Washington Consensus

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Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science by Dani Rodrik

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airline deregulation, Albert Einstein, bank run, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, butterfly effect, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, distributed generation, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, fudge factor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, informal economy, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loss aversion, low skilled workers, market design, market fundamentalism, minimum wage unemployment, oil shock, open economy, price stability, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, quantitative easing, randomized controlled trial, rent control, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, school vouchers, South Sea Bubble, spectrum auction, The Market for Lemons, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, ultimatum game, University of East Anglia, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, white flight

Williamson would frequently protest that his own list had described modest reforms that fell far short of “market fundamentalism,” the blanket term for the view that markets are the solution to all public policy problems. But the term “Washington Consensus” fit the zeitgeist of the era only too well. Advocates of the Washington Consensus—whether in its original or expanded versions—presented it as good economics. For them, the policies reflected what sound economics teaches: Free markets and competition enable the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Government regulations, trade restrictions, and state ownership create waste and hamper economic growth. But this was an economics that did not go beyond Econ 101, as the advocates ought to have recognized. One problem was that the Washington Consensus skated over the deeper institutional underpinnings of a market economy, without which none of the market-oriented reforms could reliably deliver their intended benefits.

Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (May 1970): 383–417. 8. Edmund L. Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” New York Times, October 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=0. 9. John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus” (paper commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for the conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004). 10. Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?: A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 44, no. 4 (December 2006): 973–87. 11. Dani Rodrik, “Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich,” Economic Policy 10, no. 20 (1995): 53–107; Rodrik, “Second-Best Institutions,” American Economic Review 98, no. 2 (May 2008): 100–104. 12.

To take the simplest example, in the absence of the rule of law, contract enforcement, and proper antitrust regulations, privatization is as likely to create monopolies for government cronies as it is to foster competition and efficiency. As the importance of institutions sank in, because of the poor response of many economies to Washington Consensus policies, reform efforts expanded in their direction. But it is one thing to slash import tariffs or remove ceilings on interest rates—two common enough approaches—and quite another to install, on short order, institutions that advanced economies acquired over decades, if not centuries. A useful reform agenda had to work with existing institutions, not engage in wishful thinking. Further still, the Washington Consensus presented a universal recipe. It presumed that all developing countries were pretty much alike—suffering from similar syndromes and in need of an undifferentiated list of reforms.

Making Globalization Work by Joseph E. Stiglitz

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affirmative action, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, business process, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Doha Development Round, Exxon Valdez, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Firefox, full employment, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, happiness index / gross national happiness, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, incomplete markets, Indoor air pollution, informal economy, inventory management, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, microcredit, moral hazard, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, oil rush, open borders, open economy, price stability, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, race to the bottom, reserve currency, rising living standards, risk tolerance, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, statistical model, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, union organizing, Washington Consensus

As a result of the debt crisis, the region suffered three years of decline and ten years of stagnation, a performance so poor that it came to be called the lost decade. It was during this period that Latin American economic policies changed dramatically, with most countries adopting Washington Consensus policies. As high inflation broke out in many of the countries, the Washington Consensus's focus on fighting inflation made sense. Their governments had not been working well for them, and the appeal of the Washington Consensus—minimizing the role of government—was understandable. As countries like Argentina adopted the Washington Consensus policies, praise was heaped upon them. When price stability was restored and growth resumed, the World Bank and the IMF claimed credit for the success; the case for the Washington Consensus had been made. But, as it turned out, the growth was not sustainable. It was based on heavy borrowing from abroad and on privatizations which sold off national assets to foreigners—the proceeds from which were not invested.

By 2003, even the IMF had conceded that, at least for many developing countries, capital market liberalization had led not to more growth, just to more instability.B Trade and capital market liberalization were two key components of a broader policy framework, known as the Washington Consensus—a consensus forged between the IMF (located on 19th Street), the World Bank (on 18th Street), and the U.S. Treasury (on 15th Street)—on Another World Is Possible what constituted the set of policies that would best promote development. 14 It emphasized downscaling of government, deregulation, and rapid liberalization and privatization. By the early years of the millennium, confidence in the Washington Consensus was fraying, and a post— Washington Consensus consensus was emerging. The Washington Consensus had, for instance, paid too little attention to issues of equity, employment, and competition, to pacing and sequencing of reforms, or to how privatizations were conducted.

East Asia had learned that while globalization, well managed, had brought them enormous prosperity, globalization—when it meant opening themselves up to destabilizing speculative flows—had also brought economic devastation. As officials there reflect on the lessons of that brutal experience, they have come to reject even more firmly the Washington Consensus market fundamentalism which opened their countries to the ravages of the speculators. And they have put more emphasis on equity and on policies to help the poor. Growth has recovered, but these students of the "class of '97" have not forgotten the lessons. Latin America East Asia demonstrated the success of a course markedly different from the Washington Consensus, with a role for government far larger than the minimalist role allowed by market fundamentalism. Meanwhile, Latin America embraced the Washington Consensus policies more wholeheartedly than any other region (indeed, the term was first coined with reference to policies advocated for that region).


pages: 356 words: 103,944

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy by Dani Rodrik

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, frictionless, frictionless market, full employment, George Akerlof, guest worker program, Hernando de Soto, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, night-watchman state, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, open economy, price stability, profit maximization, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, savings glut, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, transaction costs, tulip mania, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey

Trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the other reforms still seemed eminently reasonable: they would make poor nations’ policies look more like those of the advanced market economies. An explicit rejection of these reforms would have forced economists to abandon some of their most fundamental tenets. The problem with the Washington Consensus had to lie elsewhere. The rehabilitation took the form of retaining the Washington Consensus but expanding it to include a wide range of additional reforms. There was nothing wrong with the Washington Consensus itself; it just had not been ambitious enough. The failure showed, the new story line went, that much more profound institutional reforms were needed to ensure the Washington Consensus would produce the advertised results. The actual reforms undertaken have been uneven and incomplete, an IMF report complained in 2005: “More progress was made with measures that had low upfront costs, such as privatization, relative to reforms that promised greater long-term benefits, such as improving macroeconomic and labor market institutions, and strengthening legal and judicial systems.”24 Anne Krueger captured the verdict in the title of a 2004 speech: “Meant Well, Tried Little, Failed Much.”25 Developing countries had to work harder; so the thinking went.

As we have seen, financial crises have their own dynamic and don’t particularly discriminate among countries with different trade strategies. In Search of a Post–Washington Consensus Consensus Today, the Washington Consensus is a “damaged brand,” as John Williamson conceded as early as 2002.20 Its disrepute comes not only from the ideological opposition it has engendered from the political left, but, more fundamentally, from its disappointing economic record. In their 1995 article, Sachs and Warner had written that “we find no cases to support the frequent worry that a country might open and yet fail to grow.”21 Even if their claim was true at the time, subsequent evidence clearly contradicted the assertion. The countries in Latin America and elsewhere that jettisoned ISI in favor of the Washington Consensus ended up, for the most part, with considerably lower rates of growth. Considering how misguided ISI policies seem by today’s standards, this was quite an embarrassment for the proponents of the Washington Consensus.

Collins, “The Empirics of Growth: An Update,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (2003), Table 1. 19 Kalpana Kochhar, et al., “India’s Pattern of Development: What Happened, What Follows?” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 53, no. 5 (July 2006), pp. 981–1019. 20 John Williamson, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” Outline of Speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 6, 2002, online at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/ paper.cfm?ResearchID=488. The term “damaged brand” was used in Moisés Naím, “Washington Consensus: A Damaged Brand,” Financial Times, October 28, 2002. British prime minister Gordon Brown officially pronounced the death of the Washington Consensus in early 2009. 21 Sachs and Warner, “Economic Reform,” p. 44. 22 See Dani Rodrik, “Growth Strategies,” in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2005). 23 Jeffrey Sachs’s more recent worldview is captured in Jeffrey D.

Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States by Francis Fukuyama

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Andrei Shleifer, Atahualpa, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business climate, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, income per capita, labour market flexibility, land reform, land tenure, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus

(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 24. World Development Report 1997, pp. 2–3. 25. Ibid., p. 14. 26. Burki and Perry, The Long March. 27. Burki and Perry, Beyond the Washington Consensus. 28. Ibid., p. 5. 29. Kuczynski and Williamson, After the Washington Consensus, p. 2. 30. Ibid., p. 308. 31. Ibid., p. 34. 32. Dani Rodrik, “After Neoliberalism, What?” remarks at the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) seminar on New Paths of Development, Rio de Janeiro, September 2003, quoted in Patricio Navia and Andres Velasco, “The Politics of Second-Generation Reforms,” in Kuczynski and Williamson, After the Washington Consensus, p. 269. 33. Ibid. 34. Terry Lynn Karl, “The Vicious Cycle of Inequality in Latin America,” in What Justice? Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin America, edited by Susan Eva Eckstein and Timothy P.

At the same time, the characteristics of that turning point appeared to dissipate any doubt as to the validity of the model of development that 42 The Historical Context had just received the most clamorous favorable verdict in world history. This helps to explain the enthusiasm with which most Latin American countries decided to resolve, once and for all, the age-old problem of endorsing the principles of the so-called Washington Consensus. As is well known, the neoliberal model prescribed by the Washington Consensus came significantly short of fulfilling its initial promises, but that did not preclude the later posing of the question of Latin America’s development gap in its original terms. More influential on this point was the fact that, once the Cold War was over and, with it, the contrast between capitalist development and the alternative proposed by socialism, the specific characteristics of different experiences within the framework of capitalism came to dominate the debate.

The social contract was the backbone of that state, but good outcomes resulted from intelligent public policy decisions. This became increasingly the case as the twentieth century peaked because of the challenge of competitiveness in the international marketplace. Asia competed and Latin America followed, but very slowly and with growing resistance toward the end of the century to the so-called liberal economic models embodied in the Washington Consensus.3 By the end of the 1990s, fierce resistance to the reform agenda had developed in many countries, leaving the Washington Consensus in tatters. The challenge in the twenty-first century is to undo or neutralize the errors and lapses in judgment of the old century. To do so will require a major reassessment of both the resources and the leadership required to close the gap with the United States and with developing Asia. In this chapter, we will address four issues that we believe help to explain the development gap between Latin America and the United States.


pages: 273 words: 34,920

Free Market Missionaries: The Corporate Manipulation of Community Values by Sharon Beder

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anti-communist, battle of ideas, business climate, corporate governance, en.wikipedia.org, full employment, income inequality, invisible hand, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, new economy, price mechanism, profit motive, Ralph Nader, rent control, risk/return, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, shareholder value, structural adjustment programs, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Torches of Freedom, trade liberalization, traveling salesman, trickle-down economics, Upton Sinclair, Washington Consensus, young professional

For instance, Guillermo Ortiz, Mexico’s renowned finance minister and later governor of the central bank, did his graduate work at Stanford’s Business School . . . Thailand’s Minister of Finance, Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, received his BA from Harvard and obtained an MBA in finance at Stanford as well . . .13 THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT In 1990 John Williamson, an economist with experience working for the World Bank, the IMF, and the UK Treasury, compiled a list of free market policies that were being pressed onto Latin American nations ‘by the powers-that-be in Washington’. He called this package of economic ‘reforms’ the ‘Washington Consensus’.14 The World Bank calls it the ‘market-friendly view’. His list covered: • Fiscal Discipline: Reduced budget deficits at all levels of government (after taking account of debt). • Public Expenditure Priorities: Redirecting government expenditure from areas of public demand that provide little economic return to areas with ‘high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health and education, and infrastructure’. • Tax Reform: Broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates to provide more incentive to high income earners to invest their money. • Financial Liberalization: Aiming towards market-determined interest rates and the abolition of preferential interest rates for privileged borrowers. • Exchange Rates: Setting exchange ‘to induce a rapid growth in nontraditional exports’, as well as to ensure exporters remain competitive. • Trade Liberalization: Reduction of tariffs and trade restrictions. • Foreign Direct Investment: Abolition of barriers to investment by foreign firms and foreign firms to be treated on the same basis as local firms. • Privatization: Privatizing government businesses and assets. • Deregulation: Abolition of regulations that impede investment or restrict competition, and requirement that all regulations be justified ‘by such criteria as safety, environmental protection, or prudential supervision of financial institutions’. • Property Rights: Securing property rights without excessive costs.15 ECONOMIC ADVISERS 149 These measures, a codified version of the Chicago School prescriptions, were measures that would expand business opportunities, reduce the cost of doing business and minimize the regulations that business would have to abide by.

. • Property Rights: Securing property rights without excessive costs.15 ECONOMIC ADVISERS 149 These measures, a codified version of the Chicago School prescriptions, were measures that would expand business opportunities, reduce the cost of doing business and minimize the regulations that business would have to abide by. They were the policies being promoted by corporate-funded think tanks in the US and the UK. The ‘Washington Consensus’ was pushed by Washington policy networks supported by large corporations and international financial interests and incorporated into an economic reform agenda for most countries in the world. Williamson recognized the role of economic advisers in achieving the Washington Consensus. He used the term ‘technopols’ to describe the ‘burgeoning breed of economic technocrats who assume positions of political responsibility’.16 These people were not only ‘able to judge what institutions and policies are needed in specific circumstances in order to further economic objectives’ but also had the political skills and ability to persuade others to adopt those policies.17 Technopols, like corporate-funded think tanks, played a key role in ensuring business-friendly measures were adopted in affluent countries by governments of many different political persuasions during the 1980s, including the conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the US and Brian Mulroney in Canada, and labour/social democratic governments in Australia and New Zealand.

Since the early 1980s it had a political elite obedient to the transnational financial organizations in which American free-market doctrines were institutionalised.26 In fact, many of the nations following the World Bank/IMF prescriptions did not prosper: ‘the majority of those nations that have followed the IMF’s advice have experienced profound economic crises: low or even declining growth, much larger foreign debts and the stagnation that perpetuates systemic poverty’. Some countries that had declined the IMF’s ‘enhanced structural adjustment’ loans were in contrast better off.27 ECONOMIC ADVISERS 151 In the two decades before the introduction of the Washington Consensus, when government spending and welfare schemes were looked on with approval (1960–1980), the income per person grew by 73 per cent in Latin America and 34 per cent in Africa. In the following two decades, as the Washington consensus was implemented, incomes in Africa declined by 23 per cent and the Latin American economies have only grown by 6 per cent.28 In developing countries life expectancy has dropped. The gap between rich and poor has increased. Forty-four per cent of people in developing nations live in poverty and unemployment has doubled in the last decade.29 Even the IMF admits that ‘in recent decades, nearly one-fifth of the world population have regressed’.30 This is most evident to the populations of developing countries: A popular and political groundswell is building from the Andes to Argentina against the decade-old experiment with free-market capitalism.

Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order by Noam Chomsky

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Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, declining real wages, deindustrialization, full employment, invisible hand, joint-stock company, land reform, manufacturing employment, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, Telecommunications Act of 1996, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, union organizing, Washington Consensus

We often discover a considerable gap. The term “neoliberalism” suggests a system of principles that is both new and based on classical liberal ideas: Adam Smith is revered as the patron saint. The doctrinal system is also known as the “Washington consensus,” which suggests something about global order. A closer look shows that the suggestion about global order is fairly accurate, but not the rest. The doctrines are not new, and the basic assumptions are far from those that have animated the liberal tradition since the Enlightenment. THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS The neoliberal Washington consensus is an array of market oriented principles designed by the government of the United States and the international financial institutions that it largely dominates, and implemented by them in various ways—for the more vulnerable societies, often as stringent structural adjustment programs.

The most recent example is Mexico. It was highly praised as a prize student of the rules of the Washington consensus and offered as a model for others—as wages collapsed, poverty increased almost as fast as the number of billionaires, foreign capital flowed in (mostly speculative, or for exploitation of cheap labor kept under control by the brutal “democracy”). Also familiar is the collapse of the house of cards in December 1994. Today half the population cannot obtain minimum food requirement, while the man who controls the corn market remains on the list of Mexico’s billionaires, one category in which the country ranks high. Changes in global order have also made it possible to apply a version of the Washington consensus at home. For most of the US population, incomes have stagnated or declined for fifteen years along with working conditions and job security, continuing through economic recovery, an unprecedented phenomenon.

That has been a truism at least since Adam Smith, who pointed out that the “principal architects” of policy in England were “merchants and manufacturers” who used state power to serve their own interests, however “grievous” the effect on others, including the people of England. Smith’s concern was “the wealth of nations,” but he understood that the “national interest” is largely a delusion: within the “nation” there are sharply conflicting interests, and to understand policy and its effects we have to ask where power lies and how it is exercised, what later came to be called class analysis. The “principal architects” of the neoliberal “Washington consensus” are the masters of the private economy, mainly huge corporations that control much of the international economy and have the means to dominate policy formation as well as the structuring of thought and opinion. The United States has a special role in the system for obvious reasons. To borrow the words of diplomatic historian Gerald Haines, who is also senior historian of the CIA, “Following World War II the United States assumed, out of self-interest, responsibility for the welfare of the world capitalist system.”


pages: 576 words: 105,655

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea by Mark Blyth

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency peg, debt deflation, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversification, en.wikipedia.org, ending welfare as we know it, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, financial repression, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, interest rate swap, invisible hand, Irish property bubble, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, price stability, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, savings glut, short selling, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tobin tax, too big to fail, unorthodox policies, value at risk, Washington Consensus

Blyth, Great Transformations, 147–151; Posen, “Central Bank Independence.” 76. John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” paper commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for the conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004, quote from p. 1. 77. Ibid., 1, my italics. 78. Williamson, “A Short History,” 2. The fact that fiscal discipline is primus inter pares on the list is telling. 79. Korea joined the OECD in 1986. Elsewhere Williamson moves from claiming that these ideas constitute the actual practices of the OECD to claiming that they are “drawn from that body of robust empirical generalizations that forms the core of economics.” John Williamson, “Democracy and the Washington Consensus,” World Development 21, 8 (August 1993): 1113. 80. Katherine Weaver, The Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 81.

In the case of Greece and Italy in 2011, if that meant deposing a few democratically elected governments, then so be it. The most remarkable thing about this ordoliberalization of Europe is how it replicates the same error often attributed to the Anglo-American economies: the insistence that all developing states follow their liberal instruction sheets to get rich, the so-called Washington Consensus approach to development that we shall discuss shortly. The basic objection made by late-developing states, such as the countries of East Asia, to the Washington Consensus/Anglo-American idea “liberalize and then growth follows” was twofold. First, this understanding mistakes the outcomes of growth, stable public finances, low inflation, cost competitiveness, and so on, for the causes of growth. Second, the liberal path to growth only makes sense if you are an early developer, since you have no competitors—pace the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century and the United States in the nineteenth century.37 Yet in the contemporary world, development is almost always state led.

As the March of Dimes shows us so well, they invent new missions.81 In the case of the IMF, they became the provider of “firm-surveillance” of member states’ policies to increase global transparency, at least for the developed world. In the case of the developing world, however, the IMF became the financial police force behind the implementation of what were termed “structural adjustment programs”: also known as the Washington Consensus checklist applied in practice.82 As Dani Rodrik notes, IMF policy in this period, aided and abetted by the World Bank, devolved to a mantra of “stabilize, privative, and liberalize” as “codified in John Williamson’s well-known Washington Consensus.”83 The result was a series of one-size-fits-all policies that were applied from Azerbaijan to Zambia whose objective was to “minimize fiscal deficits, minimize inflation, minimize tariffs, maximize privatization, maximize liberalization of finance.”84 It was, in other words, “expansionary fiscal austerity” in a developmental form, and the results were, by and large, terrible.


pages: 221 words: 55,901

The Globalization of Inequality by François Bourguignon

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Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, Edward Glaeser, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, gender pay gap, Gini coefficient, income inequality, income per capita, labor-force participation, minimum wage unemployment, offshore financial centre, open economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Robert Gordon, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, The Spirit Level, too big to fail, very high income, Washington Consensus

., 87 Russia, 37, 46t Saez, Emmanuel, 48, 160–61 savings, 93, 174 Segal, Paul, 13n4 Sen, Amartya, 14, 61 Senegal, 46t, 54 sensitive urban zones (ZUS), 66 shocks, 38, 55, 91–92, 175 Singapore, 34, 82 Slemrod, Joel, 160–61 Slim, Carlos, 111 social justice, 2, 24, 60, 70, 142 social security, 37 South Africa, 16, 23, 46t, 156 South Korea, 34, 46t, 57, 82 Soviet Union, 26, 37, 75, 149, 153 Spain, 6, 46t, 53, 102, 135 standard of living, 184; absolute, 23, 31–32; after normalization, 29; average, 2, 13, 16, 18, 21, 43; between countries, 2–3, 7, 10, 17, 33, 36, 38–39, 42; China and, 120–22; convergence and, 7, 147–48; countries included in estimation of, 46t; definitions of, 17; distribution and, 16, 18, 24, 26–27; evolution of inequality and, 25–26, 41, 43–45, 46t, 53– 55, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 73; extreme deciles of, 18, 21–23, 28, 36; factor of proportionality and, 13; fairer globalization and, 146–48, 154, 156–58, 160, 165, 168–69; GDP measurement of, 14 (see also gross domestic product (GDP) measurement); global inequality and, 10–26, 29, 31–33, 36, 39; globalization and, 120–23, 126, 138, 143; great gap in, 33–36; international inequality and, 17; median, 24; OECD countries and, 11–12, 43, 50–52, 64, 94, 99, 102, 107, 120, 149, 159, 162, 164–65; Povcal data and, 12; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; relative gap in, 18, 20, 30– 32, 36; rise in inequality and, 106–8, 113–14; welfare and, 31; within countries and, 2 Stiglitz, Joseph, 4, 14, 136n10, 138 subsidies, 109–10, 175 superstars, 85–87, 89–90 surveys: evolution of inequality and, 42t, 43–45, 56, 68n17, 69– 71; fairer globalization and, 169; global inequality and, 10, 12– 15, 20n10, 21–22, 29, 42t, 43– 208 surveys (cont.) 45; globalization and, 127n4, 141n15; PISA, 169–70 Sweden, 46t, 51f, 59, 87, 90, 92– 94, 164, 171–72 Taiwan, 34, 82 taxes: Brazil and, 173; capital mobility and, 93; Chile and, 173; China and, 165; credit and, 164; cutting rates of, 188; educational policy and, 167–73; effective rate of, 159–60; emerging economies and, 165; estate, 187; evolution of inequality of, 12–14, 37, 48, 50, 56n5; fairer globalization and, 148, 158–73, 175, 181–83; France and, 92–93; Germany and, 92; globalization and, 129–30, 135–36, 142–45; havens for, 160, 162, 182, 187, 189; ignoring role of, 12–13; income, 37, 89n10, 92–93, 145, 159, 161–65, 170; India and, 165; inheritance, 145, 171–73; institutions and, 92–94; investment and, 92; labor and, 159– 60, 171; liberalization and, 93; Morocco and, 173; national inequality and, 158–73, 175, 181– 83; profit and, 93; rate ceiling on, 161–62; Reagan and, 92; redistribution through, 4, 158–67; reform and, 92–94, 163, 183, 189; rise in inequality and, 74, 89n10, 91–94, 104, 114–15; Sweden and, 92–93, 172; Thatcher and, 92; transfers and, 158–67; United Kingdom and, 92–94; United States and, 92– 93, 159–60, 164; value added, 92 Index technology: artists and, 86–87; communication, 78, 85–87, 96; data transfer, 78; development gap and, 34–35, 83; fairer globalization and, 156, 173; global inequality and, 3–4, 34–35; globalization and, 118–20, 125; income and, 34, 180; increased audiences and, 86–87; information, 78, 85, 88; movies and, 87; as product of globalization, 86; progress in, 3–4, 34–35, 76, 85– 86, 90–91, 114–15, 118–19, 125, 156, 173, 180; publishing and, 87; rise in inequality and, 34, 74, 76–78, 80, 82, 85–91, 96, 114–15, 180; sports and, 87; television and, 87; writers and, 86–87 terrorism, 139 Tetra Pak, 172 Thailand, 16 Thatcher, Margaret, 91–92, 94, 101 Theil coefficient, 18–19; decomposition of, 37–38, 42; evolution of inequality and, 42 Third World, 149 “too big to fail” concept, 174–75 transportation, 76, 155 TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-­ Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 156 tuition, 170 U2 (band), 87 Uganda, 46t, 54 unions, 100–106, 108, 156, 179 United Kingdom: Big Bang and, 95; competition and, 78–79; deregulation and, 94, 97n14; evolution of inequality and, 46t, 50, 51f, 59, 67, 68n17; fairer global- Index209 ization and, 163, 169; manufacturing and, 80; real earnings loss and, 78; rise in inequality and, 21, 91–94, 97n14; taxes and, 92–94; Thatcher and, 91–92, 94, 101 United Nations, 149, 185 United States: African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; Cold War and, 149, 153; competition and, 78–79; Current Population Survey and, 21; deregulation and, 94–95, 97– 98, 102–8; evolution of inequality and, 47–50, 51f, 58, 59n9, 66–70, 73; fairer globalization and, 155, 159–61, 163–64, 169, 174–75, 182; Gini coefficient of, 21; globalization and, 135–39; manufacturing and, 80; Occupy Wall Street movement and, 6, 135; Reagan and, 91–92, 101; real earnings loss and, 78; rise in inequality and, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 33, 46t, 73, 77–80, 91–95, 97– 98, 102–8; taxes and, 92–93, 159–60, 164; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 49–50 value added, 56–58, 60, 92 violence, 66, 133–35, 139 wage ladder effects, 78–79 Wall Street, 6, 90, 135 Washington consensus, 109–10, 153 wealth: bonuses and, 87, 174; developed/developing countries and, 3, 10, 16, 21, 28, 47, 58–60, 72; distribution of, 4 (see also distribution); evolution of inequality and, 58–60; executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; fairer globalization and, 162, 164, 167, 170–73; globalization and, 125, 127, 129, 131–32, 139, 143–45; great gap and, 33–36; high incomes and, 50, 52, 56, 85–93, 97–99, 140, 143, 158–62, 164, 189; income gap and, 3, 5–6, 27f, 42t, 44t, 149; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; inheritance and, 93, 144–45, 170–73; lawyers and, 89–90; measuring inequality and, 18; middle class and, 51, 71, 93, 109, 133–34, 136, 140; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; real earnings loss and, 78; real estate and, 131; redistribution and, 167–73; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31–32, 36; rise in inequality and, 74, 95, 98; superstars and, 85–87, 89–90; taxes and, 187 (see also taxes); transfers and, 4, 14, 48, 105, 110, 130, 135–36, 142, 148, 153, 158–67, 170, 175, 181, 183, 187 welfare: global, 31; individual, 6; rate of progress and, 5; social, 14; specific nations and, 7; United Kingdom and, 94 Wilkinson, Richard, 140 women: discrimination and, 64– 66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; labor and, 114; rise in inequality and, 103 210 World Bank, 10, 11n2, 23, 29n16, 43, 54, 68n18, 90, 109, 149 World’s Apart (Milanovic), 4–5 World Trade Organization, 86, 154 World War I era, 37, 160 Index World War II era, 26, 34, 37, 48, 92, 162 writers, 86–87 Zaire, 151 Zucman, Gabriel, 59n8, 161–62

These structural adjustment policies have often been criticized for their social costs, partly because they slowed growth and thus the reduction of poverty dramatically, and partly because they placed more of the brunt of the costs of these programs on the lower and middle classes, rather than on the high end of the income scale.23 The debt crisis began in Latin America, specifically in Mexico in 1982, and for a decade and a half it would have harsh consequences for the developing world, in particular in sub-­Saharan Africa and Latin America. The structural adjustment programs that the international financial institutions demanded in exchange for aid were grounded on a package of free market principles that were later baptized the “Washington consensus.” They resulted in deep institutional changes: commercial and financial liberalization, deregulation of goods, capital and labor markets, privatization, the elimination of consumer and producer subsidies, 23  See IMF-­IEO, Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-­Supported Programs, IMF, June 2002. 110 Chapter 3 cuts in social spending, and so forth. As we have seen, many of these reforms almost certainly had inegalitarian effects, and, in fact, between the 1980s and 1990s we can see a substantial rise in inequalities in the countries affected most directly by these programs: Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and even Brazil.

After three years that were especially hard on the population, growth returned and remained at high levels. However, inequality had shot up in the adjustment process. The Gini coefficient, which was 0.50 in 1999, had risen to 0.54 in 2003 at the moment when the crisis was on the verge of turning back. It has since gone back down. While this is true, there is little doubt that several structural reforms typical of the Washington consensus, in contrast to policies focused more directly on reestablishing macroeconomic equilibrium, such as those used by the Argentine government in response to the 2001 crisis (devaluation, disinflation, budgetary tightening), have had an inegalitarian effect on certain countries. This is certainly the case for policies like the elimination of input and output price subsidies for small farmers, the abandoning of consumer price subsidies, the rise in prices for certain priva- The Forces behind R ising Inequality 111 tized services, and, after some time delay, the cuts in public social spending on education and health.


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Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis by Anatole Kaletsky

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bank run, banking crisis, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, BRICs, Carmen Reinhart, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, Corn Laws, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, global rebalancing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, market design, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, paradox of thrift, peak oil, pets.com, Ponzi scheme, post-industrial society, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, statistical model, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, too big to fail, Washington Consensus

Available from http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRIC-Full.pdf. 2 Summarizing the conclusions of April 2009 G20 summit in London Gordon Brown declared: “The old Washington Consensus is over.” See Jonathan Weisman and Alistair Macdonald, “Obama, Brown Strike Similar Note on Economy,” Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2009. See also a 2009 article by John Williamson, who coined the phrase: John Williamson, “The ‘Washington Consensus’: Another Near-Death Experience?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 10, 2009. Available from http://www.iie.com/realtime/?p=604. See as well Dani Rodrik, “Is There a New Washington Consensus?” Business Standard, June 12, 2008. 3 Unattributable interview with the author in Anatole Kaletsky, “We Need a New Capitalism to Take on China, The Times, London, February 4, 2010. 4 “‘China’s Spirit,’ a ‘Great Wall’ at Heart Built to Ward Off Global Crisis,” People’s Daily, July 30, 2009. 5 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus. 6 Two of the best recent books are Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century, and Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade. 7 If China continues to grow at an average annual rate of 8 percent without any interruption, its living standards will catch up with those in Portugal, the poorest western European country, by around 2030.

In the twenty years since the demolition of the Berlin Wall, almost every nation has appeared to accept, at least in theory, the conventional wisdom known as the Washington Consensus: The only credible formula for long-term prosperity and development is “free markets and free people,” however unwelcome both these liberal concepts might be to incumbent oligarchies and ruling elites. Now, after watching the near-collapse of global capitalism and the damage done to Western democracies by the crisis, citizens, as well as political leaders, of many developing countries are having second thoughts. The apparent failure of Western capitalism has discredited liberalism in the eyes of many developing countries, as even the principle promoters of the Washington Consensus, the IMF and World Bank, have acknowledged in a series of confessional reports.2 As a senior U.S. diplomat remarked a few months after the crisis: “Developing countries have lost interest in the old Washington Consensus that promoted democracy and liberal economics.

Bush, far from supporting the U.S. government’s attempts to save the economy and financial system, formed an unholy alliance with neo-socialists and unrepentant Marxists to declare that free-enterprise capitalism was dead. Instead of the American Century, proclaimed by neo-conservatives a few years earlier, China’s rise to global dominance in the decades ahead now seemed as inevitable. Around the world, finance ministers and diplomats prepared to abandon the Washington Consensus presented to developing countries throughout the previous twenty years as the only way to achieve economic progress.1 The Beijing Consensus was the new buzzword, even if no one was quite sure what it meant.2 Yet within a few months of the collapse of Lehman and the election of a new American government, it became obvious that reports of capitalism’s death were exaggerated and premature.


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Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety by Gideon Rachman

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Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, BRICs, capital controls, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, greed is good, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, laissez-faire capitalism, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Sinatra Doctrine, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

Maxwell Cameron and Brian Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 2. 6. See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (London: Black Swan, 2001). 7. Williamson’s own account of what he meant can be found in John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” Fundación CIDOB paper, presented at a conference titled “From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24, 2004. Available from http://www.piie.com/publications/ papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. 8. Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 214. 9. Ibid., 212. 10. See John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, vol. 2. The Iron Lady (London: Vintage, 2008), 789. 11.

Even Chile, where free-market reforms had been pursued by a military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet, had turned back toward democracy with the election of a civilian government in 1989. The democratic transformation of Latin America was accompanied by a free-market revolution. The Latin dictatorships had generally pursued protectionist and state-led economic strategies. Their democratic successors were much more likely to follow the orthodox economic strategies of the “Washington Consensus”: a crackdown on inflation, a welcome for foreign investment, a more open trading regime, and privatization. Latin America’s transformation illustrates how contagious political and economic ideas can be—jumping across borders with all the energy of a determined virus. The continent had been through periods of synchronized political change before. There were nine military coups across Latin America between 1962 and 1966.1 In 1973, even Chile, which had been a democracy since 1932, fell victim to a military coup.

Prominent regional economists like the Peruvian Hernando de Soto became important contributors to the new liberal economics, with De Soto doing much to argue the case for the importance of property rights for the poor.6 Nonetheless, the new economics pursued across the continent came with the approval of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Since both mighty institutions were based in Washington, the free-market prescription became known as the “Washington Consensus”—a phrase dreamed up by John Williamson, an economist at the Institute for International Economics.7 Across Latin America, government pursued the new consensus policies: cutting tariffs and taxes, making life easier for foreign investors, allowing markets to set interest and exchange rates, cutting regulation, privatizing. The story told so far sounds like a liberal morality tale, in which economic and political freedom advance hand in hand.

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century by Francis Fukuyama

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Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, centre right, corporate governance, demand response, Doha Development Round, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Hernando de Soto, Nick Leeson, Potemkin village, price stability, principal–agent problem, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

In response to these trends, the advice offered by international financial institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as by the U.S. government, emphasized a collection of measures intended to reduce the degree of state intervention in economic affairs—a package designated as the “Washington consensus” by one of its formulators (Williamson 1994) or as “neoliberalism” by its detractors in Latin America. The Washington consensus has been relentlessly attacked in the early twenty-first century, not just by antiglobalization protesters but also by academic critics with better credentials in economics (see Rodrik 1997; Stiglitz 2002). In retrospect, there was nothing wrong with the Washington consensus per se: The state sectors of developing countries were in very many cases obstacles to growth and could only be fixed in the long run through economic liberalization. Rather, the problem was that although states needed to be cut back in certain areas, they needed to be simultaneously strengthened in others.

There is no question that it is better to be in quadrant I than in quadrant IV, but is it better to be in quadrant II, with strong institutions and an extensive state, or quadrant III, with weak institutions and a limited state? In the early 1990s many economists preferred quadrant III on the grounds that markets would be selforganizing or that institutions and residual state capabilities would somehow take care of themselves. The so-called Washington consensus was a perfectly sensible list of economic policy measures that were designed to move countries leftward along the X-axis through reduced tariff protection, privatization, reduction of subsidies, deregulation, and so forth. There is no reason, after all, for the Brazilian government to operate steel mills or for Argentina to create a domestic automobile industry. In many cases, transitional and emerging-market countries were advised to move as rapidly as possible toward smaller state scope on the grounds that the political window for engaging in this kind of reform would close quickly and that it was better to get the pain of adjustment over with all at once.

At the same time, spending on so-called sovereignty expenditures like military forces, diplomatic services, and jobs connected to the office of the presidency increased dramatically. (In Kenya, for example, the employees of the office of the president grew from 18,213 in 1971 to 43,230 in 1990.) No international lender or bilateral donor at any time wanted this outcome, yet none were able to structure their conditionality in a way to prevent it from happening because of their inability to control local political outcomes. Many proponents of the Washington consensus now say that they of course understood the importance of institutions, rule of law, and the proper sequencing of reforms. But Y-axis questions of state capacity and state-building were largely absent from policy discussion in the late 1980s to early 1990s. There were very few warnings issued from Washington-based policymakers about the dangers of liberalization in the absence of proper institutions.


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The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System by James Rickards

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, bitcoin, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business climate, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, complexity theory, computer age, credit crunch, currency peg, David Graeber, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, diversification, Edward Snowden, eurozone crisis, fiat currency, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, Flash crash, floating exchange rates, forward guidance, George Akerlof, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, inflation targeting, invisible hand, jitney, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, labour mobility, Lao Tzu, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market bubble, market clearing, market design, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mutually assured destruction, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, reserve currency, risk-adjusted returns, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, Satoshi Nakamoto, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, Stuxnet, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trade route, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, working-age population, yield curve

■ From Bretton Woods to Beijing The euro project is a part of the more broadly based international monetary system, which itself is subject to considerable stress and periodic reformation. Since the Second World War, the system has passed through distinct phases known as Bretton Woods, the Washington Consensus, and the Beijing Consensus. All three of these phrases are shorthand for shared norms of behavior in international finance, what are called the rules of the game. The Washington Consensus arose after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the late 1970s. The international monetary system was saved between 1980 and 1983 as Paul Volcker raised interest rates, and Ronald Reagan lowered taxes, and together they created the sound-dollar or King Dollar policy. The combination of higher interest rates, lower taxes, and less regulation made the United States a magnet for savings from around the world and thereby rescued the dollar.

The omission of any reference to nations other than the United States, or any institution other than those controlled by the United States, speaks to the state of international finance in 1989 and the years that followed. Williamson went on to describe what Washington meant by debtors “setting their houses in order.” He set forth ten policies that made up the Washington Consensus. These policies included commonsense initiatives such as fiscal discipline, elimination of wasteful subsidies, lower tax rates, positive real interest rates, openness to foreign investment, deregulation, and protection for property rights. The fact that these policies favored free-market capitalism and promoted the expansion of U.S. banks and corporations in global markets did not go unnoticed. By the early 2000s, the Washington Consensus was in tatters due to the rise of emerging market economies that viewed dollar hegemony as favoring the United States at their expense. This view was highlighted by the IMF response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, in which IMF austerity plans resulted in riots and bloodshed in the cities of Jakarta and Seoul.

This view was highlighted by the IMF response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, in which IMF austerity plans resulted in riots and bloodshed in the cities of Jakarta and Seoul. Washington’s failure over time to adhere to its own fiscal prescriptions, combined with the acceleration of Asian economic growth after 1999, gave rise to the Beijing Consensus as a policy alternative to the Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus comes in conflicting versions and lacks the intellectual consistency that Williamson gave to the Washington Consensus. Author Joshua Cooper Ramo is credited with putting the phrase Beijing Consensus into wide use with his seminal 2004 article on the subject. Ramo’s analysis, while original and provocative, candidly admits that the definition of Beijing Consensus is amorphous: “the Beijing Consensus . . . is flexible enough that it is barely classifiable as a doctrine.”


pages: 232

Planet of Slums by Mike Davis

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barriers to entry, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, centre right, clean water, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, failed state, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, Internet Archive, jitney, Kibera, labor-force participation, land reform, land tenure, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, market bubble, megacity, microcredit, New Urbanism, Ponzi scheme, RAND corporation, rent control, structural adjustment programs, surplus humans, upwardly mobile, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor

The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed upon debtor nations in the late 1970s and 1980s required a shrinkage of government programs and, often, the 36 Richard Kirkby, "China," in Kosta Mathey (ed.), Beyond Self-Help Housing, London 1992, pp. 298-99. 37 Andrew Harding, "Nairobi Slum Life," (series), Guardian, 4, 8, 10 and 15, October 2002. privatization of housing markets. However, the social state in the Third World was already withering away even before SAPs sounded the death knell for welfarism. Because so many experts working for the "Washington Consensus" have deemed government provision of urban housing to be an inevitable disaster, it is important to review some case histories, beginning with what, at first sight, seem to be the major exceptions to the rule of state failure. The two tropical cities where large-scale public housing has provided an alternative to slums are Singapore and Hong Kong. As a city-state with tight migration policies, the former doesn't have to face the usual demographic pressures of a poor agrarian hinterland.

In a review of recent studies, including a major report by the London-based Panos Institute, Rita Abrahamsen concludes that "rather than empowering 'civil society,' the PRSP process has entrenched the position of a small, homogeneous 'iron triangle' of transnational professionals based in key government ministries (especially Finance), multilateral and bilateral development agencies and international NGOs."19 What Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz in his brief tenure as chief economist for the Bank described as an emerging "post-Washington Consensus" might be better characterized as "soft imperialism," with the major NGOs captive to the agenda of the international donors, and grassroots groups similarly dependent upon the international NGOs.20 For all the glowing rhetoric about democratization, self-help, social capital, and the strengthening of civil society, the actual power relations in this new NGO universe resemble nothing so much as traditional clientelism.

Moreover, like the community organizations patronized by the War on Poverty in the 1960s, Third World NGOs have proven brilliant at coopting local leadership as well as hegemonizing the social space traditionally occupied by the Left Even if there are some celebrated exceptions - such as the militant NGOs so instrumental in creating the World Social Forums - the broad impact of the NGO/ "civil society revolution," as even some World Bank researchers acknowledge, has been to bureaucratize and deradicalize urban social movements.21 18 Sebastian Mallaby, The World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations, New York 2004, pp. 89-90, 145. 19 Rita Abrahamsen, "Review Essay: Poverty Reduction or Adjustment by Another Name?," Review of African Political Economy 99 (2004), p. 185. 20 Stiglitz's 1998 speech, "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Towards the Post-Washington Consensus," is discussed in John Pender, "From 'Structural Adjustment' to 'Comprehensive Development Framework': Conditionality Transformed?," Third World Quarterly 22:3 (2001). 21 Imparato and Ruster, Slum Upgrading and Participation, p. 255. Thus development economist Diana Mitlin, writing about Latin s America, describes how, on one hand, NGOs "preempt community- ; level capacity-building as they take over decision-making and negotiating roles," while, on the other hand, they are constrained by "the difficulties of managing donor finance, with its emphasis on shortterm project funds, on financial accountabilities and on tangible outputs."22 Similarly in the case of urban Argentina, architect Ruben Gazzoli complains that NGOs monopolize expert knowledge and middleman roles in the same way as traditional political machines.23 Lea Jellinek, a social historian who has spent more than a quartercentury studying the poor in Jakarta, in turn, recounts how one famed NGO, a neighborhood microbank, "beginning as a small grassroots project driven by needs and capacities of local women," grew Frankenstein-like into a "large, complex, top—down, technically oriented bureaucracy" that was "less accountable to and supportive o f " its low-income base.24 From a Middle Eastern perspective, Asef Bayat deplores the hyperbole about NGOs, pointing out that "their potential for independent and democratic organization has generally been overestimated.


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The Extreme Centre: A Warning by Tariq Ali

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bonus culture, BRICs, British Empire, centre right, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, first-past-the-post, full employment, labour market flexibility, land reform, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mortgage debt, North Sea oil, obamacare, offshore financial centre, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck

For this reason he wanted to exclude Britain, since he (and almost everybody else) knew it would be little more than a Trojan horse for the United States. Both leaders were proved right. Today Germany is the strongest country in Europe, despite its truncated sovereignty, and the EU, expanded out of control as a result of Anglo-American pressure, is groaning like a sick bull. Early attempts by the Frenchman Jacques Delors to create a ‘social Europe’ foundered on the born-again fanaticism of the Washington Consensus: neoliberal capitalism was the only way forward. The EU had to accept the new rules: privatizations at home, wars and occupations abroad. The Northern Europeans (Britain and Scandinavia) and the East Europeans (delighted to accept new satellite status, with the US replacing the USSR) proved to be the most loyal and compliant of the EU vassal states. The result has been a disaster for the EU as a whole.

Bush: ‘The brutal fact is that Western Europe, and increasingly also Central Europe, remains largely an American protectorate, with its allied states reminiscent of ancient vassals and tributaries.’ Britain was so servile that it barely counted. Germany and France were important, and in any division between these two, the Germans should be supported. Brzezinski needn’t have worried. Under Jospin and Sarkozy the French Republic happily embraced the Washington Consensus, with French mediatic intellectuals proving even more willing than their German equivalents.7 There are no signs whatsoever of François Hollande breaking with this pattern, and in the unlikely event of a Red–Green victory at the next German elections, it would produce a government far closer to Washington than that of Angela Merkel. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the European ruling class has never regarded continental independence, in the proper sense of the word, as a serious option.

They are regarded as such not only at home, but also by those who fear US withdrawal abroad: vassal politicians and states in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the loyal few in South America. The rulers of the only vassal continent – Australia – would, given its geography, be equally disturbed to contemplate independence. Yet in both the Arab world and the heartlands of Western capitalism, the systemic order imposed through the Washington Consensus since the collapse of the Soviet Union has appeared to be in forward flight. The Arab world seeks to escape its recent history, while some European states, in the grip of parliamentary paralysis, dream of external deliverance from the very bankers who were responsible for the crash of 2008. The atrophy of the productive economy in the United States and large swathes of the EU reveal a malady that was already at an advanced stage, even as some claimed that the disease had been defeated forever.


pages: 868 words: 147,152

How Asia Works by Joe Studwell

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, crony capitalism, cross-subsidies, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, failed state, financial deregulation, financial repression, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, land tenure, large denomination, market fragmentation, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, passive investing, purchasing power parity, rent control, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, working-age population

But it downplayed the significance of such policies, avoided discussion of agriculture altogether, and added Hong Kong and Singapore to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, thereby leaving Japan, Korea and Taiwan as the statistical minority among its ‘High Performing Asian Economies’. (China was omitted from the report.) 2 This was the ideologically charged era of the so-called Washington Consensus, when the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury were united in their determination that the free market policies coming into vogue in the US and Britain were appropriate to all economies, no matter what their level of development.3 The vitriol of the debate was such that academic rigour was frequently a victim, as with the World Bank reports. Indeed, even the academic specialists on Japan, Korea and Taiwan who opposed the Washington Consensus position on economic development made suspect claims in order to bolster their case. This only added to confusion. Chalmers Johnson wrote in the preface to his seminal study of Japanese development, published in 1982: ‘[The Japanese development model] is being repeated today in newly industrializing states of East Asia – Taiwan and South Korea – and in Singapore and South and Southeast Asian countries.’

Worse still, as the failings of half-hearted, poorly planned agricultural and manufacturing strategies became apparent from the 1980s, governments were tempted by the siren calls of the incipient Washington Consensus – the free market agenda for economic development that was being pressed on developing countries with increased vigour by the IMF, the World Bank and the US government. The loudest and most evangelical message of these agencies was that deregulating the financial sector could put the development efforts of lagging countries back on track. States were encouraged to privatise existing banks and license new banks, to take a laissez-faire attitude to international flows of capital and to expand stock markets. The argument of the Washington Consensus was that liberated capital would then itself identify the right investments to spur economic progress. What actually happened, in 1997, was a financial catastrophe on a scale similar to that which afflicted Latin America after 1982.

The financial deregulation urged by parties to the Washington Consensus does not present a viable alternative to this strategy. Deregulation policies do not empower a ‘natural’ tendency for finance to lead a society from poverty to wealth, they simply put short-term profit and the interests of consumers ahead of developmental learning and agricultural and industrial upgrading. There is no case for doing this when a country is poor. At best, the developmental emphasis of the IMF, the World Bank and the US government on financial sector deregulation in recent decades has been a waste of time. More commonly, the policy advice has had clear negative consequences. In forcing the pace of banking deregulation, capital account liberalisation and stock market development, the Washington Consensus has undermined east Asian countries’ capacity to shape their development and has greatly increased the risk of financial crises.


pages: 318 words: 85,824

A Brief History of Neoliberalism by David Harvey

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business climate, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, crony capitalism, debt deflation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial intermediation, financial repression, full employment, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, labour market flexibility, land tenure, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low-wage service sector, manufacturing employment, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, neoliberal agenda, new economy, phenotype, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, The Chicago School, transaction costs, union organizing, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

In retrospect it may seem as if the answer was both inevitable and obvious, but at the time, I think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood with any certainty what kind of answer would work and how. The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments that really only converged as a new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s. By then, both Clinton and Blair could easily have reversed Nixon’s earlier statement and simply said ‘We are all neoliberals now.’ The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently partial and lop-sided application from one state and social formation to another, testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred.

By the end of the decade most economics departments in the US research universities—and these helped train most of the world’s economists—had fallen into line by broadly cleaving to the neoliberal agenda that emphasized the control of inflation and sound public finance (rather than full employment and social protections) as primary goals of economic policy. All of these strands came together in the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ of the mid-1990s.5 The US and UK models of neoliberalism were there defined as the answer to global problems. Considerable pressure was put even on Japan and Europe (to say nothing of the rest of the world) to take the neoliberal road. It was, therefore, Clinton and then Blair who, from the centre-left, did the most to consolidate the role of neoliberalism both at home and internationally.

Whether it was all a matter of conscious though adaptive planning (‘groping the stones while crossing the river’ as Deng called it) or the working out, behind the backs of the party politicians, of an inexorable logic deriving from the initial premises of Deng’s market reforms, will doubtless long be debated.2 What can be said with precision, is that China, by not taking the ‘shock therapy’ path of instant privatization later foisted on Russia and central Europe by the IMF, the World Bank, and the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s, managed to avert the economic disasters that beset those countries. By taking its own peculiar path towards ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or, as some now prefer to call it, ‘privatization with Chinese characteristics’, it managed to construct a form of state-manipulated market economy that delivered spectacular economic growth (averaging close to 10 per cent a year) and rising standards of living for a significant proportion of the population for more than twenty years.3 But the reforms also led to environmental degradation, social inequality, and eventually something that looks uncomfortably like the reconstitution of capitalist class power.


pages: 214 words: 57,614

America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy by Francis Fukuyama

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affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, European colonialism, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Internet Archive, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, New Journalism, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, transaction costs, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

Radar, jet aircraft technology, and a good deal of U.S. commercial aerospace similarly benefited from military spending. The Internet was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as a means of communicating after a nuclear attack. 14. Historically, the Washington Consensus developed in response to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, where heavy foreign borrowing and lack of fiscal discipline led to a pathological cycle of currency crisis, devaluation, expansionary monetary policy to cover fiscal deficits, hyperinflation, and then renewed exchange rate crisis. The economic policy measures outlined in the Washington Consensus were necessary to break this cycle, and through a painful series of adjustments countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina managed, by the early 1990s, to stabilize their macroeconomic balances. 15. The final story in Latin America is more complicated: while the rise of Lula in Brazil, Gutierrez in Ecuador, Vazquez in Uruguay, and Chavez in Venezuela marks a turn to the left, most of these new leaders have continued to follow relatively orthodox macroeconomic policies.

But the other industrialized democracies were comfortable with their welfare states and often saw the American drive to liberalize markets around the world not as a well-intentioned effort to promote reform but as an American attempt to impose its American Exceptionalism own antistatist values on the rest of the world in a "race to the bottom." Much of the drive to Americanize the global economy came out of the private sector and the challenge posed by newly competitive U.S. companies and financial institutions. But American government policy was highly supportive of economic liberalization as well, in ways that generated a backlash that often went unperceived in Washington. The Washington Consensus was a package of orthodox economic liberalization measures that were often attached as conditions to structural adjustment lending packages by international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for developing countries. 14 Had this type of U.S.-promoted economic liberalization produced consistently positive results, there might have been greater acceptance of this form of benevolent hegemony.

., 82-83, 97> IOO > J 73 United Nations, 10; American distrust of, 159; Bush administration's attitude toward, 6, 95-96, 98; criticism of, 176; effectiveness of, 157, 160-61; legitimacy of, 157, 158-60; neocon-servative distrust of, 49, 64-65; Oil for Food program, 65, 80, 96; as political issue, 156-57; and resolutions mandating Iraq's disarmament, 96-97; and sanctions against Iraq, 80; and security issues, 158, 160-62 United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 96 United States: as enforcer of U.N. resolutions on Iraq disarmament, 96-97; hostility toward, in Middle East, 106-7; an d international institutions, 192-93; moral authority of, 187; power as exercised by, 48, 62-64, 135-38, 188-91; relationship with NATO, 173-74; ro ' e °f» m international arena, 98-99, 156, 184. See also Bush administration; foreign policy, U.S.; military, U.S. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 117, 134, 139, 149, 150, 151, 152-53, 2i2n39 Vernet, Daniel, 14 Vietnam War, 18, 121 Villepin, Dominique de, 100 Voice of America, 136, 150 Wall Street Journal, 34 warfare. See military, U.S.; nuclear proliferation; targeting precision Warsaw Pact, 29, 51 Washington Consensus, 109, 205ni4 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): intelligence failures regarding, 5-6, 87, 90-91; as threat to United States, 46, 66, 79-81, 82, 203ni9 Weber, Max, 125 Weekly Standard, 40, 117 welfare state, 28, 38, 107 Wilson, James Q., 18-19, 115,206m Wilson, Woodrow, 49 Wilsonianism. See realistic Wilsonian-ism Wohlstetter, Albert, 21, 31-36 Wohlstetter, Roberta, 87 Wolfowitz, Paul, 12, 14, 21, 31 Wolfson, Adam, 2 8 women's empowerment, 120 World Bank, 145, 147 World Intellectual Property Organization, 44 World Trade Organization (WTO), 44 Yushchenko, Viktor, 5 2 Zakaria, Fareed, 140 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 181 226 approach to American foreign policy through 4vhich such mistakes might be turned around — one in which the positive aspects of the neo-conservative legacy are joined with a more rfealistic view of the way American power can Ipe used around the world.


pages: 225 words: 61,388

Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa by Dambisa Moyo

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, Bretton Woods, colonial rule, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, diversification, diversified portfolio, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, failed state, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, invisible hand, M-Pesa, market fundamentalism, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, microcredit, moral hazard, Ponzi scheme, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, sovereign wealth fund, The Chicago School, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War

During the 1980s bilateral flows also became more concessional in nature and by the early 1990s over 90 per cent were grants. Alongside rising government-to-government transfers (bilateral aid), multilateral institutions continued their aggressive march towards gaining greater importance – both in terms of the volume of aid disbursed and as architects of development policy. By 1989, the Washington Consensus (a standard reform package of economic policy prescriptions, mainly on monetary and fiscal policy for the countries most affected by economic crisis) became the backbone of the development strategy pursued by the Washington DC-based institutions (the IMF, World Bank, and US Treasury Department). The foreign aid agenda of the 1990s: a question of governance By the end of the 1980s, emerging-market countries’ debt was at least US$1 trillion, and the cost of servicing these obligations colossal.

There is more (much more) that needs to be done to undo the ills that have gone before, to rectify what has been an unmitigated disaster, and to get Africa onto a solid economic footing. While international donors and organizations must be commended for shifting the development ideology from the bad economic policies of the 1970s (mainly statist) to the good market policies on the books today (introduced on the back of the Washington Consensus), we need to remind them that without the elimination of aid effective implementation of the new, better, development regime will remain shoddy, ineffectual and even disastrous. Africa’s development impasse demands a new level of consciousness, a greater degree of innovation, and a generous dose of honesty about what works and what does not as far as development is concerned. And one thing is for sure, depending on aid has not worked.

., D. Ghura, M. Mulheisen, R. Nord and E. M. Ucer, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth, Savings and Investment, 1986– 93’, IMF Occasional Paper No. 118, 2005 Hartung, William D. and Frida Berrigan, ‘U.S. Arms Transfers and Security Assistance to Israel: An Arms Trade Resource Center Fact Sheet’, 6 May 2002, at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/israel050602.html Harvard University, Washington Consensus, at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html Hjertholm, Peter and Howard White, ‘Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective: Background and Trends’, in Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and Development Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 Ibisin, David and Jake Lloyd Smith, ‘Tsunami disaster: UN “failing to co-ordinate relief efforts”’, Financial Times, 7 January 2005 IFAD Remittance Forum, ‘Sending Money Home: Worldwide Remittance Flows to Developing Countries’, at http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/ ING Microfinance Support, ‘A Billion to Gain?


pages: 481 words: 120,693

Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else by Chrystia Freeland

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Albert Einstein, algorithmic trading, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Basel III, battle of ideas, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, business climate, call centre, carried interest, Cass Sunstein, Clayton Christensen, collapse of Lehman Brothers, conceptual framework, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, don't be evil, double helix, energy security, estate planning, experimental subject, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Flash crash, Frank Gehry, Gini coefficient, global village, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, Guggenheim Bilbao, haute couture, high net worth, income inequality, invention of the steam engine, job automation, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, linear programming, London Whale, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, Moneyball by Michael Lewis explains big data, NetJets, new economy, Occupy movement, open economy, Peter Thiel, place-making, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, postindustrial economy, Potemkin village, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, Rod Stewart played at Stephen Schwarzman birthday party, Ronald Reagan, self-driving car, short selling, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, Solar eclipse in 1919, sovereign wealth fund, stem cell, Steve Jobs, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tony Hsieh, too big to fail, trade route, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, wage slave, Washington Consensus, winner-take-all economy

They both sharply cut taxes at the top—Reagan slashed the highest marginal tax rate from 70 percent to 28 percent and reduced the maximum capital gains tax to 20 percent—reined in trade unions, cut social welfare spending, and deregulated the economy. This Washington Consensus was exported abroad, too. Its greatest impact, and its greatest validation, was in communist regimes. The collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc and the adoption of market economics in communist China ended that ideology’s seventy-year-long intellectual and political challenge to capitalism, leaving the market economy as the only system anyone has come up with that works. That red threat was one reason the plutocrats accepted the Treaty of Detroit, and its even more generous European equivalents. The red surrender emboldened the advocates of the Washington Consensus and helped them to create the international institutions needed to underpin a globalized economy. These three transformations—the technology revolution, globalization, and the rise of the Washington Consensus—have coincided with an age of strong global economic growth, and also with the reemergence of the plutocrats, this time on a global scale.

These three transformations—the technology revolution, globalization, and the rise of the Washington Consensus—have coincided with an age of strong global economic growth, and also with the reemergence of the plutocrats, this time on a global scale. Among students of income inequality, there is a fierce debate about which of the three is the most important driver of the rise of the 1 percent. Ideology helps to shape the argument. If you are a true-faith believer in the Washington Consensus, you tend to believe rising income inequality is the product of impersonal—and largely benign—economic forces, like the technology revolution and globalization. If you are a liberal and regret the passing of the Treaty of Detroit, you tend to attribute the changed income distribution chiefly to politics—a process Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson have powerfully described in Winner-Take-All Politics.

As individuals, we aren’t getting smarter, but society as a whole is accumulating more and more knowledge. Our access to information and technological assistance in going through the mountains of chaff to get to the wheat—no society has ever had that. That is huge.” — This double-barreled economic shift has coincided with an equally consequential social and political one. MIT researchers Frank Levy and Peter Temin describe the transformation as a move from “The Treaty of Detroit” to the “Washington Consensus.” The Treaty of Detroit was the five-year contract agreed to in 1950 by the United Auto Workers and the big three manufacturers. That deal protected the carmakers from annual strikes; in exchange, it gave the workers generous health care coverage and pensions. Levy and Temin use “The Treaty of Detroit” as a shorthand to describe the broader set of political, social, and economic institutions that were established in the United States during the postwar era: strong unions, high taxes, and a high minimum wage.


pages: 537 words: 158,544

Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna

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Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, complexity theory, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, energy security, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, flex fuel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global supply chain, haute couture, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, Islamic Golden Age, Khyber Pass, knowledge economy, land reform, low skilled workers, means of production, megacity, Monroe Doctrine, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open borders, open economy, Pax Mongolica, pirate software, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Potemkin village, price stability, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, South China Sea, special economic zone, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, trickle-down economics, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

But in reality, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina had to borrow ever greater sums of money just to service their debts, like drunken sailors being served drinks by a drunken bartender. The result was the “lost decade” of the 1980s, in which Latin America became, in the words of former Venezuelan trade minister Moisés Naím, “Atlantis—the lost continent.”10 Crisis followed crisis. To make matters worse, the IMF responded to the United States “like thunder to lightning,” forcing Latin American regimes to tighten their belts as prescribed by the “Washington Consensus” orthodoxy of rapid liberalization, an international variant of trickle-down economics.11 Over a century after the Pan-American Union effort, the heated debate over how to meet Latin Americans’ rising expectations despite unequal American trade continues in the form of a proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. But China’s commercial presence in the Western Hemisphere is also deepening; thus, so is its strategic presence.

But the United States must then convince Latin American leaders that China is not an alternative to American leadership but rather its complement. To date, however, America’s hot-and-cold style of diplomacy, careening between the extremes of absent and overbearing, has contributed to the rise of leftist leaders since the 1990s who respond to American encroachment with the rhetoric of cultural resistance, loudly bucking the Washington Consensus and the pleas to democratize. Even in so perfunctory a body as the Organization of American States (OAS), whose charter vainly emphasizes “respect for individual personalities,” America has been unable to introduce a peer-review mechanism anywhere near as sophisticated as Eastern Europe’s intra–second world levers. And though past OAS secretaries-general have been virtual spokesmen for American interests, the group pointedly rebuffed all of America’s top candidates to take over the organization in 2005.

Such companies are happy to sign joint production agreements through “mixed companies” with murky standards, even if they have to pay a higher windfall tax—which Chávez uses to ratchet up pressure on European oil companies already operating in Venezuela. Since America has already thrown in its hand, will Europe play its cards to rein in Chávez? Between China and Chávez, Venezuela might still achieve a lasting contribution to both the spirit and practice of Latin American cooperation, one based on a post–Washington Consensus model of mutual aid and indigenous institutions. But history may also ultimately repeat itself in Venezuela, with surging oil prices and Chinese demand allowing Chávez to rely on energy exports and ignore other industries, leaving the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations. The country now resembles Iran prior to the overthrow of the Shah: oil wealth, inequality, and disenfranchisement, a classic prerevolutionary situation.


pages: 252 words: 13,581

Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City by Tony Roshan Samara

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conceptual framework, deglobalization, ghettoisation, global village, illegal immigration, late capitalism, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, structural adjustment programs, unemployed young men, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, working poor

For a discussion of the rise of urban neoliberalism in the United States, see Alice O’Conner, “The Privatized City: The Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the Conservative Counterrevolution in New York,” Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (January 2008): 333–53; Jamie Peck, “Liberating the City: Between New York and New Orleans, Urban Geography 27, no. 8 (2006): 681–713. 23.╯Walden Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2005). 24.╯Bryn Hughes, “The ‘Fundamental’ Threat of (Neo)Liberal Democracy: An Unlikely Source of Legitimation for Political Violence, Dialogue 3, no. 2 (2005): 43–85. http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/3-2-4.pdf (accessed November 11, 2010); Leys, Market Driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest; Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999). 25.╯Walden Bello, “The Post-Washington Consensus: The Unraveling of a Doctrine of Development” (Focus on the Global South, October 18, 2008). http://focusweb.org/the-post-washington-dissensus.html?Itemid51 (accessed 200╇ ·â•‡ Notes to introduction November 11, 2010). See also Pedro-Palo Kuczynski and John Williamson, eds., After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Petersen Institute, 2003). 26.╯Mark Purcell, Empowering Democracy: Neoliberalization and the Struggle for Alternative Urban Futures (New York: Routledge, 2008); Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (New York: Verso, 2007); Jason Hackworth, The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology and Development in American Urbanism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007); McDonald, World City Syndrome; Helga Leinter, Jamie Peck, and Eric S.

In the year following the 9/11 attacks and preceding the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in August 2002, political and economic elites from British prime minister Tony Blair to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and World Bank head James Wolfensohn went so far as to draw attention to the relationships among poverty, terrorism, and global security, arguing that underdevelopment was in fact a security issue.15 In March of that year, reformed neoliberal crusader Jeffery Sachs observed: “The extreme poverty of the bottom billion is shocking, morally intolerable and dangerous—a breeding ground of disease, terrorism and violence.”16 Growing unease about the instability that underdevelopment generates suggests that the narrower definition of security has not passed quietly into history along with the Cold War. Rather, the global development agenda of the now post–Washington Consensus continues to be constrained by and articulated through the national security interests of powerful states and transnational interests of global capital. The “pragmatic” agenda of global governance that has resulted is what Canadian political scientist Robert Cox calls global poor relief and riot control, in which the production of security means attempts “to prevent the way in which societies have been evolving through globalisation from destabilising the central structures of globalisation.”17 The merging of security and development agendas under conditions of globalization leads to a knitting together of international bodies—from the UN to aid organizations, military establishments, NGOs, private security companies, and multinational corporations—into transnational networks of global governance administered primarily from the global North.18 According to Peter Wilkin, these governance networks are not geared toward the amelioration of social crisis, but rather are structures assembled for “containment and quarantine of the effects of global poverty, . . . for protecting states from the world’s most impoverished people.”19 Despite the celebration with which many of today’s proponents 10 ╇ ·â•‡ Introduction of globalization greeted the end of the Cold War, a decidedly pessimistic core exists at the center of new elite approaches to security and development.

Neoliberal principles of economic reform originally came to prominence through their application at the national level in the global South. Although change was already afoot in the nations and cities of the global North as well, it was the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s, and the intimately related prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, that first drew attention and notoriety to the ascent of neoliberalism as a global governance force.22 The requirements for installing this new governance regime were substantial, and their implementation often Introduction╇ ·â•‡ 11 necessitated significant restructuring of the state and the strict management of often intense political resistance to all or part of the project. Neoliberal restructuring thus was immediately politicized within the geopolitical contexts of the late Cold War and, eventually, post–Cold War globalization.

When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence by Stephen D. King

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, congestion charging, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, cross-subsidies, debt deflation, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, endowment effect, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, financial repression, floating exchange rates, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, joint-stock company, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, loss aversion, market clearing, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, New Urbanism, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, price mechanism, price stability, quantitative easing, railway mania, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Tobin tax, too big to fail, trade route, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population

The near-­term losses in Asia were, in many cases, far bigger than those seen in the West following its later financial crisis but, having been written off as hotbeds of crony capitalism and, thus, doomed to fail, Asian economies were able to bounce back in style. There was no Western-­style economic stagnation but, instead, a return to economic dynamism within just a handful of years. Yet the political response varied from nation to nation. In the early 1990s, Asian nations had increasingly adopted the so-­called ‘Washington Consensus’, broadly speaking a commitment to low inflation, conservative fiscal policies and open cross-­border capital markets. For a while, the policies seemed to work: Thailand, 192 4099.indd 192 29/03/13 2:23 PM From Economic Disappointment to Political Instability Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia all enjoyed rapid income gains thanks partly to heavy inflows of foreign financial investment. Indeed, the rest of the world was perfectly happy to buy into the Asian miracle (as, indeed, it later bought into the US housing miracle and the Greek government bond miracle).

Others followed suit: Indonesia down over 13 per cent, Malaysia down more than 7 per cent and Korea down almost 6 per cent. As this financial and economic tsunami took hold, it seemed as though the Asian miracle was now over. 193 4099.indd 193 29/03/13 2:23 PM When the Money Runs Out Then came the fallout and finger-­pointing. Western policy-­makers, unable to believe there was anything wrong with the Washington Consensus, laid the blame fairly and squarely on the frailties of the Asian economic model. US Federal Reserve Governor Roger Ferguson offered the following – in hindsight, remarkable – musings on the subject at hand in a speech given in March 1998: One of the most important elements . . . has been the weakness of the banking sector in most of these countries. The managers of banks had not developed appropriate procedures for evaluating and extending loans.

As a result, the economy slowly rebalanced away from growth led by domestic demand towards export-­led growth (a polite way of saying that Malaysian workers saw the fruits of their labours heading abroad rather than staying at home). And although the economy collapsed in 1998, it thereafter delivered year after year of rapid economic expansion, having adjusted to the new global economic reality. 198 4099.indd 198 29/03/13 2:23 PM From Economic Disappointment to Political Instability Mahathir was also, however, quick to turn economic convention on its head. The Washington Consensus demanded that countries should open their capital markets to international investors. Mahathir argued that this policy had contributed to the crisis. On 1 September 1998, Bank Negara – the Malaysian central bank – released a statement announcing the imposition of capital controls, giving those holding ringgit offshore a month to bring their money back home. Later that day, Mahathir gave an interview to the media where he explained that: where the ringgit’s value is in an unstable situation, business could not be continued in a way that would be profitable . . . when the ringgit’s value is brought down, our income will be reduced . . . we have to fix the ringgit permanently . . . the currency traders . . . make huge profits, while at the same time impoverishing a whole country, regions and peoples.

Rogue States by Noam Chomsky

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anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, capital controls, collective bargaining, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, declining real wages, deskilling, Edward Snowden, experimental subject, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, new economy, oil shock, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley, strikebreaker, structural adjustment programs, Tobin tax, union organizing, Washington Consensus

A week later, farmers blockaded a highway near the capital city of La Paz to protest the eradication of coca leaf, the only mode of survival left to them under the “reforms,” as actually implemented. Reporting on the protests over water prices and the eradication programs, the Financial Times observes that “the World Bank and the IMF saw Bolivia as something of a model,” one of the great success stories of the “Washington consensus,” but the April protests reveal that “the success of eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia has carried a high social cost.” The journal quotes a European diplomat in Bolivia who says that “until a couple of weeks ago, Bolivia was regarded as a success story”—by those who “regard” a country while disregarding its people. But now, he continues, “the international community has to recognize that the economic reforms have not really done anything to solve the growing problems of poverty”; they may well have deepened it.

The high-minded rhetoric at and about the Vienna conference was not besmirched by inquiry into the observance of the UD by its leading defenders.25 These matters were, however, raised in Vienna in a Public Hearing organized by NGOs. The contributions by activists, scholars, lawyers, and others from many countries reviewed “alarming evidence of massive human rights violations in every part of the world as a result of the policies of the international financial institutions,” the “Washington Consensus” among the leaders of the free world. This “neoliberal” consensus disguises what might be called “really existing free market doctrine”: market discipline is of great benefit to the weak and defenseless, though the rich and powerful must shelter under the wings of the nanny state. They must also be allowed to persist in “the sustained assault on [free trade] principle” that is deplored in a scholarly review of the post-1970 (“neoliberal”) period by GATT secretariat economist Patrick Low (now director of economic research for the World Trade Organization), who estimates the restrictive effects of Reaganite measures at about three times those of other leading industrial countries, as they “presided over the greatest swing toward protectionism since the 1930s,” shifting the US from “being the world’s champion of multilateral free trade to one of its leading challengers,” the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations commented in a review of the decade.26 It should be added that such analyses omit the major forms of market interference for the benefit of the rich: the transfer of public funds to advanced industry that underlies virtually every dynamic sector of the US economy, often under the guise of “defense.”

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions reports that “unions are being repressed across the world in more countries than ever before,” while “poverty and inequality have increased in the developing countries, which globalization has drawn into a downward spiral of ever-lower labor standards to attract investment and meet the demands of enterprises seeking a fast profit” as governments “bow to pressure from the financial markets rather than from their own electorates,” in accord with the “Washington consensus.”60 These are not the consequences of “economic laws” or what “the free market has decided, in its infinite but mysterious wisdom,”61 as commonly alleged. Rather, they are the results of deliberate policy choices under really existing free market doctrine, undertaken during a period of “capital’s clear subjugation of labor,” in the words of the business press.62 Contempt for the socioeconomic provisions of the UD is so deeply engrained that no departure from objectivity is sensed when a front-page story lauds Britain’s incoming Labor government for shifting the tax burden from “large businesses” to working people and the “middle class,” steps that “set Britain further apart from countries like Germany and France that are still struggling with pugnacious unions, restrictive investment climates, and expensive welfare benefits.”63 Industrial “countries” never struggle with starving children, huge profits, or rapid increases in CEO pay (under Thatcher, double that of second-place US);64 a reasonable stand under the “general tacit agreement” that the “country” equals “large businesses,” along with doctrinal conventions about the health of the economy—the latter a technical concept, only weakly correlated with the health of the population (economic, social, or even medical).


pages: 234 words: 63,149

Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World by Ian Bremmer

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airport security, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, BRICs, capital controls, clean water, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, global rebalancing, global supply chain, income inequality, informal economy, Julian Assange, labour mobility, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Nixon shock, nuclear winter, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, smart grid, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Stuxnet, trade route, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, Yom Kippur War

.* Then there is the International House of Pancakes, a chain of more than fifteen hundred restaurants whose global presence amounts to seventeen restaurants in Canada, twelve in Mexico, and two in Guatemala.9 Like IHOP and baseball’s Fall Classic, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both headquartered in Washington, D.C., clearly bear the “made in America” label. Some critics charge that by conditioning financial support to needy countries on adoption of democratic, free-market reforms—an agenda dubbed the “Washington Consensus”—these institutions exist mainly as tools of U.S. foreign policy.10 That’s a caricature, but beyond the succession of Western leaders who have run these organizations, no one can deny that the U.S. and European governments retain formal and informal powers within them that no longer reflect the size of their contribution to the global economy’s strength. These baked-in Western advantages are no accident.

MITI’s ranks supplied the country with many of its midcentury prime ministers. Japan’s rise also made clear once and for all that nothing barred ancient Eastern cultures from embracing Western capitalist values. As Japan grew stronger, many Americans began to view its rise as a threat to American hegemony. Yet unlike today’s China, Japan’s competitive edge flowed from a political and economic system in relative harmony with the Washington Consensus. By the 1970s, Western Europe and Japan were breaking free of postwar U.S. dominance, but political and economic values helped align their national interests. In 1975, the United States, Japan, Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy formed the G6 group of industrialized nations. A year later, Canada made it a G7. Whatever the economic and cultural rivalries within the group, common faith in free-market democracy and a collective fear of Soviet communism ensured a fundamental unity of purpose.

China has earned a lot of friends within cash-hungry governments in both the established and the emerging worlds, but it has little chance of capturing the hearts and minds of the people who live in these countries. The United States would also lack some of its advantages of the last century. Without the kind of unity imposed by the aftermath of World War II, there will not be a new Bretton Woods to align countries’ economic policies, no Washington Consensus that gives the United States global institutional dominance, no hunger in the rest of the world for U.S. exports or investment, and nothing like the ideological appeal that came from the thirst for democracy after years of fascist dictatorship or fear of a Soviet advance. To be sure, Cold War 2.0 is more likely to emerge than either the G2 or concert scenarios, but many factors limit the risk of a direct and destabilizing U.S.


pages: 823 words: 206,070

The Making of Global Capitalism by Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, airline deregulation, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Basel III, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, collective bargaining, continuous integration, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, dark matter, Deng Xiaoping, disintermediation, ending welfare as we know it, eurozone crisis, facts on the ground, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, financial intermediation, floating exchange rates, full employment, Gini coefficient, global value chain, guest worker program, Hyman Minsky, imperial preference, income inequality, inflation targeting, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, late capitalism, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, non-tariff barriers, Northern Rock, oil shock, precariat, price stability, quantitative easing, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, seigniorage, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, union organizing, very high income, Washington Consensus, Works Progress Administration, zero-coupon bond

The countries were Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong King, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand. 63 Christopher Rude, “The Role of Financial Discipline in Imperial Strategy,” Socialist Register 2005, London: Merlin, 2004, esp. pp. 90–1. 64 See Porter, Globalization and Finance, p. 64; and Bank of International Settlements, “Strengthening Banking Supervision Worldwide,” p. 4. 65 For a comprehensive analysis of the “new monetary policy consensus” that gave rise to the push for central bank independence and inflation-targeting regimes in developing countries, see the independent report for the UNDP by Alfredo Saad Filho, “Pro-Poor Monetary and Anti-Inflation Policies: Developing Alternatives to the New Monetary Policy Consensus,” Centre for Development Policy and Research Discussion Paper 2405, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2005. 66 Volcker and Gyohten, Changing Fortunes, p. 181. 67 Baker, Group of Seven, p. 79. 68 For an earlier discussion of this in the context of a critique of Robert Cox’s “outside-in” approach to the shift in the hierarchy of state apparatuses, see Panitch, “Globalization and the State.” 69 See John Williamson, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?,” speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 6, 2002; and “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” paper presented to the conference on From the Washington Consensus to a New Global Governance, Fundacion CIDOB, Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004, p. 7. 70 Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, p. 510. 71 Frieden, Banking on the World, p. 65. 72 Harold James, “From Grandmotherliness to Governance: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality,” Finance and Development, December 1998, p. 45. 73 Sarah.

The wide international range of US firms, as well as the relative size and importance of US markets, gave American state authorities “tremendous leverage in pressuring foreign firms and regulatory authorities” to adopt these rules and practices.1 But the inherent limits on the extraterritorial application of US law in a world of formally sovereign states also gave rise to extensive coordination of national regulations through international institutions like the newly created WTO, the World Bank, the Bank of International Settlements, and the IMF. The embrace of “structural adjustment” by so many states often depended on their desperation for emergency funds on the conditional terms of the “Washington Consensus.” Yet it was not amiss of James Boughton to point out that what was “included in that rubric was similar to the indigenous revolution or evolution in thinking in developed and developing countries” on the part of state elites as well as capitalist classes around the world.2 As we shall see, the interplay between “global norm making and national lawmaking” at the end of the twentieth century confirmed the extent to which the “spread of an international legal order with capitalism” still meant that “the power dynamics of political imperialism are embedded within the very juridical equality of sovereignty.”3 The Laws of Free Trade A key determinant of the realization of global capitalism at the end of the twentieth century was the capacity of the American state to maintain the postwar trajectory towards the liberalization of trade laws.

What it did mean was that the latter were increasingly likely to restructure themselves so that their representation of non-financial interests would be more attuned to making demands and policy proposals that conformed to the exigencies of fiscal and monetary discipline.68 This sort of discipline figured at the very top of the set of policies that John Williamson was referring to when he famously coined the term “Washington Consensus” in 1989 to capture the neoliberal interface between the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, on the one hand, and the IMF and World Bank on the other.69 And central bank independence became the institutional change that, more than any other, signaled a state’s readiness to embrace the “structural adjustment” required to ensure that this discipline was enforced against democratic pressures for social expenditure.


pages: 499 words: 152,156

Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China by Evan Osnos

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conceptual framework, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Brooks, Deng Xiaoping, East Village, financial independence, Gini coefficient, income inequality, indoor plumbing, land reform, Lao Tzu, low skilled workers, market fundamentalism, Mohammed Bouazizi, Plutocrats, plutocrats, rolodex, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, transcontinental railway, Washington Consensus, Xiaogang Anhui farmers, young professional

He published The China Miracle, a book coauthored with Fang Cai and Zhou Li that zeroed in on the disarray produced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and concluded, “The more radical the reform, the more violent will be the destructive social conflicts, and opposition to reform.” Lin promoted China’s “tinkering gradualist approach.” In a lecture at Cambridge University in the fall of 2007, he pointed to “the failure of the Washington Consensus reforms.” He joked that the shock therapy policies ordained by the IMF seemed more like “shock without therapy,” and were destined to lead to “economic chaos.” He reminded people that the proponents of the Washington Consensus had warned that China’s slow-reform approach would be, in his words, “the worst possible transition strategy,” doomed to “result in unavoidable economic collapse.” He had become China’s most prominent evangelist for its own story of prosperity. In November 2007, Lin received a phone call from the World Bank, which provides loans and expertise to combat poverty.

It had the makings of a paradox: the Party was sparking individual ambition and self-creation in one half of life and suppressing those tendencies in the other. As an economic strategy, the approach put China at odds with the dominant economists in the West who recommended that the collapsing Soviet bloc undertake “shock therapy”: cut spending, privatize state-owned companies, and open borders to foreign trade and investment, a recipe that became known as the Washington Consensus. In 1994, in a small office borrowed from the geography department at Peking University, Lin and four other economists founded the China Center for Economic Research, a think tank designed to attract foreign-trained Chinese scholars. He worked like a man possessed, often hunched over his desk until 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., and back the next morning by 8:00. Among colleagues, he was known as furiously driven and, on some level, unreachable.

I think we have to accept the possibility that China may become something close to a fully developed economic state without substantial political reform.” When World Bank officials visited Beijing to celebrate thirty years since China resumed its Bank membership, Zoellick praised China’s reductions in poverty and said, “We, and the world, have much to learn from this.” At the Bank, Lin churned out a series of papers intended to “revisit” the understanding of how poor countries get rich, much if it anathema to the Washington Consensus that prevailed in the 1990s. Writing with the Cameroonian economist Célestin Monga, he argued that governments must “regain center stage.” Industrial policy, in which governments seek to support certain sectors, known to critics as “picking winners,” has a bad name in the West, he said, and for good reason: it has failed far more often than it has succeeded. But he argued that the only thing worse was not having an industrial policy.


pages: 561 words: 87,892

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity by Stephen D. King

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Admiral Zheng, asset-backed security, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, low skilled workers, market clearing, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Naomi Klein, new economy, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, statistical model, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

Levy and Temin argue that the primary reason behind the shift in income distribution is the demise of institutions created during the Great Depression that were designed to spread the benefits of prosperity more widely. These included unions, centralized bargaining frameworks for businesses, workers and government and a protected minimum wage, all of which were dismantled as the economic failures of the 1970s gave way to the laissez-faire Washington Consensus of the 1980s and beyond. Perhaps not surprisingly, others have disputed these claims. For example, Stephen N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh suggest that institutional arrangements played only a minor role in the huge income gains for those in the top echelons of the earnings spectrum.7 They also dismiss so-called trade-based theories, which argue that higher incomes accrue to those who can exploit comparative advantage while lower incomes come to those in the wrong industries at the wrong time (‘it seems difficult for trade [theories] to explain the increase in the top end of venture capital investors, private equity investors and, particularly, lawyers and professional athletes’).

Now it is the world’s biggest consumer of metals and the second-biggest consumer of oil, other countries have a strong incentive to strike bilateral deals with this new economic behemoth, an economy that finds itself at the epicentre of expanding emerging-market-to-emerging-market trade. Fourth, even if China did nothing to promote the renminbi as an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency, the renminbi’s status could be elevated by default, merely as a result of growing disenchantment with the dollar. Fifth, many countries that tried but failed with the so-called Washington Consensus might now be content to build economic relationships with a country that at least offers an alternative to US economic hegemony.9 Sixth, and politically most interesting, China is now actively promoting the renminbi’s role as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar. Admittedly, it’s still early days. However, China has seen a blossoming of bilateral currency swap deals with, amongst others, Indonesia, Belarus and Argentina.

At a White House press conference on 16 September 2001, President Bush said, ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.’ See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. 6. Argentina fell into this trap: it devalued and defaulted to its foreign creditors in 2001. 7. At the time of writing, Google was attempting to do exactly that. 8. Source: Office of the Russian Prime Minister. 9. The Washington Consensus was a view driven by the idea that ‘the market knows best’ and was often imposed by the IMF and others on unsuspecting economies that simply couldn’t cope with liberalized markets and small government. Most obviously, it demanded aggressive fiscal consolidation. Funnily enough, this particular stricture has now been forgotten in the light of the huge increases in budget deficits which followed the 2007/8 credit crunch. 10.


pages: 391 words: 22,799

To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise by Bethany Moreton

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bretton Woods, Buckminster Fuller, collective bargaining, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, estate planning, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Frederick Winslow Taylor, George Gilder, global village, informal economy, invisible hand, market fundamentalism, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, prediction markets, price anchoring, Ralph Nader, RFID, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, walkable city, Washington Consensus, white flight, Whole Earth Catalog, Works Progress Administration

Asked about the lasting impact of his years in Arkansas, Díaz recalled, “I met Sam Walton twice in person and quickly came to learn that fiÂ�nanÂ�cial success and Christianity were perfectly compatible: being successful and humble, being loving and demanding, being competitive and caring for others—all of these were compatible.”1 Díaz’s Christian testimony—his inspirational biography of salvation, success, and humility—is the quiet back story of free trade in the Americas. The ofÂ�fiÂ�cial story focuses on the hemisphere’s “Washington Consensus,” the term applied by a corporate think tank in 1989 to a suite of economic reforms that would encourage “the magic of the market” as the basis for hemispheric relations. Backed by the lending muscle of the World Bank and promoted by conservative economists like Milton Friedman, these recommendations included privatizing state enterprises, flattening tax rates, liberalizing trade, and relaxing government regulation.2 Though their consequences were uniquely devastating in much of Latin America, these policies were part of the overall economic transformation evident in the rise of the Sun Belt.

In the United States as well as for its southern neighbors, the result was a new era of federal austerity in ev�ery realm but defense. Social programs were slashed, from education to infrastructure to public health, while military spending increased by almost 50 percent over the Reagan years. States like California and Texas with sig�nifi�cant defense industries received billions in contracts.3 The Washington Consensus, in other words, functioned as the hardware of economic restructuring in the Western hemisphere. At the same time, conservative Christians took up the cause of anticommunism in Central America with new fervor in the 1970s and 1980s. As the Reagan administration funded right-wing counterinsurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala and sought to overturn the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, it had no better stateside allies than religious conservatives.

The White House Office of Public Diplomacy, staffed by psychological warfare experts from the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinated a multimillion dollar PR campaign to “defin[e] the terms of public discussion on Central America policy.”4 Against this backdrop, the intersecting lives of a Nicaraguan student, an Oklahoma journalist, and an Arkansas merchant sketch a web of relationships between people and institutions that shadowed the Washington Consensus—a private-sector “Bentonville Consensus,” a software of globÂ�alÂ�iÂ�zaÂ�tion. Through a Walton Family Foundation program, this human network bridged the transition from the last Cold War proxy battles to the new frontier of hemispheric free trade in the 1990s. It was not part of the coordinated Christian and neoconservative campaign of direct aid to anticommunists, but rather a parallel incubator of promarket Christians.


pages: 414 words: 119,116

The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World by Michael Marmot

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active transport: walking or cycling, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Atul Gawande, Bonfire of the Vanities, Broken windows theory, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, Celtic Tiger, centre right, clean water, congestion charging, correlation does not imply causation, Doha Development Round, epigenetics, financial independence, future of work, Gini coefficient, Growth in a Time of Debt, illegal immigration, income inequality, Indoor air pollution, Kenneth Rogoff, Kibera, labour market flexibility, lump of labour, Mahatma Gandhi, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microcredit, New Urbanism, obamacare, paradox of thrift, race to the bottom, Rana Plaza, RAND corporation, road to serfdom, Simon Kuznets, Socratic dialogue, structural adjustment programs, the built environment, The Spirit Level, trickle-down economics, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working poor

The HDR for 2013 expands the insights of Drèze and Sen and identifies what it calls: unwelcome types of growth: jobless growth, which does not increase employment opportunities; ruthless growth, which is accompanied by rising inequality; voiceless growth, which denies the participation of the most vulnerable communities; rootless growth, which uses inappropriate models transplanted from elsewhere; and futureless growth, which is based on unbridled exploitation of environmental resources.17 The HDR contrasts the Washington Consensus, which argues for getting the economic fundamentals right, with UNDP’s own approach, which puts human development first. I love it. Of course I do. This UN agency says that improvement in poor people’s lives – and hence, their health – cannot be postponed while the economic fundamentals start to work. It is actually stronger than that. The Washington Consensus, neoliberalism by another name, is likely to make inequalities wider in addition to neglecting the need to build people’s capabilities and ensure their meaningful freedoms. Further, consistent with Joseph Stiglitz’s arguments outlined in Chapter 9, social protection and enhancing people’s capabilities are likely to be good for economic growth and economic productivity.

In their most recent, An Uncertain Glory, they write that when India began its economic reforms in the early 1990s it faced ‘two gigantic failures of economic governance. The first was a failure to tap the constructive role of the market.’ The second was a ‘resounding failure to harness the constructive role of the state for growth and development’.10 It could not be clearer: both markets and state institutions are vital. The critique of neoliberalism is correct. The idea that unbridled free markets in everything (the so-called Washington Consensus) is the way for countries to grow, develop and ensure better health and greater health equity is contradicted by the evidence. Equally, market dynamism is a route to greater productivity and economic growth. The question should no longer be capitalism or not, but what kind of capitalistic society do we want to have. LEARNING . . . from what is working Suspending ideological predispositions, as far as is possible, where could we find societies that combine economic success, a profitable private sector, a constructive role for the state, and a record of good health?

We now need to look at what can be done to improve governance at a global level so that effective action can be taken on the social determinants of health. In light of the experience in Europe with austerity we, the governance commission, went back to an older literature to look at the effect of IMF policies of structural adjustment in low-income countries. It does not make happy reading. In the 1980s the IMF made loans contingent on governments accepting IMF recommendations on how to manage the economy. It was mainstream Washington consensus: reduce public spending, markets as the default option for public services, economic deregulation, privatise public assets. We concluded: the effects of these programmes have been disastrous for public health . . . structural adjustment programmes undermined the health of poor people in sub-Saharan Africa through effects on employment, incomes, prices, public expenditure, taxation, and access to credit, which in turn translated into negative health outcomes through effects on food security, nutrition, living and working environments, access to health services, education.13 When discussing the battle between austerians and Keynesians I said that a key criterion should be impact on the lives people are able to lead.


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How to Run the World: Charting a Course to the Next Renaissance by Parag Khanna

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, back-to-the-land, bank run, blood diamonds, borderless world, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, carbon footprint, charter city, clean water, cleantech, cloud computing, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, don't be evil, double entry bookkeeping, energy security, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, friendly fire, global village, Google Earth, high net worth, index fund, informal economy, invisible hand, labour mobility, laissez-faire capitalism, Masdar, megacity, microcredit, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, out of africa, private military company, Productivity paradox, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Silicon Valley, smart grid, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, sustainable-tourism, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, The Wisdom of Crowds, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, X Prize

A former Mexican diplomat in London put it best: “If you’re not at the table, you’ll be on the menu.” Economic diplomacy is now a dizzying game of musical tables—with the fate of globalization hanging in the balance. The first global economy took shape during the Middle Ages, but it was one in which different regions had their own anchors and rules. Similarly, today there is no more free-market “Washington Consensus” to which the world’s economies subscribe. Instead, each is searching for ways to manage globalization to its benefit. Yet all seem to agree with the mantra that the world coming out of the financial crisis must be different from the world going in. For that to happen, however, the public and private sectors need a new kind of partnership: one fast enough to manage risks and progressive enough to benefit the masses.

Who Has the Money Makes the Rules At the World Economic Forum’s 2009 Davos meeting, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao succinctly articulated what became the dominant narrative of the global financial crisis, claiming it had its roots in an “unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption” and the “blind pursuit of profits.” What part of that do Washington and Wall Street not understand as they continue to demand higher consumption from Asians? Privatization and price liberalization—tenets of the Washington Consensus—have been steadily controlled by Asian governments ever since their late 1990s financial crisis. Indeed, the “global imbalances” that we constantly hear about are as much ideological as fiscal and monetary. The United States wants Asians to reverse an innate savings culture and more than a decade of insuring themselves against economic volatility by suddenly becoming voracious consumers.

Introduction to On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes: Classic Principles of Diplomacy and the Art of Negotiation by François de Callières. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. Hart, Stuart L. Capitalism at the Crossroads: Aligning Business, Earth, and Humanity. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Wharton School Publishing, 2007. Held, David. The Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew, eds. Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002. Henderson, David. Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility. London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 2001. Higgott, Richard A., Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, and Andreas Bieler, eds. Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System.


pages: 859 words: 204,092

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom by Martin Jacques

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Admiral Zheng, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, credit crunch, Dava Sobel, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, income per capita, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, land tenure, Malacca Straits, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, open economy, pension reform, price stability, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, spinning jenny, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, the scientific method, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Xiaogang Anhui farmers

(Britain’s GDP expanded at a shade over 2 per cent and the United States at slightly over 4.2 per cent per annum between 1820 and 1870, their fastest period of growth in the nineteenth century.)4 The result has been the rapid and progressive transformation of a region with a population of around 2 billion people, with poverty levels falling to less than a quarter by 2007 (compared with 29.5 per cent in 2006 and 69 per cent in 1990).5 The myth that it was impossible for latecomers to break into the club of advanced nations has been exploded. The Asian tigers have instead demonstrated that latecomers can enjoy major advantages: they can learn from the experience of others, draw on and apply existing technologies, leapfrog old technologies, use the latest know-how and play catch-up to great effect. Their economic approach, furthermore, has largely been homespun, owing relatively little to neo-liberalism or the Washington Consensus - the dominant Western ideology from the late seventies until the financial meltdown in 2008.6 Nor is their novelty confined to the economic sphere. The Asian tigers have given birth to a new kind of political governance, namely the developmental state, whose popular legitimacy rests not on democratic elections but the ability of the state to deliver continued economic growth.7 The rise of the Asian tigers, however, has an altogether more fundamental import.

The contrasting approach of China and Western nations towards Africa, and developing countries in general, has led to a discussion amongst Africans about a distinctive Chinese model of development, characterized by large-scale, state-led investments in infrastructure and support services, and aid which is less tied to the donor’s economic interests and less overwhelmingly focused on the extraction of minerals as in the case of the West.40 China’s phenomenal growth, together with the huge reduction in poverty there, has also provoked enormous interest in what lessons it might offer for other developing nations.41 An important characteristic of the Chinese model has been the idea of strong government and the eschewing of the notion of democracy, an approach which has an obvious appeal amongst the more authoritarian African governments. In the light of the country’s economic success, the Chinese approach to governance seems destined to enjoy a much wider influence and resonance in the developing world. The Chinese academic Zhang Wei-Wei has argued that the Chinese model combines a number of features. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, it rejects shock therapy and the big bang in favour of a process of gradual reform based on working through existing institutions. It is predicated upon a strong developmental state capable of steering and leading the process of reform. It involves a process of selective learning, or cultural borrowing: China has drawn on foreign ideas, including the neo-liberal American model, as well as many that have been home-grown.

Finally, it embraces sequencing and priorities, as evidenced, for example, by a commitment to economic reforms first and political ones later, or the priority given to reforms in the coastal provinces before those in the inland provinces.42 There has been considerable debate, in this context, about a Chinese model, sometimes described as the Beijing Consensus. There are certainly fundamental differences between the Chinese approach and the Washington Consensus, with the Chinese model both markedly less ideological and also distinctively pragmatic in the manner of the Asian tigers. It is still far too early to make any considered judgement about the likely long-term merits and demerits of China’s relationship with Africa.43 The experience has been brief and the literature remains thin. The most obvious danger for Africa lies in the fundamental inequality that exists at the heart of their relationship: China’s economy is far bigger and more advanced, the nearest economic challenger, South Africa, being diminutive in comparison, while the population of Africa as a whole is less than that of China’s.


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China into Africa: trade, aid, and influence by Robert I. Rotberg

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barriers to entry, BRICs, colonial rule, corporate governance, Deng Xiaoping, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, global supply chain, global value chain, income inequality, Khartoum Gordon, labour market flexibility, land reform, megacity, microcredit, offshore financial centre, out of africa, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, special economic zone, structural adjustment programs, trade route, Washington Consensus

Vigorous debate over appropriate development models consumed much intellectual and political energy in Africa through the 1970s and 1980s. Disillusionment induced by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and the seeming global triumph of the Washington Consensus led to a cessation of the debate in the 1990s. 13-7561-4 ch13.qxd 9/16/08 4:23 PM Page 288 288 ndubisi obiorah, darren kew, and yusuf tanko The ensuing period was characterized by structural adjustment, poverty reduction, and other economic reform programs imposed on African governments by Western donors and international finance institutions. Many Africans, including intellectuals and civil society actors, perceive that their governments’ adoption of the Washington Consensus has failed to deliver both bread and freedom. African rulers learned that they could successfully engage in a sleight of hand by adopting the barest minimum in political and economic reforms, which would permit bureaucracies to continue aid flows to their countries, while vigorously resisting substantive change.

Many in African intellectual and political circles are impressed by China’s seeming geometric economic progress since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms in China in the 1980s. This success, often attributed to China’s state-led development model, has rekindled the debate in Africa over appropriate paths to development and encouraged many Africans to look to East Asia for political and economic models. Many in Africa question the wisdom of remaining wedded to the Washington Consensus and ask if indeed bread does not count more than the vote, and if human rights and democracy are not really of secondary concern to attaining political stability and economic progress. The debate in Africa over the China model is not, however, based on a romantic vision. Admiration among the Nigerian media for China’s economic success is often balanced with acute recognition of its social costs and the lack of political freedoms.

-China Economic and Security Family Planning Association, 205; Review Commission, 181, 218 16-7561-4 index.qxd 9/16/08 4:25 PM Page 338 338 Index Value-added products, 99, 106–07 West Kordofan, Sudan, 178 Venezuela, 163 Whelan, Theresa, 168 Vietnam, 26, 71; foreign aid and, 198; White Nile River, 171 network trade and, 107 Whites, 260, 263 Vines, Alex, 40 Wolfowitz, Paul, 218, 302 Wood Mackenzie (analysts firm), 120 Wade, Abdoulaye, 75, 242 World Bank, 261; aid coordination and, WAHUM Fabrics, 291 303, 308; on China as creditor, 302; Wang Dongming, 240 Chinese foreign aid and, 208, 210, Wang Jiarui, 240 218; Eximbank and, 198; high pay- Wang Qiming, 35 ments and, 123; tripartite coopera- Warri, Nigeria, 281 tion and, 205; vs. China model, 288 Washington Consensus, 287–88 World Health Organization (WHO), Van der Wath, Kobus, 52 301 Websites, 219, 240; concessional loans World Trade Organization (WTO), 2, and, 219–20, 223, 226 51, 68, 213; China’s entry into, 58, 68 Wei Jianguo, 34 Wu Bangguo, 241–42 WEMPCO (Western Metal Products Wu Guanzheng, 24 Company), 291 Wu Xueqian, 28 Wen Jiabao, 120; foreign aid and, 209; visits to Africa by, 3, 51, 53 Xiamen, China, 138–40 Wenran Jiang, 13 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, West, 116–17, 213, 217–18, 243; African 12 resources and, 290; anticolonialism and, 231; arms transfers and, 163; Yangtze River Delta, 138 balance of power and, 273, 290; Yar’Adua, Umaru, 275 China as alternative to, 274, 287; on Youth militias, 261 China as creditor, 303; Chinese- African partnership and, 299; condi- Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), tional assistance and, 251; 27, 157–59; debt-equity swaps and, development model of, 287–88, 298; 205 human rights and, 263–64; image of, Zambia, 6, 11, 27–28, 56, 117; arms 305; imperialism and, 157; market transfers to, 163; China model and, reforms and, 234; military assistance 273; Copperbelt region, 143–44; crit- and, 159, 174; Nigeria and, 277; oil icism of China by, 301; development and, 109–11, 281, 305; oil strategy and, 146; elections in, 235; foreign and, 109–12; post-Cold War era and, aid and, 200; immigrant backlash in, 300; reforms and, 290–91; Sudan 272–73; infrastructure and, 74; and, 124–25; transparency and, 124; Kaunda and, 146; labor and, 122; Zimbabwe and, 261 military ties to, 155–56, 158, 161, West Africa, 100, 106; SEZs and, 148 173; mining in, 252; as recipient of Western Sahara: peacekeeping in, Chinese arms, 9–10; SEZs and, 6, 176–77 140; Tanzam Railway and, 147 16-7561-4 index.qxd 9/16/08 4:25 PM Page 339 Index 339 Zambia Privatization Agency, 147 culpability and, 252, 261–63, 264–66; Zanzibar, 158 conflict in, 308; Confucius Institutes Zhai Jun, 175, 306 in, 29, 78; corruption and, 301; dele- Zhao Ziyang, 28, 203–05; four princi- gations from, 242; human rights and, ples of, 26–27 14–15, 55, 251, 260–61; military Zhejiang Normal University, 29 assistance and, 159–61, 173–75; Zheng He, 116, 179–80 stability-building efforts in, 17; Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equip- trade with, 6, 55; visited by Chinese ment Company, 275 leaders, 28 Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Zimbabwe African National Union— Bureau, 179 Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 242, Zhou Enlai, 23, 146, 231; China’s oil 260–61 strategy and, 112; eight principles of, Zimbabwe African National Union 26–27; foreign aid and, 200 (ZANU), 156, 260 Zhu Di, 116 Zimbabwe African People’s Union Zhuhai, China, 138, 140 (ZAPU), 260 Zimbabwe, 3, 10, 69, 81, 156; antidemo- Zimbabwe Staff College, 175 cratic regimes in, 11–15, 37; arms Zoellick, Robert, 306–07 transfers and, 9–10, 163; Chinese ZTE Corporation, 167 16-7561-4 index.qxd 9/16/08 4:25 PM Page 340 Document Outline Table of Contents Preface Chapter 1: China's Quest for Resources, Opportunities, and Influence in Africa Chapter 2: China's New Policy toward Africa Chapter 3: China's Emerging Strategic Partnerships in Africa Chapter 4: Africa and China: Engaging Postcolonial Interdependencies Chapter 5: Chinese-African Trade and Investment Chapter 6: Searching for Oil Chapter 7: Special Economic Zones Chapter 8: Military and Security Relations Chapter 9: China's Foreign Aid in Africa Chapter 10: Chinese Concessional Loans Chapter 11: China's Political Outreach to Africa Chapter 12: China's Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa Chapter 13: "Peaceful Rise" and Human Rights Chapter 14: China's Renewed Partnership with Africa Contributors Index Table of Contents Partnerships in Africa


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The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future by Laurence C. Smith

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Bretton Woods, BRICs, clean water, Climategate, colonial rule, deglobalization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, energy security, flex fuel, global supply chain, Google Earth, guest worker program, Hans Island, hydrogen economy, ice-free Arctic, informal economy, invention of agriculture, invisible hand, land tenure, Martin Wolf, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, New Urbanism, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, purchasing power parity, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, side project, Silicon Valley, smart grid, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, trade route, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Y2K

.: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005). 28 From “Store Openings,” http://franchisor.ikea.com/ (accessed November 13, 2009). 29 P. 38, Steger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 30 For more on how the United States exported its business model to the world, see J. A. Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). 31 The Washington Consensus is attributed to John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think tank in Washington, D.C. (www.iie.com). Its policies have now been adopted by (or forced onto, depending on one’s point of view) many developing countries. Neoliberals praise these reforms, citing new markets and jobs for struggling people. Critics point to two-dollar-a-day wages while multinational corporations grow rich. The Washington Consensus and similar policies remain highly controversial. If you have any antiglobalization friends, mention it to them sometime and watch their mouths foam. 32 “Expanding trade and investment has been one of the highest priorities of my administration. . . .

The neoliberalism movement was championed by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. president Ronald Reagan, but was rooted in the ideas of Adam Smith. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the IMF, WTO, and World Bank aggressively pursued agendas of liberalizing (deregulating) trade markets around the world, vigorously urged on by the United States.30 A common tactic was to require developing countries to accept neoliberal reforms to qualify for IMF or World Bank loans. This practice was exemplified by the “Washington Consensus,” a controversial list of hard-nosed reforms including trade deregulation, opening to direct foreign investment, and privatization of state enterprises.31 In the United States, presidents from both political parties also worked to dismantle international trade barriers. Of particular importance to this book was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), proposed in 1991 by President George Herbert Walker Bush to remove trade barriers between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

Department of Energy U.S. Department of State U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Committee U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) U.S. Minerals and Management Service U.S. National Intelligence Council U.S. National Science Foundation Uzbekistan Vancouver, British Colombia Varlomov, Alexei Venezuela Verkhoyansk, Russia Vietnam Vikings volcanoes Volta River Vörösmarty, Charlie Walmart warfare Washington Consensus Water Follies (Glennon) water resources: and agriculture; aquifers; and climate change; crises related to; and drought; and energy consumption; export projects; and foreign policy; and global water stress; and groundwater pumping; and hydropower; importance of; and the Intertropical Convergence Zone; large water projects; measurement of; and population growth; and privatization; prospects for; and runoff; and sanitation; and snowpack and glaciers; and transboundary rivers; and urbanization; and virtual water trade WaterGAP Watt-Cloutier, Sheila weather patterns.


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The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World by Niall Ferguson

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Admiral Zheng, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, asset allocation, asset-backed security, Atahualpa, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Black Swan, Black-Scholes formula, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial exploitation, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, deglobalization, diversification, diversified portfolio, double entry bookkeeping, Edmond Halley, Edward Glaeser, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Fractional reserve banking, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, German hyperinflation, Hernando de Soto, high net worth, hindsight bias, Home mortgage interest deduction, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, interest rate swap, Isaac Newton, iterative process, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour mobility, London Interbank Offered Rate, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, pension reform, price anchoring, price stability, principal–agent problem, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit motive, quantitative hedge fund, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, seigniorage, short selling, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transaction costs, value at risk, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War

Indeed, there was arguably a Paris Consensus before there was a Washington Consensus (though in many ways it was building on a much earlier Bonn Consensus in favour of free capital markets).64 In London, too, Margaret Thatcher’s government pressed ahead with unilateral capital account liberalization without any prompting from the United States. Rather, it was the Reagan administration that followed Thatcher’s lead. Jaime Roldós Aguilera of Ecuador . . . . . . and Omar Torrijos of Panama: Allegedly victims of the ‘economic hit men’ Stiglitz’s biggest complaint against the IMF is that it responded the wrong way to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, lending a total of $95 billion to countries in difficulty, but attaching Washington Consensus-style conditions (higher interest rates, smaller government deficits) that actually served to worsen the crisis.

Yet the days had gone when investors could confidently expect their governments to send a gunboat when a foreign government misbehaved. Now the role of financial policing had to be played by two unarmed bankers, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Their new watch-word became ‘conditionality’: no reforms, no money. Their preferred mechanism was the structural adjustment programme. And the policies the debtor countries had to adopt became known as the Washington Consensus, a wish-list of ten economic policies that would have gladdened the heart of a British imperial administrator a hundred years before.bc Number one was to impose fiscal discipline to reduce or eliminate deficits. The tax base was to be broadened and tax rates lowered. The market was to set interest and exchange rates. Trade was be liberalized and so, crucially, were capital flows. Suddenly ‘hot’ money, which had been outlawed at Bretton Woods, was hot again.

violence, in absence of money 18-19 ‘virtual’ money see electronic money VOC (Dutch/United East India Company) 128-37 shares in 129-30 structure 128-9 volatility: alleged death of 6 projected return of 356 see also investors; stock markets Volcker, Paul 166 Voltaire 145 voting rights see electoral reform wage cuts 160 Wallace, Robert 190-95 Wall Street crash 158-63 war: and capitalist system 297-8 causing ‘bankruptcy of nations’ 297 and commodity markets and prices 10 conditions for 304 finance for 1 globalization and 338-40 and industrial change 348 and inflation see inflation and insurance see insurance and money 1 probabilities 183 and trade 134 war bonds 101-2 and welfare state 202-4 see also bonds and bond markets War Damage Corporation 206 War Loans 295 Washington, D.C. 306 Washington Consensus 308 Washington Mutual 266 Waterloo, Battle of 3 Watkins, Sherron 171-2 wealthy 26 weapons see arms; technological innovation; war weather: derivatives 227-8 extreme 6; see also disasters and stock markets 159 Webster, Alexander 190-95 welfare state 199-211 backlash against 215 dismantling of 211 and economy 209-11 and war see war Wellington, Duke of 80-1 Western Union 317 Westminster, Duke of 234 wheat prices see grain widows and orphans 192-4 William of Orange 75 Williamson, John 308n.


pages: 475 words: 149,310

Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire by Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri

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affirmative action, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, conceptual framework, David Graeber, Defenestration of Prague, deskilling, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, global village, Howard Rheingold, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, land tenure, late capitalism, means of production, Naomi Klein, new economy, private military company, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Richard Stallman, Slavoj Žižek, The Chicago School, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, transaction costs, union organizing, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

It dictates for ailing and poor economies a neoliberal formula that includes minimal spending on public welfare, privatization of public industry and wealth, and the reduction of public debt. This formula, which has come to be known as the “Washington Consensus,” has always been criticized from outside and also from within the supranational economic institutions. 89 Some object on economic grounds, for example, to the way that the policies have been applied as an invariable model in different countries without regard for national specificity and without accounting for the relationship between monetary policies and social dynamics. Others object more generally to the political agenda of the Washington Consensus model: a monetary policeman is never neutral and always supports a specific political regime. After the economic disasters in Southeast Asia in 1997 and Argentina in 2000, which have been largely blamed on the IMF, the model has been even more widely criticized.

On the functioning of law firms in international commerce, see Yves Dezalay, “Multinationales de l’expertise et “dépérissement de l’Etat,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, no. 96-97 (March 1993): 3-20; Marchands de droit: La restructuration de l’ordre juridique international par les multinationales du droit (Paris: Fayard, 1992); and (with Bryant Garth), Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 86 On the concept of “complex sovereignty,” see Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 425-55. 87 For IMF voting power figures, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. 88 For an interesting view into the culture of the IMF from a sympathetic and well-informed journalist, see Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 89 For Joseph Stiglitz’s speeches about the Washington Consensus, see Ha-Joon Chang, ed., Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank: The Rebel Within (London: Anthem, 2001); and, more generally, Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 2002). See also Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, “Le ‘Washington Consensus’: Contribution à une sociologie de l’hégémonie du neoliberisme,” Actes de la Recherches en Sciences Sociales, no. 121-22 (March 1998): 3-22. 90 For a detailed history of the World Bank, see Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half Century, vol. 1: History (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997). 91 On scarcity and immaterial property, see Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures (London: Routledge, 2000), 45. 92 See Donna Haraway, Modest Witness @ Second Millennium (New York: Routledge, 1997), 79-85. 93Diamond v.


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The New Economics: A Bigger Picture by David Boyle, Andrew Simms

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Asian financial crisis, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, capital controls, carbon footprint, clean water, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, Community Supported Agriculture, congestion charging, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, delayed gratification, deskilling, en.wikipedia.org, energy transition, financial deregulation, financial innovation, full employment, garden city movement, happiness index / gross national happiness, if you build it, they will come, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, land reform, loss aversion, microcredit, Mikhail Gorbachev, mortgage debt, neoliberal agenda, new economy, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, peak oil, pensions crisis, profit motive, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ronald Reagan, seigniorage, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working-age population

If you helped some people get rich, then they would spend more and it would trickle down through the economy to the poorest. It survives to this day in most of the assumptions of mainstream regeneration and economic development, though it is even more obvious now than it was to Carville that wealth doesn’t trickle down, it floods up. In fact, of course, the great days of trickle down economics were still to come. Every government conditioned by the so-called Washington Consensus, as well as the all-powerful International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, believed that cutting taxes would in the end stimulate the economy, and – to start with – it did. But in the constant failure of regeneration, redistribution and community revitalization, it was increasingly obvious to most people outside that consensus that trickle down simply did not work. This was an era dominated by the set of policies that became known as ‘neoliberal’, though they bore no relation to any liberalism worthy of the name.

It was more accurately an application of Darwin’s evolutionary theories to economics: a kind of survival of the economically fittest. But their interpretation of the ‘fit’ – the marketable, the profitable, the global – was not only a misreading of Darwin, but deeply inadequate. The financially ‘fit’ survived; those that did not fit into the shape of the new world, people, communities and nations, were bled dry. The Washington Consensus built a devastating machine that could bear no variation, and it assumed a kind of adolescent approach to morality by business, as if it were somehow exempt in the sacred duty of creating wealth. The corporate pioneer John D. Rockefeller once boasted that he was quite willing to pay someone a salary of a million dollars if he were brutal enough. ‘He must be able to glide over every moral restraint with almost childlike disregard,’ he wrote, ‘and has, besides other positive qualities, no scruples whatsoever and be ready to kill off thousands of victims – without a murmur.’19 If you pretend that business is beyond morality, that is unfortunately the kind of business you get.

(Ernst Friedrich, ‘Fritz’) 1, 18, 21–2, 27, 114, 117 SDRs (special drawing rights) 147–8 Seattle (Washington) 41 seeds 91, 117, 119, 140, 141 seigniorage 58–9 Sen, Amartya 12 SERs (special emission rights) 148 set prices 80 sharing 34, 44, 91, 119, 140 shopping 26, 80, 82–3, 104, 105, 125, 133 shops 20 local 75, 80, 82–3, 104, 105, 124, 124–5, 126, 151 see also out-of-town retailing; supermarkets short-termism 11, 13, 14–15 SIVs (structured investment vehicles) 1, 5–6, 6 skills 13, 60, 98, 100, 101, 105, 132 190 THE NEW ECONOMICS Slow Food 118, 119–20 Small is Beautiful (Schumacher, 1977) 1, 21 small islands 31–2, 33–4 small-scale banks 146 Smith, Adam 89 social auditing 26, 45, 153–4 social banks 144, 146 social capital 19, 33, 54–5, 86–7, 89, 126–7, 132 Wal-mart and 124–5 social credit 19, 58, 59, 90 social networks 36, 127, 132 social norms 67–8, 71 social relationships 34, 45 social return on investment (SROI) 45 Soros, George 51, 148 South Africa 136 South African New Economics (Sane) 58 South Shore Bank (Chicago) 144 sovereignty 55, 113 special drawing rights (SDRs) 147–8 special emission rights (SERs) 148 speculation 22, 53, 81, 82, 84, 146, 158 deterring 51–2, 60, 61 financial 7, 15, 50–1, 51–2, 61 spirituality 4–5, 18, 21–2, 75, 79, 81 SROI (social return on investment) 45 Stamp Out Poverty 61 Starkey, Richard 118 state 12–13, 28, 155 see also governments steady-state economy 43, 44 Stern Report (Stern, 2006) 155 Stiglitz, Joseph 61 stress 4, 35, 37, 83 structured investment vehicles see SIVs sub-prime loans 1, 5–7, 144 sub-Saharan Africa 82 ‘subsidiarity’ 117 subsidies 11, 82, 112, 113, 117, 119, 123–4 success 79–80, 89 measuring 2, 8, 10, 43, 44, 55, 154, 156, 158 suicides 83, 91, 140 super rich 120, 141, 142 supermarkets 80, 85, 90, 104, 105, 123–6, 129 sustainability 24, 73, 89, 113, 114, 116, 117 sustainable development 51–2, 61 Swann, Bob 120, 151 Sweden 102 Swift, Jonathan 18 Switzerland 52, 62 T-bills (Treasury bills) 49–50, 58 takeovers 84, 142, 143 talent system 58 targets 9, 41, 129 tariffs 113 tax havens 15, 52–3, 53, 61, 136, 157 Tax Justice Network 136–7 taxation 73, 92, 116 taxes 10, 15, 27, 32, 43, 62, 136–7 paid by corporations 52, 61, 137, 157 TB (tuberculosis) 130, 148 TEQs (tradeable energy quotas) 117–18 terra (currency) 56, 61, 120 Tesco 85, 116, 125 Thatcher, Margaret 21, 22, 23, 27 The Other Economic Summit see TOES Thoreau, Henry David 69 time 44, 45–6, 60, 103, 132 time banks 58, 59, 60, 89, 92, 123, 131, 132 Titmuss, Richard 65, 70 Tobin, James 51–2 Tobin Levy 51–2, 61 TOES (The Other Economic Summit) 23–5 Toffler, Alvin 88 trade 25, 81, 109–10, 111–15, 116, 148, 158 fair trade 26, 119, 145, 153 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property see TRIPS tradeable energy quotas (TEQs) 117–18 traffic speed 65–6, 74 transport 67, 74, 112, 115 see also public transport Treasury bills (T-bills) 49–50, 58 INDEX trickle down 27–8, 39–40, 138 ‘doesn’t work’ 27, 52, 104 TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) agreement (1995) 113, 117 tuberculosis (TB) 130, 148 Turning Point network 23 UK (United Kingdom) 4, 39, 55, 61, 70, 85, 119, 145 aid from 136 corporation tax gap 137 cultural enrichment 111 debt 83, 141 Ecological Debt Day 114 energy 102, 114 food production 96, 114 Happy Planet Index 32 ‘illth’ 4, 35 interest rates 144–5 local savings schemes 61 money deposits 136 orchard loss 111, 112, 115, 124 poverty 82 real costs of road transport 115 super-casinos 14 trade 112, 113 well-being 4, 35–6, 41, 68 working hours 68 young people in 35–6 see also house prices Ukraine 110 UN (United Nations) 39, 51–2, 60, 91, 110–11, 157 unemployment 44, 46, 55–6, 91–2, 157 unpaid work 87–9 Unto This Last (Ruskin, 1860) 18, 29 USA (United States) 39, 57, 61, 82, 113, 119, 127, 157 and Cuba 95 debt 49–50, 84, 141 Happy Planet Index 32 invasion of Iraq (2003) 49, 60 subsidies 11, 113 trade deficit 50 191 unemployment 55 well-being deteriorating 41, 68 usury 80, 81, 144–5 value 44, 98, 99 measuring 10, 15, 29, 53, 59, 115 values 11, 71, 115, 127 Vanuatu 31–2, 35, 42 Vaxjo (Sweden) 102 vegetable box schemes 104 ‘victory gardening movement’ 96 Virgil, Eclogues 110 voluntary sector 13, 87, 132, 145 voting 124–5, 127 Wal-mart 104, 123, 124–5 Wall Street Crash (1929) 1, 51, 90 Waring, Marilyn 38–9 Washington Consensus 27–8 waste 97, 100–1, 158 Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive see WEEE directive wealth 18, 28, 38, 41–2, 52, 89, 141–2, 152 defining 18–19, 32, 34, 35, 38 and ‘illth’ 29, 35–6 local 14, 53–4 measuring 32, 36–40, 53–4, 143 money and 19, 32, 38, 78, 143 new economics and 3, 15, 35, 37 real 2, 32, 37–40 see also Happy Planet Index WEDGE project 23 WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment) directive 98, 100, 101 welfare 25, 28, 44, 127, 129, 153 Welfare State 19, 129 well-being 4–5, 25, 45–6, 99, 158 demand for 4–5, 11, 68–9 falls in 4, 37, 41, 68, 78 GDP and 4, 36, 37 measuring 4, 18, 32–3, 34, 43 money and 18, 21, 81 as motivation 4–5, 11, 68–9, 72 new economics and 41–7, 68–9 192 THE NEW ECONOMICS origins of 43 willingness to pay 99 Willington, Sally 23 Wir currency 62 Witt, Susan 151 Woking (Surrey) 102–3 women 38–9, 77–8, 79, 83, 144 work 24, 45, 81, 84–5, 86–7, 92 concept of 25, 83, 86, 87–9 to pay mortgages 46, 68, 73, 77–8, 79, 81, 83, 84, 89, 126–7, 140 of women 38–9, 77–8, 83 working hours 45–6, 78, 79, 83, 92 World Bank 27, 81, 82, 91, 137, 139, 143, 147 Yank Tanks (film, Schendel, 2002) 95 young people, UK 35–6 youth courts 129, 132 Yunus, Mohammed 143–4 Zimbabwe 32 Zurich (Switzerland) 66


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The Post-American World: Release 2.0 by Fareed Zakaria

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affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, airport security, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, centre right, collapse of Lehman Brothers, conceptual framework, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, delayed gratification, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, interest rate derivative, knowledge economy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, mutually assured destruction, new economy, oil shock, open economy, out of africa, postindustrial economy, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, Washington Consensus, working-age population, young professional

Before 2008, whatever people thought of American foreign policy, they all agreed that the United States had the most modern, sophisticated, and productive economy in the world—with the most advanced capital markets. As a result, it held hegemony not just in military power and diplomacy but in the realm of ideas. Central bankers and treasury ministers around the world studied the basics of their profession at American schools. Politicians developed their economies by following the advice prescribed by the Washington consensus. The innovations of Silicon Valley were the envy of the world. New York’s deep, lucrative capital markets were admired and imitated on every continent except Antarctica. As Brad Setser, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has noted, globalization after World War II was almost synonymous with Americanization. “Foreign borrowers looking to raise funds tended to issue bonds denominated in dollars, made use of New York law, and met the Securities and Exchange Commission’s standards for disclosure,” he writes.

When I have put the same question to Indian or Latin American officials, they launch into complicated explanations of the need for rural welfare, subsidies for poor farmers, and other such programs, all designed to slow down market forces and retard the historical—and often painful—process of market-driven industrialization. But Beijing’s approach has also been different from that advocated by many free-market economists—a program of simultaneous reforms on all fronts that is sometimes called the “Washington consensus.” Most significantly, it is different from Russia’s shock therapy approach under Boris Yeltsin, which Chinese leaders studied carefully and often cite as a negative example, probably agreeing with Strobe Talbot’s pithy description when he served in the Clinton administration: “Too much shock, too little therapy.” Rather than a big bang, Beijing chose an incremental approach, one that I would call a grow-the-denominator strategy.

Information Services, 271 Uttar Pradesh, 179 Uzbekistan, 54 Valentine’s Day, 88 Vedrine, Hubert, 246 Véliz, Claudio, 187 Venezuela, 6, 19, 31, 55, 190, 194n venture capital, 201–2 Vesalius, Andreas, 68 Victoria, Queen of England, 184–85 Vietnam, 20, 133–34, 143, 157, 199, 252, 281, 284 Vietnam War, 20, 199, 252, 284 Vijayanagar, 67 visas, travel, 280 Voice of America, 96 Volcker, Paul, 25 Voltaire, 123 wage levels, 67, 206, 207, 229, 282 Wahhabism, 12 Wall Street Journal, 209 Walmart, 104, 281 warfare, 69, 73, 76, 85–86 War of 1812, 194 war on terror, 29, 241, 264, 269, 272–73, 276–80 “Washington consensus,” 107 Washington Post, 30, 211 Watergate scandal, 284 water supplies, 33 wealth, 65–67, 70n, 75, 76, 93–94, 151–52, 215–16 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 17, 250 Weber, Steven, 38 WEF Competitiveness Index, 212–13 Welch, Jack, 228 Weller, Robert, 126 Wen Jiabao, 114, 119, 134, 135 Western culture, 1–5, 15, 38, 41, 62–99, 126–27 wheat prices, 21, 31, 67 Whelan, Theresa, 270 Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, 186n Wilson, Woodrow, 182 Wohlforth, William, 257 Wolf, Martin, 139, 232 women’s rights, 88–89, 93, 157–58, 160–61 working class, 216 World Bank, 24, 41, 55, 130 World Economic Forum, 146–47, 200, 212–13 World Economy, The: A Millennial Perspective, (Maddison), 66n World Trade Organization (WTO), 5, 27, 108, 137 World War I, 162, 190, 191, 195, 253 World War II, 20, 36–38, 40, 101, 134–35, 195–97, 253, 254, 256, 284 Wu Jianmin, 118, 128 Xinghai Fang, 118–19 Yalta Conference (1945), 196, 254 Yangtze River, 71, 111 Yeltsin, Boris, 107 yen, value of, 282 Youth (Conrad), 85 Yugoslavia, 10, 245 yutori kyoiku (relaxed education), 212 Yu Yongding, 49 Zambezi, 80 Zarqawi, Abu Mussab al-, 12 Zawahiri, Ayman, 13, 15 Zenawi, Meles, 130 Zheng Bijian, 119 Zheng He, 62–64, 70, 71, 77 Zimbabwe, 26, 130 * Even if an attack were to take place tomorrow, the fact that, for nine years, Al Qaeda Central has been unable to organize one explosion anywhere is surely worth noting


pages: 606 words: 87,358

The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization by Richard Baldwin

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3D printing, additive manufacturing, Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, air freight, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, Branko Milanovic, buy low sell high, call centre, Columbian Exchange, Commodity Super-Cycle, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, domestication of the camel, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, financial intermediation, George Gilder, global supply chain, global value chain, Henri Poincaré, imperial preference, industrial robot, invention of agriculture, invention of the telegraph, investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, Islamic Golden Age, James Dyson, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Lao Tzu, low skilled workers, market fragmentation, New Economic Geography, out of africa, paper trading, Pax Mongolica, profit motive, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, Second Machine Age, Simon Kuznets, Skype, Snapchat, Stephen Hawking, telepresence, telerobotics, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, trade route, Washington Consensus

He continues: “In most versions of high development theory, the self-reinforcement came from an interaction between economies of scale at the level of the individual producer and the size of the market.”3 The job of policymakers was to get the virtuous circle spinning. In the first wave of thinking, the standard way of implementing this “big push” was to reserve the local market to local productions by raising import tariffs sky-high. This was called the “import substitution industrialization” strategy. Its widespread failure was brought home by the 1980s debt crises. A second wave of theories, called the “Washington Consensus,” embraced the same virtuous cycle groundwork but relied more on free markets as the cycle starter. By the time Lindauer and Pritchett penned their piece, enthusiasm for the second wave had gone flat. Many tried it but few succeeded. Worse yet, the success stories seemed to defy the thinking. The roaring success of Asia, especially China, was something Lindauer and Pritchett called “puzzling.”

See agriculture and food foreign direct investment (FDI) , 102–103, 239, 249, 250. See also bilateral investment treaties (BTIs) The Foundations of Science (Poincaré), 281 fractionalization (fragmentation) of production, 137, 142, 168, 175–176, 196–206, 203f, 231, 232, 290, 291 France, 188. See also Europe; G7 Frantz, Brian, 49 free trade, 101, 125, 129, 161, 166, 190–191, 193–196, 194f, 209. See also GATT; liberal policies; Washington Consensus Friedman, Thomas, 142 Fujita, Masahisa, 127, 179 future (third unbundling), 8–10, 281–301 G7/global North/developed nations, 5–7; agglomeration and, 129, 188; BITs and, 104; communication and, 286–287; domestic value-added in export growth by sector 1994-2008, 94f, 95, 96; exports and, 151–154, 153f; GATT and, 101; global GDP share and, 48f, 81f, 89–, 92f, 93, 186; global income share of 1500-2020, 2f–3; Great Convergence and, 136; ICT/comparative advantage and, 139, 144; ideas and, 124; income divergence and, 57, 59; industrial clustering and, 124; industrialization and, 5, 55–56, 59–60, 60f, 61, 109; manufacturing and, 3f, 86–87, 88f, 89, 90f, 91, 133; national vs. corporate interest and, 169–170; New Globalization and, 12, 110, 143–144, 163f; New Globalization policies and, 225–241; Old Globalization (first unbundling) and, 78, 123; people-moving costs and, 7; servicification and, 155, 156–160; skilled workers and, 205; social policies and, 240; tariffs and, 72f, 100f, 101; trade with developing nations, 161; transfer of knowledge and, 175; urbanization and, 63; workers and, 13, 162, 165, 166, 168.

-Canada Auto Pact (1965), 150–151 Valeo, 202 value-added, 158f, 159 value chains, 157. See also global value chains (GVCs) Van Reenen, John, 200 Venables, Tony, 127, 179, 195, 208–211 Venezuela, 95. See also Latin America; R11 (Rising Eleven) Versailles Treaty, 64 Vietnamese case studies, 262, 270, 275–276 Vietnamese case study, 145–146 virtual presence, 98 visas, 239, 240 wages, 8, 12–13, 186–187, 201–202, 232, 290, 292 Wallerstien, Immanuel, 208 Washington Consensus, 244 water transport, inland, 49 The Wealth of Nations (Smith), 39, 40, 198–199 Weinberg, Gerhard, 66 “What’s the Big Idea? The Third Generation of Policies for Economic Growth” (Lindauer and Pritchett), 243, 244 “When Did Globalization Begin?” (O’Rourke and Williamson), 53 “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization” (Samuelson), 147–148 Why the West Rules—For Now (Morris), 25 Williamson, Jeff, 5, 53 Wilson, Charles Erwin, 169–170 Wilson, Woodrow, 64 Winkler, Deborah, 272 wire harnesses examples, 79, 260, 261, 270 workers and jobs: cities and, 235; future and, 164–165, 284–285, 294–295; global value chains and, 230–231; manufacturing and, 232–234; New Globalization (second unbundling) and, 162, 164–170, 166f, 175, 176, 225, 236; Old/New Globalization compared, 166f–169; textile-mill, 236–237.

What We Say Goes: Conversations on U.S. Power in a Changing World by Noam Chomsky, David Barsamian

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banking crisis, British Empire, Doomsday Clock, failed state, feminist movement, Howard Zinn, informal economy, microcredit, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Thomas L Friedman, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus

The economic policies he supports have been a disaster for most of the global south. If you take a look at the last twenty-five years, growth rates have sharply declined in countries that have adopted the policies he loves. The countries that have done very well—China, South Korea, Taiwan—have done so by violating the rules that Friedman advocates. These countries radically violated International Monetary Fund and World Bank rules—the Washington consensus, which he praises—and they grew. On the other hand, the countries that observed neoliberal rules rigorously had an extremely sharp decline in economic growth and just about every other macroeconomic measure. In fact, the United States doesn’t follow the rules that it imposes on others. During the last twenty-five years, to the extent that there has been a limited imposition of neoliberalism in the United States, it’s been the worst prolonged period in U.S. economic history.

The countries in Latin America and southern Africa that adhered to the rules, on the other hand, are the worst disasters. These figures are muddled in the pronouncements by the World Bank and by many economists who argue that growth has really improved greatly and poverty has been reduced by neoliberal rules. The way they get these results is by mixing together two quite different things: one is export orientation and the other is following the Washington consensus, the neoliberal rules. So China, which has a population of one billion people, has been dedicated to export promotion but has also violated the neoliberal rules. If you muddle all of this together, you can say, “Well, the neoliberal rules work because a billion Chinese had a high growth rate,” forgetting that they had a high growth rate by violating the neoliberal rules. This kind of deception is going on all the time.

Interventions by Noam Chomsky

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Albert Einstein, Ayatollah Khomeini, cuban missile crisis, energy security, facts on the ground, failed state, Monroe Doctrine, nuremberg principles, Ralph Nader, Thorstein Veblen, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, éminence grise

Those who agree with Lutzenberger’s conclusion face a clear and important task. If a perfectly logical argument leads to a totally insane conclusion, then the problem must lie with the premises, in particular, the rejection of “moral reasons” or “social concerns.” Then follows another task, if Summers is right that such a move can be used against all World Bank proposals for “liberalization”—that is, implementation of the “Washington consensus.” The conclusion seems obvious without spelling it out. It is perhaps of some interest that this reasoning, hardly more than elementary logic, appears to have been ignored within mainstream opinion, neither refuted nor pursued. The modern standard for such questions is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Article 25 declares, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”

They have sought to construct democratic systems based on popular participation rather than elite and foreign domination. A persuasive explanation for the decline of faith in existing democratic institutions has been offered by Argentine political scientist Atilio Borón, who observed that the new wave of democratization in Latin America coincided with externally mandated economic “reforms” that undermine effective democracy: the neoliberal “Washington consensus,” virtually every element of which undermines democracy, and which has also led to economic disaster in Latin America, as in other regions that rigorously followed the rules. The concepts of democracy and development are closely related in many respects. One is that they have a common enemy: loss of sovereignty. In a world of nation-states, it is true by definition that decline of sovereignty entails decline of democracy, and decline in ability to conduct social and economic policy.


pages: 851 words: 247,711

The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War by Norman Stone

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, British Empire, central bank independence, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, illegal immigration, income per capita, interchangeable parts, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, new economy, North Sea oil, oil shock, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, Steve Jobs, strikebreaker, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, V2 rocket, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War, éminence grise

But that meant far deeper changes: the Bank of France (and the nationalized banks in general) must not go on giving preferential medium-term credit at low interest rates for industry and housing; the Treasury should just take money from the market, now that one existed. The Rueff reform took a line in financial stabilization that has been familiar since 1923, when Dr Hjalmar Schacht took it in Germany; budget decreases, tax increases, a liberalization of foreign trade and a devaluation of 15.45 per cent. It is political arithmetic, dressed up, and is currently called the ‘Washington consensus’. But the whole was accompanied by a measure that caught the world’s attention - introduction of the ‘heavy franc’, at 100 to one. Now, with a money that could be converted at will, producers were to be stimulated by competition, and this indeed was to happen: France created some world-class industrial concerns in a short time. The five socialists wanted to resign, but de Gaulle browbeat Guy Mollet into staying on patriotic grounds.

By now, ideas of radical change were in the air: otherwise, the Western world would be in thrall to the Arabs, and the Soviet Union, with its vast oil revenues, would predominate. A declaration promising exchange rate stability and restored trade was made; beyond that - a sign of what was to come - the International Monetary Fund was invoked, and at last given a true world role. This was the start of the celebrated formula, the ‘Washington Consensus’, in effect shaped by the USA. It amounted to a recognition that the post-war order, with reference in effect to John Maynard Keynes and Bretton Woods in 1944, had failed. There must be liberalization. The problem of inflation was worldwide, but it was worst in the Atlantic countries. The USA, after the Nixon crash, was in poor shape and needed the formula itself, as the dollar went down.

The only hitch was that the central television aerial could not, for some time, be made to work - the signal to the units to move. The general made his broadcast, on lines by now somewhat traditional, but this time the generals had learned: they did indeed promise a return of democracy, but not at once. Parties were banned. But Turgut Özal went ahead with the IMF programme of 24 January. As was already happening with Pinochet, this was ‘the Washington consensus’ in action, and it was to work remarkably well. 24 The Eighties The 1980s have entered history, in much the same way as the twenties or the sixties or for that matter, before them, the fin-de-siècle nineties have done. Pinning down such things is not possible: pedantic historians can even claim that such decade moments do not exist. They do. Perhaps this is just a matter of technology: bikes, typewriters, telephones; the motor car; the Pill.


pages: 232 words: 77,956

Private Island: Why Britain Now Belongs to Someone Else by James Meek

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, business continuity plan, call centre, clean water, Deng Xiaoping, Etonian, HESCO bastion, housing crisis, illegal immigration, Martin Wolf, medical bankruptcy, Mikhail Gorbachev, post-industrial society, pre–internet, price mechanism, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Skype, sovereign wealth fund, Washington Consensus, working poor

In Kuwait at the beginning of the year I saw experienced British war correspondents squabble for reporting billets among the frontline troops with the ferocity of those who believe something is being offered for the last time; we thought British and American armies might never fight another war. Few doubted Saddam would be beaten, and he was. That November, as I drove off the ferry at Ostend, heading east, it seemed a racing, expanding tide of victorious free marketism flickered at my wheels, a tide that has gone by many names – consumer capitalism, Reaganism, Thatcherism, neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus. Though the watchtowers still stood at the old border between two Germanys, the border was gone. In eastern Germany, the narrow cobbled streets of medieval towns had jammed solid with second hand cars. I passed a field where an impatient western German DIY chain, unwilling to wait for steel and breeze blocks, had erected a vast, circular retail marquee, blazing with lights. The canvas superstore seemed to have landed, like a spacecraft from a flashier civilisation, come down to offer shrink-wrapped packs of rawl plugs and a choice of bathroom fittings.

They seemed to believe, or talked, made speeches, wrote papers as if they believed, that the entire structure of their own wealthy modern societies – the roads, the electricity grids, the railways, the water and sewage systems, the universal postal services, the telecoms networks, housing, education and health care – had been brought into being by individual entrepreneurs driven by desire for gain, with the occasional lump of charity thrown in, and that a bloated, parasitical state had come shambling onto the scene, seizing assets and demanding free stuff for its shirker buddies. I don’t want to absolve the Russians or Ukrainians of responsibility for their handling of the aftermath of communism, but the template they were handed by the fraternity of the Washington Consensus was based on fake history. If this is what the triumphalists of Wall Street and the City of London told the Russians about the way of the capitalist world, I thought when I moved back to Britain in 1999, what have they been telling us? And what came of it? When Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives came to power in Britain in 1979, much of the economy, and almost all its infrastructure, was in state hands.


pages: 193 words: 63,618

The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich by Ndongo Sylla

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British Empire, carbon footprint, corporate social responsibility, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Doha Development Round, Food sovereignty, global value chain, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, market fundamentalism, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, Naomi Klein, non-tariff barriers, offshore financial centre, open economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus

On the other hand, he argues, it is undeniable that the developing countries that most benefited from the gains of globalisation are those that introduced heterodox and gradualist economic policies in their approaches towards economic openness. Still, according to him, empirical data also showed that the vast majority of developing countries which, in recent history, followed the neoliberal orthodoxy, the notorious ‘Washington Consensus’, have had disastrous economic performances (see Box 3.2). In other words, neoliberal criticism of Fair Trade is rather weak from a logical point of view. On the one hand, it cannot attack consumer choices without contradicting its support of the sacred principle of individual freedom. On the other, it cannot argue that it represents a better economic 73 Sylla T02779 01 text 73 28/11/2013 13:04 the fair trade scandal alternative a priori than the model promoted by Fair Trade, because its economic and social results so far are certainly not persuasive.

., 132, 156(n4) Smithsonian Migratory Bird Center, Bird-friendly Coffee programme, 54 Social capital, 101, 117, 119 Solidaridad, 3, 38–9, 114; see also Roozen Solomon Islands, 135 Somalia, 135 SOS Wereldhandel; see Fair Trade Organisatie Spaghetti bowl, 27 South Africa, 136, 137, 159(n20), 162(n21) South South relations, 80, 149, 163(n2) Sri Lanka, 134 STABEX, see Export earnings stabilisation system Starbucks, 77, 78, 150; Coffee and farmer equity practices, 55 Stigler, Georges, 42 Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Charlton, Andrew, 31–3, 66 Structural adjustment policies, 17, 18, 42 Structuralist school, 37–8 Sudan, 135 Sugar, 16, 27, 30, 36, 60–2, 80, 85, 90 Sustainable Agriculture Network, 53 Sustainability, 4, 24, 34, 47, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 70, 79, 113, 138, 142, 149–50, 158(n5) Sustainable development, 4, 34, 47, 55, 70, 82, 83, 156(n2), 163(n1) Sustainable Fair Trade Management System, 45; see also World Fair Trade Organization Sweden, 63, 162(n29) Switzerland, 53, 127, 128 System for Minerals (Sysmin), 155(n2) Taiwan, 155(n1) Tanzania, United Republic of, 134, 135 Tariff escalation, 26–8, 30 Tariff peaks, 30 Tax havens, 157(n13) Tea, 40, 49, 52, 53, 54, 56, 80, 130, 133, 134, 136 Ten Thousand Villages, 35–6 Thailand, 155(n1) Thatcher, Margaret, 42 Third Worldism, 36–40, 120 Times (the), 160(n2) Timor Leste, 135 Togo, 134, 135, 155(n2) Torrens, Robert, 65 Trade not aid (slogan), 38, 40, 126 Trade structure, 9, 10, 133–8, 141, 154, 163(n2); see also Developing countries Traders, 20, 44, 49, 86, 106, 116–17, 140 Transfair USA, additional income transferred, 125, 128, 130–1, 153; 161(n9), 161(n11); budget and licensee fees, 127–8, 153; exit from Fairtrade, 161(n13); name change, 161(n9); sales, 161(n10) Tribune (La), 159(n18) Truman, Harry, 34, 35 Turkey, 155(n1) Tuvalu, 135 UCIRI (Union de Comunidades Indigenas de la Region del Istmo), 98, 157(n4) Uganda, 134, 135, 138 Un Comtrade, 20, 134 Underdevelopment, see development Unequal exchange, 1–2, 16–22, 25, 37, 62, 76, 120, 132, 133; unequal ecological exchange, 22–4 United Nations, 10, 144, 155(n4) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20–1, 38, 133, 134, 135, 154, 162(n19), 162(n21), 163(n2) United Kingdom, 8, 25, 31, 32, 36, 46, 53, 56–7, 60–2, 64–9, 71, 127, 128, 132 United States, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 42, 46, 53, 54, 61, 63, 67, 71, 79, 90, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 136, 156(n2), 158(n8), 158(n9); American System, 26, 67; United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 138; see also Transfair USA UTZ Certified, 54, 55, 56, 70 Van der Hoff, Frans, 3, 38–43, 87–9, 98, 139, 158(n4), 158(n5), 162(n26), 163(n1) 178 Sylla T02779 02 index 178 28/11/2013 13:04 index Vanuatu, 135 Vent for surplus theory, 65 Vertical integration, 19–21, 41 Vietnam, 74 Wage, 79, 80, 158(n7), 160(n26), 160(n27), 161(n5); minimum wage, 51, 95, 98; reservation wage, 94–5; wage employment, 19, 72, 94, 123–4, 128, 131, 133, 137, 142, 162(n22) Wal-Mart, 78, 79 Washington Consensus, 73 Wealth of Nations, see Smith, Adam West Indies, 60–2, Williams, Eric, 60–2 Williamson, Jeffrey G., 162(n27) World Bank, 17, 31, 42; development indicators, 9, 10–12, 15, 30, 89, 131, 137, 153, 161(n7, n14, n17) World Fair Trade Organization, 44–5, 46, 80, 151 World-system theory, 76 World Trade Organization, 26, 28, 29, 31–3, 74, 144, 155(n3) Yemen, 135 Zambia, 135 179 Sylla T02779 02 index 179 28/11/2013 13:04 Sylla T02779 02 index 180 28/11/2013 13:04

The Haves and the Have-Nots by Branko Milanovic

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Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, colonial rule, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, full employment, Gini coefficient, high net worth, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, Joseph Schumpeter, means of production, open borders, Plutocrats, plutocrats, purchasing power parity, Simon Kuznets, very high income, Washington Consensus

This Latin America, which reaped so few benefits from Globalization 2.0, is thus not surprisingly the only part of the world that is trying to experiment with alternative policies. By the standards of the past, these alternatives are rather meek, since the differences are not in the substance but in the details. But as the world has, in terms of economic policies followed by different countries, become much more homogeneous, even these small departures from the Washington consensus orthodoxy attract attention. Africa, of course, has remained the third world. But on account of its almost unrelieved misery and relative and often absolute decline during the last quarter of the twentieth century, we may be justified in giving it the unenviable title of the fourth world. China remains a world apart, with obviously a much higher income today than before but with equally opaque ambitions or rather the same inner ambivalence not only about the role it wants to play internationally but whether it wants a role at all.

China remains a world apart, with obviously a much higher income today than before but with equally opaque ambitions or rather the same inner ambivalence not only about the role it wants to play internationally but whether it wants a role at all. One of the striking features is that the incredible economic rise of China that was achieved by using a mixture of recipes never seen before, and indeed very different from the recipes (economic policies) advocated by the Washington consensus, has not produced any “codified” rules of economic conduct. There is no attempt to “package” these policies, explain how they might work elsewhere, in other words “sell” a specifically Chinese model of development or economic ideology. Contrast this with the fact that, already by 1776 when the Industrial Revolution was as old as the Chinese “takeoff ” is today, the world had in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations well-codified rules for economic success.

Chomsky on Mis-Education by Noam Chomsky

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deindustrialization, deskilling, Howard Zinn, invisible hand, means of production, Ronald Reagan, strikebreaker, union organizing, Washington Consensus

Far more instructive is the state of affairs in the “people’s democracies” of Eastern Europe. The point is elementary and applies to the self-designated “gatekeeper and model” as well. Latin America is the obvious testing ground, particularly the Central America–Caribbean region. Here Washington has faced few external challenges for almost a century, so the guiding principles of policy, and of today’s neoliberal “Washington consensus,” are revealed most clearly when we examine the state of the region and how that came about. It is of some interest that the exercise is rarely undertaken and, if proposed, castigated as extremist or worse. I leave it as an “exercise for the reader,” merely noting that the record teaches useful lessons about the political and economic principles that are to be “the wave of the future.” Washington’s “crusade for democracy,” as it is called, was waged with particular fervor during the Reagan years, with Latin America the chosen terrain.

The well-known economic historian Paul Bairoch points out that “there is no doubt that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization,” or even “deindustrialization,” while Europe and the regions that managed to stay free of its control developed by radical violation of these principles.46 Referring to the more recent past, Arthur Schlesinger’s secret report on Kennedy’s Latin American mission realistically criticized “the baleful influence of the International Monetary Fund,” then pursuing the 1950s version of today’s “Washington Consensus” (“structural adjustment,” “neoliberalism”). Despite much confident rhetoric, not much is understood about economic development. But some lessons of history seem reasonably clear and not hard to understand. Let us return to the prevailing doctrine that “America’s victory in the Cold War” was a victory for democracy and the free market. With regard to democracy, the doctrine is partially true, though we have to understand what is meant by democracy: top-down control “to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.”


pages: 91 words: 26,009

Capitalism: A Ghost Story by Arundhati Roy

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Bretton Woods, corporate governance, feminist movement, Frank Gehry, ghettoisation, Howard Zinn, informal economy, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, means of production, megacity, microcredit, neoliberal agenda, Occupy movement, RAND corporation, reserve currency, special economic zone, spectrum auction, stem cell, The Chicago School, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks

The foundations began to support the ANC. The ANC soon turned on the more radical organizations like Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness movement and more or less eliminated it. When Nelson Mandela took over as South Africa’s first Black president, he was canonized as a living saint, not just because he is a freedom fighter who spent twenty-seven years in prison but also because he deferred completely to the Washington Consensus. Socialism disappeared from the ANC’s agenda. South Africa’s great “peaceful transition,” so praised and lauded, meant no land reforms, no demands for reparation, no nationalization of South Africa’s mines. Instead there was privatization and structural adjustment. Mandela gave South Africa’s highest civilian award—the Order of Good Hope—to his old friend and supporter General Suharto, the killer of communists in Indonesia.


pages: 413 words: 119,379

The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth by Tom Burgis

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Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, BRICs, British Empire, central bank independence, clean water, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, F. W. de Klerk, Gini coefficient, Livingstone, I presume, McMansion, megacity, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, purchasing power parity, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, structural adjustment programs, trade route, transfer pricing, upwardly mobile, urban planning, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks

Ghana comes close to the top of the UN index that ranks countries by their success in turning GDP per head into improved living standards (scoring 22, compared with97 for Equatorial Guinea), but Ghanaians’ average income is a tenth of Lithuanians’ and one in three Ghanaians cannot read or write, the same level of illiteracy as in Congo. Inherent in the praise that is heaped on Ghana is a troubling undertone that mitigated penury is the best that Africans can aim for. Like the rest of Africa’s resource states, Ghana bowed to the orthodoxy that the World Bank and the IMF imposed from the early 1980s in the form of ‘structural adjustment programmes’. Based on a set of neoliberal economic policies known as the Washington Consensus, these programmes made loans to poor countries dependent on their adherence to strict conditions, including deep cuts to public spending, privatizing state-owned assets, and lifting controls on trade. Foreign investment was deemed essential to economic growth. African and other poor countries were exhorted to bend over backward with tax breaks and other incentives in order to attract multinational corporations.

And the issue of corruption and the issue of trying to get good governance is, I think, under less pressure now in a number of these countries than it was when I was around. It’s going to be a long road.’ It was not just the World Bank that found its influence in Africa’s resource states diminished. The IMF, its sister institution charged with maintaining the stability of the world financial system, already had a bad reputation in Africa, with reformers and kleptocrats alike, for imposing the strictures of the Washington Consensus, under which African states had become test tubes for the unfettered free-market philosophy that would also beget the subprime crisis and subsequent near-collapse of the Western banking system. Emil Salim’s review of the World Bank’s record in the oil and mining industries reported that, in the cases it had studied, ‘the IMF’s approach to the extractive sectors was mainly one that promoted aggressive privatization of significant mining and hydrocarbon assets for short-term financing of the [government’s budget] deficit.

See Diakité, Aboubacar Touré, Mamadie with Cilins in Florida, 103–105, 109, 125–126, 127 Guinea’s minerals and, 103–105, 109, 110, 124, 125–126, 127 Transfer pricing, 166 Transparency International, 17 Trendfield company, 140–141, 144 Trump, Donald, 246 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 219, 223, 237 Turner, Bill, 39–40 Tutsi/Hutu conflict and aftermath, 30–31, 32, 40–41, 43–44, 45–46, 55, 56 Tutu, Desmond, Archbishop, 66 Uba, Andy, 77, 193 Ukraine, 147, 242 Umunna, Hillary, 64–65 Vale mining and Guinea, 104, 108, 123–124, 128, 129–130 Varma, Somit, 163–164 Vicente, Manuel background, 10–11, 19 business empire, 23, 99 China Sonangol/Queensway Group and, 26, 94, 95, 96–97, 98, 100, 114, 119 Futungo and, 10–11, 12, 97, 111 oil and, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18–19, 25, 26, 94, 95, 96–97, 98, 100, 114, 119 poverty in Angola and, 20, 208 Vines, Alex, 100 ‘VIP’ (‘Vagabond in Power’/Nneka), 246–247 Voser, Peter, 194 ‘Vultures’ (Achebe), 208 Wang Xiangfei, 90–91, 92–93 Wase, Abdullahi, 182 Washington Consensus, 163, 171 Wolfensohn, James, 157, 171 Wolfowitz, Paul, 170 World Bank Africa/African countries and, 57–58, 65, 136, 151–152, 163–164 BRICS nations vs., 218 China credit vs., 137, 170, 171 criticism of, 3, 151–152, 157–159, 160, 161, 164, 170, 171 description/staff, 169–170 ‘extreme poverty’/poor countries, 4 IFC and, 153, 154, 156 Miga and, 158–161 reputation/influence, 169–170 role/methods, 144, 151, 153, 154, 157, 165, 170 Salim’s criticism/recommendations, 157–159, 160, 161, 164, 170, 171 structural adjustment programmes, 162–163, 171 See also International Finance Corporation (IFC) World Trade Organization (WTO), 81, 157, 239 Wu Yang, 93, 98, 101–102, 145, 193 Xi Jinping, 23 Xia Huang, 134–135, 148, 149 Xueming Li (pseudonym), 91 Yar’Adua, Umaru health problems/death, 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, 183–184, 189, 201, 202, 203 as Katsina governor, 68 presidential campaign/as president, 69, 72, 77–78, 179, 202 Zambia, 4, 34, 56, 163, 165, 225 Zeng Peiyan, 86–87, 94, 99 Zibi, Songezo, 217 Zimbabwe diamonds/effects, 220–223, 226, 235–236 ‘indigenization’ of mining industry/corruption, 230–232 Marange massacre/Operation No Return, 220–221, 222, 226, 235, 236 minerals (overview), 231 Mugabe’s security forces/CIO, 223, 226, 234–236, 237, 243 Pa/Queensway Group and, 223, 230, 234, 235–236, 237–238, 243 See also specific companies/organizations; specific individuals Ziv, Israel, 117 Zuks, Nik, 143–144 Zuma, Jacob, 217–218 About the Publisher Australia HarperCollins Publishers (Australia) Pty.


pages: 566 words: 163,322

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World by Ruchir Sharma

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3D printing, Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population

Talk of the new Beijing Consensus implied that many countries had come to see the virtues of an active, authoritarian hand guiding the economy, and that this new view was displacing the old Washington Consensus, in support of freedom in markets, trade, and politics. “The Rise of State Capitalism” was the theme of a number of new books and magazine covers in 2011. I watched all this with great skepticism. For one thing, it was mainly the European and American political and business elites who were marveling about China, not their peers in emerging nations. A year before, in the Egyptian seaside town of Sharm el-Sheikh, I had met with Gamal Mubarak, son of his country’s soon-to-be-deposed dictator. When I asked him whether his country would back off from the nascent liberalization process that his government was belatedly undertaking, he responded that the future was still in liberalizing the economy, along the lines of the Washington Consensus, because his country had learned from hard experience that state control doesn’t work.

., 259, 304, 310 technology: automation, 214 cycle of, 8, 124, 218–21 driverless cars, 54 and immigration, 51–52 investment in, 218–21, 229, 233, 255 and jobs, 101, 211, 212 and leisure time, 199 and productivity, 20, 51, 119, 220–21 robot workers, 27, 36, 54–57, 214 and service businesses, 210, 211–13 3-D printing, 8, 214 Tetlock, Philip, 400 Thailand, 47–48, 189–90 capital flight from, 272, 292 commodities economy in, 342, 379 credit binge in, 199, 297, 298–302, 306, 315, 328, 380 currency of, 217, 267, 271–73, 273, 285–86, 292 economic contraction in, 286, 349, 379 economic growth in, 79, 217, 256, 348, 380 economic recovery of, 288, 302, 325, 327 and hype, 330, 349 infrastructure in, 207–8, 230 and international trade, 174, 178, 179–80, 216 investment in, 206, 217, 225, 230–31 leadership in, 78–79, 97, 379–80 manufacturing in, 216–17, 225, 227, 379 military coup in (2014), 379–80 population growth rates in, 30, 47 social unrest in, 78–79, 189, 190, 217 state banks in, 151, 321, 323–24 Thatcher, Margaret, 64–65, 68, 94 Thiel, Peter, 104, 119, 125 thrift, 16, 277–79 Time, 331, 334–35, 347, 349, 350, 352 tourism, 2, 37, 199, 211, 288, 384–85 trade balance, 269 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 173, 179 Trans-Pacific Partnership, 173, 178, 361, 377, 378, 383, 384, 386 Trudeau, Justin, 386 Trump, Donald, 53, 364 Tsai Ing-wen, 383 Tunisia, 91–92, 224 Turkey, 190, 326 currency of, 273–74, 280, 283, 291, 292, 293, 396 debt of, 291, 306, 327, 328 economic growth in, 66, 69, 72 financial deepening in, 327 government spending in, 139, 247–48 hype about, 345, 348 immigration to, 48 inflation in, 241, 242, 246, 247–50, 326 leadership in, 60, 66, 71–72, 74, 349, 395 and location, 395–96 per capita income in, 68, 331, 348 population growth in, 31 populist nationalism in, 60, 72, 247 reforms in, 67–68, 72, 248, 249, 331 social unrest in, 4, 61, 72, 73, 74 wealth in, 114, 116, 120 Tusk, Donald, 74–75 Uganda, 87, 181, 354–55 United Arab Emirates, 167, 170 United Kingdom, see Britain United Nations (UN), 10, 47 on population growth, 19, 25, 27, 33, 44–45 United States, 194–95, 360–64 billionaires in, 107, 108, 114, 116, 118–19, 121, 123–25, 364 birth rate in, 26 checks and balances in, 364 credit markets in, 13, 298, 303–4, 305–6, 316 currency of, 266, 271, 272, 362–63 current account deficit in, 278, 362–63 debt in, 363 economic growth in, 3, 288, 337–38, 340 economic recovery in, 24, 64–65, 102, 360 economic strength of, 266, 400 financial speculation in, 102 and geopolitics, 172–73 and global trade, 184, 185, 402–3 government spending in, 138, 139 and hype, 361–62 and immigration, 45, 49–50, 52, 53, 360 industrialization in, 144, 215 inflation in, 240–41, 258 infrastructure in, 207, 208 life expectancy in, 39, 40 and location, 176–77, 200 long boom of, 255–56 manufacturing in, 204, 213, 214, 215, 361 oil and gas in, 228–29, 362 per capita income in, 32, 66, 339, 346 polarization in, 62–63, 132, 363–64 productivity in, 20, 51–52, 220–21, 257, 303 recessions originating in, 2, 132, 303–4, 305–6, 308–9, 327–28, 362 and regional alliances, 173–75, 178, 183, 188, 199, 361, 383, 384, 386 “second term curse” in, 70–71 technology in, 20, 218, 221, 294, 303, 361–62 Treasury bonds, 280 Washington Consensus, 132–33 and wealth gap, 101, 102, 364 workforce in, 19, 32, 37, 41–42, 43–44, 360 Uribe, Álvaro, 77, 183, 350 Uruguay, 300 Velasco, Juan, 98 Venezuela, 4, 158 economic cycle in, 87, 346, 365 leadership in, 64, 69, 76, 77, 98, 365 oil in, 333, 334 and regional alliances, 182, 366 Vietnam, 42, 202 billionaires in, 118 Communist Party in, 377–78 currency in, 295 fiscal deficit in, 377 and global trade, 174, 176–78, 180, 295 hype about, 345 inflation in, 378 investment in, 378 leadership in, 90–91 location of, 168, 177–78, 185, 378 manufacturing in, 213, 378 per capita income in, 178, 378 population centers in, 190, 191, 199 Viravaidya, Mechai, 47 Volcker, Paul, 241, 245, 335 wage-price spiral, 240 Walton family, 119 Wang Jianlin, 114 wealth: balance in, 103 billionaire lists, 100, 103, 104, 116, 117, 120–21 and capital flight, 52–53, 107, 279–81, 292 creation of, 99, 103, 115 crony capitalism, 105–6, 112, 130, 332 of entrepreneurs, 118–19, 122 in family empires/inherited, 104, 116–21 measures of, 101 redistribution of, 95, 96–98, 99, 101, 126 of robber barons, 124 scale of, 107–10 and state meddling, 127–29 wealth gap, 95–96, 99–102, 364 and corruption, 127–29 and easy money, 101–2, 108 and economic declines, 125–27 rise of, 129–31 welfare states, 64, 65, 93, 97, 126, 138, 140–41 Wen Jiabao, 307, 308, 311–12 Widodo, Joko, 143, 157, 163, 376–77 Wiesel, Elie, 331–32 wildebeest, survival of, viii, ix, xi women: and birth rates, 18, 25–26, 28, 33–36, 43, 44, 47, 392 economic restrictions on, 42 education of, 26, 41 working, 28, 34, 35, 36, 40–44, 47 workforce: aging, 392 and available jobs, 32, 37, 55 and baby bonuses, 33–36 and economic growth, 24, 26, 52 global, 55–56 growth rate in, 28–32 highly skilled, 48–54 hours worked by, 18 and immigration, 28, 44–54 manual labor, 213 new people in, 28, 36, 57 participation rate in, 36–37 and pension funds, 279 and population declines, 24–32, 35, 38, 43, 44, 56 and productivity data, 18–19, 39 replaced by machines, 16, 24 and retirement, 36–40 robots in, 54–57 skilled, 48–54 wages, 101, 184, 185, 204, 214, 243, 257 women in, 28, 34, 35, 36, 40–44, 47 World Bank: on convergence, 339, 341 data set of, 407 on economic growth factors, 12, 18, 342, 346 forecasting record of, 336, 338 on inflation, 242 on infrastructure, 186, 187 on middle-income trap, 345 on new business, 48 on service sector, 210–11 Spence Commission, 341–42 on wealth gap, 100 on workforce, 42, 51 world economy, 358–401 absence of optimism in, 359 combined scores of, 358–59 crisis (2008), see global financial crisis disruptions of, 358–59 potential growth rate of, 359 world maps, 356–57, 402–3 see also specific nations World Trade Organization, 177 Wu Jinglian, 314 Xiao Gang, 311 Xi Jinping, 120, 156, 187, 208 Yellen, Janet, 101 Yeltsin, Boris, 67, 242 Yemen, 92 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (SBY), 93, 157 Zambia, 96, 354 Zambrano, Lorenzo, 219–20 Zeihan, Peer, 184 Zielinski, Robert, The Kiss of Debt, 297–98, 299, 323 Zimbabwe, 86, 88–89, 96–97, 373 Zoellick, Robert, 242 “zombie companies,” 318–19 Zong Qinghou, 113 Zuckerberg, Mark, 104, 119, 124 Zuma, Jacob, 352, 397 ALSO BY RUCHIR SHARMA Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ruchir Sharma is head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, with more than $20 billion of assets under management.


pages: 515 words: 142,354

The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe by Joseph E. Stiglitz, Alex Hyde-White

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bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, cashless society, central bank independence, centre right, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency peg, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, financial innovation, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, housing crisis, income inequality, incomplete markets, inflation targeting, investor state dispute settlement, invisible hand, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, manufacturing employment, market bubble, market friction, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, moral hazard, mortgage debt, neoliberal agenda, new economy, open economy, paradox of thrift, pension reform, pensions crisis, price stability, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Silicon Valley, sovereign wealth fund, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working-age population

The story I tell here is a dramatic illustration of several themes that have preoccupied me in recent years—themes that should have global resonance: The first is the influence of ideas, in particular how ideas about the efficiency and stability of free and unfettered markets (a set of ideas sometimes referred to as “neoliberalism”) have shaped not just policies but institutions over the past third of a century. I have elsewhere described the policies that dominated the development discourse, called the Washington Consensus policies, and shaped the conditions imposed on developing countries.10 This book is about how these same ideas shaped what was viewed as the next step in the tremendously important project of European integration, the sharing of a common currency—and derailed it. Today, the same battle of ideas is being fought in myriad skirmishes. Indeed, in some cases, even the arguments and evidence presented are fundamentally the same.

., 266 Camdessus, Michel, 314 campaign contributions, 195, 355 Canada, 96 early 1990s expansion of, 209 in NAFTA, xiv railroad privatization in, 55 tax system in, 191 US’s free trade with, 45–46, 47 capital, 76–77 bank, 284–85 human, 78, 137 return to, 388 societal vs. physical, 77–78 tax on, 356 unemployment increased by, 264 capital adequacy standards, 152 capital budget, 245 capital controls, 389–90 capital flight, 126–34, 217, 354, 359 austerity and, 140 and labor flows, 135 capital flows, 14, 15, 25, 26, 27–28, 40, 116, 125, 128, 131, 351 economic volatility exacerbated by, 28, 274 and foreign ownership, 195 and technology, 139 capital inflows, 110–11 capitalism: crises in, xviii, 148–49 inclusive, 317 capital requirements, 152, 249, 378 Caprio, Gerry, 387 capture, 158–60 carbon price, 230, 260, 265, 368 cash, 39 cash flow, 194 Catalonia, xi CDU party, 314 central banks, 59, 354, 387–88 balance sheets of, 386 capture of, 158–59 credit auctions by, 282–84 credit creation by, 277–78 expertise of, 363 independence of, 157–63 inequality created by, 154 inflation and, 153, 166–67 as lender of last resort, 85, 362 as political institutions, 160–62 regulations and, 153 stability and, 8 unemployment and, 8, 94, 97, 106, 147, 153 CEO compensation, 383 Chapter 11, 259–60, 291 childhood poverty, 72 Chile, 55, 152–53 China, 81, 98, 164, 319, 352 exchange-rate policy of, 251, 254, 350–51 global integration of, 49–50 low prices of, 251 rise of, 75 savings in, 257 trade surplus of, 118, 121, 350–52 wages controlled in, 254 as world’s largest economy, 318, 327 chits, 287–88, 290, 299–300, 387, 388–389 Citigroup, 355 climate change, 229–30, 251, 282, 319 Clinton, Bill, xiv, xv, 187 closing hours, 220 cloves, 230 cognitive capture, 159 Cohesion Fund, 243 Cold War, 6 collateral, 364 collective action, 41–44, 51–52 and inequality, 338 and stabilization, 246 collective bargaining, 221 collective goods, 40 Common Agricultural Policy, 338 common regulatory framework, 241 communism, 10 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 360, 382 comparative advantage, 12, 171 competition, 12 competitive devaluation, 104–6, 254 compromise, 22–23 confidence, 95, 200–201, 384 in banks, 127 in bonds, 145 and structural reforms, 232 and 2008 crisis, 280 confirmation bias, 309, 335 Congress, US, 319, 355 connected lending, 280 connectedness, 68–69 Connecticut, GDP of, 92 Constitutional Court, Greek, 198 consumption, 94, 278 consumption tax, 193–94 contract enforcement, 24 convergence, 13, 92–93, 124, 125, 139, 254, 300–301 convergence criteria, 15, 87, 89, 96–97, 99, 123, 244 copper mines, 55 corporate income tax, 189–90, 227 corporate taxes, 189–90, 227, 251 corporations, 323 regulations opposed by, xvi and shutdown of Greek banks, 229 corruption, 74, 112 privatization and, 194–95 Costa, António, 332 Council of Economic Advisers, 358 Council of State, Greek, 198 countercyclical fiscal policy, 244 counterfactuals, 80 Countrywide Financial, 91 credit, 276–85 “divorce”’s effect on, 278–79 excessive, 250, 274 credit auctions, 282–84 credit bubbles, 122–123 credit cards, 39, 49, 153 credit creation, 248–50, 277–78, 386 by banks, 280–82 domestic control over, 279–82 regulation of, 277–78 credit default swaps (CDSs), 159–60 crisis policy reforms, 262–67 austerity to growth, 263–65 debt restructuring and, 265–67 Croatia, 46, 331, 338 currency crises, 349 currency pegs, xii current account, 333–34 current account deficits, 19, 88, 108, 110, 120–121, 221, 294 and exit from euro, 273, 285–89 see also trade deficit Cyprus, 16, 30, 140, 177, 331, 386 capital controls in, 390 debt-to-GDP ratio of, 231 “haircut” of, 350, 367 Czech Republic, 46, 331 debit cards, 39, 49 debtors’ prison, 204 debt restructuring, 201, 203–6, 265–67, 290–92, 372, 390 of private debt, 291 debts, xx, 15, 93, 96, 183 corporate, 93–94 crisis in, 110–18 in deflation, xii and exit from eurozone, 273 with foreign currency, 115–18 household, 93–94 increase in, 18 inherited, 134 limits of, 42, 87, 122, 141, 346, 367 monetization of, 42 mutualization of, 242–43, 263 place-based, 134, 242 reprofiling of, 32 restructuring of, 259 debt-to-GDP ratio, 202, 210–11, 231, 266, 324 Declaration of Independence, 319 defaults, 102, 241, 338, 348 and debt mutualization, 243 deficit fetishism, 96 deficits, fiscal, xx, 15, 20, 93, 96, 106, 107–8, 122, 182, 384 and balanced-budget multiplier, 188–90, 265 constitutional amendment on, 339 and exit from euro, 273, 289–90 in Greece, 16, 186, 215, 233, 285–86, 289 limit of, 42, 87, 94–95, 122, 138, 141, 186, 243, 244, 265, 346, 367 primary, 188 problems financing, 110–12 structural, 245 deficits, trade, see trade deficits deflation, xii, 147, 148, 151, 166, 169, 277, 290 Delors, Jacques, 7, 332 democracy, lack of faith in, 312–14 Democracy in America (Tocqueville), xiii democratic deficit, 26–27, 35, 57–62, 145 democratic participation, xix Denmark, 45, 307, 313, 331 euro referendum of, 58 deposit insurance, 31, 44, 129, 199, 301, 354–55, 386–87 common in eurozone, 241, 242, 246, 248 derivatives, 131, 355 Deutsche Bank, 283, 355 devaluation, 98, 104–6, 254, 344 see also internal devaluation developing countries, and Washington Consensus, xvi discretion, 262–63 discriminatory lending practices, 283 disintermediation, 258 divergence, 15, 123, 124–44, 255–56, 300, 321 in absence of crisis, 128–31 capital flight and, 126–34 crisis policies’ exacerbation of, 140–43 free mobility of labor and, 134–36, 142–44, 242 in public investment, 136–38 reforms to prevent, 243 single-market principle and, 125–26 in technology, 138–39 in wealth, 139–40 see also capital flows; labor movement diversification, of production, 47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 355 dollar peg, 50 downsizing, 133 Draghi, Mario, 127, 145, 156, 158, 165, 269, 363 bond market supported by, 127, 200, 201 Drago, Luis María, 371 drug prices, 219 Duisenberg, Willem Frederik “Wim,” 251 Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium model, 331 East Asia, 18, 25, 95, 102–3, 112, 123, 202, 364, 381 convergence in, 138 Eastern Europe, 10 Economic Adjustment Programme, 178 economic distortions, 191 economic growth, xii, 34 confidence and, 232 in Europe, 63–64, 69, 73–74, 74, 75, 163 lowered by inequality, 212–13 reform of, 263–65 and structural reforms, 232–35 economic integration, xiv–xx, 23, 39–50 euro and, 46–47 political integration vs., 51–57 single currency and, 45–46 economic rents, 226, 280 economics, politics and, 308–18 economic security, 68 economies of scale, 12, 39, 55, 138 economists, poor forecasting by, 307 education, 20, 76, 344 investment in, 40, 69, 137, 186, 211, 217, 251, 255, 300 electricity, 217 electronic currency, 298–99, 389 electronics payment mechanism, 274–76, 283–84 emigration, 4, 68–69 see also migration employment: central banks and, 8, 94, 97 structural reforms and, 257–60 see also unemployment Employment Act (1946), 148 energy subsidies, 197 Enlightenment, 3, 318–19 environment, 41, 257, 260, 323 equality, 225–26 equilibrium, xviii–xix Erasmus program, 45 Estonia, 90, 331, 346 euro, xiv, 325 adjustments impeded by, 13–14 case for, 35–39 creation of, xii, 5–6, 7, 10, 333 creation of institutions required by, 10–11 divergence and, see divergence divorce of, 272–95, 307 economic integration and, 46–47, 268 as entailing fixed exchange rate, 8, 42–43, 46–47, 86–87, 92, 93, 94, 102, 105, 143, 193, 215–16, 240, 244, 249, 252, 254, 286, 297 as entailing single interest rate, 8, 85–88, 92, 93, 94, 105, 129, 152, 240, 244, 249 and European identification, 38–39 financial instability caused by, 131–32 growth promised by, 235 growth slowed by, 73 hopes for, 34 inequality increased by, xviii interest rates lowered by, 235 internal devaluation of, see internal devaluation literature on, 327–28 as means to end, xix peace and, 38 proponents of, 13 referenda on, 58, 339–40 reforms needed for, xii–xiii, 28–31 risk of, 49–50 weakness of, 224 see also flexible euro Eurobond, 356 euro crisis, xiii, 3, 4, 9 catastrophic consequences of, 11–12 euro-euphoria, 116–17 Europe, 151 free trade area in, 44–45 growth rates in, 63–64, 69, 73–74, 74, 75, 163 military conflicts in, 196 social models of, 21 European Central Bank (ECB), 7, 17, 80, 112–13, 117, 144, 145–73, 274, 313, 362, 368, 380 capture of, 158–59 confidence in, 200–201 corporate bonds bought by, 141 creation of, 8, 85 democratic deficit and, 26, 27 excessive expansion controlled by, 250 flexibility of, 269 funds to Greece cut off by, 59 German challenges to, 117, 164 governance and, 157–63 inequality created by, 154–55 inflation controlled by, 8, 25, 97, 106, 115, 145, 146–50, 151, 163, 165, 169–70, 172, 250, 256, 266 interest rates set by, 85–86, 152, 249, 302, 348 Ireland forced to socialize losses by, 134, 156, 165 new mandate needed by, 256 as political institution, 160–62 political nature of, 153–56 quantitative easing opposed by, 151 quantitative easing undertaken by, 164, 165–66, 170, 171 regulations by, 249, 250 unemployment and, 163 as unrepresentative, 163 European Commission, 17, 58, 161, 313, 332 European Court of Human Rights, 45 European Economic Community (EEC), 6 European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 30, 335 European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), 336 European Free Trade Association, 44 European Free Trade Association Court, 44 European Investment Bank (EIB), 137, 247, 255, 301 European Regional Development Fund, 243 European Stability Mechanism, 23, 246, 357 European Union: budget of, 8, 45, 91 creation of, 4 debt and deficit limits in, 87–88 democratic deficit in, 26–27 economic growth in, 215 GDP of, xiii and lower rates of war, 196 migration in, 90 proposed exit of UK from, 4 stereotypes in, 12 subsidiarity in, 8, 41–42, 263 taxes in, 8, 261 Euro Summit Statement, 373 eurozone: austerity in, see austerity banking union in, see banking union counterfactual in, 235–36 double-dip recessions in, 234–35 Draghi’s speech and, 145 economic integration and, xiv–xx, 23, 39–50, 51–57 as flawed at birth, 7–9 framework for stability of, 244–52 German departure from, 32, 292–93 Greece’s possible exit from, 124 hours worked in, 71–72 lack of fiscal policy in, 152 and move to political integration, xvi, 34, 35, 51–57 Mundell’s work on dangers of, 87 policies of, 15–17 possible breakup of, 29–30 privatization avoided in, 194 saving, 323–26 stagnant GDP in, 12, 65–68, 66, 67 structure of, 8–9 surpluses in, 120–22 theory of, 95–97 unemployment in, 71, 135, 163, 177–78, 181, 331 working-age population of, 70 eurozone, proposed structural reforms for, 239–71 common financial system, see banking union excessive fiscal responsibility, 163 exchange-rate risks, 13, 47, 48, 49–50, 125, 235 exchange rates, 80, 85, 288, 300, 338, 382, 389 of China, 251, 254, 350–51 and competitive devaluation, 105–6 after departure of northern countries, 292–93 of euro, 8, 42–43, 46–47, 86–87, 92, 93, 94, 102, 105, 215–16, 240, 244, 249, 252, 254, 286, 297 flexible, 50, 248, 349 and full employment, 94 of Germany, 254–55, 351 gold and, 344–45 imports and, 86 interest rates and, 86 quantitative easing’s lowering of, 151 real, 105–6 and single currencies, 8, 42–43, 46–47, 86–87, 92, 93, 94, 97–98 stabilizing, 299–301 and trade deficits, 107, 118 expansionary contractions, 95–96, 208–9 exports, 86, 88, 97–99, 98 disappointing performance of, 103–5 external imbalances, 97–98, 101, 109 externalities, 42–43, 121, 153, 301–2 surpluses as, 253 extremism, xx, 4 Fannie Mae, 91 farmers, US, in deflation, xii Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 91 Federal Reserve, US, 349 alleged independence of, 157 interest rates lowered by, 150 mandate of, 8, 147, 172 money pumped into economy by, 278 quantitative easing used by, 151, 170 reform of, 146 fiat currency, 148, 275 and taxes, 284 financial markets: lobbyists from, 132 reform of, 214, 228–29 short-sighted, 112–13 financial systems: necessity of, xix real economy of, 149 reform of, 257–58 regulations needed by, xix financial transaction system, 275–76 Finland, 16, 81, 122, 126, 292, 296, 331, 343 growth in, 296–97 growth rate of, 75, 76, 234–35 fire departments, 41 firms, 138, 186–87, 245, 248 fiscal balance: and cutting spending, 196–98 tax revenue and, 190–96 Fiscal Compact, 141, 357 fiscal consolidation, 310 fiscal deficits, see deficits, fiscal fiscal policy, 148, 245, 264 in center of macro-stabilization, 251 countercyclical, 244 in EU, 8 expansionary, 254–55 stabilization of, 250–52 fiscal prudence, 15 fiscal responsibility, 163 flexibility, 262–63, 269 flexible euro, 30–31, 272, 296–305, 307 cooperation needed for, 304–5 food prices, 169 forbearance, 130–31 forecasts, 307 foreclosure proposal, 180 foreign ownership, privatization and, 195 forestry, 81 France, 6, 14, 16, 114, 120, 141, 181–82, 331, 339–40, 343 banks of, 202, 203, 231, 373 corporate income tax in, 189–90 euro creation regretted in, 340 European Constitution referendum of, 58 extreme right in, xi growth in, 247 Freddie Mac, 91 Freefall (Stiglitz), 264, 335 free mobility of labor, xiv, 26, 40, 125, 134–36, 142–44, 242 Friedman, Milton, 151, 152–53, 167, 339 full employment, 94–97, 379 G-20, 121 gas: import of, 230 from Russia, 37, 81, 93 Gates Foundation, 276 GDP-indexed bonds, 267 German bonds, 114, 323 German Council of Economic Experts, 179, 365 Germany, xxi, 14, 30, 65, 108, 114, 141, 181–82, 207, 220, 286, 307, 331, 343, 346, 374 austerity pushed by, 186, 232 banks of, 202, 203, 231–32, 373 costs to taxpayers of, 184 as creditor, 140, 187, 267 debt collection by, 117 debt in, 105 and debt restructuring, 205, 311 in departure from eurozone, 32, 292–93 as dependent on Russian gas, 37 desire to leave eurozone, 314 ECB criticized by, 164 EU economic practices controlled by, 17 euro creation regretted in, 340 exchange rate of, 254–55, 351 failure of, 13, 78–79 flexible exchange of, 304 GDP of, xviii, 92 in Great Depression, 187 growing poverty in, 79 growth of, 78, 106, 247 hours worked per worker in, 72 inequality in, 79, 333 inflation in, 42, 338, 358 internal solidarity of, 334 lack of alternative to euro seen by, 11 migrants to, 320–21, 334–35, 393 minimum wage in, 42, 120, 254 neoliberalism in, 10 and place-based debt, 136 productivity in, 71 programs designed by, 53, 60, 61, 202, 336, 338 reparations paid by, 187 reunification of, 6 rules as important to, 57, 241–42, 262 share of global employment in, 224 shrinking working-age population of, 70, 78–79 and Stability and Growth Pact, 245 and structural reforms, 19–20 “there is no alternative” and, 306, 311–12 trade surplus of, 117, 118–19, 120, 139, 253, 293, 299, 350–52, 381–82, 391 “transfer union” rejected by, 22 US loans to, 187 victims blamed by, 9, 15–17, 177–78, 309 wages constrained by, 41, 42–43 wages lowered in, 105, 333 global financial crisis, xi, xiii–xiv, 3, 12, 17, 24, 67, 73, 75, 114, 124, 146, 148, 274, 364, 387 and central bank independence, 157–58 and confidence, 280 and cost of failure of financial institutions, 131 lessons of, 249 monetary policy in, 151 and need for structural reform, 214 originating in US, 65, 68, 79–80, 112, 128, 296, 302 globalization, 51, 321–23 and diminishing share of employment in advanced countries, 224 economic vs. political, xvii failures of, xvii Globalization and Its Discontents (Stig-litz), 234, 335, 369 global savings glut, 257 global secular stagnation, 120 global warming, 229–30, 251, 282, 319 gold, 257, 275, 277, 345 Goldman Sachs, 158, 366 gold standard, 148, 291, 347, 358 in Great Depression, xii, 100 goods: free movement of, 40, 143, 260–61 nontraded, 102, 103, 169, 213, 217, 359 traded, 102, 103, 216 Gordon, Robert, 251 governance, 157–63, 258–59 government spending, trade deficits and, 107–8 gravity principle, 124, 127–28 Great Depression, 42, 67, 105, 148, 149, 168, 313 Friedman on causes of, 151 gold standard in, xii, 100 Great Malaise, 264 Greece, 14, 30, 41, 64, 81, 100, 117, 123, 142, 160, 177, 265–66, 278, 307, 331, 343, 366, 367–68, 374–75, 386 austerity opposed by, 59, 60–62, 69–70, 207–8, 392 balance of payments, 219 banks in, 200–201, 228–29, 231, 270, 276, 367, 368 blaming of, 16, 17 bread in, 218, 230 capital controls in, 390 consumption tax and, 193–94 counterfactual scenario of, 80 current account surplus of, 287–88 and debt restructuring, 205–7 debt-to-GDP ratio of, 231 debt write-offs in, 291 decline in labor costs in, 56, 103 ECB’s cutting of funds to, 59 economic growth in, 215, 247 emigration from, 68–69 fiscal deficits in, 16, 186, 215, 233, 285–86, 289 GDP of, xviii, 183, 309 hours worked per worker in, 72 inequality in, 72 inherited debt in, 134 lack of faith in democracy in, 312–13 living standards in, 216 loans in, 127 loans to, 310 migrants and, 320–21 milk in, 218, 223, 230 new currency in, 291, 300 oligarchs in, 16, 227 output per working-age person in, 70–71 past downturns in, 235–36 pensions in, 16, 78, 188, 197–98, 226 pharmacies in, 218–20 population decline in, 69, 89 possible exit from eurozone of, 124, 197, 273, 274, 275 poverty in, 226, 261, 376 primary surplus of, 187–88, 312 privatization in, 55, 195–96 productivity in, 71, 342 programs imposed on, xv, 21, 27, 60–62, 140, 155–56, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 187–88, 190–93, 195–96, 197–98, 202–3, 205, 206, 214–16, 218–23, 225–28, 229, 230, 231, 233–34, 273, 278, 308, 309–11, 312, 315–16, 336, 338 renewable energy in, 193, 229 social capital destroyed in, 78 sovereign spread of, 200 spread in, 332 and structural reforms, 20, 70, 188, 191 tax revenue in, 16, 142, 192, 227, 367–368 tools lacking for recovery of, 246 tourism in, 192, 286 trade deficits in, 81, 194, 216–17, 222, 285–86 unemployment in, xi, 71, 236, 267, 332, 338, 342 urgency in, 214–15 victim-blaming of, 309–11 wages in, 216–17 youth unemployment in, xi, 332 Greek bonds, 116, 126 interest rates on, 4, 114, 181–82, 201–2, 323 restructuring of, 206–7 green investments, 260 Greenspan, Alan, 251, 359, 363 Grexit, see Greece, possible exit from eurozone of grocery stores, 219 gross domestic product (GDP), xvii decline in, 3 measurement of, 341 Growth and Stability Pact, 87 hedge funds, 282, 363 highways, 41 Hitler, Adolf, 338, 358 Hochtief, 367–68 Hoover, Herbert, 18, 95 human capital, 78, 137 human rights, 44–45, 319 Hungary, 46, 331, 338 hysteresis, 270 Iceland, 44, 111, 307, 354–55 banks in, 91 capital controls in, 390 ideology, 308–9, 315–18 imports, 86, 88, 97–99, 98, 107 incentives, 158–59 inclusive capitalism, 317 income, unemployment and, 77 income tax, 45 Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, 376–377 Indonesia, 113, 230–31, 314, 350, 364, 378 industrial policies, 138–39, 301 and restructuring, 217, 221, 223–25 Industrial Revolution, 3, 224 industry, 89 inequality, 45, 72–73, 333 aggregate demand lowered by, 212 created by central banks, 154 ECB’s creation of, 154–55 economic performance affected by, xvii euro’s increasing of, xviii growth’s lowering of, 212 hurt by collective action, 338 increased by neoliberalism, xviii increase in, 64, 154–55 inequality in, 72, 212 as moral issue, xviii in Spain, 72, 212, 225–26 and tax harmonization, 260–61 and tax system, 191 inflation, 277, 290, 314, 388 in aftermath of tech bubble, 251 bonds and, 161 central banks and, 153, 166–67 consequences of fixation on, 149–50, 151 costs of, 270 and debt monetization, 42 ECB and, 8, 25, 97, 106, 115, 145, 146–50, 151, 163, 165, 169–70, 172, 255, 256, 266 and food prices, 169 in Germany, 42, 338, 358 interest rates and, 43–44 in late 1970s, 168 and natural rate hypothesis, 172–73 political decisions and, 146 inflation targeting, 157, 168–70, 364 information, 335 informational capital, 77 infrastructure, xvi–xvii, 47, 137, 186, 211, 255, 258, 265, 268, 300 inheritance tax, 368 inherited debt, 134 innovation, 138 innovation economy, 317–18 inputs, 217 instability, xix institutions, 93, 247 poorly designed, 163–64 insurance, 355–356 deposit, see deposit insurance mutual, 247 unemployment, 91, 186, 246, 247–48 integration, 322 interest rates, 43–44, 86, 282, 345, 354 in aftermath of tech bubble, 251 ECB’s determination of, 85–86, 152, 249, 302, 348 and employment, 94 euro’s lowering of, 235 Fed’s lowering of, 150 on German bonds, 114 on Greek bonds, 4, 114, 181–82 on Italian bonds, 114 in late 1970s, 168 long-term, 151, 200 negative, 316, 348–49 quantitative easing and, 151, 170 short-term, 249 single, eurozone’s entailing of, 8, 85–88, 92, 93, 94, 105, 129, 152, 240, 244, 249 on Spanish bonds, 114, 199 spread in, 332 stock prices increased by, 264 at zero lower bound, 106 intermediation, 258 internal devaluation, 98–109, 122, 126, 220, 255, 388 supply-side effects of, 99, 103–4 International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 79, 341 International Labor Organization, 56 International Monetary Fund (IMF), xv, xvii, 10, 17, 18, 55, 61, 65–66, 96, 111, 112–13, 115–16, 119, 154, 234, 289, 309, 316, 337, 349, 350, 370, 371, 381 and Argentine debt, 206 conditions of, 201 creation of, 105 danger of high taxation warnings of, 190 debt reduction pushed by, 95 and debt restructuring, 205, 311 and failure to restore credit, 201 global imbalances discussed by, 252 and Greek debts, 205, 206, 310–11 on Greek surplus, 188 and Indonesian crisis, 230–31, 364 on inequality’s lowering of growth, 212–13 Ireland’s socialization of losses opposed by, 156–57 mistakes admitted by, 262, 312 on New Mediocre, 264 Portuguese bailout of, 178–79 tax measures of, 185 investment, 76–77, 111, 189, 217, 251, 264, 278, 367 confidence and, 94 divergence in, 136–38 in education, 137, 186, 211, 217, 251, 255, 300 infrastructure in, xvi–xvii, 47, 137, 186, 211, 255, 258, 265, 268, 300 lowered by disintermediation, 258 public, 99 real estate, 199 in renewable energy, 229–30 return on, 186, 245 stimulation of, 94 in technology, 137, 138–39, 186, 211, 217, 251, 258, 265, 300 investor state dispute settlement (ISDS), 393–94 invisible hand, xviii Iraq, refugees from, 320 Iraq War, 36, 37 Ireland, 14, 16, 44, 113, 114–15, 122, 178, 234, 296, 312, 331, 339–40, 343, 362 austerity opposed in, 207 debt of, 196 emigrants from, 68–69 GDP of, 18, 231 growth in, 64, 231, 247, 340 inherited debt in, 134 losses socialized in, 134, 156–57, 165 low debt in, 88 real estate bubble in, 108, 114–15, 126 surplus in, 17, 88 taxes in, 142–43, 376 trade deficits in, 119 unemployment in, 178 irrational exuberance, 14, 114, 116–17, 149, 334, 359 ISIS, 319 Italian bonds, 114, 165, 323 Italy, 6, 14, 16, 120, 125, 331, 343 austerity opposed in, 59 GDP per capita in, 352 growth in, 247 sovereign spread of, 200 Japan, 151, 333, 342 bubble in, 359 debt of, 202 growth in, 78 quantitative easing used by, 151, 359 shrinking working-age population of, 70 Java, unemployment on, 230 jobs gap, 120 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 228 Keynes, John Maynard, 118, 120, 172, 187, 351 convergence policy suggested by, 254 Keynesian economics, 64, 95, 108, 153, 253 King, Mervyn, 390 knowledge, 137, 138–39, 337–38 Kohl, Helmut, 6–7, 337 krona, 287 labor, marginal product of, 356 labor laws, 75 labor markets, 9, 74 friction in, 336 reforms of, 214, 221 labor movement, 26, 40, 125, 134–36, 320 austerity and, 140 capital flows and, 135 see also migration labor rights, 56 Lamers, Karl, 314 Lancaster, Kelvin, 27 land tax, 191 Latin America, 10, 55, 95, 112, 202 lost decade in, 168 Latvia, 331, 346 GDP of, 92 law of diminishing returns, 40 learning by doing, 77 Lehman Brothers, 182 lender of last resort, 85, 362, 368 lending, 280, 380 discriminatory, 283 predatory, 274, 310 lending rates, 278 leverage, 102 Lichtenstein, 44 Lipsey, Richard, 27 liquidity, 201, 264, 278, 354 ECB’s expansion of, 256 lira, 14 Lithuania, 331 living standards, 68–70 loans: contraction of, 126–27, 246 nonperforming, 241 for small and medium-size businesses, 246–47 lobbyists, from financial sector, 132 location, 76 London interbank lending rate (LIBOR), 131, 355 Long-Term Refinancing Operation, 360–361 Lucas, Robert, xi Luxembourg, 6, 94, 142–43, 331, 343 as tax avoidance center, 228, 261 luxury cars, 265 Maastricht Treaty, xiii, 6, 87, 115, 146, 244, 298, 339, 340 macro-prudential regulations, 249 Malta, 331, 340 manufacturing, 89, 223–24 market failures, 48–49, 86, 148, 149, 335 rigidities, 101 tax policy’s correction of, 193 market fundamentalism, see neoliberalism market irrationality, 110, 125–26, 149 markets, limitations of, 10 Meade, James, 27 Medicaid, 91 medical care, 196 Medicare, 90, 91 Mellon, Andrew, 95 Memorandum of Agreement, 233–34 Merkel, Angela, 186 Mexico, 202, 369 bailout of, 113 in NAFTA, xiv Middle East, 321 migrant crisis, 44 migration, 26, 40, 68–69, 90, 125, 320–21, 334–35, 342, 356, 393 unemployment and, 69, 90, 135, 140 see also labor movement military power, 36–37 milk, 218, 223, 230 minimum wage, 42, 120, 254, 255, 351 mining, 257 Mississippi, GDP of, 92 Mitsotakis, Constantine, 377–78 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 377–78 Mitterrand, François, 6–7 monetarism, 167–68, 169, 364 monetary policy, 24, 85–86, 148, 264, 325, 345, 364 as allegedly technocratic, 146, 161–62 conservative theory of, 151, 153 in early 1980s US, 168, 210 flexibility of, 244 in global financial crisis, 151 political nature of, 146, 153–54 recent developments in theory of, 166–73 see also interest rates monetary union, see single currencies money laundering, 354 monopolists, privatization and, 194 moral hazard, 202, 203 mortgage rates, 170 mortgages, 302 multinational chains, 219 multinational development banks, 137 multinationals, 127, 223, 376 multipliers, 211–12, 248 balanced-budget, 188–90, 265 Mundell, Robert, 87 mutual insurance, 247 mutualization of debt, 242–43, 263 national development banks, 137–38 natural monopolies, 55 natural rate hypothesis, 172 negative shocks, 248 neoliberalism, xvi, 24–26, 33, 34, 98–99, 109, 257, 265, 332–33, 335, 354 on bubbles, 381 and capital flows, 28 and central bank independence, 162–63 in Germany, 10 inequality increased by, xviii low inflation desired by, 147 recent scholarship against, 24 Netherlands, 6, 44, 292, 331, 339–40, 343 European Constitution referendum of, 58 New Democracy Party, Greek, 61, 185, 377–78 New Mediocre, 264 New World, 148 New Zealand, 364 Nokia, 81, 234, 297 nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), 379–80 nonaccelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU), 379–80 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 276 nonperforming loans, 241 nontraded goods sector, 102, 103, 169, 213, 217, 359 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), xiv North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 196 Norway, 12, 44, 307 referendum on joining EU, 58 nuclear deterrence, 38 Obama, Barack, 319 oil, import of, 230 oil firms, 36 oil prices, 89, 168, 259, 359 oligarchs: in Greece, 16, 227 in Russia, 280 optimal currency area, 345 output, 70–71, 111 after recessions, 76 Outright Monetary Transactions program, 361 overregulate, 132 Oxfam, 72 panic of 1907, 147 Papandreou, Andreas, 366 Papandreou, George, xiv, 60–61, 184, 185, 220, 221, 226–27, 309, 312, 366, 373 reform of banks suggested by, 229 paradox of thrift, 120 peace, 34 pensions, 9, 16, 78, 177, 188, 197–98, 226, 276, 370 People’s Party, Portugal, 392 periphery, 14, 32, 171, 200, 296, 301, 318 see also specific countries peseta, 14 pharmacies, 218–20 Phishing for Phools (Akerlof and Shiller), 132 physical capital, 77–78 Pinochet, Augusto, 152–53 place-based debt, 134, 242 Pleios, George, 377 Poland, 46, 333, 339 assistance to, 243 in Iraq War, 37 police, 41 political integration, xvi, 34, 35 economic integration vs., 51–57 politics, economics and, 308–18 pollution, 260 populism, xx Portugal, 14, 16, 64, 177, 178, 331, 343, 346 austerity opposed by, 59, 207–8, 315, 332, 392 GDP of, 92 IMF bailout of, 178–79 loans in, 127 poverty in, 261 sovereign spread of, 200 Portuguese bonds, 179 POSCO, 55 pound, 287, 335, 346 poverty, 72 in Greece, 226, 261 in Portugal, 261 in Spain, 261 predatory lending, 274, 310 present discount value, 343 Price of Inequality, The (Stiglitz), 154 prices, 19, 24 adjustment of, 48, 338, 361 price stability, 161 primary deficit, 188, 389 primary surpluses, 187–88 private austerity, 126–27, 241–42 private sector involvement, 113 privatization, 55, 194–96, 369 production costs, 39, 43, 50 production function, 343 productivity, 71, 332, 348 in manufacturing, 223–24 after recessions, 76–77 programs, 17–18 Germany’s design of, 53, 60, 61, 187–88, 205, 336, 338 imposed on Greece, xv, 21, 27, 60–62, 140, 155–56, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 187–88, 190–93, 195–96, 197–98, 202–3, 205, 206, 214–16, 218–23, 225–28, 229, 230, 231, 233–34, 273, 278, 308, 309–11, 312, 315–16, 336, 338 of Troika, 17–18, 21, 155–57, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 187–93, 196, 202, 205, 207, 208, 214–16, 217, 218–23, 225–28, 229, 231, 233–34, 273, 278, 308, 309–11, 312, 313, 314, 315–16, 323–24, 346, 366, 379, 392 progressive automatic stabilizers, 244 progressive taxes, 248 property rights, 24 property taxes, 192–93, 227 public entities, 195 public goods, 40, 337–38 quantitative easing (QE), 151, 164, 165–66, 170–72, 264, 359, 361, 386 railroads, 55 Reagan, Ronald, 168, 209 real estate bubble, 25, 108, 109, 111, 114–15, 126, 148, 172, 250, 301, 302 cause of, 198 real estate investment, 199 real exchange rate, 105–6, 215–16 recessions, recovery from, 94–95 recovery, 76 reform, 75 theories of, 27–28 regulations, 24, 149, 152, 162, 250, 354, 355–356, 378 and Bush administration, 250–51 common, 241 corporate opposition to, xvi difficulties in, 132–33 of finance, xix forbearance on, 130–31 importance of, 152–53 macro-prudential, 249 in race to bottom, 131–34 Reinhardt, Carmen, 210 renewable energy, 193, 229–30 Republican Party, US, 319 research and development (R&D), 77, 138, 217, 251, 317–18 Ricardo, David, 40, 41 risk, 104, 153, 285 excessive, 250 risk markets, 27 Rogoff, Kenneth, 210 Romania, 46, 331, 338 Royal Bank of Scotland, 355 rules, 57, 241–42, 262, 296 Russia, 36, 264, 296 containment of, 318 economic rents in, 280 gas from, 37, 81, 93, 378 safety nets, 99, 141, 223 Samaras, Antonis, 61, 309, 377 savings, 120 global, 257 savings and loan crisis, 360 Schäuble, Wolfgang, 57, 220, 314, 317 Schengen area, 44 schools, 41, 196 Schröeder, Gerhard, 254 self-regulation, 131, 159 service sector, 224 shadow banking system, 133 shareholder capitalism, 21 Shiller, Rob, 132, 359 shipping taxes, 227, 228 short-termism, 77, 258–59 Silicon Valley, 224 silver, 275, 277 single currencies: conflicts and, 38 as entailing fixed exchange rates, 8, 42–43, 46–47, 86–87, 92, 93, 94, 97–98 external imbalances and, 97–98 and financial crises, 110–18 integration and, 45–46, 50 interest rates and, 8, 86, 87–88, 92, 93, 94 Mundell’s work on, 87 requirements for, 5, 52–53, 88–89, 92–94, 97–98 and similarities among countries, 15 trade integration vs., 393 in US, 35, 36, 88, 89–92 see also euro single-market principle, 125–26, 231 skilled workers, 134–35 skills, 77 Slovakia, 331 Slovenia, 331 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 127, 138, 171, 229 small and medium-size lending facility, 246–47, 300, 301, 382 Small Business Administration, 246 small businesses, 153 Smith, Adam, xviii, 24, 39–40, 41 social cohesion, 22 Social Democratic Party, Portugal, 392 social program, 196 Social Security, 90, 91 social solidarity, xix societal capital, 77–78 solar energy, 193, 229 solidarity fund, 373 solidarity fund for stabilization, 244, 254, 264, 301 Soros, George, 390 South Dakota, 90, 346 South Korea, 55 bailout of, 113 sovereign risk, 14, 353 sovereign spreads, 200 sovereign wealth funds, 258 Soviet Union, 10 Spain, 14, 16, 114, 177, 178, 278, 331, 335, 343 austerity opposed by, 59, 207–8, 315 bank bailout of, 179, 199–200, 206 banks in, 23, 186, 199, 200, 242, 270, 354 debt of, 196 debt-to-GDP ratio of, 231 deficits of, 109 economic growth in, 215, 231, 247 gold supply in, 277 independence movement in, xi inequality in, 72, 212, 225–26 inherited debt in, 134 labor reforms proposed for, 155 loans in, 127 low debt in, 87 poverty in, 261 real estate bubble in, 25, 108, 109, 114–15, 126, 198, 301, 302 regional independence demanded in, 307 renewable energy in, 229 sovereign spread of, 200 spread in, 332 structural reform in, 70 surplus in, 17, 88 threat of breakup of, 270 trade deficits in, 81, 119 unemployment in, 63, 161, 231, 235, 332, 338 Spanish bonds, 114, 199, 200 spending, cutting, 196–98 spread, 332 stability, 147, 172, 261, 301, 364 automatic, 244 bubble and, 264 central banks and, 8 as collective action problem, 246 solidarity fund for, 54, 244, 264 Stability and Growth Pact, 245 standard models, 211–13 state development banks, 138 steel companies, 55 stock market, 151 stock market bubble, 200–201 stock market crash (1929), 18, 95 stock options, 259, 359 structural deficit, 245 Structural Funds, 243 structural impediments, 215 structural realignment, 252–56 structural reforms, 9, 18, 19–20, 26–27, 214–36, 239–71, 307 from austerity to growth, 263–65 banking union, 241–44 and climate change, 229–30 common framework for stability, 244–52 counterproductive, 222–23 debt restructuring and, 265–67 of finance, 228–29 full employment and growth, 256–57 in Greece, 20, 70, 188, 191, 214–36 growth and, 232–35 shared prosperity and, 260–61 and structural realignment, 252–56 of trade deficits, 216–17 trauma of, 224 as trivial, 214–15, 217–20, 233 subsidiarity, 8, 41–42, 263 subsidies: agricultural, 45, 197 energy, 197 sudden stops, 111 Suharto, 314 suicide, 82, 344 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 91 supply-side effects: in Greece, 191, 215–16 of investments, 367 surpluses, fiscal, 17, 96, 312, 379 primary, 187–88 surpluses, trade, see trade surpluses “Swabian housewife,” 186, 245 Sweden, 12, 46, 307, 313, 331, 335, 339 euro referendum of, 58 refugees into, 320 Switzerland, 44, 307 Syria, 321, 342 Syriza party, 309, 311, 312–13, 315, 377 Taiwan, 55 tariffs, 40 tax avoiders, 74, 142–43, 227–28, 261 taxes, 142, 290, 315 in Canada, 191 on capital, 356 on carbon, 230, 260, 265, 368 consumption, 193–94 corporate, 189–90, 227, 251 cross-border, 319, 384 and distortions, 191 in EU, 8, 261 and fiat currency, 284 and free mobility of goods and capital, 260–61 in Greece, 16, 142, 192, 193–94, 227, 367–68 ideal system for, 191 IMF’s warning about high, 190 income, 45 increase in, 190–94 inequality and, 191 inheritance, 368 land, 191 on luxury cars, 265 progressive, 248 property, 192–93, 227 Reagan cuts to, 168, 210 shipping, 227, 228 as stimulative, 368 on trade surpluses, 254 value-added, 190, 192 tax evasion, in Greece, 190–91 tax laws, 75 tax revenue, 190–96 Taylor, John, 169 Taylor rule, 169 tech bubble, 250 technology, 137, 138–39, 186, 211, 217, 251, 258, 265, 300 and new financial system, 274–76, 283–84 telecoms, 55 Telmex, 369 terrorism, 319 Thailand, 113 theory of the second best, 27–28, 48 “there is no alternative” (TINA), 306, 311–12 Tocqueville, Alexis de, xiii too-big-to-fail banks, 360 tourism, 192, 286 trade: and contractionary expansion, 209 US push for, 323 trade agreements, xiv–xvi, 357 trade balance, 81, 93, 100, 109 as allegedly self-correcting, 98–99, 101–3 and wage flexibility, 104–5 trade barriers, 40 trade deficits, 89, 139 aggregate demand weakened by, 111 chit solution to, 287–88, 290, 299–300, 387, 388–89 control of, 109–10, 122 with currency pegs, 110 and fixed exchange rates, 107–8, 118 and government spending, 107–8, 108 of Greece, 81, 194, 215–16, 222, 285–86 structural reform of, 216–17 traded goods, 102, 103, 216 trade integration, 393 trade surpluses, 88, 118–21, 139–40, 350–52 discouragement of, 282–84, 299–300 of Germany, 118–19, 120, 139, 253, 293, 299, 350–52, 381–82, 391 tax on, 254, 351, 381–82 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, xv, 323 transfer price system, 376 Trans-Pacific Partnership, xv, 323 Treasury bills, US, 204 Trichet, Jean-Claude, 100–101, 155, 156, 164–65, 251 trickle-down economics, 362 Troika, 19, 20, 26, 55, 56, 58, 60, 69, 99, 101–3, 117, 119, 135, 140–42, 178, 179, 184, 195, 274, 294, 317, 362, 370–71, 373, 376, 377, 386 banks weakened by, 229 conditions of, 201 discretion of, 262 failure to learn, 312 Greek incomes lowered by, 80 Greek loan set up by, 202 inequality created by, 225–26 poor forecasting of, 307 predictions by, 249 primary surpluses and, 187–88 privatization avoided by, 194 programs of, 17–18, 21, 155–57, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 187–93, 196, 197–98, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 214–16, 217, 218–23, 225–28, 229, 231, 233–34, 273, 278, 308, 309–11, 312, 313, 314, 315–16, 323–24, 348, 366, 379, 392 social contract torn up by, 78 structural reforms imposed by, 214–16, 217, 218–23, 225–38 tax demand of, 192 and tax evasion, 367 see also European Central Bank (ECB); European Commission; International Monetary Fund (IMF) trust, xix, 280 Tsipras, Alexis, 61–62, 221, 273, 314 Turkey, 321 UBS, 355 Ukraine, 36 unemployment, 3, 64, 68, 71–72, 110, 111, 122, 323, 336, 342 as allegedly self-correcting, 98–101 in Argentina, 267 austerity and, 209 central banks and, 8, 94, 97, 106, 147 ECB and, 163 in eurozone, 71, 135, 163, 177–78, 181, 331 and financing investments, 186 in Finland, 296 and future income, 77 in Greece, xi, 71, 236, 267, 331, 338, 342 increased by capital, 264 interest rates and, 43–44 and internal devaluation, 98–101, 104–6 migration and, 69, 90, 135, 140 natural rate of, 172–73 present-day, in Europe, 210 and rise of Hitler, 338, 358 and single currency, 88 in Spain, 63, 161, 231, 235, 332, 338 and structural reforms, 19 and trade deficits, 108 in US, 3 youth, 3, 64, 71 unemployment insurance, 91, 186, 246, 247–48 UNICEF, 72–73 unions, 101, 254, 335 United Kingdom, 14, 44, 46, 131, 307, 331, 332, 340 colonies of, 36 debt of, 202 inflation target set in, 157 in Iraq War, 37 light regulations in, 131 proposed exit from EU by, 4, 270 United Nations, 337, 350, 384–85 creation of, 38 and lower rates of war, 196 United States: banking system in, 91 budget of, 8, 45 and Canada’s 1990 expansion, 209 Canada’s free trade with, 45–46, 47 central bank governance in, 161 debt-to-GDP of, 202, 210–11 financial crisis originating in, 65, 68, 79–80, 128, 296, 302 financial system in, 228 founding of, 319 GDP of, xiii Germany’s borrowing from, 187 growing working-age population of, 70 growth in, 68 housing bubble in, 108 immigration into, 320 migration in, 90, 136, 346 monetary policy in financial crisis of, 151 in NAFTA, xiv 1980–1981 recessions in, 76 predatory lending in, 310 productivity in, 71 recovery of, xiii, 12 rising inequality in, xvii, 333 shareholder capitalism of, 21 Small Business Administration in, 246 structural reforms needed in, 20 surpluses in, 96, 187 trade agenda of, 323 unemployment in, 3, 178 united currency in, 35, 36, 88, 89–92 United States bonds, 350 unskilled workers, 134–35 value-added tax, 190, 192 values, 57–58 Varoufakis, Yanis, 61, 221, 309 velocity of circulation, 167 Venezuela, 371 Versaille, Treaty of, 187 victim blaming, 9, 15–17, 177–78, 309–11 volatility: and capital market integration, 28 in exchange rates, 48–49 Volcker, Paul, 157, 168 wage adjustments, 100–101, 103, 104–5, 155, 216–17, 220–22, 338, 361 wages, 19, 348 expansionary policies on, 284–85 Germany’s constraining of, 41, 42–43 lowered in Germany, 105, 333 wage stagnation, in Germany, 13 war, change in attitude to, 38, 196 Washington Consensus, xvi Washington Mutual, 91 wealth, divergence in, 139–40 Weil, Jonathan, 360 welfare, 196 West Germany, 6 Whitney, Meredith, 360 wind energy, 193, 229 Wolf, Martin, 385 worker protection, 56 workers’ bargaining rights, 19, 221, 255 World Bank, xv, xvii, 10, 61, 337, 357, 371 World Trade Organization, xiv youth: future of, xx–xxi unemployment of, 3, 64, 71 Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, xiv, 155, 362 zero lower bound, 106 ALSO BY JOSEPH E.

., 393 in US, 35, 36, 88, 89–92 see also euro single-market principle, 125–26, 231 skilled workers, 134–35 skills, 77 Slovakia, 331 Slovenia, 331 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 127, 138, 171, 229 small and medium-size lending facility, 246–47, 300, 301, 382 Small Business Administration, 246 small businesses, 153 Smith, Adam, xviii, 24, 39–40, 41 social cohesion, 22 Social Democratic Party, Portugal, 392 social program, 196 Social Security, 90, 91 social solidarity, xix societal capital, 77–78 solar energy, 193, 229 solidarity fund, 373 solidarity fund for stabilization, 244, 254, 264, 301 Soros, George, 390 South Dakota, 90, 346 South Korea, 55 bailout of, 113 sovereign risk, 14, 353 sovereign spreads, 200 sovereign wealth funds, 258 Soviet Union, 10 Spain, 14, 16, 114, 177, 178, 278, 331, 335, 343 austerity opposed by, 59, 207–8, 315 bank bailout of, 179, 199–200, 206 banks in, 23, 186, 199, 200, 242, 270, 354 debt of, 196 debt-to-GDP ratio of, 231 deficits of, 109 economic growth in, 215, 231, 247 gold supply in, 277 independence movement in, xi inequality in, 72, 212, 225–26 inherited debt in, 134 labor reforms proposed for, 155 loans in, 127 low debt in, 87 poverty in, 261 real estate bubble in, 25, 108, 109, 114–15, 126, 198, 301, 302 regional independence demanded in, 307 renewable energy in, 229 sovereign spread of, 200 spread in, 332 structural reform in, 70 surplus in, 17, 88 threat of breakup of, 270 trade deficits in, 81, 119 unemployment in, 63, 161, 231, 235, 332, 338 Spanish bonds, 114, 199, 200 spending, cutting, 196–98 spread, 332 stability, 147, 172, 261, 301, 364 automatic, 244 bubble and, 264 central banks and, 8 as collective action problem, 246 solidarity fund for, 54, 244, 264 Stability and Growth Pact, 245 standard models, 211–13 state development banks, 138 steel companies, 55 stock market, 151 stock market bubble, 200–201 stock market crash (1929), 18, 95 stock options, 259, 359 structural deficit, 245 Structural Funds, 243 structural impediments, 215 structural realignment, 252–56 structural reforms, 9, 18, 19–20, 26–27, 214–36, 239–71, 307 from austerity to growth, 263–65 banking union, 241–44 and climate change, 229–30 common framework for stability, 244–52 counterproductive, 222–23 debt restructuring and, 265–67 of finance, 228–29 full employment and growth, 256–57 in Greece, 20, 70, 188, 191, 214–36 growth and, 232–35 shared prosperity and, 260–61 and structural realignment, 252–56 of trade deficits, 216–17 trauma of, 224 as trivial, 214–15, 217–20, 233 subsidiarity, 8, 41–42, 263 subsidies: agricultural, 45, 197 energy, 197 sudden stops, 111 Suharto, 314 suicide, 82, 344 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 91 supply-side effects: in Greece, 191, 215–16 of investments, 367 surpluses, fiscal, 17, 96, 312, 379 primary, 187–88 surpluses, trade, see trade surpluses “Swabian housewife,” 186, 245 Sweden, 12, 46, 307, 313, 331, 335, 339 euro referendum of, 58 refugees into, 320 Switzerland, 44, 307 Syria, 321, 342 Syriza party, 309, 311, 312–13, 315, 377 Taiwan, 55 tariffs, 40 tax avoiders, 74, 142–43, 227–28, 261 taxes, 142, 290, 315 in Canada, 191 on capital, 356 on carbon, 230, 260, 265, 368 consumption, 193–94 corporate, 189–90, 227, 251 cross-border, 319, 384 and distortions, 191 in EU, 8, 261 and fiat currency, 284 and free mobility of goods and capital, 260–61 in Greece, 16, 142, 192, 193–94, 227, 367–68 ideal system for, 191 IMF’s warning about high, 190 income, 45 increase in, 190–94 inequality and, 191 inheritance, 368 land, 191 on luxury cars, 265 progressive, 248 property, 192–93, 227 Reagan cuts to, 168, 210 shipping, 227, 228 as stimulative, 368 on trade surpluses, 254 value-added, 190, 192 tax evasion, in Greece, 190–91 tax laws, 75 tax revenue, 190–96 Taylor, John, 169 Taylor rule, 169 tech bubble, 250 technology, 137, 138–39, 186, 211, 217, 251, 258, 265, 300 and new financial system, 274–76, 283–84 telecoms, 55 Telmex, 369 terrorism, 319 Thailand, 113 theory of the second best, 27–28, 48 “there is no alternative” (TINA), 306, 311–12 Tocqueville, Alexis de, xiii too-big-to-fail banks, 360 tourism, 192, 286 trade: and contractionary expansion, 209 US push for, 323 trade agreements, xiv–xvi, 357 trade balance, 81, 93, 100, 109 as allegedly self-correcting, 98–99, 101–3 and wage flexibility, 104–5 trade barriers, 40 trade deficits, 89, 139 aggregate demand weakened by, 111 chit solution to, 287–88, 290, 299–300, 387, 388–89 control of, 109–10, 122 with currency pegs, 110 and fixed exchange rates, 107–8, 118 and government spending, 107–8, 108 of Greece, 81, 194, 215–16, 222, 285–86 structural reform of, 216–17 traded goods, 102, 103, 216 trade integration, 393 trade surpluses, 88, 118–21, 139–40, 350–52 discouragement of, 282–84, 299–300 of Germany, 118–19, 120, 139, 253, 293, 299, 350–52, 381–82, 391 tax on, 254, 351, 381–82 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, xv, 323 transfer price system, 376 Trans-Pacific Partnership, xv, 323 Treasury bills, US, 204 Trichet, Jean-Claude, 100–101, 155, 156, 164–65, 251 trickle-down economics, 362 Troika, 19, 20, 26, 55, 56, 58, 60, 69, 99, 101–3, 117, 119, 135, 140–42, 178, 179, 184, 195, 274, 294, 317, 362, 370–71, 373, 376, 377, 386 banks weakened by, 229 conditions of, 201 discretion of, 262 failure to learn, 312 Greek incomes lowered by, 80 Greek loan set up by, 202 inequality created by, 225–26 poor forecasting of, 307 predictions by, 249 primary surpluses and, 187–88 privatization avoided by, 194 programs of, 17–18, 21, 155–57, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 187–93, 196, 197–98, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 214–16, 217, 218–23, 225–28, 229, 231, 233–34, 273, 278, 308, 309–11, 312, 313, 314, 315–16, 323–24, 348, 366, 379, 392 social contract torn up by, 78 structural reforms imposed by, 214–16, 217, 218–23, 225–38 tax demand of, 192 and tax evasion, 367 see also European Central Bank (ECB); European Commission; International Monetary Fund (IMF) trust, xix, 280 Tsipras, Alexis, 61–62, 221, 273, 314 Turkey, 321 UBS, 355 Ukraine, 36 unemployment, 3, 64, 68, 71–72, 110, 111, 122, 323, 336, 342 as allegedly self-correcting, 98–101 in Argentina, 267 austerity and, 209 central banks and, 8, 94, 97, 106, 147 ECB and, 163 in eurozone, 71, 135, 163, 177–78, 181, 331 and financing investments, 186 in Finland, 296 and future income, 77 in Greece, xi, 71, 236, 267, 331, 338, 342 increased by capital, 264 interest rates and, 43–44 and internal devaluation, 98–101, 104–6 migration and, 69, 90, 135, 140 natural rate of, 172–73 present-day, in Europe, 210 and rise of Hitler, 338, 358 and single currency, 88 in Spain, 63, 161, 231, 235, 332, 338 and structural reforms, 19 and trade deficits, 108 in US, 3 youth, 3, 64, 71 unemployment insurance, 91, 186, 246, 247–48 UNICEF, 72–73 unions, 101, 254, 335 United Kingdom, 14, 44, 46, 131, 307, 331, 332, 340 colonies of, 36 debt of, 202 inflation target set in, 157 in Iraq War, 37 light regulations in, 131 proposed exit from EU by, 4, 270 United Nations, 337, 350, 384–85 creation of, 38 and lower rates of war, 196 United States: banking system in, 91 budget of, 8, 45 and Canada’s 1990 expansion, 209 Canada’s free trade with, 45–46, 47 central bank governance in, 161 debt-to-GDP of, 202, 210–11 financial crisis originating in, 65, 68, 79–80, 128, 296, 302 financial system in, 228 founding of, 319 GDP of, xiii Germany’s borrowing from, 187 growing working-age population of, 70 growth in, 68 housing bubble in, 108 immigration into, 320 migration in, 90, 136, 346 monetary policy in financial crisis of, 151 in NAFTA, xiv 1980–1981 recessions in, 76 predatory lending in, 310 productivity in, 71 recovery of, xiii, 12 rising inequality in, xvii, 333 shareholder capitalism of, 21 Small Business Administration in, 246 structural reforms needed in, 20 surpluses in, 96, 187 trade agenda of, 323 unemployment in, 3, 178 united currency in, 35, 36, 88, 89–92 United States bonds, 350 unskilled workers, 134–35 value-added tax, 190, 192 values, 57–58 Varoufakis, Yanis, 61, 221, 309 velocity of circulation, 167 Venezuela, 371 Versaille, Treaty of, 187 victim blaming, 9, 15–17, 177–78, 309–11 volatility: and capital market integration, 28 in exchange rates, 48–49 Volcker, Paul, 157, 168 wage adjustments, 100–101, 103, 104–5, 155, 216–17, 220–22, 338, 361 wages, 19, 348 expansionary policies on, 284–85 Germany’s constraining of, 41, 42–43 lowered in Germany, 105, 333 wage stagnation, in Germany, 13 war, change in attitude to, 38, 196 Washington Consensus, xvi Washington Mutual, 91 wealth, divergence in, 139–40 Weil, Jonathan, 360 welfare, 196 West Germany, 6 Whitney, Meredith, 360 wind energy, 193, 229 Wolf, Martin, 385 worker protection, 56 workers’ bargaining rights, 19, 221, 255 World Bank, xv, xvii, 10, 61, 337, 357, 371 World Trade Organization, xiv youth: future of, xx–xxi unemployment of, 3, 64, 71 Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, xiv, 155, 362 zero lower bound, 106 ALSO BY JOSEPH E.


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Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown by Philip Mirowski

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Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, barriers to entry, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, Brownian motion, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, constrained optimization, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, dark matter, David Brooks, David Graeber, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental economics, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Flash crash, full employment, George Akerlof, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Hernando de Soto, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, incomplete markets, invisible hand, Jean Tirole, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, l'esprit de l'escalier, labor-force participation, liquidity trap, loose coupling, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market design, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, Nash equilibrium, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shock, payday loans, Ponzi scheme, precariat, prediction markets, price mechanism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, random walk, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, school choice, sealed-bid auction, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Steven Levy, technoutopianism, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, the map is not the territory, The Myth of the Rational Market, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, theory of mind, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, working poor

Part of the blame might be laid at the door of the neoliberals themselves: as I document below, even though the members of Mont Pèlerin Society initially used the term “neoliberal” to refer to themselves in the early 1950s, by the 1960s they had backtracked, trumpeting the ambagious notion that their ideas all could be traced back to Adam Smith, if not before. But an equal moiety of blame should be dished out to their opponents on the left, who often bandy about attributions of “neoliberalism” as a portmanteau term of abuse when discussing grand phenomena often lumped together under the terminology of “globalization” and “financialization” and “governmentality.” The Washington Consensus, the death of the welfare state, the risk society, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, European (dis)integration, the ascendancy of China, and the outsourcing of manufacturing all portend cosmic themes, mostly of interest to those who regard themselves of taking the broad view of power politics.4 But broad characterizations of contemporary political events should not be mistaken for the painstaking construction of political doctrines to motivate organization in the long run, however much they may be related.

The market is not the one and all; it has an outside, it has a limit.14 Just so it doesn’t appear that I am unfairly taking advantage of a certain class of people who might have been overly inclined to jump the gun, let’s sample some people closer to the orthodoxy in American economics like, say, Joseph Stiglitz: Neo-liberal market fundamentalism was always a political doctrine serving certain interests. It was never supported by economic theory. Nor, it should now be clear, is it supported by historical experience. Learning this lesson may be the silver lining in the cloud now hanging over the global economy.15 In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung, Stiglitz was quoted as saying, “Neoliberalism like the Washington Consensus is dead in most western countries. See the debates in South America or other countries. The U.S. has lost its role as the model for others. Everyone only laughs when U.S. technocrats give lectures in other countries and say: ‘Do as we do, liberalize your financial markets!’”16 Stiglitz, as one of the few neoclassical economists who has periodically attempted to intellectually refute neoliberalism over the course of his career, should therefore be regarded as someone who had significant credibility tied up in expressing his conviction that the demise of neoliberalism was at hand.

Initially strident demands to abolish global financial (and other) institutions on the part of early neoliberals such as Friedman and some denizens of the Cato Institute were subsequently tempered by others—such as Anne Krueger, Stanley Fischer, and Kenneth Rogoff—and as these neoliberals came to occupy these institutions, they used them primarily to influence staffing and policy decisions, and thus to displace other internationalist agendas. The role of such transnational organizations was recast to exert “lock-in” of prior neoliberal policies, and therefore to restrict the range of political options of national governments. Sometimes they were also used to displace indigenous “crony capitalists” with a more cosmopolitan breed of cronyism. Thus it is correct to observe an organic connection between such phenomena as the Washington Consensus and the spread of neoliberal hegemony, as Dieter Plehwe argues.99 This also helps address the neoliberal conundrum of how to both hem in and at the same time obscure the strong state identified in point 4, above. The relevance of the rise of the neoliberal globalized financial regime to the crisis is a matter of great concern to the thought collective and to others (such as Ben Bernanke) who seek to offload responsibility for the crash onto someone else.


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The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire by Wikileaks

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affirmative action, anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, Chelsea Manning, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Snowden, energy security, energy transition, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, experimental subject, F. W. de Klerk, facts on the ground, failed state, financial innovation, Food sovereignty, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of journalism, high net worth, invisible hand, Julian Assange, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, Naomi Klein, Northern Rock, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, éminence grise

It also hit East Asia, despite hopes that the region would be able to ride out the storm. This is a testament to the extent of economic interpenetration that has already developed, and the extent to which the rest of the world depends upon the US economy. It is also a very good reason why, after the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the US can still lead a wide coalition of states as it presses for further entrenchment of the “Washington Consensus.” The dominance of Wall Street is reminiscent of British domination of world trade in the nineteenth century, in that US interests have in a way become synonymous with those of the world. If it goes down, we all go down. This eBook is licensed to Edward Betts, edward@4angle.com on 04/01/2016 Part II This eBook is licensed to Edward Betts, edward@4angle.com on 04/01/2016 4.

In September 2005, the new US ambassador to Ecuador, Linda Jewell, reiterated the embassy’s concerns about an unintended loss of US influence in Ecuador, in a cable titled: “Democracy Promotion Strategies for Ecuador.”48 As this cable illustrates, so-called “democracy promotion” is a strategy by which Western governments seek to influence and contain political and economic change in countries of strategic importance. In Ecuador, the US wanted to counteract the influence of Latin America’s burgeoning social movements. Demanding democratic reforms and an economic alternative to the Washington consensus, these movements had brought left-wing leaders to power in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay. The embassy feared that the “pink tide” would engulf Ecuador, damaging US business interests in the country and dashing any hopes of negotiating a free-trade agreement. Moreover, the Ecuadorians who had mobilized against Gutiérrez were calling for an end to US interference in Ecuador and closure of the US Forward Operating Base at Manta.

While soft US methods of intervention helped maintain right-wing, Washington-friendly political parties in power during the period of democratization of the 1990s, beginning in 1998 a tide of left-leaning candidates began winning elections, from the southern tip of South America to El Salvador. By 2009, the vast majority of Latin Americans—who had experienced an unprecedented economic growth failure for more than two decades6 under governments that adhered to the neoliberal “Washington Consensus”—were living under governments that explicitly rejected many of these policies. This chapter will examine the actions, recommendations, and observations of US diplomats in five countries, four of which saw left-wing political governments elected to power, and one of which experienced a US-backed coup that was followed by political violence and repression. The methods of intervention described above are all apparent in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where US diplomatic missions sought to undermine left-leaning candidates and governments.


pages: 382 words: 92,138

The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths by Mariana Mazzucato

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Apple II, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Bretton Woods, California gold rush, call centre, carbon footprint, Carmen Reinhart, cleantech, computer age, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demand response, deskilling, energy security, energy transition, eurozone crisis, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Financial Instability Hypothesis, full employment, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, incomplete markets, information retrieval, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, natural language processing, new economy, offshore financial centre, popular electronics, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, renewable energy credits, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, smart grid, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, William Shockley: the traitorous eight

Furthermore, the Japanese State coordinated the finance system through the Bank of Japan as well as through the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (funded by the postal savings system). Chang (2008) offers similar illustrations for South Korea and other recently emerged economies. China has engaged in a targeted industrialization strategy too, only joining the World Trade Organization once its industries were ready to compete, rather than as part of an International Monetary Fund–backed industrialization strategy. The Chinese strategy showed the weaknesses of the Washington Consensus on development, which denied the State the active role that it played in the development of major industrialized nations such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. If there is strong evidence that the State can be effective in pursuing targeted catch-up policies by focusing resources on being dominant in certain industrial sectors, why is it not accepted that the State can have a greater role in the development of new technologies and applications beyond simply funding basic science and having an infrastructure to support private sector activity?

Soviet Union 37, 39; market failure theory applied to 61; as measure of innovation performance 34, 41; myth of business investment requirements 53–5; myth of innovation being about 44, 159–60; as not enough 142; of pharmaceutical companies 25–6, 188; R&D/GDP 52; SEMATECH funding 99; spending differences 42; of struggling OECD countries 41; technological change investments 59; in wind energy projects 144–5; worker tax credit 54 R&D/GDP 52 R&D Magazine 63 redistributional policies 31 Reenen, John van 46 Reinert, Erik 9n3, 38n5, 73 Reinhart, Carmen 17–18 renewable energy credits (RECs) 115n1 Renewable Portfolio Standards 114 ‘repatriation tax holiday’ 175 ‘representative’ agent 60 research 60, 78, 84, 136; see also science rewards, socialization of 156 risk 58–62, 70; see also socialization of risk risk landscape 22–3, 58, 194, 198 risk–reward nexus framework 186 risk–reward relationships: Apple and the US government 167–8; collective vs. private benefit 165–6, 196; corporate success resulting in regional economic misery 176–8; need for functional dynamic in 182–3, 197–8; overview 165–7; State recognition in 12 Robinson, Joan 34 Roche 82 Rock, Arthur 94 Rodrik, Dani 27, 28 Rogoff, Kenneth 17–18 Roland, Alex 98n7 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 6, 74 Royal Radar Establishment (RRE) 101 royalties 188–9 Ruegg, Rosalie 148 Ruttan, Vernon 62–3 Sanofi 69 Schmidt, Horace 92, 92–3; see also Apple Schumpeter, Joseph 10n4, 31, 35, 58 Schumpeterian innovation economics: creative destruction concept in 10, 10n4, 58, 165; extended protection in 189; influence of on BNDES 5; investment role in 31; macro models of 44; ‘systems of innovation’ view of 35–6; theory of 36n4 science 49, 51, 57, 59n1, 69; see also research Seagate 97 Segal, David 170 Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) consortium 99 Shapiro, Isaac 170–71, 171n2 share buybacks 25–7, 67, 171, 175 shareholder-value ideology 184, 186 Shiman, Philip 98n7 Shi Zhengrong 141, 152–4 Shockley, William 76 Silicon Valley 20, 63, 78, 95 Silver, Jonathan 129, 154 SIRI 103, 105–6, 109 SITRA, Finnish Innovation Fund 190 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 10, 45–6, 45n6, 111n13 Small Business Administration (US) 94 small business associations 19 Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 79 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) (US) 20, 47, 79–81, 80, 188 Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) (US) 94 Smith, Adam 30; see also Adam Smith Institute; Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, An; ‘Invisible Hand’ socialization of risk and privatization of rewards: as cause of inequity and instability 185; direct or indirect returns of 187–91; framework for change of 185–7; income-contingent loans and equity 189–90; in the innovation economy 3; ‘innovation fund’ creation 189; IPR 189; mapping innovative labour into division of rewards 184–5; in pharmaceutical development 181; in public–private partnerships 27; skewed reality of risk and reward 181–5 social vs. private returns on investment 3–4 solar power: see wind and solar power Solow, Robert M. 33–4 Solyndra 129–32, 151, 154–5, 162; see also clean technology; ‘No More Solyndras Act’ Something Ventured, Something Gained (documentary) 78 Sony 108 Soppe, Birgit 146 South Korea 40, 61, 120–21 Soviet Union 37–9, 39, 76 Spain 120n4, 121, 121, 157 Spectrawatt 130n11, 162 spillovers 194 spinoff business model 76 SPINTRONICS 97, 97n5 Sputnik launch 76 Stanford Research Institute (SRI) 105–6; see also SIRI State: administrative role of 6, 12; attracting talent 12; capitalintensive investment by 27; ‘crowding in’ of 5–6, 8; ‘Developmental State’ 10, 37–8, 37–8n5, 40, 68; ‘directionality’ provided by 32n2; ‘dynamizing in’ 8; economic role of 1, 29; flexibility of 195–6; funding: see individual US agencies and departments; industrial directives of 21; as leading entrepreneurial force 193; market creation by 62, 167; organizational dynamics consideration 197; performance indicators lacking for 194; as private sector partner 5; response to criticism 19; responsibilities of 13; scope of endeavours of 18–19, 195; sectors funded by 63, 83, 196; targeted catch-up policies of 40; views of 9; see also ‘entrepreneurial’ State; ‘picking winners’ State development banks 2–3, 5, 122, 137–40, 189–91; see also Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES); China Development Bank (CDB); KfW (German Development Bank) stock market 49–50 Strategic Computing Initiative (SCI) 98–9 strategic management 197 Stumpe, Bent 101 Sullivan, Martin A. 174 SunPower 151 Suntech of China 152–5, 152n5 supply-side policies 83, 113–15, 159 sustainability 117, 119, 123, 195; see also green industrial revolution Swanson, Richard 151 Sweden 121 ‘systems of innovation’ approach: defined 36; foundation of 35–7; market failure approach vs. 9–10, 61–2; need for 22; regional 39; State role in 74; see also innovation; innovation ecosystems; Schumpeterian innovation economics ‘systems’ perspective 196 tariffs 108, 157, 157n6; see also feed-in tariffs Tassey, Gregory 32 tax avoidance: by Apple 11, 12, 171–5, 188; corporate 173–5, 187; ‘tax gap’ 187, 187n1 tax breaks 45–7 tax credits: energy 114, 138; impact of on R&D 28, 52–4; and R&D 111n13; and R&E 110; wind and solar power 126n8, 145, 149 tax cuts 10, 19, 23, 54, 69 taxes: antidumping tariffs 108; business as dependent on 69; ‘carbon tax’ 114; Citizens for Tax Justice 174n5; citizens unawareness of uses of 166; global avoidance schemes 174, 174n5; incentives to biotech firms 81; innovation systems not supported by 187–8; insensitivity of investment to 30n1; IRS 529 plans 111, 111n15; ‘patent box’ policy 51–2; policies impacting SMEs 45; policy 51; ‘repatriation tax holiday’ 175; State return from 165; US tax code 174; see also private vs. social returns; risk–reward nexus framework Taxol 188 Tea Party movement 17 technology: causing creative destruction 58; commissioning of advances in 54; core enabler technologies of Apple 95; dual-use 97; and growth 33–4; impact of regions on national performance 39; interagency collaborations in 74; origins of Apple products 109; revolutions 125, 126; SIRI 103, 105–6; State leadership of strategy for 40; unique situations in 59; see also computer field; wind and solar power technology commercialized: from capacitive sensing to click-wheels 99–101, 100n9, 103; cellular 102, 104, 109; from click-wheels to multi-touch screens 102–3; digital signal processing (DSP) 109; GPS 105; GPTs 62; LCD 107–8; lithium-ion battery 108; resistive touch-screens 101; silicon ICs impact on 98; thin-film transistors (TFTs) 107–8; ‘zero-emission’ electric vehicles 108 technology policy 75 Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) 97 TFP of India vs. 46 TFTs (thin-film transistors) 107–8 Thomas, Patrick 148 ‘trade wars’ 122, 131, 157 ‘traitorous eight’, the 76 Tulum, Oner: on biopharmaceutical industry 67, 69, 82; NIH spending data compilation of 25, 69; on orphan drugs 81–2 United Kingdom (UK): approach to green initiatives 124–6; BBC 16; BERD (business expenditure on R&D) in 24; Big Society theme of 15–16; clean technology investment by 120; energy strategies of 116; government energy R&D spending 121, 121; green revolution in 120; Medical Research Council (MRC) 20, 67; outsourcing in 16; public R&D spending in 61; R&D/GDP 52; sector specialties of 42; SME government support 45; SME performance in 46 United States: Air Force 98, 104, 105; American Energy Innovation Council (AEIC) 26; Apple’s risk– reward relationship with 167–8; Army 107; competitiveness decline in 176; energy policy 158; energy strategies of 116, 137; funding and innovation in 52; funding sources for basic research R&D in 61; funding sources for R&D in 60, 60–61, 60n2; green revolution in 120; ‘hidden Developmental State’ in 38, 38n5; innovation threatened in 24; systems of innovation in 37; tax code 174; tax system 172; ‘trade wars’ of 122, 131, 157; types of venture capital successes in 49; undermining of innovation in 53; wind capacity of 143; see also taxes; specific agencies and departments of University of Southern California 77–8 UNIX 104 USSR: see Soviet Union US Windpower (later Kenetech) 147 Valentine, Don 94 Vallas, Steven P. 67–8 value: extraction 26, 42, 162; measures of 34 Venrock 94 Vensys Energiesysteme 149 venture capital: in Europe 53; Europe’s lag attributed to lack of 20; exit opportunities 48, 67, 81, 130, 138; failure of 107; government stimulation of 116; impatience of 129–32, 146n2; limited role of 131, 138; myth of as risk loving 47–50, 142, 161–2; and NASDAQ’s coevolution 50; presenting as lead risk taker 183; public vs. private 19, 47; short-termist approach of 108, 127; timing of investment by 23; Venrock 94; see also private sector venture capital sector investment: clean technology 161; green revolution 127–8, 128n9; in Solyndra 130; subsectors of within clean energy 128 venture capital stages of investment 47, 48; early stage and seed funding awards by 80; risk of loss in 48 Vestas: Denmark producing 143; DoE research influence on 148; early years of 147; patents purchased by 145; policy responses by 125, 137; rugged designs of 146 vision: Apple’s 93, 94, 99–100; ‘green’ 116, 120, 123; lack of 107; in nanotechnology 83–4; State’s 21–4, 58, 62–4 Warburg Pincus 50 Washington Consensus 40 Washington Post 57 Wayne, Ronald 89, 89n1; see also Apple welfare state institutions 31 Westerman, Wayne 102–3 Westinghouse 107 wind and solar power: clean technology in crisis 158–9; collective failure in 163; decline of US firms in 144, 144n1; grid parity in 141; networks of learning in 146n2; R&D myth in 159–60; small being beautiful myth in 160–61; solar bankruptcies 153–6; symbiotic innovation ecosystems in 162–3; venture capital myth in 161–2; from ‘Wind Rush’ to rise of China’s wind power sector 144–50; withdrawal of government support 149; see also specific corporations; clean technology wind and solar power markets: competition, innovation and market size 156–8; disrupting existing markets 161; global market for 143; growth opportunities in 156–7; growth powered by crisis 142–4; and manufacturing of 144, 146–7, 153 wind and solar power policies: California’s tax programme 147; fostering development 144–5; providing incentives 149–51; subsidies 148–9, 152; tax credits 145, 149 wind and solar power technology: aerodynamics of 148; computer use in 147–8; C-Si 129, 130n11, 151–2, 158; Denmark’s Gedser design 145; oil company role in 161n8; origins of solar technologies 150–53; remote power applications 150; research behind 148–9; see also clean technology wind energy R&D projects 144–6 Witty, Andrew 66–7 World Trade Organization (WTO) 40 World War II 74 Wozniak, Steve 89, 89n1, 94; see also Apple Wuxi-Guolian 152 Wuxi Suntech 153 Xerox 107 Xerox PARC 24 Zond Corporation 147–8 Table of Contents Halftitle Page Title Page Copyright Dedication Epigraph Contents List of Tables and Figures List of Acronyms Acknowledgements Foreword by Carlota Perez Introduction: Do Something Different A Discursive Battle Beyond Fixing Failures From ‘Crowding In’ to ‘Dynamizing In’ Images Matter Structure of the Book Chapter 1: From Crisis Ideology to the Division of Innovative Labour And in the Eurozone State Picking Winners vs.


pages: 376 words: 109,092

Paper Promises by Philip Coggan

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, debt deflation, delayed gratification, diversified portfolio, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, fear of failure, financial innovation, financial repression, fixed income, floating exchange rates, full employment, German hyperinflation, global reserve currency, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, inflation targeting, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market bubble, market clearing, Martin Wolf, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, oil shale / tar sands, paradox of thrift, peak oil, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, principal–agent problem, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, QWERTY keyboard, railway mania, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, short selling, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, time value of money, too big to fail, trade route, tulip mania, value at risk, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

When the property bubble burst, and the banks collapsed, Asian countries had to turn to the outside world for help. In the 1980s and 1990s, sovereign debt crises forced governments to turn to the International Monetary Fund. The demise of the Bretton Woods system had caused the fund to remake itself as an emergency provider of finance to the developing world. These loans often carried strict conditions that reflected what was known as the ‘Washington consensus’, in favour of free markets and reduced public spending. The negotiations between governments and the fund carried an echo of the ‘bankers’ ramp’ that Britain faced in 1931. Governments that followed the IMF prescriptions faced street protests and were often accused of selling out to Western creditors. The accusation of financial colonialism carried greatest weight in Africa. That continent suffered from continued crises in the 1980s and 1990s.

Rubin, Robert Rueff, Jacques Rumsfeld, Donald Russia Sack, Alexander St Augustine Saint-Simon, duc de Salamis (city) Santelli, Rick Sarkozy, Nicholas Saudi Arabia savings savings glut Sbrancia, Belen Schacht, Hjalmar Scholes, Myron shale gas Second Bank of the United States Second World War Securities and Exchange Commission seignorage Shakespeare, William share options Shiller, Robert short-selling silver Singapore Sloan, Alfred Smith, Adam Smith, Fred Smithers & Co Smithsonian agreement Snowden, Philip Socialist Party of Greece social security Société Générale solidus Solon of Athens Soros, George sound money South Africa South Korea South Sea bubble sovereign debt crisis Soviet Union Spain special drawing right speculation, speculators Stability and Growth pact stagnation Standard & Poor’s sterling Stewart, Jimmy Stiglitz, Joseph stock markets stop-go cycle store of value Strauss-Kahn, Dominque Strong, Benjamin sub-prime lending Suez canal crisis Suharto, President of Indonesia Sumerians supply-side reforms Supreme Court (US) Sutton, Willie Sweden Swiss franc Swiss National Bank Switzerland Sylla, Richard Taiwan Taleb, Nassim Nicholas taxpayers Taylor, John tea party (US) Temin, Peter Thackeray, William Makepeace Thailand Thatcher, Margaret third world debt crisis Tiernan, Tommy Times Square, New York tobacco as currency treasury bills treasury bonds Treaty of Versailles trente glorieuses Triana, Pablo Triffin, Robert Triffin dilemma ‘trilemma’ of currency policy Truck Act True Finn party Truman, Harry S tulip mania Turkey Turner, Adair Twain, Mark unit of account usury value-at-risk (VAR) Vanguard Vanity Fair Venice Vietnam War vigilantes, bond market Viniar, David Volcker, Paul Voltaire Wagner, Adolph Wall Street Wall Street Crash of 1929 Wal-Mart wampum Warburton, Peter Warren, George Washington consensus Weatherstone, Dennis Weimar inflation Weimar Republic Weinberg, Sidney West Germany whales’ teeth White, Harry Dexter William of Orange Wilson, Harold Wirtschaftswunder Wizard of Oz, The Wolf, Martin Women Empowering Women Woodward, Bob Woolley, Paul World Bank Wriston, Walter Xinhua agency Yale University yen yield on debt yield on shares Zambia zero interest rates Zimbabwe Zoellick, Robert Philip Coggan is the Buttonwood columnist of the Economist.


pages: 829 words: 229,566

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate by Naomi Klein

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1960s counterculture, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, big-box store, bilateral investment treaty, British Empire, business climate, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, clean water, Climategate, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, Community Supported Agriculture, complexity theory, crony capitalism, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, energy security, energy transition, equal pay for equal work, Exxon Valdez, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, financial deregulation, food miles, Food sovereignty, global supply chain, hydraulic fracturing, ice-free Arctic, immigration reform, income per capita, Internet Archive, invention of the steam engine, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, market fundamentalism, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, Nixon shock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, open borders, patent troll, planetary scale, post-oil, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Rana Plaza, Ronald Reagan, smart grid, special economic zone, Stephen Hawking, Stewart Brand, structural adjustment programs, Ted Kaczynski, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, urban planning, urban sprawl, wages for housework, walkable city, Washington Consensus, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks

And that, she says, is a problem that requires “a pretty fundamental re-formation of our economy, if we’re going to do this right.”38 International trade deals were only one of the reasons that governments embraced this particular model of fast-and-dirty, export-led development, and every country had its own peculiarities. In many cases (though not China’s), the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were a major factor, so was the economic orthodoxy imparted to elite students at schools like Harvard and the University of Chicago. All of these and other factors played a role in shaping what was (never ironically) referred to as the Washington Consensus. Underneath it all is the constant drive for endless economic growth, a drive that, as will be explored later on, goes much deeper than the trade history of the past few decades. But there is no question that the trade architecture and the economic ideology embedded within it played a central role in sending emissions into hyperdrive. That’s because one of the primary driving forces of the particular trade system designed in the 1980s and 1990s was always to allow multinationals the freedom to scour the globe in search of the cheapest and most exploitable labor force.

Center for Economic and Policy Research, September 2012, p. 26; “Ecuador Overview,” Ecuador, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org; “Population Below National Poverty Line, Urban, Percentage,” Millienium Development Goals Database, U.N. Data, http://data.un.org. 42. “Bolivia: Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation,” International Monetary Fund, February 2014, p. 6. 43. Luis Hernández Navarro, “Bolivia Has Transformed Itself by Ignoring the Washington Consensus,” Guardian, March 21, 2012. 44. ECUADOR: Nick Miroff, “In Ecuador, Oil Boom Creates Tensions,” Washington Post, February 16, 2014; BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA: Dan Luhnow and José de Córdoba, “Bolivia Seizes Natural-Gas Fields in a Show of Energy Nationalism,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2006; ARGENTINA: “Argentine Province Suspends Open-Pit Gold Mining Project Following Protests,” MercoPress, January 31, 2012; “GREEN DESERTS”: “The Green Desert,” The Economist, August 6, 2004; BRAZIL: “The Rights and Wrongs of Belo Monte,” The Economist, May 4, 2013; RAW RESOURCES: Exports of Primary Products as Percentage of Total Exports, “Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean,” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, 2012, p. 101; CHINA: Joshua Schneyer and Nicolás Medina Mora Pérez, “Special Report: How China Took Control of an OPEC Country’s Oil,” Reuters, November 26, 2013. 45.

., 75 venture capitalists, 252 Vermont: anti-fracking movement in, 348 local agriculture in, 404–5 Vernon, Caitlyn, 365 victory gardens, 16, 17 Vidal, John, 244 Vietnam War, 261 Virgin Earth Challenge, 257, 284–85 Virgin Green Fund, 238, 239, 253 Virgin Group, 230, 237 Virgin Airlines, 231, 238, 241–44, 249–52 Virgin Fuels, 238 Virgin Racing, 243 Virgin Trains, 231, 238, 252–53 Viteri, Franco, 388 volcanic eruptions: droughts and, 272–73 global impact of, 274 weather patterns and, 259, 270, 271–74 Volney, Constantin-François, 273 Vonnegut, Kurt, 286, 287 Vowel, Chelsea, 371 Voynet, Dominique, 218 wage controls, 125 Wallach, Lori, 359–60 Wall Street, 206, 208 in financial crisis of 2008, 9, 44 Wall Street Journal, 207, 312 Walmart, 196, 208–10 Walton, Sam, 209 Walton, Sam Rawlings, 209 Walton Family Foundation, 209 Wang Wenlin, 300 Wania, Frank, 328n Ward, Barbara, 286 Warsaw climate change summit (2013), 200–201, 276 Washington, D.C.: Keystone XL protest in, 139, 301–2 record temperatures in, 73 Washington Consensus, 81 Washington State, 319 Indigenous land rights in, 323, 374–75, 380–81 proposed coal export terminals in, 320, 322, 346, 349, 374, 380–81 Washington, Tracie, 419 water: disruption to supplies of, 14, 165 First Nations and, 384 privatization of, 133 as public utility, 7 water pollution: extractive industry and, 83, 94, 295, 296, 332, 344–47 from fracking, 328–29, 332, 344, 346 water power, 16, 101, 215 of factories, 171 steam engine vs., 171–72 Waters, Donny, 431, 432 Watt, James, 171–75, 204, 266, 394, 410 Waxman-Markey, 227 wealth: concentration of, 154, 155 decentralization of, 131 greenhouse gas emissions and, 113–14 inequality of, 123, 454–55 redistribution of, 40, 42, 453 transfers of, 5 Wealth of Nations (Smith), 173, 462 weapons, climate change and, 9 weather, extreme, 35, 102–10 weather futures, 8–9 weatherization, 93 weather patterns: global warming and, 269 historical record of, 271–76 Pinatubo eruption and, 259, 270, 271–72, 274 variations in, 269 weather patterns, intentional modification of: as weapon, 261, 278 see also Pinatubo Option; Solar Radiation Management Weintrobe, Sally, 12 Werner, Brad, 449–50, 451, 460 West Antarctic ice sheet, 13, 14, 15 West Burton, England, 300 Western Australia, 376 West, Thomas, 365 West Virginia, 332, 357n, 367 wetlands, extractive industry damage to, 425–26 Weyerhaeuser, 369 Where Do We Go from Here (King), 453 Whitehead, Andrew, 432 Whitehorn, Will, 230–31 Whitehouse, Mark, 428 Whiteman, Phillip, Jr., 386 Whole Earth Catalogue, 288 WikiLeaks, 78, 165 wilderness system, federal, 203 wildfires, 14, 52, 108, 446 Wildlife Conservation Society, 221–22 Wildlife Society, 192 Willemse, Oom Johannes, 347 Willett Advisors, 216, 235 Williams, Eric, 415 Willis, Rebecca, 90 wind farms, 110, 223, 287 “Window for Thermal Coal Investment Is Closing” (Goldman Sachs), 352 wind power, 16, 67, 70, 97, 102, 118, 122, 124, 127, 131–32, 147, 215, 237 in combined-cycle plant, 129 fracking’s negative impact on, 129, 144n large offshore, 131 manufacturers in, 68 private sector and, 100–101 Wood, Lowell, 268n, 271, 280, 288 Woolsey, R.


pages: 790 words: 150,875

Civilization: The West and the Rest by Niall Ferguson

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Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Albert Einstein, Andrei Shleifer, Atahualpa, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, clean water, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, Copley Medal, corporate governance, credit crunch, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Dean Kamen, delayed gratification, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, Hans Lippershey, haute couture, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, invention of movable type, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, land tenure, Louis Pasteur, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, Martin Wolf, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, new economy, probability theory / Blaise Pascal / Pierre de Fermat, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spice trade, spinning jenny, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, The Great Moderation, the market place, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, total factor productivity, trade route, transaction costs, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, upwardly mobile, uranium enrichment, wage slave, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

Nemesis came first in the backstreets of Sadr City and the fields of Helmand, which exposed not only the limits of American military might but also, more importantly, the naivety of neo-conservative visions of a democratic wave in the Greater Middle East. It struck a second time with the escalation of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 into the credit crunch of 2008 and finally the ‘great recession’ of 2009. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the sham verities of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the ‘Great Moderation’ – the central bankers’ equivalent of the ‘End of History’ – were consigned to oblivion. A second Great Depression for a time seemed terrifyingly possible. What had gone wrong? In a series of articles and lectures beginning in mid-2006 and culminating in the publication of The Ascent of Money in November 2008 – when the financial crisis was at its worst – I argued that all the major components of the international financial system had been disastrously weakened by excessive short-term indebtedness on the balance sheets of banks, grossly mispriced and literally overrated mortgage-backed securities and other structured financial products, excessively lax monetary policy on the part of the Federal Reserve, a politically engineered housing bubble and, finally, the unrestrained selling of bogus insurance policies (known as derivatives), offering fake protection against unknowable uncertainties, as opposed to quantifiable risks.

In demographic terms, the population of Western societies has long represented a minority of the world’s inhabitants, but today it is clearly a dwindling one. Once so dominant, the economies of the United States and Europe are now facing the real prospect of being overtaken by China within twenty or even ten years, with Brazil and India not so very far behind. Western ‘hard power’ seems to be struggling in the Greater Middle East, from Iraq to Afghanistan, just as the ‘Washington Consensus’ on free-market economic policy disintegrates. The financial crisis that began in 2007 also seems to indicate a fundamental flaw at the heart of the consumer society, with its emphasis on debt-propelled retail therapy. The Protestant ethic of thrift that once seemed so central to the Western project has all but vanished. Meanwhile, Western elites are beset by almost millenarian fears of a coming environmental apocalypse.


pages: 717 words: 150,288

Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism by Stephen Graham

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airport security, anti-communist, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, call centre, carbon footprint, clean water, congestion charging, credit crunch, DARPA: Urban Challenge, defense in depth, deindustrialization, edge city, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Food sovereignty, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Google Earth, illegal immigration, income inequality, knowledge economy, late capitalism, loose coupling, market fundamentalism, McMansion, megacity, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, pattern recognition, peak oil, planetary scale, private military company, RAND corporation, RFID, Richard Florida, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, smart transportation, surplus humans, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, urban decay, urban planning, urban renewal, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, white flight

States and consumers alike pile up drastic financial debt, securitized through arcane instruments of global stock markets. By 2006, just before the onset of the global financial crash, financial markets were trading more in a month than the annual gross domestic product of the entire world.9 In practice, the much-vaunted economic axioms of ‘privatization’, ‘structural adjustment’ and the ‘Washington consensus’ camouflage disturbing transformations. They serve as euphemisms for what Gene Ray has called ‘the coordinated coercions of the global debtors’ prison, for the pulverization of local labor and environmental protections, and for the breaking open of all markets to the uncontrolled operations of finance capital’.10 Wealth has been stripped from poor and vulnerable economies through the flagrant predations of global capital, organized from a mere handful of megacities in the North.

See also asymmetric war; Gulf War; Iraq, US war on; just war; Long War; Second World War; securocratic war; urban warfare war crime, 178, 181–82, 275 n.41 Ward, Kevin, 102 n.53 Warden, John, 274–78, 285 Ware Corporation, 189 Warren, Robert, 23, 121, 125 War on Terror, xviii, 9, 20, 27, 31, 38–40, 53, 56–59, 72, 81, 105, 112, 114, 116, 128, 156, 163, 177, 185, 196, 214, 220, 226, 228, 230, 232–34, 237–39, 248, 253, 259–60, 298, 300–301, 306, 315, 318, 322, 338, 350–52, 355, 361, 365, 368, 372, 374 Washington, DC, 103, 128, 268 Washington consensus, 4 Washington Israel Business Council, 253 Washington Post, 214, 364 Watson, Tim, 82, 344 Watts, Michael, 337 n.143 wealth: concentration of, 5–7; and poverty, 5–6 weapons, non-lethal, 244–46 Webb, Dave, 340 n.152 Weber, Cynthia, 374 n.65 Weber, Leanne, 89 n.1, 137 n.177 Weber, Max, Vie City,10 n.33 Weber, Samuel, Targets of Opportunity,89 n.3 Weibel, Peter, 327 n.115, 367 Weitz, Richard, 256 n.110 Weizman, Eyal, xvii n.8, 12 n.43&46, 16 n.65, 21 n.86, 85, 157, 184, 229, 249 n.78, 251, 284 n.76 West Africa, 119, 337 West Bank, 113, 143, 177, 226, 229, 233, 241, 242, 243–44, 246–48, 262, 284–85, 287, 354, 355; simulated, 193 Whitaker, Brian, 53 n.71 Whiteley, Frank, 328 Wielhouwer, Peter, 202 n.57 Wilborn, Paul, 317 n.69 Wilding, Barbara, 259 Williams, Michael, 383 n.94 Willis, Bruce, 69 Wilson, Dean, 89 n.1, 137 n.177 Wilson, J.


pages: 543 words: 147,357

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society by Will Hutton

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Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, capital controls, carbon footprint, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, centre right, choice architecture, cloud computing, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, debt deflation, decarbonisation, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of DNA, discovery of the americas, discrete time, diversification, double helix, Edward Glaeser, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, first-past-the-post, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, I think there is a world market for maybe five computers, income inequality, inflation targeting, interest rate swap, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, Long Term Capital Management, Louis Pasteur, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price discrimination, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, railway mania, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Rory Sutherland, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, Skype, South Sea Bubble, Steve Jobs, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Myth of the Rational Market, the payments system, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, unpaid internship, value at risk, Washington Consensus, working poor, éminence grise

They could innovate and grow their balance sheets however they chose, inventing new instruments along the way, and now even the capital they were obliged to hold to sustain confidence could be fudged to meet national rather than international norms. They had been given the wink. A monster was about to be spawned. Turbo finance The implosion of the Communist Bloc and the triumph of liberal capitalist democracy initiated a further intensification of globalisation and the high-water mark of the Washington consensus. However, although the main contours were agreed – rolling back the state, deregulation, balancing budgets, setting inflation targets, privatisation and generally extending the ‘magic of the market’, as Ronald Reagan had famously dubbed it – there was still room for debate. Some economists, such as Jagwad Bhagwati, had impeccable free trade credentials but still had doubts about financial deregulation.

Edward, 266 Stephenson, George, 126, 127 Stiglitz, Joe, 51, 168–9, 367–8, 371 Strategy Unit, 337 structured investment vehicles, 151, 165, 169, 171, 188, 207, 209 Stutzer, Alois, 86 sub-prime mortgages, 64, 161, 203 Sugar, Alan, 64–5, 67 Summers, Larry, 92, 183 the Sun, 318, 327 Sunday Express, 321 Sunday Times, 318 supermarkets, relentless spread of, 389 Sure Start scheme, 10, 278, 307 Sutton Trust, 273, 293 swaps, 164; credit default swaps, 151, 152, 166–8, 170, 171, 175, 176, 191, 203, 207 Switzerland, 7, 86, 138, 180 takeovers and mergers, 8, 21, 33, 92, 245, 250, 258, 259, 388 Taliban, 102 Tax Justice network, 296 taxation: American right’s attitude to, 235, 297; capital transfer taxes, 73–4; collapse of tax base, 224, 368; concessions for private equity, 245, 247, 249, 374; Conservative reforms (1979-97), 275–6; corporation tax, 245; as deterrent to innovation, 104, 105; due desert and, 40, 220, 234, 235, 266; foreign nationals and, 32; housing wealth levy proposal, 373–4; inheritance tax, 73–4, 75, 78, 302–4, 393; low rates of, 5, 19, 387; luck and, 73–4, 75, 78, 303; one-off tax on bank bonuses, 26, 179, 249; progressive/redistributive, 78, 79, 80, 303, 387; proposed reforms, 209–10, 372, 373–4; relief on childcare vouchers, 277; tax avoidance, 25, 29, 42, 145, 151, 193, 245, 295–7; tax credits, 142, 277, 278, 336; tax evasion, 42, 145, 295–7; tax havens, 32, 295; tax relief on debt interest, 209–10, 374 teachers, 306, 307, 308 Technology Foresight, 21 Technology Strategy Board, 21 telecommunications, 133–4, 143 Terra Firma (private-equity firm), 28, 178, 247–8 terrorism, 36 Tesco, 246, 295 Tett, Gillian, 195 Thailand, 168 Thaler, Richard, 94–5 Thatcher, Margaret, 32, 81, 135, 144, 275, 290, 334, 388; centralisation of power, 14, 313; Rupert Murdoch and, 318 Thompson (wire service), 331 ‘3i’, 250, 252 Tilly, Charles, 24, 27, 272 The Times, 288, 295, 318, 319, 327, 330, 349 Times Higher Education, 21 Toulmin, Tim, 325, 332 Tourre, Fabrice, 103, 167–8 Toyota, 91, 269 trade unions, 88, 91, 142, 161, 179, 275, 364, 387; decline of, 272, 291–2, 341, 365–6; print and journalism, 320, 332; undue influence of, 31–2, 33, 364 Train to Gain, 306 Transport for London, 336 Treasury, 92, 178, 208, 214, 215, 218, 335, 336, 337, 369 Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 340 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 175, 176 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 24 Turkish oligarchs, 30 Turnbull, Lord, 334 Turner, Lord Adair, 24, 179 Tyler, Tom, 87 UBS, 170, 178 UK Trade and Industry (UKTI), 230–1 Ulpian (Roman jurist), 45 Unipart, 93 United Nations, 68, 332–3, 384 United States: American colonists, 54, 121, 126; annual consumption levels, 375; anti-statism and, 234, 311; banking system, 138, 150–2, 156, 158–9, 160, 162–3, 167–9, 173–6, 181, 191–2, 195–6, 244; big finance’s penetration of the state, 176–8, 183; United States – continued economic conflict with China, 376–7, 378–80, 381, 382, 383; economic history of, 108, 131–4, 300; executive pay in, 67, 101, 172–4; financial crisis/collapse and, 152, 158–9, 181, 192, 358–9, 375; free market policies/theory in, 140, 145, 160, 163, 165, 184, 234–5; Great Depression, 159, 162, 205, 362; ‘growth triangle’ in South Carolina, 254; impact of small firms, 253, 255, 256; international order and, 226, 378–9, 385–6; LTCM crisis, 169–70, 183, 193, 200–1; money market funds in, 156, 158, 161; neo-conservatism and, 17–18, 144, 297; as non-saver, 36; relationship finance in, 244; savings and loans crisis, 161–2, 163–4; short termism of markets, 241; TARP, 175, 176; ‘tea-party’ conservatism, 234, 327, 386; universal male suffrage, 128; universities, 101, 262–3, 264, 308; volatility of economy, 297; welfare and, 80, 281, 283, 297 universities, 21, 252, 261–5, 295, 308, 355, 370, 372; private schools and, 293–4, 306; uncapping of fees proposal, 264–5, 371 Vadera, Shriti, 178 Value Added Tax (VAT), 366–7, 370, 372 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 133 Venetian empire, 121 venture capitalists, 241, 244–9, 250 Vishny, Robert, 62, 63 Vodafone, 255 Volcker, Paul, 206 voting system: alternative vote system (AV), 345–6; as delivering right-of-centre bias, 343; first-past-the-post system, 97–8, 217, 312, 313, 341, 343, 347; need for reform of, 97–8, 344–6, 347, 391; proportional representation, 97, 98, 344–6, 347, 391 Wales, devolving of power to, 15 Wall Street Journal, 349 Wallis, John Joseph, 113, 116, 129–30 Walpole, Robert, 125, 166 ‘war on terror’, 17, 144 Wars of the Roses, 124 Washington consensus, 163 Washington Post, 183 Watson, David Pitt, 242 Watson, Thomas, 29 Watt, James, 110, 126 ‘weapons of the weak’, 114–15 Weatherstone, Dennis (CEO of JP Morgan), 191–2 Webster, David, 292 Wedgwood, Josiah, 126–7 Weingast, Barry, 113, 116, 129–30 Welch, Jack, 216 welfare/social provision, 34, 80–2, 83–4, 281, 283–5, 297, 335; see also social security benefits; asset based, 298, 301–3, 304; coalition policy on, 343; undermining of popular support for, 80, 281–2, 283, 297, 302–3; universal services, 34, 79, 277, 281 welfare-to-work programmes, 278 Wenger, Arsène, 352 Westminster, Duke of, 64, 65 White, William, 182, 185 Willetts, David, The Pinch, 372 Williams, Rowan (Archbishop of Canterbury), 4, 26 Wilson, Harold, 312 Wilson, Woodrow, 132–3 Wilson Committee into City (1980), 179 Wilthagen, Tom, 299–301 Winstanley College, Wigan, 294 Winston, Robert, 107 wire agencies, 322, 331 Woessmann, Ludger, 305–6 Work Foundation, 94, 233 World Bank, 164, 182, 226, 383, 384 xenophobia, 16, 36 X-Factor, 282, 314 York University, Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC), 263 Young, Michael, 283–4 Young, Toby, 282 Yu Yongding, 381 Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 115–16 Zinoviev letter, 315


pages: 478 words: 126,416

Other People's Money: Masters of the Universe or Servants of the People? by John Kay

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bitcoin, Black Swan, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, call centre, capital asset pricing model, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, cognitive dissonance, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, cross-subsidies, dematerialisation, diversification, diversified portfolio, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, Elon Musk, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Flash crash, forward guidance, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Growth in a Time of Debt, income inequality, index fund, inflation targeting, interest rate derivative, interest rate swap, invention of the wheel, Irish property bubble, Isaac Newton, London Whale, Long Term Capital Management, loose coupling, low cost carrier, M-Pesa, market design, millennium bug, mittelstand, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, Nick Leeson, Northern Rock, obamacare, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shock, passive investing, peer-to-peer lending, performance metric, Peter Thiel, Piper Alpha, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, quantitative trading / quantitative finance, railway mania, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, regulatory arbitrage, Renaissance Technologies, rent control, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Schrödinger's Cat, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Myth of the Rational Market, the payments system, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, Tobin tax, too big to fail, transaction costs, tulip mania, Upton Sinclair, Vanguard fund, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, Yom Kippur War

In 1997 the Thai exchange rate collapsed as foreign investors rushed to salvage their positions while some value remained. Contagion spread through Asia. The following year Russia defaulted on its debts. The emerging market crises were partly defused by interventions from the International Monetary Fund, which provided support through loans for countries, and, implicitly, the banks that had foolishly provided finance. The IMF imposed much-resented austerity programmes on Asian economies. The phrase ‘Washington consensus’ was widely used to describe the common set of neo-liberal economic policies that were conditions of their support. Privatisation and capital market liberalisation contributed to both national and international financialisation. The internet came to the educated public, and the financial community, in the 1990s. The dot.com boom began in 1995 with the publication of a research note pointing out the commercial opportunities of the internet from Mary Meeker of Morgan Stanley (who would become known as ‘the internet goddess’) and the flotation of Netscape (which devised the first accessible internet browser).23 By 1999 journalists, consultants and business people talked of a ‘new economy’.

.: Hyperion 220 Loomis, Carol 108 lotteries 65, 66, 68, 72 Lucas, Robert 40 Lynch, Dennios 108 Lynch, Peter 108, 109 M M-Pesa 186 Maastricht Treaty (1993) 243, 250 McCardie, Sir Henry 83, 84, 282, 284 McGowan, Harry 45 Machiavelli, Niccolò 224 McKinley, William 44 McKinsey 115, 126 Macy’s department store 46 Madoff, Bernard 29, 118, 131, 132, 177, 232, 293 Madoff Securities 177 Magnus, King of Sweden 196 Manhattan Island, New York: and Native American sellers 59, 63 Manne, Henry 46 manufacturing companies, rise of 45 Marconi 48 marine insurance 62, 63 mark-to-market accounting 126, 128–9, 320n22 mark-to-model approach 128–9, 320n21 Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 226 market economy 4, 281, 302, 308 ‘market for corporate control, the’ 46 market risk 97, 98, 177, 192 market-makers 25, 28, 30, 31 market-making 49, 109, 118, 136 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) 226 Markkula, Mike 162, 166, 167 Markopolos, Harry 232 Markowitz, Harry 69 Markowitz model of portfolio allocation 68–9 Martin, Felix 323n5 martingale 130, 131, 136, 139, 190 Marx, Groucho 252 Marx, Karl 144, 145 Capital 143 Mary Poppins (film) 11, 12 MasterCard 186 Masters, Brooke 120 maturity transformation 88, 92 Maxwell, Robert 197, 201 Mayan civilisation 277 Meade, James 263 Means, Gardiner 51 Meeker, Mary 40, 167 Melamed, Leo 19 Mercedes 170 merchant banks 25, 30, 33 Meriwether, John 110, 134 Merkel, Angela 231 Merrill Lynch 135, 199, 293, 300 Merton, Robert 110 Metronet 159 Meyer, André 205 MGM 33 Microsoft 29, 167 middleman, role of the 80–87 agency and trading 82–3 analysts 86 bad intermediaries 81–2 from agency to trading 84–5 identifying goods and services required 80, 81 logistics 80, 81 services from financial intermediaries 80–81 supply chain 80, 81 transparency 84 ‘wisdom of crowds’ 86–7 Midland Bank 24 Milken, Michael 46, 292 ‘millennium bug’ 40 Miller, Bill 108, 109 Minuit, Peter 59, 63 Mises, Ludwig von 225 Mittelstand (medium-size business sector) 52, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172 mobile banking apps 181 mobile phone payment transfers 186–7 Modigliani-Miller theorem 318n9 monetarism 241 monetary economics 5 monetary policy 241, 243, 245, 246 money creation 88 money market fund 120–21 Moneyball phenomenon 165 monopolies 45 Monte Carlo casino 123 Monte dei Paschi Bank of Siena 24 Montgomery Securities 167 Moody’s rating agency 21, 248, 249, 313n6 moral hazard 74, 75, 76, 92, 95, 256, 258 Morgan, J.P. 44, 166, 291 Morgan Stanley 25, 40, 130, 135, 167, 268 Morgenthau, District Attorney Robert 232–3 mortality tables 256 mortgage banks 27 mortgage market fluctuation in mortgage costs 148 mechanised assessment 84–5 mortgage-backed securities 20, 21, 40, 85, 90, 100, 128, 130, 150, 151, 152, 168, 176–7, 284 synthetic 152 Mozilo, Angelo 150, 152, 154, 293 MSCI World Bank Index 135 muckraking 44, 54–5, 79 ‘mugus’ 118, 260 multinational companies, and diversification 96–7 Munger, Charlie 127 Munich, Germany 62 Munich Re 62 Musk, Elon 168 mutual funds 27, 108, 202, 206 mutual societies 30 mutualisation 79 mutuality 124, 213 ‘My Way’ (song) 72 N Napoleon Bonaparte 26 Napster 185 NASA 276 NASDAQ 29, 108, 161 National Economic Council (US) 5, 58 National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) 255 National Institutes of Health 167 National Insurance Fund (UK) 254 National Provincial Bank 24 National Science Foundation 167 National Westminster Bank 24, 34 Nationwide 151 Native Americans 59, 63 Nazis 219, 221 neo-liberal economic policies 39, 301 Netjets 107 Netscape 40 Neue Markt 170 New Deal 225 ‘new economy’ bubble (1999) 23, 34, 40, 42, 98, 132, 167, 199, 232, 280 new issue market 112–13 New Orleans, Louisiana: Hurricane Katrina disaster (2005) 79 New Testament 76 New York Stock Exchange 26–7, 28, 29, 31, 49, 292 New York Times 283 News of the World 292, 295 Newton, Isaac 35, 132, 313n18 Niederhoffer, Victor 109 NINJAs (no income, no job, no assets) 222 Nixon, Richard 36 ‘no arbitrage’ condition 69 non-price competition 112, 219 Norman, Montagu 253 Northern Rock 89, 90–91, 92, 150, 152 Norwegian sovereign wealth fund 161, 253 Nostradamus 274 O Obama, Barack 5, 58, 77, 194, 271, 301 ‘Obamacare’ 77 Occidental Petroleum 63 Occupy movement 52, 54, 312n2 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ slogan 305 off-balance-sheet financing 153, 158, 160, 210, 250 Office of Thrift Supervision 152–3 oil shock (1973–4) 14, 36–7, 89 Old Testament 75–6 oligarchy 269, 302–3, 305 oligopoly 118, 188 Olney, Richard 233, 237, 270 open market operations 244 options 19, 22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 263 Osborne, George 328n19 ‘out of the money option’ 102, 103 Overend, Gurney & Co. 31 overseas assets and liabilities 179–80, 179 owner-managed businesses 30 ox parable xi-xii Oxford University 12 P Pacific Gas and Electric 246 Pan Am 238 Paris financial centre 26 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 295 partnerships 30, 49, 50, 234 limited liability 313n14 Partnoy, Frank 268 passive funds 99, 212 passive management 207, 209, 212 Patek Philippe 195, 196 Paulson, Hank 300 Paulson, John 64, 109, 115, 152, 191, 284 ‘payment in kind’ securities 131 payment protection policies 198 payments system 6, 7, 25, 180, 181–8, 247, 259–60, 281, 297, 306 PayPal 167, 168, 187 Pecora, Ferdinand 25 Pecora hearings (1932–34) 218 peer-to-peer lending 81 pension funds 29, 98, 175, 177, 197, 199, 200, 201, 208, 213, 254, 282, 284 pension provision 78, 253–6 pension rights 53, 178 Perkins, Charles 233 perpetual inventory method 321n4 Perrow, Charles 278, 279 personal financial management 6, 7 personal liability 296 ‘petrodollars’ 14, 37 Pfizer 96 Pierpoint Morgan, J. 165 Piper Alpha oil rig disaster (1987) 63 Ponzi, Charles 131, 132 Ponzi schemes 131, 132, 136, 201 pooled investment funds 197 portfolio insurance 38 Potts, Robin, QC 61, 63, 72, 119, 193 PPI, mis-selling of 296 Prebble, Lucy: ENRON 126 price competition 112, 219 price discovery 226 price mechanism 92 Prince, Chuck 34 private equity 27, 98, 166, 210 managers 210, 289 private insurance 76, 77 private sector 78 privatisation 39, 78, 157, 158, 258, 307 probabilistic thinking 67, 71, 79 Procter & Gamble 69, 108 product innovation 13 property and infrastructure 154–60 protectionism 13 Prudential 200 public companies, conversion to 18, 31–2, 49 public debt 252 public sector 78 Q Quandt, Herbert 170 Quandt Foundation 170 quantitative easing 245, 251 quantitative style 110–11 quants 22, 107, 110 Quattrone, Frank 167, 292–3 queuing 92 Quinn, Sean 156 R railroad regulation 237 railway mania (1840s) 35 Raines, Franklin 152 Rajan, Raghuram 56, 58, 79, 102 Rakoff, Judge Jed 233, 294, 295 Ramsey, Frank 67, 68 Rand, Ayn 79, 240 ‘random walk’ 69 Ranieri, Lew 20, 22, 106–7, 134, 152 rating agencies 21, 41, 84–5, 97, 151, 152, 153, 159, 249–50 rationality 66–7, 68 RBS see Royal Bank of Scotland re-insurance 62–3 Reagan, Ronald 18, 23, 54, 59, 240 real economy 7, 18, 57, 143, 172, 190, 213, 226, 239, 271, 280, 288, 292, 298 redundancy 73, 279 Reed, John 33–4, 48, 49, 50, 51, 242, 293, 314n40 reform 270–96 other people’s money 282–5 personal responsibility 292–6 principles of 270–75 the reform of structure 285–92 robust systems and complex structures 276–81 regulation 215, 217–39 the Basel agreements 220–25 and competition 113 the origins of financial regulation 217–19 ‘principle-based’ 224 the regulation industry 229–33 ‘rule-based’ 224 securities regulation 225–9 what went wrong 233–9 ‘Regulation Q’ (US) 13, 14, 20, 28, 120, 121 regulatory agencies 229, 230, 231, 235, 238, 274, 295, 305 regulatory arbitrage 119–24, 164, 223, 250 regulatory capture 237, 248, 262 Reich, Robert 265, 266 Reinhart, C.M. 251 relationship breakdown 74, 79 Rembrandts, genuine/fake 103, 127 Renaissance Technologies 110, 111, 191 ‘repo 105’ arbitrage 122 repo agreement 121–2 repo market 121 Reserve Bank of India 58 Reserve Primary Fund 121 Resolution Trust Corporation 150 retirement pension 78 return on equity (RoE) 136–7, 191 Revelstoke, first Lord 31 risk 6, 7, 55, 56–79 adverse selection and moral hazard 72–9 analysis by ‘ketchup economists’ 64 chasing the dream 65–72 Geithner on 57–8 investment 256 Jackson Hole symposium 56–7 Kohn on 56 laying bets on the interpretation of incomplete information 61 and Lloyd’s 62–3 the LMX spiral 62–3, 64 longevity 256 market 97, 98 mitigation 297 randomness 76 socialisation of individual risks 61 specific 97–8 risk management 67–8, 72, 79, 137, 191, 229, 233, 234, 256 risk premium 208 risk thermostat 74–5 risk weighting 222, 224 risk-pooling 258 RJR Nabisco 46, 204 ‘robber barons’ 44, 45, 51–2 Robertson, Julian 98, 109, 132 Robertson Stephens 167 Rockefeller, John D. 44, 52, 196 Rocket Internet 170 Rogers, Richard 62 Rogoff, K.S. 251 rogue traders 130, 300 Rohatyn, Felix 205 Rolls-Royce 90 Roman empire 277, 278 Rome, Treaty of (1964) 170 Rooney, Wayne 268 Roosevelt, Franklin D. v, 25, 235 Roosevelt, Theodore 43–4, 235, 323n1 Rothschild family 217 Royal Bank of Scotland 11, 12, 14, 24, 26, 34, 78, 91, 103, 124, 129, 135, 138, 139, 211, 231, 293 Rubin, Robert 57 In an Uncertain World 67 Ruskin, John 60, 63 Unto this Last 56 Russia defaults on debts 39 oligarchies 303 Russian Revolution (1917) 3 S Saes 168 St Paul’s Churchyard, City of London 305 Salomon Bros. 20, 22, 27, 34, 110, 133–4 ‘Salomon North’ 110 Salz Review: An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices 217 Samuelson, Paul 208 Samwer, Oliver 170 Sarkozy, Nicolas 248, 249 Savage, L.J. 67 Scholes, Myron 19, 69, 110 Schrödinger’s cat 129 Scottish Parliament 158 Scottish Widows 26, 27, 30 Scottish Widows Fund 26, 197, 201, 212, 256 search 195, 209, 213 defined 144 and the investment bank 197 Second World War 36, 221 secondary markets 85, 170, 210 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 20, 64, 126, 152, 197, 225, 226, 228, 230, 232, 247, 292, 293, 294, 313n6 securities regulation 225–9 securitisation 20–21, 54, 100, 151, 153, 164, 169, 171, 222–3 securitisation boom (1980s) 200 securitised loans 98 See’s Candies 107 Segarra, Carmen 232 self-financing companies 45, 179, 195–6 sell-side analysts 199 Sequoia Capital 166 Shad, John S.R. 225, 228–9 shareholder value 4, 45, 46, 50, 211 Sharpe, William 69, 70 Shell 96 Sherman Act (1891) 44 Shiller, Robert 85 Siemens 196 Siemens, Werner von 196 Silicon Valley, California 166, 167, 168, 171, 172 Simon, Hermann 168 Simons, Jim 23, 27, 110, 111–12, 124 Sinatra, Frank 72 Sinclair, Upton 54, 79, 104, 132–3 The Jungle 44 Sing Sing maximum-security gaol, New York 292 Skilling, Jeff 126, 127, 128, 149, 197, 259 Slim, Carlos 52 Sloan, Alfred 45, 49 Sloan Foundation 49 small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), financing 165–72, 291 Smith, Adam 31, 51, 60 The Wealth of Nations v, 56, 106 Smith, Greg 283 Smith Barney 34 social security 52, 79, 255 Social Security Trust Fund (US) 254, 255 socialism 4, 225, 301 Société Générale 130 ‘soft commission’ 29 ‘soft’ commodities 17 Soros, George 23, 27, 98, 109, 111–12, 124, 132 South Sea Bubble (18th century) 35, 132, 292 sovereign wealth funds 161, 253 Soviet empire 36 Soviet Union 225 collapse of 23 lack of confidence in supplies 89–90 Spain: property bubble 42 Sparks, D.L. 114, 283, 284 specific risk 97–8 speculation 93 Spitzer, Eliot 232, 292 spread 28, 94 Spread Networks 2 Square 187 Stamp Duty 274 Standard & Poor’s rating agency 21, 99, 248, 249, 313n6 Standard Life 26, 27, 30 standard of living 77 Standard Oil 44, 196, 323n1 Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon) 323n1 Stanford University 167 Stanhope 158 State Street 200, 207 sterling devaluation (1967) 18 stewardship 144, 163, 195–203, 203, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213 Stewart, Jimmy 12 Stigler, George 237 stock exchanges 17 see also individual stock exchanges stock markets change in organisation of 28 as a means of taking money out of companies 162 rise of 38 stock-picking 108 stockbrokers 16, 25, 30, 197, 198 Stoll, Clifford 227–8 stone fei (in Micronesia) 323n5 Stone, Richard 263 Stora Enso 196 strict liability 295–6 Strine, Chancellor Leo 117 structured investment vehicles (SIVs) 158, 223 sub-prime lending 34–5, 75 sub-prime mortgages 63, 75, 109, 149, 150, 169, 244 Summers, Larry 22, 55, 73, 119, 154, 299 criticism of Rajan’s views 57 ‘ketchup economics’ 5, 57, 69 support for financialisation 57 on transformation of investment banking 15 Sunday Times 143 ‘Rich List’ 156 supermarkets: financial services 27 supply chain 80, 81, 83, 89, 92 Surowiecki, James: The Wisdom of Crowds xi swap markets 21 SWIFT clearing system 184 Swiss Re 62 syndication 62 Syriza 306 T Taibbi, Matt 55 tailgating 102, 103, 104, 128, 129, 130, 136, 138, 140, 152, 155, 190–91, 200 Tainter, Joseph 277 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas 125, 183 Fooled by Randomness 133 Tarbell, Ida 44, 54 TARGET2 system 184, 244 TARP programme 138 tax havens 123 Taylor, Martin 185 Taylor Bean and Whitaker 293 Tea Party 306 technological innovation 13, 185, 187 Tel Aviv, Israel 171 telecommunications network 181, 182 Tesla Motors 168 Tetra 168 TfL 159 Thai exchange rate, collapse of (1997) 39 Thain, John 300 Thatcher, Margaret 18, 23, 54, 59, 148, 151, 157 Thiel, Peter 167 Third World debt problem 37, 131 thrifts 25, 149, 150, 151, 154, 174, 290, 292 ticket touts 94–5 Tobin, James 273 Tobin tax 273–4 Tolstoy, Count Leo 97 Tonnies, Ferdinand 17 ‘too big to fail’ 75, 140, 276, 277 Tourre, Fabrice ‘Fabulous Fab’ 63–4, 115, 118, 232, 293, 294 trader model 82, 83 trader, rise of the 16–24 elements of the new trading culture 21–2 factors contributing to the change 17–18 foreign exchange 18–19 from personal relationships to anonymous markets 17 hedge fund managers 23 independent traders 22–3 information technology 19–20 regulation 20 securitisation 20–21 shift from agency to trading 16 trading as a principal source of revenue and remuneration 17 trader model 82, 83 ‘trading book’ 320n20 transparency 29, 84, 205, 210, 212, 226, 260 Travelers Group 33, 34, 48 ‘treasure islands’ 122–3 Treasuries 75 Treasury (UK) 135, 158 troubled assets relief program 135 Truman, Harry S. 230, 325n13 trust 83–4, 85, 182, 213, 218, 260–61 Tuckett, David 43, 71, 79 tulip mania (1630s) 35 Turner, Adair 303 TWA 238 Twain, Mark: Pudd’nhead Wilson’s Calendar 95–6 Twitter 185 U UBS 33, 134 UK Independence Party 306 unemployment 73, 74, 79 unit trusts 202 United States global dominance of the finance industry 218 house prices 41, 43, 149, 174 stock bubble (1929) 201 universal banks 26–7, 33 University of Chicago 19, 69 ‘unknown unknowns’ 67 UPS delivery system 279–80 US Defense Department 167 US Steel 44 US Supreme Court 228, 229, 304 US Treasury 36, 38, 135 utility networks 181–2 V value discovery 226–7 value horizon 109 Van Agtmael, Antoine 39 Vanderbilt, Cornelius 44 Vanguard 200, 207, 213 venture capital 166 firms 27, 168 venture capitalists 171, 172 Vickers Commission 194 Viniar, David 204–5, 233, 282, 283, 284 VISA 186 volatility 85, 93, 98, 103, 131, 255 Volcker, Paul 150, 181 Volcker Rule 194 voluntary agencies 258 W wagers and credit default swaps 119 defined 61 at Lloyd’s coffee house 71–2 lottery tickets 65 Wall Street, New York 1, 16, 312n2 careers in 15 rivalry with London 13 staffing of 217 Wall Street Crash (1929) 20, 25, 27, 36, 127, 201 Wall Street Journal 294 Wallenberg family 108 Walmart 81, 83 Warburg 134 Warren, Elizabeth 237 Washington consensus 39 Washington Mutual 135, 149 Wasserstein, Bruce 204, 205 Watergate affair 240 ‘We are the 99 per cent’ slogan 52, 305 ‘We are Wall Street’ 16, 55, 267–8, 271, 300, 301 Weber, Max 17 Weill, Sandy 33–4, 35, 48–51, 55, 91, 149, 293, 314n40 Weinstock, Arnold 48 Welch, Jack 45–6, 48, 50, 52, 126, 314n40 WestLB 169 Westminster Bank 24 Whitney, Richard 292 Wilson, Harold 18 windfall payments 14, 32, 127, 153, 290 winner’s curse 103, 104, 156, 318n11 Winslow Jones, Alfred 23 Winton Capital 111 Wolfe, Humbert 7 The Uncelestial City 1 Wolfe, Tom 268 The Bonfire of the Vanities 16, 22 women traders 22 Woodford, Neil 108 Woodward, Bob: Maestro 240 World Bank 14, 220 World.Com bonds 197 Wozniak, Steve 162 Wriston, Walter 37 Y Yellen, Janet 230–31 Yom Kippur War (1973) 36 YouTube 185 Z Zurich, Switzerland 62


pages: 483 words: 134,377

The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor by William Easterly

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air freight, Andrei Shleifer, battle of ideas, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business process, business process outsourcing, Carmen Reinhart, clean water, colonial rule, correlation does not imply causation, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, discovery of the americas, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, fundamental attribution error, germ theory of disease, greed is good, income per capita, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jane Jacobs, John Snow's cholera map, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, M-Pesa, microcredit, Monroe Doctrine, oil shock, place-making, Ponzi scheme, risk/return, road to serfdom, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, urban planning, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey, young professional

William Easterly, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett, and Lawrence H. Summers, “Good Planning or Good Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics 32, no. 3 (1993): 459–83. 3. Ricardo Hausmann, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik, “Growth Accelerations” Journal of Economic Growth 10, no. 4 (December 2005): 303–29; available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10566.pdf, accessed August 27, 2013. 4. Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?” Journal of Economic Literature 44 (December 2006): 969–83. 5. Alwyn Young, “The African Growth Miracle,” Journal of Political Economy 120, no. 4 (August 2012): 696–739. 6. Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, “Penn World Table Version 7.1,” Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, November 2012. 7.

Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 5. Dani Rodrik, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them,” Studies in Comparative International Development 35, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 3–31. 6. William Easterly, “Benevolent Autocrats,” DRI Working Paper Number 75, Development Research Institute, New York University, New York, NY, 2011. 7. Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, “The Post-Washington Consensus: Development After the Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 51. Available at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23124/foreignaffairs_postwashingtonconsensus.pdf, accessed August 31, 2013. 8. Thomas L. Friedman, “Our One-Party Democracy,” New York Times (September 8, 2009). Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=0, accessed August 31, 2013. 9.

Culture and Prosperity: The Truth About Markets - Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor by John Kay

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, Barry Marshall: ulcers, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, California gold rush, complexity theory, computer age, constrained optimization, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Donald Trump, double entry bookkeeping, double helix, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, equity premium, Ernest Rutherford, European colonialism, experimental economics, Exxon Valdez, failed state, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, George Gilder, greed is good, haute couture, illegal immigration, income inequality, invention of the telephone, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, John Nash: game theory, John von Neumann, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, market clearing, market fundamentalism, means of production, Menlo Park, Mikhail Gorbachev, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, Nash equilibrium, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pets.com, popular electronics, price discrimination, price mechanism, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, random walk, rent-seeking, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, second-price auction, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South Sea Bubble, Steve Jobs, telemarketer, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Predators' Ball, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, total factor productivity, transaction costs, tulip mania, urban decay, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, yield curve, yield management

I want to argue in these lectures that the competitive paradigm not only did not provide much guidance on the vital question of the choice of economic systems, but what 'advice' it did provide was often misguided. The conceptions of the market that underlay that analysis mischaracterized it: the standard analyses underestimated the strength-and weaknessesof market economies." 26 In 1995, Stiglitz joined the President's Council of Economic Advisers and in 1997 was appointed chief economist at the World Bank. Installed at the heart of the Washington consensus, Stiglitz did not change his views-nor refrain from expressing them. He Culture and Prosperity { 207} found a sympathetic listener in the World Bank's president, James Wolfensohn, who had sought to broaden the institution's remit. But Stiglitz's outspoken views went too far for Wall Street. And more particularly, for a U.S. Treasury basking in the warm glow of American triumphalism. It became clear that Wolfensohn's continued support for Stiglitz might be at the cost of his own job, and in 1999 Stiglitz returned to research and teaching at Stanford University.

The American Business Model And so at the start of the twenty-first century, the American business model (ABM) plays the role in political economy that socialism enjoyed for so long. All political positions, even hostile ones, are defined by their relationship to it. Globalization and privatization have displaced capital and class as the terms of discourse. The label market forces immediately evokes hostile or supportive reactions. The term Washington consensus is for some a statement of inescapable reali- Culture and Prosperity { 313} ties of economic life; it is demonized in many poor states as an attack on democracy and living standards. The right has determined the terms of political debate. The philosophy of the ABM, as articulated by Milton Friedman, is of government as referee. "It is important to distinguish the day-today activities of people from the general customary and legal framework within which these take place.

The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be by Moises Naim

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additive manufacturing, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deskilling, disintermediation, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, intermodal, invisible hand, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, Martin Wolf, megacity, Naomi Klein, Nate Silver, new economy, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, private military company, profit maximization, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, World Values Survey

For starters, thanks to the integration of the world economy, the dependence of any one country on supplies, customers, or financing from any one other country has loosened enormously. Falling trade barriers and more open capital markets were long-held goals of the United States and other rich nations in international trade talks. Their victory—along with the widespread promotion of the “Washington consensus” as a condition for lending by the World 125 Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other institutions—has had the paradoxical effect of weakening the hold that the United States or former colonial powers like Britain and France once had over countries in their sphere of influence. The imposition of sanctions against Iran in an effort to bring its nuclear program into compliance with international regimes is the exception that proves the rule.

See also Elections Wagstyl, Stefan, 133 Walker, Scott, 202 Wall Street, 49. See also Banks; Occupy Wall Street movement 259 Wall Street Journal, 6, 174, 212 Waltz, Julie, 145 Wars, 10, 16, 17, 28, 42, 48, 111, 115, 135, 243 asymmetric/irregular wars, 5, 108, 109–114, 124 generations of warfare, 116–118 rules of war, 121–128 See also Conflict; Cyber-crime/warfare; individual wars Warsaw Pact, 139, 141, 142. See also Soviet Union: ex-Soviet bloc Washington Consensus, 144 Washington Post, 28, 95, 162, 200 Watergate, 68 Wealth, 6–7, 8, 13, 15, 42, 46, 48, 49–50, 130, 167, 195, 197, 198, 207, 210, 236. See also Billionaires Weapons, 44, 54, 110, 116, 118–121, 141, 144, 149 precision weapons, 111–112 See also Nuclear issues Weber, Max, 38–42, 43, 47, 50, 52, 75, 76, 79, 103, 115, 116 Weiss, Gary, 190 Wells, Peter, 166 Welzel, Christian, 67 Westinghouse, 36 White Collar: The American Middle Classes (Mills), 47 White House, 76 White people, 67 Who Rules America?

The Great Turning: From Empire to Earth Community by David C. Korten

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Albert Einstein, banks create money, big-box store, Bretton Woods, British Empire, clean water, colonial rule, Community Supported Agriculture, death of newspapers, declining real wages, European colonialism, Francisco Pizarro, full employment, George Gilder, global supply chain, global village, Hernando de Soto, Howard Zinn, informal economy, invisible hand, joint-stock company, land reform, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Monroe Doctrine, Naomi Klein, neoliberal agenda, new economy, peak oil, planetary scale, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, South Sea Bubble, stem cell, structural adjustment programs, The Chicago School, trade route, Washington Consensus, World Values Survey

It is the beneficent mission of the Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization — to facilitate the orderly advancement of these processes. Only the misinformed or mean-spirited who would deny the poor their opportunity for a better life oppose these institutions and their sacred mission. This story is commonly referred to as the Washington consensus, because it is propagated by the U.S. Treasury Department, the World Bank, the IMF, and various related think tanks, lobbyists, and contractors based in Washington, D.C. It is also known as economic liberalism, neoliberalism, and corporate libertarianism. Because advocates of the Washington consensus cling to their story with the blind faith of true believers in denial of all contrary evidence, international financier George Soros calls them “market fundamentalists.” Of the contemporary stories of Empire, the New Right prosperity story is the most often repeated and celebrated in policy papers and scholarly publications, taught in universities, and recited by pundits of 240 PART III: AMERIC A, THE UNFINISHED PROJECT the corporate media.


pages: 258 words: 63,367

Making the Future: The Unipolar Imperial Moment by Noam Chomsky

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Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate personhood, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Frank Gehry, full employment, Howard Zinn, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, Long Term Capital Management, market fundamentalism, Mikhail Gorbachev, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, precariat, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, working poor

As international affairs scholar Stephen Zunes points out, in the early 1950s, “at a critical point in the nation’s effort to become more self-sufficient, the U.S. government forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital not for its own development, but to compensate the former mine owners and repay its foreign debts.” The economic policies forced on Bolivia at that time were a precursor of the structural-adjustment programs imposed on the continent thirty years later, under the terms of the neoliberal “Washington consensus,” which has generally had disastrous effects wherever its strictures have been observed. By now, the victims of neoliberal market fundamentalism are coming to include the rich countries, where the curse of financial liberalization has helped to bring about the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The traditional modalities of imperial control—violence and economic war—are weakening.

Masters of Mankind by Noam Chomsky

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affirmative action, Berlin Wall, failed state, income inequality, land reform, Martin Wolf, means of production, nuremberg principles, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit maximization, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Silicon Valley, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, union organizing, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

Or to discuss the suffering caused across the board by “downsizing” when the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the category of “executives, managers, and administrative personnel” for US companies grew almost 30 percent from 1983 to 1993,53 while compensation for executives skyrocketed (and easily retains its international lead, relative to labor costs)—apparently with little or no correlation to performance.54 Similarly, some caution seems necessary in lauding the marvels of the “emerging markets” when the leading recipient of US Foreign Direct Investment in the hemisphere (Canada aside) is Bermuda, with about one-quarter, another 20 percent going to other tax havens, much of the rest to such “economic miracles” as Mexico, which followed the dictates of the “Washington consensus” with unusual obedience, and less than glorious consequences for the overwhelming majority.55 In fact, the very notions of “capitalism” and “markets” seem to be disappearing from consciousness, much like the concept of democracy. A few examples may serve to illustrate. A lead story in the Wall Street Journal, discussing the “fateful choices” that states are making to attract business, compares two cases: Maryland, with its “antibusiness image,” and “more Republican” Virginia, which is “more gung-ho about corporate growth” and more sympathetic to “the choices made by entrepreneurs.”


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Meltdown: How Greed and Corruption Shattered Our Financial System and How We Can Recover by Katrina Vanden Heuvel, William Greider

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Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, carried interest, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, conceptual framework, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Exxon Valdez, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, fixed income, floating exchange rates, full employment, housing crisis, Howard Zinn, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, kremlinology, Long Term Capital Management, margin call, market bubble, market fundamentalism, McMansion, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, new economy, offshore financial centre, payday loans, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, pushing on a string, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent control, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, sovereign wealth fund, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, union organizing, wage slave, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, Y2K

Organized labor, pounded by years of unionbusting and deindustrialization, slipped below 10 percent of the U.S. private-sector workforce and seemed to disappear altogether from the popular consciousness. The opposition was ceasing to oppose, but the market was now safe, its supposedly endless array of choice substituting for the lack of choice on the ballot. Various names were applied to this state of affairs. In international circles the grand agreement was called the “Washington Consensus”; economics writer Daniel Yergin called it the “market consensus”; New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman coined the phrase “golden straitjacket” to describe the absence of political options. While once “people thought” there were ways to order human affairs other than through the free market, Friedman insisted, those choices now no longer existed. “I don’t think there will be an alternative ideology this time around,” he wrote in August 1998.


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Pity the Billionaire: The Unexpected Resurgence of the American Right by Thomas Frank

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, big-box store, bonus culture, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, financial innovation, housing crisis, invisible hand, Naomi Klein, obamacare, payday loans, profit maximization, profit motive, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, strikebreaker, The Chicago School, The Myth of the Rational Market, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, union organizing, Washington Consensus, white flight, Works Progress Administration

Consider the barest facts: this is the fourth successful conservative uprising to happen in the last half century,* each one more a-puff with populist bluster than the last, each one standing slightly more rightward, and each one helping to compose a more spellbinding chapter in the historical epoch that I call “the Great Backlash,” and that others call the “Age of Reagan” (the historian Sean Wilentz), the “Age of Greed” (the journalist Jeff Madrick), the “Conservative Ascendancy” (the journalist Godfrey Hodgson), or the “Washington Consensus” (various economists). Think about it this way. It has now been more than thirty years since the supply-side revolution conquered Washington, since laissez-faire became the dogma of the nation’s ruling class, shared by large numbers of Democrats as well as Republicans. We have lived through decades of deregulation, deunionization, privatization, and free-trade agreements; the neoliberal ideal has been projected into every corner of the nation’s life.


pages: 219 words: 61,720

American Made: Why Making Things Will Return Us to Greatness by Dan Dimicco

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2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, 3D printing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, American energy revolution, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, Bernie Madoff, carbon footprint, clean water, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, decarbonisation, fear of failure, full employment, Google Glasses, hydraulic fracturing, invisible hand, job automation, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, Loma Prieta earthquake, manufacturing employment, oil shale / tar sands, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, smart grid, smart meter, sovereign wealth fund, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, Works Progress Administration

Otherwise, I’m telling you, we would not be supporting your efforts. But we know that if Nucor is complaining, something is really, really wrong.” And that’s where, as a leader, your job is to make sure you use all of the resources you have at your disposal when the time is right. You can’t waste your capital on small fights. For years—decades, really—the steel industry ran to Washington for help at the first hint of trouble. But the Washington consensus changed to favor the ideology of free trade, no matter how distorted a version it might be. Our leadership role and our reputation helped sway an administration biased toward free trade to support the steel industry on a massive trade dispute. And it was a big one. Everybody in the world got shook up by it—customers, farms, steel producers, trading companies, you name it. But it was a necessary fight, and it worked.


pages: 283 words: 77,272

With Liberty and Justice for Some: How the Law Is Used to Destroy Equality and Protect the Powerful by Glenn Greenwald

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Ayatollah Khomeini, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, Clive Stafford Smith, collateralized debt obligation, crack epidemic, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Brooks, deskilling, financial deregulation, full employment, high net worth, income inequality, Julian Assange, nuremberg principles, Ponzi scheme, rolodex, Ronald Reagan, too big to fail, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks

There is no doubt that the 2003 attack on Iraq by the United States was an “aggressive war” by every measure, and certainly by the standard codified at Nuremberg. Moreover, that attack resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, the displacement of millions more, and the total devastation of a nation of 26 million people. But the very idea that American leaders responsible for it should be held legally accountable under the Nuremberg principles, or condemned as having done anything criminal, is violently rejected by the Washington consensus whenever the idea is brought up at all. Jackson’s warning that the Nuremberg proceedings would be meaningful only if their principles bound all nations in the future, including the nations that had convened the trial, has simply been brushed aside. The Nuremberg trials also have relevance to a key claim repeatedly made by opponents of torture prosecutions, those in the media and the political class who oppose prosecutions for torture sanctioned by the Bush administration: namely, that it would be terribly unfair to punish people for having done something that DOJ lawyers had told them they could.


pages: 277 words: 80,703

Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle by Silvia Federici

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Community Supported Agriculture, declining real wages, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, financial independence, global village, illegal immigration, informal economy, invisible hand, labor-force participation, land tenure, means of production, microcredit, neoliberal agenda, new economy, Occupy movement, planetary scale, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, the market place, trade liberalization, UNCLOS, wages for housework, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

But in the 1970s, few political positions aroused so much vehement opposition. By the late 1970s, two decades of international struggles that shook up the foundations of the capitalist accumulation process came to an end, put on the defensive by the engineering of a still continuing global crisis. Starting with the oil embargo of 1974, a long period of capitalist experimentation in class “decomposition” began under the guises of the “Washington Consensus,” neoliberalism, and “globalization.” From “Zero Growth” (in 1974-75) to the debt crisis and then to industrial relocation and the imposition of structural adjustment on regions of the former colonial world, a new world was forced into existence, radically changing the balance of power between workers and capital worldwide. I have discussed some of the effects of this change on the reproduction of the workforce in the articles contained in Part Two of this volume and the essays I contributed to Midnight Notes, especially in the issue titled “The New Enclosures.”6 Here, I want to add that thanks to the analysis we developed first in WfH and later in Midnight Notes, I could see that what was afoot was not an industrial reconversion but a restructuring of class relations starting from the process of social reproduction.7 My understanding of the new world order was facilitated by two developments that profoundly affected my theoretical and political practice.


pages: 840 words: 202,245

Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present by Jeff Madrick

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Bretton Woods, capital controls, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, desegregation, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, financial deregulation, fixed income, floating exchange rates, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Akerlof, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, index fund, inflation targeting, inventory management, invisible hand, laissez-faire capitalism, locking in a profit, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, oil shock, price stability, quantitative easing, Ralph Nader, rent control, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, technology bubble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, union organizing, V2 rocket, value at risk, Vanguard fund, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

A cause of the crisis was the deregulatory policy of the Clinton administration, which had insisted that nations like Korea end capital controls, which had until then restricted the inflow of international capital. This policy once again reflected the free market attitudes now ascendant in the major rich nations and international agencies like the International Monetary Fund, policies generally known as the Washington Consensus. But the capital flows reached speculative heights because interest rates offered in these nations were so high and, because their currencies were pegged to the dollar, there was no currency risk. Some $250 billion of foreign money was invested in 1996 alone, an increasing amount going into spurious real estate projects. Greenspan was in full agreement with these deregulatory policies. He and Rubin had a weekly meeting, typically breakfast, in which Rubin’s deputy, Lawrence Summers, often participated.

., prl.1, prl.2, 7.1 Trump, Donald Tsai, Gerald Tudor Investment Tunney, John, 7.1, 7.2 Turner, Ed Turner, Ted, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 13.1 Turner Broadcasting Network (TNT), 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 Tuttle, Holmes Twentieth Century Fox, 7.1, 8.1, 8.2 Two Lucky People (Friedman and Friedman), 2.1 Tyco, 17.1, 17.2 Tynan, Kenneth UBS, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4 Uhler, James Carvel, prl.1, prl.2 Uhler, Lewis, ix–x, prl.1, prl.2, 2.1, 7.1, 7.2 underwriters, 1.1, 6.1, 13.1, 13.2, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5, 17.6, 17.7, 18.1, 19.1 unemployment insurance, 2.1, 2.2, 7.1 unemployment rate, prl.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 6.1, 8.1, 8.2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 10.1, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 17.1, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6 United Technologies, 4.1, 5.1 Unruh, Jesse Updike, John uranium, 4.1, 5.1, 14.1 Utah International, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 12.1, 12.2 Value at Risk (VAR), 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 17.1, 17.2 Vanguard Funds Van Horn, Rob Versailles, Treaty of (1919) Veterans Administration (VA), 18.1, 18.2 Viacom, 8.1, 16.1 Vietnam War, prl.1, 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 7.1, 10.1, 12.1, 19.1 Vilar, Alberto Viner, Jacob, 2.1, 2.2 Vinson & Elkins Volcker, Paul, 11.1, 11.2; background of, 3.1, 6.1, 11.3; in Carter administration, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6; as Federal Reserve chairman, itr.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 9.1, 9.2, 11.7, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 14.1, 15.1, 18.1, 19.1, 19.2; Greenspan compared with, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6; inflation policy of, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 9.3, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 14.7, 14.8; interest rates policy of, 6.9, 6.10, 9.4, 11.18, 11.19, 11.20, 11.21, 11.22, 15.2, 18.2, 18.3; in Reagan administration, 11.23, 11.24, 11.25; tax policy of, 11.26, 11.27, 11.28; as Treasury undersecretary, 3.2, 3.3, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 9.5, 9.6; unemployment rate and, 11.29, 11.30 Voorhis, Jerry Vranos, Michael, 12.1, 18.1 Wachtel, Paul wage controls, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 14.1 wage levels, itr.1, prl.1, prl.2, prl.3, 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.1, 4.2, 8.1, 8.2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 10.1, 10.2, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1, 12.2, 13.1, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 16.1, 17.1, 17.2, 19.1, 19.2 Walker, Charls Wall, Danny Wallace, George Wallich, Henry Wall Street, x, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.1, 4.1, 6.1, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 17.1, 17.2, 18.1, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6, 19.7, 19.8, 19.9, 19.10, 19.11, 19.12, 19.13, 19.14 Wall Street Journal, 2.1, 6.1, 16.1, 16.2, 17.1, 17.2 Wal-Mart, 8.1, 8.2 Walras, Léon Walters, Barbara Walton, Bud Walton, Sam, 8.1, 8.2, 12.1 Warner, Douglas, III Warner-Amex Cable, 8.1, 8.2 Warner Bros., 7.1, 8.1, 8.2 Warner Bros.-Seven Arts, 8.1, 8.2 Warner Communications, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 12.1 Warren, Earl, prl.1, 10.1 Washington Consensus Wasserman, Lew, 7.1, 7.2, 8.1 Wasserstein, Bruce, 4.1, 16.1 Watergate scandal, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 9.1, 10.1, 14.1 Waterman, Robert, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 Watkins, Sherron Waxman, Henry Weaver, Karen Weidenbaum, Murray, 3.1, 9.1, 11.1 Weill, Jessica Weill, Joan, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4 Weill, Marc Weill, Max Weill, Sanford I. “Sandy,” 286–317, 16.1, 19.1; acquisitions strategy of, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 17.1; on American Express board, 16.6, 17.2; background of, 16.7; back office expertise of, 16.8, 16.9, 16.10, 16.11, 16.12, 16.13, 16.14, 16.15; as brokerage trader, 16.16; on Citicorp and Citigroup boards, 16.17, 16.18, 16.19, 16.20, 17.3, 17.4, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6; costs cut by, 16.21, 16.22, 16.23, 16.24, 16.25, 16.26, 16.27, 16.28; deregulation supported by, 16.29, 16.30, 16.31, 17.5, 17.6, 17.7; as Hayden Stone partner, 16.32; investment strategy of, 16.33, 16.34, 16.35, 16.36, 16.37, 16.38; Jewish ancestry of, 16.39, 16.40, 16.41, 16.42, 16.43, 16.44; layoffs by, 16.45, 16.46, 16.47, 16.48, 16.49; legal problems of, 16.50, 16.51, 16.52, 16.53, 17.8, 17.9, 17.10, 17.11; managerial style of, 16.54, 16.55, 16.56, 16.57, 16.58, 16.59, 16.60; personality of, 16.61, 16.62, 16.63, 16.64, 16.65, 16.66, 16.67, 16.68, 16.69, 16.70; philanthropies of, 16.71, 16.72, 17.12, 17.13; on Primerica board, 16.73, 16.74, 16.75; profits of, 16.76, 16.77, 16.78, 16.79, 16.80, 16.81, 16.82, 16.83, 16.84; reputation of, 16.85, 16.86, 16.87, 16.88, 16.89, 16.90, 16.91, 16.92, 17.14, 17.15; at Salomon Brothers, 15.1; SEC investigations of, 16.93, 16.94, 17.16; at Shearson Hayden Stone, 16.95, 17.17; Shearson Loeb Rhoades directed by, 16.96, 16.97, 19.7; stock market trends and, 16.98, 16.99, 16.100, 16.101, 16.102, 16.103, 16.104, 16.105, 16.106, 16.107, 16.108; as Travelers Insurance CEO, 15.2, 15.3, 16.109; wealth of, 16.110, 16.111, 16.112, 16.113, 16.114, 16.115, 16.116, 16.117, 16.118, 16.119, 16.120, 17.18, 19.8; Wriston compared with, 16.121 Welch, Jack, 12.1, 12.2; acquisitions strategy of, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 16.1; background of, 12.7; competitiveness of, 12.8; employee relations of, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12, 12.13; financial services developed by, 12.14, 12.15, 12.16, 12.17; as General Electric CEO, 12.18, 12.19, 12.20, 12.21, 16.2, 16.3, 17.1; Hudson River cleanup opposed by, 12.22; management style of, 12.23, 13.1; profits of, 12.24, 12.25, 12.26, 12.27, 12.28; reputation of, 12.29, 12.30, 12.31, 12.32, 12.33; stock price increased by, 12.34, 12.35, 12.36, 12.37, 12.38, 12.39, 12.40, 12.41; wealth of, 12.42, 12.43, 12.44, 12.45 Welch, Robert, prl.1 welfare programs, itr.1, prl.1, prl.2, prl.3, 2.1, 3.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 10.1, 11.1 Wells Fargo, 18.1, 19.1 Werblin, Sonny Where’s the Rest of Me?


pages: 740 words: 217,139

The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

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Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, California gold rush, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, conceptual framework, correlation does not imply causation, currency manipulation / currency intervention, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, invention of agriculture, invention of the printing press, Khyber Pass, labour market flexibility, land reform, land tenure, means of production, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Scramble for Africa, spice trade, Stephen Hawking, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

See Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 75; and Max Rheinstein, “Introduction,” in Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. xlviii. 13 Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 36–37. 14 Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, pp. 50–52. To this day, the government of the Turkish Republic tightly controls the Muslim religious establishment. 15 “Binding constraint” is taken from Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausmann, and Andres Velasco, “Growth Diagnostics,” in Narcís Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). There were many other constraints on the emergence of sustained economic growth in the Muslim world beyond poor property rights. Perhaps the most important was a growing intellectual unwillingness to engage in public debate over the social system itself as it was being overtaken by the West, particularly after the conflict with the Safavids at the end of the seventeenth century.

Searle-Chatterjee, Mary, and Ursula Sharma, eds. 1994. Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. ———. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. Sen, Amartya K. 1999. “Democracy as a Universal Value.” Journal of Democracy 10:3–17. Sengupta, Somini. 2006. “Often Parched, India Struggles to Tap the Monsoon.” New York Times, October 1. Serra, Narcís, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. 2008. The Washington Consensus Reconsidered. New York: Oxford University Press. Service, Elman R. 1971. Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective. 2d ed. New York: Random House. Shapiro, Martin M. 1981. Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sharma, Ram S. 1968. Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Shaughnessy, Edward L. 1991.


pages: 669 words: 210,153

Tools of Titans: The Tactics, Routines, and Habits of Billionaires, Icons, and World-Class Performers by Timothy Ferriss

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Airbnb, artificial general intelligence, asset allocation, Atul Gawande, augmented reality, back-to-the-land, Bernie Madoff, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, Black Swan, blue-collar work, Buckminster Fuller, business process, Cal Newport, call centre, Checklist Manifesto, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, Colonization of Mars, Columbine, correlation does not imply causation, David Brooks, David Graeber, diversification, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, effective altruism, Elon Musk, fault tolerance, fear of failure, Firefox, follow your passion, future of work, Google X / Alphabet X, Howard Zinn, Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall, Jeff Bezos, job satisfaction, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, Lao Tzu, life extension, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, Mason jar, Menlo Park, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nicholas Carr, optical character recognition, PageRank, passive income, pattern recognition, Paul Graham, Peter H. Diamandis: Planetary Resources, Peter Singer: altruism, Peter Thiel, phenotype, post scarcity, premature optimization, QWERTY keyboard, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, rent-seeking, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, sharing economy, side project, Silicon Valley, skunkworks, Skype, Snapchat, social graph, software as a service, software is eating the world, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, superintelligent machines, Tesla Model S, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas L Friedman, Wall-E, Washington Consensus, Whole Earth Catalog, Y Combinator

It provides maximal upside and minimal downside. GOOD QUESTION TO ASK YOURSELF WHEN TACKLING INCUMBENT COMPANIES (OR IDEAS) “How is their bread buttered?” “What is it that they can’t afford to say or think?” “CONSENSUS” SHOULD SET OFF YOUR SPIDEY SENSE “Somehow, people have to learn that consensus is a huge problem. There’s no ‘arithmetic consensus’ because it doesn’t require a consensus. But there is a Washington consensus. There is a climate consensus. In general, consensus is how we bully people into pretending that there’s nothing to see. ‘Move along, everyone.’ I think that, in part, you should learn that people don’t naturally come to high levels of agreement unless something is either absolutely clear, in which case consensus isn’t present, or there’s an implied threat of violence to livelihood or self.”

Tsatsouline, Pavel: “‘You can be anything you want. But you must be strong first.’” von Ahn, Luis: “‘It would be in front of the Google Pittsburgh office and it would say ‘Duolingo is hiring.’” Waitzkin, Joshua: “‘LIVE ALL IN.’” Weinstein, Eric: “Somehow, people have to learn that consensus is a huge problem. There’s no arithmetic consensus because it doesn’t require a consensus. But there is a Washington consensus. There is a climate consensus. In general, consensus is how we bully people into pretending that there’s nothing to see—move along, everyone. And so I think that in part, you should start to learn that people don’t naturally come to high levels of agreement unless something is either absolutely clear, in which case consensus isn’t present, or there’s an implied threat of violence to livelihood or self.”


pages: 381 words: 101,559

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Gobal Crisis by James Rickards

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Asian financial crisis, bank run, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Black Swan, borderless world, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business climate, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, collateralized debt obligation, complexity theory, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Deng Xiaoping, diversification, diversified portfolio, Fall of the Berlin Wall, family office, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, full employment, game design, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, global rebalancing, global reserve currency, high net worth, income inequality, interest rate derivative, Kenneth Rogoff, labour mobility, laissez-faire capitalism, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market bubble, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Network effects, New Journalism, Nixon shock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, paradox of thrift, price mechanism, price stability, private sector deleveraging, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, time value of money, too big to fail, value at risk, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

Of course, there was no coordination between the scenario the lab had produced and the wild card Steve and I were secretly ready to play, but this was a pretty good fit. Russia could exempt Japan from its gold currency deal and still placate China by inviting it to join in its plan to sideline the dollar. I sat in our simulated Chinese capital listening to my Harvard and RAND teammates discussing how to punish Japan for deviating from the Washington Consensus free trade paradigm, but my mind was elsewhere, literally waiting for the phone to ring. A few minutes later, our lab observers informed us that a communiqué had come in from Russia requesting a summit conference. This was good news; it meant Steve had convinced his teammates to let him play the gold wild card. Before my team could digest the news, I offered, “Hey, guys. My friend Steve Halliwell is playing the Russian cell—I’m guessing he’s behind this.


pages: 397 words: 112,034

What's Next?: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy by David Hale, Lyric Hughes Hale

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affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, cognitive bias, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, debt deflation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, diversification, energy security, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, full employment, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global village, high net worth, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, index fund, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Just-in-time delivery, Kenneth Rogoff, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, Long Term Capital Management, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mortgage tax deduction, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, passive investing, payday loans, peak oil, Ponzi scheme, post-oil, price stability, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, regulatory arbitrage, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Tobin tax, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, yield curve

And although Australia’s political cycles have not always mirrored those in the United States and Britain (indeed, it is striking how Australian and British electorates have swung in opposite directions since the 1980s), Australian policymakers have been significantly influenced by political and intellectual fashions and trends emanating from Britain and America. In particular, since the 1980s Australian government have for the most part been committed to the so-called Washington consensus of trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of financial and other markets. Moreover, most of Australia’s major financial institutions have been managed by executives originally from, or with substantial experience gained in, the American or British markets for at least part of the 1990s or early 2000s. And there are other parallels. Australian households have substantially increased their borrowing since the early 1990s—much more rapidly than their British or American peers.


pages: 223 words: 10,010

The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality Is Essential for Recovery by Stewart Lansley

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banking crisis, Basel III, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business process, call centre, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, Edward Glaeser, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Financial Instability Hypothesis, floating exchange rates, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, hiring and firing, Hyman Minsky, income inequality, James Dyson, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Martin Wolf, mittelstand, mobile money, Mont Pelerin Society, new economy, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, shareholder value, The Great Moderation, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working-age population

Moreover the other pillars of the market experiment adopted in the US and the UK—the weakening of unions, the axing of business regulations and the switch from maintaining employment to fighting inflation—also served to re-concentrate power in the hands of the leaders of the global finance industry. Nowhere was this dismantling of the post-war financial and state economic apparatus more welcome than in the offices of the City, Wall Street and the other financial centres. Although the pillars of the post-1979 pro-market economic experiment were embraced most strongly in the UK and the United States, the ripple effects were felt globally. The adoption of what became known as the ‘Washington consensus’ by the IMF and the World Bank—the belief in liberalised trade and labour markets—ensured that, throughout the 1990s, financial and trade liberalisation policies spread across the world economy—rich and poor nations alike. From the early 1980s, cross-border financial flows accelerated. To enable London to compete on equal terms with New York in the race for the world’s expanding pool of mobile capital, Mrs Thatcher set out to transform the City from a cosy, insular club into a global leader, able to win the race for the spoils of the new open borders.


pages: 385 words: 111,807

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide by Ha-Joon Chang

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, discovery of the americas, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global value chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, inventory management, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, post-industrial society, precariat, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working-age population, World Values Survey

Economically, it advocates the classical minimal state but with some modifications – most importantly, it accepts the central bank with note issue monopoly, while the classical liberals thought that there should be competition in the production of money too. In political terms, neo-liberals do not openly oppose democracy, as the classical liberals did. But many of them are willing to sacrifice democracy for the sake of private property and the free market. Neo-liberalism is also known, especially in developing countries, as the Washington Consensus view, referring to the fact that it is strongly advocated by the three most powerful economic organizations in the world, all based in Washington, DC, namely, the US Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 1870–1913 period did not actually see universal liberalism on the international front. In the heartland of capitalism, in Western Europe and the US, trade protectionism actually increased, not decreased.


pages: 377 words: 110,427

The Boy Who Could Change the World: The Writings of Aaron Swartz by Aaron Swartz, Lawrence Lessig

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affirmative action, Alfred Russel Wallace, Benjamin Mako Hill, bitcoin, Bonfire of the Vanities, Brewster Kahle, Cass Sunstein, deliberate practice, Donald Trump, failed state, fear of failure, Firefox, full employment, Howard Zinn, index card, invisible hand, John Gruber, Lean Startup, More Guns, Less Crime, post scarcity, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Richard Stallman, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, semantic web, single-payer health, SpamAssassin, SPARQL, telemarketer, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the scientific method, Toyota Production System, unbiased observer, wage slave, Washington Consensus, web application, WikiLeaks, working poor

“We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it”; apparently they never got past naming) and barely even exists anymore. The term socialism has become so watered down that it polls roughly equal with capitalism among the under-30 set—apparently it now means anything to the left of austere neoliberalism (except file sharing, of course). If there was ever a time for a new program, this would seem to be it. The economic crisis has shattered the Washington Consensus more than a thousand Chomsky op-eds could, while the Internet has made it possible to organize people by the million. But the left can’t seem to move beyond its reactive stance. If you want books that criticize the policies of the Bush administration, you can fill up a whole library. But if you want books on what to do instead, where do you go? The only left-of-center group seriously putting out policy proposals is Third Way.

Propaganda and the Public Mind by Noam Chomsky, David Barsamian

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, deindustrialization, European colonialism, experimental subject, Howard Zinn, Hyman Minsky, interchangeable parts, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, Martin Wolf, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, school vouchers, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, Thomas L Friedman, Tobin tax, Washington Consensus

The Times has an article on Bolivia, where farmers are staging big protests.47 One background reason is that there are farmers who have been compelled to grow coca because there are no other options. The U.S. has come in with crop destruction programs and counterinsurgency operations which have destroyed their coca crops, and now they’re starving. So they’re among those who are protesting, though the immediate causes are different. Bolivia is one of the poorest countries of the world. So first they are driven to coca production by the ‘’Washington consensus” and IMF/World Bank programs which say, You’ve got to open your country up to agriculture and other imports and you have to be a rational peasant producing for the agro-export market trying to maximize profit. You put those conditions together and it spells c-o-c-a. A rational peasant producing for the agro-export market when the country is being flooded by subsidized Western agricultural production is going to be producing coca.


pages: 261 words: 86,905

How to Speak Money: What the Money People Say--And What It Really Means by John Lanchester

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asset allocation, Basel III, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bitcoin, Black Swan, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, BRICs, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, Dava Sobel, David Graeber, disintermediation, double entry bookkeeping, en.wikipedia.org, estate planning, financial innovation, Flash crash, forward guidance, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, high net worth, High speed trading, hindsight bias, income inequality, inflation targeting, interest rate swap, Isaac Newton, Jaron Lanier, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Kodak vs Instagram, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, London Whale, loss aversion, margin call, McJob, means of production, microcredit, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, Nick Leeson, Nikolai Kondratiev, Nixon shock, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open economy, paradox of thrift, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, purchasing power parity, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Satoshi Nakamoto, security theater, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, six sigma, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working poor, yield curve

Different industries use different ones: in US transport and road safety calculations, the VOSL is $6 million. So our guardrail has a one in a million chance of saving $6 million; so the VOSL tells us that it makes sense to spend $6 on our guardrail ($6 x 1,000,000 = $6,000,000), whereas spending $7 would be too much, and spending $5 would be a bargain. There’s something beautifully chilling and amoral about the VOSL. Washington consensus One name for the neoliberal economic model, as imposed on developing and emerging economies by the big international economic institutions. It was crisply summarized by the Indian writer Pankaj Mishra as “the dominant ideological orthodoxy before the economic crisis of 2008: that no nation can advance without reining in labor unions, eliminating trade barriers, ending subsidies, and, most importantly, minimizing the role of government.” 79 wealth The term is not precisely defined in economics, but the crucial point is that it refers to accumulated assets rather than to earnings.

Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution by Wendy Brown

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bitcoin, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, collective bargaining, corporate governance, credit crunch, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, Food sovereignty, haute couture, immigration reform, income inequality, invisible hand, labor-force participation, late capitalism, means of production, new economy, obamacare, occupational segregation, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, sharing economy, The Chicago School, the market place, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck, young professional

At the time, critical intellectuals mainly characterized neoliberalism as something the Global North imposed on the 50  u n d o in g t h e d e m o s Global South — something that reconfigured as it intensified NorthSouth inequalities, something that resecured the South as a source of cheap resources, labor, and production in the aftermath of colonialism, something that was perfectly compatible with coups, support of brutal dictatorships and other political interventions, and something that could also be carried out with the velvet glove of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization governance, and, eventually, NAFTA-like trade agreements. While students of neoimperialism in the 1970s and early 1980s grasped the importance of neoliberal economic experiments in parts of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, they rarely detected its presence back in the metropole. The “Washington Consensus” affirming free-market policies over Keynesian ones was still more than a decade off. Thatcher and Reagan had not yet come to power. European welfare states still appeared to be the beacon and the future of the civilized West, and the question for most of those leaning left in the mid-1970s was not how to defend them, but whether they could be pushed further toward — or beyond — social democracy.


pages: 538 words: 141,822

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov

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A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Buckminster Fuller, Cass Sunstein, citizen journalism, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, Columbine, computer age, conceptual framework, crowdsourcing, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Earth, illegal immigration, invention of radio, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, John von Neumann, Marshall McLuhan, Naomi Klein, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, pirate software, pre–internet, Productivity paradox, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Sinatra Doctrine, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, social graph, Steve Jobs, technoutopianism, The Wisdom of Crowds, urban planning, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

Why Technologies Are Never Neutral chapter eleven - The Wicked Fix Why the Ultimate Technological Fix Is Online What We Talk About When We Talk About Code Taming the Wicked Authoritarianism Prophecies Versus Profits After Utopia: The Cyber-Realist Manifesto Acknowledgements BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX ABOUT THE AUTHOR Copyright Page To Aernout van Lynden INTRODUCTION For anyone who wants to see democracy prevail in the most hostile and unlikely environments, the first decade of the new millennium was marked by a sense of bitter disappointment, if not utter disillusionment. The seemingly inexorable march of freedom that began in the late 1980s has not only come to a halt but may have reversed its course. Expressions like “freedom recession” have begun to break out of the think-tank circuit and enter the public conversation. In a state of quiet desperation, a growing number of Western policymakers began to concede that the Washington Consensus—that set of dubious policies that once promised a neoliberal paradise at deep discounts—has been superseded by the Beijing Consensus, which boasts of delivering quick-and-dirty prosperity without having to bother with those pesky institutions of democracy. The West has been slow to discover that the fight for democracy wasn’t won back in 1989. For two decades it has been resting on its laurels, expecting that Starbucks, MTV, and Google will do the rest just fine.


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Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies by Judith Stein

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1960s counterculture, affirmative action, airline deregulation, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, capital controls, centre right, collective bargaining, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, desegregation, energy security, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, feminist movement, financial deregulation, floating exchange rates, full employment, income inequality, income per capita, intermodal, invisible hand, knowledge worker, laissez-faire capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market bubble, Martin Wolf, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open economy, payday loans, post-industrial society, post-oil, price mechanism, price stability, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, strikebreaker, trade liberalization, union organizing, urban planning, urban renewal, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, working poor, Yom Kippur War

Historically, years of rapid productivity growth have also been periods of strong upward pressure on wages.91 Wright’s explanation matches the characteristics of the 1990S upsurge. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the 1990s was that deficit reduction and trade, financial, and technological liberalization were the primary ingredients of prosperity. This ideological stew was promoted at home and also abroad, where it was known as the “Washington Consensus.” CAPITAL REMAKES THE WORLD: U.S. FINANCE VS. U.S. MANUFACTURING The ending of the Cold War led many Americans to conclude that the nation’s economic interests would replace strategic goals at the center of foreign policy. But a nation’s interests are never predetermined. Joseph Stiglitz, a member of Clinton’s CEA, recalled, “We in the Clinton administration did not have a vision of a new post-Cold War international order, but the business and financial community did: they saw new opportunities for profits.”92 Eastern Europe, Russia, and China needed investment, and China offered a huge, cheap workforce.


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The American Way of Poverty: How the Other Half Still Lives by Sasha Abramsky

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2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, big-box store, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, indoor plumbing, job automation, Mark Zuckerberg, Maui Hawaii, microcredit, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, payday loans, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, Potemkin village, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

For most of the rest of Queen Victoria’s near-seventy-year reign, “the great unwashed” were either left to find their own ways through terrain of hunger, homelessness, and disease, or were corralled into the sorts of ghastly workhouse settings made infamous by the writings of Charles Dickens. In America, the South in particular took the Victorian lesson to heart, though to a lesser degree so too did the rest of the country. As did most of Europe. After all, Great Britain was the dominant power of the age, its economic prescriptions as hard to avoid as, say, the Washington consensus’s emphasis on opening up markets to international trade, privatizing public services, and deregulation a century and a half later. Coercive poor law politics, shaped around workhouses, poor houses, and other near-prison-like conditions for confining and attending to the subsistence needs of the poor was, as a consequence, the dominant response to poverty on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century.


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A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins

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airline deregulation, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, big-box store, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, centre right, clean water, colonial rule, corporate governance, corporate personhood, deglobalization, deindustrialization, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, financial deregulation, financial independence, full employment, global village, high net worth, land reform, large denomination, Long Term Capital Management, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, new economy, North Sea oil, offshore financial centre, oil shock, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transatlantic slave trade, transfer pricing, union organizing, Washington Consensus, working-age population, Yom Kippur War

Treasury Department 88, 240, 252 Uzbekistan 200 VA Tech 23–14 Venezuela: Chavez government 273 coup attempt in 3, 25 foreign debt 230, 233 oil industry 154 Vietnam 229 foreign debt 225, 243 Volcker, Paul 78, 82 Wälde, Thomas 147 Walker, Peter Lord 138 Wallach, Lori 273 Watson-Clark, Nigel 113–14, 115–17, 121–22, 124, 127–30 When Corporations Rule the World (Korten) 4 Williamson, Craig 26 Witt, Dan 134–35, 136–39, 144–45 Washington consensus see neoliberalism Wolfowitz, Paul 27, 126 World Bank 19, 23, 135, 253, 275 Argentina and 169–73 Congo and 100 conflicts of interest 243–44 culture of lending 157, 158, 173–74 debt relief and 221–22, 224, 226, 237, 240–41, 242–46, 250–51 dictators and 158, 159 export credit agencies and 199, 201, 202, 204, 212, 213, 214 investigations of fraud 158, 162–73 Iraq and 151–52 Liberia and 159–67 Nigeria and 167–69 offshore banking and 43, 234 Philippines and 175–84 privatization and 100, 191, 277 protests against 266 structural adjustment programs 191–91, 265–66 World Economic Forum 126–27 World Forum on Globalization and Global Trade 271 World Gold Council 244 World Social Forum 271 World Trade Organization 4, 188, 189, 275 Agreement on Agriculture 271–72 agricultural trade and 186–87, 271–72 Doha Round 272–73 establishment of 267–68 export credit agencies and 200, 215 foreign sales corporations and 51 protests against 266, 270–73 Uruguay Round 215 Yamani, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki 145 Yemen, foreign debt 225, 243 Yergin, Daniel 139 Zaire see Congo Zambia: foreign debt 230, 247, 249 impact of IMF SAP 22 Zapatista Army of Liberation 272 Zedillo, Ernesto 238 Zeng Peiyan 126–27 Table of Contents Cover Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents Introduction: New Confessions and Revelations from the World of Economic Hit Men 1 Global Empire: The Web of Control 2 Selling Money—and Dependency: Setting the Debt Trap 3 Dirty Money: Inside the Secret World of Offshore Banking 4 BCCI’s Double Game: Banking on America, Banking on Jihad 5 The Human Cost of Cheap Cell Phones 6 Mercenaries on the Front Lines in the New Scramble for Africa 7 Hijacking Iraq’s Oil Reserves: Economic Hit Men at Work 8 The World Bank and the $100 Billion Question 9 The Philippines, the World Bank, and the Race to the Bottom 10 Exporting Destruction 11 The Mirage of Debt Relief 12 Global Uprising: The Web of Resistance About the Authors Acknowledgments Appendix Index


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Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science (Fully Revised and Updated) by Charles Wheelan

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affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Andrei Shleifer, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, capital controls, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, congestion charging, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, demographic transition, diversified portfolio, Doha Development Round, Exxon Valdez, financial innovation, floating exchange rates, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, happiness index / gross national happiness, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, index fund, interest rate swap, invisible hand, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, libertarian paternalism, low skilled workers, lump of labour, Malacca Straits, market bubble, microcredit, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, Network effects, new economy, open economy, presumed consent, price discrimination, price stability, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, random walk, rent control, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, Steve Jobs, The Market for Lemons, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, trickle-down economics, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, Yogi Berra, young professional

Jeffrey Sachs, “Growth in Africa: It Can Be Done,” The Economist, June 29, 1996. 36. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin, 2007). 37. William Easterly, “Was Development Assistance a Mistake,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 2 (May 2007). 38. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 4 (September 2000), pp. 847–68. 39. Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XLIV (December 2006). EPILOGUE. LIFE IN 2050 1. “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” The Economist, May 18, 2001. 2. Denise Grady, “In Quest to Cure Rare Diseases, Some Get Left Out,” New York Times, November 16, 1999. 3. Anthony Lewis, “A Civilized Society,” New York Times, September 8, 2001. 4.


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Why We Can't Afford the Rich by Andrew Sayer

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, Albert Einstein, asset-backed security, banking crisis, banks create money, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, collective bargaining, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deglobalization, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, demand response, don't be evil, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, en.wikipedia.org, Etonian, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Fractional reserve banking, full employment, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, high net worth, income inequality, investor state dispute settlement, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, job automation, Julian Assange, labour market flexibility, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, moral hazard, mortgage debt, neoliberal agenda, new economy, New Urbanism, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, patent troll, payday loans, Plutocrats, plutocrats, predatory finance, price stability, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working poor, Yom Kippur War

., Nilsson, A. and Williams, K. (2011) After the great complacence: Financial crisis and the politics of reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 90 As Gillian Tett and other close observers of the financial sector have observed, the efficient markets thesis – routinely used to legitimise the financialisation of everything – has become a kind of religion: ‘There is a real sense of intellectual confusion. Over the past year I have been talking to former true believers and they’re like a priest who has lost faith in the Bible, but still has to go to church, and the congregation is sitting there but he doesn’t know what the Bible is any more …’ Adair Turner adds: ‘Yes, the fact is that intellectual systems – the whole efficient market theory, Washington consensus, free market deregulation system – can become like a religion’: Turner, A. (2009) ‘How to tame global finance’ Prospect, 27 August, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-to-tame-global-finance/. 91 Mirowski, P. (2013), Never let a serious crisis go to waste, London: Verso. It has been heterodox economists, largely excluded from major economic journals, who have blown the whistle on economists acting on behalf of companies. 92 It’s worth asking economists who profess this whether they believe it because they think it’s true or because it’s in their self-interest to believe it.


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The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It by Owen Jones

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anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, citizen journalism, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, don't be evil, Edward Snowden, Etonian, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, housing crisis, inflation targeting, investor state dispute settlement, James Dyson, laissez-faire capitalism, market fundamentalism, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, open borders, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, stakhanovite, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transfer pricing, union organizing, unpaid internship, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

Its share of global economic output has collapsed from a quarter in 1991 to less than a fifth today. China is a rapidly expanding competitor, along with other booming economies such as India and Brazil. The 2008 financial collapse has helped to speed up a global shift in economic power to the East. The US once enjoyed near-hegemony over Latin America, a position initially enshrined by the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and, in modern times, the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. But a wave of left-leaning administrations swept to power across Latin America in the noughties, asserting an independent course. The disastrous Iraq War undermined US military prestige and possible domestic support for military interventions, and perversely boosted the influence of its arch-enemy Iran across the Middle East. With US power declining, the Establishment dogma behind the ‘special relationship’ may be weakening too, as an abortive build-up to military action would illustrate.


pages: 493 words: 132,290

Vultures' Picnic: In Pursuit of Petroleum Pigs, Power Pirates, and High-Finance Carnivores by Greg Palast

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anti-communist, back-to-the-land, bank run, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, British Empire, capital asset pricing model, capital controls, centre right, Chelsea Manning, clean water, collateralized debt obligation, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, Donald Trump, energy security, Exxon Valdez, invisible hand, means of production, offshore financial centre, random walk, Ronald Reagan, sensible shoes, transfer pricing, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, Yogi Berra

Much of the power of the WTO, IMF, and World Bank is not just in their brute ability to choke off a nation’s money supply, but the gallons of greasy highfalutin techno-economic-theoretical jive that covers up their cold threats. But they were trying to blow their complex economics smoke in the face of Professor Dr. Correa, European-trained economist, fluent in five languages. Until he was tapped for the Finance post by Palacio, Dr. Correa taught economics at the University of Illinois, where his doctorate and publications included “Destabilizing Speculation in the Exchange Market: The Ecuadorian Case,” “The Washington Consensus in Latin America: A Quantitative Evaluation,” and so on. In other words, he had Larry Summers’s number. When the World Bank spoke in macroeconomic bullshit, Correa knew exactly what they really meant. Correa knows that Ecuador’s only hope, other than begging, is to take back control of its own oil. Ecuador was once a member of OPEC. Correa rejoined it. He had already taken the first difficult step of taking back the public’s oil, while Palacio’s Finance Minister.

Hopes and Prospects by Noam Chomsky

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Albert Einstein, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, colonial rule, corporate personhood, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deskilling, en.wikipedia.org, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Firefox, Howard Zinn, Hyman Minsky, invisible hand, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, new economy, nuremberg principles, open borders, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus

Stephen Zunes, one of the leading scholarly analysts of these matters, points out that “at a critical point in the nation’s effort to become more self-sufficient [in the early 1950s], the U.S. government forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital not for its own development, but to compensate the former mine owners and repay its foreign debts.”1 The economic policies forced on Bolivia in those years were a precursor of the structural adjustment programs imposed on the continent thirty years later, under the terms of the neoliberal “Washington consensus,” which has generally had harmful effects wherever its strictures have been observed. By now, the victims of neoliberal market fundamentalism are coming to include the rich countries, where financial liberalization is bringing about the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s and leading to massive state intervention in a desperate effort to rescue collapsing financial institutions.


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The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty by Benjamin H. Bratton

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1960s counterculture, 3D printing, 4chan, Ada Lovelace, additive manufacturing, airport security, Alan Turing: On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Amazon Web Services, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, bioinformatics, bitcoin, blockchain, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, call centre, carbon footprint, carbon-based life, Cass Sunstein, Celebration, Florida, charter city, clean water, cloud computing, connected car, corporate governance, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, dark matter, David Graeber, deglobalization, dematerialisation, disintermediation, distributed generation, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, Eratosthenes, ethereum blockchain, facts on the ground, Flash crash, Frank Gehry, Frederick Winslow Taylor, future of work, Georg Cantor, gig economy, global supply chain, Google Earth, Google Glasses, Guggenheim Bilbao, High speed trading, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, industrial robot, information retrieval, intermodal, Internet of things, invisible hand, Jacob Appelbaum, Jaron Lanier, Jony Ive, Julian Assange, Khan Academy, linked data, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, Masdar, McMansion, means of production, megacity, megastructure, Menlo Park, Minecraft, Monroe Doctrine, Network effects, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, packet switching, PageRank, pattern recognition, peak oil, performance metric, personalized medicine, Peter Thiel, phenotype, place-making, planetary scale, RAND corporation, recommendation engine, reserve currency, RFID, Sand Hill Road, self-driving car, semantic web, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Slavoj Žižek, smart cities, smart grid, smart meter, social graph, software studies, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Startup school, statistical arbitrage, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, Stuxnet, Superbowl ad, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, the built environment, The Chicago School, the scientific method, Torches of Freedom, transaction costs, Turing complete, Turing machine, Turing test, universal basic income, urban planning, Vernor Vinge, Washington Consensus, web application, WikiLeaks, working poor, Y Combinator

If the content of the terrorist form is that there is no civilian space, then the content of counterterrorism is identical if inverted. 10.  I would argue this framework of “the political” as articulated by Schmitt and developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, for example, is a stale and ineffective strategy for understanding the logics of power and design in our age of ecological precarity. Put differently, only a fool would tell you that the functional definition of the “post-political” looks like the Washington Consensus. As should be clear to the attentive reader, my rehearsal of Schmitt's model in this chapter is in order to overwhelm it with catastrophic contradictions. 11.  See also Stuart Elden's work on the history of the concept of territory, especially The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), as well as Elden, “Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics and the Depth of Power,” Political Geography 34 (May 2013): 35–51; Elden, “The Geopolitics of King Lear: Territory, Land, Earth,“ in Law and Literature, 25: 2 (2013); and Elden, “Chamayou's Manhunts: From Territory to Space?”


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The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World) by Robert J. Gordon

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3D printing, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, airline deregulation, airport security, Apple II, barriers to entry, big-box store, blue-collar work, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, collective bargaining, computer age, deindustrialization, Detroit bankruptcy, discovery of penicillin, Donner party, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, feminist movement, financial innovation, full employment, George Akerlof, germ theory of disease, glass ceiling, high net worth, housing crisis, immigration reform, impulse control, income inequality, income per capita, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflight wifi, interchangeable parts, invention of agriculture, invention of air conditioning, invention of the telegraph, invention of the telephone, inventory management, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, jitney, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, labor-force participation, Loma Prieta earthquake, Louis Daguerre, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market fragmentation, Mason jar, McMansion, Menlo Park, minimum wage unemployment, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, occupational segregation, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, payday loans, Peter Thiel, pink-collar, Productivity paradox, Ralph Nader, Ralph Waldo Emerson, refrigerator car, rent control, Robert X Cringely, Ronald Coase, school choice, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, Skype, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Pinker, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, transaction costs, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban decay, urban planning, urban sprawl, washing machines reduced drudgery, Washington Consensus, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration, yield management

Several authors contend that the erosion of the real minimum wage accounts for much of the increase of inequality as represented by the ratio of incomes in the tenth percentile to those in the ninetieth percentile.17 It seems plausible that the decline of relative incomes below the ninetieth percentile since the late 1970s has been caused, at least in part, by the declining bargaining power and density of unions, by the increased importance of imports and immigration, by the inroads of automation, and by the decrease in the real minimum wage. Frank Levy and Peter Temin provide a complementary interpretation that places more emphasis on a change in political philosophy from what they call the “Detroit Consensus” of the late 1940s to the Reagan-initiated “Washington Consensus” of the early 1980s. The main point that Levy and Temin add to our preceding summary is that highly progressive taxes, with 90 percent marginal tax rates for top-bracket earners in the 1940s and 1950s, sent a signal that high incomes were unacceptable.18 Beginning with the Reagan tax cuts, that element of the policy support of the great compression began to erode, and CEO compensation surged ahead from twenty times average worker pay in 1973 to 257 times higher in 2013, when the average CEO pay of publicly traded companies reached $10.5 million.19 The pay gap is even greater for retirement saving, in which it is typical for departing CEOs to receive multi-million-dollar retirement plans.