ref Sainte-Baume massif (Bouches-du-Rhône and Var) ref, ref, ref Sainte-Croix, Lac de (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence and Var) ref Sainte-Marie-de-Campan (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Sainte-Menehould (Marne) ref Sainte-Opportune (Orne) ref Sainte-Reine see Alise-Sainte-Reine Saintes (Charente-Marl time) ref, ref, ref Saintonge, province ref Salbris (Loir-et-Cher) ref Salency (Oise) ref, ref Salers (Cantal) ref La Salette-Fallavaux (Isère) ref Salies-de-Bearn (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Salins-les-Bains (Jura) ref, ref Salses-le-Château (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Sambre river ref San Salvador see Saint-Sauveur-sur-Tinée San-Sebastián ref Santiago de Compostela (Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle) ref, ref, ref, ref Saône river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sarrebourg (Moselle) ref Sarthe département ref Saulzais-le-Potier (Cher) ref Saumur (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref Saverne, Col de (Bas-Rhin) ref, ref Savoie (Savoy) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sceaux (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Scotland ref, ref, ref Sebastopol, Battle of ref Sedan, Battle of ref, ref Sedan (Ardennes) ref Seine département ref, ref, ref Seine river and valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref source of the river ref, ref Seine-Maritime département ref Sens (Yonne) ref, ref, ref Sermoise (Aisne) ref Sète (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref Seuil de Naurouze ref, ref Seven Wonders of the Dauphine ref, ref Severen, Col de ref Sèvre river ref Sèvres (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Sexey-les-Bois (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref La Sibérie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Sicié, Cap (Var) ref Signy-le-Petit (Ardennes) ref Sigottier (Hautes-Alpes) ref Simplon Pass ref Six-Fours (Var) ref Sixt (Haute-Savoie) ref Slovenia ref Soissons (Aisne) ref, ref Soleis (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Solférino (Landes) ref Sologne region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Somme département ref Songy (Marne) ref Sorbonne, Paris ref Sotteville (Seine-Maritime) ref Soulac-sur-Mer (Gironde) ref Soule (Basque province) ref La Souterraine (Creuse) ref South America ref, ref Souvigny-en-Sologne (Loir-et-Cher) ref Spain ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sphinx, Le, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Stevenson Trail ref Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Strasbourg Minster ref, ref Suez Canal ref, ref, ref Suisse d’Alsace ref Suisse Niçoise ref Suisse Normande ref Surjoux (Ain) ref Switzerland ref, ref, ref, ref Tarare hill (Rhône) ref Tarn département ref, ref, ref, ref [del:, ref] Tarn gorges ref, ref, ref Tarn river ref, ref, ref, ref Temple, Paris ref Tende, Col de (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Texon (Haute-Vienne) ref Thann (Haut-Rhin) ref Thiérache, pays ref, ref Thiers (Puy-de-Dôme) ref, ref Thivars (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Thury-en-Valois (Oise) ref Tibre département ref Tonneins (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Toulon (Var) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Toulousain region ref, ref Toulouse (Haute-Garonne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref boat travel ref, ref, ref civil order ref cuisine ref, ref maps ref provincial pride ref roads ref, ref, ref Toulven, nr Ergue-Gabéric (Finistère) ref Le Touquet (Pas-de-Calais) ref Touraine, province ref, ref, ref, ref Tourcoing (Nord) ref Tourmalet, Col du (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref Tours (Indre-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Tout-y-faut (‘lieu-dit’) ref Tower Without Venom ref Tranchée de Calonne (Meuse) ref Trappe de Bonne-Espérance (Dordogne) ref Traversette, Col de la (Hautes-Alpes) ref Tréguier (Côtes-d’Armor) ref, ref Treignat (Allier) ref Tremblevif see Saint-Viatre Trembling Meadow ref Le Tréport (Seine-Maritime) ref Trocadéro, Palais du, Paris ref Trouville-sur-Mer (Calvados) ref, ref Troyes (Aube) ref, ref Tuileries, Gardens and Palace, Paris ref, ref Turin ref, ref, ref Turkey ref Tyrol ref Ubaye region ref United States of America ref, ref Urdos (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Usingen, Germany ref Uzès (Gard) ref, ref Vacères-en-Quint (Drôme) ref Le Val d’Ajol (Vosges) ref Valence (Drôme) ref Valenciennes (Nord) ref Valensole plain (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Valle d’Aosta ref, ref Var département ref, ref Var river ref, ref Varangéville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Varennes-en-Argonne (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Vaucluse département ref, ref Vaugirard, Paris ref Vaumale, Pas de (Var) ref Vauxbuin (Aisne) ref Velay region ref Vendée département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Venice ref Ventoux, Mont ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Vercors massif (Isère and Drôme) ref, ref, ref, ref Verdelot (Seine-et-Marne) ref Verdon Gorges ref, ref, ref Verdon river ref, ref Verdun (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Verdun-sur-Garonne (Tarn-et-Garonne) ref Le Vernet, suburb of Perpignan ref Vernet-les-Bains (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Versailles palace ref, ref, ref, ref Versailles (Yvelines) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Vesdun (Cher) ref Vexin region ref Vézelay basilica ref, ref Via Agrippa ref Via Aurelia ref Via Domitia ref, ref Vichy (Allier) ref, ref, ref Vienne département ref Vienne (Isère) ref, ref, ref Vienne river ref, ref, ref Le Vigeant (Vienne) ref Vigneulles (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Vilaine river ref Villard, nr Bourg-Saint-Maurice (Savoie) ref Ville-Affranchie (Lyon) ref Villemomble (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref Villequier (Seine-Maritime) ref Villers-Cotterêts (Aisne) ref, ref, ref Le Vitarel (Aveyron) ref Vitteaux (Côte-d’Or) ref Vivarais region ref, ref Vizille (Isère) ref Vole Regordane ref Vosges département ref, ref, ref Vosges mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Voûte d’Émeraude, Verdon Gorges ref Waterloo, Battle of ref, ref, ref Wesserling (Haut-Rhin) ref West Indies ref Western Front ref Winy Fountain ref Yeu, Île d’ (Vendée) ref Yeux du Blaireau, Les, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Yonne river ref, ref Yonville-l’Abbaye (Madame Bavary) ref Yssingeaux (Haute-Loire) ref Acknowledgements This book began and ended with the friendliness and expertise of Andrew Kidd and Sam Humphreys at Picador, Starling Lawrence at W.

 

pages: 828 words: 232,188

Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy by Francis Fukuyama

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Atahualpa, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, British Empire, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Snowden, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, invention of the printing press, iterative process, knowledge worker, land reform, land tenure, life extension, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, means of production, Menlo Park, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, new economy, open economy, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, Port of Oakland, post-industrial society, Post-materialism, post-materialism, price discrimination, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, stem cell, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

With rising labor costs in China and other emerging-market countries, a certain amount of manufacturing has started to return to the United States and other developed countries. But this has happened in part only because labor costs as a proportion of total manufacturing costs have gotten much smaller due to increases in automation. This means that renewed onshore production will not be likely to replace the huge numbers of middle-class jobs that were lost in the initial process of deindustrialization. This points to the much more important long-term factor of technological advance, which in a sense is the underlying facilitator of globalization. There has been a constant substitution of technology for human labor over the decades, which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought huge benefits not just to elites but also to the broad mass of people in industrializing countries.

Governments frequently had to be involved in the adjustment process since private markets and individuals on their own could not always cope with the consequences of technological change.16 Public policy must therefore be factored into the fate of middle-class societies. Across the developed world, there has been a range of responses to the challenges of globalization and technological change. At one end of the spectrum are the United States and Britain, where governments provided minimal adjustment help to communities facing deindustrialization beyond short-term unemployment insurance. Indeed, both public authorities and pundits in academia and journalism have often embraced the shift to a postindustrial world. Public policy supported deregulation and privatization at home and pushed for free trade and open investment abroad. Particularly in the United States, politicians intervened to weaken the power of trade unions and to otherwise increase the flexibility of labor markets.

 

Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink (Politics and Society in Modern America) by Louis Hyman

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asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, card file, central bank independence, computer age, corporate governance, credit crunch, declining real wages, deindustrialization, diversified portfolio, financial independence, financial innovation, Gini coefficient, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, income inequality, invisible hand, late fees, London Interbank Offered Rate, market fundamentalism, means of production, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, p-value, pattern recognition, profit maximization, profit motive, risk/return, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, statistical model, technology bubble, the built environment, transaction costs, union organizing, white flight, women in the workforce, working poor

William Fair’s company went on to create the well-known FICO score—Fair, Isaac Corporation score—that is today synonymous with credit score and is generated for every American by the big-three credit agencies, two of which descended from Retail Credit Company (Equifax) and Credit Data Corporation (Experian). “Fairness” in lending, defined as objective and widespread, seemed to have been achieved, but the earlier lingering question of whether people ought to borrow, and did borrowing actually help consumers when their incomes were uncertain, remained unanswered. In a time of rising unemployment and deindustrialization, the logic of borrowing from a future income—which underpinned the postwar growth economy—began to unravel. Credit cards for all emerged at the exact moment when the future had become less certain than ever before. Membership, nonetheless, had its privileges. For women, as an American Bankers Association representative testified, the “the only way we can tell sex right now including our credit scoring system . . . is by her name.”203 Individual credit records created the possibility of individual interest rates.

While critics of the credit card industry have pointed to the Marquette decision as harmful for consumers, the decision allowed a more competitive industry to develop that ultimately lowered interest rates for consumers. The balance of power in capitalism was not determined by the interest rate caps for consumers, but whether they were able to pay back what they borrowed. Thirty years of wage stagnation made paying back those debts through anything but accidental asset inflation—homes and home equities—impossible. In the 1990s, the full flower of deindustrialization pummeled not only blue- but white-collar America as well. While a generation of postwar consumers could safely borrow against rising incomes, the promise on which American prosperity had been built now cracked. The evanescent promise of getting a good-paying job that a generation earlier would have been seen as a sure path to upward mobility, only led in the 1990s to increased debt and certain bankruptcy after that job was downsized.275 Even those with college educations found themselves downsized in the 1990s as information technology increased the efficiency of office work, and their wages converged with high school graduates.

 

pages: 289 words: 112,697

The new village green: living light, living local, living large by Stephen Morris

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back-to-the-land, Buckminster Fuller, clean water, cleantech, collective bargaining, Columbine, Community Supported Agriculture, computer age, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, discovery of penicillin, distributed generation, energy security, energy transition, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial independence, Firefox, index card, Indoor air pollution, invisible hand, Kevin Kelly, Louis Pasteur, Mahatma Gandhi, McMansion, Menlo Park, Negawatt, peak oil, rolodex, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, Whole Earth Catalog, Whole Earth Review

Senegalese cereal farmers in purple satin and matching headdresses trade packaging tips with Peruvian potato growers in traditional red embroidered garb. Goat cheese makers and Hmong long-bean growers from California find common ground with their Italian and Eastern European counterparts. Israeli and Palestinian farmers, along with Iraqi and American food producers, share space and the excited chat that food never fails to stimulate. This is Terra Madre, a gathering that is the Olympics of the international movement to deindustrialize food production. That means putting taste back at the heart of food, saving heirloom fruits, vegetables and animals, keeping small farmers in business and in local communities, and pushing farming back on sound environmental ground. Mingling with the farmers are prominent Bay Area names in the sustainable food movement – Chez Panisse founder Alice Waters and UC Berkeley journalism professor and The Omnivore’s Dilemma author Michael Pollan, just to name a couple.

 

pages: 273 words: 93,419

Let them eat junk: how capitalism creates hunger and obesity by Robert Albritton

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Bretton Woods, California gold rush, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, Food sovereignty, Haber-Bosch Process, illegal immigration, immigration reform, invisible hand, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, land reform, late capitalism, means of production, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, South Sea Bubble, the built environment, union organizing, Unsafe at Any Speed, upwardly mobile

Even to compete amongst themselves in producing tropical commodities, because of the “green” revolution, developing countries often had to invest heavily in agro-industrial seed, and mechanical and chemical inputs that would only be possible for the larger wealthier farms. Further, the green revolution became a substitute for much-needed land reform in many developing countries. As a result, huge numbers of people were driven off the land as only the richer farmers benefited. According to Davis: 136 L E T T H E M E AT J U N K the Third World now contains many examples of capitalintensive countryside and labor-intensive deindustrialized cities.80 As large numbers of small farmers have been forced off the land, city slums have grown to the point that now onethird of all the world’s urban dwellers live in slums, and this percentage is expected to increase in the near future.81 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has impacted upon Mexico much as SAPs have affected other developing countries. As previously mentioned, when NAFTA was ratified by Canada, Mexico and the United States, subsidized US corn began to pour into Mexico where corn is not subsidized, and corn imports from the United States tripled in a short time.

 

pages: 397 words: 112,034

What's Next?: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy by David Hale, Lyric Hughes Hale

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, cognitive bias, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, diversification, energy security, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, full employment, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global village, high net worth, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, index fund, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Just-in-time delivery, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, Long Term Capital Management, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage tax deduction, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, passive investing, payday loans, peak oil, Ponzi scheme, post-oil, price stability, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Tobin tax, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, yield curve

Unlike the early years of South Africa’s democratic dispensation, when currency volatility was caused primarily by domestic sociopolitical factors, ever since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the sources of rand strength and its above-average volatility are mostly exogenous. In effect, fundamental shifts in the dynamics of the global capital markets, together with marginally high domestic interest rates, lead to sustained strength and volatility of currency. This in turn leads to ongoing de-industrialization and the gradual emergence of the so-called Dutch Disease. The negative economic, fiscal, and employment consequences of this process are too severe for South Africa. The underperformance of South Africa’s export sector, despite the prevailing super cycle of commodity prices, is, to a large extent, attributed to the currency factor, which is operating within a free-float regime. Increasingly, there is a case for a shift from a free float to a “managed float” for the currency, with a view to moderate foreign exchange volatility and its socioeconomic impact.

 

pages: 323 words: 89,795

Food and Fuel: Solutions for the Future by Andrew Heintzman, Evan Solomon, Eric Schlosser

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agricultural Revolution, Berlin Wall, big-box store, clean water, Community Supported Agriculture, corporate social responsibility, David Brooks, deindustrialization, distributed generation, energy security, Exxon Valdez, flex fuel, full employment, half of the world's population has never made a phone call, hydrogen economy, land reform, microcredit, Negawatt, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, RAND corporation, risk tolerance, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment

Yet the German response to mad cow disease rejected all of that. After years of distortions and cover-ups by German agricultural officials, Renate Kuenast, a member of the Green Party, became minister of Agriculture, Nutrition, and Consumer Protection in 2001. “Things will no longer be the way they are,” Kuenast declared, introducing a fundamentally new approach to food policy. The German government is now officially committed to the de-industrialization of agriculture. It vows to make 20 percent of German farmland organic within a decade. It has enacted the world’s first animal bill of rights. If Germany can head down this path, so can the rest of the world. The essays in this book suggest new agricultural technologies and new business models. Some may prove important; others, a complete waste of time. You may agree with some of the arguments made in these pages, and vehemently disagree with others.

 

pages: 364 words: 104,697

Were You Born on the Wrong Continent? by Thomas Geoghegan

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Albert Einstein, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, collective bargaining, corporate governance, cross-subsidies, dark matter, David Brooks, declining real wages, deindustrialization, ending welfare as we know it, facts on the ground, Gini coefficient, haute cuisine, income inequality, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, McJob, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, offshore financial centre, payday loans, pensions crisis, Plutocrats, plutocrats, purchasing power parity, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Saturday Night Live, Silicon Valley, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, union organizing, Wolfgang Streeck, women in the workforce

There had to be severance pay. There were “conditions, conditions, conditions” on getting out the way we did. Tougher bankruptcy laws made it hard for big business to walk away. They could not go into Chapter 11 and dump their pension and health obligations. It was the power of labor not just “against” or “outside” the firm but deep “inside” the very structure of the big German firm that made it harder to deindustrialize the way we did. And maybe in a social democracy, there are just fewer investment alternatives. There is the fact that, because people have public goods, there are fewer alternative ways to profiteer. Businesses can’t make the same profits on health or education the way they can here, since in Europe, unlike in the U.S., the state will not pay for these goods at whatever price the market will bear.

 

pages: 537 words: 99,778

Dreaming in Public: Building the Occupy Movement by Amy Lang, Daniel Lang/levitsky

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Bay Area Rapid Transit, bonus culture, British Empire, clean water, cognitive dissonance, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate personhood, crowdsourcing, David Graeber, deindustrialization, facts on the ground, glass ceiling, housing crisis, Kibera, late capitalism, Naomi Klein, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, out of africa, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Port of Oakland, Rosa Parks, Saturday Night Live, Slavoj Žižek, structural adjustment programs, the medium is the message, too big to fail, trade liberalization, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, War on Poverty, We are Anonymous. We are Legion, We are the 99%, white flight, working poor

Larisa Mann argues that the Occupy movement’s growing solidarity with communities targeted by police violence accounts for the brutality of police response to OWS, and locates the radical potential of Occupy precisely in this solidarity. According to novelist Sara Paretsky, Occupy radically alters our modes of response to the overwhelming problems of the last half-century, from women’s rights to deindustrialization to the fraying social safety net. Its unwillingness to yield to the demand for demands allows it to return not merely to a language of justice and the general welfare but to their achievement. Thirteen Observations made by Lemony Snicket while watching Occupy Wall Street from a Discreet Distance Lemony Snicket 17 October 2011 1. If you work hard, and become successful, it does not necessarily mean you are successful because you worked hard, just as if you are tall with long hair it doesn’t mean you would be a midget if you were bald. 2.

 

pages: 284 words: 92,387

The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement by David Graeber

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Bretton Woods, British Empire, corporate personhood, David Graeber, deindustrialization, dumpster diving, East Village, feminist movement, financial innovation, George Gilder, Lao Tzu, late fees, Occupy movement, payday loans, planetary scale, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ralph Nader, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, seigniorage, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, unpaid internship, We are the 99%, working poor

One reason the old 1960s antipathy between “hippies and hard hats” has dissolved into an uneasy alliance, then, is partly because cultural barriers have been overcome, and partly because of the changing composition of the working class itself, the younger elements of which are far more likely to be entangled in an increasingly exploitive and dysfunctional higher education system. But there is another, I suspect, even more critical element. This is the changing nature of capitalism itself. There has been much talk in recent years about the financialization of capitalism, or even in some versions the “financialization of everyday life.” In the United States and much of Europe, this has been accompanied by deindustrialization; the U.S. economy is no longer driven by exports, but by the consumption of products largely manufactured overseas, paid for by various forms of financial manipulation. This is usually spoken of in terms of the dominance of what’s called the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) in the economy. For instance, the share of total U.S. corporate profits derived from finance alone has tripled since the 1960s: 1965 13% 1970 15% 1975 18% 1980 17% 1985 16% 1990 26% 1995 28% 2000 30% 2005 38% Even this breakdown underestimates the numbers considerably, since it only counts nominally financial firms.

 

pages: 523 words: 111,615

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters by Diane Coyle

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, bonus culture, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, call centre, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, conceptual framework, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Diane Coyle, disintermediation, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Financial Instability Hypothesis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, happiness index / gross national happiness, Hyman Minsky, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, market bubble, market design, market fundamentalism, megacity, Network effects, new economy, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, oil shock, principal–agent problem, profit motive, purchasing power parity, railway mania, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Steven Pinker, The Design of Experiments, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, The Market for Lemons, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Spirit Level, transaction costs, transfer pricing, tulip mania, ultimatum game, University of East Anglia, web application, web of trust, winner-take-all economy, World Values Survey

Recent research at the level of individual firms suggests that investment in ICTs needs to be accompanied by significant changes in structure.19 The use of the technology improves productivity only when companies at the same time invest effort in changing people’s jobs, the flow of work, and the structure of the company. More jobs in the leading economies require people to use their initiative, to be adaptable, and able to think. People need more qualifications and are not as likely as in the past to get through their working life without changing what they do. This is the familiar process of deindustrialization. There are still plenty of “unskilled” jobs; after all, cleaners and laborers are still needed. But a growing proportion of jobs require more than basic skills—the middling sorts of job that were suited to people who did not go into tertiary education, and were based on the kind of skills acquired through repetition, have been shrinking in number. So, for instance, the use of ICTs and automation of banks’ back offices have cut the number of bank tellers needed.

 

pages: 278 words: 88,711

The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century by George Friedman

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banking crisis, British Empire, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, illegal immigration, immigration reform, invisible hand, megastructure, Monroe Doctrine, pink-collar, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, working poor

The next largest economy in the world is Japan's, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion—about a third the size of ours. The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan's and China's industries combined. There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly increase.

 

pages: 422 words: 89,770

Death of the Liberal Class by Chris Hedges

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1960s counterculture, Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, call centre, clean water, collective bargaining, Columbine, corporate governance, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, hive mind, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Lao Tzu, post scarcity, profit motive, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, Tobin tax, union organizing, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, WikiLeaks, working poor, Works Progress Administration

The true militants of the American twentieth century, including the old communist unions, understood, in a way the liberal class does not, the dynamics of capitalism and human evil. They knew that they had to challenge every level of management. They saw themselves as political beings. They called for a sweeping social transformation that would include universal health insurance, subsidized housing, social reforms, deindustrialization, and worker-controlled factories. And for this they were destroyed. They were replaced by a pliant liberal class that spoke in the depoliticized language of narrow self-interest and pathetic “Buy American” campaigns. Our collapse, economic and environmental, might not have been thwarted by anarchists and others, but at least someone would have fought against it. The liberal class was useless.

 

pages: 297 words: 89,206

Social Class in the 21st Century by Mike Savage

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call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clapham omnibus, Corn Laws, deindustrialization, deskilling, Downton Abbey, financial independence, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, precariat, psychological pricing, The Spirit Level, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, very high income, winner-take-all economy, young professional

The staggering decline of the aristocratic class in the years after the Second World War has been emphatically demonstrated by David Cannadine.1 In 2013 only a small minority of the wealthiest people in Britain were from landed and titled backgrounds – a far cry from the 1980s.2 Even the Duke of Westminster, whose fortune is buttressed by huge swathes of central London real estate, struggles to get into the top ten. In retrospect, the 1980s marked the last blast of this old aristocratic culture. It was the last moment when sociologists such as John Scott could still write about the ‘upper class’ as a kind of closed, landed elite.3 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, elected in 1979, presided over the de-industrialization of the old manufacturing heartlands, and this ushered in a new kind of cultural confidence from those with money to spend. This marked a sharp change from previous decades when the wealthy kept their heads down in a period when equality was seen as a good thing. In the 1970s levels of inequality reached their nadir and tax rates on high-income earners reached their peak. In the 1980s, however, the flaunting of wealth started to take on a new legitimacy.

 

Propaganda and the Public Mind by Noam Chomsky, David Barsamian

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, deindustrialization, European colonialism, experimental subject, Howard Zinn, Hyman Minsky, interchangeable parts, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, Martin Wolf, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, school vouchers, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, Washington Consensus

Does it have anything to do with the legacy of Gandhi? First of all, India has a very rich and complex history. If you go back to the eighteenth century, India was the commercial and industrial center of the world. In the early nineteenth century, book publication in Bengal was probably higher per capita than in England, but India was severely harmed by the British occupation. The country was deindustrialized and turned into an impoverished rural society, though one maintaining a rich cultural tradition and a rich tradition of resistance. The Gandhian legacy is there, but remember, there was a revolution that threw out the British. This included the Congress Party. There was a national movement and so on. And that remains. It’s remained a vibrant, complex society. After the British were thrown out, economic development resumed.

 

pages: 438 words: 109,306

Tower of Basel: The Shadowy History of the Secret Bank That Runs the World by Adam Lebor

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banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, central bank independence, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, deindustrialization, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial independence, financial innovation, forensic accounting, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, haute cuisine, IBM and the Holocaust, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, reserve currency, special drawing rights, V2 rocket

After 1945 White was subjected to sustained attacks on his patriotism, attacks that James M. Boughton, the IMF’s official historian, has described as ranging from “the questionable to the bizarre.”7 White’s failed attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the IMF in 1944 (when the country was an ally of the United States) and his meetings with Soviet officials were recast as support for Communism. So was his support for the Morgenthau Plan to de-industrialize Germany. White’s request to the nationalist government in China to account for how it had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid was respun as sympathy for Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist forces. In August 1948, White was called to testify before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities to be questioned about his relations with the Soviets. Historians continue to investigate these.

 

pages: 452 words: 110,488

The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead by David Callahan

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1960s counterculture, affirmative action, corporate governance, David Brooks, deindustrialization, East Village, forensic accounting, full employment, game design, greed is good, high batting average, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, job satisfaction, market fundamentalism, McMansion, microcredit, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, postindustrial economy, profit maximization, profit motive, RAND corporation, Ray Oldenburg, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Chicago School, Thorstein Veblen, War on Poverty, winner-take-all economy, World Values Survey, young professional

As conservatives preached laissez-faire ideology in economic forums, policy circles, and within the culture at large during the 1970s, another free-market revolution was gaining steam in business. The malaise besetting corporate America during the downturn of the decade led to the rise of a new breed of corporate leaders and money managers who called for a take-no-prisoners brand of the bottom line in business. This crusade was motivated partly by the foreign competition that knocked a number of industries on their backs in the '70s, helping fuel deindustrialization across the U.S. as larger manufacturers pulled up stakes and moved overseas to lower costs. But the new emphasis on the bottom line was not actually about survival in many companies; it was about increasing efficiency and, ultimately, profits. Before these changes, back in the 1950s and 1960s, corporate life was pretty laid back. As Paul Krugman writes: "America's great corporations behaved more like socialist republics than like cutthroat capitalist enterprises, and top executives behaved more like public-spirited bureaucrats than like captains of industry."

 

pages: 285 words: 86,174

Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy by Chris Hayes

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affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, asset-backed security, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, carried interest, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, dark matter, David Brooks, David Graeber, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, fixed income, full employment, George Akerlof, hiring and firing, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, jimmy wales, Julian Assange, Mark Zuckerberg, mass affluent, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, Nate Silver, peak oil, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, Ralph Waldo Emerson, rolodex, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, University of East Anglia, We are the 99%, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

On the right, there is the Tea Party movement, whose demographic was summarized in 2010 by the New York Times with the headline POLL FINDS TEA PARTY BACKERS WEALTHIER AND MORE EDUCATED. Both the Netroots and the Tea Party, though obviously different in many ways—geographic distribution, political heritage, ideology, and whom they blame their lot on—share a uniting frustration. It is the anger of an upper middle class that finds itself increasingly dispossessed. A group of people who feel that those with more power and access are getting away with things. Decades of deindustrialization and globalization have already squeezed and battered the poor and working classes. But the professional class that makes up the core of the new insurrectionists had, until recently, been able to escape the vise of wage stagnation and foreshortened horizons. But no longer. They are now the class that feels most keenly the sense of betrayal, injustice, and dissolution that the Crisis of Authority has ushered in.

 

pages: 349 words: 95,972

Messy: The Power of Disorder to Transform Our Lives by Tim Harford

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affirmative action, Air France Flight 447, Airbnb, airport security, Albert Einstein, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Amazon Web Services, Atul Gawande, autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Barry Marshall: ulcers, Basel III, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Broken windows theory, call centre, Cass Sunstein, Chris Urmson, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, crowdsourcing, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Erdős number, experimental subject, Ferguson, Missouri, Filter Bubble, Frank Gehry, game design, global supply chain, Googley, Guggenheim Bilbao, high net worth, Inbox Zero, income inequality, Internet of things, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, Loebner Prize, Louis Pasteur, Mark Zuckerberg, Menlo Park, Merlin Mann, microbiome, out of africa, Paul Erdős, Richard Thaler, Rosa Parks, self-driving car, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, telemarketer, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Turing test, urban decay

Stumped for a marketing slogan to sell this hodgepodge to a skeptical world, Birmingham’s elders have tended to go for “the city of a thousand trades.” It hasn’t really caught on.*14 When Jane Jacobs was admiring Birmingham in the early 1960s, her view seemed odd. Detroit, the quintessential one-industry town, was booming. The standard view was that cities could prosper by playing to their own strengths. But as deindustrialization ripped the life out of specialized cities from Detroit to Glasgow, it became clear that this view was shortsighted. Jacobs had been right that specialized cities were fragile. Diverse industries might seem untidy, and they might occasionally get in one another’s way. But the diversity gave a city a chance to respond to shocks. And while nobody ever gets very excited about Birmingham, it has adapted and endured for hundreds of years.

 

pages: 338 words: 92,465

Reskilling America: Learning to Labor in the Twenty-First Century by Katherine S. Newman, Hella Winston

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blue-collar work, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, desegregation, factory automation, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, job-hopping, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, performance metric, reshoring, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, two tier labour market, union organizing, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, Wolfgang Streeck, working poor

Indeed, we are starting to see an increasing number of parents and kids who reject the apprenticeship pathway in favor of university education and the lure of a white-collar job. This shift has been slower to gain ground in Germany compared to the United States in part because the wage differential between blue-collar workers in Germany and their white-collar counterparts is not as large as it is in the United States, especially after decades of deindustrialization, declining union density, and falling wages in America. Nonetheless, even in Germany, we see younger people wondering about whether they want to devote their lives to blue-collar work. Industry looks on this development with dismay. Time will tell whether these changing attitudes will open up opportunities previously unfulfilled for German youth or lead them into the dead ends that many of their American counterparts have experienced.

 

pages: 489 words: 111,305

How the World Works by Noam Chomsky, Arthur Naiman, David Barsamian

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business climate, capital controls, clean water, corporate governance, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, glass ceiling, Howard Zinn, income inequality, interchangeable parts, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, labour market flexibility, land reform, Monroe Doctrine, offshore financial centre, Plutocrats, plutocrats, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, single-payer health, strikebreaker, Telecommunications Act of 1996, transfer pricing, union organizing, War on Poverty, working poor

Starting from about 1700, Britain imposed harsh tariff regulations to prevent Indian manufacturers from competing with British textiles. They had to undercut and destroy Indian textiles because India had a comparative advantage. They were using better cotton and their manufacturing system was in many respects comparable to, if not better than, the British system. The British succeeded. India deindustrialized, it ruralized. As the industrial revolution spread in England, India was turning into a poor, ruralized and agrarian country. It wasn’t until 1846, when their competitors had been destroyed and they were way ahead, that Britain suddenly discovered the merits of free trade. Read the British liberal historians, the big advocates of free trade—they were very well aware of it. Right through that period they say: “Look, what we’re doing to India isn’t pretty, but there’s no other way for the mills of Manchester to survive.

 

pages: 586 words: 159,901

Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom by Doug Henwood

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Andrei Shleifer, asset allocation, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, diversification, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, equity premium, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental subject, facts on the ground, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, implied volatility, index arbitrage, index fund, interest rate swap, Internet Archive, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labor-force participation, late capitalism, law of one price, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, London Interbank Offered Rate, Louis Bachelier, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, oil shock, payday loans, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, random walk, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, shareholder value, short selling, Slavoj Žižek, South Sea Bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Predators' Ball, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, women in the workforce, yield curve, zero-coupon bond

Forecasts for the composition of GNP were even worse than the ag- WALL STREET gregate numbers: the consumption share projected for 1990 in 1978 was too high; that predicted in 1981 was too low; 1983 and 1985 projections were much closer to the market — but all missed the fall in spending on nondurable goods and the rise in spending on medical and financial services. The BLS also missed deindustrialization and the overbuilding of commercial real estate — trends that unhappily shaped the U.S. macroeconomy of the early 1990s. In the words of the Bureau's own summary of its review, "the projections improve the nearer to the target year they are made...; the downside is that they often fail to forsee major structural shifts in the U.S. economy" (Saunders 1992, p. 15). In other words, forecasts are least accurate when they are most needed — when the world is about to change.

 

pages: 497 words: 143,175

Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies by Judith Stein

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1960s counterculture, affirmative action, airline deregulation, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, desegregation, energy security, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, feminist movement, financial deregulation, floating exchange rates, full employment, income inequality, income per capita, intermodal, invisible hand, knowledge worker, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Martin Wolf, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, payday loans, post-industrial society, post-oil, price mechanism, price stability, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, union organizing, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor, Yom Kippur War

Mondale was a wooden campaigner who oscillated between the “new realism” and “compassion.” But as Bill Clinton realized eight years later, it was the economy, stupid. As the improved economic state of the nation took center stage, Mondale was easily tarred with Carter’s performance. Democrats had better opportunities in 1988. Although the macro numbers on inflation, economic growth, and unemployment continued to be good during Reagan’s second term, the wrenching effects of deindustrialization produced an edgy electorate, which returned the Senate to the Democrats in 1986. Big cities and their industrial suburbs were ravaged by job loss and a crack cocaine epidemic. There was a consensus that crumbling infrastructure, poor education, and inadequate child care needed to be addressed. Yet there was no sense of crisis or urgency to solve the problems, certainly if it meant increasing taxes.

 

pages: 477 words: 135,607

The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger by Marc Levinson

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air freight, anti-communist, barriers to entry, Bay Area Rapid Transit, British Empire, call centre, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, deskilling, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, full employment, global supply chain, intermodal, Isaac Newton, job automation, knowledge economy, Malcom McLean invented shipping containers, manufacturing employment, Network effects, New Economic Geography, new economy, oil shock, Panamax, Port of Oakland, post-Panamax, Productivity paradox, refrigerator car, South China Sea, trade route, Works Progress Administration, Yom Kippur War

In 1964, New York’s five boroughs were home to just over 30,000 manufacturing establishments employing nearly 900,000 workers. Almost two-thirds of the city’s manufacturers were located in Manhattan, where the apparel and printing industries dominated. The factory sector held steady through 1967, then abruptly collapsed. Between 1967 and 1976, New York lost a fourth of its factories and one-third of its manufacturing jobs. The scope of this deindustrialization was shockingly widespread, with forty-five of forty-seven important manufacturing industries experiencing double-digit declines in employment.41 How much of the loss of industry can be blamed on the container? There can be no definitive answer, as containerization was only one of many forces affecting manufacturers during the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. This period saw the completion of expressways that opened up suburban acreage to industrial development.

 

pages: 459 words: 123,220

Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis by Robert D. Putnam

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correlation does not imply causation, deindustrialization, demographic transition, desegregation, ending welfare as we know it, epigenetics, full employment, George Akerlof, helicopter parent, impulse control, income inequality, index card, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, meta analysis, meta-analysis, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Occupy movement, Ralph Waldo Emerson, randomized controlled trial, school choice, Socratic dialogue, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the built environment, upwardly mobile, Walter Mischel, white flight, working poor

Bob’s initial shock at what had become of less affluent kids in his hometown in just half a century made us wonder if we had stumbled upon atypical working-class kids caught in Rust Belt circumstances far worse than the national average. We extended our sample, adding Duluth, Minnesota; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; Austin, Texas; Bend, Oregon; Orange County, California; and Waltham and Weston, Massachusetts, to our research sites. These sites represent various kinds of local economies and cultures across the United States, encompassing deindustrializing small towns in the Rust Belt (Port Clinton and Duluth), gentrifying tourist destinations (Bend), booming high-tech “miracle” cities (Austin), unevenly revitalizing urban centers (Philadelphia and Atlanta), and Birmingham, still coming to terms with the Civil Rights revolution. Orange County was chosen because of its reputation as the mecca of the extraordinarily wealthy, allowing us to explore the poor and working-class immigrant communities obscured by the “OC” mythology.

 

pages: 406 words: 113,841

The American Way of Poverty: How the Other Half Still Lives by Sasha Abramsky

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2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, big-box store, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, indoor plumbing, job automation, Mark Zuckerberg, Maui Hawaii, microcredit, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, payday loans, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, Potemkin village, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

The country, its leaders were now telling the public, was closer to a complete collapse of its economy than at any time since the Great Depression.6 For an increasing number of Americans, what the political leadership was just cottoning on to was something that they had been living in the shadow of for years. For homeowners in California cities such as Stockton or Modesto, or in Arizona or Nevada suburbs, for unemployed construction workers, or social workers in hard-hit deindustrialized regions, poverty was just a part of the landscape by 2008. Omnipresent. Ugly. Too often soul-destroying. In April 2010, a group of educators and organizers from around California walked hundreds of miles up the Central Valley, from Bakersfield to the state capital of Sacramento, protesting education cuts and holding rallies and meetings with residents along the way. One of them was a middle-aged English teacher named Jim Miller, a tall man with a ponytail, who taught at a community college in downtown San Diego.

 

pages: 448 words: 142,946

Sacred Economics: Money, Gift, and Society in the Age of Transition by Charles Eisenstein

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Albert Einstein, back-to-the-land, bank run, Bernie Madoff, big-box store, Bretton Woods, capital controls, clean water, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, disintermediation, diversification, fiat currency, financial independence, financial intermediation, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, global supply chain, happiness index / gross national happiness, hydraulic fracturing, informal economy, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, land tenure, Lao Tzu, liquidity trap, lump of labour, McMansion, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, Own Your Own Home, peak oil, phenotype, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, Scramble for Africa, special drawing rights, spinning jenny, technoutopianism, the built environment, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail

It is not only the Wall Street casino economy that is an unsustainable pyramid scheme. The larger economic system, based as it is on the eternal conversion of a finite commonwealth into money, is unsustainable as well. It is like a bonfire that must burn higher and higher, to the exhaustion of all available fuel. Only a fool would think that a fire can burn ever-higher when the supply of fuel is finite. To extend the metaphor, the recent deindustrialization and financialization of the economy amount to using the heat to create more fuel. According to the second law of thermodynamics, the amount created is always less than the amount expended to create it. Obviously, the practice of borrowing new money to pay the principal and interest of old debts cannot last very long, but that is what the economy as a whole has done for ten years now. Yet even abandoning this folly, we still must face the depletion of fuel (remember, I mean not literal energy sources, but any bond of nature or culture that can be turned into a commodity).

 

pages: 497 words: 123,718

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins

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airline deregulation, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, corporate governance, corporate personhood, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, financial deregulation, financial independence, full employment, global village, high net worth, land reform, large denomination, Long Term Capital Management, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transatlantic slave trade, transfer pricing, union organizing, Washington Consensus, working-age population, Yom Kippur War

Hereafter cited as Bernabe interview. 52. Walden Bello, executive director of Focus on the Global South, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, January 22, 2006. Hereafter cited as Bello interview. 53. Joy Chavez, senior associate, Focus on the Global South and Coordinator of the Philippines Program, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, February 5, 2006. Hereafter cited as Chavez interview. 54. Stop De-Industrialization: Re-Calibrate Philippine Tariffs Now (Manila: Fair Trade Alliance, 2003), p. 16. 55. Family of Madge Kho, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, January 30, 2006. 56. Freddie de Leon, businessman, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, February 12, 2006. 57. Ibid. 58. Bello interview. 59. Sta Ana interview. 60. Social Weather Station Survey, 4th quarter 2005. 61. Sta Ana interview. 62. Avigail Olarte and Yvonne Chua, “Mini-Size Me,” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Jan.

 

pages: 435 words: 127,403

Panderer to Power by Frederick Sheehan

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Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, diversification, financial deregulation, financial innovation, full employment, inflation targeting, interest rate swap, inventory management, Isaac Newton, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, market bubble, McMansion, Menlo Park, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, oil shock, place-making, Ponzi scheme, price stability, reserve currency, rising living standards, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, savings glut, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South Sea Bubble, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, VA Linux, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

In 1969, the Justice Department, several members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Chemical Bank’s counsel), and members of the Federal Reserve Board brought Steinberg’s effort to an end.24 This was within weeks of a Time magazine cover featuring James Joseph Ling. The cover subtitle: “Threat or Boon to U.S. Business?”25 It has traditionally been true that politicians rediscover their populist leanings when such magazine headlines appear. Deindustrialization, anxiety, and the general collapse of American living standards has been the topic of thousands of books by worthy economists and sociologists. The American peak is generally considered to have been in the 1960s, with the slide commencing about 1970. John Brooks, author of The Go-Go Years, described the disorientation: 18 Brooks, Go-Go Years, p. 153. 19 Ibid., p. 165. 20 Ibid., pp. 165–166. 21 Fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/The LTV-Corporation-Company-History. 22 Brooks, Go-Go Years, p. 238. 23 Ibid., p. 230. 24 Ibid., pp. 254–255. 25 Full title of front cover: “Takeovers in High Gear: Threat or Boon to U.S.

 

pages: 497 words: 144,283

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization by Parag Khanna

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1919 Motor Transport Corps convoy, 2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, 3D printing, 9 dash line, additive manufacturing, Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, blockchain, borderless world, Boycotts of Israel, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, British Empire, business intelligence, call centre, capital controls, charter city, clean water, cloud computing, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, data is the new oil, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, Detroit bankruptcy, diversification, Doha Development Round, edge city, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, energy security, ethereum blockchain, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, family office, Ferguson, Missouri, financial innovation, financial repression, forward guidance, global supply chain, global value chain, global village, Google Earth, Hernando de Soto, high net worth, Hyperloop, ice-free Arctic, if you build it, they will come, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, informal economy, Infrastructure as a Service, interest rate swap, Internet of things, Isaac Newton, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, John von Neumann, Julian Assange, Just-in-time delivery, Kevin Kelly, Khyber Pass, Kibera, Kickstarter, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, LNG terminal, low cost carrier, manufacturing employment, mass affluent, megacity, Mercator projection, microcredit, mittelstand, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, New Economic Geography, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, openstreetmap, out of africa, Panamax, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, Peter Thiel, Plutocrats, plutocrats, post-oil, post-Panamax, private military company, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, race to the bottom, Rana Plaza, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, sharing economy, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, six sigma, Skype, smart cities, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spice trade, Stuxnet, supply-chain management, sustainable-tourism, TaskRabbit, telepresence, the built environment, Tim Cook: Apple, trade route, transaction costs, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, urban planning, urban sprawl, WikiLeaks, young professional, zero day

Many of those surveyed in 2014 belong to a baby boomer generation whose retirement savings were wiped out in the 2008 financial crisis, while the subsequent financial repression (resulting from ultralow interest rates) slashed any hope of what’s left of their pensions recovering value. Record numbers of elderly are moving to Mexico, Panama, and elsewhere seeking more affordable sunset years. Yet more emigrants come from America’s unskilled youth who make up 50 percent of the unemployed. (Some American scholars have even suggested that the United States should export its structurally unemployed so they can reduce demands on the government.) The combination of deindustrialization and the sub-prime meltdown has created severe internal dislocation as well, with droves of unemployed or homeless migrating to America’s 350 major metro areas in search of jobs at any wage. Maps 20, 21, 22, and 23, corresponding to this chapter, appear in the map insert. Higher up the value chain, America’s wealthy and talented not only share ambivalence about remaining at home but act on it.

 

pages: 444 words: 138,781

Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City by Matthew Desmond

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affirmative action, Cass Sunstein, crack epidemic, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, desegregation, dumpster diving, ending welfare as we know it, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, housing crisis, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, late fees, New Urbanism, payday loans, price discrimination, profit motive, rent control, statistical model, superstar cities, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, thinkpad, upwardly mobile, working poor, young professional

There used to be an American Motors plant on Richards and Capitol, on the city’s predominantly black North Side. It has been replaced by a Walmart. Today in Milwaukee, former leather tanneries line the banks of the Menominee River Valley like mausoleums of the city’s golden industrial age; the Schlitz and Pabst breweries have been shuttered; and one in two working-age African American men doesn’t have a job.2 In the 1980s, Milwaukee was the epicenter of deindustrialization. In the 1990s, it would become “the epicenter of the antiwelfare crusade.” As President Clinton was fine-tuning his plan to “end welfare as we know it,” a conservative reformer by the name of Jason Turner was transforming Milwaukee into a policy experiment that captivated lawmakers around the country. Turner’s plan was dubbed Wisconsin Works (or W-2), and “works” was right: If you wanted a welfare check, you would have to work, either in the private sector or in a community job created by the state.

 

pages: 525 words: 153,356

The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910-2010 by Selina Todd

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call centre, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, credit crunch, deindustrialization, deskilling, Downton Abbey, financial independence, full employment, income inequality, manufacturing employment, New Urbanism, Red Clydeside, rent control, rising living standards, strikebreaker, The Spirit Level, unemployed young men, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban renewal, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, young professional

McHugh to the Daily Mirror when, in 1968, they asked readers to nominate Britain’s ‘Boom City’. ‘New precincts to shop in. New art galleries … New flats and flyovers … At the moment our car industry is in the doldrums, but watch us zoom out of this, too.’6 Alas, by 1981 when the Coventry-born band The Specials released their single ‘Ghost Town’, their lyrical account of the decimation of deindustrialization resonated in their home town. It is an image that today’s residents feel sums up the city’s problems, but says nothing about the spirit of its people. Back in 1933, Liverpool was poorer and darker than Coventry, ‘like a city in a rather gloomy Victorian novel’, according to the writer J.B. Priestley. The city’s working class was crowded into ‘slum tenements … Faces that had shone for a season in brothels in Victoria’s time now peered and mumbled at us.

 

pages: 411 words: 114,717

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles by Ruchir Sharma

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3D printing, affirmative action, Albert Einstein, American energy revolution, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, cloud computing, collective bargaining, colonial rule, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, eurozone crisis, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, housing crisis, income inequality, indoor plumbing, inflation targeting, informal economy, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, labour market flexibility, land reform, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, Peter Thiel, planetary scale, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, software is eating the world, sovereign wealth fund, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, working-age population

In the last decade, as the price of gold rose by more than 600 percent, the stock price of South Africa’s leading gold companies actually declined. That’s an incredibly counterintuitive outcome and contrasts with the impressive performance of gold shares in other parts of the world such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Between 2005 and 2011, the price of shares in Barick Gold of the United States was up more than 50 percent, while Harmony Gold of South Africa was down 10 percent in dollar terms. South Africa is deindustrializing at a point in its development when basic industry should still be growing. Despite the world’s largest platinum and manganese reserves, along with abundant deposits of gold, iron ore, and coal, employment in the mining industry is falling. Mining now accounts for 3 percent of GDP, down from 14 percent in the 1980s, and South African manufacturing is hollowing out as well. The share of manufacturing has fallen from a peak of 17.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to 15.5 percent today, and South Africa’s ability to create jobs is in decline as factories go idle.

 

pages: 1,797 words: 390,698

Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan by Lynne B. Sagalyn

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affirmative action, airport security, Bonfire of the Vanities, clean water, conceptual framework, corporate governance, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, estate planning, Frank Gehry, Guggenheim Bilbao, high net worth, informal economy, intermodal, iterative process, Jane Jacobs, mortgage debt, New Urbanism, place-making, rent control, Rosa Parks, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, the built environment, the High Line, time value of money, too big to fail, Torches of Freedom, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, white flight, young professional

Fears of firms leaving the city in a mass exodus, fears of residents fleeing, fears of tourists staying away, fears of the end of skyscraper development and, by extension, the very self of the city were paramount, and news headlines in the weeks after 9/11 messaged the doubts: “In Wounded Financial Center, Trying to Head Off Defections,” “Reaching for the Sky, and Finding a Limit; Tall Buildings Face New Doubt as Symbols of Vulnerability,” “When the Towers Collapsed, So Did Their Desire to Live Here.” Like the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center shook New Yorkers’ confidence in the future of their city. Uncertainties existed across the five boroughs and beyond. Was New York still the resilient city that had overcome so many post–World War II crises—deindustrialization, disinvestment and property abandonment, racial and ethnic change, white suburban flight, social and cultural conflict, and a near brush with bankruptcy? Based on well-founded and widespread fears prevalent at the time, no one was able to say for sure that the attack would not have a lasting negative economic impact on the city and the region. The city’s sense of invulnerability had been shattered, yet as historian Mike Wallace reminded readers in a special section of the Times that appeared within a week of the attack, “that sense always rested on a truncated reading of history.

Like many a central city in older metropolitan regions in the East and Midwest where the industrial and mercantile economy had created a troika of economic power, wealth, and prestige that gave rise to a great many institutions of cultural excellence and supported a great many nonprofit social-service institutions and philanthropic organizations, New York City during the 1960s experienced profound economic and social change that shook the foundations of its civic self. The forces of “deindustrialization, disinvestment, racial change, and suburbanization that began full force in the 1950s [and] culminated in the racial conflict of the late 1960s and the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s” had profound impacts—white flight, property abandonment, arson, crime, deep social unrest—which devastated the physical and social fabric of New York City. “One might well have been excused for thinking, based on the evidence, that New York was headed over the same cliff from which Detroit had already plunged,” remarked urban expert and political scientist John Mollenkopf.23 “This did not happen,” he added.

 

pages: 540 words: 168,921

The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism by Joyce Appleby

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1919 Motor Transport Corps convoy, agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, Bartolomé de las Casas, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Columbian Exchange, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Doha Development Round, double entry bookkeeping, epigenetics, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, Firefox, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francisco Pizarro, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gordon Gekko, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, informal economy, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, invention of movable type, invention of the printing press, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, land reform, Livingstone, I presume, Long Term Capital Management, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, profit motive, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, refrigerator car, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, special economic zone, spice trade, spinning jenny, strikebreaker, the built environment, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thorstein Veblen, total factor productivity, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, union organizing, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, urban renewal, War on Poverty, working poor, Works Progress Administration, Yogi Berra, Yom Kippur War

These colorful cottons caused an instant sensation with the English, who could now adorn their bodies, their windows, or divans with light and bright fabrics. At the height of the calico craze, the company carried the designs for favorite English patterns like paisleys to Indian weavers to copy. Pretty quickly, English clothiers summoned their political clout and got laws passed to reduce these imports to a trickle. Thus began Britain’s deindustrialization of India, whose fabrics had been famous since the time of Heroditus. The East India Company stopped buying finished cloth and instead imported raw materials for English clothiers to work up. Indian cloth manufacturers confined themselves to nearby markets that didn’t interest the English. This story bears heavily on the colonial history of India. Attached to the British economic behemoth, India became the recipient of millions of English pounds sterling in public works, but they were directed to benefiting the empire, not India per se.

 

pages: 614 words: 176,458

Meat: A Benign Extravagance by Simon Fairlie

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agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, back-to-the-land, call centre, carbon footprint, Community Supported Agriculture, deindustrialization, en.wikipedia.org, food miles, Food sovereignty, Haber-Bosch Process, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall, informal economy, Just-in-time delivery, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, megacity, Northern Rock, Panamax, peak oil, refrigerator car, scientific mainstream, stem cell, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, University of East Anglia, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce

The shift towards such production has thus, a largely negative effect on rural development. In the above, the FAO are describing a process of industrialization that has, in its own individual way, already taken place in the UK over the last 200 years and whose spread throughout the developing world they predict, endorse and promote. Today many people in Britain have misgivings about the industrialized agricultural system that we have inherited, and are trying to de-industrialize it through support for organic farming, local foods, real meat, community supported agriculture, animal welfare measures, and campaigns against GM, pesticides and junk food. To the FAO these are an indication that we in Britain, have reached the ‘post-industrial’ phase where, as they put it, ‘environmental and public health objectives take predominance’. The poorest in the developing world have no choice but to progress through three prior stages of industrialization and urbanization before they arrive at our state of grace, and even if they had the choice, that is what they would choose to do.

 

pages: 650 words: 203,191

After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405 by John Darwin

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agricultural Revolution, Atahualpa, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Cape to Cairo, colonial rule, Columbian Exchange, cuban missile crisis, deglobalization, deindustrialization, European colonialism, failed state, Francisco Pizarro, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Khartoum Gordon, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, Malacca Straits, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, price mechanism, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, South Sea Bubble, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade

Fear of German recovery, a newGerman imperium or a second Nazi empire built on the wreckage of Eastern and Central Europe ruled Allied diplomacy. For obvious reasons, it was the dominant element in Soviet thinking. Hence the reconstruction of Europe was meant to proceed in a continent made safe from German aggression. A four-power commission (France would join the ‘Big Three’) was to dismantle permanently the apparatus and sources of German imperialism. Disarmed, denazified and deindustrialized, Germany could empire-build no more. But it was over this programme that the Allies fell out. To the Western powers economic recovery was paramount. They feared that its delay would spark mass unrest across Western Europe, and refused to postpone economic normalization in their part of Germany. When Stalin objected, they went ahead anyway. After the Berlin blockade in 1948 (Stalin’s riposte), joint supervision of Germany was abandoned in favour of a de facto partition.

 

pages: 829 words: 229,566

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate by Naomi Klein

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1960s counterculture, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, big-box store, bilateral investment treaty, British Empire, business climate, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, clean water, Climategate, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, Community Supported Agriculture, complexity theory, crony capitalism, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, energy security, energy transition, equal pay for equal work, Exxon Valdez, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, financial deregulation, food miles, Food sovereignty, global supply chain, hydraulic fracturing, ice-free Arctic, immigration reform, income per capita, Internet Archive, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, market fundamentalism, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, Nixon shock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open borders, patent troll, planetary scale, post-oil, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Rana Plaza, Ronald Reagan, smart grid, special economic zone, Stephen Hawking, Stewart Brand, structural adjustment programs, Ted Kaczynski, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, urban planning, urban sprawl, wages for housework, walkable city, Washington Consensus, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks

(And there remains little momentum at the U.N. for changing that, despite the reality that shipping emissions are set to double or even triple by 2050.)33 And fatefully, countries are responsible only for the pollution they create inside their own borders—not for the pollution produced in the manufacturing of goods that are shipped to their shores; those are attributed to the countries where the goods were produced.34 This means that the emissions that went into producing, say, the television in my living room, appear nowhere on Canada’s emissions ledger, but rather are attributed entirely to China’s ledger, because that is where the set was made. And the international emissions from the container ship that carried my TV across the ocean (and then sailed back again) aren’t entered into anyone’s account book. This deeply flawed system has created a vastly distorted picture of the drivers of global emissions. It has allowed rapidly de-industrializing wealthy states to claim that their emissions have stabilized or even gone down when, in fact, the emissions embedded in their consumption have soared during the free trade era. For instance, in 2011, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study of the emissions from industrialized countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol. It found that while their emissions had stopped growing, that was partly because international trade had allowed these countries to move their dirty production overseas.

 

pages: 662 words: 180,546

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown by Philip Mirowski

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Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, Brownian motion, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, constrained optimization, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, dark matter, David Brooks, David Graeber, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental economics, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Flash crash, full employment, George Akerlof, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, incomplete markets, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, l'esprit de l'escalier, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loose coupling, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market design, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, Nash equilibrium, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shock, payday loans, Ponzi scheme, precariat, prediction markets, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, random walk, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, school choice, sealed-bid auction, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Steven Levy, technoutopianism, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Myth of the Rational Market, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, theory of mind, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, working poor

To a first approximation, it accounts for their often eccentric position that the crisis cannot be understood as revealing any flaws in markets whatsoever. For neoliberals, the manifestation of an economic crisis is never traceable to any defects in their own previous policies (say, the deregulation of finance, or the quasi-privatization of the securitization function with regard to newer classes of debt, the breakdown of private-label debt issuance, or deindustrialization); rather, it is a consequence of the unstoppable evolution of nature and society (of which their interventions are a significant component), which can never be fully comprehended by mere human intelligence. The demonization of the government becomes one salient corollary of this fundamental precept: in their version of events, nothing was ever intrinsically wrong with the mortgage market or CDOs or the megabanks or the shadow banking sector or trade imbalances between China and the rest of the world; the snafu came when governments sought to rein them in, encourage them, or call them to account.

 

pages: 641 words: 182,927

In Pursuit of Privilege: A History of New York City's Upper Class and the Making of a Metropolis by Clifton Hood

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affirmative action, British Empire, David Brooks, death of newspapers, deindustrialization, family office, Golden Gate Park, Google Earth, jitney, new economy, New Urbanism, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ray Oldenburg, ride hailing / ride sharing, Scientific racism, Steven Levy, The Great Good Place, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, urban planning, We are the 99%, white flight

Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment (New York: Norton, 1980), 11–33; and Robert Fitch, The Assassination of New York (London: Verso, 1993), vii–xxi. See also Vincent J. Cannato, The Ungovernable City: John Lindsay and His Struggle to Save New York City (New York: Basic, 2001), ix–xv. Scholars commonly understand the concept “urban decline” to involve combined processes of depopulation, deindustrialization, chronic unemployment, social disintegration, building abandonment, and infrastructure decay. Katharine L. Bradbury, Kenneth A. Small, and Anthony Downs, Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), 18–67. 36. Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World (New York: Routledge, 2008), 3–17; “Press Conference No. 23 of the President of the United States, 7:30 P.M., November 26, 1975,” New York City Finances, President’s Press Conference, November 26, 1975 Folder, Box 19, Edward C.

 

pages: 585 words: 165,304

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama

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barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, business climate, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, double entry bookkeeping, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Gilder, glass ceiling, global village, hiring and firing, industrial robot, Jane Jacobs, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, mittelstand, price mechanism, profit maximization, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transfer pricing, traveling salesman, union organizing

Skeptics will argue that while postwar Germany has had liberal asylum laws, it remains extremely difficult to become a German citizen. Turks living in Germany for generations would never be considered real Germans, and there is no German equivalent of Léopold Senghor, the Senegalese-born poet who was admitted to the Académie française. There is also a fanatic character to leftwing German politics, evident among Greens who argue that Germany needs to be deindustrialized, or supporters of the Palestinians who readily compare the Israelis to the Nazis. This suggests that something of the hardness of the Germans’ old Protestant culture has not yet disappeared. 20Until the apology for the war given by reformist prime minister Masuhiro Hosokawa in 1993, no Japanese prime minister had apologized formally for Japan’s role in the war, and it is safe to say that no Japanese politician has yet made Willy Brandt’s gesture of falling to his hands and knees in contrition for the Holocaust.

 

Understanding Power by Noam Chomsky

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anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Burning Man, business climate, cognitive dissonance, continuous integration, Corn Laws, cuban missile crisis, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, global reserve currency, Howard Zinn, labour market flexibility, Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mortgage tax deduction, Ralph Nader, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, school choice, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, wage slave, women in the workforce

Well, look at it today: Dacca, “the Manchester of India,” is the capital of Bangladesh—the absolute symbol of disaster. 46 And that’s because the British just despoiled the country and destroyed it, by the equivalent of what we would today call “structural adjustment” [i.e. economic policies from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which expose Third World economies to foreign penetration and control]. In fact, India generally was a real competitor with England: as late as the 1820s, the British were learning advanced techniques of steel-making there, India was building ships for the British navy at the time of the Napoleonic Wars [1803–1815], they had a developed textiles industry, they were producing more iron than all of Europe combined—so the British just proceeded to de-industrialize the country by force and turn it into an impoverished rural society. 47 Was that competition in the “free market”? And it goes on and on: the United States annexed Texas [in 1845], and one of the main reasons for that was to ensure that the U.S. achieved a monopoly on cotton—which was the oil of the nineteenth century, it was what really fueled the industrial economies. So the American leadership figured that if they could take Texas, which was a major cotton-producing area, then they would be able to strangle England economically.

 

pages: 777 words: 186,993

Imagining India by Nandan Nilekani

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affirmative action, BRICs, British Empire, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre,