Francis Fukuyama: the end of history

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Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq by Francis Fukuyama

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Berlin Wall, business climate, colonial rule, conceptual framework, en.wikipedia.org, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, informal economy, land reform, microcredit, open economy, unemployed young men

In addition to several edited volumes, Flournoy has published numerous articles and reports on a variety of international security issues. She holds a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. As of July 1, 2005, he is also the director of the International Development program at SAIS. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992) has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (Free Press, 1999), and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).

Nation-Building Forum on Constructive Capitalism Francis Fukuyama, Series Editor Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq • • Edited by Francis Fukuyama The Johns Hopkins University Press • B A LT I M O R E • © 2006 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2006 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nation-building : beyond Afghanistan and Iraq / edited by Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. “Product of a conference held at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University, in April 2004”—Ack. Includes bibliographical references and index.

North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 10. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj,” Journal of Democracy 14 (July 2003): 60–74. 11. See John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli, eds., Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Development Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 12. Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building. See also the chapters by Michèle A. Flournoy and James Dobbins. 13. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 159–62. 15.


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Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety by Gideon Rachman

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Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, BRICs, capital controls, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, greed is good, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, laissez-faire capitalism, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, pension reform, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price stability, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Sinatra Doctrine, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

Quoted in Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 195. 10. DEMOCRACY: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY 1. Bloom’s book was published in 1987. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 2. Interview with the author, Washington, D.C. May 27, 2009. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, June 1989. The article was subsequently turned into a book, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 4. Ibid. 5. See for example Vince Cable, The Storm: The World Economic Crisis and What It Means (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), 3, and Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (London: Atlantic Books, 2008). 6. Fukuyama, End of History, 280. 7. Ibid., 50. 8. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 9.

The very idea of competing nation states that scramble for markets, power and resources will become passé.”23 The World Economic Forum responded to the new conventional wisdom by launching a grandiose new Global Redesign Initiative, promoted at the annual forum in Davos in January 2010.24 But where were these inspiring new examples of global cooperation to be found? In Washington, D.C., Francis Fukuyama came up with a surprising answer. Reflecting on his end-of-history thesis in 2009, twenty years after the publication of the original article, Fukuyama mused that one respect in which he might have gone wrong was that “I kind of assumed that American power would be used wisely.” In the aftermath of the Bush administration, that no longer seemed a safe assumption. And the man who twenty years earlier had been seen as the very epitome of American triumphalism argued that “the End of History was never about Reaganism, you know … the true exemplar of the End of History is the European Union, not the United States, because the European Union is trying to transcend sovereignty and power politics; it’s trying to replace that with the global rule of law, and that’s what ought to happen at the end of history.”25 In Brussels, capital of the EU, there were plenty of people who did indeed see the global economic crisis as a unique opportunity to push a distinctively European view of the world. 20 GLOBAL GOVERNMENT THE WORLD AS EUROPE The idea that the European Union might represent the culmination of world history is depressing.

But the model formed in America had failed in America. 10 DEMOCRACY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY In early 1989, Francis Fukuyama returned to the University of Chicago, his alma mater, to give a lecture. His talk was part of a series on the decline of the West, organized by his old professor Allan Bloom, author of the celebrated and gloomy conservative tract The Closing of the American Mind.1 There was only one problem. In early 1989, Fukuyama was in anything but a gloomy mood. As he later recalled, “I said I’ll give a talk, but it’s not going to be the decline of the West, it’s going to be the victory of the West. And they said, okay, fine, whatever. So I gave the talk in February of 1989.”2 The thesis that Fukuyama outlined in Chicago became famous as “the end of history.” A soft-spoken Asian-American, with an academic manner and conservative views, Fukuyama was thirty-six in 1989.


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Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

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Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, bioinformatics, Columbine, demographic transition, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Flynn Effect, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, impulse control, life extension, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, out of africa, Peter Singer: altruism, phenotype, presumed consent, Ray Kurzweil, Scientific racism, stem cell, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Turing test

CHAPTER 1: A TALE OF TWO DYSTOPIAS 1 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 308. 2 Peter Huber, Orwell’s Revenge: The 1984 Palimpsest (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 222–228. 3 Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 35. 4 Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired 8 (2000): 238–246. 5 Tom Wolfe, “Sorry, but Your Soul Just Died,” Forbes ASAP, December 2, 1996. 6 Letter to Roger C. Weightman, June 24, 1826, in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 729–730. 7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 8 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard/Belknap, 1983). 9 On this point, see Leon Kass, “Introduction: The Problem of Technology,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur M. Melzer et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 10–14. 10 See Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” The National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1999): 16–33. CHAPTER 2: SCIENCES OF THE BRAIN 1 Quote taken from the e-biomed home page, http://www.liebertpub.com/ebi/defaulti.asp. 2 For the application of genomics to the study of the mind, see Anne Farmer and Michael J.

There are many examples of this, from reforms in post-Meiji Restoration Japan to the Internet. 32 Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 24–40. 33 Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Pantheon, 2000). 34 The intellectual landscape on the issue of group selection has recently changed somewhat with the work of biologists like David Sloan Wilson, who have made the case for multilevel (that is, both individual and group) selection. See David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 35 For an overview, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Old Age of Mankind,” in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). CHAPTER 8: HUMAN NATURE 1 Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect (Washington, D.C./Covelo, Calif.: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000), p. 330. See Francis Fukuyama, review of Ehrlich in Commentary, February 2001. 2 David L. Hull, “On Human Nature,” in David L. Hull and Michael Ruse, eds., The Philosophy of Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 387. 3 Alexander Rosenberg, for example, argues that there are no “essential” characteristics of species because all species exhibit variance, and the median point of a range of variance does not constitute an essence.

CHAPTER 9: HUMAN DIGNITY 1 Clive Staples Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Touchstone, 1944), p. 85. 2 Counsel of Europe, Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, On the Prohibiting of Cloning Human Beings, Doc. 7884, July 16, 1997. 3 This is the theme of the second part of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4 For an interpretation of this passage in Tocqueville, see Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 11–17. 5 John Paul II, “Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences,” October 22, 1996. 6 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 35–39; see also Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 40–42. 7 Michael Ruse and David L.


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America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy by Francis Fukuyama

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affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, European colonialism, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Internet Archive, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, New Journalism, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, transaction costs, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

As noted earlier, the long trend toward the spread of liberal democracy is the central theme of my book The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000), 14-17. 5. For a description of these models, see Kaushik Basu, Analytical Development Economics: The Less Developed Economy Revisited (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 6. See David Ekbladh, "From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation Building in U.S. Foreign Relations," and Frank Sutton, "Nation-Building in the Heyday of the Classic Development Ideology: Ford Foundation Experience in the 1950s and 1960s," in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

See realistic Wilsonian-ism Wohlstetter, Albert, 21, 31-36 Wohlstetter, Roberta, 87 Wolfowitz, Paul, 12, 14, 21, 31 Wolfson, Adam, 2 8 women's empowerment, 120 World Bank, 145, 147 World Intellectual Property Organization, 44 World Trade Organization (WTO), 44 Yushchenko, Viktor, 5 2 Zakaria, Fareed, 140 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 181 226 approach to American foreign policy through 4vhich such mistakes might be turned around — one in which the positive aspects of the neo-conservative legacy are joined with a more rfealistic view of the way American power can Ipe used around the world. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of .International Political Economy and director of the International Development Program at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has written widely on political and economic development, and his previous books include the End of History and the Last Man, a best seller and the winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize. fURE SERIES

See also Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)," Finance and Development 40, no. 2 (2003): 31-34. William R. Easterly and Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, NBER Working Paper 9106, 2002. 13. Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah, "Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development, " Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 80-94; Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, "'Stateness' First," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 (2005): 84-88. 15. For a historical overview, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 16. For the Left, see, inter alia, Vernon Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?"

Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States by Francis Fukuyama

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Andrei Shleifer, Atahualpa, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business climate, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, income per capita, labour market flexibility, land reform, land tenure, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus

Domínguez is vice provost for international affairs at Harvard University, chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and Antonio Madero Professor of Mexican and Latin American Politics and Economics in the Harvard Department of Government. His most recent publications include Cuba hoy: Analizando su pasado, imaginando su futuro (2006); and, as coeditor with B. K. Kim, Between Compliance and Conflict: East Asia, Latin America, and the “New” Pax Americana (2005). Francis Fukuyama is director of the International Development Program and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Among his most salient works are The End of History and the Last Man (1992); State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004); and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006). Francisco E. González is the Riordan Roett Assistant Professor of Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H.

The Role of High-Stakes Politics in Latin America’s Development Gap, 134 Riordan Roett and Francisco E. González Part III: Institutional Factors in Latin America’s Development 7. The Latin American Equilibrium, 161 James A. Robinson 8. Do Defective Institutions Explain the Development Gap between the United States and Latin America?, 194 Francis Fukuyama 9. Why Institutions Matter: Fiscal Citizenship in Argentina and the United States, 222 Natalio R. Botana 10. Conclusion, 268 Francis Fukuyama Contributors, 297 Index, 301 xiv Contents falling behind This page intentionally left blank 1 Introduction francis fukuyama I n 1492, on the eve of the European settlement and colonization of the New World, Bolivia and Peru hosted richer and more complex civilizations than any that existed in North America. After two centuries of colonization, in 1700, per capita income in continental Latin America was $521, and it was a marginally higher $527 in what would become the United States.1 During the eighteenth century, the sugarproducing island of Cuba was far wealthier than Britain’s American colonies.

falling behind This page intentionally left blank edited by francis fukuyama FALLING BEHIND Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States 1 2008 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2008 by Francis Fukuyama Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved.


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The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

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Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, California gold rush, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, conceptual framework, correlation does not imply causation, currency manipulation / currency intervention, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, invention of agriculture, invention of the printing press, Khyber Pass, labour market flexibility, land reform, land tenure, means of production, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Scramble for Africa, spice trade, Stephen Hawking, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

This is the framework in which I will resume the account of political development in Volume 2. ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man NOTES PREFACE 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 3 On redistributive economic systems in general, see Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as an Instituted Process,” in Polanyi and C.

Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 46–47. 31 Trivers, “Reciprocal Altruism.” 32 On this general topic, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), chap. 13–17. 33 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 34 Ibid., pp. 21–25. Conversely, low-status human beings often suffer from chronic depression and have been successfully treated with Prozac, Zoloft, and other so-called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which increase levels of brain serotonin. See Roger D. Masters and Michael T. McGuire, The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 10. 35 On this issue, see Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 36 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 37 Wade, Before the Dawn, pp. 16–17. 38 See R.

Three Books Against the Simoniacs (Humbert of Moyenmoutier) Three Dynasties Three Gorges Dam Three Kingdoms Tibet Tiger, Lionel Tilly, Charles Time of Troubles Timor-Leste Tocqueville, Alexis de Togo Tokugawa shogunate Tolstoy, Leo Tonga Tönnies, Ferdinand Tower of Babel, biblical story of Transoxania Transparency International Transylvania tribal societies; Arab; Chinese; European; Indian; in Latin America; law and justice in; legitimacy in; military slavery and; mitigation of conflict in; persistence to present day of; property in; religion in; state-level societies compared to; transition from or band-level organization to; Turkish; warfare and conquest by; see also kinship; lineage; specific tribes Trivers, Robert Trobriand Islands Tudors Tunisia Tuoba tribe Turcoman tribes Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turkana people Turkish Republic Turks; in Abbasid empire; in China; in Hungary; in India; in Transylvania; see also Ottoman Empire Tursun Bey Tylor, Edward Ukraine ulama Umar, Caliph Umayyad dynasty United Nations United States; accountability in; Afghanistan and; antistatist traditions in; bureaucracy in; during cold war; dysfunctional political equilibrium in; economic crises in; homicide in; invasion of Iraq by; Japan and; local governments in; military of; modernization theory in; patronage politics in; per capital spending on government services in; rule of law in; slavery in; South Korea and; taxation in Urban II, Pope urban centers, see cities Uthman, Caliph Uzbekistan Vaishyas Vanuatu Varangians Vedas Velasco, Andres Vena, King venal officeholding: in England; in France; in Russia; in Spain Venezuela Venice, republic of Vietnam Vikings Vinogradoff, Paul violence; in agrarian societies; in chimpanzee society; in China; as driver of state formation; in England; in France; in India; in prehistoric societies; property rights and; religion and; in Russia; in state of nature; see also war Vladimir, Prince Voltaire Vorontsov, Count Vrijjis, gana-sangha chiefdom of Wahhabism Wales Wallis, John Wang, Empress of China Wang family Wang Mang Wanli emperor waqfs (Muslim charity) war; civil, see civil war; counterinsurgency; financing of; institutional innovations brought on by; in Malthusian world; in Muslim states; prisoners of; religion and; state formation driven by; in state of nature; technology of; tribal; see also specific wars War and Peace (Tolstoy) Warring States period; cities during; cultural outpourings during; education and literacy during; infantry/cavalry warfare during; kinship groupings during; map of; road and canal construction during Wealth of Nations, The (Smith) Weber, Max; on bureaucracy; on charismatic authority; on feudalism; modernization theory of; on religion Wei, state of Wei Dynasty Weingast, Barry Wei state well-field system Wen, Emperor of China Wendi, Emperor of China Westphalia, Peace of Whig history White, Leslie William I, King of England William III (William of Orange), King of England Wittfogel, Karl Woolcock, Michael World Bank World Trade Organization World War I Worms, Concordat of Wrangham, Richard Wriston, Walter Wu, Emperor of China Wu Zhao (Empress Wu) Xia Dynasty Xian, Duke Xianbei tribe Xiang Yu Xiao, Duke Xiao-wen, Emperor of China Xin dynasty Xiongnu tribe Xi Xia tribe Xu, Empress of China Xun Zi Yale University Yan, Empress of China Yangdi, Emperor of China Yang family Yang Jian Yangshao period Yanomamö Indians Y chromosome Yellow Turban rebellion Ying Zheng Young Turk movement Yuan Dynasty Yuezhi Yugoslavia Yurok Indians Yushchenko, Viktor Zaire Zakaria, Fareed zemskiy sobor zero-sum games Zhang Shicheng Zhao Kuangyin Zheng He Zhongzong, Emperor of China Zhou Dynasty; bureaucracy during; Confucianism during; Eastern (see also Spring and Autumn period; Warring States period); feudalism of; Later; Mandate of Heaven and; Western Zhu Yuangzhang Zi Chan Zoloft Zoroastrianism A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Resident at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He has taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. He was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served as the deputy director in the State Department’s policy planning staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. He lives with his wife in Palo Alto, California. Copyright © 2011 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved FARRAR, STRAUS AND GIROUX 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 www.fsgbooks.com Maps copyright © 2011 by Mark Nugent Designed by Abby Kagan eISBN 9781429958936 First eBook Edition : April 2011 First edition, 2011 Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to reprint the following material: Excerpts from Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople.


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Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy by Francis Fukuyama

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Atahualpa, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, British Empire, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Snowden, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, invention of the printing press, iterative process, knowledge worker, land reform, land tenure, life extension, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, means of production, Menlo Park, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, new economy, open economy, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, Port of Oakland, post-industrial society, Post-materialism, post-materialism, price discrimination, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, stem cell, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

Wilson, Woodrow “winner-take-all” society Wolfenson, James Woolcock, Michael workers working class; conversion into middle class; voting by World Bank; Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank Institute World Values Survey World War I World War II; Japan’s defeat in Wrong, Michela Wu Zhao Xi Jinping Yamagata Aritomo Yang, Dali Yang, Hongxing Yanukovich, Viktor Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa Yemen Yrigoyen, Hipólito Yugoslavia Zaire Zakaria, Fareed Zambia Zanzibar Zenawi, Meles Zhao, Dingxin Zhou Enlai Zhu Yuangzhang Zimbabwe ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man About the Author Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has previously taught at the Paul H.

Fukuyama was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He is the author of The Origins of Political Order, The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads. He lives with his wife in California. Farrar, Straus and Giroux 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 Copyright © 2014 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved First edition, 2014 eBooks may be purchased for business or promotional use. For information on bulk purchases, please contact Macmillan Corporate and Premium Sales Department by writing to MacmillanSpecialMarkets@macmillan.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy / Francis Fukuyama. pages cm ISBN 978-0-374-22735-7 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-4299-4432-8 (e-book) 1.

This argument is made in Huntington, The Third Wave. 5. Gellner makes the comparison of European nationalism and Middle Eastern Islamism in Nations and Nationalism, pp. 75–89. A variant of this argument is also made in Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See also Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 30: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE 1. This chapter expands on Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 53–61. 2. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 124. Gellner also makes this argument in Culture, Identity, and Politics. See also Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy.” 3. See The Global Middle Class (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2009); Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); William Easterly, The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2346, 2000); Luis F.


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The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World by Steven Radelet

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Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, business climate, business process, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, colonial rule, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, income inequality, income per capita, invention of the steam engine, James Watt: steam engine, John Snow's cholera map, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, low skilled workers, M-Pesa, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, oil shock, out of africa, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, randomized controlled trial, Robert Gordon, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, special economic zone, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, women in the workforce, working poor

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, “The State of the State: The Global Contest for the Future of Government,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, p. 119. 3. Samuel Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 15–16, www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/IntPol/Huntington.91.Demo.3rd.pdf/. 4. Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661. 5. Alan Neuhauser, “U.S., China Reach Historic Climate Accord,” U.S. News and World Report, November 12, 2014, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/12/us-china-reach-historic-climate-change-accord. 6. Coral Davenport, “Philippines Pushes Developing Countries to Cut Their Emissions,” New York Times, December 8, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/world/americas/philippines-pushes-developing-countries-to-cut-their-emissions-.html. 7.

Praise for The Great Surge “Powerful, lucid, and revelatory, The Great Surge makes a vital argument and offers indispensable prescriptions about sustaining global economic progress into the future.” —George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund Management “Steven Radelet’s brilliant new book demonstrates how the world has actually gotten better in recent years, not by a little but by a lot. This is a careful antidote to today’s fashionable pessimism and should be read by everyone.” —Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History “With the airwaves filled with news of insurrection, desperation and stubborn diseases, this book jars you out of a cliched response. With his typical care and detail, Steve describes humanity’s greatest hits over the last twenty years—never have we lived in a time when so many are doing so well. The job surely isn’t done, but these pages provide the evidence the job can be done, if we choose to do it.”

At a time of increased media coverage, global connectivity, and flow of information, the idea that a major transformation was possible spread fast. People around the world could watch in real time as Marcos boarded a plane to flee to Hawaii, Chinese protestors stood up in Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall fell, governments in Eastern Europe collapsed, and Mandela walked out of jail. By the early 1990s, dramatic change had begun, as political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama described in his masterpiece The End of History and the Last Man: The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades.


pages: 217 words: 61,407

Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short by David Archibald

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Bakken shale, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income per capita, means of production, mutually assured destruction, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, out of africa, peak oil, price discovery process, rising living standards, South China Sea, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, Yom Kippur War

This method of conversion into animal protein with Prussian blue supplements in stages along the way could be the only way to consume the radiologically contaminated grain. CHAPTER SIX CHINA WANTS A WAR And there appeared another wonder in heaven; and behold a great red dragon, having seven heads and ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads. —Revelation 12:3 After the collapse of most Communist states in 1990, the world appeared to have entered a period of permanent peace. Stanford University–based political scientist Francis Fukuyama called it “the end of history,” in which democracy and free-market capitalism would become the final form of human government.1 In response to Fukuyama’s 1992 book, Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington penned an article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?,” which he expanded into a 1996 book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.2 Huntington argued that now that the age of ideological conflict between Communism and capitalism had ended, civilizational conflict, the normal state of affairs in the world, would reassert itself.

Originally published as La Trahison des Clercs, Paris: Grasset, 1927. 2.Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926). Originally published as Der Untergang des Abenlandes, Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1918. Chapter 1: The Time Is at Hand 1.Alexandra Smith, “Food, Too, Is Wasted on the Young,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 20, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/food-too-is-wasted-on-the-young-20120719-22d32.html. 2.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3.Eigil Friis-Christensen and Knud Lassen, “Length of the Solar Cycle: An Indicator of Solar Activity Closely Associated with Climate,” Science 254 (1991): 698–700. 4.David Archibald, The Past and Future of Climate (Rhaetian Management, 2010). 5.J. E. Solheim, K. Stordahl, and O. Humlum, “The Long Sunspot Cycle 23 Predicts a Significant Temperature Decrease in Cycle 24,” Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 80, May 2012. 6.James Delingpole, “Lovelock Goes Mad for Shale Gas,” Telegraph, June 16, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/100165783/lovelock-goes-mad-for-shale-gas/.

Chapter 5: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 1.Amir Tahiri, The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution (New York: Encounter, 2010). 2.Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 3.Tahiri, The Persian Night. 4.Peter Robinson, “An Endless Struggle,” Hoover Digest 3 (2013): 148–58. 5.Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013). 6.Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts, 2002 update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002), http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/. Chapter 6: China Wants a War 1.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2.Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 3.Edward Luttwark, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). 4.Paul Monk, “A Fox’s Thoughts about China and Australia’s Security,” Quadrant, April 2013. 5.Manuel Quinones, “Alternative Fuels: Coal-to-Liquids’ Prospects Dim, but Boosters Won’t Say Die,” Greenwire, May 17, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981383. 6.Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.


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Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up by Philip N. Howard

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, Brian Krebs, British Empire, call centre, Chelsea Manning, citizen journalism, clean water, cloud computing, corporate social responsibility, crowdsourcing, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Filter Bubble, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Google Earth, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Julian Assange, Kibera, Kickstarter, land reform, M-Pesa, Marshall McLuhan, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, mobile money, Mohammed Bouazizi, national security letter, Network effects, obamacare, Occupy movement, packet switching, pension reform, prediction markets, sentiment analysis, Silicon Valley, Skype, spectrum auction, statistical model, Stuxnet, trade route, uranium enrichment, WikiLeaks, zero day

And online search habits leading up to an election help predict which candidates will win.43 Around the world, being a modern politician means more than having a decent website. It means being able to work with the information infrastructure that young citizens are using to form their political identities. Ideologies, like governments, have lost much of their ability to exclusively and comprehensively frame events. Indeed, the claim of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument is that there will be no more great ideologies because capitalism has triumphed over all of its rivals. While it may be true that there have been no great ideologies since the arrival of the civilian internet, it’s also true that when there are ideological battles, they happen online. What makes an ideology successful is its ability to prevent followers from being aware of the way public issues are being framed.

“Internet Users in the World,” Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, June 30, 2012, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 6. “Hooking up,” Economist, January 31, 2013, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571126-new-data-flows-highlight-relative-decline-west-hooking-up. 7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 8. World Affairs Council, “Press Conference” (Regent Beverly Wilshire Hotel, April 19, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May 1996): 79–91. 9. James Ball, “Meet the Seven People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security,” Guardian, February 28, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web; “Internet Society,” accessed June 16, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.org/; “ICANN,” accessed June 16, 2014, https://www.icann.org/. 10.

Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2013–2018 (San Jose, CA: Cisco, February 2014), accessed September 30, 2014, http://cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/white_paper_c11–520862.html. 25. Larry Diamond, “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 93–112. 26. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? 27. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reissue ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 28. Clive Southey, “The Staples Thesis, Common Property, and Homesteading,” Canadian Journal of Economics 11, no. 3 (1978): 547–59, doi:10.2307/134323. 29. Lita Person, Mobile Wallet (NFC, Digital Wallet) Market (Applications, Mode of Payment, Stakeholders, and Geography)—Global Share, Size, Industry Analysis, Trends, Opportunities, Growth, and Forecast, 2012–2020 (Portland, OR: Allied Market Research, November 2013), accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/mobile-wallet-market; Marion Williams, “The Regulatory Tension over Mobile Money,” Australian Banking and Finance, February 17, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/the-regulatory-tension-over-mobile-money/. 30.

The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be by Moises Naim

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additive manufacturing, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, corporate governance, crony capitalism, deskilling, disintermediation, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, intermodal, invisible hand, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, Martin Wolf, megacity, Naomi Klein, Nate Silver, new economy, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, private military company, profit maximization, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, World Values Survey

More than three dozen countries now operate drone fleets, and dozens of private companies are now offering to fly them on behalf of other countries that lack the support infrastructure to do so.29 More disturbingly, ordinary hobbyists and private users abound: in the United States in 2012, a group called DIY Drones already had twenty thousand members. In 2004, Hezbollah flew a drone into Israeli air space; the Israeli military downed it, but the psychological effect of the violation, and the message it sent about Hezbollah’s capacities, endures. 30 What happens when any disaffected, delusional, or deranged individual has the capacity to wreak havoc from the sky? As Stanford University’s Francis Fukuyama, who has been building his own drone to take better nature photos, has observed: “As the technology becomes cheaper and more commercially available, moreover, drones may become harder to trace; without knowing their provenance, deterrence breaks down. A world in which people can be routinely and anonymously targeted by unseen enemies is not pleasant to contemplate.”31 Drones are hyper-sophisticated compared with the most devastating weapon in military conflicts of the past few years—the improvised explosive device.

Having a more diverse and inclusive group of actors at the table (the erstwhile “weak”) and reducing the number of decisions arbitrarily imposed on the world by a few powerful players are worth applauding, but the heightened difficulty of getting things done is not. POLITICAL PARALYSIS AS COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF THE DECAY OF POWER That paralysis has become acutely evident in the United States. As politics has become more polarized, the defects of a system overloaded with checks and balances have become more apparent. Francis Fukuyama calls this system a “vetocracy.” He writes: “Americans take great pride in a constitution that limits executive power through a series of checks and balances. But those checks have metastasized. And now America is a vetocracy. When this system is combined with ideologized parties, . . . the result is paralysis. . . . If we are to get out of our present paralysis we need not only strong leadership, but changes in institutional rules.”6 Economist Peter Orszag witnessed the workings of vetocracy and its nefarious 185 consequences.

That starts with embracing the reality of the decay of power and, again, changing our conversation to reflect it. Not just in the corridors of presidential palaces, corporate headquarters, and university boardrooms but even more so in encounters around watercoolers in offices, in casual conversations among friends, and at the dinner table at home. These conversations are the indispensable ingredients of a political climate that is less welcoming to the terrible simplifiers. For as Francis Fukuyama correctly argues, to eradicate the vetocracy that is paralyzing the system, “political reform must first and foremost be driven by popular, grassroots mobilization.” 5 This, in turn, requires focusing the conversation on how to contain the negative aspects of the decay of power and move us to the positive sloping side of the inverted U-curve. For this to happen, we need something that is very difficult: an increased disposition in democratic societies to give more power to those who govern us.


pages: 585 words: 165,304

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama

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barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, business climate, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, double entry bookkeeping, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Gilder, glass ceiling, global village, hiring and firing, industrial robot, Jane Jacobs, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, land reform, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, mittelstand, price mechanism, profit maximization, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transfer pricing, traveling salesman, union organizing

Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again. Now that the question of ideology and institutions has been settled, the preservation and accumulation of social capital will occupy center stage. NOTES CHAPTER 1. ON THE HUMAN SITUATION AT THE END OF HISTORY 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2For an excellent discussion of the origins of civil society and its relationship to democracy, see Ernest Gellner, Conditions and Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 3For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 7-14. 4Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1994): 22-49. 5According to Durkheim, “Society is not alone in its interest in the formation of special groups to regulate their own activity, developing within them what otherwise would become anarchic; but the individual, on his part, finds joy in it, for anarchy is painful to him.

King, “A Christian and a Japanese-Buddhist Work-Ethic Compared,” Religion 11 (1981): 207-226. 2Japanese commentators alternate between arguing that Japanese culture and institutions are totally unique and unexportable and saying that they could potentially be a model for other parts of Asia. For a hostile Western account of the literature on Japanese uniqueness, or nihonjinron, see Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). CHAPTER 30. AFTER THE END OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2In addition, virtually all of the central themes of this book concerning the importance of culture to economic behavior were anticipated in my earlier work. See Fukuyama (1992), chaps. 20, 21; and “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18, where I discuss the Weber hypothesis and the impact of culture. 3This point is argued in David Gellner, “Max Weber: Capitalism and the Religion of India,” Sociology 16 (1982): 526-543. 4Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), vol 1. 5This point is made in Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 39-69.

THE SPIRITUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE 1The correlation between democracy and development is explored by Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105. For a review of the literature on the Lipset hypothesis that largely confirms this point, see Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March-June 1992): 450-499. 2For a summary of this argument, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. xi-xxiii. 3This is described on pp. 143-180 of Fukuyama (1992). 4Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), p. 50. 5Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). BIBLIOGRAPHY Abe, Yoshio, “The Basis of Japanese Culture and Confucianism (2),” Asian Culture Quarterly 2 (1974): 21-28.

Social Capital and Civil Society by Francis Fukuyama

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Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, p-value, postindustrial economy, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, transaction costs, World Values Survey

Social Capital FRANCIS FUKUYAMA THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford May 12, 14, and 15, 1997 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the Institute of Public Policy at George Mason University and director of the Institute’s International Transactions Program. Educated at Cornell, he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has been a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, where he is currently a consultant, as well as a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations; the editor, with Andrez Korbonski, of T h e Soviet Union and the Third W o r l d : T h e Last Three Decades (1987) ; and book review editor at Foreign A f a i r s .

He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations; the editor, with Andrez Korbonski, of T h e Soviet Union and the Third W o r l d : T h e Last Three Decades (1987) ; and book review editor at Foreign A f a i r s . His publications include T h e End of History and the Last M a n ( 1 9 9 2 ), which received the Premio Capri and the Book Critics Award (from the Los Angeles T i m e s ) , and Trust : T h e Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), which was named “business book of the year” by European. LECTURE I. THE GREAT DISRUPTION Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been an extraordinary amount of attention paid to the interrelated issues of social capital, civil society, trust, and social norms as central issues for contemporary democracies. The propensity for civil society was said to be an essential condition for the transition to stable democracy in Eastern Europe, and the decline in social capital in the United States is said to be a major problem for American democracy today.


pages: 235 words: 62,862

Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek by Rutger Bregman

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autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, Berlin Wall, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, Branko Milanovic, cognitive dissonance, computer age, conceptual framework, credit crunch, David Graeber, Diane Coyle, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, George Gilder, happiness index / gross national happiness, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, income inequality, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, low skilled workers, means of production, megacity, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microcredit, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, Nathan Meyer Rothschild: antibiotics, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, Peter Thiel, post-industrial society, precariat, RAND corporation, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Skype, stem cell, Steven Pinker, telemarketer, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, wage slave, War on Poverty, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, wikimedia commons, women in the workforce, working poor, World Values Survey

Orazem, “Challenge Paper: Education,” Copenhagen Consensus Center (April 2014). http://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/education 17. “Where have all the burglars gone?” The Economist (July 18, 2013). http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582041-rich-world-seeing-less-and-less-crime-even-face-high-unemployment-and-economic 18. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). http://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf 19. Andrew Cohut et al., Economies of Emerging Markets Better Rated During Difficult Times. Global Downturn Takes Heavy Toll; Inequality Seen as Rising, Pew Research (May 23, 2013), p. 23. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Economic-Report-FINAL-May-23-20131.pdf 20. Lyman Tower Sargent, Utopianism.

See for example: Milton Friedman, “Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects,” Farmand (February 17, 1951). http://0055d26.netsolhost.com/friedman/pdfs/other_commentary/Farmand.02.17.1951.pdf 15. F.A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review (Spring 1949). https://mises.org/etexts/hayekintellectuals.pdf 16. Quoted in: Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion. Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (2012). p. 13. 17. Quoted in: Burgin, The Great Persuasion, p. 169. 18. Ibid, p. 11. 19. Ibid, p. 221. 20. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 21. At the end of his life, Friedman said there was only one philosopher he had ever really studied in depth: the Austrian Karl Popper. Popper argued that good science revolves around “falsifiability,” requiring a continual search for things that don’t fit your theory instead of only seeking confirmation. However, as we’ve seen, most people approach theories the other way around.

“There are still criminals, but there are ever fewer of them and they are getting older.”17 War has been on the decline Source: Peace Research Institute Oslo A Bleak Paradise Welcome, in other words, to the Land of Plenty. To the good life. To Cockaigne, where almost everyone is rich, safe, and healthy. Where there’s only one thing we lack: a reason to get out of bed in the morning. Because after all, you can’t really improve on paradise. Back in 1989, the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama already noted that we had arrived in an era where life has been reduced to “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”18 Notching up our purchasing power another percentage point, or shaving a couple off our carbon emissions; perhaps a new gadget – that’s about the extent of our vision. We live in an era of wealth and overabundance, but how bleak it is.


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The end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, centre right, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, labour mobility, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, nuclear winter, open economy, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Socratic dialogue, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions

Francis Fukuvama THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN As the tumultuous twentieth century shudders toward its close — with the collapse of commu­ nism leading to a transformation of world politics — Francis Fukuyama asks us to return with him to a question that has been asked by the great philosophers of centuries past: is there a direction to the history of mankind? And if it is directional, to what end is it moving? And where are we now in relation to that "end of history"? In this exciting and profound inquiry, which goes far beyond the issues raised in his worldfamous essay "The End of History?" in the summer 1989 National Interest, Fukuyama presents evidence to suggest that there are two powerful forces at work in human history. He calls one "the logic of modern science" and the other "the struggle for recognition'.'

His discussion of the idea of thymos may prove to be even more important than his theory of the end of history'.' - T o m Wolfe A bold and brilliant work. Very, very impressive'.' — Irving Kristol "Fukuyama tells us where we were, where we are, and most important, speculates about where we will likely be — with clarity and an astonishing sweep of reflection and imag­ ination. His command of political philosophy and political facts takes us beyond the daily newspapers to a grasp of the meaning of our situation'.' — Allan Bloom "For me, [Fukuyama's thought] is an attempt to arm Western political thought with new fundamental theoretical arguments to reinforce its practical actions. Moreover, it is not an unsuccessful attempt " — Eduard Shevardnadze ISBN 0-02-910975-2 T H E END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN T H E END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN Francis Fukuyama T H E FREE PRESS A Division of Macmillan, NEW YORK Inc.

Maxwell Macmillan Canada TORONTO Maxwell Macmillan International NEW YORK OXFORD SINGAPORE SIDNEY Copyright © 1992 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. The Free Press A Division of Macmillan, Inc. 866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 Maxwell Macmillan Canada, Inc. 1200 Eglinton Avenue East Suite 200 Don Mills, Ontario M3C 3N1 Macmillan, Inc. is part of the Maxwell Communication Group of Companies. Printed in the United States of America printing number 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the last man / Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.


pages: 798 words: 240,182

The Transhumanist Reader by Max More, Natasha Vita-More

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23andMe, Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic, artificial general intelligence, augmented reality, Bill Joy: nanobots, bioinformatics, brain emulation, Buckminster Fuller, cellular automata, clean water, cloud computing, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, combinatorial explosion, conceptual framework, Conway's Game of Life, cosmological principle, data acquisition, discovery of DNA, Drosophila, en.wikipedia.org, experimental subject, Extropian, fault tolerance, Flynn Effect, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, friendly AI, game design, germ theory of disease, hypertext link, impulse control, index fund, John von Neumann, joint-stock company, Kevin Kelly, Law of Accelerating Returns, life extension, Louis Pasteur, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, Network effects, Norbert Wiener, P = NP, pattern recognition, phenotype, positional goods, prediction markets, presumed consent, Ray Kurzweil, reversible computing, RFID, Richard Feynman, Ronald Reagan, silicon-based life, Singularitarianism, stem cell, stochastic process, superintelligent machines, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, technological singularity, Ted Nelson, telepresence, telepresence robot, telerobotics, the built environment, The Coming Technological Singularity, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, transaction costs, Turing machine, Turing test, Upton Sinclair, Vernor Vinge, Von Neumann architecture, Whole Earth Review, women in the workforce

Meanwhile, maddened children, deluded fanatics, and terrorists like Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) murder with homemade bombs or stolen passenger jets to express their distaste for this relentless and unprecedented future that has exploded, as it were, into reality. It was refreshing, then, in 2002, to find a public intellectual of Dr. Francis Fukuyama’s ­standing take on the intensely real, serious topic of accelerating biotechnology. Instant fame had embraced Fukuyama a decade earlier when his conservative The End of History (Fukuyama 2006) seemed to explain the Soviet Union’s abrupt collapse. Liberal humanism – democratic, realistic, and market-driven rather than authoritarian – had won the cold war against its authoritarian and deludedly utopian foes. Why? Because, Fukuyama argued, it worked in harmony with human nature.

Shapiro explains “moral category” arguments such as arguments from nature, arguments from identity, from merit, and from external influence, and argues that there are serious problems in distinguishing disorder from augmentation models. This matters because some people have argued in favor of allowing treatments for disorders while prohibiting them for augmentations that are otherwise similar in nature. Philosopher Andy Miah casts a critical eye on Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg” and Francis Fukuyama’s views on “posthumanism.” Miah argues that the technoprogressive pursuit of biological transgressions can enrich individual and collective human life, while also permitting societies to attend to any social injustices that might arise through such behavior. Miah concludes with a full articulation of the concept of “biocultural capital,” which conveys a general, transhumanist justification for human enhancement.

One of the main criticisms of this emerging era is the way in which it may commodify life, the focus of the next section. Life as a Commodity If one acknowledges the merit of systematically reinforcing human biology so it is optimized to flourish – while accepting that one cannot expect certainty of bringing about such conditions – then what objections might there be to such a system? Francis Fukuyama’s (2002) primary concern is the commercial character of such a system of healthcare. He argues that such commercialization will lead inevitably to the commodification of life and this will diminish human flourishing, notably through it bringing about an impoverished view of human dignity. In response, I will seek to explain how the freedom to pursue commercial enhancements may be justified on the basis of what I call the accumulation of biocultural capital.


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Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna

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Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, complexity theory, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, energy security, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, flex fuel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global supply chain, haute couture, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, Islamic Golden Age, Khyber Pass, knowledge economy, land reform, low skilled workers, means of production, megacity, Monroe Doctrine, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open borders, open economy, Pax Mongolica, pirate software, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Potemkin village, price stability, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, South China Sea, special economic zone, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, trickle-down economics, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

But ever concentrated on the question of how to defend Britain against Continental powers, he focused on the Eurasian “world island,” whose “heartland” was “the greatest natural fortress on earth,” for it was inaccessible from the sea—and thus unassailable by British sea power—allowing a land-based power to dominate the world.18 His strategic counterpoint, the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, argued that in fact oceanic power was the key to global dominance, writing, “The empire of the seas is doubtless the empire of the world.” Geopolitics has since evolved into a family of holistic power formulae applied across the world and over long time horizons, what Fernand Braudel termed the longue durée.19 But it remains Toynbee’s story of challenge and response. GEOPOLITICS VERSUS GLOBALIZATION? In the 1990s, a great debate took place between the contrasting visions of Francis Fukuyama (The End of History) and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations), with the former generally caricatured as utopian and the latter as fatalistic. The grand predecessor to this dichotomy was the tension between the worldviews of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Spengler opened The Decline of the West (1918) with the bold claim, “This book will for the first time attempt to predict history.” He argued that the demise of the classical West was as inevitable as history itself; the symbols of high culture would naturally degenerate into material decadence in a process similar to human aging or the cycle of the seasons.

Today there are numerous equivalent statements on the pacifying effect of globalization, each echoing Norman Angell’s Great Illusion claim of the “complete economic futility of conquest.” Francis Fukuyama argues for the end of ideological struggle; John Mueller observes that the prospect of total, annihilating war makes it “subrationally unthinkable” Jonathan Schell and Peter Singer see the emergence of global consciousness as the “moral equivalent of war” or a “weapon of civilization” Robert Wright demonstrates that the accumulation of positive outcomes disincentivizes conflict; and Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman argue for a “Great Capitalist Peace.” See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992); Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Schell, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003); Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); Wright, Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage, 2000); and Lieven and Hulsman, Ethical Realism. 69.

.: Princeton University Press, 2005), ch. 7. 39. One measure of progress up the ladder of modernity is “stateness.” Stateness refers to a government’s capacity to enforce its power, ranging from minimal functions (public goods, property rights, defense) to intermediate functions (addressing externalities, education, regulation, social insurance) to more activist roles (industrial policy, wealth redistribution). See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). Four decades ago, Samuel Huntington wrote in Political Order in Changing Societies that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.” 40.


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A Short History of Progress by Ronald Wright

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Albert Einstein, Atahualpa, Bretton Woods, British Empire, clean water, Columbian Exchange, cuban missile crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Haber-Bosch Process, Hernando de Soto, invention of agriculture, James Watt: steam engine, Jane Jacobs, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, nuclear winter, out of africa, Parkinson's law, Ronald Reagan, Thomas Malthus, urban sprawl

And peasants were freed from vermin with generous dustings of ddt in what became known as the Third World — that unravelling tapestry of non-Western cultures seen as a relic of “backwardness” torn between the superpowers. In both its capitalist and communist versions, the great promise of modernity was progress without limit and without end. The collapse of the Soviet Union led many to conclude that there was really only one way of progress after all. In 1992 Francis Fukuyama, a former U.S. State Department official, declared that capitalism and democracy were the “end” of history — not only its destination but its goal.8 Doubters pointed out that capitalism and democracy are not necessarily bedfellows, citing Nazi Germany, modern China, and the worldwide archipelago of sweatshop tyrannies. Yet Fukuyama’s naive triumphalism strengthened a belief, mainly on the political right, that those who have not chosen the true way forward should be made to do so for their own good — by force, if necessary.

American Cold Warriors of the last century used to threaten to “bomb the Soviets back into the Stone Age.” Whether the Russians uttered the same threat, I don’t know. But it was certainly a credible one. Even if a nuclear “exchange” (as the euphemism went) failed to extinguish all higher forms of life, it would have ended civilization worldwide. No crops worth eating would grow in a nuclear winter. 8. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 9. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1711; Thomas Henry Huxley, On Elementary Instruction in Physiology, 1877. 10. Quoted in Robert J. Wenke, Patterns in Prehistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 79. 11. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 2, scene 2. 12. Ibid., As You Like It, act 4, scene 1. 13. Quoted in Glyn Daniel, The Idea of Prehistory (Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican, 1962), p. 19. 14.

Governments keen to avoid more of the same began broadening the franchise throughout the following century. A measure of participation filtered grudgingly down the social pyramid, while the new industrial economy nourished a growing middle class.33 We in the lucky countries of the West now regard our two-century bubble of freedom and affluence as normal and inevitable; it has even been called the “end” of history, in both a temporal and teleological sense.34 Yet this new order is an anomaly: the opposite of what usually happens as civilizations grow. Our age was bankrolled by the seizing of half a planet, extended by taking over most of the remaining half, and has been sustained by spending down new forms of natural capital, especially fossil fuels. In the New World, the West hit the biggest bonanza of all time.

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century by Francis Fukuyama

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Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, centre right, corporate governance, demand response, Doha Development Round, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Hernando de Soto, Nick Leeson, Potemkin village, price stability, principal–agent problem, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, transaction costs, Washington Consensus

state-building state-building governance and world order in the 21st century f r a n c i s f u k u ya m a cornell univer sit y press I t h a c a , N e w Yo r k Copyright © 2004 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2004 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. State-building : governance and world order in the 21st century / Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8014-4292-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. State, The. 2. National state.

In fact, the European peacekeepers contributed to the problem by not being willing to fight; in places like Srebrenica, they were held hostage and needed to be rescued. It was only as a result of actions by states that were willing to decisively use traditional forms of military power— the Croatians in the case of Bosnia and the Americans in the case of Kosovo—that Serbian domination was ended and the Balkans pacified. Robert Kagan put the matter in the following manner. The Europeans are the ones who actually believe they are living at the end of history–that is, in a largely peaceful world that to an weak states and international legitimacy 117 increasing degree can be governed by law, norms, and international agreements. In this world, power politics and classical realpolitik have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, think they are still living in history, and need to use traditional power-political means to deal with threats from Iraq, al-Qaida, North Korea, and other malignant forces.


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A Theory of the Drone by Gregoire Chamayou

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failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, moral hazard, Necker cube, private military company, RAND corporation, telepresence, V2 rocket, Yom Kippur War

There is no wall high enough, no barrier sufficiently impassable to guarantee the absolute isolation of a national “gated community.” The military drone is a low-cost weapon—at least in comparison to classic fighter planes. That has long been one of the principal selling points for such a weapon. But of course the contradiction lies in the fact that it is in the nature of such a weapon to proliferate. What does Francis Fukuyama do after the end of history? In his leisure hours, he puts together little drones in his garage and then proudly exhibits them on his blog.14 He is part of an rapidly developing subculture: that of the homemade drone. Following in the footsteps of the model enthusiasts of the 1960s, there today exists a whole little community of amateurs who buy or construct drones at the cost of a few hundred dollars. With their microcameras on board, these machines make it possible to produce unofficial little films, some of which are strikingly beautiful.

To the principle of the nonexposure of lives at the scene of hostilities is added the principle of making the base of operations secure: “the US homeland must remain a secure base from which the Air Force can globally project power”—which means “ensuring the protection of US facilities and infrastructures used for power projection.” Steven M. Rinaldi, Donald H. Leathem, and Timothy Kaufman, “Protecting the Homeland Air Force: Roles in Homeland Security,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2002, 83. 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Surveillance Drones, Take Two,” Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (blog), September 12, 2012, blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/09/20/surveillance-drones-take-two. 15. See the Team BlackSheep video from November 30, 2010, on YouTube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9cSxEqKQ78 and the Team BlackSheep website at www.team-blacksheep.com. 16. “Terrorists’ Unmanned Air Force,” Defensetech, May 1, 2006, defensetech.org/2006/05/01/terrorists-unmanned-air-force.


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The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov

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A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Buckminster Fuller, Cass Sunstein, citizen journalism, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, Columbine, computer age, conceptual framework, crowdsourcing, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Earth, illegal immigration, invention of radio, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, John von Neumann, Marshall McLuhan, Naomi Klein, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, pirate software, pre–internet, Productivity paradox, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Sinatra Doctrine, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, social graph, Steve Jobs, technoutopianism, The Wisdom of Crowds, urban planning, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

As such, the Google Doctrine owes less to the advent of tweeting and social networking than it does to the giddy sense of superiority that many in the West felt in 1989, as the Soviet system collapsed almost overnight. As history was supposed to be ending, democracy was quickly pronounced the only game in town. Technology, with its unique ability to fuel consumerist zeal—itself seen as a threat to any authoritarian regime—as well as its prowess to awaken and mobilize the masses against their rulers, was thought to be the ultimate liberator. There is a good reason why one of the chapters in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man, the ur-text of the early 1990s that successfully bridged the worlds of positive psychology and foreign affairs, was titled “The Victory of the VCR.” The ambiguity surrounding the end of the Cold War made such arguments look far more persuasive than any close examination of their theoretical strengths would warrant. While many scholars took it to mean that the austere logic of Soviet-style communism, with its five-year plans and constant shortages of toilet paper, had simply run its course, most popular interpretations downplayed the structural deficiencies of the Soviet regime—who would want to acknowledge that the Evil Empire was only a bad joke?

In 1990, the RAND Corporation, a California-based think tank that, perhaps by the sheer virtue of its propitious location, never passes up an opportunity to praise the powers of modern technology, reached a strikingly similar conclusion. “The communist bloc failed,” it said in a timely published study, “not primarily or even fundamentally because of its centrally controlled economic policies or its excessive military burdens, but because its closed societies were too long denied the fruits of the information revolution.” This view has proved remarkably sticky. As late as 2002, Francis Fukuyama, himself a RAND Corporation alumnus, would write that “totalitarian rule depended on a regime’s ability to maintain a monopoly over information, and once modern information technology made that impossible, the regime’s power was undermined.” By 1995 true believers in the power of information to crush authoritarianism were treated to a book-length treatise. Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union, a book by Scott Shane—who from 1988 to 1991 served as the Baltimore Sun’s Moscow correspondent—tried to make the best case for why information mattered, arguing that the “death of the Soviet illusion ...

Ballard in reviewing a Huxley biography for the Guardian in 2002. “Orwell feared that what we hate will ruin us. Huxley feared that what we love will ruin us. This book is about the possibility that Huxley, not Orwell, was right,” is how Neil Postman chose to describe the theme of his best-selling Amusing Ourselves to Death. “[In contrast to Brave New World], the political predictions of ... 1984 were entirely wrong,” writes Francis Fukuyama in Our Posthuman Future. Maybe, but what many critics often fail to grasp is that both texts were written as sharp social critiques of contemporary problems rather than prophecies of the future. Orwell’s work was an attack on Stalinism and the stifling practices of the British censors, while Huxley’s was an attack on the then-popular philosophy of utilitarianism. In other words, those books probably tell us more about the intellectual debates that were prevalent in Britain at the time than about the authors’ visions of the future.


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Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics by Nicholas Wapshott

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airport security, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, British Empire, collective bargaining, complexity theory, cuban missile crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, if you build it, they will come, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage debt, New Journalism, Northern Rock, price mechanism, pushing on a string, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, War on Poverty, Yom Kippur War

Galbraith, The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, New York, 2008), p. 4. 10 Quoted in Kevin A. Hassett, “The Second Coming of Keynes,” National Review, February 9, 2009. 11 UCLA Oral History Program, p. 195. 12 Robert E. Lucas Jr., “Macroeconomic Priorities,” presidential address to the American Economic Association, January 10, 2003, http://home.uchicago.edu/%7Esogrodow/homepage/paddress03.pdf. 13 Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952– ), American political economist. 14 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992). 15 Ben Bernanke (1953– ), chairman of the Federal Reserve (2006– ), chairman of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers (2005–6). 16 Ben Bernanke, remarks at “A Conference to Honor Milton Friedman,” University of Chicago, Chicago, November 8, 2002. 17 Michael Kinsley (1951– ), American political journalist. 18 Michael Kinsley, “Greenspan Shrugged,” The New York Times, October 14, 2007. 19 Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, p. 68. 20 George H.

An air of triumphalism pervaded those who believed that the new post-Keynesian consensus had solved the conundrum that both Keynes and Hayek had set themselves in the 1920s: whether the business cycle—and the endless series of booms and busts—could or should be tamed. Lucas was in no doubt. The cyclical dragon had been vanquished. “Macroeconomics . . . has succeeded,” he announced. “Its central prob-lem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical pur-poses.”12 When the Cold War ended, the American political economist Francis Fukuyama13 declared that the evolutionary stages of societal development, from feudalism through agricultural and industrial revolutions to a modern capitalist democracy, had come to an end; the world had reached “the end of history.”14 It was with a similar confidence that economists announced “the end of economic history”: the world economy was cured of the prospect of a return to depression. Friedman, not Keynes, was credited with solving the mystery of why the Great Depression of the 1930s occurred and how it could be prevented from happening again.

“The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement, an Essay in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,” (in Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money [University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956]). Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. Two Lucky People: Memoirs (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998). Friedman, Milton, and Anna D. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963). Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1992). Galbraith, James K. Ambassador’s Journal (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1969). —. A Life in Our Times (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1981). —. The Essential Galbraith, ed. Andrea D. Williams (Mariner Books, Orlando, Fla., 2001). —. The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, New York, 2008).


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The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century by Ryan Avent

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3D printing, Airbnb, American energy revolution, autonomous vehicles, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, gig economy, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, inventory management, invisible hand, Jacquard loom, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph-Marie Jacquard, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, lump of labour, Lyft, manufacturing employment, means of production, new economy, performance metric, pets.com, price mechanism, quantitative easing, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reshoring, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, software is eating the world, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, The Nature of the Firm, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, very high income, working-age population

, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).   5. Such a story had not, to my knowledge, been told at the time of writing.   6. ‘The Gifts of the Moguls’, The Economist, 4 July 2015. 11. The Politics of Labour Abundance   1. Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952–) is an American political scientist, political economist and author, known for his book The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992), which expanded on his 1989 essay, ‘The End of History’.   2. Schleicher, David, ‘Things Aren’t Going That Well Over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective’, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 18 November 2014.   3. US Census Bureau, Income and Poverty.   4. Kenworthy, Lane, and Pontusson, Jonas, ‘Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries’, Perspectives on Politics, September 2005.   5. 

The period began, in the 1970s and 1980s, with a liberalizing impulse across a broad range of countries, from Britain and America to China and India. While Thatcher and Reagan cut tax rates and squashed unions, Deng Xiaopeng trod cautiously towards limited tolerance of markets and foreign trade. The era of consensus continued with the collapse of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, which prompted Francis Fukuyama to muse that ‘the end of history’ had arrived with the global ascendance of liberal democracy.1 As global markets integrated, politics in most rich democracies coalesced around support for market-oriented economies, global openness and progressive social goals. It was a pleasant sort of era for the cosmopolitan, technocratic elite: the believers in the notion that markets, lightly tended, offered the best route to global prosperity and peace.

., The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) Ford, Martin, The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future (Createspace, 2009) _____, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015) Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (The Free Press, 1992) Glaeser, Edward, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier (London: Macmillan, 2011) Goldin, Claudia and Katz, Lawrence, The Race Between Education and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) Gordon, Robert, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016) Hansen, Alan Harvey, Full Recovery or Stagnation (New York, NY: W.


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Culture works: the political economy of culture by Richard Maxwell

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1960s counterculture, AltaVista, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, big-box store, business process, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, intermodal, late capitalism, Marshall McLuhan, medical malpractice, Network effects, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, refrigerator car, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, talking drums, telemarketer, the built environment, Thorstein Veblen, Unsafe at Any Speed, urban renewal, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce

“The ratings were so high that NBC will take the same tack into Sydney and beyond.”143 Coda In corporate/Americanized sport, the game has become somewhat less important than its capacity to be a vehicle presenting particular messages to a particular select and often massive audience.144 This discussion may have unearthed some disheartening revelations pertaining to the political economy of contemporary sport culture. Elsewhere I have argued that sport has, in Francis Fukuyama’s terms, reached the end of history precipitated by the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives”145 to the sport-media-entertainment complex discussed here.146 On reflection, this sentiment intimates a resigned bitterness that adds little to the critical analysis of contemporary sport. Without question, the global sport economy is dominated by brazenly commercial enterprises that make no pretense as to the cardinal importance of delivering entertaining products designed to maximize profit margins.

Celia Lury and Alan Warde, “Investments in the Imaginary Consumer: Conjectures regarding Power, Knowledge and Advertising,” in Buy This Book: Studies in Advertising and Consumption, ed. Mica Nava, Andrew Blake, Iain MacRury, and Barry Richards (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 87–102. 161 David L. A n d r e w s 142. Gunther, “Get Ready for the Oprah Olympics,” 42. 143. Knisley, “Rock Solid,” S6. 144. P. Donnelly, “The Local and the Global: Globalization in the Sociology of Sport,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 20:3 (1996): 246. 145. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (1989): 3. 146. Andrews, “Dead and Alive?” 147. L. Grossberg, We Gotta Get out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (London: Routledge, 1992), 21. 162 Chapter Seven Shopping Susan G. Davis The opportunity and imperative to shop are everywhere. As retail theorist Paco Underhill rhapsodizes: the economic party that has been the second half of the twentieth century has fostered more shopping than anyone could have predicted, more shopping than has ever taken place anywhere at any time.

., For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 25th ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 279. T. Miller and A. McHoul, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (London: Sage, 1998), 61. S. Hardy, “Where Did You Go, Jackie Robinson? Or the End of History and the Age of Sport Infrastructure,” Sporting Traditions: Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History 16:1 (1999): 85–100. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), 48. This apt metaphor is borrowed from Jürgen Habermas, “Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis,” New Left Review 115 (1979): 73–84. J. McKay and T.


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The Vanishing Neighbor: The Transformation of American Community by Marc J. Dunkelman

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, big-box store, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, Broken windows theory, call centre, clean water, cuban missile crisis, dark matter, David Brooks, delayed gratification, double helix, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, global supply chain, global village, helicopter parent, if you build it, they will come, impulse control, income inequality, invention of movable type, Jane Jacobs, Khyber Pass, Louis Pasteur, Marshall McLuhan, Martin Wolf, McMansion, Nate Silver, Nicholas Carr, obamacare, Occupy movement, Peter Thiel, post-industrial society, Richard Florida, rolodex, Saturday Night Live, Silicon Valley, Skype, Steve Jobs, telemarketer, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, Thomas L Friedman, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, urban decay, urban planning, Walter Mischel, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, World Values Survey

The disparity is particularly harrowing for anyone who has recently returned from China, where many of the airports gleam.19 The United States devotes only 2 percent of its annual GDP to infrastructure investment—less than half of what Europe spends, and a mere sixth of China’s equivalent investment.20 Nevertheless, it’s not entirely clear how we would finance an explosion of new building: though some dispute whether the nation’s budget is really in such dire need of rebalance, a country whose deficit is out of control seems a lousy candidate for the next New Deal.21 No one can doubt that many of the institutions that were once uniquely American—or, at least, creatures of the West—have recently been adopted elsewhere around the world. It’s been more than two decades since Francis Fukuyama published The End of History, arguing that free-market democracy had finally vanquished its competitors as the prescription for societal success.22 Whether or not you bought into Fukuyama’s thesis—even if you believe, as some do, that history has “returned”—what’s undeniable is that many of the rhythms that propelled American preeminence have been adopted elsewhere. Nevertheless, compelling as the declinists’ explanation may be, it suggests that American society is just another iPhone, blessed by nothing more that a better menu of apps.

Norton, 2009), 211–12. 16Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 12. 17Binyamin Appelbaum and Robert Gebeloff, “Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It,” New York Times, February 12, 2012. 18Martin Wolf, ”How Austerity Has Failed,” New York Review of Books, July 11, 2013. 19Friedman and Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us. 20Paul Weinstein Jr., “Cut to Invest: Establish a ‘Cut-to-Invest Commission’ to Reduce Low-Priority Spending, Consolidate Duplicative Programs, and Increase High-Priority Investments,” Brookings Institute, November 2012. 21http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html. 22Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996). 24Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 54, 81–83. 25The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, November 15, 2012. 26Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm. 27Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Classics, 1909–14). 28Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 29Gordon S.

Jamaica, 179–81 in Brazil, 178–79 Clinton and, 113, 114 economics, economy, xix, 7, 10, 14–15, 85, 132, 138, 232 globalization and, 17–18, 141, 221 inequality and, 21–24, 26, 31 Economy of Cities, The (Jacobs), 166–68 Edison, Thomas, 160, 161 Ed Sullivan Show, The (TV show), 36, 37 education, xiv–xvii, 23, 32, 75, 194, 202, 215, 218, 220–26, 234 decline of, xiv, xvi, xvii, 11 intermarriage and, 43–44 segregation by, 237–38 efficiency, 19, 34, 138, 152, 166–67, 170, 176, 209, 236 EHarmony, 69–70 Ehrenhalt, Alan, 48, 139 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Eisenhower administration), 14, 51, 58, 65, 100, 190 elderly people, 196–211 independence of, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 elections, U.S., 15, 50, 56, 187, 190 Chinatown Bus effect and, 47 gerrymandering and, xvi, 182–87, 189 of 2012, 7, 37–38, 184–85 Elks Lodges, 44, 116 e-mail, xi, 8, 109–10, 125, 145 End of History, The (Fukuyama), 230–31 England, xii, 81, 82, 157, 158, 166–67, 179, 194 entrepreneurialism, 82, 164 ethnicity, 32, 79, 147, 148, 231, 237 ethnic tensions, 4, 39 Europe, 81, 226, 230, 232 evangelism, 42, 71 evolution, 90–91 expectations, 30, 60, 70–71, 82 Facebook, 37–38, 45, 48, 108, 114, 124–25, 140, 145, 148–49, 152, 190, 194, 219 faith, loss of, xv, xvii, xviii, 14, 181–82, 193, 195 family, 70, 119, 125, 129, 139, 194 affirmation and, 104–7 extended (traditional), 12, 15, 16, 26–27, 68, 97, 106 health care and, 201, 210 income inequality and, 21–22 nuclear, 16, 26, 32, 84, 145 in Saturn model, 95, 96 single-parent, 26, 30–31, 43, 105, 216 Farmer, Paul, 64 fathers, 12, 106, 131 of author, 132–33, 134, 240 fax machines, 16, 35, 74 fear, 71, 84, 119, 128, 157, 233, 235 of hitchhiking, 133, 134, 135 homosexuality and, 42 quality of life and, 50–52, 55–57, 60 Federal Express, 147–48 Ferguson, Niall, 229 Fiddler on the Roof (musical), 69–70 filibuster, xvi, 182, 185, 188, 191, 248n Filter Bubble, The (Pariser), 37 Fiorina, Morris, 139 First Wave society, 16, 20, 31–32, 233 Fischer, Claude, 87, 88, 105, 106, 128–29, 237–38 Fishkin, James, 192–93 Florida, Richard, 83, 175 food, 51, 58, 62, 79, 136–37, 202 brain and, 90–91 see also agriculture Ford, Gerald, 47 Fortune, 4–5, 14 Fowler, James, 96 Fox News, 184, 187–88 France, 80 Franklin, Rosalind, 161 Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner), 7, 133–34 freedom, 25, 26, 43, 49, 52, 60, 67, 82, 102, 161, 207 French and Indian War, 157 Friedman, Thomas, xiv, 17–21, 24, 141–42, 151–52, 240 friends, 8, 12, 24, 25, 91, 95, 99–100, 101, 119, 120, 122, 124, 152, 194 affirmation from, 102–3, 104, 107, 110, 111 agreement of, 148–49 health care and, 201, 210 Fukuyama, Francis, 230–31 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 52 Gans, Herbert, 144–45 Gates, Bill, 10 gay marriage, 42, 50, 69 GDP (gross domestic product), 17, 53, 99, 180, 198, 227, 230 gemeinschaft, 86 General Social Survey, 105, 119–20, 260n–61n generational succession, 135 genetics, 160–62 genius, 159, 160, 162 Genovese, Kitty, 84–85 Georgetown University, 118 gerrymandering, xvi, 182–87, 189 ghettos, 128 Gingrich, Newt, 14, 15 Gini coefficient, 22, 23 Girls (TV show), 30 Gladwell, Malcolm, 6, 91–92 globalization, 17–18, 20, 50, 138, 141, 152, 221 global village, 16, 142–43 Google, 37, 194 government, U.S., xii–xviii, 52, 67, 200, 234 dysfunction of, 181–90 French government compared with, 80 health care and, 201–5 public frustration with, xiv–xvii, 181–83, 195 urban decay and, 127 Graduate, The (movie), 4, 28, 30, 248n Granovetter, Mark, 168–69, 266n Great Depression, 60, 68, 85, 202–6, 210, 226 Greatest Generation, 51, 70 Great Migration, 40–41, 43, 137 Great Recession, xv, 54, 55, 62, 106 Great Society, 210, 255n Gresens, Mr., 220–22, 225 grit, 5, 6, 216–25 Grove, Andy, 10 Guest, Avery, 118 Gutenberg, Johann, 162 “habits of the heart,” 81, 89, 115, 138, 258n Habits of the Heart (Bellah), 65–66, 141, 258n Hampton, Keith, 118–19 Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), 222, 224 health, health care, 101, 197–211 costs of, 198–200, 204–5, 206, 209–10 public, 197, 199, 204 quality of life and, 31, 51, 52, 57–60, 204 Hearst, William Randolph, 188 heart attack, 58, 200, 207 Heckman, James, 223 helicopter parent, 106 Henry, Peter Blair, 179–81 history, 51, 59, 67, 68, 230–34 affirmation and, 109, 110 of American community, 79–89 Dunbar’s number and, 94 Tofflers’ view of, 15–16 hitchhiking, 132–35 Hoffman, Dustin, 28 homogeneity, 46–47, 135, 147–48, 189, 191 homophobia, 42, 43, 51 homosexuality, 42–43, 87, 88 hospitals, 197, 199–204, 206–7 House of Representatives, U.S., xvi, 182, 184–85, 186 Hout, Mike, 237–38 Hughes, Charles Evans, 187 Hunter, James Davison, 69 hunter-gatherers, 16, 92, 142, 144–45 Hussein, Saddam, 67 Hutterites, 94 identity, 20, 42, 74, 130, 146 immigrants, 79, 82–83, 88, 232 income, xv, 21, 147, 180, 216, 227 discretionary, 55 inequality and, 21–24, 31 national, 21–22, 54 online communities and, 250n working women and, 27, 28 independence, 28–29, 30, 52, 57, 60, 106, 138, 151 of elderly, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 individualism, 65–66, 73, 74, 102 networked, 111 industrial paradigm, 14–15, 26, 82, 84–87, 170–71, 233 Industrial Revolution, xiii, 4, 16, 85, 86, 127, 138, 166, 201 inequality, economic, 21–24, 26, 31 information, 6–8, 18, 21, 26, 138, 260n brought together in a new way, 159–66, 209 Chinatown bus effect and, 35–38 information technology, 13, 16, 125, 141–43, 187, 209 affirmation and, 103–4, 108, 109–10 online communities and, 114–15 infrastructure, xiv, xv, xvi, 11, 25, 45, 194, 236 decay of, 229, 230 health, 200–201, 203–4, 206, 210 Inglehart, Ronald, 67–69, 73 inner directedness, 5–7 inner-ring relationships, see intimate relationships innovation, xiii, xvii, xviii, 158–75, 209 intellectual cross-fertilization, 158–68 interdependence, 17, 85–86 intermarriage: educational, 43–44 racial, 68 Internet, 10, 18, 36, 37, 121, 125, 146, 250n interracial marriage, 68 intimate relationships (inner-ring relationships), 92, 93, 96, 119–20, 137, 138–39, 145, 238 affirmation and, 103–7, 110, 112, 115 Chinatown Bus effect and, 42–46 health care and, 201, 204, 210 see also marriage iPhones, 160, 231 Iraq, 67 isolation: intellectual, 176 social, 73, 87, 113, 115, 118–19, 122, 127, 149, 207 Issacson, Walter, 164 Italy, 17, 163 It Gets Better Project, 43 Jackson, Kenneth, 40 Jacobs, Jane, 85–88, 127, 166–68, 170, 176 Jamaica, 179–81, 191 James, LeBron, 8–9 Japan, 226, 233 Jews, Orthodox, 98–99 jobs, 18–20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 131, 139, 170–71, 235–36, 260n–61n affirmation and, 104–5, 107 assembly line, 53, 85 exporting of, 197–98 service, 18–19, 53, 132, 138, 236 Jobs, Steve, 10, 64, 160, 164–65 Johansson, Frans, 163, 168, 172 Johnson, Lyndon B., 127, 187, 210 Johnson, Steven, 159 Kahneman, Daniel, 13 Kelling, George, 150 Kelly, Mervin, 164 Kennedy, Robert, 206 Kenner, Edward, 158, 159 Kentucky, 147–48 Kerry, John, 47 Keynes, John Maynard, 53 Khrushchev, Nikita, 56 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 24, 46, 108–9, 128, 238 King, Stephen, 123 Kiwanis Club, 44, 45, 116 “Knowledge Is Power Program” (KIPP), 222, 223, 224 Koestler, Arthur, 158–60, 162, 166 Krebs cycle, 220–22 Ku Klux Klan, 111, 146 labor, labor unions, 14, 19, 20, 23, 53, 180, 181 leadership, xv, xvii, 23, 101, 108–9, 182, 186, 191 Leave It to Beaver (TV show), 34–35, 51 legislative districts, manipulation of (gerrymandering), xvi, 182–86, 189 Lehigh Valley, 170, 171 leisure, 53, 104–5, 139 Levin, David, 223 Levitt, Steven, 133–34 Lexus and the Olive Tree, The (Friedman), 141, 151–52 LGBT rights, 24, 42–43 libraries, 18, 36, 37 lifespan, longevity, 17, 31, 57–60, 62, 199, 204–5 Lincoln, Abraham, 228 Ling, Richard, 122–23 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 231 LISTSERVs, 114, 151 Little House on the Prairie (TV show), xii, 247n lobbyists, 183, 187, 229 Locke, Richard, 165, 172 Lonely Crowd, The (Riesman), 5–6, 7, 65, 141 Loose Connections (Wuthnow), 239 Lorain, Ohio, 79–80, 135 “lord of the manor” community, xii–xiii, 81 Lowery, Rev.


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Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There by David Brooks

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1960s counterculture, affirmative action, Community Supported Agriculture, David Brooks, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Gilder, haute couture, haute cuisine, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, New Urbanism, place-making, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Silicon Valley, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Thorstein Veblen, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban planning, War on Poverty, Yogi Berra

But an illogical or wrong essay will prompt dozens of other writers to rise and respond, thus giving the author mounds of publicity. Yale professor Paul Kennedy had a distinguished but unglamorous career under his belt when he wrote The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, predicting American decline. He was wrong, and hundreds of other commentators rose to say so, thus making him famous and turning his book into a bestseller. Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay called “The End of History,” which seemed wrong to people who read only the title. Thousands of essayists wrote pieces pointing out that history had not ended, and Fukuyama became a global sensation. After the article has appeared, the young intellectual will want to let the editor of the piece know what a massive impact the article is having at the White House/the Federal Reserve/the film industry or wherever its intended target is.

Not everyone has spooned so many helpings from the spiritual buffet table. But even in more traditional circles, when one sees people return to religious participation, one often gets the sense that it is the participation they go for as much as the religion. The New York Times Magazine recently ran a special issue on religion that included the astute headline “Religion Makes a Comeback (Belief to Follow).” Francis Fukuyama nicely captured the ethos of Bobo religiosity in his 1999 book, The Great Disruption: Instead of community arising as a byproduct of rigid belief, people will return to religious belief because of their desire for community. In other words, people will return to religious tradition not necessarily because they accept the truth of revelation, but precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world makes them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition.


pages: 606 words: 157,120

To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism by Evgeny Morozov

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3D printing, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Andrew Keen, augmented reality, Automated Insights, Berlin Wall, big data - Walmart - Pop Tarts, Buckminster Fuller, call centre, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, citizen journalism, cloud computing, cognitive bias, crowdsourcing, data acquisition, Dava Sobel, disintermediation, East Village, en.wikipedia.org, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, frictionless, future of journalism, game design, Gary Taubes, Google Glasses, illegal immigration, income inequality, invention of the printing press, Jane Jacobs, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, jimmy wales, Julian Assange, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, license plate recognition, lone genius, Louis Pasteur, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, Narrative Science, Nicholas Carr, packet switching, PageRank, Paul Graham, Peter Singer: altruism, Peter Thiel, pets.com, placebo effect, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, Richard Thaler, Ronald Coase, Rosa Parks, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, smart meter, social graph, social web, stakhanovite, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Stuxnet, technoutopianism, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs, urban decay, urban planning, urban sprawl, Vannevar Bush, WikiLeaks

. ,” see Frederic Jameson, “Future City,” New Left Review 21 (2003): 65–80. 22 this experience of the “offline” is also profoundly affected: Nathan Jurgenson, “The IRL Fetish,” The New Inquiry, June 28, 2012, http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-irl-fetish. 23 the French finally pull the plug on Minitel: Scott Sayare, “After 3 Decades in France, Minitel’s Days Are Numbered,” New York Times, June 27, 2012. 23 Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reprint ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23 “policymakers should work with the grain of the Internet”: Eric Schmidt, “Let Luvvie Embrace Boffin in the Digital Future,” The Guardian, August 26, 2011. 23 “without a major upgrade”: Rebecca MacKinnon, “Why Doesn’t Washington Understand the Internet?,” Washington Post, January 22, 2012. 23 “nagging fear Germans harbor”: Jeff Jarvis, Public Parts: How Sharing in the Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 24 “Web 2.0 means using the Web”: Paul Graham, “Web 2.0,” PaulGraham.com, November 2005, http://www.paulgraham.com/web20.html. 24 “There are laws of Nature”: David Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 211. 25 it’s not “the solution to the problem”: Steven Johnson, Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age (New York: Penguin, 2012), xxxv. 25 “one could use the Internet directly”: ibid., xxxv, 26 “the creation of ARPANET and TCP/IP”: ibid., 16. 26 “Slowly but steadily”: ibid., 18. 26 “The question with Kickstarter”: ibid., 43. 27 Kickstarter’s most famous failed alumnus is Diaspora: see Jenna Wortham, “Success of Crowdfunding Puts Pressure on Entrepreneurs,” New York Times, September 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/technology/success-of-crowdfunding-puts-pressure-on-entrepreneurs.html. 28 Inge Ejbye Sørensen has studied how crowdfunding: see Inge Ejbye Sørensen, “Crowd-sourcing and Outsourcing: The Impact of Online Funding and Distribution on the Documentary Film Industry in the UK,” Media, Culture & Society 34 no. 6 (September 2012): 726–743; I’ve written about Sørensen’s research in my Slate column, from which the following few paragraphs are drawn: see Evgeny Morozov, “Kickstarter Will Not Save Artists from the Entertainment Industry’s Shackles,” Slate, September 25, 2012http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/09/kickstarter_s_crowdfunding_won_t_save_indie_filmmaking_.single.html . 29 What Would Google Do?

If “the Internet” goes, it seems, the entire armament of our technologies—all those artifacts on display in our museums of science and technology and history textbooks—would go with it. But perhaps we can’t imagine life after “the Internet” because we don’t think that “the Internet” is going anywhere. If the public debate is any indication, the finality of “the Internet”—the belief that it’s the ultimate technology and the ultimate network—has been widely accepted. It’s Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: just as capitalism-driven liberal democracy in Francis Fukuyama’s controversial account remains the only game in town, so does the capitalism-driven “Internet.” It, the logic goes, is a precious gift from the gods that humanity should never abandon or tinker with. Thus, while “the Internet” might disrupt everything, it itself should never be disrupted. It’s here to stay—and we’d better work around it, discover its real nature, accept its features as given, learn its lessons, and refurbish our world accordingly.

But, alas, the preservation of “the Internet” seems to have become an end in itself, to the great detriment of our ability even to imagine what might come to supplant it and how our Internet fetish might be blocking that something from emerging. To choose “the Internet” over the starkly uncertain future of the post-Internet world is to tacitly acknowledge that either “the Internet” has satisfied all our secret plans, longings, and desires—that is, it is indeed Silicon Valley’s own “end of history”—or that we simply can’t imagine what else innovation could unleash. The irony is that Zittrain’s theory of generativity, while very critical of gatekeepers like Apple, is itself a gatekeeper. While generativity green-lights good, reliable, and predictable innovation, the kind that promises to stay within the confines of “the Internet” and leave things as they are, it frowns upon—and possibly even blocks—the unruly and disruptive kind that might start within “the Internet” but eventually transcend, supplant, and perhaps even eliminate it.


pages: 388 words: 125,472

The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It by Owen Jones

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anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, citizen journalism, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, don't be evil, Edward Snowden, Etonian, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, housing crisis, inflation targeting, investor state dispute settlement, James Dyson, laissez-faire capitalism, market fundamentalism, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, open borders, Plutocrats, plutocrats, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, stakhanovite, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transfer pricing, union organizing, unpaid internship, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent

Politicians largely conform to a similar script; once-mighty trade unions are now treated as if they have no legitimate place in political or even public life; and economists and academics who reject Establishment ideology have been largely driven out of the intellectual mainstream. The end of the Cold War was spun by politicians, intellectuals and the media to signal the death of any alternative to the status quo: ‘the end of history’, as US political scientist Francis Fukuyama put it. All this has left the Establishment pushing at an open door. Whereas the position of the powerful was once undermined by the advent of democracy, an opposite process is now underway. The Establishment is amassing wealth and aggressively annexing power in a way that has no precedent in modern times. After all, there is nothing to stop it. There is a predictable objection to this portrait.

Meanwhile, university economics departments have been emptied of opponents of the status quo. As well as the dramatic political shifts in Britain, the proponents of unrestrained free-market economics were helped by other developments too. When the Soviet bloc collapsed in the late 1980s onwards, it was spun as a dramatic victory for free-market capitalism. It was the ‘end of history’, declared US political scientist Francis Fukuyama. ‘It’s time to say we’ve won, goodbye’ was the assessment of US neo-conservative Midge Decter. Even mild Keynesianism, however non-existent its links with Soviet-style Communism, was somehow seen as beyond the pale. Even mild forms of state involvement in the economy were consigned to a discredited past. ‘In academia, I am in a minority of maybe 5 per cent,’ says dissident economist Ha-Joon Chang.


pages: 387 words: 120,092

The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge by Ilan Pappe

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affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Boycotts of Israel, British Empire, double helix, facts on the ground, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, New Journalism, postnationalism / post nation state, stem cell, urban planning, Yom Kippur War

He claims that the equation between the two became commonplace in Israel, because those who subscribe to it have tenure in the Israeli universities.’ As a result, the report goes on, a more theoretical debate developed. ‘Sounds boring? More than 600 people filled the university hall and gave up the game in which Bulgaria kicked Germany out of the World Cup.’ Zvi Gilat, Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 July 1994. 5 I have described this in Ilan Pappe, Out of the Frame: The Struggle for Academic Freedom, London: Pluto, 2010. 6 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 7 Gorny, ‘Thoughts on Zionism as a Utopian Ideology’. 8 This is part of a campaign led by the Israeli Ministry of Information called ‘The Faces of Israel’ launched in 2000. 9 See Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanction: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, New York: Haymarket Books, 2011. 10 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage, 1979, pp. 5–28.

The images and narratives formulated by Zionist leaders and activists in the past, and Israeli Jewish intellectuals and academics in the present, present Israel as the inevitable, successful implementation of the European history of ideas. Ideas are the transformative agents that in any narrative of Western enlightenment lifted Western societies, and in turn the rest of the world, out of medieval darkness and into the Renaissance, and helped restore civilisation following the Second World War. According to Francis Fukuyama, this history of ideas would almost have reached its culmination had not political Islam, national movements in the former Soviet bloc, and Marxist leaders in South America ‘sabotaged’ the train of progress and modernisation.6 Israel was one such transformative idea. To challenge it as such is to challenge the entire narrative of the West as the driving global force of human progress and enlightenment.


pages: 225 words: 189

The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War by Robert D. Kaplan

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Berlin Wall, clean water, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Honoré de Balzac, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Thomas Malthus, trade route, unemployed young men, Yom Kippur War

The breaking apart and remakina of crack • 8 H ^ T ^ f t G m i R f n f t U S e r e and OF T H E P O S T C O L D W A R of the Arab-Israel milita^ Qngp^tj^n^areQnerely prologues^tothe realU Ina changes that lie ahead. . . . A u t h o r of B A L K A N GHOSTS U.S.A. $21.95 Canada $33.00 When "The Coming Anarchy" was published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1994, it was hailed as among the most important and influential articulations of the future of our planet, along with Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History" and Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations." Since then, Robert Kaplan's anti-utopian vision of the fault lines of the twentyfirst century has taken on the status of a paradigm. "The Coming Anarchy" has been hailed as the defining thesis for understanding the post-Cold War world. At the heart of this book is a question as old as America and one that is crucial to our national self-definition: what can and should we do when violence breaks out in countries far from our borders?


pages: 225 words: 11,355

Financial Market Meltdown: Everything You Need to Know to Understand and Survive the Global Credit Crisis by Kevin Mellyn

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asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, cuban missile crisis, disintermediation, diversification, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, Home mortgage interest deduction, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, margin call, market clearing, moral hazard, mortgage tax deduction, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, pattern recognition, pension reform, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, pushing on a string, reserve currency, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, statistical model, The Great Moderation, the payments system, too big to fail, value at risk, very high income, War on Poverty, Y2K, yield curve

The collapse of the Soviet Union twenty years ago largely discredited the notion that governments rather than markets should control economic life. The state had clearly failed to deliver prosperity and had destroyed the liberty of billions and the lives of millions in the process. Outside of its strongholds in the universities and cultural elites of the rich capitalist world, state socialism was universally seen to be an abject failure. THE END OF HISTORY In 1992, a renowned scholar published a book that stayed on the bestseller list for months. Francis Fukuyama based The End of History and the Last Man on a lecture he gave in 1989 when state socialism began to crumble in Eastern Europe. He argued persuasively that ‘‘liberal democracy remains [after the fall of communism] the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics—the ‘‘free market’’—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that have been part of the impoverished third world.’’

The triumph of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States during the 1980s had started the pendulum of history swinging back to the classical liberalism of Bagehot’s Britain. The triumph of the AngloAmerican model of business and finance appeared complete and final. Conclusion REAL HISTORY DOES NOT END Of course, real history as we have seen is always a series of accidents. It never really comes to an end. Instead of the end of history, Fukuyama was really observing a turnover in the long, never complete grudge match between free markets and those people and institutions that seek to suppress and manipulate markets through political power. The game continued, and in 2008, the other team—the left wing of the Democratic Party, not its basically mainstream membership as a whole—was able to turn a very scary market panic that had nothing to do with the fundamentals of capitalism into a big score for a return to state control of the economy.

.), 20, 28, 42, 54–55, 72, 82, 88–89, 93–97, 120, 167, 169 Fannie Mae, 57, 133, 142 FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 16, 128–129, 131–132, 159, 163 federal funds rate, 146 Federal Home Loan Banks, 56, 142 Federal Reserve, 6, 11, 13–14, 44, 84, 86, 102–110, 123–124, 128, 132, 140, 152, 156, 159, 162–163, 186 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 103–104, 124 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 105 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 104, 107 Ferguson, Niall, concept of ‘‘Chimerica,’’ 185; on John Law, 92; on Medicis, 79; on the Rothschilds, 88; Fiat money, 155, 173, 184 FICO scores, 63, 65, 68 financial economy, ix, 1–5, 8, 150, 174 financial innovation, 58, 60, 74 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 132 financial instruments, 19–20, 64; customization, 65, 150; standardization of, 66; risks, 47, 49, 52; types of, 29–31; 32–40, 42–45, 54–55; uses of, 31–32 financial markets, x, xx, 19–20, 22, 24–25, 29, 40, 45, 75, 79–80, 88, 90, 99, 101, 119, 127, 139–141, 160, 165, 167, 176, 180, 186, 189 First National Bank of Boston, 143 First National City Bank of New York, 145 fixed income, 43, 48, 52, 67, 93, 153 floating currencies and FX market, 155 foreign exchange, x, 55, 72, 93–95, 125, 149, 156 401(k) plans, 122, 157 fractional reserves, 151 Freddie Mac, 57 Friedman, Tom, World Is Flat, The, 184 Fukuyama, Francis, End of History and the Last Man, The, 182–183 ‘‘futures,’’ 54–55 Galbraith, John Kenneth, Affluent Society, The, 153 Garn-St. Germain Act, 130–131 GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 6, 14, 27, 133, 169, 171, 188 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 115 Genoa and origins of banking and finance, 77–79 Glass-Steagall, 141, 149, 159 gold, xiv–xvi, xix, 8, 12, 19, 34, 83–84, 106, 147, 149, 154–155, 184 Goldman Sachs, 159 Goldsmiths, 83 gold standard, 94–98, 108, 115, 125–126, 137–139, 155, 162 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 159 Great Inflation, 130, 152, 154, 156 Great Moderation, 140–141, 152 Greenberg, Maurice ‘‘Hank,’’ and AIG, 138, Index Greenspan, Alan, 101, 111, 140, 157 ‘‘Greenspan put,’’ 101, 111 Gresham, Sir Thomas, 80, 82 GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises), 57, 133, 142, 176, 186 Health Care, 51, 162, 187–189 Hedge Funds, 25–27, 65 High Street (UK equivalent for Main Street), 91 High Street Bank, 89.


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The Secret War Between Downloading and Uploading: Tales of the Computer as Culture Machine by Peter Lunenfeld

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Albert Einstein, Andrew Keen, Apple II, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Brownian motion, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, butterfly effect, computer age, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Dynabook, East Village, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, Grace Hopper, gravity well, Guggenheim Bilbao, Honoré de Balzac, Howard Rheingold, invention of movable type, Isaac Newton, Jacquard loom, Jacquard loom, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, John von Neumann, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, Mercator projection, Mother of all demos, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, PageRank, pattern recognition, planetary scale, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Post-materialism, post-materialism, Potemkin village, RFID, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Richard Stallman, Robert X Cringely, Schrödinger's Cat, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, SETI@home, Silicon Valley, Skype, social software, spaced repetition, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, Thomas L Friedman, Turing machine, Turing test, urban planning, urban renewal, Vannevar Bush, walkable city, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, William Shockley: the traitorous eight

I adopt this notion of long and short decades from the ways in which historians have proposed that the nineteenth was a long century, from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and that the twentieth was a short one, running from 1914 to 1989. Likewise we can say that in the United States, the 1960s were a long decade, lasting from 1957 to 1973 (roughly the publication of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road to the triple shocks of the OPEC oil embargo, Watergate, and the loss in Vietnam). 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. For a sterling analysis of New Economy hubris, see Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 4. This figure comes from Lawrence Haverty Jr., senior vice president of State Street Research, quoted in Rachel Konrad, “Assessing the Carnage: Sizing Up the Market’s Swift Demise,” CNET News, March 8, 2001, available at <http://news. com.com/2009-1017-253125-2.html?

The post-1989 period contained a multitude of features, but one unifying construct was the belief that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the Soviet Union itself, not just Communism, but all the countervailing forces against market capitalism were vanquished, and not just for the moment but literally for all time. The Market with a capital M was the grail at the end of Francis Fukayama’s treatise The End of History.2 The Market was the solution for all questions, the Market would bring peace and prosperity, and would free itself from the tyranny of the business cycle, evolving into an entirely invisible, frictionless, perpetual motion machine that would take the name of the New Economy (again with capital letters).3 This immediate post-1989 period coincided with the most utopian phase of the culture machine: the euphoria of the World Wide Web’s first Wild, Wild West phase.

., 9 Difference engine, 149 Digg, 34 Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 71, 149, 153, 163, 170 Digital video discs (DVDs), 2, 7–8, 15, 58 Digital video recorders (DVRs), 2, 7, 15, 23, 181n3 Disco, 63 Disney Concert Hall, 39 DIY (do-it-yourself) movements, 67–70 203 Dot-com bubble, 79, 145, 174 Doubleclick, 177 Downloading, xiii–xiv, 180nn1,2 animal kingdom and, 1 bespoke futures and, 97, 123, 132, 138 best use and, 13–14 commercial networks and, 4–5 communication devices and, 15–16 cultural hierarchy of, 1–2 culture machine and, 143, 168 dangers of overabundance and, 7–10 defined, 1 diabetic responses to, 3–5 disrupting flow and, 23–24 figure/ground and, xvi, 42–43, 46, 102 Freedom software and, 22–23 habits of mind and, 9–10 humans and, 1–2 information overload and, 22, 149 info-triage and, xvi, 20–23, 121, 132, 143 as intake, 5 mindfulness and, xvi, 14, 17, 20–24, 27–29, 42, 77, 79, 123, 129, 183n6 patio potato and, 9–10, 13 peer-to-peer networks and, 15, 54, 92, 116, 126 stickiness and, 13–17, 20–23, 27–29, 184n15 surfing and, 20, 80, 180n2 television and, 2 unimodernism and, 41–42, 49, 54–57, 66–67, 76–77 viral distribution and, 30, 56, 169 wants vs. needs and, 13, 37, 57 Web n.0 and, 79, 82–83, 86–87 Duchamp, Marcel, 44, 48, 94 Dymaxion map, 73 Dynabook, 161–162, 196n17 Dynamic equilibrium, 117–120 EBay, 68 Eckert, J. Presper, 148 INDEX Efficiency, 21–24, 98, 103 8 Man (Hirai and Kuwata), 108 8–track tapes, 2 89/11, xvi, 97, 100–102, 105, 130 Einstein, Albert, 49–50, 186n4 Eisenstein, Sergei, 31 52, 88 El Lissitzky, 45 Eminent Victorians (Strachey), 19 End of History, The (Fukayama), 97 Engelbart, Douglas, 144, 157–167 ENIAC computer, 148 Enlightenment Electrified, xvi, 47 bespoke futures and, 129–139 determinism and, 131–132 Nietzschean self-satisfaction and, 132 religion and, 130–135, 138 secular culture and, 133–134 technology and, 131–133, 136–139 Entrepreneurs, 99, 109, 156–157, 174 Environmental impact reports (EIRs), 79–80 Ethernet, 161 Etsy.com, 68 Evans, Walker, 41–42 Everyone Is a Designer!

Toast by Stross, Charles

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anthropic principle, Buckminster Fuller, cosmological principle, dark matter, double helix, Ernest Rutherford, Extropian, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, glass ceiling, gravity well, Khyber Pass, Mars Rover, Mikhail Gorbachev, NP-complete, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, performance metric, phenotype, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, slashdot, speech recognition, strong AI, traveling salesman, Turing test, urban renewal, Vernor Vinge, Whole Earth Review, Y2K

Historian Eric Hobsbawm dated it as running from June 28th, 1914 (when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, raising the curtain on the First World War) until December 25th, 1991 (when Mikhail Gorbachev formally dissolved the Soviet Union). But that diagnosis was carried out in the 1990s, back when it was possible for conservative political analyst Francis Fukuyama to publish a book titled The End of History without being laughed out of town and pelted with rotten fruit. It is seductively tempting in 2005 to say that the 20th century really ended on September 11th, 2001, with an iconic act of violence that may well lead to long-term consequences as horrific as the start of the First World War. Terrorism begets terrorism, and the scramble to dismember the Ottoman Empire during the Versailles conference that followed the war created the preconditions for the political mess that is theMiddle East today.

“I should like to stress that this holocaust of our own making is nothing less than a matter of complacency,” the Professor continued. “Once we quantized time, we tied our work to the clock; and now that the work is automated, so is the ticking. We are a short-sighted species. That there was a quarter of a trillion lines of bad software out there seven years ago is no surprise. That such a quantity has been halved to date is good news, but not quite adequate. We have, in a very real way, invented our own end of history: a software apocalypse that in the day ahead will engulf banks, businesses, government agencies, and anyone who runs a large, monolithic, database that is more than perhaps ten years old. Let us hope for the future that the consequences are not too serious—and that the lesson will be learned for good by those who for so long have ignored us.” Polite applause, then louder: a groundswell of clapping as the ship gently pushed its way through the waves.


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But What if We're Wrong? Thinking About the Present as if It Were the Past by Chuck Klosterman

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, British Empire, citizen journalism, cosmological constant, dark matter, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, Gerolamo Cardano, ghettoisation, Howard Zinn, Isaac Newton, non-fiction novel, obamacare, pre–internet, Ralph Nader, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stephen Hawking, the medium is the message, the scientific method, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, too big to fail, Y2K

[2]When I spoke with Horgan, he’d recently completed his (considerably less controversial) fifth book, The End of War, a treatise arguing against the assumption that war is an inescapable component of human nature. The embryo for this idea came from a conversation he’d had two decades prior, conducted while working on The End of Science. It was an interview with Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist best known for his 1989 essay “The End of History?” The title of the essay is deceptive, since Fukuyama was mostly asserting that liberal capitalist democracies were going to take over the world. It was an economic argument that (thus far) has not happened. But what specifically appalled Horgan was Fukuyama’s assertion about how a problem-free society would operate. Fukuyama believed that once mankind eliminated all its problems, it would start waging wars against itself for no reason, almost out of boredom.

Hyde (Stevenson), 143–44 dreaming content of dreams, 142–43 dimethyltryptamine (DMT), 141–42 “Dream Argument,” 137n lucid, 137, 141 meaningless nature of, 138–39 and near-death experiences, 141–42 Dress, The (viral phenomenon), 146–47 dying and sleep, relationship between, 141–42 Dylan, Bob, 74–77, 86–87, 230 Earth, location in Milky Way, 120 earthquakes, 258–60 echolocation sonar, 254 Ed Sullivan Show, The, 60, 66 Egan, Jennifer, 52 Eggers, Dave, 52 Ehrlich, Paul, 14 Einstein, Albert, 4, 112, 114 elections, US Ohio’s importance in, 196–97 political polarization since 9/11, 198–99 presidential race of 2000, 197–98, 216 See also voting electronic dance music (EDM), 79 EmDrive rocket thruster, 119–20 Empire (TV show), 170 “End of History?, The” (Fukuyama), 226–27 End of Science, The (Horgan), 223–24, 226 End of War, The (Horgan), 226–27 Entourage (TV show), 170 equality, 212–14 Esquire, 246 E.T. (film), 182 “Ethicist, The” (New York Times Magazine column), 255 Everest, Mount, 183 extraterrestrials, music for, 83–84 fact-checking, 154n false memories, 150–51 Fight Club (Palahniuk), 53 film industry, 28–30, 90, 227, 243–45 financial crisis of 2008, 41 First Amendment rights, 211–12 flawed assumptions, 93–94, 185–86 fleeting popularity, 23–24 Foer, Jonathan Safran, 47 Fomenko, Anatoly, 135 football college level, 191–93 comparative risks in other sports, 183 dangerous nature of, 179–80, 185 future of, 178–82 hypothetical scenario of its decline, 180 National Football League (NFL), 180–81, 182–83 safety modifications envisioned, 181 silo analogy, 184–85 forces fundamental vs. emergent, 4 gravity, 3–7 Fourteenth Amendment rights, 220 fox vs. hedgehog, 199–201 Franzen, Jonathan, 27, 36, 261 free speech, limitations to, 211–12 Freed, Alan, 59 freedom, 214 Freud, Sigmund, 138 Frost, Robert, 93 Fukuyama, Francis, 226–27 future, thinking about, 252–53 Galileo, 5, 100, 117–18 Gaussian curve, 22n Gazzaniga, Michael, 203n Gehry, Frank, 90 genius, recognizing, 23–24, 73 Gibbon, Edward, 207 Gillett, Charlie, 14 Gioia, Ted, 77–79 Gladwell, Malcolm, 177–79, 181 Glass, Stephen, 154n global politics, 15, 17 God and the simulation hypothesis, 124–27 Gone Girl (Flynn), 53 “good job” response to art, 188–89 Goodman, John, 174 Gore, Al, 197–98 gorillas, 255–56 GQ, 242–43 Grand Theft Auto (video game), 128 Grant, Ulysses S., 206 gravity Aristotle’s ideas about, 5, 101 author’s knowledge of, 3 evolution of ideas about, 3–7 temperature analogy, 4n greatness, 51n Greene, Brian, 3–4, 101–8, 112–14, 124–25 Gross, David, 104n Gumbel, Bryant, 185 Halley’s Comet, 136 Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, 156–57 Harbaugh, Jim, 185 Hard Rain (album), 75 Hardcore History (podcast), 201–3 Harrison, George, 84n heliocentrism, 117 Hellman, Martin, 260 Hemingway, Ernest, 93 Hendrix, Jimi, 60 “Here Comes the Sun” (song), 84 Hero with a Thousand Faces, The (Campbell), 74n hero’s journey, 74 Hersh, Seymour, 151–53 Herzen, Alexander, 201 Hidden Reality, The (Greene), 103 Higgs boson (“God particle”), 130–31 historical figure game, 155–56 history confirming, 151, 153–57, 203–5 revisionist, 233–35 History: Fiction or Science?


pages: 267 words: 82,580

The Dark Net by Jamie Bartlett

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3D printing, 4chan, bitcoin, blockchain, brain emulation, carbon footprint, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Chrome, Howard Rheingold, Internet of things, invention of writing, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Julian Assange, Kuwabatake Sanjuro: assassination market, life extension, litecoin, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, moral hazard, Occupy movement, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, Satoshi Nakamoto, Skype, slashdot, technological singularity, technoutopianism, Ted Kaczynski, The Coming Technological Singularity, Turing test, Vernor Vinge, WikiLeaks, Zimmermann PGP

But his ultimate vision is for us to return to what we once were, thousands of years ago: roaming groups of hunter-gatherers. ‘I accept, of course,’ says Zerzan, ‘this is going to be rather difficult to achieve.’ Zerzan’s solutions are pretty extreme. But it’s not just anarcho-primitivists who are worried by a transhumanist future of boundless possibilities. Francis Fukuyama, the prominent economist who coined the expression ‘the end of history’ to pronounce the victory of the capitalist system, has declared transhumanism the ‘most dangerous idea of the twenty-first century’. That’s probably a little unfair. One of the stated aims of Humanity+ is to think through the ethical, legal and social implications of dramatic technological change. But the sort of rapid technological advances we’re living through certainly raise several difficult questions.


pages: 208 words: 67,582

What About Me?: The Struggle for Identity in a Market-Based Society by Paul Verhaeghe

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Berlin Wall, call centre, cognitive dissonance, deskilling, epigenetics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, invisible hand, jimmy wales, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Louis Pasteur, market fundamentalism, Milgram experiment, new economy, post-industrial society, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Silicon Valley, stem cell, The Spirit Level, ultimatum game, working poor

Just as in the case of religion, everything was fine as long as there was only a single ideology. But whenever a number of religions or ideologies laid claim to being the one true belief, wars broke out in the name of faith or reason. Since that time, secular religions have followed hot on each other’s heels, each with their promise of a new and better world: socialism, communism, fascism, and, most recently, liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of the latter as marking ‘the end of history’ again conjures up the idea of a ladder with a substandard beginning and a glorious end. Once again, it’s not hard to see the legacy of Christianity in these different ideologies: the better society, Heaven on Earth, is always located in the future, and requires a great deal of effort and sacrifice. It makes me think of Freud’s laconic response after being told that communism would create a social paradise, albeit after an initial period of revolution involving the necessary sacrifices and privations.


pages: 494 words: 28,046

Empire by Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri

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Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, discovery of the americas, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Haight Ashbury, informal economy, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, labour mobility, late capitalism, low skilled workers, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, New Urbanism, open borders, Peace of Westphalia, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, Scramble for Africa, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, urban planning, William of Occam

The liberal notion of the public, the IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY place outside where we act in the presence of others, has been both universalized (because we are always now under the gaze of others, monitored by safety cameras) and sublimated or de-actualized in the virtual spaces of the spectacle. The end of the outside is the end of liberal politics. Finally, there is no longer an outside also in a military sense. When Francis Fukuyama claims that the contemporary historical passage is defined by the end of history, he means that the era of major conflicts has come to an end: sovereign power will no longer confront its Other and no longer face its outside, but rather will progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain.10 The history of imperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. The end of that history has ushered in the reign of peace.

We are thinking here primarily of Hannah Arendt’s notion of the political articulated in The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 8. For Los Angeles, see Mike Davis, City of Quartz (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 221–263. For São Paulo, see Teresa Caldeira, ‘‘Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation,’’ Public Culture, no. 8 (1996); 303–328. 9. See Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994). 10. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 11. ‘‘We have watched the war machine . . . set its sights on a new type of enemy, no longer another State, or even another regime, but ‘l’ennemi quelconque’ [the whatever enemy].’’ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 422. 12. There are undoubtedly zones of deprivation within the world market where the flow of capital and goods is reduced to a minimum.

In Empire the political struggle over the definition of machinic virtuality, or really over the different alternatives of the passage between the virtual and the real, is a central terrain of struggle. This new terrain of production and life opens for labor a future of metamorphoses that subjective cooperation can and must control ethically, politically, and productively. Res Gestae/Machinae In recent years there has been much talk of the end of history, and there have also been made many justified objections to the reactionary celebrations of an end of history that would see the present state of rule as eternal. It is certainly true, nonetheless, that in modernity the power of capital and its institutions of sovereignty had a solid hold on history and exerted their rule over the historical process. The virtual powers of the multitude in postmodernity signal the end of that rule and those institutions.


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When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom by Martin Jacques

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Admiral Zheng, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, credit crunch, Dava Sobel, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, income per capita, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, land tenure, Malacca Straits, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, new economy, New Urbanism, open economy, pension reform, price stability, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, spinning jenny, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, the scientific method, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Xiaogang Anhui farmers

For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001. 32 . Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4-5. 33 . Chris Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia (London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166. 34 . Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25. 35 . John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue. 36 . Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Jim Rohwer, Asia Rising (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), Chapters 1-3. 37 .

The significance of this debate to a world in which the developing nations are increasingly influential is far-reaching: if their end-point is similar to the West, or, to put it another way, Western-style modernity, then the new world is unlikely to be so different from the one we inhabit now, because China, India, Indonesia and Brazil, to take four examples, will differ little in their fundamental characteristics from the West. This was the future envisaged by Francis Fukuyama, who predicted that the post-Cold War world would be based on a new universalism embodying the Western principles of the free market and democracy.34 If, on the other hand, their ways of being modern diverge significantly, even sharply, from the Western model, then a world in which they predominate is likely to look very different from the present Western-made one in which we still largely live.

., ‘China’s Sunshine Boys’, International Herald Tribune, 7 December 2006 ——‘Democrats and China’, International Herald Tribune, 11- 12 November 2006 ——The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999) ——The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the Twenty-first Century (London: Allen Lane, 2005) Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, 16, Summer 1989 ——The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) ——Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995) Gall, Susan, and Irene Natividad, eds, The Asian American Almanac: A Reference Work on Asians in the United States (Detroit: Gale Research, 1995) Gardner, Howard, To Open Minds (New York: Basic Books, 1989) Garrett, Valery M., Chinese Clothing: An Illustrated Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) ——Traditional Chinese Clothing in Hong Kong and South China, 1840- 1980 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987) Garrison, Jim, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power?


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The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire by Wikileaks

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affirmative action, anti-communist, banking crisis, battle of ideas, Boycotts of Israel, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, Chelsea Manning, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, corporate social responsibility, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Edward Snowden, energy security, energy transition, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, experimental subject, F. W. de Klerk, facts on the ground, failed state, financial innovation, Food sovereignty, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of journalism, high net worth, invisible hand, Julian Assange, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, Naomi Klein, Northern Rock, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, statistical model, structural adjustment programs, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, UNCLOS, UNCLOS, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, éminence grise

But “regime change” did not significantly alter these countries’ strategic relationship with—and dependency on—the US. Meanwhile, post-Mao Beijing, under Deng Xiaoping, emerged as a major Western strategic partner, further isolating Moscow and post-unification Hanoi.19 The decisive collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 sparked a triumphalist celebration of American prowess, with conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama prematurely declaring “The End of History.” For Fukuyama, the apparent defeat of communism supposedly underscored the emergence of democratic capitalism as the ideological endpoint of human history, with US hegemony defining and underpinning the architecture of the post–Cold War global order.20 America’s wholesale embrace of its newfound role as the sole global superpower was starkly evident in key strategic documents such as the infamous 1992 Defence Planning Guidance, under the administration of George H.

16Porter, “Sharing Power?,” p. 16. 17Benedict Anderson, “From Miracle to Crash,” London Review of Books, April 16, 1998. 18Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Holt, 2006); Benedict Anderson, “Exit Suharto: Obituary for a Mediocre Tyrant,” New Left Review II/50 (March 2008). 19Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011). 20Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest, Summer 1989. 21“Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’”New York Times, March 8, 1992. 22Bello, Dilemmas of Domination. 23Eric Schmitt, “US-Philippine Command May Signal War’s Next Phase,” New York Times, January 16, 2002. 24Richard Javad Heydarian, “The China-Philippines-US Triangle,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, December 16, 2010. 25Ibid; Achariya and Arabinda Achariya, “The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the ‘War on Terror’ in Southeast Asia,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2007. 26It was common knowledge, reflected in Washington’s statements in Obama’s trips to these countries, that the US has been irked by the supposedly protectionist policies of these countries, which had affected American companies’ ability to increase their exports. 27Richard Javad Heydarian, “Obama’s Free Trade Strategy Falters in Asia,” Inter Press Service, June 14, 2014, at ipsnews.net; “Japan, America and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Stalemate,” The Economist, October 4, 2014. 28Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New York: Yale University Press, 2007). 29Amado Mendoza and Richard Javad Heydarian, “Member Country: Philippines,” ASEAN-CHINA Free Trade Area: Challenges, Opportunities, and the Road Ahead, Monograph No. 22, National University of Singapore, 2012. 30Heydarian, “China-Philippines-US Triangle.” 31Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 32Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “Far Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014. 33Kissinger, On China. 34Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 35American popularity in the Philippines is in fact consistently reflected in surveys by Gallup and Pew.


pages: 356 words: 102,224

Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space by Carl Sagan

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Albert Einstein, anthropic principle, cosmological principle, dark matter, Dava Sobel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, germ theory of disease, invention of the telescope, Isaac Newton, Kuiper Belt, linked data, nuclear winter, planetary scale, profit motive, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, Stephen Hawking, telepresence

CHAPTER 22, TIPTOEING THROUGH THE MILKY WAY I. A. Crawford, "Interstellar Travel: A Review for Astronomers," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. 31 (1990), p. 377. I. A. Crawford, "Space, World Government, and `The End of History,' "Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 46 (1993), pp. 415-420. Freeman J. Dyson, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (London: Birkbeck College, 1972). Ben R. Finney and Eric M. Jones, editors, Interstellar Migration and the Human Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Charles Lindholm, Charisma (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). The comment on the need for a telos is in this book. Eugene F. Mallove and Gregory L. Matloff, The Starflight Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989).

The prospects of such a time contrast provocatively with forecasts that the progress of science and technology is now near some asymptotic limit; that art, literature, and music are never to approach, much less exceed, the heights our species has, on occasion, already touched; and that political life on Earth is about to settle into some rock-stable liberal democratic world government, identified, after Hegel, as "the end of history." Such an expansion into space also contrasts with a different but likewise discernible trend in recent times—toward authoritarianism, censorship, ethnic hatred, and a deep suspicion of curiosity and learning. Instead, I think that, after some debugging, the settlement of the Solar System presages an open-ended era of dazzling advances in science and technology; cultural flowering; and wide-ranging experiments, up there in the sky, in government and social organization. In more than one respect, exploring the Solar System and homesteading other worlds constitutes the beginning, much more than the end, of history. IT'S IMPOSSIBLE, for us humans at least, to look into our future, certainly not centuries ahead.


pages: 361 words: 81,068

The Internet Is Not the Answer by Andrew Keen

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3D printing, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Airbnb, AltaVista, Andrew Keen, augmented reality, Bay Area Rapid Transit, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, Burning Man, Cass Sunstein, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collective bargaining, Colonization of Mars, computer age, connected car, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, disintermediation, Downton Abbey, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, Frederick Winslow Taylor, frictionless, full employment, future of work, gig economy, global village, Google bus, Google Glasses, Hacker Ethic, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, index card, informal economy, information trail, Innovator's Dilemma, Internet of things, Isaac Newton, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, Kodak vs Instagram, Lean Startup, libertarian paternalism, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, Martin Wolf, move fast and break things, Nate Silver, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, nonsequential writing, Norbert Wiener, Occupy movement, packet switching, PageRank, Paul Graham, Peter Thiel, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Potemkin village, precariat, pre–internet, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, ride hailing / ride sharing, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Skype, smart cities, Snapchat, social web, South of Market, San Francisco, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, TaskRabbit, Ted Nelson, telemarketer, the medium is the message, Thomas L Friedman, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber for X, urban planning, Vannevar Bush, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks, winner-take-all economy, working poor, Y Combinator

Six months later, a few hundred miles to the northeast of Geneva, the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War came to an end. Back then, with the dramatic destruction of the Wall in November, it was thought that 1989 would be remembered as a watershed year that marked the end of the Cold War and the victory of free-market liberalism. The Stanford University political scientist Francis Fukuyama, assuming that the great debate between capitalists and socialists over the best way to organize industrial society had finally been settled, described the moment that the Wall came down as the “End of History.” But the converse is actually true. Nineteen eighty-nine actually represents the birth of a new period of history, the Networked Computer Age. The Internet has created new values, new wealth, new debates, new elites, new scarcities, new markets, and above all, a new kind of economy. Well-intentioned technologists like Vannevar Bush, Norbert Wiener, J.

And yet if there is just one answer, a single solution, to the Internet’s epic failure, it is the opposite of forgetting. That answer is more memory—of the human rather than the computer kind. The answer is history. It’s not just Michael Birch who has seceded from time and space. Fukuyama may have thought that history ended in 1989, but it’s that other world-historic 1989 event, Tim Berners-Lee’s invention of the World Wide Web, that has unintentionally created another, more troubling version of the end of history. “I recently took my 16-year-old daughter Adele to see a section of the Berlin Wall that has been preserved as part of a museum devoted to the division of the city, Germany and Europe. It was a bright Berlin morning,” writes the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen about revisiting the divided Berlin of Erich Mielke and the Stasi. “Adele, born in 1997, with just a toehold in the last century, wandered around.

As the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland explains, today’s networked generation, in their preoccupation with “trading Instagrams and Vines,” has created an intimate, always-on culture that will—like a disappearing Snapchat photograph—vanish forever and leave nothing to posterity. “The point is that a fundamental aspect of human life—memory—is being altered by the digital revolution,” Freedland warns.20 The savage irony is that the more accurately the Internet remembers everything, the more our memories atrophy. The result is an amnesia about everything except the immediate, the instant, the now, and the me. It’s the end of history as a shared communal memory, the end of our collective engagement with the past and the future. “Once we had a nostalgia for the future,” warns Mark Lilla. “Today we have an amnesia for the present.”21 “The libertarian age,” Lilla argues, “is an illegible age.”22 But this isn’t quite right, either. It might be illegible for a traditional historian like Lilla, but not for a seasoned observer of networked society like the American media theorist Douglas Rushkoff.


pages: 523 words: 111,615

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters by Diane Coyle

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accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, bonus culture, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, call centre, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, conceptual framework, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, Credit Default Swap, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Diane Coyle, disintermediation, Edward Glaeser, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Financial Instability Hypothesis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, happiness index / gross national happiness, Hyman Minsky, If something cannot go on forever, it will stop, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, low skilled workers, market bubble, market design, market fundamentalism, megacity, Network effects, new economy, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, oil shock, principal–agent problem, profit motive, purchasing power parity, railway mania, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, Steven Pinker, The Design of Experiments, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, The Market for Lemons, The Myth of the Rational Market, The Spirit Level, transaction costs, transfer pricing, tulip mania, ultimatum game, University of East Anglia, web application, web of trust, winner-take-all economy, World Values Survey

I watched the events, holding my breath in case it all went wrong at the last minute, on an ancient small black-and-white television in the depths of the English countryside. It couldn’t have been more exhilarating. Seeing the images again, twenty years on, was still an emotional experience. After the drama of the end of communism came the debate. Even those who found Francis Fukuyama’s famous and triumphal declaration of “The End of History” abrasive had to acknowledge that the philosophical basis of communism and economic planning was in tatters.1 In the economic sphere, the first chance people on each side of the divide had had for an honest look at each other’s way of life made it clear that the capitalist economies had massively outperformed the centrally planned ones.2 In the political sphere, there was no question about the huge costs imposed by repression, conformism, and the absence of civil liberties on countless individuals.

How Conservatives Won the Heart of America. New York: Henry Holt. Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer. 2002. Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2007. “Should National Happiness Be Maximized?” Working Paper No. 306. Zurich: University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1952. American Capitalism—The Concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ———. 1958. The Affluent Society. New York: Penguin. Garber, Peter. 1989. “Tulipmania.” Journal of Political Economy 97:3, pp. 535–60. ———. 1990. “Famous First Bubbles.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4:2, pp. 35–54. ———. 2000. Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias.

., 127–28 Calculus of Consent, The: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Buchanan and Tullock), 242 call centers, 131, 133, 161 Cameron, David, 288 capitalism: China and, 234; communism and, 96, 182–83, 209–13, 218, 226, 230, 239–40; community and, 27, 51, 65, 117–18, 137, 141, 152–54; cultural effects of, 25–29, 230–38; current crisis of, 6–9; democracy and, 230–38; Engels on, 14; fairness and, 134, 137, 149; growth and, 268, 275, 290, 293, 297; happiness and, 25–29, 33, 45, 53–54; historical perspective on, 3, 6, 14; institutions and, 240; market failure and, 226–30; Marx on, 14; measurement and, 182; mercantile economy and, 27–28; nutrition and, 10; profit–oriented, 18; Protestant work ethic and, 13–14; protests against, 211–13; rethinking meaning of, 9; social effects of, 25–26; values and, 209–13, 218, 226, 230–32, 235–36; well-being and, 137–39 carbon prices, 70–71 celebrities, 33 charitable giving, 33, 141 Checkpoint Charlie, 147 China, 161, 262, 280; capitalism and, 234; carbon emissions and, 63; changed demographic structure of, 90; convergence and, 122; declining population in, 98; energy use in, 63, 65; global manufacturing and, 149; inequality and, 125–26; Mao and, 10; middle class of, 125–26; as next major power, 94; one–child policy and, 95–96; population growth and, 95–96; purchasing power parity (PPP) and, 306n19; rise in wealth of, 81, 122–23, 125, 212; savings and, 87, 94, 100, 108; wage penalties and, 133; World Bank influence and, 163 cities, 308n29; face-to-face contact and, 165–68; size and, 165–66; structural changes in, 165–70; urban clustering and, 166 City of London, 147, 221 Clemens, Michael, 81 climate change, 5–7, 17, 24, 90, 238; carbon prices and, 70–71; Copenhagen summit and, 62, 64–65, 68, 162, 292; domestic dissent and, 66–71; future and, 75–83; geological history and, 69; global warming and, 57, 64, 66, 68; greenhouse gases and, 23, 29, 35, 59, 61–63, 68, 70–71, 83; Himalayan glaciers and, 66–67; incandescent light bulbs and, 59–60; InterAcademy Council and, 66–67; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and, 59, 66–69, 82, 297; Kyoto Protocol and, 62–64; lack of consensus on, 66–71; Montreal Protocol and, 59; policy dilemma of, 58–62; policy recommendations for, 267, 280, 297; politics and, 62–65; social welfare and, 71–75; technology and, 59–60, 198 Coachella Value Music Festival, 197 Cobb, John, 36 Coca Cola, 150 coherence, 49 Cold War, 93, 112, 147, 209, 213, 239, 252 Collier, Paul, 77–78, 80, 82 Commerzbank, 87 Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 37–38 communism: Berlin Wall and, 182, 226, 239; capitalism and, 96, 182–83, 209–13, 218, 226, 230, 239–40; Cold War and, 93, 112, 147, 209, 213, 239, 252; fall of, 209–13, 226, 239–40, 252; Iron Curtain and, 183, 239, 252; Leipzig marches and, 239; one-child policy and, 95–96; Velvet Revolution and, 239 community: civic engagement and, 140–41; globalization and, 148–49; intangible assets and, 149–52, 157, 161 (see also trust); public service and, 295; Putnam on, 140–41, 152–54 commuting, 45–47 Company of Strangers, The (Seabright), 148–49, 213–14 comprehensive wealth, 81–82, 202–3, 208, 271–73 consumerism, 22, 34, 45, 138 consumption: conspicuous, 11, 22, 45, 236; consumerism and, 22, 34, 45, 138; cutting, 61; downgrading status of, 11; downshifting and, 11, 55; Easterlin Paradox and, 39–44; global per capita, 72; of goods and services, 7, 10, 24, 35–36, 40, 82, 99, 161, 188, 191, 198, 214, 218, 228–29, 282; green lifestyle and, 55, 61, 76, 289, 293; growth and, 280, 295; happiness and, 22, 29, 40, 45; hedonic treadmill and, 40; increasing affluence and, 12; institutions and, 254, 263; Kyoto Protocol and, 63–64; measurement and, 181–82, 198; missing markets and, 229; natural resources and, 8–12, 58, 60, 79–82, 102, 112, 181–82; nature and, 58–61, 71–76, 79, 82; posterity and, 86, 104–5, 112–13; reduction of, 105; Slow Movement and, 27; trends in, 138; trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; values and, 229, 236 convergence, 5, 122 Copenhagen summit, 62, 64–65, 68, 162, 292 Crackberry, 205 Crafts, Nicholas, 156–57 credit cards, 2, 21, 136, 138, 283 Csikszentmilhalyi, Mihaly, 45–49 Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, The (Bell), 230, 235–36 Czechoslovakia, 239 Daly, Herman, 36 Damon, William, 48 Dasgupta, Partha, 61, 73, 77–78, 80, 82 David, Paul, 156 Dawkins, Richard, 118 debit cards, 2 decentralization, 7, 159, 218, 246, 255, 275, 291 defense budgets, 93 democracy, 2, 8, 16, 312n19; capitalism and, 230–38; culture and, 230–38; fairness and, 141; growth and, 268–69, 285–89, 296–97; institutions and, 242–43, 251–52, 262; nature and, 61, 66, 68; posterity and, 106; trust and, 175; values and, 230–35 Denmark, 125 Dickens, Charles, 131 Diener, Ed, 48, 49 Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men (Rousseau), 114 distribution, 29, 306n22; Asian influence and, 123; bifurcation of social norms and, 231–32; consumerism and, 22, 34, 45, 138; Easterlin Paradox and, 39–44; fairness and, 115–16, 123–27, 134, 136; food and, 10, 34; of goods and services, 7, 10, 24, 35–36, 40, 82, 99, 161, 188, 191, 198, 214, 218, 228–29, 282; income, 34, 116, 123–27, 134, 278; inequality and, 123 (see also inequality); institutions and, 253; measurement and, 181, 191–99, 202; paradox of prosperity and, 174; policy recommendations for, 276, 278; posterity and, 87, 94; trust and, 151, 171; unequal countries and, 124–30; values and, 226 Dorling, Danny, 224, 307n58, 308n34 Douglas, Michael, 221 downshifting, 11, 55 downsizing, 175, 246, 255 drugs, 44, 46, 137–38, 168–69, 191, 302n47 Easterlin, Richard, 39 Easterlin Paradox, 39–44 eBay, 198 Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity project, The (TEEB), 78–79 economies of scale, 253–58 Economy of Enough, 233; building blocks for, 12–17; first ten steps for, 294–98; growth and, 182; happiness and, 24; institutions and, 250–51, 258, 261–63; living standards and, 13, 65, 78–79, 106, 113, 136, 139, 151, 162, 190, 194, 267; Manifesto of, 18, 267–98; measurement and, 182, 186–88, 201–7; nature and, 59, 84; Ostrom on, 250–51; posterity and, 17, 85–113; values and, 217, 233–34, 238; Western consumers and, 22 (see also consumption) Edinburgh University, 221 efficiency, 2, 7; evidence–based policy and, 233–34; fairness and, 126; Fama hypothesis and, 221–22; happiness and, 9, 29–30, 61; institutions and, 245–46, 254–55, 261; limits to, 13; nature and, 61–62, 69, 82; network effects and, 253, 258; productivity and, 13 (see also productivity); trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; trust and, 158–59; values and, 210, 215–16, 221–35 Ehrlich, Paul, 70 e-mail, 252, 291 “End of History, The” (Fukuyama), 239 Engels, Friedrich, 14 Enlightenment, 7 Enron, 145 environmentalists. See nature European Union, 42, 59, 62, 162–63, 177, 219 Evolution of Cooperation, The (Axelrod), 118–19 “Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, The” (Trivers), 118 externalities, 15, 70, 80, 211, 228–29, 249, 254 Facebook, 289 face-to-face contact, 7, 147, 165–68 fairness: altruism and, 118–22; antiglobalization and, 115; bankers and, 115, 133, 139, 143–44; behavioral econoics and, 116–17, 121; bonuses and, 87–88, 115, 139, 143–44, 193, 221, 223, 277–78, 295; capitalism and, 134, 137, 149; consequences for growth, 135–36; criticism of poor and, 142; democracy and, 141; emotion and, 118–19, 137; game theory and, 116–18, 121–22; government and, 121, 123, 131, 136; gratitude and, 118; growth and, 114–16, 121, 125, 127, 133–37; happiness and, 53; health issues and, 137–43; high salaries and, 130, 143–44, 193, 223, 277–78, 286, 296; inequality and, 115–16, 122–43; innate sense of, 114–19; innovation and, 121, 134; morals and, 116–20, 127, 131, 142, 144, 221; philosophy and, 114–15, 123; politics and, 114–16, 125–31, 135–36, 140–44; productivity and, 131, 135; Putnam on, 140–41; self-interest and, 114–22; social corrosiveness of, 139–44; social justice and, 31, 43, 53, 65, 123, 164, 224, 237, 286; statistics and, 115, 138; superstar effect and, 134; sustainability and, 115; technology and, 116, 131–34, 137; tit-for-tat response and, 118–19; trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; trust and, 139–44, 150, 157, 162, 172, 175–76; ultimatum game and, 116–17; unequal countries and, 124–30; wage penalties and, 133; well-being and, 137–43; World Values Survey and, 139 Fama, Eugene, 221–22 faxes, 252 Federal Reserve, 145 Ferguson, Niall, 100–101 financial crises: actions by governments and, 104–12; bubbles and, 3 (see also bubbles); capitalism and, 6–9 (see also capitalism); contracts and, 149–50; crashes and, 3, 28, 161, 244, 283; current, 54, 85, 90–91, 145; debt legacy of, 90–92; demographic implosion and, 95–100; goodwill and, 150; government debt and, 100–104; Great Depression and, 3, 28, 35, 61, 82, 150, 208, 281; growth debt and, 85–86; historical perspective on, 3–4; institutional blindness to, 87–88; intangible assets and, 149–50; intrusive regulatory practices and, 244; pension burden of, 92–95; as political crisis, 8–9; statistics of, 145; stimulus packages and, 91, 100–103, 111; structural change and, 25; total cost of current, 90–91; trust and, 88–89 (see also trust); weightless activities and, 150; welfare burden of, 92–95 Financial Times, 257 Fitzgerald, F.


pages: 299 words: 19,560

Utopias: A Brief History From Ancient Writings to Virtual Communities by Howard P. Segal

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1960s counterculture, British Empire, Buckminster Fuller, complexity theory, David Brooks, death of newspapers, dematerialisation, deskilling, energy security, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of journalism, garden city movement, germ theory of disease, Golden Gate Park, invention of the printing press, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, John von Neumann, knowledge economy, Louis Pasteur, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, Nicholas Carr, Nikolai Kondratiev, out of africa, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, union organizing, urban planning, War on Poverty, Whole Earth Catalog

For that matter, in the spirit of Victor Frankenstein, the ultimate dream of many of Noble’s visionaries is the creation through genetic engineering of a womanless world—the culmination of centuries of mistreatment of women in general and of female engineers and scientists in particular.5 Such schemes go beyond the eugenics crusades of many “reformers” in both Europe and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that culminated in Nazism’s quest for a pure Aryan race—but not, of course, one of men alone. The Absence of Historical Context History can therefore be ignored, so profoundly different will the future be from the past. History no longer matters.6 One might, of course, suggest that our ahistorical contemporary visionaries have embraced a watered-down version of Francis Fukuyama’s still controversial The End of History and the Last Man (1992), but there is no evidence of that kind of sophisticated argument in any of their writings. Consequently, few if any of the high-tech zealots of our own day have ever considered the possibility that, far from being original, their crusades fit squarely within a rich Western tradition of 188 The Resurgence of Utopianism scientific and technological utopianism.

As someone devoid of ideological purity and persistence of any kind (having repeatedly changed his positions on most major issues in order to advance his political career), Bush’s dismissal of “vision” might seem merely self-serving, the crassest kind of practical political bent. But it was sometimes taken up by others who, for whatever reasons, dismissed serious and systematic thinking about the future as a waste of time, an indulgence not The Future of Utopias and Utopianism 241 fit for respectable leaders daily confronting endless challenges. Fukuyama’s provocative The End of History and the Last Man (1992) might have been Bush’s gospel had he ever read, much less understood, it; but he did neither. Ironically, Bush lost re-election in part because of his inability to present specifics to support the New World Order that he mentioned from time to time in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not having “that vision thing” in the end hurt his presidency and his legacy.

Adams) 82–83 Educational Network of Maine 208 Edutopia 203–213 higher education and Edutopia 206–213 Edwards, Robert 127 Ehrenreich, Barbara 168 Einstein’s general theory of relativity 202 Eisenhower, President Dwight D 108–109, 115, 143 el dorado, Latin America 21 Electricite de France 152 “electronic battlefield” 105, 112 “electronic campus” 208, 210 Elements of Technology (Bigelow) 52 Elizabeth II, Queen, on economic crisis 166–167 Ellicott, Thomas 77 Embree, Ainslie 171 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 84 empowerment of the individual 122–123 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) 188, 242 End of Ideology, The (Bell) 101 end of science 116 Endangered Species Act, United States 111 Energy Policy Act, US 153, 157 Index 273 Engels, Friedrich 32, 53, 60, 66–67, 250, 251 engineers and scientists compared 52 engineering as a culture 121 Engineers and the Price System, The (Veblen) 97, 106 “Enlightenment Project” 104, 116 Enlightenment 50, 55–56, 104, philosophies of 160 environmental disasters 115 environmental rights 253 Epode 47 Equality movement Washington state 25 equality 56 equality of genders 26, 92–93, 196 equality of opportunity 31, 54, 210 Erasmus 190 Espy, James 188 ethnopsychiatry 170 Etzler, John Adolphus 78, 79–80, 81 eugenics 159, 188 Evans, Oliver 77 Ewbank, Thomas 78, 80 experts 109, 112 and activism 107 attitudes toward 114, 115, 155–156, 157–160, 192 and changing of society 97 and education 205, 211 experts and scientists 100, 119, 121 need for 57 and nuclear power 155–156 as social engineers 108 systems experts 160 and Systems Analysis 110 and TQM 217 274 Index Expo 2010 Shanghai, China 38 Fabianism 20 Facebook 193, 194, 238 Fair America: World’s Fairs in the United States (Rydell, Findling, Pelle) 36 fascism 98, 104 Federal Communications Commission 210 Female Man, The (Russ) 92 Findling, John 36 Flanagan, Judy 145 Fleming, James 187–188, 207 Flubber 202 Fogarty, Robert 25 Ford Motor Company 139, 246 Ford, Henry 104, 157, 165 Ford, President Gerald 108 Fourier, Charles 25, 53, 60, 64–66, 67, 255 utopian views 64–65 Fourierists 29 Fourth Eclogue 47 Fragments (Pindar) 47, 237 France: and energy 157 French Revolution 57, 60, 64 French student revolt 1968 252 nuclear industry in 152 utopian housing projects in 2 utopianism in 24 Frankenstein (M.


pages: 561 words: 87,892

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity by Stephen D. King

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Admiral Zheng, asset-backed security, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, low skilled workers, market clearing, Martin Wolf, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Naomi Klein, new economy, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, statistical model, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

Globalization is a natural feature of the economic landscape, leading to a happier, more contented, global community driven on by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the spread of liberal democracy. In this view of the world, it is relatively easy to incorporate the hopes, aspirations and economic muscle of the emerging nations into an already established world economic order. This is the kind of message that found favour in books such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and which still finds sympathy today in international gatherings such as the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (where the great and the good of the global community can solve mass poverty for the benefit of the international media before heading off to the nearest champagne reception or ski slope). Admittedly it’s a seductive view. If globalization is inevitable, the only things that can hold it back are evil men, stupid ideas and wars.

., Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2007 Friedman, B., The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2005 Friedman, M., A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957 Friedman, T., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York, 1999 ———, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, New York, 2005 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992 Gibson, C. and Lennon, E., Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850–1990, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, US Bureau of the Census, Washington DC, 1999 Gohkale, J. and Smetters, K., Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities, Policy Discussion Paper No. 5, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, OH, 2003 Greenspan, A., The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Federal Reserve, Washington DC, 1996 ———, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Allen Lane, London, 2007 Headrick, D.R., Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981 Heilbroner, R., The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, 7th edn, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1999 Hertz, N., The Silent Takeover, The Free Press, New York, 2002 Hobbes, T., ed Gaskin, J., Leviathan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Globalisation: Prospects and Policy Responses, Fourteenth Report of Session, London, 2006/7 Hume, D.

(i) Canada (i), (ii), (iii) Canning, David (i) capital Asian economic growth (i) empires (i), (ii) inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability (i) protectionism (i) resource scarcity (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) capital controls (i), (ii), (iii) capital flows see cross-border capital flows capital goods (i), (ii), (iii) capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) capital markets anarchy in capital markets (i) emerging nation war-chest (i) at the end of the rainbow (i) foreign-exchange reserves (i) gold rush revisited (i) the hole in the story (i) hunt for yield (i) Japan’s currency appreciation (i) liquidity and greed (i) mispricing of Western capital markets (i) no promised land (i) role of capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) resource scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) capital mobility (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) car industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) carry trades (i), (ii) Catholic Church (i) Ceauşescu, Nicolae (i) Celler, Emanuel (i) central banks capital controls (i) capital flows and nation states (i) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) printing money (i) Central Europe (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Chang, Ha-Joon (i) Chelsea FC (i) Cheney, Dick (i) Chevron (i) China anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) currency (i) globalization (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) savings (i) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (i), (ii) Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) (i) choice (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Christianity (i), (ii), (iii) Chrysler (i) Clark, Gregory (i) classical economists (i) climate change (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) coal (i) COFER (currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves) (i), (ii) Collier, Paul (i) colonialism (i), (ii), (iii) Columbus, Christopher (i), (ii) Comet jet airliner (i), (ii) Commission of the European Union (i) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (i) commodity prices globalization (i) income inequality (i) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) savings (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) Common Agricultural Policy (i) communications (i), (ii), (iii) communism capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) fall of (i) political economy and inequalities (i) population demographics (i), (ii) scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels) (i) Communist Party (i), (ii) comparative advantage political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) computers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Congress of Vienna (i) Conservative Party (i) consumer prices (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) contraception (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘core’ inflation (i), (ii) corruption (i), (ii) Cortés, Hernando (i), (ii) Costa Rica (i) cotton industry (i), (ii) Cour de Cassation (i) credit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) credit crunch anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) politics and economics (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) crime (i), (ii), (iii) Crimean War (i) ‘crony capitalism’ (i) cross-border capital flows anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) capital flows and nation states (i), (ii), (iii) comparative advantage (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) economic models (i), (ii) globalization (i), (ii) Japan (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Cuba (i), (ii) Cultural Revolution (i), (ii), (iii) currency capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economic integration, political proliferation (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) monetary union (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) protectionism (i) single capital market and many nations (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) current account (balance of payments) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account deficit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account surplus capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Cyprus (i) Czechoslovakia (i) Czech Republic (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) debt capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i) population ageing (i) price stability and economic instability (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) deflation (i), (ii), (iii) demand-management policies (i), (ii), (iii) democracy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) demographic deficit (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividend (i), (ii), (iii) demographic profile (i), (ii), (iii) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii) dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Depression see Great Depression Desai, Meghnad (i) Deutsche Mark (i), (ii), (iii) developed world capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) diet (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) see also food diversification (i), (ii) division of labour (i) dollar see US dollar Dominican Republic (i) dot.com bubble (i), (ii) drugs (i), (ii), (iii) Dubai Ports World (DP World) (i), (ii) Dutch East India Company (i), (ii) East Asia (i), (ii) Eastern Europe capital markets (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) East Germany (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) East India Company (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes) (i), (ii), (iii) economic crisis see also Asian economic crisis anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) economic instability (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) economic growth capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividends and deficits (i) globalization (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i), (ii) US domestic reform (i) economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) economic models (i), (ii), (iii) economic rent (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) economics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economies of scale (i), (ii), (iii) The Economist (i) Ecuador (i) EdF (Électricité de France) (i), (ii) education capital markets (i) migration (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) Eichengreen, Barry (i), (ii) elderly population (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) electricity (i) Elizabeth II, Queen (i) Ellis Island (i), (ii) emerging economies anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) globalization (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Western progress (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘enabling’ resources (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) The End of History (Fukuyama) (i) energy supplies political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) politics and economics (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) resource scarcity (i), (ii) Russian power politics (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Engels, Friedrich (i) England (i), (ii), (iii) English language (i) English Premier League (i), (ii), (iii) Enlightenment (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Enron (i) Entente Cordiale (i) equities anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population ageing (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) savings (i) An Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus) (i), (ii), (iii) EU see European Union euro (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) Europe political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) European Central Bank (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) European Union (EU) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) exchange rates anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) income inequality (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) sovereign wealth funds (i) the West’s diminished status (i) exports China (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Eyser, George (i) Fannie Mae (i) Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) (i), (ii) Federal Reserve anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) economic integration, political proliferation (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Ferrari (i) fertility rates (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Fidelity International (i) financial services industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Finland (i) First World War (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) FOMC see Federal Open Markets Committee food political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) rent-seeking behaviour (i) resource scarcity (i), (ii) savings (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Forbes.com (i) foreign direct investment anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) income inequality (i) population demographics (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) foreign-exchange reserves anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i) single capital market and many nations (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) fossil fuels (i) France economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) Louisiana Purchase (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) Frank, Barney (i) Freddie Mac (i) freedom of speech (i), (ii) free market (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) free trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Friedman, Milton (i), (ii), (iii) Friedman, Thomas (i) Fu Chengyu (i) fuel (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Fukuyama, Francis (i) fund managers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) G7 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) G8 (i), (ii), (iii) G20 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Gagon, Joseph E.


pages: 334 words: 98,950

Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang

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affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labour mobility, land reform, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, moral hazard, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

They have come back into fashion just as the more dominant cultures (narrowly Anglo-American, more broadly European) have started to feel ‘threatened’ by other cultures – Confucianism in the economic sphere; Islam in the realm of politics and international relations.20 They also offered a very convenient excuse to the Bad Samaritans – neo-liberal policies have not worked very well, not because of some inherent problems but because the people practising them had ‘wrong’ values that diminished their effectiveness. In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

While the developed countries should open their markets, the developing countries could continue to protect their own markets. Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J.Bhagwati & M.Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.


pages: 385 words: 111,807

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide by Ha-Joon Chang

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Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, banks create money, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, discovery of the americas, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, experimental economics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global value chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Haber-Bosch Process, happiness index / gross national happiness, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, interchangeable parts, interest rate swap, inventory management, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge economy, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, post-industrial society, precariat, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Scramble for Africa, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spinning jenny, structural adjustment programs, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade liberalization, transaction costs, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, working-age population, World Values Survey

The Central European countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – fared better, especially after they joined the European Union in 2004, thanks to being more gradualist in their reform and to their better skill bases. But even in the case of these countries, it is difficult to hail the transition experience as a great success. The fall of the socialist bloc ushered in a period of ‘free-market triumphalism’. Some, such as the American (then) neo-con thinker Francis Fukuyama, pronounced the ‘end of history’ (no, not the end of the world) on the grounds that we had finally conclusively identified the best economic system in the form of capitalism. The fact that capitalism comes in many varieties, each with particular strengths and weaknesses, was blissfully ignored in the euphoric mood of the day. One world, ready or not: globalization and the new world economic order By the mid-1990s, neo-liberalism had spread throughout the world.

According to the Eurostat, the EU’s statistical agency, in 2010, GDP was €12.3 trillion in the European Union and €10.9 trillion in the US. 9. L. Lin and J. Sutri, ‘Capital requirements for over-the-counter derivatives central counterparties’, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/3, 2013, p. 7, figure 1, downloadable from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1303.pdf. 10. G. Palma, ‘The revenge of the market on the rentiers: why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 4 (2009). 11. Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing, p. 206, figure 2. 12. J. Crotty, ‘If financial market competition is so intense, why are financial firm profits so high?: Reflections on the current “golden age” of finance’, Working Paper no. 134 (Amherst, MA: PERI (Political Economy Research Institute), University of Massachusetts, April 2007). 13.


pages: 357 words: 95,986

Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work by Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams

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3D printing, additive manufacturing, air freight, algorithmic trading, anti-work, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, battle of ideas, blockchain, Bretton Woods, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, centre right, collective bargaining, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, David Graeber, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, deskilling, Doha Development Round, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ferguson, Missouri, financial independence, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of work, gender pay gap, housing crisis, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, intermodal, Internet Archive, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, late capitalism, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market design, Martin Wolf, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, patent troll, pattern recognition, post scarcity, postnationalism / post nation state, precariat, price stability, profit motive, quantitative easing, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Slavoj Žižek, social web, stakhanovite, Steve Jobs, surplus humans, the built environment, The Chicago School, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, wages for housework, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population

For a contemporary updating, see the Laboria Cuboniks manifesto in Helen Hester and Armen Avanessian, eds, Dea Ex Machina (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2015). 69.Benedict Singleton, ‘Maximum Jailbreak’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate. 70.Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: Verso, 2014), pp. 144–5. 71.Sadie Plant, ‘Binary Sexes, Binary Codes’, 3 June 1996, at future-nonstop.org. 72.Reza Negarestani, ‘The Labor of the Inhuman’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate, 452. 73.Ibid., p. 438. 74.For examples of these parochial defences, see Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile, 2003). 75.For two fascinating accounts of bodily experimentation, see Shannon Bell, Fast Feminism (New York: Autonomedia, 2010); and Beatriz Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era (New York: Feminist Press CUNY, 2013). 76.The remainder of this book will be concerned mostly with the first two aspects of synthetic freedom: the basic conditions of existence, and the collective capacities to act.

Triumph in the political battles to achieve it will require organising a broadly populist left, building the organisational ecosystem necessary for a full-spectrum politics on multiple fronts, and leveraging key points of power wherever possible. Yet the end of work would not be the end of history. Building a platform for a post-work society would be an immense accomplishment, but it would still only be a beginning.1 This is why conceiving of left politics as a politics of modernity is so crucial: because it requires that we not confuse a post-work society – or indeed any society – with the end of history. Universalism always undoes itself, possessing its own resources for an immanent critique that insists and expands upon its ideals. No particular social formation is sufficient to satisfy its conceptual and political demands. Equally, synthetic freedom compels us to reject contentment with the existing horizon of possibilities.


pages: 347 words: 99,317

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity by Ha-Joon Chang

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affirmative action, Albert Einstein, banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labour mobility, land reform, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, moral hazard, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

They have come back into fashion just as the more dominant cultures (narrowly Anglo-American, more broadly European) have started to feel ‘threatened’ by other cultures – Confucianism in the economic sphere; Islam in the realm of politics and international relations.20 They also offered a very convenient excuse to the Bad Samaritans – neo-liberal policies have not worked very well, not because of some inherent problems but because the people practising them had ‘wrong’ values that diminished their effectiveness. In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

While the developed countries should open their markets, the developing countries could continue to protect their own markets. Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J. Bhagwati & M. Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.


pages: 298 words: 95,668

Milton Friedman: A Biography by Lanny Ebenstein

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affirmative action, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, labour market flexibility, Lao Tzu, liquidity trap, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, Ponzi scheme, price stability, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school choice, school vouchers, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, stem cell, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen

Is there anything more to say than free markets are the most efficient way to organize a society? Is it the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama put it? Friedman: Oh no. “Free markets” is a very general term. There are all sorts of problems that will emerge. Free markets work best when the transaction between two individuals affects only those individuals. But that isn’t the fact. The fact is that, most often, a transaction between you and me affects a third party. That is the source of all problems for government. That is the source of all pollution problems, of the inequality problem. There are some good economists like Gary Becker and Bob Lucas who are working on these issues. This reality ensures the end of history will never come. Many books and articles have been written on Friedman over the decades. J.


pages: 281 words: 95,852

The Googlization of Everything: by Siva Vaidhyanathan

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1960s counterculture, AltaVista, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Burning Man, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, cloud computing, computer age, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, data acquisition, death of newspapers, don't be evil, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full text search, global village, Google Earth, Howard Rheingold, informal economy, information retrieval, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, knowledge worker, libertarian paternalism, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Naomi Klein, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, PageRank, pirate software, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, single-payer health, Skype, social web, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, The Nature of the Firm, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thorstein Veblen, urban decay, web application

Abigail Cutler, “Penetrating the Great Firewall: Interview with James Fallows,” Atlantic, February 19, 2008; James Fallows, “ ‘The Connection Has Been Reset,’ ” Atlantic, March 2008; Ronald Deibert et al., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 51. Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 52. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Pres, 1992). 53. Ideology, as the Cambridge University sociologist John Thompson argues, is “meaning in the service of power,” or a sense of how symbolic expressions support or challenge structures and habits of social domination. See John Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 54.


pages: 325 words: 99,983

Globish: How the English Language Became the World's Language by Robert McCrum

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Alistair Cooke, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, call centre, colonial rule, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Etonian, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, invention of movable type, invention of writing, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, jimmy wales, knowledge economy, Livingstone, I presume, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile

Now the Anglo-American hegemony-often hotly disputed by anti-American liberals – was wholly underpinned by rampant capitalism, represented by Margaret Thatcher’s premiership in Britain and Ronald Reagan’s two-term presidency in the United States. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 this new global culture would morph into the worldwide cultural revolution that would become Globish. The eerie decade that preceded the crisis of 2001 was the first in a century in which the world was no longer in the shadow of war. Francis Fukuyama declared ‘the End of History’. It was during this unreal and optimistic hiatus that the little term coined by Jean-Paul Nerrière in 1995, ‘Globish’ – simple, inelegant and almost universal-first gained currency. Now Globish began to emerge, in the words of The Times, as ‘the language of the present and the future’, the worldwide dialect of the third millennium. CHAPTER THIRTEEN ‘The World At Your Fingertips’ From Google to Globish, 1989–2009 Because it amplifies our potential in so many ways, it’s possible that the long-term impact of the Internet could equal that of electricity, the automobile and the telephone all rolled together


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1989 The Berlin Wall: My Part in Its Downfall by Peter Millar

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anti-communist, back-to-the-land, Berlin Wall, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, glass ceiling, kremlinology, Marshall McLuhan, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, pre–internet, QWERTY keyboard, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Sinatra Doctrine, urban sprawl, working-age population

And we committed wanton vandalism: kicking in a few doors, smashing the occasional window. It was stupid, childish, futile and meaningless. But it didn’t half feel good. * See also Peter Millar’s All Gone to Look for America: Riding the Iron Horse Across a Continent and Back. London: Arcadia Books, 2008 12 Brave New World And with that, history came to an end. I wish. American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, arguing that the collapse of communism spelled the global triumph of Western liberal democracy could not have been more wrong. In early 1990, I described the tumultuous events of the previous year as a wave of revolutions that had finally ended a seventy-five-year European civil war. Round One, 1914–1918, had been a furious slugfest, with the heavyweight empires of the old world battling it out, ending with them all battered but one lot more bloodied than the rest.


pages: 279 words: 87,910

How Much Is Enough?: Money and the Good Life by Robert Skidelsky, Edward Skidelsky

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banking crisis, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, Bonfire of the Vanities, call centre, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, death of newspapers, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, lump of labour, market clearing, market fundamentalism, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, union organizing, University of East Anglia, wage slave, World Values Survey

(The adoration of a sycophant or a mob leads more often to self-contempt than to self-respect.) In all ages, we find groups of “peers” or “equals” respecting each other while looking down on everyone else. The citizenry of ancient Athens was one such group, as was the medieval nobility. Modern democracy extends the circle of peers to all adults in a given territory. Whether or not its triumph is guaranteed by History, as Francis Fukuyama has claimed, it now has the support of almost all the world, at least on paper. No modern vision of the good life can be such as to thwart it. This rules out, as we noted in Chapter 3, values such as mastery and “greatness of soul,” which cannot in principle be universalized. Respect has many sources, varying from culture to culture. Strength, money, land, nobility, education and office have all figured prominently at one time or another.

The Book of Revelation, source of so much poetry and madness, prophesies a “new heaven and a new earth,” in which “there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.” The millenarian seed lies deep in the Christian consciousness, ready to sprout forth lusciously in times of hardship or turmoil. But mainstream Christianity has kept a wary distance from it. St. Augustine, a former Platonist, positioned his “city of God” not at the end of history but outside time altogether, abandoning the “city of man” to its old cyclical fate. Sacred history was thus sharply distinguished from mundane, secular history. However, the potential for intermingling was always there. Joachim of Flora, a twelfth-century mystic, developed an ingenious theory of human history based on the three persons of the Trinity. The age of the Father had ended with the birth of Christ; the age of the Son was coming to a close; the age of the Holy Spirit, in which all Christians would be united in a new spiritual kingdom, free from the letter of the law, was at hand.


pages: 357 words: 99,684

Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions by Paul Mason

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back-to-the-land, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, capital controls, centre right, citizen journalism, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, illegal immigration, informal economy, land tenure, low skilled workers, means of production, megacity, Mohammed Bouazizi, Naomi Klein, Network effects, New Journalism, Occupy movement, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rising living standards, short selling, Slavoj Žižek, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, union organizing, We are the 99%, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, young professional

He calls the resulting phenomenon ‘capitalist realism’, defined as the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it … a pervasive atmosphere conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining action.11 Up to 2008, the left’s inability to imagine any alternative to capitalism was like a mirror image of the right’s triumphalism. The establishment’s tramline thinking on Islam and its theories of ‘durable authoritarianism’ conformed, like the rest of its ideology, to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and the paeans of various commentators—Thomas Friedman foremost among them—to the triumph of globalization. Together, left and right created a shared fatalism about the future. The right believed that with indomitable power it could create whatever truth it wanted to. In a famous phrase, Karl Rove, senior advisor to then US President George W. Bush, scorned those without power as the ‘reality-based community’.


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The Year That Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall by Michael Meyer

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Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, BRICs, call centre, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, haute couture, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, union organizing

For them, the revolutions of 1989 became the foundation of a new post–Cold War weltanschauung: the idea that all totalitarian regimes are similarly hollow at the core and will crumble with a shove from the outside. If its symbol is the Berlin Wall, coming down as Ronald Reagan famously bid it to do in a speech in Berlin in 1987, the operational model was Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania. “Once the wicked witch was dead,” as Francis Fukuyama, the eminent political economist, has put it, “the munchkins would rise up and start singing joyously about their liberation.” It is true that instead of seeking to contain the former Soviet Union, as previous administrations had done, the United States under Ronald Reagan chose to confront it. He challenged Mikhail Gorbachev not only to reform the Soviet system from within but to “tear down this wall.”

In it, he warned of the dangers of “mismemory” or, worse, the deliberate rewriting of memory (not unlike the onetime overlords of the Soviet empire) to shape the future. “In the wake of 1989,” he said, “with boundless confidence and insufficient reflection, we put the twentieth century behind us and strode boldly into its successor swaddled in self-serving half-truths: the triumph of the West, the end of History, the unipolar American moment.” If there is a real enemy, he concluded, it is less the rogues’ gallery of Washington’s “bad guys” than America’s ignorance of itself and the past—a prescription, according to Judt, for self-defeat. America will sort out its troubles. The country does that well, better than most others. But it begins with stock-taking—going back to where things went wrong and facing problems squarely.


pages: 518 words: 107,836

How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (Information Policy) by Benjamin Peters

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Albert Einstein, Andrei Shleifer, Benoit Mandelbrot, bitcoin, Brownian motion, Claude Shannon: information theory, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, computer age, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Graeber, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, double helix, Drosophila, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death, hive mind, index card, informal economy, invisible hand, Jacquard loom, Jacquard loom, John von Neumann, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, linear programming, mandelbrot fractal, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, Menlo Park, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, Norbert Wiener, packet switching, pattern recognition, Paul Erdős, Peter Thiel, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, scientific mainstream, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, stochastic process, technoutopianism, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, transaction costs, Turing machine

For example, sociologist Manuel Castells has developed an extensive argument detailing how the Soviet Union failed to enter the information age, which this book is in some ways a sideways response to, and legal scholar Lawrence Lessig used his experience observing the rapid deregulation and privatization in post-Soviet economic transition in the early 1990s as a formative analog for what he felt was an equally disastrous attitude about the supposed unregulability of cyberspace common in the late 1990s.10 Since then, scholars have recognized that the summary experiences of perhaps the last two great information frontiers of the twentieth-century—the rise of post-Soviet economic transition and the Internet—present not, as Francis Fukuyama infamously claimed, the end of history so much as a new chapter in it. Leading cyber legal scholar Yochai Benkler has argued for a middle way by observing how online modes of “commons-based peer production” sustain capitalist profit margins through collectivist forms of reputational altruistic communities that do not depend on individual self-interest.11 From the final chapters of Soviet history, we may begin to observe and puzzle through the perennial fact that, for many Western technologists and scholars, the promise of socialist collaboration shines brightest online today—a promise that the Soviet OGAS designers were among the first to foresee.

Culture and Prosperity: The Truth About Markets - Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor by John Kay

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Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, Barry Marshall: ulcers, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, California gold rush, complexity theory, computer age, constrained optimization, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Donald Trump, double entry bookkeeping, double helix, Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse, equity premium, Ernest Rutherford, European colonialism, experimental economics, Exxon Valdez, failed state, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, George Gilder, greed is good, haute couture, illegal immigration, income inequality, invention of the telephone, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, John Nash: game theory, John von Neumann, Kevin Kelly, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, late capitalism, Long Term Capital Management, loss aversion, Mahatma Gandhi, market bubble, market clearing, market fundamentalism, means of production, Menlo Park, Mikhail Gorbachev, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, moral hazard, Naomi Klein, Nash equilibrium, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pets.com, popular electronics, price discrimination, price mechanism, prisoner's dilemma, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, QWERTY keyboard, Ralph Nader, RAND corporation, random walk, rent-seeking, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, second-price auction, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South Sea Bubble, Steve Jobs, telemarketer, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Predators' Ball, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, total factor productivity, transaction costs, tulip mania, urban decay, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, yield curve, yield management

Russian productivity was so low that the Soviet Union could not match the military capabilities of the United States, and the attempt to reform its economy led to the collapse of the associated political system. A central lesson of the last chapter of the Soviet Union was that economic institutions cannot be viewed in isolation from the social and political environment in which they function. This lesson was not taken to heart, either by the American victors or by the reformers who subsequently came to power in Russia. Francis Fukuyama famously captured the triumphalism of America's victory by proclaiming "the end of history." 1 A lightly regulated market economy in a liberal democracy was appropriate, not just for the United States at the end of the twentieth century, but for all countries at all times. The market economy was victorious not only in the war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1959, Russia had shocked the West with its technological prowess by putting Sputnik into space.

Friedman, M., with R D. Friedman. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Friedman, T. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books. Bibliography { 397} Fry, M., ed. 1992. Adam Smith's Legacy. New York: Routledge. Fudenberg, D., and]. Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Fukuyama, F. 1989. "The End of History." The National Interest, summer, 3-18. ---. 1992. The End ofHistory and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton. Fulbrook, E. ed. 2003. The Crisis in Economics. London: Routledge .. Furbotn, E. G., and S. Pejovich. 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature." journal of Economic Literature. 10 (4) (December): 1137-62. Gachet, P., with comments by A. Mothe. 1994. Les 70 jours de van Gogh aAuvers.

Antiglobalization protesters gained confidence from their Seattle success, and every subsequent international economic meeting was besieged by demonstrators. Symbols of international capitalism-branches ofMcDonald's-were stoned and Culture and Prosperity { 11} even burned. Environmentalists joined these protesters in denouncing the values of modern business. So, as the new millennium dawned, the end of history seemed more, not less, distant. International relations took on a new complexity, in which a simple contrast of good and evil became a complex mixture of economics, ideology, religion, and politics. Russian living standards have fallen below the dismal levels achieved under communism, while Russian criminal oligarchs have become billionaires. And the most sinister and threatening opposition to democracy and the market came from fundamentalists who rejected not only the market economy but the values of a society that could give rise to it.


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Geek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change From the Cult of Technology by Kentaro Toyama

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Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, blood diamonds, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Cass Sunstein, cognitive dissonance, computer vision, conceptual framework, delayed gratification, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, epigenetics, Erik Brynjolfsson, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, fundamental attribution error, germ theory of disease, global village, Hans Rosling, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Khan Academy, Kibera, knowledge worker, libertarian paternalism, M-Pesa, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, microcredit, mobile money, Nicholas Carr, North Sea oil, pattern recognition, Peter Singer: altruism, Peter Thiel, post-industrial society, randomized controlled trial, rent-seeking, RFID, Richard Florida, Richard Thaler, school vouchers, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, technoutopianism, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Upton Sinclair, Walter Mischel, War on Poverty, winner-take-all economy, World Values Survey, Y2K

It will take at least another decade for India to reach America’s 1962 levels even at 7 percent year-on-year growth. 11.Park (2014) notes this statistic, which is based on data from the World Health Organization (2014). 12.Kralev (2009). 13.If the 2014 US-China climate deal was a bit of an exception, it was exactly because President Obama brought with him American willingness to cut carbon emissions. Congressman Henry Waxman said of it, “History may look back and say this was the turning point on climate” (Parsons et al. 2014). Let’s hope it sticks. 14.Figures are as posted by the US Energy Information Administration (2010) and include only CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels in 2010. 15.Francis Fukuyama (1992) contended that liberal democracy represents the “end of history” – the summit and end point of human civilization, which other nations would eventually tend toward. The thesis has been heavily criticized, not least by Fukuyama himself. 16.Asimov (1942 [1991]), p. 126. Asimov’s thinking about the laws of robotics was philosophically much deeper than presented here, though none of it changes what I’m trying to say in these paragraphs.

On issues such as gender equality, many developed countries are admirable, if still imperfect. Additional intrinsic growth would mean less material consumption and more involvement with self-transcendent ends. Other countries would likely follow. Seeking our own growth also takes the edge off paternalism. Humility is required in social causes, as privileged-world dogmas often cause damage. We should dispense with arrogant notions that we’ve reached some End of History.15 Today’s rich societies are, at best, adolescents with still a long way to go before they reach maturity. When everyone’s intrinsic growth is a common goal, relationships become closer to true partnerships. When Do We Intend to Start? Isaac Asimov was tired of dark robot stories. Tales involving what he called the “Frankenstein syndrome” always had humanity destroyed by its own creations.

Freud, Sigmund. (1962). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. James Strachey, trans. Basic Books. Fried, Barbara. (2013). Beyond blame. Boston Review, June 28, 2013, www.bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-philosophy-law. Friedman, Thomas L. (2005). The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. Penguin. Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. Fuller, Robert W. (2004). Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. New Society Publishers. Fundación Paraguaya. (n.d.). Self-sufficient school, www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py/?page_id=741. Gallup and Purdue University. (2014). Great jobs great lives: The 2014 Gallup-Purdue index report, http://products.gallup.com/168857/gallup-purdue-index-inaugural-national-report.aspx.


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Why geography matters: three challenges facing America : climate change, the rise of China, and global terrorism by Harm J. De Blij

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agricultural Revolution, airport security, Anton Chekhov, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial exploitation, complexity theory, computer age, crony capitalism, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Eratosthenes, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, illegal immigration, Internet Archive, John Snow's cholera map, Khyber Pass, manufacturing employment, megacity, Mercator projection, out of africa, RAND corporation, risk tolerance, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, special economic zone, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, UNCLOS, UNCLOS

Over the long term, therefore, think of our planet's surface as ever changing, of continents moving and the crust shaking, of oceans and seas opening and closing, of land lost by subduction and gained by eruption. And this is only one dimension of the ceaseless transformation of Earth that began 4.6 billion years ago. OCEANS PAST AND FUTURE The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to much introspection—not only political, but also philosophical and scientific—and gave rise to a spate of books signaling the onset of a new era. Their titles were often misleading, such as The End of History by Francis Fukuyama, but none more so than one by John Horgan (1996) called The End of Science, which argued that all the great questions of science had been answered and that what remained, essentially, was a filling of the gaps. When it comes to global environments, however, some great questions remain open. One of these relates to the oceans. Planet Earth today is often called the Blue Planet because more than 70 percent of its surface is covered by water and views from space are dominated by blue hues and swirls of white cloud, but in truth we do not know with any certainty how the Earth acquired its watery cloak, or exactly when.

See also specific regions and countries and geography, 10, 15 and Islam, 164 and NAFTA, 3 and population, 95-96 and terrorism, 175 Economist, 52, 95, 257 Ecuador, 120, 180 education graduate education of geographers, 6, 46 on Islam, 164 and population, 96 status of geography, X, 12, 13, 14-19 Eemian interglacial, 69, 72-73, 82, 83, 90 Egypt ancient civilization of, 128, 134,258-59 Islam in, 162, 185 terrorism, 156, 159, 161, 176 Ehriich, Paul, 93 empires, 77, 135, 138-44 The End of History (Fukuyama), 57 The End of Science (Horgan), 57 energy crises, 21,51, 132, 277-78. See also natural gas; oil England, 202. See also United Kingdom English Channel, 74 Enlai, Zhou, 125 Environmental Conservation, 15 environmental determinism, 11, 87-90 environmental issues, 6, 15, 100-101, 102, 115. See also global warming Eocene era, 55, 59, 63, 64, 64, 66 epidemiology, 6, 42-44, 43 equal-area projections in maps, 33 Equatorial Guinea, 185 Eratosthenes, 5 Eritrea, 118, 176, 184, 185 Estonia borders and boundaries, 169, 231 and European Union, 217, 218, 225, 227 language, 198, 199, 201 and NATO, 229 and Russia, 231, 234, 236 Ethiopia (formerly Abyssinia) borders and boundaries, 118, 259 colonialism, 111-12, 184 Ogaden, 184, 186, 260 population, 103 religion, 182, 184, 185, 260 wars, 266 ethnic groups and ethnic conflict.


pages: 613 words: 151,140

No Such Thing as Society by Andy McSmith

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anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, call centre, cuban missile crisis, Etonian, F. W. de Klerk, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, full employment, glass ceiling, greed is good, illegal immigration, index card, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, mortgage debt, mutually assured destruction, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, strikebreaker, The Chicago School, union organizing, upwardly mobile, urban decay, Winter of Discontent, young professional

, Woman’s Own, October 1987. 10. Handwritten draft by Margaret Thatcher for a speech to be delivered. This was also among the batch of documents released on 30 January 2010. 11. John Hills et al., An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK – Report of the National Equality Panel, Government Equalities Office, London, 2010, p. 41, p. 27. 12. The Times, 14 October 1981. 13. Francis Fukuyama’s essay ‘The End of History?’ first appeared in the magazine The National Interest in 1989. 14. She used this expression in a valedictory interview with ITN, broadcast 28 June 1991. CHAPTER 1 1. Kenneth Williams, The Kenneth Williams Diaries, edited by Russell Davies, HarperCollins, London, 1993, p. 581. 2. Lee Hall ‘Adaptation’, from the programme notes to Billy Elliott; The Musical, Victoria Palace Theatre, London, 2005. 3.

The capitalist system was more dynamic and more successful economically than its rival, but once communism took hold of a country, it seemed that nothing could turn it back. No established communist system had ever been dismantled or overthrown from within. People expected this contest between rival systems to continue indefinitely. Instead, they saw it coming to a quick, decisive and non-violent end. As communism rolled out of Eastern Europe in 1989, an American philosopher forecast that the end of history was approaching13 and that every other political system in the world would evolve into the western model of liberal capitalism. These developments were mirrored in domestic politics. Since 1945, the UK had edged towards becoming more ‘socialist’, with free medicine, free schools, state pensions and more than 40 per cent of the country’s industrial capacity owned by the state. Within the Labour Party, there was a vigorous movement led by Tony Benn to give the country another sharp push in the same direction.


pages: 394 words: 118,929

Dreaming in Code: Two Dozen Programmers, Three Years, 4,732 Bugs, and One Quest for Transcendent Software by Scott Rosenberg

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A Pattern Language, Berlin Wall, c2.com, call centre, collaborative editing, conceptual framework, continuous integration, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Hofstadter, Dynabook, en.wikipedia.org, Firefox, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Grace Hopper, Gödel, Escher, Bach, Howard Rheingold, index card, Internet Archive, inventory management, Jaron Lanier, John von Neumann, knowledge worker, life extension, Loma Prieta earthquake, Menlo Park, Merlin Mann, new economy, Nicholas Carr, Norbert Wiener, pattern recognition, Paul Graham, Potemkin village, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Stallman, Ronald Reagan, semantic web, side project, Silicon Valley, Singularitarianism, slashdot, software studies, South of Market, San Francisco, speech recognition, stealth mode startup, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, Ted Nelson, Therac-25, thinkpad, Turing test, VA Linux, Vannevar Bush, Vernor Vinge, web application, Whole Earth Catalog, Y2K

But there is one set of circumstances under which methodologies really are The Answer. This is the scenario presented by a business thinker named Nicholas Carr in a notorious May 2003 article in the Harvard Business Review titled “IT Doesn’t Matter.” Carr infuriated legions of Silicon Valley visionaries and technology executives by suggesting that their products—the entire corpus of information technology, or IT—had become irrelevant. Like Francis Fukuyama, the Hegelian philosopher who famously declared “the end of history” when the Berlin wall fell and the Soviet Union imploded, Carr argued, essentially, that software history is over, done. We know what software is, what it does, and how to deploy it in the business world, so there is nothing left but to dot the i’s and bring on the heavyweight methodologies to perfect it. Drawing comparisons from previous generations of “disruptive technologies” like railroads and electricity, Carr argued that computers and software had at first offered farsighted early adopters an opportunity to seize comparative advantage.

Over and over, those who have bet that there can be nothing new under the technology industry sun have lost their shirts. To believe that we already know all the possible uses for software is to assume that the programs we already possess satisfy all our needs and that people are going to stop seeking something better. Irate critics of software flaws like The Software Conspiracy’s Mark Minasi and skeptical analysts of the software business like Nicholas Carr share these end-of-history blinders. If you believe that we already know everything we want from software, then it’s natural to believe that with enough hard work and planning, we can perfect it—and that’s where we should place our energies. Don’t even think about new features and novel ideas; focus everyone’s energies on whittling down every product’s bug list until we can say, for the first time in history, that most software is in great shape.


pages: 406 words: 113,841

The American Way of Poverty: How the Other Half Still Lives by Sasha Abramsky

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2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, big-box store, collective bargaining, deindustrialization, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, housing crisis, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, indoor plumbing, job automation, Mark Zuckerberg, Maui Hawaii, microcredit, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, payday loans, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, Potemkin village, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, school vouchers, upwardly mobile, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, Works Progress Administration

In the halls of power in the postwar decades, a broad consensus held that one of the state’s core functions was to either slow down the destruction of markets unfettered or to subsidize the incomes and benefits of those whose livelihoods had been irrevocably damaged, or stunted from the get-go, by sweeping market changes. Skip forward forty years, however, and in many political circles that concern with addressing the needs of the worst-off, and with wrestling with markets’ imperfections, had largely vanished. In the post–Cold War world—a triumphalist environment that the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notoriously labeled “the end of history”—there were, quite simply, few to no breaks placed on the machinations of markets. The result was both a philosophical and practical breakdown in many of the networks of laws, regulatory agencies, and cultural practices designed to tame markets. The crisis that ensued is as much an existential one—of identity—as a practical economic mess. Increasingly, we have lost the language to explain exactly why market-generated inequality is a problem—and, by extension, why widespread poverty poses a challenge to the body politic.

In the Appalachian region, the professor noted, “it’s pretty common the poverty rate is 25 percent in any given year. We have a large population who are poor; economic opportunities are few and far between. On a year-to-year basis they’re going to have a lot of uncertainty trying to make long-term plans. Employment in Eastern Kentucky for men 25 to 60: about 65 percent are employed; nationally it’s about 85.” MARKETS RUN AMOK, SHIVERING IN THE RAINFOREST, AND THE END OF HISTORY Regional development alone, however, won’t be enough. After all, some problems, such as the massive growth in unemployment seen in the post-2008 years, have national implications. To tackle them, we need to marshal energies at a federal level. There will have to be an expansion in the resources available to meet the needs of the long-term unemployed and jobless, as well as resources to keep the short-term unemployed out of poverty and to preserve the assets of the working and middle classes during particularly acute economic downturns.


pages: 510 words: 120,048

Who Owns the Future? by Jaron Lanier

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3D printing, 4chan, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, augmented reality, automated trading system, barriers to entry, bitcoin, book scanning, Burning Man, call centre, carbon footprint, cloud computing, computer age, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, David Graeber, delayed gratification, digital Maoism, en.wikipedia.org, facts on the ground, Filter Bubble, financial deregulation, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, global supply chain, global village, Haight Ashbury, hive mind, if you build it, they will come, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, Jacquard loom, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Kevin Kelly, Khan Academy, Kickstarter, Kodak vs Instagram, life extension, Long Term Capital Management, Mark Zuckerberg, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, obamacare, packet switching, Peter Thiel, place-making, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, post-oil, pre–internet, race to the bottom, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reversible computing, Richard Feynman, Richard Feynman, Ronald Reagan, self-driving car, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, smart meter, stem cell, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Stewart Brand, Ted Nelson, The Market for Lemons, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Turing test, Vannevar Bush, WikiLeaks

Lana Wachowski, cowriter and director of the Matrix movies, described a later project, Cloud Atlas, as residing between “the future idea that everything is fragmented and the past idea that there is a beginning, middle, and end.”1 As the turn of the millennium approached, such declarations were commonplace (as in the monologue of the “world’s oldest Bolshevik” in Tony Kushner’s play Perestroika, or aspects of Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of History—both from 1992), but it’s odd that we can still hear them today even from the most tech-oriented writers and thinkers. You won’t find any such point of view within tech circles, however. There, one is immersed in a clear-enough dominant narrative. Everything is becoming more and more software-mediated, physicality is becoming more mutable by technology, and reality is being optimized.

., 18, 137 differential pricing, 63–64 digital cameras, 2 digital networks, 2–3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19–21, 31, 35, 49, 50–51, 53, 54–55, 56, 57, 59, 60–61, 66–67, 69–71, 74, 75, 77–80, 92, 96, 99, 107–8, 118–19, 120, 122, 129–30, 133n, 136–37, 143–48, 192, 199, 209, 221–30, 234, 235, 245–51, 259, 277, 278, 286–87, 308–9, 316, 337, 345, 349, 350, 355, 366–67 design of, 40–45 educational, 92–97 effects, 99, 153, 169–74, 179, 181–82, 183, 186, 207, 305, 362–63, 366 elite, 15, 31, 54–55, 60, 122, 201 graph-shaped, 214, 242–43 medical, 98–99 nodes of, 156, 227, 230, 241–43, 350 power of, 147–49, 167 punishing vs. rewarding, 169–74, 182, 183 tree-shaped, 241–42, 243, 246 see also Internet digital rights movement, 225–26 digital technology, 2–3, 7–8, 15–16, 18, 31, 40, 43, 50–51, 132, 208 dignity, 51–52, 73–74, 92, 209, 239, 253–64, 280, 319, 365–66 direct current (DC), 327 disease, 110 disenfranchisement, 15–16 dossiers, personal, 109, 318 dot-com bubble, 186, 301 double-blind tests, 112 Drexler, Eric, 162 DSM, 124n dualism, 194–95 Duncan, Isadora, 214 Dyson, George, 192 dystopias, 130, 137–38 earthquakes, 266 Eastern Religion, 211–17 eBay, 173, 176, 177n, 180, 241, 343 eBooks, 113, 246–47, 352–60 eBureau, 109 economic avatars, 283–85, 302, 337–38 economics, 1–3, 15, 22, 37, 38, 40–41, 42, 67, 122, 143, 148–52, 153, 155–56, 204, 208, 209, 236, 259, 274, 288, 298–99, 311, 362n, 363 economies: austerity in, 96, 115, 125, 151, 152, 204, 208 barter system for, 20, 57 collusion in, 65–66, 72, 169–74, 255, 350–51 competition in, 42, 60, 81, 143–44, 147, 153, 180, 181, 187–88, 246–48, 326 consumer, 16–17, 43, 54, 56n, 62, 63–65, 72–74, 85–86, 98, 114, 117, 154, 162, 173–74, 177, 179–80, 182, 192, 193, 215, 216, 223, 227, 241, 246, 247, 248–64, 271–72, 273, 286–88, 293, 323, 347–48, 349, 355–56, 357, 358–60 depressions in, 69–70, 75, 135, 151–52, 288, 299 dignity in, 51–52, 73–74, 92, 209, 239, 253–64, 280, 319, 365–66 distributions in, 37–45 of education, 92–97 efficiency in, 39, 42–43, 53, 61, 66–67, 71–74, 88, 90, 97, 118, 123, 155, 176n, 187–88, 191, 236, 246, 310, 349 entrepreneurial, 14, 57, 79, 82, 100–106, 116, 117–20, 122, 128, 148–49, 166, 167, 183, 200, 234, 241–43, 248, 274, 326, 359 equilibrium in, 148–51 financial sector in, 7n, 29–31, 35, 38, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56–67, 69–70, 74–80, 82, 115, 116–20, 148n, 153–54, 155, 179–85, 200, 208, 218, 254, 257, 258, 277–78, 298, 299–300, 301, 336–37, 344–45, 348, 350 freedom and, 32–33, 90–92, 277–78, 336 global, 33n, 153–56, 173, 201, 214–15, 280 government oversight of, 44, 45–46, 49, 79–80, 96, 151–52, 158, 199, 205–6, 234–35, 240, 246, 248–51, 299–300, 307, 317, 341, 345–46, 350–51 growth in, 32, 43–45, 53–54, 119, 149–51, 236, 256–57, 270–71, 274–75, 291–94, 350 of health care, 98–99, 100, 153–54 historical analysis of, 29–31, 37–38, 69–70 humanistic, 194, 209, 233–351 361–367 of human labor, 85, 86, 87, 88, 99–100, 257–58, 292 identity in, 82, 283–90, 305, 306, 307, 315–16 inclusiveness of, 291–94 information, 1–3, 8–9, 15–17, 18, 19–20, 21, 35, 60–61, 92–97, 118, 185, 188, 201, 207, 209, 241–43, 245–46, 246–48, 256–58, 263, 283–87, 291–303, 331, 361–67 leadership in, 341–51 legal issues for, 49, 74–78 levees in, 43–45, 46, 47, 48, 49–50, 52, 92, 94, 96, 98, 108, 171, 176n, 224–25, 239–43, 253–54, 263, 345 local advantages in, 64, 94–95, 143–44, 153–56, 173, 203, 280 market, 16–17, 20, 23–24, 33–34, 38, 39, 43–46, 47, 50–52, 66–67, 75, 108, 118–19, 126, 136, 143, 144–48, 151–52, 155, 156, 167, 202, 207, 221–22, 240, 246–48, 254–57, 261, 262–63, 266, 277–78, 288, 292–93, 297–300, 318, 324, 326, 329, 344, 354, 355–56; see also capitalism mathematical analysis of, 40–41 models of, 40–41, 148–52, 153, 155–56 monopolies in, 60, 65–66, 169–74, 181–82, 187–88, 190, 202, 326, 350 morality and, 29–34, 35, 42, 50–52, 54, 71–74, 252–64 Nelsonian, 335, 349–50 neutrality in, 286–87 optimization of, 144–47, 148, 153, 154–55, 167, 202, 203 outcomes in, 40–41, 144–45 political impact of, 21, 47–48, 96, 149–51, 155, 167, 295–96 pricing strategies in, 1–2, 43, 60–66, 72–74, 145, 147–48, 158, 169–74, 226, 261, 272–75, 289, 317–24, 331, 337–38 productivity of, 7, 56–57, 134–35 profit margins in, 59n, 71–72, 76–78, 94–95, 116, 177n, 178, 179, 207, 258, 274–75, 321–22 public perception of, 66n, 79–80, 149–50 recessions in, 31, 54, 60, 76–77, 79, 151–52, 167, 204, 311, 336–37 regulation of, 37–38, 44, 45–46, 49–50, 54, 56, 69–70, 77–78, 266n, 274, 299–300, 311, 321–22, 350–51 risk in, 54, 55, 57, 59–63, 71–72, 85, 117, 118–19, 120, 156, 170–71, 179, 183–84, 188, 242, 277–81, 284, 337, 350 scams in, 119–21, 186, 275n, 287–88, 299–300 self-destructive, 60–61 social aspect of, 37–38, 40, 148–52, 153, 154–56 stimulus methods for, 151–52 sustainable, 235–37, 285–87 transformation of, 280–94, 341–51 trust as factor in, 32–34, 35, 42, 51–52 value in, 21, 33–35, 52, 61, 64–67, 73n, 108, 283–90, 299–300, 321–22, 364 variables in, 149–50 vendors in, 71–74 Edison, Thomas, 263, 327 editors, 92 education, 92–97, 98, 120, 150, 201 efficiency, 39, 42–43, 53, 61, 66–67, 71–74, 88, 90, 97, 118, 123, 155, 176n, 187–88, 191, 236, 246, 310, 349 Egypt, 95 eHarmony, 167–68 Einstein, Albert, 208n, 364 elderly, 97–100, 133, 269, 296n, 346 elections, 202–4, 249, 251 electricity, 131, 327 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 184 “elevator pitch,” 233, 342, 361 Eloi, 137 employment, 2, 7–8, 11, 22, 56–57, 60, 71–74, 79, 85–106, 117, 123, 135, 149, 151–52, 178, 201, 234, 257–58, 321–22, 331, 343 encryption, 14–15, 175, 239–40, 305–8, 345 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 338 End of History, The (Fukuyama), 165 endoscopes, 11 end-use license agreements (EULAs), 79–82, 314 energy landscapes, 145–48, 152, 209, 336, 350 energy sector, 43, 55–56, 90, 144, 258, 301–3 Engelbart, Doug, 215 engineering, 113–14, 120, 123–24, 157, 180, 192, 193, 194, 217, 218, 248, 272, 286n, 326, 342, 362–63 Enlightenment, 35, 255 enneagrams, 124n, 215 Enron Corp., 49, 74–75 entertainment industry, 7, 66, 109, 120, 135, 136, 185–86, 258, 260 see also mass media entrepreneurship, 14, 57, 79, 82, 100–106, 116, 117–20, 122, 128, 148–49, 166, 167, 183, 200, 234, 241–43, 248, 274, 326, 359 entropy, 55–56, 143, 183–84 environmental issues, 32 equilibrium, 148–51 Erlich, Paul, 132 est, 214 Ethernet, 229 Etsy, 343 Europe, 45, 54, 77, 199 evolution, 131, 137–38, 144, 146–47 exclusion principle, 181, 202 Expedia, 65 experiments, scientific, 112 experts, 88, 94–95, 124, 133–34, 178, 325–31, 341, 342 externalization, 59n Facebook, 2, 8, 14, 20, 56–57, 93, 109, 154, 169, 171, 174, 180, 181, 188, 190–91, 200n, 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 214, 215, 217, 227, 242–43, 246, 248, 249, 251, 270, 280, 286, 306, 309, 310, 313, 314, 317, 318, 322, 326, 329, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347–48, 366 facial recognition, 305n, 309–10 factories, 43, 85–86, 88, 135 famine, 17, 132 Fannie Mae, 69 fascism, 159–60 fashion, 89, 260 feedback, 112, 162, 169, 203, 298, 301–3, 363–64, 365 fees, service, 81, 82 feudalism, 79 Feynman, Richard, 94 file sharing, 50–52, 61, 74, 78, 88, 100, 223–30, 239–40, 253–64, 277, 317–24, 335, 349 “filter bubbles,” 225, 357 filters, 119–20, 200, 225, 356–57 financial crisis (2008), 76–77, 115, 148n financial services, 7n, 29–31, 35, 38, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56–67, 69–70, 74–80, 82, 115, 116–20, 148n, 153–54, 155, 179–85, 200, 208, 218, 254, 257, 258, 277–78, 298, 299–300, 301, 336–37, 344–45, 348, 350 firewalls, 305 first-class economic citizens, 246, 247, 248–51, 273, 286–87, 323, 349, 355–56 Flightfox, 64 fluctuations, 76–78 flu outbreaks, 110, 120 fMRI, 111–12 food supplies, 17, 123, 131 “Fool on the Hill, The,” 213 Ford, Henry, 43 Ford, Martin, 56n Forster, E.


pages: 449 words: 127,440

Moscow, December 25th, 1991 by Conor O'Clery

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Anton Chekhov, Berlin Wall, central bank independence, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Doomsday Clock, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, haute couture, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, Sinatra Doctrine, The Chicago School

It is a stupendous moment in the story of humankind, the end of a millennium of Russian and Soviet Empire, and the beginning of Russia’s national and state renaissance. It signals the final defeat of the twentieth century’s two totalitarian systems, Nazi fascism and Soviet communism, which embroiled the world in the greatest war in history. It is the day that allows American conservatives to celebrate—prematurely—the prophecy of the philosopher Francis Fukuyama that the collapse of the USSR will mark the “end of history,” with the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Mikhail Gorbachev created the conditions for the end of totalitarianism, and Boris Yeltsin delivered the death blow. But neither is honored in Russia in modern times as a national hero, nor is the date of the transfer of power formally commemorated in Moscow. Contemporary leaders discourage any celebration of December 25, 1991.


pages: 543 words: 147,357

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society by Will Hutton

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Andrei Shleifer, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Benoit Mandelbrot, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, capital controls, carbon footprint, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, centre right, choice architecture, cloud computing, collective bargaining, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, debt deflation, decarbonisation, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of DNA, discovery of the americas, discrete time, diversification, double helix, Edward Glaeser, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, first-past-the-post, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, George Akerlof, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, Growth in a Time of Debt, Hyman Minsky, I think there is a world market for maybe five computers, income inequality, inflation targeting, interest rate swap, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Dyson, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, labour market flexibility, Long Term Capital Management, Louis Pasteur, low-wage service sector, mandelbrot fractal, margin call, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, millennium bug, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, open economy, Plutocrats, plutocrats, price discrimination, private sector deleveraging, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, railway mania, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Rory Sutherland, shareholder value, short selling, Silicon Valley, Skype, South Sea Bubble, Steve Jobs, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Myth of the Rational Market, the payments system, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, unpaid internship, value at risk, Washington Consensus, working poor, éminence grise

In November Bill Clinton strode to victory in the American presidential election by promising to combine Republican toughness on welfare reform and rigour on tackling the budget deficit with Democratic promises on expanding healthcare entitlements and improving training. Intervention in the economy was determinedly out. The world had decided that markets, free enterprise and globalisation ruled. Francis Fukuyama captured the zeitgeist with his book The End of History and the Last Man, declaring that the ideological pitched battles that had punctuated world history were over because liberal democracy and capitalism had emphatically won and their efficiency could not now be contested. There was only one future. For Labour politicians confronting the prospect of another five years in opposition, bitter truths had to be learned.


pages: 566 words: 163,322

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World by Ruchir Sharma

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3D printing, Asian financial crisis, backtesting, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business climate, business process, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, central bank independence, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate governance, crony capitalism, currency peg, dark matter, debt deflation, deglobalization, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, Elon Musk, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, inflation targeting, Internet of things, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, labor-force participation, Malacca Straits, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, megacity, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, mittelstand, moral hazard, New Economic Geography, North Sea oil, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, pattern recognition, Peter Thiel, pets.com, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, price stability, Productivity paradox, purchasing power parity, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, rent-seeking, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Shenzhen was a fishing village, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, Snapchat, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spectrum auction, Steve Jobs, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Malthus, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, unorthodox policies, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce, working-age population

Writers raced to explain this outburst of unrest in the summer of 2013, and all focused on the middle-class protesters, not the stale regimes they were targeting. A Washington Post team identified the “middle-class rage” of societies that “are now demanding more.” A New York Times writer began his piece in an upscale restaurant in the Istanbul suburbs, where he saw a revolt of “the rising classes” and of the “educated haves” who had benefited most from the regimes they had come to reject. The Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama spotted a “middle-class revolution” of tech-savvy youths. These were rich stories, well told, but the growing middle class was not a harbinger of the coming protests. Yes, the middle class was growing in the protest-stricken nations, but it was growing in many other countries as well. Over the previous fifteen years, in twenty-one of the largest emerging nations, the middle-class population had expanded by an average of 18 percentage points as a share of the total population, to a bit more than half.3 The protests, however, had erupted in nations where the middle class had grown very fast, such as Russia (up 63 percentage points) and quite slowly, such as South Africa (up 5 percentage points).

“Some Cracks in the Cult of Technocrats.” New York Times, May 23, 2013. Friedman, Thomas. “The Other Arab Awakening.” New York Times, November 30, 2013. Fry, Richard, and Rakesh Kochhar. “America’s Wealth Gap between Middle-Income and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record,” Pew Research Center, December 17, 2014. Fukuyama, Francis. “The Middle Class Revolution.” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2013. ——. “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy.” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014. Garman, Christopher. “New Voices vs. Old Leaders: How the Middle Class Is Reshaping EM Politics.” Eurasia Group, July 2013. ——. “Emerging Markets Strategy.” Eurasia Group, November 2014. Global Emerging Markets Equity Team. “Tales from the Emerging World: The Myths of Middle-Class Revolution.” Morgan Stanley Investment Management.


pages: 422 words: 113,830

Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism by Kevin Phillips

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algorithmic trading, asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, Black Swan, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, collateralized debt obligation, computer age, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, currency peg, diversification, Doha Development Round, energy security, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Gilder, housing crisis, Hyman Minsky, imperial preference, income inequality, index arbitrage, index fund, interest rate derivative, interest rate swap, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, large denomination, Long Term Capital Management, market bubble, Martin Wolf, Menlo Park, mobile money, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, mortgage debt, new economy, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, Plutocrats, plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, Renaissance Technologies, reserve currency, risk tolerance, risk/return, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, The Chicago School, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route

House of Representatives, envisioned a politics in which major questions could be resolved by asking “our major multinational corporations for advice.” Technology guru George Gilder theologized that “it is the entrepreneurs who know the rules of the world and the laws of God.” Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, enthused, “International finance has turned the world into a parliamentary system” that allows initiates “to vote every hour, every day through their mutual funds, their pension funds, their brokers.” Even historian Francis Fukuyama, normally sober, burbled that “liberal democracy combined with open market economics has become the only model a state could follow.”1 The Holy Grail had rarely been pursued with more passion than market-bewitched academicians brought to seeking financial capitalism’s roots in furthest antiquity. Dissatisfied that Max Weber and others had pursued the economic origins of the market back only to the era of Calvin and Luther, zealots figuratively competed to find its antecedents in the hills around Lascaux or the Great Rift Valley.

In China, with its $1.4 trillion holdings, comments on how Beijing might or might not view the anemic U.S. currency sometimes came from officials of leading Communist Party bodies.2 Something went wrong in the 1990s after “the fall of Communism”; somebody forgot to explain the New World Order to the Russians and the Chinese. Instead, Anglo-Saxon speculative capitalism—in a grand misreading that may yet turn out to match the cupidity of the French Bourbons in 1789—decided to celebrate “the end of history” and the perceived vacuum of serious economic rivalry by staging the largest-ever orgy of debt and credit. If history had ended, thereby assuring the triumphal invulnerability of asset-backed securities and structured investment vehicles, well, then, let ’em roll. Of course, we now know that history had not ended; the muse had merely started learning Mandarin, Hindi, and Arabic, rereading Karl Polanyi and Hyman Minsky, and pondering what might befall a leading world economic power that so worshipped its markets as to entrust them to hedge funds, bad quantitative mathematics, and banks like Citigroup.


pages: 475 words: 149,310

Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire by Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri

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affirmative action, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, conceptual framework, David Graeber, Defenestration of Prague, deskilling, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, global village, Howard Rheingold, Howard Zinn, illegal immigration, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, land tenure, late capitalism, means of production, Naomi Klein, new economy, private military company, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, Richard Stallman, Slavoj Žižek, The Chicago School, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, transaction costs, union organizing, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

Patrick Camiller (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 3 See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Robert Harvey, Global Disorder: America and the Threat of World Conflict (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003). 4 Two influential examples that link capitalist democracy and U.S. hegemony are Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 5 See the National Security Strategy document released by the White House in September 2002. One of the most widely discussed arguments for unilateral U.S. power is Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). 6 Michael Hirsh, At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 254.


pages: 331 words: 60,536

The Sovereign Individual: How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare State by James Dale Davidson, Rees Mogg

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affirmative action, agricultural Revolution, bank run, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, borderless world, British Empire, California gold rush, clean water, colonial rule, Columbine, compound rate of return, Danny Hillis, debt deflation, ending welfare as we know it, epigenetics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, feminist movement, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Gilder, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, information retrieval, Isaac Newton, Kevin Kelly, market clearing, Martin Wolf, Menlo Park, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, Parkinson's law, pattern recognition, phenotype, price mechanism, profit maximization, rent-seeking, reserve currency, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, school vouchers, seigniorage, Silicon Valley, spice trade, statistical model, telepresence, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Turing machine, union organizing, very high income

The Great Unanswered Question This brings us to one of the great unanswered puzzles of modern history: why the Cold War that came at the conclusion of the Great Power system pitted as its final contenders Communist dictatorships against welfare-state democracies. This issue has been so little examined that it actually seemed plausible to many when a State Department analyst, Francis Fukuyama, proclaimed "the end of history" after the Berlin Wall fell. The enthusiastic audience his work elicited took too much for granted. Apparently neither the author nor many others had bothered to ask a fundamental question: What common characteristics of state socialism and welfare-state democracies led them to be the final contenders for world domination? This is an important issue. After all, dozens of contending systems of sovereignty have come and gone in the past five centuries, including absolute monarchies, tribal enclaves, prince-bishoprics, direct rule by the pope, sultanates, city-states, and Anabaptist colonies.


pages: 1,351 words: 385,579

The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined by Steven Pinker

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1960s counterculture, affirmative action, Alan Turing: On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Albert Einstein, availability heuristic, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, British Empire, Broken windows theory, California gold rush, Cass Sunstein, citation needed, clean water, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, Columbine, computer age, conceptual framework, correlation coefficient, correlation does not imply causation, crack epidemic, cuban missile crisis, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, delayed gratification, demographic transition, desegregation, Doomsday Clock, Douglas Hofstadter, Edward Glaeser, en.wikipedia.org, European colonialism, experimental subject, facts on the ground, failed state, first-past-the-post, Flynn Effect, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, fudge factor, full employment, ghettoisation, Gini coefficient, global village, Henri Poincaré, impulse control, income inequality, informal economy, invention of the printing press, Isaac Newton, lake wobegon effect, libertarian paternalism, loss aversion, Marshall McLuhan, McMansion, means of production, mental accounting, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, Peter Singer: altruism, QWERTY keyboard, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, Republic of Letters, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Saturday Night Live, security theater, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, South China Sea, statistical model, stem cell, Steven Levy, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, theory of mind, transatlantic slave trade, transatlantic slave trade, Turing machine, ultimatum game, uranium enrichment, V2 rocket, Walter Mischel, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

The story can be told in titles and dates: Werner Levi’s The Coming End of War (1981), John Gaddis’s “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System” (1986), Kalevi Holsti’s “The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?” (1986), Evan Luard’s The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics (1988), John Mueller’s Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (1989), Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” (1989), James Lee Ray’s “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War” (1989), and Carl Kaysen’s “Is War Obsolete?” (1990).154 In 1988 the political scientist Robert Jervis captured the phenomenon they were all noticing: The most striking characteristic of the postwar period is just that—it can be called “postwar” because the major powers have not fought each other since 1945.

Two highly publicized rallies in the nation’s capital, one organized by black men, one by white, affirmed the obligation of men to support their children: Louis Farrakhan’s Million Man March, and a march by the Promise Keepers, a conservative Christian movement. Though both movements had unsavory streaks of ethnocentrism, sexism, and religious fundamentalism, their historical significance lay in the larger recivilizing process they exemplified. In The Great Disruption, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes that as rates of violence went down in the 1990s, so did most other indicators of social pathology, such as divorce, welfare dependency, teenage pregnancy, dropping out of school, sexually transmitted disease, and teenage auto and gun accidents.181 The recivilizing process of the past two decades is not just a resumption of the currents that have swept the West since the Middle Ages.

Valentino notes that no small part of the decline of genocide is the decline of communism, and thus “the single most important cause of mass killing in the twentieth century appears to be fading into history.”171 Nor is it likely that it will come back into fashion. During its heyday, violence by Marxist regimes was justified with the saying “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.”172 The historian Richard Pipes summarized history’s verdict: “Aside from the fact that human beings are not eggs, the trouble is that no omelet has emerged from the slaughter.”173 Valentino concludes that “it may be premature to celebrate ‘the end of history,’ but if no similarly radical ideas gain the widespread applicability and acceptance of communism, humanity may be able to look forward to considerably less mass killing in the coming century than it experienced in the last.”174 On top of that singularly destructive ideology were the catastrophic decisions of a few men who took the stage at particular moments in the 20th century. I have already mentioned that many historians have joined the chorus “No Hitler, no Holocaust.”175 But Hitler was not the only tyrant whose obsessions killed tens of millions.


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The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War by Norman Stone

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affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, British Empire, central bank independence, Deng Xiaoping, desegregation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, European colonialism, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, illegal immigration, income per capita, interchangeable parts, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, labour mobility, land reform, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, new economy, North Sea oil, oil shock, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, special drawing rights, Steve Jobs, strikebreaker, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, trade liberalization, trickle-down economics, V2 rocket, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War, éminence grise

But in 1983 the Third World was not working out as intended. Iran had gone very badly wrong. So had the invasion of Afghanistan. And two very vulnerable places, Chile and Turkey, had shown that the Soviet formula was quite misplaced. The eighties economy was defeating not just Marx, but Lenin and Mao Tsetung as well. The most characteristic book of the eighties was written not long after the decade ended, Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992). The title seemed funny when the book appeared, and seemed even funnier afterwards, but it was not senseless. The claim (a quote from Hegel) was that democracy and capitalism (‘free markets’) had spread from period to period after the Second World War, that dictatorships, Communism, wars, etc. would be things of the past, and that the world would move more and more in the direction of, say, Denmark.

He braved extreme unpopularity, deserved well of the Republic, and received the best sort of flattery, in that there are now two dozen imitations of Bilkent in Turkey, and private universities all over the European area. America in a Turkish mirror made for a contrast with Chile. In Chile there was a general in charge, and there were no elections for ten years while Chicago economists sorted things out. Then she experienced the end of history. Turkey did not, although there was a brave try. There, the army did not want formal power: no Pinochet. It was happier with professors of Political Science, and wanted figureheads. Turhan Feyzioğlu had thought that he would be indispensable to the generals, as an old, reliable republican alternative to the wayward Ecevit. There, he was wrong: this was a military coup with a big difference.

Fortunelist Foster, William Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilization Fouchet, Christian Fourier, Charles Fowler, Henry France: agriculture aircraft industry and Algerian oil Algerian war aristocracy austerity programmes automobile industry balance of payments banking system Bibliothèque Nationale bicentenary of Revolution birth rates bourgeoisie Catholic Church Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) civil service Code Napoléon colonies Communist Party cultural institutions currency controls Depression (1930s) and division of Germany economic recovery and success education system (see also universities) and EEC/EU and Egypt election of 1958 and establishment of NATO and European Defence Community Fifth Republic, establishment of film industry First World War Fourth Republic, fall of franc fort Franco-German reconciliation Free French gold reserves ‘Grand Schools’ and Helsinki conference (1975) immigration imports Indo-China war industrial unrest inflation intelligentsia and Kurdish nationalism and Marshall Plan Marxism Monnet Plan nationalization of industry Nazi occupation nuclear power nuclear weapons peasantry pieds noirs Popular Front post-war claims to German resources post-war shortages and rationing productivity levels protectionism republicanism resistance to American cultural domination Revolution (1789-99) revolution of 1830 revolution of 1848 and Romania Second Empire and spread of Marxism Stavisky scandal (1934) steel production strikes student demonstrations (1968) and Suez crisis and ‘Swedish model’ technological developments television theatre Third Republic trade unions unemployment universities UNR (Union pour la Nouvelle République) Vichy government war damage withdrawal from NATO military command zone of occupation in Germany Franco, Francisco Frankfurt Frankfurt School Free Democrats (German; FDP) Free French freeways French Foreign Legion French language: anglicization of attempts to promote in Belgium French Revolution bicentenary Friedan, Betty, The Feminine Mystique Friedman, Milton ‘Fritalux’ (proposed European free-trade area) Frum, David Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History Fulbright, J. William Fumaroli, Marc G7 (group of industrial nations) G10 (group of industrial nations) Gaddafi, Muammar al Gagarin, Yuri Gage, Nicholas, Eleni Gaillard, Félix Galata Galbraith, John Kenneth Affluent Society Galkovskiy, V. N. Galtieri, Leopoldo Galtung, Johan Galvani, Luigi Gandhi, Mahatma Gansel, Norbert GAP (South-Eastern Anatolia Project) Garaudy, Roger gas, natural Gates, William ‘Bill’ GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Gaulle, Charles de see de Gaulle, Charles Gavras, Costa Gdańsk Gencer, Leyla Genentech (biotechnology corporation) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) General Electric General Motors Geneva Geneva conference (1954) Geneva conference (1958) Genghiz Khan Genscher, Hans-Dietrich George II, King of Greece Georgia Gerasimov, Gennady German Customs Union (Zollverein) German Democratic Republic see East Germany German empire German language, anglicization of Germany, Weimar Republic Germany, Nazi: Allied bombing of capitulation concentration camps eugenics exports inflation invasion of Greece invasion of USSR local political supervisors protectionism reduction of unemployment rise of Nazis war criminals Germany, post-war occupied: Allied occupation zones (‘Bizonia’/‘Trizonia’) ‘Bank of German Lands’ black market bomb damage Christian Democrats coal production Communist Party Communist takeover in east currency reform division exports inflation and Marshall Plan prisoners of war in USSR reparations shortages Social Democrats Soviet occupation zone steel production territorial losses trade unions winter weather of 1946-7 see also East Germany; West Germany Germany, reunified Germinal (film) Gerő, Ernő Gerschenkron, Alexander Ghana Ghibellines Giap, Vo Nguyen Gielgud, Sir John Gierek, Edward Gillette (corporation) Gillingham, John Ginsborg, Paul Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry Gladstone, William Ewart Glasgow High School Royal Technical College glasnost Glotz, Peter Glubb Pasha Godesberg program (German SPD) Godley, Wynne Gogol, Nikolai, Dead Souls Gold Coast Gold Standard Golden Bull (1356) Golden Ring (Russia) Goldsmith, Sir James Goldwater, Barry Gomułka, Władysław Gone With the Wind (film) Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge Gorbachev, Mikhail: and Afghan war anti-alcohol campaign background and character and collapse of East Germany and coup of August 1991 elected General Secretary glasnost and perestroyka international reputation Malta summit (1989) meeting with Margaret Thatcher (1984) ‘our common European home’ and Poland Gordievsky, Oleg Goths Gottwald, Klement Gow, Ian Goytisolo, Juan Gramsci, Antonio Great Britain see Britain Great Society (Johnson) failure of Greece: backwardness civil war Colonels’ coup (1967) Communists and Cyprus EEC membership intelligentsia and Kurdish nationalism nation statehood Nazi occupation nineteenth-century history Ottoman Empire peasantry Second World War strategic importance US aid and war in Afghanistan war with Turkey (1919-22) Greek diaspora Greek Orthodox Church Greene, Graham The Comedians Greer, Germaine The Female Eunuch Grenada Gromyko, Andrey Gross, John Gruchko, Viktor Guantanamo (US naval base) Guardian (newspaper) Guatemala Gudenus, Count Guelfs Guevara, Ernesto ‘Che’ cult of Guillaume, Günter Guillén, Nicolás Gulf (oil company) Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964) Gulf War (1990-91) Gummer, John Gürsel, Cemal gypsies Hacı Bektaş Haig, Alexander Hailufeng soviet Haiphong Haiti Halberstam, David Halifax, E.


pages: 1,309 words: 300,991

Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations by Norman Davies

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anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Celtic Tiger, Corn Laws, en.wikipedia.org, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, labour mobility, land tenure, Mikhail Gorbachev, oil rush, oil shale / tar sands, Red Clydeside, Ronald Reagan, Skype, special economic zone, trade route, urban renewal

Yuri Meltsev reviewing Shane, Dismantling Utopia, in Independent Review, 1 (1996). 80. See Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Oxford, 2006). 81. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1997); idem, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford, 2007). 82. Leonid Batkin, as quoted by Shane, Dismantling Utopia, p. 5. 83. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Threatens Both Russia and the West (London, 2007). 84. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ National Interest, 16 (1989). 85. Paul Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988). 86. Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission (London, 1995); Bill Emmott, Rivals: The Power Struggle between China, India and Japan (London, 2008); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London, 2009); Lauren Phillips, International Politics in 2030: The Transformative Power of Large Developing Countries (Bonn, 2008). 87.

Others, including Estonia, declined, and within a short time were heading eagerly towards membership both of NATO and of the European Union. The vacuum in international politics took at least a decade to fill. Some American analysts, preoccupied for the whole of their adult lives by rivalry with the Soviet Union, assumed that US-led capitalist democracy would henceforth have no more major competitors, that they had reached the ‘End of History’.84 Others concluded that the twenty-first century would be the ‘American Century’. All of this was questionable. It was just as possible to argue, as one prescient historian did in 1988, that American power had passed its peak,85 that the US lead had been squandered by a neo-conservative administration, or that the new century heralded the rise of new powers like China, India and Brazil.86 The geopolitics of the world were changing from ‘bipolar’ to polygonal.