Francis Fukuyama: the end of history

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Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq by Francis Fukuyama

Berlin Wall, business climate, colonial rule, conceptual framework, en.wikipedia.org, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Gunnar Myrdal, informal economy, land reform, microcredit, open economy, unemployed young men

In addition to several edited volumes, Flournoy has published numerous articles and reports on a variety of international security issues. She holds a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. As of July 1, 2005, he is also the director of the International Development program at SAIS. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992) has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (Free Press, 1999), and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).

Nation-Building Forum on Constructive Capitalism Francis Fukuyama, Series Editor Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq • • Edited by Francis Fukuyama The Johns Hopkins University Press • B A LT I M O R E • © 2006 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2006 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nation-building : beyond Afghanistan and Iraq / edited by Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. “Product of a conference held at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University, in April 2004”—Ack. Includes bibliographical references and index.

North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 10. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj,” Journal of Democracy 14 (July 2003): 60–74. 11. See John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli, eds., Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Development Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 12. Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building. See also the chapters by Michèle A. Flournoy and James Dobbins. 13. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 159–62. 15.


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Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

Albert Einstein, Asilomar, assortative mating, Berlin Wall, bioinformatics, Columbine, demographic transition, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Flynn Effect, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, impulse control, life extension, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, out of africa, Peter Singer: altruism, phenotype, presumed consent, Ray Kurzweil, Scientific racism, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), sexual politics, stem cell, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Turing test, twin studies

CHAPTER 1: A TALE OF TWO DYSTOPIAS 1 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 308. 2 Peter Huber, Orwell’s Revenge: The 1984 Palimpsest (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 222–228. 3 Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 35. 4 Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired 8 (2000): 238–246. 5 Tom Wolfe, “Sorry, but Your Soul Just Died,” Forbes ASAP, December 2, 1996. 6 Letter to Roger C. Weightman, June 24, 1826, in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 729–730. 7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 8 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard/Belknap, 1983). 9 On this point, see Leon Kass, “Introduction: The Problem of Technology,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur M. Melzer et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 10–14. 10 See Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” The National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1999): 16–33. CHAPTER 2: SCIENCES OF THE BRAIN 1 Quote taken from the e-biomed home page, http://www.liebertpub.com/ebi/defaulti.asp. 2 For the application of genomics to the study of the mind, see Anne Farmer and Michael J.

There are many examples of this, from reforms in post-Meiji Restoration Japan to the Internet. 32 Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 24–40. 33 Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Pantheon, 2000). 34 The intellectual landscape on the issue of group selection has recently changed somewhat with the work of biologists like David Sloan Wilson, who have made the case for multilevel (that is, both individual and group) selection. See David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 35 For an overview, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Old Age of Mankind,” in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). CHAPTER 8: HUMAN NATURE 1 Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect (Washington, D.C./Covelo, Calif.: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000), p. 330. See Francis Fukuyama, review of Ehrlich in Commentary, February 2001. 2 David L. Hull, “On Human Nature,” in David L. Hull and Michael Ruse, eds., The Philosophy of Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 387. 3 Alexander Rosenberg, for example, argues that there are no “essential” characteristics of species because all species exhibit variance, and the median point of a range of variance does not constitute an essence.

CHAPTER 9: HUMAN DIGNITY 1 Clive Staples Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Touchstone, 1944), p. 85. 2 Counsel of Europe, Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, On the Prohibiting of Cloning Human Beings, Doc. 7884, July 16, 1997. 3 This is the theme of the second part of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4 For an interpretation of this passage in Tocqueville, see Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 11–17. 5 John Paul II, “Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences,” October 22, 1996. 6 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 35–39; see also Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 40–42. 7 Michael Ruse and David L.


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Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety by Gideon Rachman

Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, BRICs, capital controls, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, currency manipulation / currency intervention, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, energy security, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, greed is good, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, laissez-faire capitalism, Live Aid, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, peak oil, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, price stability, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Sinatra Doctrine, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Myth of the Rational Market, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, zero-sum game

Quoted in Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 195. 10. DEMOCRACY: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY 1. Bloom’s book was published in 1987. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 2. Interview with the author, Washington, D.C. May 27, 2009. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, June 1989. The article was subsequently turned into a book, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 4. Ibid. 5. See for example Vince Cable, The Storm: The World Economic Crisis and What It Means (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), 3, and Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (London: Atlantic Books, 2008). 6. Fukuyama, End of History, 280. 7. Ibid., 50. 8. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 9.

The very idea of competing nation states that scramble for markets, power and resources will become passé.”23 The World Economic Forum responded to the new conventional wisdom by launching a grandiose new Global Redesign Initiative, promoted at the annual forum in Davos in January 2010.24 But where were these inspiring new examples of global cooperation to be found? In Washington, D.C., Francis Fukuyama came up with a surprising answer. Reflecting on his end-of-history thesis in 2009, twenty years after the publication of the original article, Fukuyama mused that one respect in which he might have gone wrong was that “I kind of assumed that American power would be used wisely.” In the aftermath of the Bush administration, that no longer seemed a safe assumption. And the man who twenty years earlier had been seen as the very epitome of American triumphalism argued that “the End of History was never about Reaganism, you know … the true exemplar of the End of History is the European Union, not the United States, because the European Union is trying to transcend sovereignty and power politics; it’s trying to replace that with the global rule of law, and that’s what ought to happen at the end of history.”25 In Brussels, capital of the EU, there were plenty of people who did indeed see the global economic crisis as a unique opportunity to push a distinctively European view of the world. 20 GLOBAL GOVERNMENT THE WORLD AS EUROPE The idea that the European Union might represent the culmination of world history is depressing.

But the model formed in America had failed in America. 10 DEMOCRACY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY In early 1989, Francis Fukuyama returned to the University of Chicago, his alma mater, to give a lecture. His talk was part of a series on the decline of the West, organized by his old professor Allan Bloom, author of the celebrated and gloomy conservative tract The Closing of the American Mind.1 There was only one problem. In early 1989, Fukuyama was in anything but a gloomy mood. As he later recalled, “I said I’ll give a talk, but it’s not going to be the decline of the West, it’s going to be the victory of the West. And they said, okay, fine, whatever. So I gave the talk in February of 1989.”2 The thesis that Fukuyama outlined in Chicago became famous as “the end of history.” A soft-spoken Asian-American, with an academic manner and conservative views, Fukuyama was thirty-six in 1989.


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After Europe by Ivan Krastev

affirmative action, bank run, Berlin Wall, central bank independence, clean water, conceptual framework, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, job automation, mass immigration, moral panic, open borders, post-work, postnationalism / post nation state, Silicon Valley, Slavoj Žižek, too big to fail, Wolfgang Streeck, World Values Survey, Y Combinator

Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction (New York: New York Review Books, 2016). Chapter 1 1. José Saramago, Death with Interruptions (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005). 2. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” in The National Interest, Summer 1989. 3. Ken Jowitt, “After Leninism: The New World Disorder,” Journal of Democracy 2 (Winter 1991): 11–20. Jowitt later elaborated his ideas in The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); see esp. chapters 7–9. 4. Ibid., 310. 5. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” in The National Interest, Summer 1989. 6. Harry Kreisler interview with Ken Jowitt, “Doing Political Theory,” Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley (Regents of the University of California, 2000). http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Jowitt/jowitt-con5.html. 7.

Shared memories of the Second World War, for example, have faded from view: half of all fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds in German high schools don’t even know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. As Timur Vermes’s 2011 satirical novel Look Who’s Back suggests, the question is no longer whether it’s possible for Hitler to come back; it’s whether we’d even be able to recognize him. The novel sold more than a million copies in Germany. “The end of history” that Francis Fukuyama promised us in 1989 may well have arrived, but in the perverse sense that historical experience no longer matters and few are really interested in it.6 The geopolitical rationale for European unity vanished with the Soviet Union’s collapse. And Putin’s Russia, threatening as it may be, cannot fill this existential void. Europeans today are more insecure than in the waning days of the Cold War.

[It] was not the result of a plan by the four powers that still held ultimate legal authority in divided Berlin. . . . The opening represented a dramatic instance of surprise, a moment when structures both literal and figurative crumbled unexpectedly. A series of accidents, some of them mistakes so minor that they might otherwise have been trivialities.”11 The end of communism is thus less effectively explained by Francis Fukuyama’s narrative of “the end of history” than it is by Harold Macmillan’s “events, my dear boy, events.” It is the experience of the Soviet collapse that in myriad aspects defines the way eastern Europeans perceive what is taking place today. Witnessing the political turmoil in Europe, we have a sinking feeling that we have been through this before—the only difference being that then it was their world that collapsed.


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America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy by Francis Fukuyama

affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, European colonialism, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Internet Archive, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, New Journalism, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, transaction costs, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus

As noted earlier, the long trend toward the spread of liberal democracy is the central theme of my book The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000), 14-17. 5. For a description of these models, see Kaushik Basu, Analytical Development Economics: The Less Developed Economy Revisited (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 6. See David Ekbladh, "From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation Building in U.S. Foreign Relations," and Frank Sutton, "Nation-Building in the Heyday of the Classic Development Ideology: Ford Foundation Experience in the 1950s and 1960s," in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

See realistic Wilsonian-ism Wohlstetter, Albert, 21, 31-36 Wohlstetter, Roberta, 87 Wolfowitz, Paul, 12, 14, 21, 31 Wolfson, Adam, 2 8 women's empowerment, 120 World Bank, 145, 147 World Intellectual Property Organization, 44 World Trade Organization (WTO), 44 Yushchenko, Viktor, 5 2 Zakaria, Fareed, 140 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 181 226 approach to American foreign policy through 4vhich such mistakes might be turned around — one in which the positive aspects of the neo-conservative legacy are joined with a more rfealistic view of the way American power can Ipe used around the world. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of .International Political Economy and director of the International Development Program at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has written widely on political and economic development, and his previous books include the End of History and the Last Man, a best seller and the winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize. fURE SERIES

See also Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)," Finance and Development 40, no. 2 (2003): 31-34. William R. Easterly and Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, NBER Working Paper 9106, 2002. 13. Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah, "Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development, " Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 80-94; Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, "'Stateness' First," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 (2005): 84-88. 15. For a historical overview, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 16. For the Left, see, inter alia, Vernon Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?"


Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States by Francis Fukuyama

Andrei Shleifer, Atahualpa, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, British Empire, business climate, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, creative destruction, crony capitalism, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, income per capita, land reform, land tenure, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, New Urbanism, oil shock, open economy, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, total factor productivity, trade liberalization, transaction costs, upwardly mobile, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

Domínguez is vice provost for international affairs at Harvard University, chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and Antonio Madero Professor of Mexican and Latin American Politics and Economics in the Harvard Department of Government. His most recent publications include Cuba hoy: Analizando su pasado, imaginando su futuro (2006); and, as coeditor with B. K. Kim, Between Compliance and Conflict: East Asia, Latin America, and the “New” Pax Americana (2005). Francis Fukuyama is director of the International Development Program and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Among his most salient works are The End of History and the Last Man (1992); State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004); and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006). Francisco E. González is the Riordan Roett Assistant Professor of Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H.

The Role of High-Stakes Politics in Latin America’s Development Gap, 134 Riordan Roett and Francisco E. González Part III: Institutional Factors in Latin America’s Development 7. The Latin American Equilibrium, 161 James A. Robinson 8. Do Defective Institutions Explain the Development Gap between the United States and Latin America?, 194 Francis Fukuyama 9. Why Institutions Matter: Fiscal Citizenship in Argentina and the United States, 222 Natalio R. Botana 10. Conclusion, 268 Francis Fukuyama Contributors, 297 Index, 301 xiv Contents falling behind This page intentionally left blank 1 Introduction francis fukuyama I n 1492, on the eve of the European settlement and colonization of the New World, Bolivia and Peru hosted richer and more complex civilizations than any that existed in North America. After two centuries of colonization, in 1700, per capita income in continental Latin America was $521, and it was a marginally higher $527 in what would become the United States.1 During the eighteenth century, the sugarproducing island of Cuba was far wealthier than Britain’s American colonies.

falling behind This page intentionally left blank edited by francis fukuyama FALLING BEHIND Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States 1 2008 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2008 by Francis Fukuyama Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved.


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The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, California gold rush, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, conceptual framework, correlation does not imply causation, currency manipulation / currency intervention, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, double entry bookkeeping, endogenous growth, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, invention of agriculture, invention of the printing press, Khyber Pass, land reform, land tenure, means of production, offshore financial centre, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Right to Buy, Scramble for Africa, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), spice trade, Stephen Hawking, Steven Pinker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

This is the framework in which I will resume the account of political development in Volume 2. ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man NOTES PREFACE 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 3 On redistributive economic systems in general, see Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as an Instituted Process,” in Polanyi and C.

Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 46–47. 31 Trivers, “Reciprocal Altruism.” 32 On this general topic, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), chap. 13–17. 33 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 34 Ibid., pp. 21–25. Conversely, low-status human beings often suffer from chronic depression and have been successfully treated with Prozac, Zoloft, and other so-called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which increase levels of brain serotonin. See Roger D. Masters and Michael T. McGuire, The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 10. 35 On this issue, see Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 36 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 37 Wade, Before the Dawn, pp. 16–17. 38 See R.

Three Books Against the Simoniacs (Humbert of Moyenmoutier) Three Dynasties Three Gorges Dam Three Kingdoms Tibet Tiger, Lionel Tilly, Charles Time of Troubles Timor-Leste Tocqueville, Alexis de Togo Tokugawa shogunate Tolstoy, Leo Tonga Tönnies, Ferdinand Tower of Babel, biblical story of Transoxania Transparency International Transylvania tribal societies; Arab; Chinese; European; Indian; in Latin America; law and justice in; legitimacy in; military slavery and; mitigation of conflict in; persistence to present day of; property in; religion in; state-level societies compared to; transition from or band-level organization to; Turkish; warfare and conquest by; see also kinship; lineage; specific tribes Trivers, Robert Trobriand Islands Tudors Tunisia Tuoba tribe Turcoman tribes Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turkana people Turkish Republic Turks; in Abbasid empire; in China; in Hungary; in India; in Transylvania; see also Ottoman Empire Tursun Bey Tylor, Edward Ukraine ulama Umar, Caliph Umayyad dynasty United Nations United States; accountability in; Afghanistan and; antistatist traditions in; bureaucracy in; during cold war; dysfunctional political equilibrium in; economic crises in; homicide in; invasion of Iraq by; Japan and; local governments in; military of; modernization theory in; patronage politics in; per capital spending on government services in; rule of law in; slavery in; South Korea and; taxation in Urban II, Pope urban centers, see cities Uthman, Caliph Uzbekistan Vaishyas Vanuatu Varangians Vedas Velasco, Andres Vena, King venal officeholding: in England; in France; in Russia; in Spain Venezuela Venice, republic of Vietnam Vikings Vinogradoff, Paul violence; in agrarian societies; in chimpanzee society; in China; as driver of state formation; in England; in France; in India; in prehistoric societies; property rights and; religion and; in Russia; in state of nature; see also war Vladimir, Prince Voltaire Vorontsov, Count Vrijjis, gana-sangha chiefdom of Wahhabism Wales Wallis, John Wang, Empress of China Wang family Wang Mang Wanli emperor waqfs (Muslim charity) war; civil, see civil war; counterinsurgency; financing of; institutional innovations brought on by; in Malthusian world; in Muslim states; prisoners of; religion and; state formation driven by; in state of nature; technology of; tribal; see also specific wars War and Peace (Tolstoy) Warring States period; cities during; cultural outpourings during; education and literacy during; infantry/cavalry warfare during; kinship groupings during; map of; road and canal construction during Wealth of Nations, The (Smith) Weber, Max; on bureaucracy; on charismatic authority; on feudalism; modernization theory of; on religion Wei, state of Wei Dynasty Weingast, Barry Wei state well-field system Wen, Emperor of China Wendi, Emperor of China Westphalia, Peace of Whig history White, Leslie William I, King of England William III (William of Orange), King of England Wittfogel, Karl Woolcock, Michael World Bank World Trade Organization World War I Worms, Concordat of Wrangham, Richard Wriston, Walter Wu, Emperor of China Wu Zhao (Empress Wu) Xia Dynasty Xian, Duke Xianbei tribe Xiang Yu Xiao, Duke Xiao-wen, Emperor of China Xin dynasty Xiongnu tribe Xi Xia tribe Xu, Empress of China Xun Zi Yale University Yan, Empress of China Yangdi, Emperor of China Yang family Yang Jian Yangshao period Yanomamö Indians Y chromosome Yellow Turban rebellion Ying Zheng Young Turk movement Yuan Dynasty Yuezhi Yugoslavia Yurok Indians Yushchenko, Viktor Zaire Zakaria, Fareed zemskiy sobor zero-sum games Zhang Shicheng Zhao Kuangyin Zheng He Zhongzong, Emperor of China Zhou Dynasty; bureaucracy during; Confucianism during; Eastern (see also Spring and Autumn period; Warring States period); feudalism of; Later; Mandate of Heaven and; Western Zhu Yuangzhang Zi Chan Zoloft Zoroastrianism A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Resident at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He has taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. He was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served as the deputy director in the State Department’s policy planning staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. He lives with his wife in Palo Alto, California. Copyright © 2011 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved FARRAR, STRAUS AND GIROUX 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 www.fsgbooks.com Maps copyright © 2011 by Mark Nugent Designed by Abby Kagan eISBN 9781429958936 First eBook Edition : April 2011 First edition, 2011 Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to reprint the following material: Excerpts from Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople.


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Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy by Francis Fukuyama

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, Atahualpa, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blood diamonds, British Empire, centre right, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Snowden, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, Gini coefficient, Hernando de Soto, Home mortgage interest deduction, income inequality, information asymmetry, invention of the printing press, iterative process, Kickstarter, knowledge worker, labour management system, land reform, land tenure, life extension, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, means of production, Menlo Park, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monroe Doctrine, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, new economy, open economy, out of africa, Peace of Westphalia, Port of Oakland, post-industrial society, post-materialism, price discrimination, quantitative easing, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, Silicon Valley, special economic zone, stem cell, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Vilfredo Pareto, women in the workforce, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

Wilson, Woodrow “winner-take-all” society Wolfenson, James Woolcock, Michael workers working class; conversion into middle class; voting by World Bank; Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank Institute World Values Survey World War I World War II; Japan’s defeat in Wrong, Michela Wu Zhao Xi Jinping Yamagata Aritomo Yang, Dali Yang, Hongxing Yanukovich, Viktor Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa Yemen Yrigoyen, Hipólito Yugoslavia Zaire Zakaria, Fareed Zambia Zanzibar Zenawi, Meles Zhao, Dingxin Zhou Enlai Zhu Yuangzhang Zimbabwe ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man About the Author Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has previously taught at the Paul H.

Fukuyama was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He is the author of The Origins of Political Order, The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads. He lives with his wife in California. Farrar, Straus and Giroux 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 Copyright © 2014 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved First edition, 2014 eBooks may be purchased for business or promotional use. For information on bulk purchases, please contact Macmillan Corporate and Premium Sales Department by writing to MacmillanSpecialMarkets@macmillan.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy / Francis Fukuyama. pages cm ISBN 978-0-374-22735-7 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-4299-4432-8 (e-book) 1.

This argument is made in Huntington, The Third Wave. 5. Gellner makes the comparison of European nationalism and Middle Eastern Islamism in Nations and Nationalism, pp. 75–89. A variant of this argument is also made in Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See also Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 30: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE 1. This chapter expands on Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 53–61. 2. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 124. Gellner also makes this argument in Culture, Identity, and Politics. See also Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy.” 3. See The Global Middle Class (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2009); Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); William Easterly, The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2346, 2000); Luis F.


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The Abandonment of the West by Michael Kimmage

Albert Einstein, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Charles Lindbergh, City Beautiful movement, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global pandemic, global supply chain, Gunnar Myrdal, interchangeable parts, Isaac Newton, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, Peace of Westphalia, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, RAND corporation, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, Thomas L Friedman, transatlantic slave trade, urban planning, Washington Consensus

On the publishing success of The Closing of the American Mind, see Levine, Opening of the American Mind, 6. 30. Bloom, Closing of the American Mind, 322, 320, 321, 380, 256. 31. Bloom, Closing of the American Mind, 312, 79, 382. 32. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18; and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 33. On the CIA and Nelson Mandela, see Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, 156. 34. Fukuyama, End of History, 323, 48. 35. Fukuyama, End of History, xiii, 7, 48. 36. Fukuyama, End of History, 18. 37. Fukuyama, End of History, 45. CHAPTER SIX: THE POST–COLUMBIAN REPUBLIC, 1992–2016 1. McNeill, Pursuit of Truth, 133, 136. 2. William McNeill, “Debunking Columbus,” New York Times, October 7, 1990. See Kirkpatrick Sale, The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy (New York: Knopf, 1990); and Jan Carew, Rape of Paradise: Columbus and the Birth of Racism in the Americas (New York: A&B Publishers, 1994). 3.

Kennedy’s mantra was the “new frontier,” a westward extension into modernity and outer space. The romance of the American West signaled the application of European power, technology and law outside of Europe. It was civilization on the frontier, the opposite of civilization as decadence or overrefinement, civilization honored in the breach, mythically vigorous and thrilling. (Francis Fukuyama would conclude the End of History [1992] with a long comparison of the Western triumph after 1989 and the winning of the American West in the nineteenth century.) The historical reality was distressingly at odds with Teddy Roosevelt’s Western romance: the suppression of Native peoples and the theft of their land, the crimes of civilizational entitlement and of empire. The TR-style fantasy of the West and the reality that shadowed it mixed together in Roosevelt’s larger-than-life cultural legacy.

The gravity of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.31 IN 1981 AND 1982, Francis Fukuyama, a thirty-year-old holder of a bachelor’s degree in classics and a former student of Allan Bloom at Cornell (class of ’74), held a position at the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning. He spent the following six years at the Rand Corporation working on Cold War strategy while the Cold War was rushing through its final phases. In 1989, after Reagan’s vice president George H. W. Bush had become president, Fukuyama went back to Policy Planning as its deputy director. Around this time, he was invited by the University of Chicago’s Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy to lecture on politics and history. The lecture must have gone well, for it resulted in an article. “The End of History?” was published in the summer 1989 issue of the National Interest, a neoconservative foreign-policy magazine founded in 1985.


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The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory by Andrew J. Bacevich

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, clean water, Columbian Exchange, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, gig economy, global village, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, illegal immigration, income inequality, Jeff Bezos, Kickstarter, Marshall McLuhan, mass incarceration, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Norman Mailer, obamacare, Occupy movement, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Potemkin village, price stability, Project for a New American Century, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Saturday Night Live, school choice, Silicon Valley, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, WikiLeaks

And To Whom Is He Saying It?” New York Times Magazine (October 22, 1989). 29. “Responses to Fukuyama,” National Interest (Summer 1989). 30. Strobe Talbott, “The Beginning of Nonsense,” Time (September 11, 1989). 31. For contemporaneous synopses of that debate, see Henry Allen, “The End. Or Is It? Francis Fukuyama and the Schism over His Ism,” Washington Post (September 27, 1989); and Richard Bernstein, “The End of History, Explained for the Second Time,” New York Times (December 10, 1989). 32. Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” New York Times Magazine (February 19, 2006). 3. KICKING 41 TO THE CURB 1. For a colorful contemporaneous account of Trump’s troubles, see Marie Brenner, “After the Gold Rush,” Vanity Fair (September 1990). 2. Russ Buettner and Charles V. Bagli, “How Donald Trump Bankrupted His Atlantic City Casinos, but Still Earned Millions,” New York Times (June 11, 2016). 3.

Big Thinkers An exquisitely timed depiction of that future, limning its essential contours, had only recently appeared. Just three months prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall, an article published in the National Interest, a Washington-based quarterly of meager circulation, had created among policy intellectuals a remarkable stir. The author was Francis Fukuyama, hitherto a little-known policy analyst. The title of the piece that vaulted him to instantaneous fame: “The End of History?” The cautious question mark reflected an editorial misjudgment. Given the essay’s expansive claims and eventual impact, an exclamation point would have been far more appropriate. As a milestone in American intellectual history, Fukuyama’s essay belongs in the category of writings that capture something essential about the moment in which they appear, while simultaneously shaping expectations about what lies ahead.

To those occupying (or aspiring to enter) the inner circle of power, it was self-evident that the United States should orchestrate whatever history was to follow “the end of history.” Having won, “we” were now in charge. By expounding on such expectations, Fukuyama invested them with credibility. In this way, he left an indelible mark on the emerging post–Cold War era. As had Kennan, Fukuyama himself would in time disown policies devised pursuant to his own prescriptions.32 Yet while his second thoughts are not without interest, they never really mattered. His essential contribution came in 1989 when he articulated the basis for a secular theology destined to shape American attitudes and actions for decades to come. If the post–Cold War consensus had a godfather, it was Francis Fukuyama. 3 KICKING 41 TO THE CURB As the Cold War was ending, Donald Trump had other things on his mind.


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The Retreat of Western Liberalism by Edward Luce

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, affirmative action, Airbnb, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, business cycle, call centre, carried interest, centre right, Charles Lindbergh, cognitive dissonance, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, computer age, corporate raider, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, double entry bookkeeping, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, George Santayana, gig economy, Gini coefficient, global pandemic, global supply chain, illegal immigration, imperial preference, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Jaron Lanier, knowledge economy, lateral thinking, liberal capitalism, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, moral panic, more computing power than Apollo, mutually assured destruction, new economy, New Urbanism, Norman Mailer, offshore financial centre, one-China policy, Peace of Westphalia, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, precariat, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, reshoring, Richard Florida, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, Snapchat, software is eating the world, South China Sea, Steve Jobs, superstar cities, telepresence, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, unpaid internship, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, white flight, World Values Survey, Yogi Berra

We called it progress, or rather Progress – belief in which is the closest thing the modern West has to a religion. In 1989 its schism was healed. By unifying its booming western wing with the shrivelled post-Stalinist eastern one, there was no longer any quarrel between the present and the present. Shortly before the Berlin Wall fell, Francis Fukuyama published his famous essay, ‘The End of History?’. ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War . . . but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,’ he wrote.1 Though I did not subscribe to Fukuyama’s view of the ideal society I shared his relief. A monumental roadblock had been cleared from our future. No longer would nuclear-armed ideological camps face each other across the twentieth-century bloodlands of central Europe.

Trump’s opponents must also learn to separate the man from the people who vote for him. It would be lethal malpractice to continue writing off half of society as hidebound. Someone once said that the difference between erotica and pornography is the lighting. There is an equally hazy line between illiberal democracy and autocracy. We will know the difference when we see it. NOTES Preface 1 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest (summer 1989). 2 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1941–1991 (Abacus, London, 1995). 3 Dan Jones, Magna Carta: The Birth of Liberty (Viking, New York, 2015), p. 4. 4 Interview with the author, January 2017. 5 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: And the Rise of the Rest (Penguin, New York, 2009). 6 Henry Kissinger, World Order (Penguin, New York, 2014).

Since the turn of the millennium, and particularly over the last decade, no fewer than twenty-five democracies have failed around the world, three of them in Europe (Russia, Turkey and Hungary). In all but Tunisia, the Arab Spring was swallowed by the summer heat. Is the Western god of liberal democracy failing? ‘It is an open question whether this is a market correction in democracy, or a global depression,’ Francis Fukuyama tells me.4 The backlash of the West’s middle classes, who are the biggest losers in a global economy that has been rapidly converging, but still has decades to go, has been brewing since the early 1990s. In Britain we call them the ‘left-behinds’. In France, they are the ‘couches moyennes’. In America, they are the ‘squeezed middle’. A better term is the ‘precariat’ – those whose lives are dominated by economic insecurity.


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Why Liberalism Failed by Patrick J. Deneen

David Brooks, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, mortgage debt, Nicholas Carr, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price mechanism, Ronald Reagan, shared worldview, Steven Levy, the scientific method, Thomas L Friedman, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

Robinson, Appletopia (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013). 2. Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to our Brains (New York: Norton, 2010). 3. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic, 2011). 4. Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage, 1993). 5. Ibid., 28. 6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 7. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Republic of Technology: Reflections on Our Future Community (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 5. 8. Stephen Marche, “Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?” Atlantic, May, 2012. 9. Richard H. Thomas, “From Porch to Patio,” Palimpsest, August 1975. 10.

Liberalism is credited with the cessation of religious war, the opening of an age of tolerance and equality, the expanding spheres of personal opportunity and social interaction that today culminate in globalization, and the ongoing victories over sexism, racism, colonialism, heteronormativity, and a host of other unacceptable prejudices that divide, demean, and segregate. Liberalism’s victory was declared to be unqualified and complete in 1989 in the seminal article “The End of History” by Francis Fukuyama, written following the collapse of the last competing ideological opponent.5 Fukuyama held that liberalism had proved itself the sole legitimate regime on the basis that it had withstood all challengers and defeated all competitors and further, that it worked because it accorded with human nature. A wager that was some five centuries in the making, and had been first instantiated as a political experiment by the Founders of the American liberal republic exactly two hundred years before Fukuyama’s bold claim, had panned out with unprecedented clarity in the often muddled and contested realm of political philosophy and practice.

Our popular culture seems to be a kind of electronic Cassandra, seeing the future but unable to get anyone to believe it. The culture offers entertaining prophecies born of our anxieties, and we take perverse pleasure distracting ourselves with portrayals of our powerlessness. One example of this genre of technological (as well as political) inevitability, albeit framed in a triumphalist mode, is the narrative advanced by Francis Fukuyama in his famous essay, and later book, The End of History. The book, in particular, provides a long materialist explanation of the inescapable scientific logic, driven by the need for constant advances in military technology, contributing to the ultimate rise of the liberal state. Only the liberal state, in Fukuyama’s view, could provide the environment for the open scientific inquiry that has led to the greatest advances in military devices and tactics.


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The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World by Steven Radelet

"Robert Solow", Admiral Zheng, agricultural Revolution, Asian financial crisis, bank run, Berlin Wall, Branko Milanovic, business climate, business process, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, clean water, colonial rule, creative destruction, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Doha Development Round, Erik Brynjolfsson, European colonialism, F. W. de Klerk, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Gini coefficient, global pandemic, global supply chain, income inequality, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of the steam engine, James Watt: steam engine, John Snow's cholera map, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, land reform, low skilled workers, M-Pesa, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, off grid, oil shock, out of africa, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, randomized controlled trial, Robert Gordon, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, special economic zone, standardized shipping container, Steven Pinker, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, women in the workforce, working poor

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, “The State of the State: The Global Contest for the Future of Government,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, p. 119. 3. Samuel Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 15–16, www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/IntPol/Huntington.91.Demo.3rd.pdf/. 4. Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661. 5. Alan Neuhauser, “U.S., China Reach Historic Climate Accord,” U.S. News and World Report, November 12, 2014, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/12/us-china-reach-historic-climate-change-accord. 6. Coral Davenport, “Philippines Pushes Developing Countries to Cut Their Emissions,” New York Times, December 8, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/world/americas/philippines-pushes-developing-countries-to-cut-their-emissions-.html. 7.

Praise for The Great Surge “Powerful, lucid, and revelatory, The Great Surge makes a vital argument and offers indispensable prescriptions about sustaining global economic progress into the future.” —George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund Management “Steven Radelet’s brilliant new book demonstrates how the world has actually gotten better in recent years, not by a little but by a lot. This is a careful antidote to today’s fashionable pessimism and should be read by everyone.” —Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History “With the airwaves filled with news of insurrection, desperation and stubborn diseases, this book jars you out of a cliched response. With his typical care and detail, Steve describes humanity’s greatest hits over the last twenty years—never have we lived in a time when so many are doing so well. The job surely isn’t done, but these pages provide the evidence the job can be done, if we choose to do it.”

At a time of increased media coverage, global connectivity, and flow of information, the idea that a major transformation was possible spread fast. People around the world could watch in real time as Marcos boarded a plane to flee to Hawaii, Chinese protestors stood up in Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall fell, governments in Eastern Europe collapsed, and Mandela walked out of jail. By the early 1990s, dramatic change had begun, as political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama described in his masterpiece The End of History and the Last Man: The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades.


American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup by F. H. Buckley

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrei Shleifer, Bernie Sanders, British Empire, Cass Sunstein, colonial rule, crony capitalism, desegregation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, hindsight bias, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, old-boy network, race to the bottom, Republic of Letters, reserve currency, Ronald Coase, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, wealth creators

We used to think that personal and political freedoms went together, like horse and carriage. This was called the “Washington Consensus.” When a state liberalized its economy it would create a middle class that would demand political freedom. That seemed to be what had happened in Chile, when the freemarket Pinochet regime was followed by a liberal democracy. Insofar as this pattern was spreading around the globe, it represented what Francis Fukuyama called “the end of history,” the point where the big questions of politics have been settled. The best possible kind of state is one with a free-market economy and guarantees of personal and political liberty.1 That’s as good as it gets. But now China presents us with a rival model, a “Beijing Consensus,” granting its people economic freedoms while denying them political liberty. “We’ll make you rich,” says the government.

Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2018, at http://visionofhumanity.org/ reports (accessed June 2018). 12 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 353. 13 Editorial, “The Other China Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2018. 14 Edith Sitwell, English Eccentrics (London: Folio, 1994), p. 141. 15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra II. 22, “On Self-Overcoming,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954), pp. 226–27. 16 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p. 25. 17 Melanie Mason, “Single-payer healthcare could cost $400 billion to implement in California,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2017. CHAPTER 8—BIGNESS AND FREEDOM 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1992), p. 204. 2 World Bank, State of the Poor, April 17, 2013. 3 George Orwell, “The Freedom of the Press,” unused preface to Animal Farm published in the Times Literary Supplement, September 15, 1972. 4 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Part 2, Bk. 11.6, in Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 397. 5 Others are the Polity IV measure of constitutional democracy, Tatu Vanhalen’s assessment of participatory democracy, and the measure of contested democracy provided by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues.

Frank Buckley’s new book shows how we can rein it in and help restore the Republic. —William Bennett, former Secretary of Education This is Buckley at his colorful, muckraking best—an intelligent, powerful, but depressing argument laced with humor. —Gordon S. Wood, Pulitzer Prize winner Praise for The Way Back: Restoring the Promise of America Frank Buckley marshals tremendous data and insight in a compelling study. —Francis Fukuyama Best book of the year. —Michael Anton Praise for The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America His prose explodes with energy. —James Ceasar THE LOOMING THREAT OF A NATIONAL BREAKUP American Secession F. H. BUCKLEY © 2020 by F.H. Buckley All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601, New York, New York, 10003.


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The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities by John J. Mearsheimer

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Ayatollah Khomeini, Cass Sunstein, Chelsea Manning, Clive Stafford Smith, Donald Trump, drone strike, Edward Snowden, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, invisible hand, laissez-faire capitalism, liberal world order, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Peace of Westphalia, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, Ted Kaczynski, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs

On page 692, Pinker, sounding like Fukuyama talking about the ineluctable spread of liberal democracy, writes that “many liberalizing reforms that originated in Western Europe or on the American coasts have been emulated, after a time lag, by the more conservative parts of the world.” 33. Jeremy Waldron, “How Judges Should Judge,” review of Justice in Robes, by Ronald Dworkin, New York Review of Books, August 10, 2006. 34. Quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 296, 298, 338. 35. Quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 128, 294, 332, 334. Not surprisingly, Fukuyama is even less confident today about his 1989 predictions than he was when he wrote The End of History and the Last Man in 1992. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014. 36. Stephen Holmes, “The Scowl of Minerva,” New Republic, March 23, 1992, p. 28. Dworkin and Pinker also sometimes pull back from their bold claims about where reason can take us, although not as emphatically as Fukuyama.

Until the Cold War ended, however, spreading liberal democracy always took a backseat to hard-nosed policies based on power politics, which sometimes involved overthrowing democratically elected leaders and having cozy relations with brutal autocrats. The United States, in other words, was not in a position to adopt liberal hegemony until 1989. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18. Also see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4. “The 1992 Campaign; Excerpts from Speech by Clinton on U.S. Role,” New York Times, October 2, 1992. 5. “President Discusses the Future of Iraq,” Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC, February 26, 2003. For the White House transcript see https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030226-11.html. 6.

The quotes in this paragraph are from Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, pp. 119, 145, 187, 203. To be fair, Dworkin understands that applying moral principles to hard cases will be an especially difficult task, which is why he calls his ideal judge “Hercules.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 238–40. 31. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. xii. The remaining quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” pp. 4, 5, 18. 32. The quotes in this paragraph are from Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011), pp. 182, 650, 662, 690–91. On page 692, Pinker, sounding like Fukuyama talking about the ineluctable spread of liberal democracy, writes that “many liberalizing reforms that originated in Western Europe or on the American coasts have been emulated, after a time lag, by the more conservative parts of the world.” 33.


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Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up by Philip N. Howard

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, Brian Krebs, British Empire, butter production in bangladesh, call centre, Chelsea Manning, citizen journalism, clean water, cloud computing, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, digital map, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Filter Bubble, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Google Earth, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, Internet of things, Julian Assange, Kibera, Kickstarter, land reform, M-Pesa, Marshall McLuhan, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, mobile money, Mohammed Bouazizi, national security letter, Nelson Mandela, Network effects, obamacare, Occupy movement, packet switching, pension reform, prediction markets, sentiment analysis, Silicon Valley, Skype, spectrum auction, statistical model, Stuxnet, trade route, undersea cable, uranium enrichment, WikiLeaks, zero day

And online search habits leading up to an election help predict which candidates will win.43 Around the world, being a modern politician means more than having a decent website. It means being able to work with the information infrastructure that young citizens are using to form their political identities. Ideologies, like governments, have lost much of their ability to exclusively and comprehensively frame events. Indeed, the claim of Francis Fukuyama’sEnd of History” argument is that there will be no more great ideologies because capitalism has triumphed over all of its rivals. While it may be true that there have been no great ideologies since the arrival of the civilian internet, it’s also true that when there are ideological battles, they happen online. What makes an ideology successful is its ability to prevent followers from being aware of the way public issues are being framed.

“Internet Users in the World,” Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, June 30, 2012, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 6. “Hooking up,” Economist, January 31, 2013, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571126-new-data-flows-highlight-relative-decline-west-hooking-up. 7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 8. World Affairs Council, “Press Conference” (Regent Beverly Wilshire Hotel, April 19, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May 1996): 79–91. 9. James Ball, “Meet the Seven People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security,” Guardian, February 28, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web; “Internet Society,” accessed June 16, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.org/; “ICANN,” accessed June 16, 2014, https://www.icann.org/. 10.

Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2013–2018 (San Jose, CA: Cisco, February 2014), accessed September 30, 2014, http://cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/white_paper_c11–520862.html. 25. Larry Diamond, “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 93–112. 26. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? 27. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reissue ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 28. Clive Southey, “The Staples Thesis, Common Property, and Homesteading,” Canadian Journal of Economics 11, no. 3 (1978): 547–59, doi:10.2307/134323. 29. Lita Person, Mobile Wallet (NFC, Digital Wallet) Market (Applications, Mode of Payment, Stakeholders, and Geography)—Global Share, Size, Industry Analysis, Trends, Opportunities, Growth, and Forecast, 2012–2020 (Portland, OR: Allied Market Research, November 2013), accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/mobile-wallet-market; Marion Williams, “The Regulatory Tension over Mobile Money,” Australian Banking and Finance, February 17, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/the-regulatory-tension-over-mobile-money/. 30.


pages: 585 words: 165,304

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity by Francis Fukuyama

barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate raider, creative destruction, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, double entry bookkeeping, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, George Gilder, glass ceiling, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, hiring and firing, industrial robot, Jane Jacobs, job satisfaction, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, land reform, liberal capitalism, liberation theology, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, mittelstand, price mechanism, profit maximization, RAND corporation, rent-seeking, Ronald Coase, Silicon Valley, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transaction costs, transfer pricing, traveling salesman, union organizing

Social capital is like a ratchet that is more easily turned in one direction than another; it can be dissipated by the actions of governments much more readily than those governments can build it up again. Now that the question of ideology and institutions has been settled, the preservation and accumulation of social capital will occupy center stage. NOTES CHAPTER 1. ON THE HUMAN SITUATION AT THE END OF HISTORY 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2For an excellent discussion of the origins of civil society and its relationship to democracy, see Ernest Gellner, Conditions and Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 3For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 7-14. 4Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (1994): 22-49. 5According to Durkheim, “Society is not alone in its interest in the formation of special groups to regulate their own activity, developing within them what otherwise would become anarchic; but the individual, on his part, finds joy in it, for anarchy is painful to him.

King, “A Christian and a Japanese-Buddhist Work-Ethic Compared,” Religion 11 (1981): 207-226. 2Japanese commentators alternate between arguing that Japanese culture and institutions are totally unique and unexportable and saying that they could potentially be a model for other parts of Asia. For a hostile Western account of the literature on Japanese uniqueness, or nihonjinron, see Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). CHAPTER 30. AFTER THE END OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2In addition, virtually all of the central themes of this book concerning the importance of culture to economic behavior were anticipated in my earlier work. See Fukuyama (1992), chaps. 20, 21; and “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18, where I discuss the Weber hypothesis and the impact of culture. 3This point is argued in David Gellner, “Max Weber: Capitalism and the Religion of India,” Sociology 16 (1982): 526-543. 4Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), vol 1. 5This point is made in Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 39-69.

THE SPIRITUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE 1The correlation between democracy and development is explored by Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105. For a review of the literature on the Lipset hypothesis that largely confirms this point, see Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March-June 1992): 450-499. 2For a summary of this argument, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. xi-xxiii. 3This is described on pp. 143-180 of Fukuyama (1992). 4Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), p. 50. 5Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). BIBLIOGRAPHY Abe, Yoshio, “The Basis of Japanese Culture and Confucianism (2),” Asian Culture Quarterly 2 (1974): 21-28.


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Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short by David Archibald

Bakken shale, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, deindustrialization, energy security, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income per capita, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), means of production, mutually assured destruction, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, out of africa, peak oil, price discovery process, rising living standards, sceptred isle, South China Sea, University of East Anglia, uranium enrichment, Yom Kippur War

This method of conversion into animal protein with Prussian blue supplements in stages along the way could be the only way to consume the radiologically contaminated grain. CHAPTER SIX CHINA WANTS A WAR And there appeared another wonder in heaven; and behold a great red dragon, having seven heads and ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads. —Revelation 12:3 After the collapse of most Communist states in 1990, the world appeared to have entered a period of permanent peace. Stanford University–based political scientist Francis Fukuyama called it “the end of history,” in which democracy and free-market capitalism would become the final form of human government.1 In response to Fukuyama’s 1992 book, Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington penned an article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?,” which he expanded into a 1996 book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.2 Huntington argued that now that the age of ideological conflict between Communism and capitalism had ended, civilizational conflict, the normal state of affairs in the world, would reassert itself.

Originally published as La Trahison des Clercs, Paris: Grasset, 1927. 2.Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926). Originally published as Der Untergang des Abenlandes, Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1918. Chapter 1: The Time Is at Hand 1.Alexandra Smith, “Food, Too, Is Wasted on the Young,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 20, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/food-too-is-wasted-on-the-young-20120719-22d32.html. 2.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3.Eigil Friis-Christensen and Knud Lassen, “Length of the Solar Cycle: An Indicator of Solar Activity Closely Associated with Climate,” Science 254 (1991): 698–700. 4.David Archibald, The Past and Future of Climate (Rhaetian Management, 2010). 5.J. E. Solheim, K. Stordahl, and O. Humlum, “The Long Sunspot Cycle 23 Predicts a Significant Temperature Decrease in Cycle 24,” Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 80, May 2012. 6.James Delingpole, “Lovelock Goes Mad for Shale Gas,” Telegraph, June 16, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/100165783/lovelock-goes-mad-for-shale-gas/.

Chapter 5: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 1.Amir Tahiri, The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution (New York: Encounter, 2010). 2.Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 3.Tahiri, The Persian Night. 4.Peter Robinson, “An Endless Struggle,” Hoover Digest 3 (2013): 148–58. 5.Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013). 6.Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts, 2002 update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002), http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/. Chapter 6: China Wants a War 1.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2.Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 3.Edward Luttwark, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). 4.Paul Monk, “A Fox’s Thoughts about China and Australia’s Security,” Quadrant, April 2013. 5.Manuel Quinones, “Alternative Fuels: Coal-to-Liquids’ Prospects Dim, but Boosters Won’t Say Die,” Greenwire, May 17, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981383. 6.Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.


pages: 372 words: 92,477

The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State by John Micklethwait, Adrian Wooldridge

Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, banking crisis, barriers to entry, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, cashless society, central bank independence, Chelsea Manning, circulation of elites, Clayton Christensen, Corn Laws, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, Detroit bankruptcy, disintermediation, Edward Snowden, Etonian, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, Khan Academy, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, Kodak vs Instagram, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, liberal capitalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, mobile money, Mont Pelerin Society, Nelson Mandela, night-watchman state, Norman Macrae, obamacare, oil shale / tar sands, old age dependency ratio, open economy, Parag Khanna, Peace of Westphalia, pension reform, pensions crisis, personalized medicine, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, profit maximization, rent control, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, school choice, school vouchers, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, too big to fail, total factor productivity, War on Poverty, Washington Consensus, Winter of Discontent, working-age population, zero-sum game

Allison and Blackwill, Lee Kuan Yew, p. 27. 8. Ibid., p. 32. 9. Ibid., p. 120. 10. Ibid., p. 113. 11. Ibid., p. 34. 12. Ibid., p. 25. 13. “New Cradles to Graves,” The Economist, September 8, 2012. 14. “Asia’s Next Revolution,” ibid. 15. “Widefare,” The Economist, July 6, 2013. 16. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, Summer 1989. 17. Joint news conference in Washington, D.C., October 29, 1997. 18. Fukuyama, “The End of History.” 19. Kurlantzik, Democracy in Retreat, p. 201. 20. Ibid., p. 7. 21. Bertelsmann Foundation, “All Over the World, the Quality of Democratic Governance Is Declining” (press release), November 29, 2009. 22. Jim Krane, Dubai: The Story of the World’s Fastest City (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), pp. 137–38. 23.

In South Korea, for instance, about 80 percent of what you get out of the system is tied to what you put in.15 In Asia as a whole, public-health spending is still only 2.5 percent of GDP, compared with about 7 percent in the OECD group of rich nations. The second reason is the crisis of the Western model of democracy and free-market capitalism. In the 1990s Lee’s lectures on Asian values seemed somewhat eccentric, even to Asians. The Washington consensus was sweeping all before it. Francis Fukuyama talked about “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”16 Rather than associating Deng Xiaoping’s China with economic greatness, Americans thought of the lone student walking toward the tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Bill Clinton told China’s president, Jiang Zemin, to his face that he was “on the wrong side of ­history.”17 The Asian economic crisis in 1997 only reinforced the conceit of Western democracy, especially when the IMF had to launch a $40 billion program to help South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, which had all borrowed too much from foreign banks.

Between January 2009 and November 2013, when the Democrats finally changed the filibuster procedure, seventy-nine of Barack Obama’s nominees were blocked, forcing the president to appoint people while the Senate was in recess (itself something of an abuse of power).6 Obama struggled to get Republican senators to let him appoint Chuck Hagel as his defense secretary, even though Hagel was both a decorated military veteran and a former Republican senator. Even allowing for the 2013 reform, the American political system continues to give extraordinary power to individual politicians to gum up the works. It remains what Francis Fukuyama has dubbed a “vetocracy.” Mill and Tocqueville would have been nervous about fiddling with the checks and balances that were designed to protect liberty. The other two structural problems, gerrymandering and money politics, even though they find some protection in the Constitution, seem far more alien to any idea of liberty. Indeed, they reek of the Old ­Corruption. Gerrymandering is simply a modern name for rotten boroughs.


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The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be by Moises Naim

additive manufacturing, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, business cycle, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, clean water, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, colonial rule, conceptual framework, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deskilling, disintermediation, disruptive innovation, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, intangible asset, intermodal, invisible hand, job-hopping, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Kickstarter, liberation theology, Martin Wolf, mega-rich, megacity, Naomi Klein, Nate Silver, new economy, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, open borders, open economy, Peace of Westphalia, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price mechanism, price stability, private military company, profit maximization, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, Steve Jobs, The Nature of the Firm, Thomas Malthus, too big to fail, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

More than three dozen countries now operate drone fleets, and dozens of private companies are now offering to fly them on behalf of other countries that lack the support infrastructure to do so.29 More disturbingly, ordinary hobbyists and private users abound: in the United States in 2012, a group called DIY Drones already had twenty thousand members. In 2004, Hezbollah flew a drone into Israeli air space; the Israeli military downed it, but the psychological effect of the violation, and the message it sent about Hezbollah’s capacities, endures.30 What happens when any disaffected, delusional, or deranged individual has the capacity to wreak havoc from the sky? As Stanford University’s Francis Fukuyama, who has been building his own drone to take better nature photos, has observed: “As the technology becomes cheaper and more commercially available, moreover, drones may become harder to trace; without knowing their provenance, deterrence breaks down. A world in which people can be routinely and anonymously targeted by unseen enemies is not pleasant to contemplate.”31 Drones are hyper-sophisticated compared with the most devastating weapon in military conflicts of the past few years—the improvised explosive device.

Having a more diverse and inclusive group of actors at the table (the erstwhile “weak”) and reducing the number of decisions arbitrarily imposed on the world by a few powerful players are worth applauding, but the heightened difficulty of getting things done is not. POLITICAL PARALYSIS AS COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF THE DECAY OF POWER That paralysis has become acutely evident in the United States. As politics has become more polarized, the defects of a system overloaded with checks and balances have become more apparent. Francis Fukuyama calls this system a “vetocracy.” He writes: “Americans take great pride in a constitution that limits executive power through a series of checks and balances. But those checks have metastasized. And now America is a vetocracy. When this system is combined with ideologized parties, . . . the result is paralysis. . . . If we are to get out of our present paralysis we need not only strong leadership, but changes in institutional rules.”6 Economist Peter Orszag witnessed the workings of vetocracy and its nefarious consequences.

That starts with embracing the reality of the decay of power and, again, changing our conversation to reflect it. Not just in the corridors of presidential palaces, corporate headquarters, and university boardrooms but even more so in encounters around watercoolers in offices, in casual conversations among friends, and at the dinner table at home. These conversations are the indispensable ingredients of a political climate that is less welcoming to the terrible simplifiers. For as Francis Fukuyama correctly argues, to eradicate the vetocracy that is paralyzing the system, “political reform must first and foremost be driven by popular, grassroots mobilization.”5 This, in turn, requires focusing the conversation on how to contain the negative aspects of the decay of power and move us to the positive sloping side of the inverted U-curve. For this to happen, we need something that is very difficult: an increased disposition in democratic societies to give more power to those who govern us.


pages: 245 words: 72,893

How Democracy Ends by David Runciman

barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, blockchain, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Internet of things, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, loss aversion, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, money: store of value / unit of account / medium of exchange, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, Norman Mailer, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, Peter Thiel, quantitative easing, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Steven Pinker, The Wisdom of Crowds, Travis Kalanick, universal basic income, Yogi Berra

eISBN 978 178283 4120 Contents PREFACE Thinking the unthinkable INTRODUCTION 20 January 2017 1Coup! 2Catastrophe! 3Technological takeover! 4Something better? CONCLUSION This is how democracy ends EPILOGUE 20 January 2053 FURTHER READING ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS NOTES INDEX PREFACE Thinking the unthinkable NOTHING LASTS FOREVER. At some point democracy was always going to pass into the pages of history. No one, not even Francis Fukuyama – who announced the end of history back in 1989 – has believed that its virtues make it immortal.1 But until very recently, most citizens of Western democracies would have imagined that the end was a long way off. They would not have expected it to happen in their lifetimes. Very few would have thought it might be taking place before their eyes. Yet here we are, barely two decades into the twenty-first century, and almost from nowhere the question is upon us: is this how democracy ends?

When another democracy starts to fall apart, we want to know if it’s a warning of our own possible fate. Democratic politics is hungry for morality tales, so long as it is someone else who is living them. In the late 1980s many Western commentators viewed Japan as the coming power: the twenty-first century would be the Japanese century. Francis Fukuyama cited Japan (along with the EU) as the likeliest illustration of what we could expect from the end of history: the triumph of democracy would turn out to be stable, prosperous, efficient and just a little bit boring. Then the Japanese bubble burst – along with the Japanese stock market – and the future belonged to someone else. Japan became instead a fable about the dangers of hubris. As the country embarked on its lost decades of zero growth and political stagnation it offered a stark warning to others.

On the big questions that have preoccupied contemporary political scientists – what causes democracy to stick and what causes it to slide backwards – one very influential answer is given by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012; London: Profile, 2013). They identify trustworthy institutions as the key to political stability. This is a more accessible version of their classic earlier book, The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The initial book has some equations in it; the later one doesn’t. Francis Fukuyama, still best known for The End of History and the Last Man (New York and London: Free Press, 1992), gives his own account of the rise and possible fall of democracy in The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux; London: Profile, 2012) and Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux, 2014; London: Profile, 2015). The second volume in particular, with its concerns about the inflexibility of American ‘vetocracy’, should dispel any lingering illusions that Fukuyama is a blithe optimist.


pages: 367 words: 108,689

Broke: How to Survive the Middle Class Crisis by David Boyle

anti-communist, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, call centre, collateralized debt obligation, corporate raider, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, deindustrialization, delayed gratification, Desert Island Discs, Eugene Fama: efficient market hypothesis, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial independence, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, housing crisis, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, job satisfaction, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mega-rich, mortgage debt, Neil Kinnock, Nelson Mandela, new economy, Nick Leeson, North Sea oil, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, off grid, offshore financial centre, pension reform, pensions crisis, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Ponzi scheme, positional goods, precariat, quantitative easing, school choice, Slavoj Žižek, social intelligence, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Vanguard fund, Walter Mischel, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent, working poor

But it also misses the key point. It isn’t sudden middle-class impoverishment by unemployment that is really the most important story — though it happens in economic downturns of course — it is the slow impoverishment of middle-class professionals, the constriction of their room for manoeuvre, their status and then their salary too. The political thinker Francis Fukuyama caused a storm of intellectual excitement after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 by proclaiming ‘the End of History’. He became, rather reluctantly, part of the intellectual underpinnings of a new kind of deregulated ideal, the one that fell to pieces in the banking crash of 2008. These days, he finds himself in rather different company, and has recently begun a defence of the embattled American middle classes.[23] What he described as ‘happy talk about the wonders of the knowledge economy’, hailing a new economy based exclusively on service and finance, was actually a ‘gauzy veil placed over the hard facts of deindustrialization’.

There certainly is a middle-class problem in the USA, where 4 million families are believed to be in danger of sliding into poverty and one in four middle-class households are about to drop down onto the lower rung, spending a quarter of their incomes just servicing debt.[22] It is different over there, but there are important parallels between the UK and USA, which is why the Labour leader Ed Miliband borrowed the American phrase ‘squeezed middle’ in 2011. The parallel has also been noticed by one of the most important commentators on world affairs. Francis Fukuyama is busily charting the decline of the middle classes in all developed nations. Into the misty past, the middle classes have benefited from rising above the undifferentiated masses, Fukuyama implies. Now they are being driven back into the undifferentiated mass by a new global elite which is benefiting from the shifts in the financial world over the past generation. Once the middle classes siphoned off wealth to provide themselves with comfortable lives, now they are the victims of the siphoning — and siphoning on a vast scale.

This period has also coincided with an extraordinary and deeply unpleasant vilification of the working classes, tracked so compellingly by Owen Jones in his polemic Chavs, where mainstream culture and politics alike seem to have become suffused with an unpleasant contempt for anyone who wasn’t middle-class, as if the threat to middle-class values came from below and not from above. Websites like Chavscum were reported in the Daily Telegraph under the headline ‘In defence of snobbery’.[10] As Francis Fukuyama suggested (see previous chapter), the political risks from destroying the middle classes are terrifying. This ‘chavscum’ attitude has fed into the extremes of panic for many middle-class parents desperate to choose the right school for their children, and fearing that a feckless, alien culture would somehow steal their security and poison the minds of their families. This panic is at least partly a feature of middle-class imagination, and actually it always has been.


The Ecotechnic Future: Envisioning a Post-Peak World by John Michael Greer

back-to-the-land, Black Swan, clean water, Community Supported Agriculture, David Strachan, deindustrialization, European colonialism, Extropian, failed state, feminist movement, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, hydrogen economy, hygiene hypothesis, illegal immigration, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of agriculture, mass immigration, McMansion, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, post-industrial society, Project for a New American Century, Ray Kurzweil, Stewart Brand, the scientific method, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, upwardly mobile, Whole Earth Catalog, Y2K

It’s ironic that one of the best places to begin that discussion is to glance at a recent announcement — ​one of many down through the years — ​that history itself had come to an end. P A R T III P ossi b i l ities The Ecotechnic Promise I 13 n retrospect, 1989 may not have been a good year to announce that history was over. That spring, however, a US State Department official named Francis Fukuyama did just that in an article titled “The End of History?” Later expanded into book form, ­Fukuyama’s claim got the fifteen minutes of fame Andy Warhol claimed everyone would receive in the future and sparked enough controversy in academic circles to justify a small bookshelf of discussions and rebuttals.1 Fukuyama’s announcement is easy to misunderstand and even easier to satirize. He was not claiming, as many of his critics suggested, that what might more broadly be called historical events would stop happening.

Hegel’s view of history became enormously influential, less through his own work — ​I challenge any of my readers to struggle through a chapter of Hegel’s prose and come out the other end with anything but a headache — ​than through the writings of those he influenced. Political radicals at both ends of the spectrum pounced on Hegel’s ideas before the ink was dry on the first edition of his Philosophy of History. Karl Marx used Hegelian ideas as the foundation for his philosophy of class warfare and Communist revolution, while Giovanni Gentile, the pet philosopher of Mussolini’s Fascist regime in Italy, was also a strict Hegelian. For that matter, Francis Fukuyama, who played Gentile’s role for the neoconservative movement, drew his theory of an end to history straight from Hegel. Still, the spread of Hegel’s ideas isn’t limited to the radical fringes, or even to those who know who Hegel was. When peak oil comes up for discussion outside the activist community, one of the most 229 230 T he E cotechnic F u t u re common responses is,“Oh, they’ll think of something.”

James McClenon, Deviant Science: The Case of Parapsychology, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, offers a useful case study of the split between inquiry and ideology in modern scientific research. 8. See Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics, Oxford University Press, 1989, for a thoughtful discussion. 9. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 10. McClenon, Deviant Science. Chapter Thirteen: The Ecotechnic Promise 1. See, for example, Timothy Burns, ed., After History? Francis Fukuyama and his Critics, Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. 2. “We are history’s actors ...when we act, we create our own reality.” This embarrassing display of hubris by a Bush administration staffer is quoted in Ron Suskind, “Faith, certainty, and the presidency of George W. Bush,” New York Times Magazine (17 October 2004). 3. Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, is representative. 4. See particularly Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Basic Books, 1957. 5.


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This America: The Case for the Nation by Jill Lepore

Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, desegregation, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, immigration reform, liberal world order, mass immigration

Many of Degler’s contemporaries also believed that studying the nation would prop up nationalism, which ought, instead, be left to die. By the last quarter of the twentieth century nationalism was, outside of postcolonial states, nearly dead, a stumbling, ghastly wraith. And many intellectuals believed that if they stopped writing national history, nationalism would die sooner, starved, neglected, deserted, a fitting death for a war criminal, destroyer of worlds. Francis Fukuyama’s much-read 1989 essay “The End of History?” appeared three years after Degler delivered his speech, but it remains the best-known illustration of the wisdom of Degler’s warning. At the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama announced that fascism and communism were dead and that nationalism, seemingly all but the last threat to liberalism left standing, was utterly decrepit in Europe (“European nationalism has been defanged”) and that, where it was still kicking in other parts of the world, well, that wasn’t quite nationalism: it was a halting striving for democracy.

Liberals and the Left offered answers, but few of them involved the nation, as a nation. In 1986, when Degler rose from his chair to deliver his presidential address before the American Historical Association, hardly anyone in the academy was writing national history anymore, or making the case for the nation. Degler didn’t have much patience with this. Nor, I suspect, did he have much patience with Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 “The End of History?” Later, after the onset of civil war in Bosnia, the political theorist Michael Walzer grimly announced, “The tribes have returned.” They had never left. They’d only become harder for historians to see, because they weren’t really looking anymore. · XV · THE RETURN OF NATIONALISM To say that events did not bear out foretellings of the death of nationalism is to mute the screams of millions.

Bridging Race Divides: Black Nationalism, Feminism, and Integration in the United States, 1896–1935. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. DuBois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Free Press, 1935. Epps, Garrett. Democracy Reborn: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post–Civil War America. New York: Henry Holt, 2006. Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989. ______ . Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018. Gates, Henry, Jr. Stony the Road: Reconstruction, White Supremacy, and the Rise of Jim Crow. New York: Penguin, 2019. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. 2nd ed. London: Blackwell, 2006. First published in 1983. Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century.


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Shadows of Empire: The Anglosphere in British Politics by Michael Kenny, Nick Pearce

battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, colonial rule, corporate governance, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, global reserve currency, imperial preference, informal economy, invention of the telegraph, Khartoum Gordon, labour mobility, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, Monroe Doctrine, Nixon shock, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, trade route, Washington Consensus

This sustained a ‘distinctive architecture of policy collaboration between these countries’, consisting of transgovernmental elite policy networks addressing common problems and devising shared solutions. Its depth and range suggests a ‘structural multilateral relationship in the Anglosphere, rather than simply bilateral or ad hoc arrangements.’8 From the ‘End of History’ to Iraq In the immediate years after the collapse of Soviet communism, when Francis Fukuyama's contention that liberal-democratic capitalism represented the ‘end of history’, the global dominance of this Anglo-American, liberal economic and political order appeared assured. A long boom, fuelled by global financialisation, was under way. China and India were becoming integrated into the global economy. And some of the leading, disruptive ideologies of the twentieth century – fascism, communism and socialism – had apparently fallen away.

Castles, ‘Australian antecedents of the Third Way’, Political Studies, 50 (2002), pp. 683–702. 7  Commission on Social Justice/Institute for Public Policy Research, Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal (London: Vintage, 1994). 8  Tim Legrand, ‘Elite, exclusive and elusive: transgovernmental policy networks and iterative policy transfer in the Anglosphere’, Policy Studies, 37/5 (2016), pp. 440–55. 9  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p. xxiii. 10  Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The West: unique, not universal’, Foreign Affairs, 75 (1996), pp. 28–46. 11  Rick Fawn, ‘Canada: outside the Anglo-American fold’, in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 12  Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2007). 13  Ibid., p. 314. 14  Ibid., p. 95. 15  Perry Anderson, ‘American foreign policy and its thinkers’, New Left Review, no. 83 (2013) p. 122 [special issue]. 16  The UKIP Manifesto 2015, www.ukip.org/manifesto2015. 17  William Hague, ‘Britain and Australia: making the most of global opportunity’, John Howard Lecture, 17 January 2013, www.menziesrc.org/images/Latest_News/PDF/Britain_and_Australia__making_the_most_of_global_opportunity1.pdf. 18  Boris Johnson, ‘The Aussies are just like us, so let's stop kicking them out’, The Telegraph, 25 August 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10265619/The-Aussies-are-just-like-us-so-lets-stop-kicking-them-out.html. 19  Boris Johnson, Speech at Bloomberg in response to the receipt of Dr Gerard Lyons's publication of ‘The Europe report: a win–win situation’, 6 August 2014, www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/bj-europe-speech.pdf. 20  Tony Abbott, Address to Queen's College, Oxford University, 14 December 2012, www.australiantimes.co.uk/tony-abbott-address-to-queens-college-oxford-university/. 21  See, for example, Owen Paterson, ‘The Anglosphere, trade and international security’, speech to the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 25 March 2015, www.uk2020.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Anglosphere-Trade-and-International-Security-UK-2020-25.03.2015-FINAL.pdf. 22  Shashi Parulekar and Joel Kotkin, ‘The state of the Anglosphere’, City Journal (winter 2012), www.city-journal.org/html/state-anglosphere-13447.html. 23  Daniel Hannan, Why America Must Not Follow Europe (New York: Encounter Books, 2011). 7 Brexit: The Anglosphere Triumphant?

The full story of the emergence of this New Right Anglosphere is yet to be told, primarily because the identity of its main donors and the nature of the relationships between its key figures remain rather opaque.29 Two conferences, organised by the Hudson Institute in 1999 and 2000 in Washington, DC, and Berkshire, brought together what one journalistic observer called ‘the intellectual heart of British-American conservatism’.30 Among the delegates were Thatcher and David Davis MP (later the government minister tasked with negotiating the UK's departure from the EU), leading intellectual conservatives, including Francis Fukuyama, Robert Conquest and Kenneth Minogue, prominent commentators such as James C. Bennett, John O'Sullivan and Owen Harries, the media mogul Conrad Black, and John Hulsman from the Heritage Foundation. Very few American politicians identified with this cause in these years, with the notable exception of the leading Republican Pat Buchanan. The linkages which these events established – between politicians, pundits and intellectuals – represented the latest in a long line of Anglo-American political communities stretching back to the late nineteenth century and the invention of the idea of the English-speaking peoples.


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The Future of War by Lawrence Freedman

Albert Einstein, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, Black Swan, British Empire, colonial rule, conceptual framework, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Donald Trump, drone strike, en.wikipedia.org, energy security, Ernest Rutherford, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Glasses, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), John Markoff, long peace, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral hazard, mutually assured destruction, New Journalism, Norbert Wiener, open economy, pattern recognition, Peace of Westphalia, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, speech recognition, Steven Pinker, Stuxnet, the scientific method, uranium enrichment, urban sprawl, Valery Gerasimov, WikiLeaks, zero day

Another Syrian policy centre estimated in February 2016 that the true number was 470,000, including 15 percent indirect deaths. ‘Quantifying carnage’, The Economist, 20 Feb. 2016. Available: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21693279-how-many-people-has-syrias-civil-war-killed-quantifying-carnage CHAPTER 12 1. Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 100. 2. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, The National Interest (1989). The original essay was developed into a book: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). A key factor according to Huntington was not only the active promotion of democracy by the US and the snowball effect within regions but also the growing opposition of the Catholic Church to authoritarian rule. 4.

If others followed the same path there was a possibility of a transcendent community of shared values that would produce peace if only because there would be nothing to fight about. But the spread of democracy was bound to be contentious and would be resisted by autocrats. As European communism imploded Francis Fukuyama of the RAND Corporation announced that this was not just ‘the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history’, but ‘the end of history as such’. By this he meant ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’2 Talking of the ‘end of history’ invited misinterpretation. He was not suggesting that there would be no more conflict, or other transformational events, only that there was now no serious ideological alternative to the political and economic model that had been embraced by the Western world, to their enormous benefit.

Behind all this lay some great political failure, but that was not where the story was to be found. [ 23 ] Mega-Cities and Climate Change In our world there are still people who run around risking their lives in bloody battles over a name or a flag or a piece of clothing but they tend to belong to gangs with names like the Bloods and the Crips and they make their living dealing drugs. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, The End of History, 19921 As Fukuyama looked with optimism at the West’s liberal triumph in the early 1990s, there was also anxiety about whether a lack of anything serious to fight about would lead it into a soft decadence. The Bloods and the Crips were two famous Los Angeles street gangs. The Bloods were formed at first to resist the influence of the Crips in their neighbourhoods. They later came to be known for a ‘take-no-prisoners’ attitude and violence.


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The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? by Ian Bremmer

affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, centre right, collective bargaining, corporate governance, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, diversified portfolio, Doha Development Round, Exxon Valdez, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, global supply chain, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, laissez-faire capitalism, low skilled workers, mass immigration, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, Nelson Mandela, new economy, offshore financial centre, open economy, race to the bottom, reserve currency, risk tolerance, shareholder value, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, spice trade, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, trade route, tulip mania, uranium enrichment, Washington Consensus, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

Chapter five outlines why state capitalism threatens free markets and the future of the global economy. Chapter six details what those who believe in free-market capitalism can do about it. CHAPTER ONE The Rise of a New System What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. —FRANCIS FUKUYAMA , “The End of History”1 In championing globalization as the defining force in international politics and the global economy, we’ve spent the past several years writing obituaries for communism, for dictatorship, and even for the nation-state. Globalization is the single most important thing that governments and corporations could not afford to be wrong about over the past two decades.

As I finish the acknowledgments, most of their hard work is just beginning. Finally, much love to Ann Shuman, who generally puts up with my insufferable nature. And to my favorite brother, Robert Coolbrith. They’re both brilliant, adorable, and would be in more paragraphs if good taste didn’t dictate otherwise. NOTES CHAPTER ONE : The Rise of a New System 1 Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History” appeared in the National Interest, Summer 1989, and was expanded into the book The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2008 Democracy Index, “Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalize and thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive, most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights.

Many around the world (fairly or not) blamed the meltdown on American-style free-market capitalism. If the turmoil that these crises generated couldn’t breathe life into the communist corpse, it’s hard to imagine what could. Communism is dead, and there will be no resurrection. Yet no one can credibly say the same for dictatorship. In 1989, as Eastern Europe’s communist states fell like dominoes and millions of Chinese students mounted a bold challenge to their government, writer Francis Fukuyama penned a provocative essay to support a surprising claim: that “history” had come to an end. He argued that though forms of government would continue to vary from place to place and that some countries had considerable catching up to do, mankind was moving toward consensus on the virtues of liberal democracy. Where authoritarian governments cling to power, the increasingly free flow of goods, services, capital, and labor would generate demand for freedoms of information, assembly, and expression—and for government that derives its powers from the consent of the governed.


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Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek by Rutger Bregman

autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, Branko Milanovic, cognitive dissonance, computer age, conceptual framework, credit crunch, David Graeber, Diane Coyle, Erik Brynjolfsson, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane: The New Division of Labor, full employment, George Gilder, George Santayana, happiness index / gross national happiness, Henry Ford's grandson gave labor union leader Walter Reuther a tour of the company’s new, automated factory…, income inequality, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Kodak vs Instagram, low skilled workers, means of production, megacity, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microcredit, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, Nathan Meyer Rothschild: antibiotics, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, post-industrial society, precariat, RAND corporation, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Skype, stem cell, Steven Pinker, telemarketer, The Future of Employment, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, wage slave, War on Poverty, We wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters, wikimedia commons, women in the workforce, working poor, World Values Survey

Orazem, “Challenge Paper: Education,” Copenhagen Consensus Center (April 2014). http://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/education 17. “Where have all the burglars gone?” The Economist (July 18, 2013). http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582041-rich-world-seeing-less-and-less-crime-even-face-high-unemployment-and-economic 18. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). http://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf 19. Andrew Cohut et al., Economies of Emerging Markets Better Rated During Difficult Times. Global Downturn Takes Heavy Toll; Inequality Seen as Rising, Pew Research (May 23, 2013), p. 23. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Economic-Report-FINAL-May-23-20131.pdf 20. Lyman Tower Sargent, Utopianism.

See for example: Milton Friedman, “Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects,” Farmand (February 17, 1951). http://0055d26.netsolhost.com/friedman/pdfs/other_commentary/Farmand.02.17.1951.pdf 15. F.A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review (Spring 1949). https://mises.org/etexts/hayekintellectuals.pdf 16. Quoted in: Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion. Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (2012). p. 13. 17. Quoted in: Burgin, The Great Persuasion, p. 169. 18. Ibid, p. 11. 19. Ibid, p. 221. 20. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 21. At the end of his life, Friedman said there was only one philosopher he had ever really studied in depth: the Austrian Karl Popper. Popper argued that good science revolves around “falsifiability,” requiring a continual search for things that don’t fit your theory instead of only seeking confirmation. However, as we’ve seen, most people approach theories the other way around.

“There are still criminals, but there are ever fewer of them and they are getting older.”17 War has been on the decline Source: Peace Research Institute Oslo A Bleak Paradise Welcome, in other words, to the Land of Plenty. To the good life. To Cockaigne, where almost everyone is rich, safe, and healthy. Where there’s only one thing we lack: a reason to get out of bed in the morning. Because after all, you can’t really improve on paradise. Back in 1989, the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama already noted that we had arrived in an era where life has been reduced to “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”18 Notching up our purchasing power another percentage point, or shaving a couple off our carbon emissions; perhaps a new gadget – that’s about the extent of our vision. We live in an era of wealth and overabundance, but how bleak it is.


Social Capital and Civil Society by Francis Fukuyama

Berlin Wall, blue-collar work, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Jane Jacobs, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, p-value, Pareto efficiency, postindustrial economy, principal–agent problem, RAND corporation, Silicon Valley, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, transaction costs, World Values Survey

Social Capital FRANCIS FUKUYAMA THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford May 12, 14, and 15, 1997 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the Institute of Public Policy at George Mason University and director of the Institute’s International Transactions Program. Educated at Cornell, he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has been a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, where he is currently a consultant, as well as a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations; the editor, with Andrez Korbonski, of T h e Soviet Union and the Third W o r l d : T h e Last Three Decades (1987) ; and book review editor at Foreign A f a i r s .

He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations; the editor, with Andrez Korbonski, of T h e Soviet Union and the Third W o r l d : T h e Last Three Decades (1987) ; and book review editor at Foreign A f a i r s . His publications include T h e End of History and the Last M a n ( 1 9 9 2 ), which received the Premio Capri and the Book Critics Award (from the Los Angeles T i m e s ) , and Trust : T h e Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), which was named “business book of the year” by European. LECTURE I. THE GREAT DISRUPTION Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been an extraordinary amount of attention paid to the interrelated issues of social capital, civil society, trust, and social norms as central issues for contemporary democracies. The propensity for civil society was said to be an essential condition for the transition to stable democracy in Eastern Europe, and the decline in social capital in the United States is said to be a major problem for American democracy today.


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Fully Automated Luxury Communism by Aaron Bastani

"Robert Solow", autonomous vehicles, banking crisis, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Bretton Woods, capital controls, cashless society, central bank independence, collapse of Lehman Brothers, computer age, computer vision, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, decarbonisation, dematerialisation, Donald Trump, double helix, Elon Musk, energy transition, Erik Brynjolfsson, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, G4S, housing crisis, income inequality, industrial robot, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Markoff, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, Kuiper Belt, land reform, liberal capitalism, low earth orbit, low skilled workers, M-Pesa, market fundamentalism, means of production, mobile money, more computing power than Apollo, new economy, off grid, pattern recognition, Peter H. Diamandis: Planetary Resources, post scarcity, post-work, price mechanism, price stability, private space industry, Productivity paradox, profit motive, race to the bottom, RFID, rising living standards, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sensor fusion, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Slavoj Žižek, stem cell, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, the built environment, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, transatlantic slave trade, Travis Kalanick, universal basic income, V2 rocket, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, Whole Earth Catalog, working-age population

‘Two ways,’ Mike said. ‘Gradually and then suddenly.’ Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises In the summer of 1989, as it became clear the United States and its allies had won the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay titled ‘The End of History?’ for the National Interest. Its core proposition was provocative yet simple, with the little-known academic asserting that the collapse of the Soviet Union was of greater importance than simply marking the end of a military rivalry: ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’ Fukuyama’s contention was that, while clocks would still tick and years continue to roll by, no new ideas would emerge, at least none capable of challenging the status quo.

‘Space Act Of 2015 Passes in the House (H.R. 2262)’. Planetary Resources, 14 July 2015. ‘Wisconsin Board Clears Way For $3 Billion Foxconn Deal’. Reuters, 8 November 2017. Part I. Chaos under Heaven 1. The Great Divide Fukuyama, Francis. ‘The End of History’. National Interest, 16 Summer 1989. Capitalist Realism Cox, Christoph, Molly Whalen and Alain Badiou. ‘On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou’. Cabinet, Winter 2001-2. Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Zero Books, 2010. Menand, Louis. ‘Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History’. New Yorker, 3 September 2018. Crisis Unleashed ‘Depression Looms as Global Crisis’. BBC News, 2 September 2009. Hertle, Hans-Hermann and Maria Nooke. The Victims at the Berlin Wall 1961–1989: A Biographical Handbook. Links Verlag, 2011.

The claim that capitalism will end, is, for capitalist realism, like saying a triangle doesn’t have three sides or that the law of gravity no longer applies while an apple falls from a tree. Rather than understanding the present as one historical period among many, like Victorian England or the Roman Republic, to be alive at the end of history means presuming our social systems to be as unchanging as the physical laws that govern the universe. And yet the truth is capitalist realism is already coming apart. The fact you are reading these words at all is proof. Despite the observations of Francis Fukuyama and his disciples, history returned on 15 September 2008 when the global financial system crashed. Within weeks the world’s leading economic powers, previous zealots for minimal state interference, were left with no alternative but to bail out their domestic banks, with some even being nationalised.


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The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It by Yascha Mounk

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Andrew Keen, basic income, battle of ideas, Boris Johnson, Branko Milanovic, Bretton Woods, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, centre right, clean water, cognitive bias, conceptual framework, David Brooks, deindustrialization, demographic transition, desegregation, Donald Trump, en.wikipedia.org, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, German hyperinflation, gig economy, Gini coefficient, Home mortgage interest deduction, housing crisis, income inequality, invention of the printing press, invention of the steam engine, investor state dispute settlement, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, land value tax, low skilled workers, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, mortgage tax deduction, Naomi Klein, new economy, offshore financial centre, open borders, Parag Khanna, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-materialism, price stability, ride hailing / ride sharing, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, secular stagnation, sharing economy, Thomas L Friedman, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, upwardly mobile, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

Margaret Talev and Sahil Kapur, “Trump Vows Election-Day Suspense without Seeking Voters He Needs to Win,” Bloomberg, 20 October, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/trump-vows-election-day-suspense-without-seeking-voters-he-needs-to-win; Associated Press, “Trump to Clinton: ‘You’d Be in Jail’” New York Times website, video, October 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000004701741/trump-to-clinton-youd-be-in-jail.html; Yochi Dreazen, “Trump’s Love for Brutal Leaders Like the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, Explained,” Vox, May 1, 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/1/15502610/trump-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-obama-putin-erdogan-dictators. 2. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18, quotation on p. 4; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. For a variety of early responses to Fukuyama, see for example essays by Harvey Mansfield, E. O. Wilson, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Robin Fox, Robert J. Samuelson, and Joseph S. Nye, “Responses to Fukuyama,” National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1989): 34–44. 4. Adam Przeworski, Limongi Neto, and Fernando Papaterra, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997): 155–183, 165.

Source: US Census Bureau, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.html; and Pew Research Center tabulations of 2010 and 2015 American Community Survey (IPUMS) in Gustavo López and Kristen Bialik: “Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, May, 3, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/. Acknowledgments At the end of “The End of History?,” Francis Fukuyama revealed that he had some doubts about whether history would really end: The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.

China’s unique system of state capitalism under the banner of communism could hardly be emulated by countries that didn’t share its unusual history. The future, it seemed, belonged to liberal democracy. The idea that democracy was sure to triumph has come to be associated with the work of Francis Fukuyama. In a sensational essay published in the late 1980s, Fukuyama argued that the conclusion of the Cold War would lead to “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Democracy’s triumph, he proclaimed in a phrase that has come to encapsulate the heady optimism of 1989, would mark “The End of History.”2 Plenty of critics took Fukuyama to task for his supposed naiveté. Some argued that the spread of liberal democracy was far from inevitable, fearing (or hoping) that many countries would prove resistant to this Western import.


State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century by Francis Fukuyama

Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, centre right, corporate governance, demand response, Doha Development Round, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, Hernando de Soto, information asymmetry, liberal world order, Live Aid, Nick Leeson, Pareto efficiency, Potemkin village, price stability, principal–agent problem, rent-seeking, road to serfdom, Ronald Coase, structural adjustment programs, technology bubble, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, Westphalian system

state-building state-building governance and world order in the 21st century f r a n c i s f u k u ya m a cornell univer sit y press I t h a c a , N e w Yo r k Copyright © 2004 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2004 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. State-building : governance and world order in the 21st century / Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8014-4292-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. State, The. 2. National state.

In fact, the European peacekeepers contributed to the problem by not being willing to fight; in places like Srebrenica, they were held hostage and needed to be rescued. It was only as a result of actions by states that were willing to decisively use traditional forms of military power— the Croatians in the case of Bosnia and the Americans in the case of Kosovo—that Serbian domination was ended and the Balkans pacified. Robert Kagan put the matter in the following manner. The Europeans are the ones who actually believe they are living at the end of history–that is, in a largely peaceful world that to an weak states and international legitimacy 117 increasing degree can be governed by law, norms, and international agreements. In this world, power politics and classical realpolitik have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, think they are still living in history, and need to use traditional power-political means to deal with threats from Iraq, al-Qaida, North Korea, and other malignant forces.


pages: 442 words: 130,526

The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India's New Gilded Age by James Crabtree

accounting loophole / creative accounting, Asian financial crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Branko Milanovic, business climate, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, colonial rule, Commodity Super-Cycle, corporate raider, creative destruction, crony capitalism, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, facts on the ground, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global supply chain, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, informal economy, Joseph Schumpeter, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, McMansion, megacity, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, open economy, Parag Khanna, Pearl River Delta, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, Rubik’s Cube, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, smart cities, special economic zone, spectrum auction, The Great Moderation, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, yellow journalism, young professional

In the three decades since Rajiv Gandhi last won a victory on a similar scale, both the Congress and the BJP had been weakened by regional and caste-based political rivals, and fragile governing coalitions had become the norm in New Delhi. But now Modi had crafted a new and popular nationalism, which drew strength from the decline of the older identity the Congress represented. Modi’s career had barely begun in 1989, the year when Francis Fukuyama wrote “The End of History,” his essay in the National Interest predicting the triumph of Western-style free-market democracy. “It is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society,” Fukuyama argued.39 Already a democracy, post-socialist India should have provided a neat test case for the brand of this free-market democratic shift.

A better approach is to push institutional anti-graft reforms, such as the earlier decision to auction off rights to natural resources, which can help keep corruption under control while allowing growth slowly to return. This in turn should form part of a broader set of changes that are described in India as a transition from a “deals-based” to a “rules-based” model of capitalism, meaning one whose rules allow little political and bureaucratic discretion over public resources.13 Yet even this will be far from straightforward. Francis Fukuyama describes this shift away from a “patrimonial” state, meaning one marked by corruption and clientelism, as the defining challenge for all developing nations. “[It is] much more difficult,” he writes, “than making the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic one.”14 This balance of growth and corruption then lies at the heart of the struggles of India’s industrial economy.

CMS Transparency, “Lure of Money in Lieu of Votes in Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections,” p. 7. 23. Rajesh Kumar Singh and Devidutta Tripathy, “India Moves Resolution of $150 Billion Bad Debt Problem into RBI’s Court,” Reuters, May 6, 2017. 24. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 11. 25. T. N. Ninan, “India’s Gilded Age,” Seminar, January 2013. 26. Twain and Warner, The Gilded Age. 27. Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Corruption?” Research Institute for Development, Growth and Economics, 2016. 28. Jayant Sinha and Ashutosh Varshney, “It Is Time for India to Rein In Its Robber Barons,” Financial Times, January 7, 2011. 29. Data compiled by Gapminder.org, which takes India’s 2013 GDP per capita data from a cross-country comparison based on 2005 dollars. The comparison was quoted in Dylan Matthews and Kavya Sukumar, “India Is as Rich as the US in 1881: A Mesmerizing Graphic Shows Where Every Country Falls,” Vox, October 8, 2015. 30.


pages: 354 words: 92,470

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History by Stephen D. King

9 dash line, Admiral Zheng, air freight, Albert Einstein, Asian financial crisis, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, bilateral investment treaty, bitcoin, blockchain, Bonfire of the Vanities, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, colonial rule, corporate governance, credit crunch, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, debt deflation, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, eurozone crisis, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, Hyman Minsky, imperial preference, income inequality, income per capita, incomplete markets, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, Internet of things, invisible hand, joint-stock company, Kickstarter, Long Term Capital Management, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, moral hazard, Nixon shock, offshore financial centre, oil shock, old age dependency ratio, paradox of thrift, Peace of Westphalia, plutocrats, Plutocrats, price stability, profit maximization, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent-seeking, reserve currency, reshoring, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Second Machine Age, Skype, South China Sea, special drawing rights, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, trade liberalization, trade route, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, Yom Kippur War, zero-sum game

The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires disappeared without trace, while the British Empire began what proved to be its terminal decline. Eighty years on, as the Soviet states began to crumble, Francis Fukuyama, the eminent political scientist, argued that: The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships … liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration … liberal principles in economics – the ‘free market’ – have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been part of the impoverished Third World.5 More than two decades after the publication of Fukuyama’s The End of History – both as a 1989 short paper6 and a 1992 weighty tome – its claims no longer appear to be quite so secure.

Soviet communism ultimately failed to deliver. In an earlier, supposedly more peaceful era, Norman Angell’s supporters hoped that common sense would prevail, that war would be futile because it would be mutually destructive. Economic interdependency was so great that only a madman would go to war. Having suffered brain damage at birth, Kaiser Wilhelm II unfortunately went on to prove the point.18 Francis Fukuyama admitted in 1992 that he could not guarantee the end of history. For him, the biggest objection came from Nietzsche, ‘who believed that modern democracy represented not the self-mastery of former slaves, but the unconditional victory of the slave and a kind of slavish morality … The last man had no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such desire no excellence or achievement was possible.’19 Yet, as Soviet communism collapsed, Fukuyama’s disciples were convinced that Western liberal democracy – and Western free-market capitalism – had triumphed.

(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Byzantium (i) Cabinet (UK) (i) California (i), (ii) caliphates (i), (ii), (iii) Callaghan, Jim (i), (ii) Cameron, David (i) Canada a reputable country (i) Asian Development Bank and (i) closes gap on US (i) Irish emigrate to (i), (ii) North America Free Trade Agreement (i), (ii) TPP (i) Cape of Good Hope (i) capital, mobility of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) see also cross-border capital flow Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Thomas Piketty) (i) capitalism communism and (i) free-market capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Fukuyama’s disciples on (i) Steffens and Shaw on (i) US economic model and (i) Caribbean (i) Carter, Jimmy (i) Castillon, Battle of (i) Castro, Fidel (i) Catherine of Aragon (i) Catherine the Great (i) Catholics (i), (ii), (iii) Caucasus (i), (ii) Central African Republic (i), (ii) Central America (i) Central Asia (i), (ii), (iii) see also Asia central banks (i), (ii) see also bankers inflation targets (i) Kosmos (i) price distortion (i) printing money (i), (ii) quantitative easing (i), (ii), (iii) zero interest rates and (i) Chad (i) Chechens (i) checks and balances (i), (ii) Chile (i) China (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) 1980 emergence (i) ageing population (i) attracting Western investment (i) balance of payments surplus (i) boom to slowdown (i) Brazil and (i) British in (i) Coca-Cola and (i) demand for German goods (i) Deng Xiaoping (i) Disney and (i) economic resurgence (i), (ii) excess capital in US (i) foreign capital for (i) iPhones (i) Japan and (i) living standards (i) military spending (i) OECD and (i) per capita incomes (i), (ii) ratifies Paris climate deal (i) rise of renminbi (i), (ii) Russia threatens (i) South China Sea and neighbour disputes (i) TPP and (i) treaty ports (i) Trump’s protectionism and (i) US tries to contain (i), (ii), (iii) Chongqing (i), (ii) Christianity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Churchill, Winston (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)n1 CIA (i) Ciudadanos (i) Cleveland, Grover (i) climate change (i), (ii) Clinton, Hillary 2016 campaign (i) Bernie Sanders opposes (i) concerns of supporters (i) rejects TPP (i), (ii) Syria (i) wins Democrat nomination (i) clubs (i), (ii) Cobden, Richard (i), (ii), (iii) Coca-Cola (i) ‘coffin ships’ (i) Cold War binary rivalry, a (i) economic differences (i) end of (i), (ii) globalization and (i) NATO and (i) Soviet living standards (i) collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (i) Collins, Philip (i) Columbus, Christopher (i), (ii), (iii) commodity markets (i), (ii), (iii) common sense (i) Commonwealth (i) communism Berlin Wall and (i) capitalism and (i) Cuba (i) Marx’s stages (i) Shaw extols (i) Soviet Union collapse and (i), (ii) Como, Lake (i) Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris (i) Concert of Europe (i) Congo (i) Congress (US) 1933 banking crisis (i) American public’s confidence in (i) Bush Jnr on terrorism (i) Immigration Act 1917 (i) Japanese sanctions (i), (ii) Smoot–Hawley tariff (i) Congress of Vienna (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Connally, John (i) Conolly, Arthur (i) Conservative Party (i), (ii) Constantinople (i), (ii) Constitutional Tribunal (Poland) (i) ‘Convention of Peking’ (i) Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (i) Corbyn, Jeremy (i), (ii) Córdoba (i), (ii) corporate scandals (i) Corroyer, Edouard (i) Court of Cassation (Egypt) (i) Crécy, Battle of (i) Creole languages (i) Crimea (i), (ii) Crimean War (19th century) (i) crop yields (i) cross-border capital flow allocation of resources and (i) emerging markets and (i), (ii) extraordinary growth of (i), (ii), (iii) globalization dominated by (i) inequality and (i) Varoufakis tries to limit (i) Cuba (i) Czech Republic (i) Czechoslovakia (i) Darius the Great (i) Darwin, Charles (i) Davos (i), (ii) de Gaulle, Charles (i), (ii) debt (i) Africa (i) China (i) debt to income ratios (i) government debt (i) Latin America (i) low inflation and (i) deflation (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Delhi (i) demand management (i), (ii) Democratic Party (US) (i), (ii) Democratic Republic of the Congo (i) Denfert-Rochereau, Eugène (i) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Denmark (i), (ii) Department of Housing and Urban Development (US) (i) deposit insurance (i) devaluation 1930s (i), (ii), (iii) dollars, gold and (i) Eisenhower and Britain (i) franc (i) right conditions for (i) Diaoyu (i) Disney (i), (ii) Doha Round (i) dollar (US) see American dollar Dow Jones Industrial Average (i) Draghi, Mario (i) Duisburg (i) Duterte, Rodrigo (i), (ii) DVDs (i) East Africa (i) see also Africa Eastern Europe EU and its effects (i) importing democracy (i) joining the EU (i), (ii) Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (i) New World emigration (i) Ottoman Empire and (i) Soviet communism and (i), (ii), (iii) ‘Economic Theory of Clubs’ (James Buchanan) (i) Ecuador (i) Eden, Anthony (i), (ii) Edison, Thomas (i) Edison Electric (i) educational attainment (i) Edward VI, King (i) Egypt (i), (ii), (iii) Einstein, Albert (i) Eisenhower, Dwight D. (i) elites (i) Ellis Island (i) Empire Windrush, SS (i) empires (i) End of Alchemy, The (Mervyn King) (i)n12 End of History, The (Francis Fukuyama) (i), (ii), (iii) England (i), (ii), (iii) see also United Kingdom Enron (i) Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (i) EU (European Union) asylum seekers (i), (ii), (iii) blame thrown at (i) Brexit (i), (ii) eastward expansion (i) economic success and (i) former Soviet countries and (i) Hamas and (i) increasing membership, effect of (i) Juncker Plan (i) key arrangements lacking (i) Marshall Plan and (i) member states and their citizens (i) nation states and (i) Poland and (i) problems from a break-up of (i) Schengen Agreement (i), (ii) Syrian refugees (i) Eurasian Economic Union (i) European Central Bank (i) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (i), (ii) European Commission (i) European Economic Community (EEC) (i), (ii) see also EU European Exchange Rate Arrangement (i) European House Ambrosetti (i) European Monetary System (i) European Parliament (i) European Recovery (Marshall) Plan (i) Eurozone 2010 crisis (i), (ii), (iii) debtor and creditor nations (i) gap in living standards and (i) impact on rest of world (i) partial aspects of a nation state (i) Spaniards look for work (i) UK deflation and (i) exchange controls (i), (ii) Exchange Rate Mechanism (i) exchange rates (i), (ii) exclusion, sense of (i) experts (i) Facebook (i), (ii), (iii) FaceTime (i) fashion (i) Federal Reserve 2009 emergency measures (i) Bernanke (i) central to global economy (i) Greenspan (i) IMF and (i), (ii)n21 interest rates and (i) printing money (i) S&P 500 index (i) Volcker (i) Finland (i), (ii), (iii) Finns Party (i) First Opium War (i) First World War aftermath in West (i) immigration during (i) US and (i), (ii), (iii) US view of (i) Versailles (i) world turned upside down (i) Five Star Movement (i), (ii) Florence (i) Forbes (i) Forum Villa d’Este (i) ‘Four Freedoms’ (i), (ii) France American troops stationed (i) banks and Eurozone crisis (i) banning the burqa and niqab (i) Coal and Steel (i), (ii) franc plummets (i) G7 (i) Germany and (i) Mitterrand and (i) per capita incomes (i) position in EU (i) Second Gulf War condemned (i) Suez (i) UN Security Council (i) warship tonnage (i) Franco-Prussian War (i), (ii) Franklin, Benjamin (i) free trade Bernie Sanders opposes (i) British Empire and (i) Cobden (i), (ii) EU and (i) evidence regarding (i) protectionism and (i) RCEP and (i) Soviet communism and (i) TPP and (i) Trump against (i) UK leads the way (i), (ii) Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) (i) Freedom House (i), (ii) French Indochina (i) French Revolution (i) Friedman, Milton (i) Front National (i) Fukushima (i) Fukuyama, Francis (i), (ii), (iii) G5 (i), (ii) G7 (i), (ii) G20 (i) Gaddafi, Colonel (i) Gallup (i), (ii) Gansu corridor (i) Gansu province (China) (i) Gastarbeiter (i), (ii) GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) creation (i), (ii) industrial nations and (i) protectionism kept at bay (i) rounds of (i), (ii), (iii) Gaza (i) General Electric (GE) (i), (ii) General Strike (i) General Theory (John Maynard Keynes) (i) Geneva (i), (ii) Geneva Convention (i) Genghis Khan (i) Georgia (Europe) (i), (ii), (iii) Germany (i) ageing population (i) American troops stationed (i) asylum seekers (i), (ii) Bundesbank (i) Coal and Steel (i), (ii) financial strength (i) France and (i) G7 (i) Gastarbeiter (i) hatred of inflation (i) history of unification (i) Hitler (i) interest rates (i) migration to US (i) per capita incomes (i) position in EU (i) post-First World War (i) post-Second World War (i), (ii) Second Gulf War condemned (i) Southern Europe deficits and (i) Turkish population (i) warship tonnage (i) Weimar Republic (i) Giralda (i), (ii) glacial melt (i) Global Peace Index (i) globalization 19th century (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) 2016 US election (i) Brexiteers and (i) competing currencies and (i) cross-border capital flows dominate (i) see also cross-border capital flow immigrants and (i), (ii) in big trouble (i) information technology and (i) key claims regarding (i) key drivers (i) nation states and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) opponents of (i) rich benefit from (i) technology and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Trump rejects (i), (ii) Glorious Revolution (i) Góes, Carlos (i) GOFF (Global Organization for Financial Flows) (i) gold (i), (ii) 19th century (i), (ii) Churchill re-joins gold standard (i) post-First World War (i) sub-Saharan trade in (i) US dollar and (i) Golden Dawn (i) Google (i), (ii) Gove, Michael (i) Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (i) Grand Canal (China) (i) Grand Mosque of Córdoba (i) Great Debasement (i) Great Depression bailing out the banks (i) British Empire survives (i) fears of another (i) GATT and (i) macroeconomics and (i) moving away from the free market (i) Great Game (i) Great Illusion, The (Norman Angell) (i) ‘Great Moderation’ (i), (ii), (iii) ‘Great Society’ (i) ‘Great White Fleet’ (i) Greece asylum seekers and (i) border problems (i) financial weakness (i) joins EU (i) Persia and ancient Greece (i) private sector creditors turn back on (i) Syriza (i), (ii) Greenspan, Alan (i) Grenada (i), (ii)n4 Gresham’s Law (i) Guam (i) Guantanamo Bay (i) Guinness (i) Guizhou province (China) (i), (ii) Gujarat (i) Gulag (i) Gulf States (i) Gulf War, First (i) Gulf War, Second (i), (ii), (iii) Gutt, Camille (i) Haiti (i) Haldeman, H.R.


pages: 312 words: 91,835

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization by Branko Milanovic

"Robert Solow", Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, colonial exploitation, colonial rule, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deglobalization, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, income inequality, income per capita, invisible hand, labor-force participation, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Martin Wolf, means of production, mittelstand, moral hazard, Nash equilibrium, offshore financial centre, oil shock, open borders, Paul Samuelson, place-making, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post scarcity, post-industrial society, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Nader, Second Machine Age, seigniorage, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, special economic zone, stakhanovite, trade route, transfer pricing, very high income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

A final wave of literature that I want to mention here is from the 1990s. It was dominated by the Washington Consensus (a set of policy prescriptions that emphasized deregulation and privatization) and the forecasting of the “end of history” (the title of an influential 1989 article by Francis Fukuyama, leading to the book The End of History and the Last Man [1992]). Japan still appeared to be ascendant, but China made a cameo appearance. Many of the books celebrated neoliberalism and predicted its speedy extension to the rest of the world, including the Middle East. Later, the US invasion of Iraq would be justified by, among other things, an appeal to the “end of history.”5 The war was supposed to bring democracy to Iraq and indirectly to the rest of the Arab world, resulting in an end to the intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in negotiations between the now democratic parties.

Sicco Mansholt, then the president of the European Commission, was a strong proponent of zero growth. See also Kahn and Wiener (1968). A much more realistic, and in some areas like migration, strikingly prescient, picture was painted by Alfred Sauvy in his excellent Zero Growth? (1976) (the French original was published in 1973). 5. See Francis Fukuyama’s interview with Spiegel International, “A Model Democracy Is Not Emerging in Iraq” (March 22, 2006), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/interview-with-ex-neocon-francis-fukuyama-a-model-democracy-is-not-emerging-in-iraq-a-407315.html. 6. It could be that Chinese weapons producers, which are all state-owned, are less belligerent than their American counterparts because there is nothing for them to gain in case of a war. 7. Steamship technology took almost one hundred years to spread from rich to poor countries, while today’s technological developments are almost instantly available to poor countries (see Comin 2014).

See also capital; Industrial Revolution and industrialization; labor; skill-biased technological progress economicism, naïve, 73 economic power, 102 economics, discipline of, 234–239 economies, main features of, 246n12 economies of scale, 13 education: twenty-first and twenty-second centuries and, 7, 181; skill-biased technological progress and, 47; twentieth century and, 53, 93–94; preindustrial period and, 70; Brazil and, 82; Chile and, 84; communist countries and, 99; Kuznets cycles and, 99, 117; socialist great leveling and, 100, 102; war and, 102; union density and, 106; race with skills and, 114; United States, 114, 188, 189, 260n24; migrant taxes and, 152; China and, 178; United States and, 181, 263n4; capital/ labor income and, 186–187, 216; globalization and, 207–208, 215–217; equalizing, 218, 219–222; capital income and, 221–222; wages and, 256n21, 263n3; assortative mating and, 260n26; families and, 263n4. See also benign/malign forces; social services effort, work, 140 Ehrlich, Paul, 21 1820–2011, 119–125, 127–132. See also Industrial Revolution; preindustrial period; twentieth century elephant curve, 242n8 Elsby, Michael W. L., 182 emerging market economies, 29 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama), 157 endowments, 218, 220–222 Engels, Friedrich, 129, 255n14 entrepreneurship, 100–101 entropy index, 254n10 environmental concerns, 232–233, 234, 263n9 epidemics, 50, 57, 62–63, 65, 69, 98. See also benign/malign forces; plague equality of opportunity, 238–239 “equivalent units,” 13 expenditures as share of GDP (United Kingdom and United States), 246n10 exports, 24, 62, 143, 173, 235, 236–237, 241n2 false consciousness, 114, 200, 201–202, 217 families, 112, 141, 215–216, 263n4.


pages: 307 words: 88,745

War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers by Benjamin R. Teitelbaum

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bitcoin, Boris Johnson, creative destruction, crony capitalism, cryptocurrency, Donald Trump, Etonian, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, Joseph Schumpeter, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, mass immigration, mutually assured destruction, Network effects, Saturday Night Live, school choice, side project, Skype, South China Sea, Westphalian system, WikiLeaks

Sergey Naryshkin: Christoph Laug, “Prominent Right-Wing Figures in Russia,” Russian Analytical Digest 135 (August 5, 2013), https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-135-6-9.pdf. “All that is anti-liberal is good”: “Alexander Dugin (Introduction by Mark Sleboda) Identitär Idé 4 / Identitarian Ideas 4,” YouTube, September 14, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7X-o_ndhSVA. Note that I lightly edit Dugin’s English throughout these quotations, as I do in my interview with him. Francis Fukuyama: Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989). all three were modernist: These ideas are more fully elaborated in Aleksandr Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory (London: Arktos, 2012), 17. Chapter 12: The Summit nobody seemed to notice: Luca Steinmann, “The Illiberal Far-Right of Aleksandr Dugin. A conversation,” Reset DOC, December 4, 2018, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/illiberal-far-right-aleksandr-dugin-conversation/.

And this is important: liberalism taken to its logical end cannot recognize gender. Because to be a woman or to be a man, that means that we have a collective identity.” This way of thinking about people, defining them as ideally disconnected (liberated) from religion, family, nation, even their own bodies is historically exotic and insidious, he claimed. And as even a proponent of liberalism like Francis Fukuyama understood, it would leave us yearning for community. That problem, Dugin argued, birthed the two main challenges to liberalism in the twentieth century: communism and fascism. Both ideologies aspired to promote an alternative entity—not the individual, but two collectivities, class and race. And each claimed the universal validity of their vision for all of humanity, meaning they could never coexist.

Pre-Christian polytheistic faiths weren’t always evangelistic, and they were often tolerant of different religious practices, even different deities, for different peoples. Christianity, however, claimed to be a universal truth superseding local beliefs. It guided people to disdain and abandon their roots through its assertion that the past was sin and the future will bring salvation. Especially in its Protestant incarnations, Christianity would unite all humans in the pursuit of a unified goal at the end of history: communion with God. Marxism and capitalism adopted a lot of these ideas, each claiming to be an absolute truth for all people, regardless of blood or creed, and attempting to funnel all toward a unified goal in the future rather than the past—be it earthly communist utopia, personal wealth, or mere social “progress” instead of a union with the divine. The result? Wherever you turn in the modern Westernized world, regardless of whether the mainstream left or right is in power, you will come into conflict with doctrines hostile to anything that could make one community meaningfully different from another.


pages: 798 words: 240,182

The Transhumanist Reader by Max More, Natasha Vita-More

23andMe, Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic, artificial general intelligence, augmented reality, Bill Joy: nanobots, bioinformatics, brain emulation, Buckminster Fuller, cellular automata, clean water, cloud computing, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, combinatorial explosion, conceptual framework, Conway's Game of Life, cosmological principle, data acquisition, discovery of DNA, Douglas Engelbart, Drosophila, en.wikipedia.org, endogenous growth, experimental subject, Extropian, fault tolerance, Flynn Effect, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, friendly AI, game design, germ theory of disease, hypertext link, impulse control, index fund, John von Neumann, joint-stock company, Kevin Kelly, Law of Accelerating Returns, life extension, lifelogging, Louis Pasteur, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral hazard, Network effects, Norbert Wiener, pattern recognition, Pepto Bismol, phenotype, positional goods, prediction markets, presumed consent, Ray Kurzweil, reversible computing, RFID, Ronald Reagan, scientific worldview, silicon-based life, Singularitarianism, social intelligence, stem cell, stochastic process, superintelligent machines, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, technological singularity, Ted Nelson, telepresence, telepresence robot, telerobotics, the built environment, The Coming Technological Singularity, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, transaction costs, Turing machine, Turing test, Upton Sinclair, Vernor Vinge, Von Neumann architecture, Whole Earth Review, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

Meanwhile, maddened children, deluded fanatics, and terrorists like Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) murder with homemade bombs or stolen passenger jets to express their distaste for this relentless and unprecedented future that has exploded, as it were, into reality. It was refreshing, then, in 2002, to find a public intellectual of Dr. Francis Fukuyama’s ­standing take on the intensely real, serious topic of accelerating biotechnology. Instant fame had embraced Fukuyama a decade earlier when his conservative The End of History (Fukuyama 2006) seemed to explain the Soviet Union’s abrupt collapse. Liberal humanism – democratic, realistic, and market-driven rather than authoritarian – had won the cold war against its authoritarian and deludedly utopian foes. Why? Because, Fukuyama argued, it worked in harmony with human nature.

Shapiro explains “moral category” arguments such as arguments from nature, arguments from identity, from merit, and from external influence, and argues that there are serious problems in distinguishing disorder from augmentation models. This matters because some people have argued in favor of allowing treatments for disorders while prohibiting them for augmentations that are otherwise similar in nature. Philosopher Andy Miah casts a critical eye on Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg” and Francis Fukuyama’s views on “posthumanism.” Miah argues that the technoprogressive pursuit of biological transgressions can enrich individual and collective human life, while also permitting societies to attend to any social injustices that might arise through such behavior. Miah concludes with a full articulation of the concept of “biocultural capital,” which conveys a general, transhumanist justification for human enhancement.

One of the main criticisms of this emerging era is the way in which it may commodify life, the focus of the next section. Life as a Commodity If one acknowledges the merit of systematically reinforcing human biology so it is optimized to flourish – while accepting that one cannot expect certainty of bringing about such conditions – then what objections might there be to such a system? Francis Fukuyama’s (2002) primary concern is the commercial character of such a system of healthcare. He argues that such commercialization will lead inevitably to the commodification of life and this will diminish human flourishing, notably through it bringing about an impoverished view of human dignity. In response, I will seek to explain how the freedom to pursue commercial enhancements may be justified on the basis of what I call the accumulation of biocultural capital.


pages: 329 words: 102,469

Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West by Timothy Garton Ash

Albert Einstein, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, BRICs, British Empire, call centre, centre right, clean water, Columbine, continuation of politics by other means, cuban missile crisis, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, Eratosthenes, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), James Watt: steam engine, Kickstarter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, Peace of Westphalia, postnationalism / post nation state, Project for a New American Century, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Thomas Malthus, trade liberalization, Washington Consensus, working poor, working-age population, World Values Survey

“Yes,” excited Europeans exclaimed, “that’s who we are: systematic peace-loving Kantians!” (Derrida and Habermas also invoked Kant.) The fact that this confirmation came from a right-wing American—indeed, one of the fabled, demonized cabal of neoconservatives—doubled the impact. It was as if the devil had just certified the status of the angels. Europeans had already derived their two biggest political ideas of the post–Cold War era from the United States: Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Like Kagan’s boutade, both had started as journal articles with a striking, deliberately overstated thesis. The authors’ subsequent caveats and qualifications in the longer book versions passed largely unnoticed. But this was something more. For here, Europeans were getting their own idea of themselves played back to them by an American, in an exaggerated form.

Now Americans, with their characteristic historical optimism, have laid out a breathtaking proposition to the world: that we—we, the free—can, by our own endeavors, so foster this unprecedented advance of freedom that it will, in time, embrace the whole of humankind. Then there will be no cause for terror. Underlying the starkest version of this vision is an equally breathtaking analytical premise: that there is now “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”18 This recalls Francis Fukuyama’s argument for a “worldwide liberal revolution” in his hugely influential article of 1989 and subsequent book on The End of History,19 and the so-called Washington Consensus of the IMF and World Bank in the 1990s. The bald simplicity of this claim for a single sustainable model, with its implicit image of America as a model for the future of all humankind, has offended many Europeans, Africans, Asians, and others who have themselves long been committed to such a post-Enlightenment, global meliorist aspiration.

Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, available on http://www.whitehouse.gov. 7. National security strategy issued on September 17, 2002, section III. All quotations are from the version on http://www.whitehouse.gov. 8. In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 6, 1941. 9. In Newsweek, special Davos edition “Issues 2004,” dated December 2003–February 2004. 10. The list in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 49, seems to me arbitrarily short. I am most grateful to Jonathan Keates, and his disintegrating Almanach de Gotha, for help in augmenting it. 11. This and the following figures follow Larry Diamond, “A Report Card on Democracy,” Hoover Digest, 2000, no. 3, pp. 91–100, p. 91. 12. This covers the period from January to November 2003. Information from Freedom House, to be published in Adrian Karatnycky et al.


pages: 225 words: 54,010

A Short History of Progress by Ronald Wright

Albert Einstein, Atahualpa, Bretton Woods, British Empire, clean water, Columbian Exchange, cuban missile crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Haber-Bosch Process, Hernando de Soto, invention of agriculture, James Watt: steam engine, Jane Jacobs, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, mass immigration, nuclear winter, out of africa, Parkinson's law, Ronald Reagan, Thomas Malthus, urban sprawl

And peasants were freed from vermin with generous dustings of ddt in what became known as the Third World — that unravelling tapestry of non-Western cultures seen as a relic of “backwardness” torn between the superpowers. In both its capitalist and communist versions, the great promise of modernity was progress without limit and without end. The collapse of the Soviet Union led many to conclude that there was really only one way of progress after all. In 1992 Francis Fukuyama, a former U.S. State Department official, declared that capitalism and democracy were the “end” of history — not only its destination but its goal.8 Doubters pointed out that capitalism and democracy are not necessarily bedfellows, citing Nazi Germany, modern China, and the worldwide archipelago of sweatshop tyrannies. Yet Fukuyama’s naive triumphalism strengthened a belief, mainly on the political right, that those who have not chosen the true way forward should be made to do so for their own good — by force, if necessary.

American Cold Warriors of the last century used to threaten to “bomb the Soviets back into the Stone Age.” Whether the Russians uttered the same threat, I don’t know. But it was certainly a credible one. Even if a nuclear “exchange” (as the euphemism went) failed to extinguish all higher forms of life, it would have ended civilization worldwide. No crops worth eating would grow in a nuclear winter. 8. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 9. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1711; Thomas Henry Huxley, On Elementary Instruction in Physiology, 1877. 10. Quoted in Robert J. Wenke, Patterns in Prehistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 79. 11. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 2, scene 2. 12. Ibid., As You Like It, act 4, scene 1. 13. Quoted in Glyn Daniel, The Idea of Prehistory (Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican, 1962), p. 19. 14.

Governments keen to avoid more of the same began broadening the franchise throughout the following century. A measure of participation filtered grudgingly down the social pyramid, while the new industrial economy nourished a growing middle class.33 We in the lucky countries of the West now regard our two-century bubble of freedom and affluence as normal and inevitable; it has even been called the “end” of history, in both a temporal and teleological sense.34 Yet this new order is an anomaly: the opposite of what usually happens as civilizations grow. Our age was bankrolled by the seizing of half a planet, extended by taking over most of the remaining half, and has been sustained by spending down new forms of natural capital, especially fossil fuels. In the New World, the West hit the biggest bonanza of all time.


pages: 537 words: 158,544

Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna

"Robert Solow", Admiral Zheng, affirmative action, anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, Bartolomé de las Casas, Branko Milanovic, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, cognitive dissonance, colonial rule, complexity theory, continuation of politics by other means, crony capitalism, Deng Xiaoping, different worldview, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Edward Glaeser, energy security, European colonialism, facts on the ground, failed state, flex fuel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global supply chain, haute couture, Hernando de Soto, illegal immigration, income inequality, informal economy, invisible hand, Islamic Golden Age, Khyber Pass, Kickstarter, knowledge economy, land reform, low cost airline, low skilled workers, mass immigration, means of production, megacity, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, open borders, open economy, Parag Khanna, Pax Mongolica, Pearl River Delta, pirate software, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, Potemkin village, price stability, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, South China Sea, special economic zone, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, trickle-down economics, uranium enrichment, urban renewal, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce

But ever concentrated on the question of how to defend Britain against Continental powers, he focused on the Eurasian “world island,” whose “heartland” was “the greatest natural fortress on earth,” for it was inaccessible from the sea—and thus unassailable by British sea power—allowing a land-based power to dominate the world.18 His strategic counterpoint, the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, argued that in fact oceanic power was the key to global dominance, writing, “The empire of the seas is doubtless the empire of the world.” Geopolitics has since evolved into a family of holistic power formulae applied across the world and over long time horizons, what Fernand Braudel termed the longue durée.19 But it remains Toynbee’s story of challenge and response. GEOPOLITICS VERSUS GLOBALIZATION? In the 1990s, a great debate took place between the contrasting visions of Francis Fukuyama (The End of History) and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations), with the former generally caricatured as utopian and the latter as fatalistic. The grand predecessor to this dichotomy was the tension between the worldviews of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Spengler opened The Decline of the West (1918) with the bold claim, “This book will for the first time attempt to predict history.” He argued that the demise of the classical West was as inevitable as history itself; the symbols of high culture would naturally degenerate into material decadence in a process similar to human aging or the cycle of the seasons.

Today there are numerous equivalent statements on the pacifying effect of globalization, each echoing Norman Angell’s Great Illusion claim of the “complete economic futility of conquest.” Francis Fukuyama argues for the end of ideological struggle; John Mueller observes that the prospect of total, annihilating war makes it “subrationally unthinkable” Jonathan Schell and Peter Singer see the emergence of global consciousness as the “moral equivalent of war” or a “weapon of civilization” Robert Wright demonstrates that the accumulation of positive outcomes disincentivizes conflict; and Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman argue for a “Great Capitalist Peace.” See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992); Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Schell, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003); Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); Wright, Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage, 2000); and Lieven and Hulsman, Ethical Realism. 69.

.: Princeton University Press, 2005), ch. 7. 39. One measure of progress up the ladder of modernity is “stateness.” Stateness refers to a government’s capacity to enforce its power, ranging from minimal functions (public goods, property rights, defense) to intermediate functions (addressing externalities, education, regulation, social insurance) to more activist roles (industrial policy, wealth redistribution). See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). Four decades ago, Samuel Huntington wrote in Political Order in Changing Societies that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.” 40.


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Age of Anger: A History of the Present by Pankaj Mishra

anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, continuation of politics by other means, creative destruction, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Fellow of the Royal Society, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, global village, Gunnar Myrdal, informal economy, invisible hand, liberal capitalism, Mahatma Gandhi, Marshall McLuhan, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Nelson Mandela, Peter Thiel, Philip Mirowski, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, precariat, Republic of Letters, Scientific racism, Silicon Valley, smart cities, Snapchat, stem cell, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, traveling salesman, urban planning, Vilfredo Pareto, wage slave, women in the workforce, zero-sum game

Yet since he wrote, the emotional and intellectual realities signified by the words ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ have come to be seen as fundamentally different and opposed. In particular, the attacks of 9/11, breaking into the general celebratory mood of globalization, sharpened an old divide. How could, it was felt, people be so opposed to modernity, and all the many goods it had to offer to people around the world: equality, liberty, prosperity, toleration, pluralism and representative government. Having proclaimed the end of history, Francis Fukuyama wondered whether there is ‘something about Islam’ that made ‘Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity’. Such perplexity, widely shared, was answered by a simple idea: that these opponents of modernity were religious fanatics – jihadists – seeking martyrdom; they were unenlightened zealots. This answer did not explain the nature of their fanaticism. It simply assumed that modernity was inherently liberal, if not anti-religious, individualistic and emancipatory, and fundamentally opposed to medieval and oppressive religion.

This religion of universal progress has had many presumptive popes and encyclicals: from the nineteenth-century dream championed by The Economist, in which capital, goods, jobs and people freely circulate, to Henry Luce’s proclamation of an ‘American century’ of free trade, and ‘Modernization Theory’, which proclaimed a ‘great world revolution in human aspirations and economic development’. Writing soon after 9/11, Francis Fukuyama seemed more convinced than ever that ‘modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful and unprecedented. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for much of the world.’ As late as 2008, Fareed Zakaria could declare in his much-cited book, The Post-American World, that ‘the rise of the rest is a consequence of American ideas and actions’ and that ‘the world is going America’s way’, with countries ‘becoming more open, market-friendly and democratic’, their numerous poor ‘slowly being absorbed into productive and growing economies’.

Born in 1958, a year after Osama bin Laden, to a devout middle-class family in Aleppo, al-Suri dropped out of university in 1980 to join a radical group that opposed Syria’s secular nationalist Baath Party and advocated an Islamic state based on Shariah law. Working his way through various Islamist organizations in Asia and Africa, al-Suri ended up designing a leaderless and global jihad for uprooted men like himself. A Militant Intelligentsia Al-Suri, labelled by Newsweek the ‘Francis Fukuyama of al-Qaeda’, was more accurately the Mikhail Bakunin of the Muslim world in his preference for anarchist tactics. In his magnum opus, The Global Islamic Resistance Call (2004), al-Suri scorned hierarchical forms of political organization, exhorting a jihadi strategy based on ‘unconnected cells’ and ‘individual operations’ – a call answered by today’s auto-intoxicated killers. In mass-producing such malcontents and radicals through modernization, Muslim countries followed, as discussed earlier, a pattern established by Russia – the first country where autocrats decreed a tryst with modernity.


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The end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama

affirmative action, anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, business cycle, centre right, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, European colonialism, Exxon Valdez, F. W. de Klerk, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Gunnar Myrdal, Hernando de Soto, income inequality, Isaac Newton, Joan Didion, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, kremlinology, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, life extension, linear programming, long peace, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, New Journalism, nuclear winter, old-boy network, open economy, post-industrial society, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Socratic dialogue, strikebreaker, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, zero-sum game

THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN Francis Fukuyama FREE PRESS NEW YORK LONDON TORONTO SYDNEY FREE PRESS A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Copyright © 1992, 2006 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. First Free Press trade paperback edition 2006 FREE PRESS and colophon are trademarks of Simon & Schuster, Inc. For information about special discounts for bulk purchases, please contact Simon & Schuster Special Sales: 1-800-456-6798 or business@simonandschuster.com Manufactured in the United States of America 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 The Library of Congress has catalogued the hardcover edition as follows: Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the last man / Francis Fukuyama p. cm.

Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey. Afterword to the Second Paperback Edition of The End of History and the Last Man In the seventeen years that have passed since the original publication of my essay, “The End of History?”, my hypothesis has been criticized from every conceivable point of view. Publication of the second paperback edition of the book The End of History and the Last Man gives me an opportunity to restate the original argument, to answer what I regard as the most serious objections that were raised to it, and to reflect on some of the developments in world politics that have occurred since the summer of 1989. Let me begin with the question: What was the “End of History”? The phrase is of course not an original one, but comes from Hegel and, more popularly, from Marx.

And Marx shared Hegel’s belief in the possibility of an end of history. That is, he foresaw a final form of society that was free from contradictions, and whose achievement would terminate the historical process. Where Marx differed from Hegel was over just what kind of society emerged at the end of history. Marx believed that the liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of class conflict, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Marx turned Hegel’s historicism against him, arguing that the liberal state did not represent the universalization of freedom, but only the victory of freedom for a certain class, the bourgeoisie. Hegel believed that alienation—the division of man against himself and his subsequent loss of control over his destiny—had been adequately resolved at the end of history through the philosophical recognition of the freedom possible in the liberal state.


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They Don't Represent Us: Reclaiming Our Democracy by Lawrence Lessig

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, blockchain, Cass Sunstein, Columbine, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, David Brooks, do-ocracy, Donald Trump, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, income inequality, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, Joi Ito, Mark Zuckerberg, obamacare, Parag Khanna, plutocrats, Plutocrats, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Skype, speech recognition, Steven Levy, Upton Sinclair

On remedies, see Frances Moore Lappé and Adam Eichen, Daring Democracy: Igniting Power, Meaning, and Connection for the America We Want (Boston: Beacon, 2017). 4.See, e.g., Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists. 5.Numbers drawn from Max Roser, “Democracy,” in Our World in Data (2016), available at link #7. For a slightly different reckoning, see Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 8. 6.Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 6. 7.Steven Kull, “Voter Anger with Government and the 2016 Election: A Survey of American Voters,” Voice of the People, conducted by the Program for Public Consultation, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland (November 2016), available at link #8. The differences between Republicans and Democrats with each of these questions was slight: “big interests” 95%R/89%D; “does not serve the common good”—87%R; 84%D; “corporations and their lobbyists have too much influence”—89%R/90%D; “elected officials think more about the interests of their campaign donors than the common good of the people”—92%R/88%D.

But along a wide range of issues, they conflict. Tea Party Republicans hate crony capitalism. The rich don’t. Swing-state Democrats turn a blind eye to steel tariffs. Democrats generally don’t. Rather than a bias that runs in an obvious direction, the sum of these different inequalities bends consistently in no particular direction. This is not the physics of a plutocracy. It is the dynamic of a vetocracy—a “veto-ocracy,” as Francis Fukuyama puts it.129 As Fukuyama describes, the American Constitution already embeds many veto points for any substantial legislation. A law can be stopped in either house. A law can be slowed by the president. A law can be struck down by the courts. A president can refuse to enforce a law. All of these constitute the ways in which the constitutional system makes change difficult. This much (small-c) conservatism is built into the plan.

Lacombe, Billionaires and Stealth Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 127.See Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 128.Indeed, the median household income of the twenty smallest states is below the median household income of the top twenty. See Per Capita Wealth, available at link #79. 129.Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), chap. 34. 130.Van Reybrouck, Against Elections, xiii. 131.See the analysis by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy in “What Drives Climate Change Denial? Campaign Donations and Lobbying,” Brennan Center for Justice, September 19, 2017, available at link #80. 132.See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “U.S.


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Moneyland: Why Thieves and Crooks Now Rule the World and How to Take It Back by Oliver Bullough

banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, bitcoin, blood diamonds, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, capital controls, central bank independence, corporate governance, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, dark matter, diversification, Donald Trump, energy security, failed state, Flash crash, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, high net worth, if you see hoof prints, think horses—not zebras, income inequality, joint-stock company, liberal capitalism, liberal world order, mass immigration, medical malpractice, offshore financial centre, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances, rent-seeking, Richard Feynman, risk tolerance, Sloane Ranger, sovereign wealth fund, WikiLeaks

In the summer of 1991, when hardliners in Moscow tried and failed to re-impose the old Soviet ways on their country, I was on a family holiday in the Scottish Highlands, where I spent days trying to coax the radio into cutting through the mountains to tell me what was going on. By the time our holiday was over, the coup had failed, and a new world was dawning. The previously sober historian Francis Fukuyama declared it to be the End of History. The whole world was going to be free. The Good Guys Had Won. I longed to see what was happening in Eastern Europe, and I read hundreds of books by those who had been there before me. While at university, I spent every long summer wandering through the previously forbidden countries of the old Warsaw Pact, revelling in Europe’s reunification. At graduation, most of my fellow students had lined up jobs to go to, but not me.

Another reason for our failure to adequately engage with their mechanics is that Westerners often do not realise how rare it is now, or how unique it is in a historical perspective, for anyone to live in an honest and prosperous democracy. Much Western political thought envisages the liberal democracies of the ‘developed’ countries as the natural end point of a historical process, and refers to other societies as ‘developing’, as if they are trains on a track which will eventually deliver them to the terminal station where we now live. The political theorist Francis Fukuyama – who has given up on the idea that history has come to an end – argues in his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order that this is a damagingly wrong way of looking at the world. The liberal capitalism of Western Europe, the United States and the other Western countries is not only extremely unusual, but also just one of multiple kinds of government. Corruption, he writes, often emerges where a Western-style state and economic structure has been imposed through ignorance or arrogance on to a society with totally different traditions.

I have used reliable media reports extensively, and have identified them as the source where appropriate. It would take too long to list all the books I have read, but here is a brief summary of key texts used in researching different chapters, with suggestions for further reading. 1 – Aladdin’s Cave Mancur Olson’s theories on bandits are set out in Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000). I also found Francis Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011; London: Profile Books, 2011) very helpful. Sarah Chayes lays out the connection between corruption and terrorism in unanswerable detail in Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2015). The John Allen quote is taken from evidence he provided to the US Senate’s committee on foreign relations, and is available on its website, alongside statements from diplomats and others, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/a-transformation-afghanistan-beyond-2014.


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Revolting!: How the Establishment Are Undermining Democracy and What They're Afraid Of by Mick Hume

anti-communist, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, central bank independence, colonial rule, David Brooks, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, non-tariff barriers, Occupy movement, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Slavoj Žižek, the scientific method, We are the 99%, World Values Survey

Yet even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was little evidence of any renewed faith in democracy among the rulers of the Western world. In 1989 American author Francis Fukuyama’sEnd of History’ thesis was hailed as a statement of the historic triumph of liberal democratic capitalism. Yet there was little real triumphalism in Fukuyama’s argument. He based his case rather on the fact that all the alternatives had been discredited and collapsed. It was hardly a statement of deep commitment to or faith in the democratic cause. Western democracy was the winner by default. When Fukuyama expanded his thesis into a 1992 book, the full title became The End of History and the Last Man. He was at least half-right; the West had won by being the last man standing. We were soon to be reminded, however, that the history of the struggle for democracy never ends.43 Since then, what passes for Western democracy has increasingly been exposed as an empty shell.

Sylvia Pankhurst (author) and Kathryn Dodd (ed.), A Sylvia Pankhurst Reader (Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 74 38. A. Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941–44 (London, 1953), p. 497 39. www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/7805.H_L_Mencken 40. Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship (Cambridge University, revised edition, 1980), p. 173 41. Cited in Runciman, Confidence Trap, pp. 104, 106 42. Ibid., p. 306 43. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 1992 (Penguin, 2012) 44. The Writings of the Young Karl Marx, Philosophical and Social, translated by L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City, NY, 1967), p. 206 Chapter 4: For Europe – against the EU 1. Miguel Herrero de Minon, ‘Europe’s Non-Existent Body Politic’, in de Minon and G. Leicester, Europe: A Time for Pragmatism (European Policy Forum, 1996), pp. 1–5 2.


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The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century by Robert D. Kaplan

Admiral Zheng, always be closing, California gold rush, collective bargaining, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, Haight Ashbury, kremlinology, load shedding, mass immigration, megacity, one-China policy, Parag Khanna, Pax Mongolica, Ronald Reagan, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, trade route, Westphalian system, Yom Kippur War

Huntington disdains “rational-choice theory,” the reigning fad in political science, which assumes that human behavior is predictable but which fails to take account of fear, envy, hatred, self-sacrifice, and other human passions that are essential to an understanding of politics. In an age of academic operators he is an old-fashioned teacher who speculates historically and philosophically on the human condition. His former students include Francis Fukuyama, the author of the famous Post Cold War anthem The End of History and the Last Man (1992), and Fareed Zakaria, the former managing editor of Foreign Affairs and the current editor of Newsweek International. You aren’t likely to see Huntington on C-SPAN, let alone on The McLaughlin Group. He is a worse than indifferent public speaker: hunched over, reading laboriously from a text. His status and reputation have come the hard way: through writing books that, though often publicly denounced, have had a pervasive influence among people who count.

Indeed, with the most critical part of the world, East Asia, in the midst of an unprecedented arms race fed by acquisitions of missiles and submarines (especially in the South China Sea region, where states are motivated by old-fashioned nationalism rather than universal values), and with the Middle East undergoing less a democratic revolution than a crisis in central authority, we ignore Mearsheimer’s larger message at our peril. In fact, Mearsheimer is best known in the academy for his equally controversial views on China, and particularly for his 2001 magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2010, the Columbia University professor Richard K. Betts called Tragedy one of the three great works of the Post Cold War era, along with Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). And, Betts suggested, “once China’s power is full grown,” Mearsheimer’s book may pull ahead of the other two in terms of influence. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics truly defines Mearsheimer, as it does realism. Mearsheimer sat me down in his office, overlooking the somber Collegiate Gothic structures of the University of Chicago, and talked for hours, over the course of several days, about Tragedy and his life.

Whatever the latest groupthink happens to be, Mearsheimer almost always instinctively wants to oppose it—especially if it emanates from Washington. The best grand theories tend to be written no earlier than middle age, when the writer has life experience and mistakes behind him to draw upon. Morgenthau’s 1948 classic, Politics Among Nations, was published when he was forty-four, Fukuyama’s The End of History was published as a book when he was forty, and Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations as a book when he was sixty-nine. Mearsheimer began writing The Tragedy of Great Power Politics when he was in his mid-forties, after working on it for a decade. Published just before 9/11, the book intimates the need for America to avoid strategic distractions and concentrate on confronting China. A decade later, with the growth of China’s military might vastly more apparent than it was in 2001, and following the debacles of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, its clairvoyance is breathtaking.


pages: 538 words: 141,822

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov

"Robert Solow", A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Buckminster Fuller, Cass Sunstein, citizen journalism, cloud computing, cognitive dissonance, Columbine, computer age, conceptual framework, crowdsourcing, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, don't be evil, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Earth, illegal immigration, invention of radio, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, John Markoff, John von Neumann, Marshall McLuhan, Mitch Kapor, Naomi Klein, Network effects, new economy, New Urbanism, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, peer-to-peer, pirate software, pre–internet, Productivity paradox, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, Sinatra Doctrine, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, social graph, Steve Jobs, technoutopianism, The Wisdom of Crowds, urban planning, Washington Consensus, WikiLeaks, women in the workforce

As such, the Google Doctrine owes less to the advent of tweeting and social networking than it does to the giddy sense of superiority that many in the West felt in 1989, as the Soviet system collapsed almost overnight. As history was supposed to be ending, democracy was quickly pronounced the only game in town. Technology, with its unique ability to fuel consumerist zeal—itself seen as a threat to any authoritarian regime—as well as its prowess to awaken and mobilize the masses against their rulers, was thought to be the ultimate liberator. There is a good reason why one of the chapters in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man, the ur-text of the early 1990s that successfully bridged the worlds of positive psychology and foreign affairs, was titled “The Victory of the VCR.” The ambiguity surrounding the end of the Cold War made such arguments look far more persuasive than any close examination of their theoretical strengths would warrant. While many scholars took it to mean that the austere logic of Soviet-style communism, with its five-year plans and constant shortages of toilet paper, had simply run its course, most popular interpretations downplayed the structural deficiencies of the Soviet regime—who would want to acknowledge that the Evil Empire was only a bad joke?

In 1990, the RAND Corporation, a California-based think tank that, perhaps by the sheer virtue of its propitious location, never passes up an opportunity to praise the powers of modern technology, reached a strikingly similar conclusion. “The communist bloc failed,” it said in a timely published study, “not primarily or even fundamentally because of its centrally controlled economic policies or its excessive military burdens, but because its closed societies were too long denied the fruits of the information revolution.” This view has proved remarkably sticky. As late as 2002, Francis Fukuyama, himself a RAND Corporation alumnus, would write that “totalitarian rule depended on a regime’s ability to maintain a monopoly over information, and once modern information technology made that impossible, the regime’s power was undermined.” By 1995 true believers in the power of information to crush authoritarianism were treated to a book-length treatise. Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union, a book by Scott Shane—who from 1988 to 1991 served as the Baltimore Sun’s Moscow correspondent—tried to make the best case for why information mattered, arguing that the “death of the Soviet illusion ...

Ballard in reviewing a Huxley biography for the Guardian in 2002. “Orwell feared that what we hate will ruin us. Huxley feared that what we love will ruin us. This book is about the possibility that Huxley, not Orwell, was right,” is how Neil Postman chose to describe the theme of his best-selling Amusing Ourselves to Death. “[In contrast to Brave New World], the political predictions of ... 1984 were entirely wrong,” writes Francis Fukuyama in Our Posthuman Future. Maybe, but what many critics often fail to grasp is that both texts were written as sharp social critiques of contemporary problems rather than prophecies of the future. Orwell’s work was an attack on Stalinism and the stifling practices of the British censors, while Huxley’s was an attack on the then-popular philosophy of utilitarianism. In other words, those books probably tell us more about the intellectual debates that were prevalent in Britain at the time than about the authors’ visions of the future.


pages: 324 words: 80,217

The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success by Ross Douthat

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, AI winter, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, Burning Man, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, charter city, crack epidemic, crowdsourcing, David Graeber, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, East Village, Elon Musk, Flynn Effect, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Francisco Pizarro, ghettoisation, gig economy, Haight Ashbury, helicopter parent, hive mind, Hyperloop, immigration reform, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Islamic Golden Age, Jeff Bezos, Joan Didion, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, knowledge worker, life extension, mass immigration, mass incarceration, means of production, megacity, move fast and break things, move fast and break things, multiplanetary species, New Journalism, Nicholas Carr, Norman Mailer, obamacare, Oculus Rift, open borders, out of africa, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, pre–internet, QAnon, quantitative easing, rent-seeking, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Snapchat, social web, Steve Jobs, Steven Pinker, technoutopianism, the built environment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, wage slave, women in the workforce, Y2K

The vital culture makes a bricolage of classic stories; the decadent culture remakes the bricolage with a slightly different cast and a few plot beats swapped around. The vital culture creates fans de novo; the decadent culture performs “fan service.” The vital culture is a workshop; the decadent culture is a museum. Can the End of History End? One important prophet of this museum culture was Francis Fukuyama, whose end-of-the-Cold-War magnum opus, The End of History and the Last Man, anticipated some of the tedium and repetition I’ve described. The “end” that Fukuyama discerned, contrary to many subsequent smug dismissals of his thesis, was not an ending of events—an end to wars or calamities or economic setbacks. Rather, it was the end of a particular dialectic of ideas, the “common ideological heritage of mankind,” which had led from the feudal and hierarchical past to the egalitarian present, and which Fukuyama suggested had ended, with the mid-twentieth-century defeat of fascism and then the final crashing fall of the Communist alternative, in a victory for liberal democracy that left no other serious ideological possibilities standing.

Since the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession exposed almost a decade’s worth of Western growth as an illusion, a diverse cast of economists and political scientists and other figures on both the left and the right have begun to talk about stagnation and repetition and complacency and sclerosis as defining features of this Western age: Tyler Cowen and Robert Gordon, Thomas Piketty and Francis Fukuyama, David Graeber and Peter Thiel, and many others. This book is, in part, an attempt to synthesize their various perspectives into a compelling account of our situation. But it also weaves the social sciences together with observations on our intellectual climate, our popular culture, our religious moment, our technological pastimes, in the hopes of painting a fuller portrait of our decadence than you can get just looking at political science papers on institutional decay or an economic analysis of the declining rate of growth.

Fukuyama was often accused of being a liberal triumphalist, but the conclusion of his original essay was somewhat mournful about the scenario he described. “The end of history will be a very sad time,” he wrote. “The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the posthistorical period, there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.” And then: “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.” So even Fukuyama didn’t imagine that his “end” would be eternal—and as a provisional description of the post-1989 world, the landscape that I’m calling decadent, his “end of history” label is a reasonable fit.


pages: 304 words: 80,143

The Autonomous Revolution: Reclaiming the Future We’ve Sold to Machines by William Davidow, Michael Malone

2013 Report for America's Infrastructure - American Society of Civil Engineers - 19 March 2013, agricultural Revolution, Airbnb, American Society of Civil Engineers: Report Card, Automated Insights, autonomous vehicles, basic income, bitcoin, blockchain, blue-collar work, Bob Noyce, business process, call centre, cashless society, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, collaborative consumption, collaborative economy, collective bargaining, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, disintermediation, disruptive innovation, distributed ledger, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Geoffrey West, Santa Fe Institute, gig economy, Gini coefficient, Hyperloop, income inequality, industrial robot, Internet of things, invention of agriculture, invention of movable type, invention of the printing press, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, license plate recognition, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, Network effects, new economy, peer-to-peer lending, QWERTY keyboard, ransomware, Richard Florida, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Snapchat, speech recognition, Stuxnet, TaskRabbit, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, trade route, Turing test, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, uranium enrichment, urban planning, zero day, zero-sum game, Zipcar

Then we will have to teach those norms in schools, act them out in our homes, and have our leaders both advocate them and set good examples. We can start by shutting off our phones at meals and sharing our beds with our partners rather than with texts and tweets. CHAPTER NINE THE BODY POLITIC Government in the Autonomous Revolution IN 1992, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA published his acclaimed book The End of History and the Last Man, which proclaimed that, with the fall of the USSR, government had completed its evolution. As he put it, civilization had arrived at “the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”1 In the decades since, the rise of authoritarian regimes (roughly one nominally democratic country has reverted to tyranny every year for the last two decades) and the surge of right- and left-wing populism have cast a pall over Fukuyama’s optimistic vision.

Car and Driver, June 24, 2009, http://www.caranddriver.com/features/texting-while-driving-how-dangerous-is-it-the-results-page-2 (accessed June 27, 2019). 57. Gazzaley and Rosen, The Distracted Mind, 129. 58. Gloria Mark et al., “The Task Left Behind? Examining the Nature of Fragmented Work,” University of California, Irvine, April 2005, http://www.ics.uci.edu/%7Egmark/CHI2005.pdf (accessed June 27, 2019). Chapter Nine THE BODY POLITIC 1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reissue ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 2. “Homestead Act,” History.com, https://www.history.com/topics/homestead-act (accessed June 27, 2019). 3. Julian M. Alston, Jennifer S. James, Matthew A. Andersen, Philip G. Pardey, “A Brief History of US Agriculture,” in Persistence Pays: U.S. Agricultural Productivity Growth and the Benefits from Public R&D Spending (New York: Springer, 2008). 4.

See also retail sector cybercrime and security, 132, 153–154 credit card, 74–76 cyber currencies, 78–80, 177–178 evolution of, 172–173 fake news classification as, 169–170 financial, 39–40, 75–76, 78–80, 171–172, 177–178 global effort needed for, 179 government response to, 172–176, 179 public utilities threat with, 173, 174 response rate relation to rate of, 171–172 Russia-based, 174 cyber currencies, 10, 83 blockchain technology of, 79, 80 electricity and miners involved with, 176 governance rules and systems, 176–178 government regulation needed for, 176–177 security with, 78–80, 177–178 as spatial equivalence, 16 cyber weapons, 16, 172–173, 174, 176 Daimler, Gottlieb, 53 Data and Goliath (Schneier), 127 Data Protection Directive, 129 data tracking/collection: advertising revenues’ role in, 89, 90, 120–123 algorithmic prisons with, 13, 114, 123–128 behavior manipulation in, 117, 121, 123 consumer protections against, 127–128 cookies’ role in, 89, 116, 117–118, 128 of credit rating agencies, 118–119 evolution and factors behind abuses of, 116–118 freemium business model role in, 121–123, 129–130 government agencies purchasing, 119, 131 information fiduciaries as protection for, 129–131 laws and regulations on, 128–130 liberty threats to and factors with, 13, 116–117, 123–128 privacy threat evolution with, 116–119 from social networking sites, 116, 118 transparency of, 127 Death and Life of Great American Cities, The (Jacobs), 109 Deep Blue, 46–47 delivery services, 102 democracy: authoritarianism threat to, 158–159 collective identity of citizens key to, 163, 166, 168 income inequality in relation to, 163–164 social media/networking threats to, 7, 18, 168–169 depression, 147–148, 166 Dichter, Ernest, 135 discrimination, 162–163, 165–166 displacement: business, 71, 72–73, 99 job, with job creation historically, 51–54, 106 job, without new job creation, 43, 51, 60–64, 98–99, 105–106 Distracted Minds (Gazzaley), 155 Echo, 119 economic policy and metrics: Depression-era, 67, 160 on monetizable productivity, 58–59 non-monetizable productivity in relation to, 52, 58–59, 66, 67, 68 unemployment rates in relation to, 106–107 “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” (Keynes), 187–189 economy: automation impacts on, 12–13 Autonomous, 60–61, 96–98 entrepreneurship, 110 gig, 7, 34, 63, 84, 85, 94 Second Economy contrasted with traditional, 97–98, 103 sharing, 70, 83–87, 100, 101–102 social empathy decline with decline of, 164–165 traditional compared to Autonomous, 96 elder care, 111 election tampering, 89, 167, 180, 186 electricity: cyber currency mining use of, 176 invention of, 29, 182 ELIZA, 46 Elsevier, Reed, 119 email, 60–61, 150 emotion detection technology, 115–116 empires, rise and fall of, 6–7, 24–25 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama), 158 Enlightenment, xii, 2, 22, 152 entrepreneurship, rates of, 110 Epic of Gilgamesh, The, 24, 183–184, 185 Equifax, 75–76, 118, 126, 130 Estonia, 174 ethnicity. See race and ethnicity European Union, 14, 128–129 expertise, impairment with, 2–3 Facebook, 43, 65, 70 addictive design elements of, 144 BAADD practices of, 88, 90, 91 content governance policies of, 168 cyber currency under, 10 emotion detection technology, 115 employee to user ratio for, 86, 105 evolution unpredictability of, 180 freemium business model profiting, 122–123 narcissistic personality proliferation on, 146–147 revenue, 150 Snapchat competition with, 91 usage decline, 154 facial recognition, 116 fake news, 18, 150, 168, 169–170 farming, 25, 152, 159, 160.


pages: 333 words: 86,628

The Virtue of Nationalism by Yoram Hazony

Berlin Wall, British Empire, conceptual framework, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, invention of the printing press, Mahatma Gandhi, Peace of Westphalia, profit motive, Ronald Reagan, Steven Pinker, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Torches of Freedom, urban planning, Westphalian system

In the United States, the effort to establish an American “world order,” with Europe effectively an American protectorate, was the order of the day. On both sides of the Atlantic, the unpleasant history of past European and American imperialism prevented most from speaking openly of empire. What was repeated endlessly by elected officials, diplomats, businessmen, and media personalities—as well as in a profusion of utopian political tracts, from Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992), to Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999), to Shimon Peres’s The New Middle East (1995)—was that the “international community” was being brought under “global governance.” The world would have a single regime of law and a single economic system, governed by Americans and Europeans in accordance with liberal political doctrines. And when a nation “broke the rules” of this new world order, as was the case in Serbia, Iraq, and Libya, the American military, with allied European contingents, was going to go in and re-establish these rules.63 A worldwide regime of peace and prosperity.

Bacevich concludes, “Holding sway in not one but several regions of pivotal geopolitical importance, disdaining the legitimacy of political and economic principles other than its own, declaring the existing order to be sacrosanct, asserting unquestioned military supremacy with a globally deployed force configured not for self-defense but for coercion: These are the actions of a nation engaged in the governance of empire.… Like it or not, America today is Rome” (p. 244). As Tom Friedman put it, “The emerging global order needs an enforcer. That’s America’s new burden.” Thomas Friedman, “A Manifesto for a Fast World,” New York Times Magazine, March 28, 1999. See also Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Picador, 1999), 465–468; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); and Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), among many other such works. 64. On the conservative (or “traditionalist”) school in English political theory, see Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection; J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ed.), esp. 30–55, 148–181; Harold J.

As a result, almost all public discussion of these efforts was conducted in a murky newspeak riddled with euphemisms such as “new world order,” “ever-closer union,” “openness,” “globalization,” “global governance,” “pooled sovereignty,” “rules-based order,” “universal jurisdiction,” “international community,” “liberal internationalism,” “transnationalism,” “American leadership,” “American century,” “unipolar world,” “indispensable nation,” “hegemon,” “subsidiarity,” “play by the rules,” “the right side of history,” “the end of history,” and so on.6 All of this endured for a generation—until finally the meaning of these phrases began to become clear to a broad public, with the results that we see before us. Whether the outpouring of nationalist sentiment in Britain and America will, in the end, be for the best, remains to be seen. But perhaps we can all agree on this: The time for vacuous talk is past. The debate between nationalism and imperialism is upon us.


pages: 142 words: 18,753

Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There by David Brooks

1960s counterculture, affirmative action, Community Supported Agriculture, David Brooks, Donald Trump, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Gilder, haute couture, haute cuisine, income inequality, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, New Urbanism, Norman Mailer, place-making, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Robert Bork, Silicon Valley, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Thorstein Veblen, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, urban planning, War on Poverty, Yogi Berra

But an illogical or wrong essay will prompt dozens of other writers to rise and respond, thus giving the author mounds of publicity. Yale professor Paul Kennedy had a distinguished but unglamorous career under his belt when he wrote The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, predicting American decline. He was wrong, and hundreds of other commentators rose to say so, thus making him famous and turning his book into a bestseller. Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay called “The End of History,” which seemed wrong to people who read only the title. Thousands of essayists wrote pieces pointing out that history had not ended, and Fukuyama became a global sensation. After the article has appeared, the young intellectual will want to let the editor of the piece know what a massive impact the article is having at the White House/the Federal Reserve/the film industry or wherever its intended target is.

Not everyone has spooned so many helpings from the spiritual buffet table. But even in more traditional circles, when one sees people return to religious participation, one often gets the sense that it is the participation they go for as much as the religion. The New York Times Magazine recently ran a special issue on religion that included the astute headline “Religion Makes a Comeback (Belief to Follow).” Francis Fukuyama nicely captured the ethos of Bobo religiosity in his 1999 book, The Great Disruption: Instead of community arising as a byproduct of rigid belief, people will return to religious belief because of their desire for community. In other words, people will return to religious tradition not necessarily because they accept the truth of revelation, but precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world makes them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition.


pages: 335 words: 82,528

A Theory of the Drone by Gregoire Chamayou

drone strike, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, moral hazard, Necker cube, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, private military company, RAND corporation, telepresence, Yom Kippur War

There is no wall high enough, no barrier sufficiently impassable to guarantee the absolute isolation of a national “gated community.” The military drone is a low-cost weapon—at least in comparison to classic fighter planes. That has long been one of the principal selling points for such a weapon. But of course the contradiction lies in the fact that it is in the nature of such a weapon to proliferate. What does Francis Fukuyama do after the end of history? In his leisure hours, he puts together little drones in his garage and then proudly exhibits them on his blog.14 He is part of an rapidly developing subculture: that of the homemade drone. Following in the footsteps of the model enthusiasts of the 1960s, there today exists a whole little community of amateurs who buy or construct drones at the cost of a few hundred dollars. With their microcameras on board, these machines make it possible to produce unofficial little films, some of which are strikingly beautiful.

To the principle of the nonexposure of lives at the scene of hostilities is added the principle of making the base of operations secure: “the US homeland must remain a secure base from which the Air Force can globally project power”—which means “ensuring the protection of US facilities and infrastructures used for power projection.” Steven M. Rinaldi, Donald H. Leathem, and Timothy Kaufman, “Protecting the Homeland Air Force: Roles in Homeland Security,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2002, 83. 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Surveillance Drones, Take Two,” Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (blog), September 12, 2012, blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/09/20/surveillance-drones-take-two. 15. See the Team BlackSheep video from November 30, 2010, on YouTube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9cSxEqKQ78 and the Team BlackSheep website at www.team-blacksheep.com. 16. “Terrorists’ Unmanned Air Force,” Defensetech, May 1, 2006, defensetech.org/2006/05/01/terrorists-unmanned-air-force.


pages: 486 words: 150,849

Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History by Kurt Andersen

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, airline deregulation, airport security, always be closing, American ideology, American Legislative Exchange Council, anti-communist, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, artificial general intelligence, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, blue-collar work, Bonfire of the Vanities, bonus culture, Burning Man, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Cass Sunstein, centre right, computer age, coronavirus, corporate governance, corporate raider, COVID-19, Covid-19, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, ending welfare as we know it, Erik Brynjolfsson, feminist movement, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, game design, George Gilder, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, High speed trading, hive mind, income inequality, industrial robot, interchangeable parts, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, jitney, Joan Didion, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, knowledge worker, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market bubble, mass immigration, mass incarceration, Menlo Park, Naomi Klein, new economy, Norbert Wiener, Norman Mailer, obamacare, Peter Thiel, Picturephone, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, Powell Memorandum, pre–internet, Ralph Nader, Right to Buy, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, Seaside, Florida, Second Machine Age, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Future of Employment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, trickle-down economics, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, union organizing, universal basic income, Unsafe at Any Speed, urban planning, urban renewal, very high income, wage slave, Wall-E, War on Poverty, Whole Earth Catalog, winner-take-all economy, women in the workforce, working poor, young professional, éminence grise

As the millennium approached, invented-in-America political and economic freedom was triumphing globally and for good, because—in the words of an unknown Reagan State Department dweeb in 1989—we’d arrived at “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Francis Fukuyama turned his essay into a bestselling and enormously influential book, The End of History, in 1992. It was a moment of supreme self-satisfaction for America’s educated upper middle class in particular. One of their own, a Rhodes Scholar who’d graduated from Yale Law School, was about to be elected president. As the Harvard political philosophy professor (and baby boom Rhodes Scholar) Michael Sandel puts it, “Meritocracies…produce morally unattractive attitudes among those who make it to the top.

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose always meant that the constant novelty and flux of modern life is superficial, that the underlying essences endure unchanged. But that saying now has an alternative and nearly opposite meaning: the more that underlying structures change for real (technology, the political economy), the more the surfaces (style, entertainment) remain the same. In the early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama published his argument that all societies were inexorably arriving at the same evolutionary end point—the glorious finale of political economic history. Such folly. Yet in the arts and entertainment and style, what happened then, at the moment when both The End of History and the film Groundhog Day came out, does feel like an end of cultural history. Or at least, and I’m still hoping, an extremely long pause. So to recap: the national nostalgia reflex was triggered in the first place in the 1970s by fatigue from all the warp-drive cultural changes of the ’60s.

And the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010, the conservative majority’s view that “there’s no such thing as spending too much money to support a political candidate, because your money is actually speech—that’s all nonsense,” but as a result, apart from passing a constitutional amendment, “there isn’t anything the government can do [about regulating campaign finance] now.” Then there’s the remarkable apostasy of the neoconservative political economist and Reagan administration official Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and its celebration of the permanent global triumph of U.S.-style capitalism in the 1990s got him an endowed public policy professorship at George Mason University, the Koch academic headquarters, and although he moved on to Stanford, he remains conservative in some ways. But when he was asked recently what he thought of the apparent new U.S. vogue for social democracy, even socialism, he said, “It all depends on what you mean by socialism,” and then he went off.


pages: 287 words: 95,152

The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order by Bruno Macaes

active measures, Berlin Wall, British Empire, computer vision, Deng Xiaoping, different worldview, digital map, Donald Trump, energy security, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, failed state, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global value chain, illegal immigration, intermodal, iterative process, land reform, liberal world order, Malacca Straits, mass immigration, megacity, open borders, Parag Khanna, savings glut, scientific worldview, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, speech recognition, trade liberalization, trade route, Transnistria, young professional, zero-sum game, éminence grise

Ironically, this would be the most despicable state of human history, when no further movement can be conceived, let alone attempted, when men and women entertain themselves to death in the belief that they have, at long last, discovered happiness. ‘One still works, but work is a pastime.’ Politics has disappeared: ‘Who still wants to rule? Who still wants to obey? Both are too burdensome.’ Mankind lives at the end of history when everything is as perfect as it can be and the whole past looks like a madhouse: ‘Formerly all the world was insane.’ In his extraordinarily popular book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama defended the argument that the desire to live in a modern society is universal and that a modern society assumes everywhere the form of a market economy and a democratic political system. What foreign policy should follow from this thesis remained unclear. Fifteen years after the initial publication of the book in 1992, when accused of providing intellectual cover for the American occupation of Iraq, Fukuyama felt the need to dissociate himself from every attempt to accelerate the historical stages through which a society must pass on its modernization path.

While they were rebelling against the confined spaces of life in Tehran, they also insisted that they did not want to follow the same path as Europeans or Americans. Contemporary art had taught them that there is always a different way of seeing. Art must foresee other pictures, other worlds. Western modernity is for them just another form of tradition to be uprooted and overcome. When discussing world politics today, we often revert to one of two models. The first, popularized by Francis Fukuyama, sees the whole world converging to a European or Western political framework, after which no further historical development is possible. Every country or region is measured by the time it will still take to reach this final destination, but all doubts and debates about where we are heading have been fundamentally resolved. The other model, defended by Samuel Huntington, is sceptical of such irreversible movement.

In the works of Montesquieu, Adam Smith or Hegel, the Asian continent appeared as the living image of that ancestral past from which Europe was freeing itself. The view of Asian society was of a society that was backward, that had remained static since antiquity and that, left to itself, would always remain static. As Hegel was to argue, Europe was the end and destination of historical change, Asia the beginning. ‘The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning.’12 With China history begins, for it is the oldest empire and also, as Hegel puts it, the newest; a place where change is excluded ‘and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually takes the place of what we should call the truly historical’.13 As the contemporary Chinese political philosopher Wang Hui writes, this division had a number of distinctive traits: Asian political empires as opposed to European nations; agrarian and nomad social types in contrast to European urban societies; political despotism against developed legal systems and the pursuit of individual freedom.


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The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century by Ryan Avent

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, Airbnb, American energy revolution, assortative mating, autonomous vehicles, Bakken shale, barriers to entry, basic income, Bernie Sanders, BRICs, business cycle, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, computer age, creative destruction, dark matter, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, disruptive innovation, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, Downton Abbey, Edward Glaeser, Erik Brynjolfsson, eurozone crisis, everywhere but in the productivity statistics, falling living standards, first square of the chessboard, first square of the chessboard / second half of the chessboard, Ford paid five dollars a day, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, future of work, gig economy, global supply chain, global value chain, hydraulic fracturing, income inequality, indoor plumbing, industrial robot, intangible asset, interchangeable parts, Internet of things, inventory management, invisible hand, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph-Marie Jacquard, knowledge economy, low skilled workers, lump of labour, Lyft, manufacturing employment, Marc Andreessen, mass immigration, means of production, new economy, performance metric, pets.com, post-work, price mechanism, quantitative easing, Ray Kurzweil, rent-seeking, reshoring, rising living standards, Robert Gordon, Ronald Coase, savings glut, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, software is eating the world, supply-chain management, supply-chain management software, TaskRabbit, The Future of Employment, The Nature of the Firm, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transaction costs, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber and Lyft, Uber for X, uber lyft, very high income, working-age population

, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).   5. Such a story had not, to my knowledge, been told at the time of writing.   6. ‘The Gifts of the Moguls’, The Economist, 4 July 2015. 11. The Politics of Labour Abundance   1. Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952–) is an American political scientist, political economist and author, known for his book The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992), which expanded on his 1989 essay, ‘The End of History’.   2. Schleicher, David, ‘Things Aren’t Going That Well Over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective’, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 18 November 2014.   3. US Census Bureau, Income and Poverty.   4. Kenworthy, Lane, and Pontusson, Jonas, ‘Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries’, Perspectives on Politics, September 2005.   5. 

The period began, in the 1970s and 1980s, with a liberalizing impulse across a broad range of countries, from Britain and America to China and India. While Thatcher and Reagan cut tax rates and squashed unions, Deng Xiaopeng trod cautiously towards limited tolerance of markets and foreign trade. The era of consensus continued with the collapse of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, which prompted Francis Fukuyama to muse that ‘the end of history’ had arrived with the global ascendance of liberal democracy.1 As global markets integrated, politics in most rich democracies coalesced around support for market-oriented economies, global openness and progressive social goals. It was a pleasant sort of era for the cosmopolitan, technocratic elite: the believers in the notion that markets, lightly tended, offered the best route to global prosperity and peace.

., The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) Ford, Martin, The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future (Createspace, 2009) _____, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015) Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (The Free Press, 1992) Glaeser, Edward, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier (London: Macmillan, 2011) Goldin, Claudia and Katz, Lawrence, The Race Between Education and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) Gordon, Robert, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016) Hansen, Alan Harvey, Full Recovery or Stagnation (New York, NY: W.


pages: 379 words: 99,340

The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium by Martin Gurri

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, anti-communist, Arthur Eddington, Ayatollah Khomeini, bitcoin, Black Swan, Burning Man, business cycle, citizen journalism, Climategate, Climatic Research Unit, collective bargaining, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, currency manipulation / currency intervention, dark matter, David Graeber, death of newspapers, en.wikipedia.org, Erik Brynjolfsson, facts on the ground, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frederick Winslow Taylor, full employment, housing crisis, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of writing, job-hopping, Mohammed Bouazizi, Nate Silver, Occupy movement, Port of Oakland, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, Skype, Steve Jobs, the scientific method, The Signal and the Noise by Nate Silver, too big to fail, traveling salesman, University of East Anglia, urban renewal, War on Poverty, We are the 99%, WikiLeaks, young professional

Each, in turn, was defeated to the point of extinction. With the fall of communism and implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, no alternative system was left to oppose the democracies. They had triumphed with a completeness rarely seen in history. As early as 1989, Francis Fukuyama, in his famous essay “The End of History?”, could speculate about a world wholly dominated by the democratic ideology: What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, of the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’ yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world.

[265] Robert Mackey, “For Egypt’s Rulers, Familiar Scapegoats,” New York Times, November 29, 2014, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/for-egypts-new-rulers-familiar-scapegoats/. [266] Patrick Kingsley, “I’m no traitor, says Wael Ghonim as Egypt regime targets secular activists,” The Guardian, January 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/wael-ghonim-egypt-regime-targets-secular-activists. [267] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989, http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf. [268] Angelique Chrisafis, “François Hollande becomes most unpopular French president ever,” The Guardian, October 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/francois-hollande-most-unpopular-president. [269] “Political Insurgency: Europe’s Tea Parties,” The Economist, July 4, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21592610-insurgent-parties-are-likely-do-better-2014-any-time-second-world

But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.[267] Following the horrors of 9/11, Fukuyama and his ideas were derided as triumphalist nonsense. But he was only half wrong. Fukuyama, a Hegelian, argued that Western democracy had run out of “contradictions”: that is, of ideological alternatives. That was true in 1989 and remains true today. Fukuyama’s mistake was to infer that the absence of contradictions meant the end of history. There was another possibility he failed to consider. History could well be driven by negation rather than contradiction. It could ride on the nihilistic rejection of the established order, regardless of alternatives or consequences. That would not be without precedent. The Roman Empire wasn’t overthrown by something called “feudalism” – it collapsed of its own dead weight, to the astonishment of friend and foe alike.


The Despot's Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy by Brian Klaas

Asian financial crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, citizen journalism, clean water, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, failed state, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, friendly fire, global pandemic, moral hazard, Ronald Reagan, selection bias, Skype, Steve Jobs, trade route, Transnistria, unemployed young men, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

Even with heroic efforts to the contrary, digital information flows are difficult to stop— and knowledge and social coordination can be extremely powerful when it comes to standing up to despots. â•… But the corresponding backlash by authoritarian rulers, who also have learned a thing or two about digital communication, is undermining naïve predictions made across the Western world in the wake of the Arab Spring. Everyone seemed to think that it was only a matter of time before Twitter revolutions began toppling despots left and right. It was a return to the notion, initially articulated by Francis Fukuyama, that we had reached the democratic endpoint, the “End of History”4—but this time the end would be announced in 140 characters or fewer. There was even a movement to nominate Twitter for the Nobel Peace Prize.5 Yet as the grip of authoritarianism has tightened rather than loosened in the last decade, it has become clear that reports of despotism’s death at the hands of Twitter and Facebook have been greatly exaggerated. â•… Social media, information technology, and digital communication are incredibly powerful tools that scare despots—and rightly so.

Nonetheless, the voices of these Henry Kissinger disciples are rising, gaining steady influence in London, Paris, Brussels and Washington. â•… In the second camp are those who believe in the value of democracy promotion, but find it worthwhile only if it aligns with the short-term geostrategic interests of Western governments. When it does not, it should fall by the wayside, as other overriding interests are deemed more important. This is the current approach. It has led us to a prolonged period of democratic stagnation and decline, giving despots the upper hand. Twenty-five years ago, Francis Fukuyama mistakenly argued that the world was nearing “The End of History,” wherein democracy would ultimately supplant despotism everywhere as the ideological dominance of democracy became uncontested. Instead, because of the West’s halfhearted approach to democracy promotion, despots have a growing number of defenders, and the West is far too often on the wrong side of “history.” â•… There is a third way forward: promote democracy consistently and more intelligently.

‘Turkey: End Prosecutions for Insulting the President,’ 29 April 2015, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2015/04/29/turkey-end-prosecutions-insulting-president, last accessed 29 July 2016. 3.╇Molloy, Mark and Raziye Akkoc (2015). ‘Director Peter Jackson Wades into Turkish Debate over “Evil” Gollum’, The Telegraph, 3 December 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/ 12030987/Lord-of-the-Rigns-director-Peter-Jackson-wades-into-RecepTayyip-Erdogan-Gollum-debate.html, last accessed 3 April 2016. 4.╇Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press. 5.╇Khan, Urmee (2009). ‘Twitter Should Win Nobel Peace Prize, Says Former US Security Adviser,’ The Telegraph, 7 July 2009, http://www. telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/5768159/Twitter-should-winNobel-Peace-Prize-says-former-US-security-adviser.html, last accessed 3 April 2016. 6.╇Dobson, William J. (2012). The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy, New York: Random House. 7.╇Ibid., Chapter 3. 8.╇Interestingly, Afifi was funded directly by the United States government, through the National Endowment for Democracy.


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Can Democracy Work?: A Short History of a Radical Idea, From Ancient Athens to Our World by James Miller

Berlin Wall, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Cass Sunstein, colonial rule, cuban missile crisis, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Graeber, Donald Trump, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, Joseph Schumpeter, mass incarceration, means of production, Occupy movement, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Republic of Letters, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, The Wisdom of Crowds, transatlantic slave trade, union organizing, upwardly mobile, Vilfredo Pareto

Yet with twists and turns, and despite some spectacular setbacks, the “great democratic revolution” that Tocqueville described indeed continued, sometimes flaring up with disturbing results, throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Tocqueville was one of the first in a long line of modern writers who have believed that democracy in some sense represented a logical culmination of human affairs: for Francis Fukuyama, writing in 1989, the year that jubilant Germans tore down the Berlin Wall, liberal democracy marked “the end of history,” with an American exclamation point. But history hasn’t evolved in quite the way that these theorists anticipated. Tocqueville expected democracy to produce greater equality—yet democratic states conjoined with market societies have recurrently produced growing inequality. At the same time, as nations have grown larger, and as new transnational institutions have changed the everyday life of millions, those who govern have become increasingly remote, often making democracy in practice seem like a puppet show, a spectacle in which hidden elites pull all the strings—not “a great word” with a “history that has yet to be enacted.”

Although Huntington briefly worked for Brzezinski when his old friend became national security adviser for the Democratic president Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s, he mainly focused his energies on teaching undergraduates at Harvard—and on episodically commenting in books and articles on the main currents of history as he perceived them. When the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed in 1989, and a renewed democratic spirit afterward led to mainly peaceful transitions to liberal democratic regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Huntington saw no cause to celebrate. Where his student Francis Fukuyama perceived the apparent triumph of liberal democracy as the logical climax of world history, Huntington discerned the ascendance of new centers of political power in China and the Islamic world, both representing mature civilizations of great antiquity—and both offering religious and authoritarian alternatives to Western liberal ideals of human rights and representative democracy. “A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible,” Huntington concluded.

Karl Marx, for example, attacked Maine’s account: See, e.g., The Ethnographical Notebooks of Karl Marx, ed. Lawrence Krader (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1974). “to answer Sir Henry Maine’s ‘Popular Government’”: Woodrow Wilson to Horace Elisha Scudder, May [12], 1886, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 5:218. “Democracy in Europe,” he explains: Ibid., 5:69–70. In effect, Wilson puts America at the end of history, as Hegel put Prussia in his Philosophy of Right, and Marx put communism in his Manifesto. “It had not to overthrow other polities”: Wilson, “The Modern Democratic State,” Ibid., 5:67. Democracy “in its most modern sense”: Wilson, “The Modern Democratic State,” in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 5:70. “practical political education is everywhere spreading”: Ibid., 5:74. this “sovereignty is of a peculiar sort”: Ibid., 5:75 (emphasis added).


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Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society by Eric Posner, E. Weyl

3D printing, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Amazon Mechanical Turk, anti-communist, augmented reality, basic income, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Branko Milanovic, business process, buy and hold, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collective bargaining, commoditize, Corn Laws, corporate governance, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, endowment effect, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ethereum, feminist movement, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, global supply chain, guest worker program, hydraulic fracturing, Hyperloop, illegal immigration, immigration reform, income inequality, income per capita, index fund, informal economy, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, Landlord’s Game, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Lyft, market bubble, market design, market friction, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, negative equity, Network effects, obamacare, offshore financial centre, open borders, Pareto efficiency, passive investing, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, performance metric, plutocrats, Plutocrats, pre–internet, random walk, randomized controlled trial, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, ride hailing / ride sharing, risk tolerance, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Coase, Rory Sutherland, Second Machine Age, second-price auction, self-driving car, shareholder value, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Skype, special economic zone, spectrum auction, speech recognition, statistical model, stem cell, telepresence, Thales and the olive presses, Thales of Miletus, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Future of Employment, The Market for Lemons, The Nature of the Firm, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, trade route, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, urban planning, Vanguard fund, women in the workforce, Zipcar

Gaffney suggested that God replied, “Bill, that’s how we’ve always done it here; but thank you for urging folks to have my will done on earth as it is in Heaven.” 2. Juan Camilo Castillo, Daniel T. Knoepfle, & E. Glen Weyl, Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase (2017), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ECabstract.pdf. 3. Janny Scott, After Three Days in the Spotlight, Nobel Prize Winner Is Dead, New York Times, October 12, 1996. Introduction. The Crisis of the Liberal Order 1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992). 2. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas & Sarah L. Babb, The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries, 108 American Journal of Sociology 533 (2002); Fourcade et al., The Superiority of Economists, 29 Journal of Economic Perspectives 89 (2015). 3. Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton University Press, 2010). 4.

Schor, The Overspent America: Why We Want What We Don’t Need (Harper Perennial, 1999). 70. Saumitra Jha, Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England, 130 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1485 (2015); Markku Kaustia, Samuli Knüpfer, & Sami Torstila, Stock Ownership and Political Behavior: Evidence from Demutualizations, 62 Management Science 945 (2015). 71. Francis Fukuyama, Trust (Free Press, 1995); Paola Sapienza, Anna Toldra-Simats, & Luigi Zingales, Understanding Trust, 123 Economic Journal 1313 (2013). Chapter 2. Radical Democracy 1. Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology 6 (J. A. Crook, trans., Basil Blackwell, 1999). 2. Xenophon, Hellenica bk. 1, ch. 7, §§ 1–35 (Carlton Brownson trans., 1921) and Hansen, Athenian Democracy. 3.

—JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY, 1936 The Berlin Wall fell when one of us was just starting preschool and the other was beginning his career, that moment was crucial in shaping our political identities. The “American way”—free markets, popular sovereignty, and global integration—had vanquished the Soviet “evil empire.” Since then those values—which we will call the liberal order—have dominated intellectual discussions. Leading thinkers declared “the end of history.” The great social problems that had so long been the center of political drama had been solved.1 Both of us came of age intellectually in an unprecedented era of global intellectual consensus, confidence, and complacency. Nowhere was this atmosphere clearer than in the policy world in which we each ended up—one of us in law, the other in economics. Ironically, economics, more than any other field, took on the mantle of leadership in a world where debates over economic systems had disappeared.


pages: 393 words: 91,257

The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class by Joel Kotkin

Admiral Zheng, Andy Kessler, autonomous vehicles, basic income, Bernie Sanders, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, clean water, creative destruction, deindustrialization, demographic transition, don't be evil, Donald Trump, edge city, Elon Musk, European colonialism, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gig economy, Gini coefficient, Google bus, guest worker program, Hans Rosling, housing crisis, income inequality, informal economy, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, job satisfaction, Joseph Schumpeter, land reform, liberal capitalism, life extension, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, megacity, Nate Silver, new economy, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, Parag Khanna, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-industrial society, post-work, postindustrial economy, postnationalism / post nation state, precariat, profit motive, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, rent control, Richard Florida, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Sam Altman, Satyajit Das, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, smart cities, Steve Jobs, Stewart Brand, superstar cities, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Future of Employment, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Thomas L Friedman, too big to fail, trade route, Travis Kalanick, Uber and Lyft, uber lyft, universal basic income, unpaid internship, upwardly mobile, We are the 99%, Wolfgang Streeck, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y Combinator

Essays on a Failing System (New York: Verso, 2016), 219. 30 Phil Longman, The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity (New York: New America Books, 2004); Joel Kotkin, “Death Spiral Demographics: The Countries Shrinking the Fastest,” Forbes, February 1, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2017/02/01/death-spiral-demographics-the-countries-shrinking-the-fastest/#4ae48b38b83c. 31 Alex Gray, “The troubling charts that show young people losing faith in democracy,” World Economic Forum, December 1, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/charts-that-show-young-people-losing-faith-in-democracy/. 32 Amanda Taub, “How Stable Are Democracies? ‘Warning Signs Are Flashing Red,’” New York Times, November 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/americas/western-liberal-democracy.html?_r=0. 33 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 12. 34 Emily Atkin, “Al Gore’s Carbon Footprint Doesn’t Matter,” New Republic, August 7, 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/144199/al-gores-carbon-footprint-doesnt-matter; “How Electricity Became a Luxury Good,” Spiegel, September 4, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/high-costs-and-errors-of-german-transition-to-renewable-energy-a-920288-2.html; Dagmara Stoerring, “Energy Poverty,” European Parliament, November 9, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/607350/IPOL_STU(2017)607350_EN.pdf. 35 Salena Zito and Brad Todd, The Great Revolt: Inside the Populist Coalition Reshaping American Politics (New York: Crown Forum, 2018), 3, 246. 36 Guilluy, Twilight of the Elites, 15; Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, “The Failure of the French Elite,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-failure-of-the-french-elite-11550851097?

China’s top-down way of solving problems has been praised by some environmental activists, such as Jerry Brown, former governor of California, who favors applying “the coercive power of the state” to achieve environmental goals. A strong supporter of the Beijing regime’s current climate policies, Brown even recommends the “brainwashing” of the uncomprehending masses, a concept very much congruent with the logic behind Chinese thought control.48 CHAPTER 21 Can We Challenge Neo-feudalism? The hope that we might see a global convergence toward democracy, as was once predicted by Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman among others, seems increasingly remote. As China has grown both richer and more powerful, it has not become more like us, but instead has developed an authoritarian form of state capitalism.1 Globally, democratic governance appears to have peaked in 2006, and many countries—including Turkey, Russia, and China—have become far more authoritarian. Even democratic India and many European countries have seen their own constitutional order frayed by internal dissension and racial and religious divisions.2 China’s “civilization state,” deeply rooted in thousands of years of history, represents the most profound philosophical challenge to liberal values since the end of the Cold War.3 Jorgen Randers, a professor emeritus of climate strategy at the BI Norwegian Business School, predicts a Chinese-dominated global future, despite the country’s many environmental and other challenges.


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How to Stop Brexit (And Make Britain Great Again) by Nick Clegg

Berlin Wall, Boris Johnson, collapse of Lehman Brothers, Dominic Cummings, Donald Trump, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, offshore financial centre, sceptred isle, Snapchat

The reasons behind the recent run of election results require extensive analysis, but it is clear that the shock of Brexit, followed by Trump’s victory, inspired liberal-minded, internationalist, pro-European politicians to come out of their shells and make their arguments with renewed passion. They can no longer close their eyes and pretend there is no populist threat. They can no longer assume that we have reached, as the political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously stated, the end of history. Instead they have had to take their message to voters – many of whom are unhappy with the status quo – with fresh arguments and a promise to listen and reform. Europe has been shocked into action and is determined to … well, make Europe great again. The Times is often credited with a headline that, sadly, never actually appeared. ‘Dense Fog in the Channel: Continent Isolated’ is such a perfect description of British attitudes towards Europe that it turns out it was too good to be true.


pages: 268 words: 112,708

Culture works: the political economy of culture by Richard Maxwell

1960s counterculture, American ideology, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, big-box store, business process, commoditize, corporate governance, cuban missile crisis, deindustrialization, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Howard Rheingold, income inequality, informal economy, intermodal, late capitalism, Marshall McLuhan, medical malpractice, Network effects, profit maximization, Ralph Nader, refrigerator car, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, structural adjustment programs, talking drums, telemarketer, the built environment, Thorstein Veblen, Unsafe at Any Speed, urban renewal, Victor Gruen, Whole Earth Catalog, women in the workforce

“The ratings were so high that NBC will take the same tack into Sydney and beyond.”143 Coda In corporate/Americanized sport, the game has become somewhat less important than its capacity to be a vehicle presenting particular messages to a particular select and often massive audience.144 This discussion may have unearthed some disheartening revelations pertaining to the political economy of contemporary sport culture. Elsewhere I have argued that sport has, in Francis Fukuyama’s terms, reached the end of history precipitated by the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives”145 to the sport-media-entertainment complex discussed here.146 On reflection, this sentiment intimates a resigned bitterness that adds little to the critical analysis of contemporary sport. Without question, the global sport economy is dominated by brazenly commercial enterprises that make no pretense as to the cardinal importance of delivering entertaining products designed to maximize profit margins.

Celia Lury and Alan Warde, “Investments in the Imaginary Consumer: Conjectures regarding Power, Knowledge and Advertising,” in Buy This Book: Studies in Advertising and Consumption, ed. Mica Nava, Andrew Blake, Iain MacRury, and Barry Richards (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 87–102. 161 David L. A n d r e w s 142. Gunther, “Get Ready for the Oprah Olympics,” 42. 143. Knisley, “Rock Solid,” S6. 144. P. Donnelly, “The Local and the Global: Globalization in the Sociology of Sport,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 20:3 (1996): 246. 145. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (1989): 3. 146. Andrews, “Dead and Alive?” 147. L. Grossberg, We Gotta Get out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (London: Routledge, 1992), 21. 162 Chapter Seven Shopping Susan G. Davis The opportunity and imperative to shop are everywhere. As retail theorist Paco Underhill rhapsodizes: the economic party that has been the second half of the twentieth century has fostered more shopping than anyone could have predicted, more shopping than has ever taken place anywhere at any time.

., For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 25th ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 279. T. Miller and A. McHoul, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (London: Sage, 1998), 61. S. Hardy, “Where Did You Go, Jackie Robinson? Or the End of History and the Age of Sport Infrastructure,” Sporting Traditions: Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History 16:1 (1999): 85–100. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), 48. This apt metaphor is borrowed from Jürgen Habermas, “Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis,” New Left Review 115 (1979): 73–84. J. McKay and T.


Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World by Branko Milanovic

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Asian financial crisis, assortative mating, barriers to entry, basic income, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, Black Swan, Branko Milanovic, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, colonial rule, corporate governance, creative destruction, crony capitalism, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, gig economy, Gini coefficient, global supply chain, global value chain, high net worth, income inequality, income per capita, invention of the wheel, invisible hand, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, land reform, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, Lyft, means of production, new economy, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-materialism, purchasing power parity, remote working, rent-seeking, ride hailing / ride sharing, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, special economic zone, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, uber lyft, universal basic income, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Xiaogang Anhui farmers

It is, within Marxism, the equivalent of trying to explain how a society might go through capitalist and industrial revolutions, create the bourgeoisie and the working class, and then suddenly regress to a feudal order with labor, formerly free, now being chained once again to the land and an aristocracy exacting forced labor and paying no taxes. It would seem absurd to Marxists, as well as to pretty much everyone else, that such a development could happen. But the “fall” of communism back to capitalism is equally absurd, and cannot be explained within the traditional Marxist framework. It can be explained better, albeit not fully, within the liberal framework. In the liberal view, which Francis Fukuyama captured quite well in the 1990s with The End of History and the Last Man, liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism represent the terminus of socioeconomic formations invented by humankind. What Marxists see as an incomprehensible reversal to a much lower (inferior) system, liberals see as a perfectly understandable movement from an inferior, dead-end system (communism) back onto the straight path leading to the end point of human evolution: liberal capitalism.

Debin Ma reprises a similar theme in his paper on the fiscal capacity of the Chinese state: “In China, the precocious rise of absolutism [centralized state based on hierarchically organized bureaucracy] with the absence of any representative institution ensured that the economic rents from the control of violence were firmly in the hands of political interest divorced from those of commercial and property interest” (2011, 26–27). It was surely not a government at the behest of the bourgeoisie. Francis Fukuyama, in The Origins of Political Order (2011), explains the absence of a countervailing merchant class in China by the omnipotence of the state, which goes back to the formation of the Chinese state. Fukuyama argues that China was ahead of every other major power in building the state; it did so also before any other organized nonstate actors (independent bourgeoisie, free cities, clergy) were created.

Rich People Poor Countries: The Rise of Emerging Market Tycoons and Their Mega Firms. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Freund, Caroline, and Sarah Oliver. 2016. “The Origins of the Superrich: The Billionaire Characteristics Database.” PIIE Working Paper 16-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics, February. https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-1.pdf. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Gabriel, Satyananda J. 2006. Chinese Capitalism and the Modernist Vision. London: Routledge. Gernet, Jacques. 1962. Daily Life in China on the Eve of Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276. New York: Macmillan; repr. Stanford University Press. Gewirtz, Julian. 2017. Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China.


The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union by Serhii Plokhy

affirmative action, Anton Chekhov, Berlin Wall, bilateral investment treaty, cuban missile crisis, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, land reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Potemkin village, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Sinatra Doctrine, Stanislav Petrov, Transnistria

,” interview with Gennadii Burbulis, Forbes (Russian edition), July 22, 2010, www.forbes.ru/node/53407/print. 12. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York, 1994), 116; Gorbachev, Memoirs, 658; interview with Valentin Varennikov in Rozpad Radians’koho Soiuzu. Usna istoriia nezalezhnoï Ukraïny 1988–91, tape 2, http://oralhistory.org.ua/interview-ua/401/. 13. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, Summer 1989; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992). 14. George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York, 2008), 914; C. J. Chivers, “Russia Will Pursue Democracy, but in Its Own Way, Putin Says,” New York Times, April 26, 2005. 15. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (New York, 2009). 16.

While losing the battle to save the Soviet Union as a junior partner in the international arena, the Bush administration helped orchestrate its peaceful dissolution. This was no small accomplishment, especially if one thinks of the bloody ends of other empires. On a certain level, history had indeed come to an end—not in the sense of a final victory of liberalism, as declared by the leading American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his best-selling book The End of History and the Last Man (1990), but in the disappearance of the old European empires. The United States, born of rebellion against an empire and an archenemy of colonialism throughout the world, unexpectedly found itself presiding over the dissolution of a country often labeled the last world empire. The Americans thus accomplished their anti-imperial purpose without really wishing to do so.13 THERE IS EVERY REASON to see 1991 as a major turning point in world history, and nowhere does this seem more obvious than in the former post-Soviet space, where many present-day trends in international relations, domestic politics, and economic relations continue to develop in the shadow of the year that some call an annus mirabilis, while others, including President Vladimir Putin of Russia, associate it with the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”14 It was in 1991 that the Russian leadership set a policy on the use of military force by which it abided until the Russo-Georgian war of 2008.

., 202–203, 237, 329, 331–332 Economic management, reform of, 30 Economic reform center-republic relations and, 206, 207, 215–230, 238–239 difficulties with, 13–14, 216, 219–220, 223, 238–239, 341 Yeltsin and, 218–220, 225–226, 227–230, 238–239, 241, 284 Economy food shortage and dire, 205, 208, 214, 220–221, 237, 242, 340, 351 with state funds emptied, 259, 270–271 U.S., 331 Egypt, 231 Electoral democracy demonstrations for, 139–143, 202 imperial rule incompatible with, xviii, 13–14, 33, 394 in Russia, xviii, 112 Electoral system, reform of, 29, 33, 35, 56 Elena (Yeltsin’s elder daughter), 100 Elliott, Iain, 118 Empires Soviet Union as last, xvii–xviii, xx–xxii, 34, 40, 178, 182, 185–186, 393 world, xviii, xix, 6, 33, 393, 402 The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama), 405 Estonia, 45, 191 annexation of, 192 population, 244 sovereignty and, 174, 175, 195, 197 Ethnic clashes between Azeris and Armenians, 33–34, 213, 357, 361 in Kazakhstan, 349–352 See also specific ethnic groups Ethnicity minorities in Ukraine, 283–286 nationality and mixed, 288–289 EU. See European Union Europe Eastern, 204 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 232 See also specific countries European Union (EU), 22, 331 Exchange rate, black-market, 370 Fallout, nuclear, 16, 47, 300–301 Famine, 351, 401 Farming, dairy, 300 Finances.


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Owning the Earth: The Transforming History of Land Ownership by Andro Linklater

agricultural Revolution, anti-communist, Anton Chekhov, Ayatollah Khomeini, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, British Empire, business cycle, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, facts on the ground, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gini coefficient, Google Earth, income inequality, invisible hand, James Hargreaves, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, joint-stock limited liability company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kibera, Kickstarter, land reform, land tenure, light touch regulation, market clearing, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Mohammed Bouazizi, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, mortgage debt, Northern Rock, Peace of Westphalia, Pearl River Delta, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit motive, quantitative easing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, refrigerator car, Right to Buy, road to serfdom, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, spinning jenny, The Chicago School, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, ultimatum game, wage slave, WikiLeaks, wikimedia commons, working poor

In reciprocal fashion, American debt was sold everywhere from Oslo to Sydney, but the most significant buyers turned out to be the city and provincial as well as central governments in the coastal crescent from Shanghai to Beijing. The collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union in 1989, and the growing strength of China’s market economy, made it appear that one economic system now circled the world. Soaring on the wings of hubris, Thomas Friedman named his popular book on the globalized economy The World is Flat, while Francis Fukuyama updated Walt Rostow’s development strategy and, in a scholarly article that assumed universal capitalism must lead to universal democracy, predicted “The End of History.” Absent from the writings of either author and from the published deliberations of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, of governments on either side of the Atlantic, of most of Wall Street and the City of London, and an array of international financial experts, was any suggestion that they understood that the phenomenon of globalization grew out of the disparity between two ways of owning the earth.

almost six hundred trillion dollars: The figure from the Bank for International Settlements for the last quarter of 2007, $596 trillion. the number of politically free countries: Figures for 2007 from Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” 2008. the 1992 paper he cited: Professor Fukuyama’s assertion of a “strong correlation” between industrial development and democracy is made in “Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later” by Francis Fukuyama, History and Theory 34, no. 2, Theme Issue 34: World Historians and Their Critics (May, 1995), 27–43. The paper he refers to is by Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March–June 1992), 450–499. “free and equal in dignity and rights”: Compared to the painstaking arguments that backed the assertion to natural rights in property and to the pursuit of happiness, the United Nations’ assertion of its human rights is strangely bare.

During the thirty-year experiment, a transformation had taken place in other societies as they became linked to the globalized economy. In that period, the number of politically free countries, according to the index of democracy compiled by Freedom House, rose from forty-three to eighty-seven, home to three billion inhabitants or 43 percent of the global population. For “development” commentators, such as Professor Francis Fukuyama, this was cause and effect, the result of “an extraordinarily strong correlation between high levels of industrial development and stable democracy.” But, as Fukuyama ought to have been aware, the 1992 paper he cited as evidence gave no more than the shakiest support for his belief that industrial development led to democracy. Many of the countries offered as examples were from Eastern Europe and became democratic not because of industrialization but because they were liberated from the former Soviet Union by the end of the Cold War; others, such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, were industrialized but then became dictatorships, and only later became democratic due to persistent pressure from western European neighbors; yet more, including South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, arrived at modernization through the prior redistribution of land as private property, while some at least of the remaining examples, such as Romania and Pakistan, were hardly shining examples of either industrialization or democracy.


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21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari

1960s counterculture, accounting loophole / creative accounting, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, algorithmic trading, augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, Ayatollah Khomeini, basic income, Bernie Sanders, bitcoin, blockchain, Boris Johnson, call centre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carbon-based life, cognitive dissonance, computer age, computer vision, cryptocurrency, cuban missile crisis, decarbonisation, deglobalization, Donald Trump, failed state, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Freestyle chess, gig economy, glass ceiling, Google Glasses, illegal immigration, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, invisible hand, job automation, knowledge economy, liberation theology, Louis Pasteur, low skilled workers, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, Menlo Park, meta analysis, meta-analysis, Mohammed Bouazizi, mutually assured destruction, Naomi Klein, obamacare, pattern recognition, post-work, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Rosa Parks, Scramble for Africa, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, transatlantic slave trade, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, uranium enrichment, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, zero-sum game

For a general discussion see for example: Nicholas John Cull, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003). 6 For this interpretation see: Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Brexit: A modern-day Peasants’ Revolt?’, Washington Post, 25 June 2016; John Curtice, ‘US election 2016: The Trump–Brexit voter revolt’, BBC, 11 November 2016. 7 The most famous of these remains, of course, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 8 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018); Anne Garrels, Putin Country: A Journey Into the Real Russia (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2016); Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2016). 9 Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Report 2015, 53; Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman, ‘From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905–2016’, July 2017, World Wealth and Income Database; Shaun Walker, ‘Unequal Russia’, Guardian, 25 April 2017. 10 Ayelet Shani, ‘The Israelis Who Take Rebuilding the Third Temple Very Seriously’, Haaretz, 10 August 2017; ‘Israeli Minister: We Should Rebuild Jerusalem Temple’, Israel Today, 7 July 2013; Yuri Yanover, ‘Dep.

Thornton, A Cultural History of the Atlantic World, 1250–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 110. 13 Susannah Cullinane, Hamdi Alkhshali and Mohammed Tawfeeq, ‘Tracking a Trail of Historical Obliteration: ISIS Trumpets Destruction of Nimrud’, CNN, 14 April 2015. 14 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 36–8. 15 ‘ISIS Leader Calls for Muslims to Help Build Islamic State in Iraq’, CBCNEWS, 1 July 2014; Mark Townsend, ‘What Happened to the British Medics Who Went to Work for ISIS?’, Guardian, 12 July 2015. 7. Nationalism 1 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014). 2 Ashley Killough, ‘Lyndon Johnson’s “Daisy” Ad, Which Changed the World of Politics, Turns 50’, CNN, 8 September 2014. 3 ‘Cause-Specific Mortality: Estimates for 2000–2015’, World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates/en/index1.html, accessed 19 October 2017. 4 David E.

Contents Cover About the Book About the Author Also by Yuval Noah Harari Dedication Title Page Introduction Part I: The Technological Challenge 1. DISILLUSIONMENT The end of history has been postponed 2. WORK When you grow up, you might not have a job 3. LIBERTY Big Data is watching you 4. EQUALITY Those who own the data own the future Part II: The Political Challenge 5. COMMUNITY Humans have bodies 6. CIVILISATION There is just one civilisation in the world 7. NATIONALISM Global problems need global answers 8. RELIGION God now serves the nation 9. IMMIGRATION Some cultures might be better than others Part III: Despair and Hope 10. TERRORISM Don’t panic 11. WAR Never underestimate human stupidity 12. HUMILITY You are not the centre of the world 13. GOD Don’t take the name of God in vain 14.


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Can It Happen Here?: Authoritarianism in America by Cass R. Sunstein

active measures, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, airline deregulation, anti-communist, anti-globalists, availability heuristic, business cycle, Cass Sunstein, David Brooks, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, failed state, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, ghettoisation, illegal immigration, immigration reform, Isaac Newton, job automation, Joseph Schumpeter, Long Term Capital Management, Nate Silver, Network effects, New Journalism, night-watchman state, obamacare, Potemkin village, random walk, Richard Thaler, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, the scientific method, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks, World Values Survey

Viktor Orbán, Speech at the Opening of the World Science Forum, November 7, 2015, http://2010–2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/viktor_orban_s_speech_at_the_opening_of_the_world_science_forum. 35. David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London: Hurst, 2017). 36. Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 37. This thesis is developed more fully in Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The End of Victory: The Untold Story of the Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order (forthcoming). 38. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). 39. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 40. Thomas Geoghegan, Only One Thing Can Save Us: Why America Needs a New Kind of Labor Movement (New York: New Press, 2014). 41. Stephen Holmes, “Imitating Democracy, Feigning Capacity,” in Adam Przeworski, ed., Democracy in a Russian Mirror (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30–57. 42.

To answer this question, a good place to start is again East Central Europe. The key to explaining the appeal of authoritarian xenophobia in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere in the region lies in the aftermath of 1989. The end of the Cold War was experienced there as the beginning of the Age of Imitation.37 This is why we can trace the roots of the current crisis of liberal democracy to the communist collapse. Francis Fukuyama’s central thesis was that, after the Soviet Union dissolved, Western-style liberal democracy had no serious competitors. This thesis, put into practice, turned out to have exceptionally perverse consequences.38 Because Western liberal democracy was unrivaled and uncontested, it allegedly offered the one and only political and economic model worthy of emulation. After 1989, refusing to imitate Western norms and institutions was no longer an option.

Liberal democracy can become its own undoing because its core elements activate forces that undermine it and its best features constrain it from vigorously protecting itself. So it seems we are not at the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). The “last man” is not a perfected liberal democrat. Liberal democracy may not be the “final form of human government.” And intolerance is not a thing of the past; it is very much a thing of the present, and of the future. References Adorno, Theodor, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and D. J. Levinson. 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Row. Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2008. Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. Duckitt, John. 1989. “Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct.” Political Psychology, 10(1): 63–84. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.


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The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge by Ilan Pappe

affirmative action, Ayatollah Khomeini, Boycotts of Israel, British Empire, double helix, facts on the ground, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, mass immigration, Nelson Mandela, New Journalism, one-state solution, postnationalism / post nation state, stem cell, urban planning, Yom Kippur War

He claims that the equation between the two became commonplace in Israel, because those who subscribe to it have tenure in the Israeli universities.’ As a result, the report goes on, a more theoretical debate developed. ‘Sounds boring? More than 600 people filled the university hall and gave up the game in which Bulgaria kicked Germany out of the World Cup.’ Zvi Gilat, Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 July 1994. 5 I have described this in Ilan Pappe, Out of the Frame: The Struggle for Academic Freedom, London: Pluto, 2010. 6 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 7 Gorny, ‘Thoughts on Zionism as a Utopian Ideology’. 8 This is part of a campaign led by the Israeli Ministry of Information called ‘The Faces of Israel’ launched in 2000. 9 See Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanction: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, New York: Haymarket Books, 2011. 10 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage, 1979, pp. 5–28.

The images and narratives formulated by Zionist leaders and activists in the past, and Israeli Jewish intellectuals and academics in the present, present Israel as the inevitable, successful implementation of the European history of ideas. Ideas are the transformative agents that in any narrative of Western enlightenment lifted Western societies, and in turn the rest of the world, out of medieval darkness and into the Renaissance, and helped restore civilisation following the Second World War. According to Francis Fukuyama, this history of ideas would almost have reached its culmination had not political Islam, national movements in the former Soviet bloc, and Marxist leaders in South America ‘sabotaged’ the train of progress and modernisation.6 Israel was one such transformative idea. To challenge it as such is to challenge the entire narrative of the West as the driving global force of human progress and enlightenment.


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The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. Mearsheimer

active measures, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, British Empire, colonial rule, continuation of politics by other means, deindustrialization, discrete time, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, illegal immigration, long peace, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, oil shock, Pareto efficiency, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, Yom Kippur War

See his “Perpetual Peace,” in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 93–130. Also see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998–99), pp. 20–38; and Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18, which was the basis of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994–95), pp. 50–90. 3. The balance of power is a concept that has a variety of meanings. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 2; and Ernst B.

Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, chap. 5; Mastny, The Cold War, pp. 85–97; Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea” and Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1–9. 85. See inter alia Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Carol R. Saivetz, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989). 86. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Robert G.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 1 Introduction Many in the West seem to believe that “perpetual peace” among the great powers is finally at hand. The end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to the “the end of history.”1 This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations, members of what is sometimes called the “international community.” The prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great powers. Even a few adherents of realism, a school of thought that has historically held pessimistic views about the prospects for peace among the great powers, appear to have bought into the reigning optimism, as reflected in an article from the mid-1990s titled “Realists as Optimists.”2 Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong.


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Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities by Eric Kaufmann

4chan, affirmative action, Amazon Mechanical Turk, anti-communist, anti-globalists, augmented reality, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, British Empire, centre right, Chelsea Manning, cognitive dissonance, complexity theory, corporate governance, correlation does not imply causation, crowdsourcing, Daniel Kahneman / Amos Tversky, David Brooks, deindustrialization, demographic transition, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, facts on the ground, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, first-past-the-post, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Haight Ashbury, illegal immigration, immigration reform, imperial preference, income inequality, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, liberal capitalism, longitudinal study, Lyft, mass immigration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, moral panic, Nate Silver, New Urbanism, Norman Mailer, open borders, phenotype, postnationalism / post nation state, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, Scientific racism, Silicon Valley, statistical model, Steven Pinker, the built environment, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, transcontinental railway, twin studies, uber lyft, upwardly mobile, urban sprawl, Washington Consensus, white flight, working-age population, World Values Survey, young professional

His brother Jeb, meanwhile, was elected governor of Florida in 1998 on 61 per cent of the Hispanic vote and his Mexican-American wife was viewed as an asset with Latino voters that would one day help him become president. The Bushes’ string of victories produced an optimistic mindset in which the Republican elite felt they could win Latino votes with a package emphasizing conservative social values and the work ethic. Ideologically, the fall of the Berlin Wall gave rise to an optimistic ‘End of History’ spirit among American neoconservatives and interventionist liberals, symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s iconic book of 1992.40 With communism defeated, liberalism, capitalism and democracy, under American tutelage, could finally become universal. A global framework based on the Pax Americana and the shared values of the ‘Washington Consensus’ would revolutionize humanity. Here was a classic form of liberal-democratic missionary nationalism in keeping with the country’s ‘City on a Hill’ traditions.

Both are seminal influences on today’s internet-based white nationalist movement which forms the core of today’s alternative right, or ‘alt right’.55 Neoconservatives preferred to endorse American exceptionalism, the idea that the US was a new type of post-ethnic nation. Most came to approve of Official English, opposed affirmative action and bilingual education and endorsed the need for immigrants to embrace a positive view of American history. They focused squarely on the creedal elements in the national repertoire. Francis Fukuyama, whom I interviewed soon after Brimelow’s book came out, saw value in the country’s ethno-traditions, thus deviating from the missionary nationalism of the neoconservatives. He argued that English was key for assimilation and traced the country’s founding to its Anglo-Protestant forebears. Where Fukuyama was critical of paleoconservatism was over Brimelow’s emphasis on a ‘white’ ethnic core rather than an Anglo-Protestant cultural inheritance which could be readily adopted by citizens of any background.

The Lemba, a trading minority native to Zimbabwe and South Africa, long believed they were descended from Jews. When genetic tests revealed this to be true, the findings reinforced their myth of descent.29 In contrast, a study of North African Jews which showed them to be more similar to Arabs than European Jews caused ructions because it challenged existing beliefs.30 The active manipulation of genes would be much more consequential, raising a wide range of questions which Francis Fukuyama tackles in Our Posthuman Future (2002). The least intrusive form is to use gene therapy to modify our genetic makeup, altering physical traits. A more problematic step is to select which embryo we would like from a range of naturally occurring possibilities so that no one could guess that we engineered our baby’s characteristics. Beyond this, biotechnology will permit us to alter genetic characteristics of an embryo which are then passed on to future generations.


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Conscience of a Conservative: A Rejection of Destructive Politics and a Return to Principle by Jeff Flake

4chan, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, cognitive dissonance, crony capitalism, David Brooks, Donald Trump, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global supply chain, immigration reform, impulse control, invisible hand, Mark Zuckerberg, obamacare, Potemkin village, race to the bottom, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, uranium enrichment, zero-sum game

Havel similarly called out to the whole world from Washington that day in early 1990, with grace and without rancor, in a speech that deserves to live as long as Lincoln’s, but for one mistaken prophecy, that to me now reads as tragic. At the time, as the wall fell and the Soviet bloc that had been encased in Stalinism thawed, it was a vogue among some historians, scholars, and others to declare “the end of history”—that the big questions had been settled, that liberal democracy was triumphal and inexorable, and that the decline of the blackhearted impulse to enslave whole countries was also inexorable. Freedom had won, it was said, and for ever. The historian Francis Fukuyama, who had coined “the end of history” in an essay the year before, was much in demand, and it is likely that Havel would have been inspired by the fervor, which would explain this passage from his speech: “I often hear the question: How can the United States of America help us today?


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The Case for Space: How the Revolution in Spaceflight Opens Up a Future of Limitless Possibility by Robert Zubrin

Ada Lovelace, Albert Einstein, anthropic principle, battle of ideas, Charles Lindbergh, Colonization of Mars, complexity theory, cosmic microwave background, cosmological principle, discovery of DNA, double helix, Elon Musk, en.wikipedia.org, flex fuel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gravity well, if you build it, they will come, Internet Archive, invisible hand, Jeff Bezos, Johannes Kepler, John von Neumann, Kuiper Belt, low earth orbit, Mars Rover, Menlo Park, more computing power than Apollo, Naomi Klein, nuclear winter, off grid, out of africa, Peter H. Diamandis: Planetary Resources, Peter Thiel, place-making, Pluto: dwarf planet, private space industry, rising living standards, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, telerobotics, Thomas Malthus, transcontinental railway, uranium enrichment

Thus, in his seminal work on world history, The Evolution of Civilizations, historian Carroll Quigley identified seven major stages in the development of societies: (1) mixture, (2) gestation, (3) expansion, (4) conflict, (5) universal empire, (6) decay, and (7) collapse.4 With its victory in the Cold War circa 1990, Western (essentially modern global) civilization reached stage five. Should we choose to continue in the footsteps of such historical analogs, stage six would soon follow—and in fact, some would argue that it has already begun. In 1992, philosophy professor Francis Fukuyama wrote a widely read book entitled The End of History, in which he posited that with the unification of the world resulting from the West's victory in the Cold War, human history had essentially “ended.”5 In 1996, Scientific American writer James Horgan published a much more interesting best seller entitled The End of Science, in which he held that all the really big discoveries to be made in science had already been made, and thus the enterprise of scientific discovery must soon grind to a halt.6 (The day after I finished reading Horgan's book in February 1998, a group of astronomers using the Hubble Space Telescope announced they had found a fifth fundamental force in nature.)

Christopher Stringer and Robin McKie, African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity (New York: Henry Holt, 1997). 2. James Shreve, The Neanderthal Enigma: Solving the Mystery of Modern Human Origins (New York: Avon Books, 1995). 3. William McNeill, The Rise of the West (New York: Mentor Books, 1965). 4. Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1961). 5. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History (New York: Free Press, 1992). 6. James Horgan, The End of Science (New York: Broadway Books, 1997). 7. Thomas D. Snyder, 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait (Washington, DC: US Department of Education, 1993), pp. 85–87, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf (accessed November 24, 2018). CHAPTER 11. FOR OUR SURVIVAL 1. Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot (New York: Random House, 1994). 2.

The Earth's challenges have largely been met, and the planet is currently in the process of effective unification. I believe this marks the end, not of human history but merely of the first phase of human history: our development into a mature Type I civilization. It is not the end of history, because if we choose to embrace it, we have in space a new frontier offering endless challenge—an infinite frontier, filled with worlds waiting to be discovered and history waiting to be made by myriad new branches of human civilization waiting to be born. Are we living at the end of history or at the beginning of history? Are we old, or are we young? The choice is ours. FOCUS SECTION: SPACE PROGRAM SPIN-OFFS One of the main selling points that NASA has frequently advanced to support its funding are the technological advances developed to meet space program needs that have greatly benefited society at large.


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The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It by Owen Jones

anti-communist, Asian financial crisis, bank run, battle of ideas, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bonus culture, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, centre right, citizen journalism, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, don't be evil, Edward Snowden, Etonian, eurozone crisis, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, G4S, glass ceiling, hiring and firing, housing crisis, inflation targeting, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), investor state dispute settlement, James Dyson, laissez-faire capitalism, light touch regulation, market fundamentalism, mass immigration, Monroe Doctrine, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, Neil Kinnock, night-watchman state, Northern Rock, Occupy movement, offshore financial centre, old-boy network, open borders, plutocrats, Plutocrats, popular capitalism, profit motive, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rent control, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, short selling, sovereign wealth fund, stakhanovite, statistical model, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, transfer pricing, union organizing, unpaid internship, Washington Consensus, wealth creators, Winter of Discontent

Politicians largely conform to a similar script; once-mighty trade unions are now treated as if they have no legitimate place in political or even public life; and economists and academics who reject Establishment ideology have been largely driven out of the intellectual mainstream. The end of the Cold War was spun by politicians, intellectuals and the media to signal the death of any alternative to the status quo: ‘the end of history’, as US political scientist Francis Fukuyama put it. All this has left the Establishment pushing at an open door. Whereas the position of the powerful was once undermined by the advent of democracy, an opposite process is now underway. The Establishment is amassing wealth and aggressively annexing power in a way that has no precedent in modern times. After all, there is nothing to stop it. There is a predictable objection to this portrait.

Meanwhile, university economics departments have been emptied of opponents of the status quo. As well as the dramatic political shifts in Britain, the proponents of unrestrained free-market economics were helped by other developments too. When the Soviet bloc collapsed in the late 1980s onwards, it was spun as a dramatic victory for free-market capitalism. It was the ‘end of history’, declared US political scientist Francis Fukuyama. ‘It’s time to say we’ve won, goodbye’ was the assessment of US neo-conservative Midge Decter. Even mild Keynesianism, however non-existent its links with Soviet-style Communism, was somehow seen as beyond the pale. Even mild forms of state involvement in the economy were consigned to a discredited past. ‘In academia, I am in a minority of maybe 5 per cent,’ says dissident economist Ha-Joon Chang.


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The Left Case Against the EU by Costas Lapavitsas

anti-work, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, capital controls, central bank independence, collective bargaining, declining real wages, eurozone crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, hiring and firing, neoliberal agenda, offshore financial centre, post-work, price stability, quantitative easing, reserve currency, Ronald Reagan, Washington Consensus, Wolfgang Streeck

The Maastricht Treaty came hard on the heels of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the reunification of Germany. It was very much a product of its time marked by the discrediting of state-controlled socialism, the retreat of organized labour in the previous decade in the face of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the ascendancy of neoliberal economics in both theory and policy. That was the moment of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, a book that gained tremendous visibility by claiming that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism went hand-in-hand, and together had actually won the grand historical contest among political and social systems.2 The Maastricht Treaty encapsulated the spirit of the time for Europe, and was a moment of historic importance in the evolution of the European project.3 The EU engaged in further sustained expansion in the 1990s and the 2000s, above all by incorporating a host of new countries in Eastern Europe and developing its international presence.

‘The Systemic Crisis of the Euro: True Causes and Effective Therapies’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Studien, available at: http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Studien/Studien_The_systemic_crisis_web.pdf Flassbeck, H. and C. Lapavitsas 2015. Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone, London and New York: Verso. Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, F. 2007. ‘The History at the End of History’, The Guardian, 3 April, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/03/thehistoryattheendofhist Giurlando, P. 2016. Eurozone Politics: Perception and Reality in Italy, the UK, and Germany, London and New York: Routledge. Gourinchas P.O., T. Philippon, and D. Vayanos 2016. ‘The Analytics of the Greek Crisis’, in M. Eichenbaum and J.

This is fully appreciated in the academic literature, which recognizes the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ after Maastricht, that is, the end of a period in which European integration proceeded mostly from above as a project operated by the elites of European countries. After Maastricht, ‘Europe’ became an issue of national and popular politics and the functioning of the EU acquired new characteristics. See Hooghe and Marks (2009) and Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015). 4. More than a decade after publishing The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama (2007) helpfully explained in the British Guardian that his model for the triumph of ‘post-historical’ liberal democracy was not the USA but the EU precisely because it was transnational (Fukuyama 2007). 5. Academics have long discussed the ‘crisis of representation’ in Europe: see, for instance, the special issues of West European Politics (Hayward 1995) and the European Journal of Political Research (summed up in Norris 1997).


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People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent by Joseph E. Stiglitz

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, basic income, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bernie Sanders, business cycle, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, carried interest, central bank independence, clean water, collective bargaining, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, crony capitalism, deglobalization, deindustrialization, disintermediation, diversified portfolio, Donald Trump, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, Firefox, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, gig economy, global supply chain, greed is good, income inequality, information asymmetry, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John von Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter, labor-force participation, late fees, low skilled workers, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, mass incarceration, meta analysis, meta-analysis, minimum wage unemployment, moral hazard, new economy, New Urbanism, obamacare, patent troll, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, Peter Thiel, postindustrial economy, price discrimination, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, Richard Thaler, Robert Bork, Robert Gordon, Robert Mercer, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, secular stagnation, self-driving car, shareholder value, Shoshana Zuboff, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, speech recognition, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, The Great Moderation, the market place, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the scientific method, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade liberalization, transaction costs, trickle-down economics, two-sided market, universal basic income, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, uranium enrichment, War on Poverty, working-age population

—MARK 3:25; ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHAPTER 1 Introduction That things are not going well in the US and in many other advanced countries is a mild understatement. There is widespread discontent in the land. It wasn’t supposed to be this way, according to the dominant thinking in American economics and political science in the last quarter century. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Francis Fukuyama declared The End of History, as democracy and capitalism at last had triumphed. A new era of global prosperity, with faster-than-ever growth, was thought to be at hand, and America was supposed to be in the lead.1 By 2018, those soaring ideas seem finally to have crashed to Earth. The 2008 financial crisis showed that capitalism wasn’t all that it was supposed to be—it seemed neither efficient nor stable.

US labor force participation rate (the fraction of working-age citizens who either have or are looking for a job) is also much lower than that of many other countries with much higher tax rates. 46.Nancy MacLean, a distinguished historian at Duke University, has put these arguments into historical context in her book Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (New York: Penguin, 2017). 47.Including our rules-based competitive market economy and our democracy with its system of checks and balances to which we referred earlier, and upon which we will elaborate below. 48.Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1961. 49.As we noted earlier, Francis Fukuyama referred to this as the “end of history.” All the world would now converge to this economic and political system. 50.Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André Maréchal, “Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry,” Nature 516, no. 7592 (2014): 86–89. 51.Yoram Bauman and Elaina Rose, “Selection or Indoctrination: Why Do Economics Students Donate Less than the Rest?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 79, no. 3 (2011): 318–27.

Norton), I analyzed the unfolding Great Recession, giving recommendations for how serious, extended economic underperformance could be avoided, and how the financial sector could be reformed to prevent such bubbles and their bursting in the future. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.The full title of Fukuyama’s 1992 book is The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press). After the election of Trump, his views changed: “Twenty five years ago, I didn’t have a sense or a theory about how democracies can go backward. And I think they clearly can.” Ishaan Tharoor, “The Man Who Declared the ‘End of History’ Fears for Democracy’s Future,” Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2017. 2.This is the thesis of a recent book by Adam Tooze of Columbia University, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (New York: Viking, 2018). 3.New York: Harper, 2016. 4.New York: The New Press, 2016. 5.See also Jennifer Sherman, Those Who Work, Those Who Don’t: Poverty, Morality, and Family in Rural America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Joan C.


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Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics by Nicholas Wapshott

"Robert Solow", airport security, banking crisis, Bretton Woods, British Empire, business cycle, collective bargaining, complexity theory, creative destruction, cuban missile crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Gordon Gekko, greed is good, Gunnar Myrdal, if you build it, they will come, Isaac Newton, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, liquidationism / Banker’s doctrine / the Treasury view, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, mortgage debt, New Journalism, Northern Rock, Paul Samuelson, Philip Mirowski, price mechanism, pushing on a string, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Ronald Reagan, Simon Kuznets, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trickle-down economics, War on Poverty, Yom Kippur War

Galbraith, The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, New York, 2008), p. 4. 10 Quoted in Kevin A. Hassett, “The Second Coming of Keynes,” National Review, February 9, 2009. 11 UCLA Oral History Program, p. 195. 12 Robert E. Lucas Jr., “Macroeconomic Priorities,” presidential address to the American Economic Association, January 10, 2003, http://home.uchicago.edu/%7Esogrodow/homepage/paddress03.pdf. 13 Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952– ), American political economist. 14 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992). 15 Ben Bernanke (1953– ), chairman of the Federal Reserve (2006– ), chairman of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers (2005–6). 16 Ben Bernanke, remarks at “A Conference to Honor Milton Friedman,” University of Chicago, Chicago, November 8, 2002. 17 Michael Kinsley (1951– ), American political journalist. 18 Michael Kinsley, “Greenspan Shrugged,” The New York Times, October 14, 2007. 19 Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, p. 68. 20 George H.

“Macroeconomics . . . has succeeded,” he announced. “Its central prob-lem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical pur-poses.”12 When the Cold War ended, the American political economist Francis Fukuyama13 declared that the evolutionary stages of societal development, from feudalism through agricultural and industrial revolutions to a modern capitalist democracy, had come to an end; the world had reached “the end of history.”14 It was with a similar confidence that economists announced “the end of economic history”: the world economy was cured of the prospect of a return to depression. Friedman, not Keynes, was credited with solving the mystery of why the Great Depression of the 1930s occurred and how it could be prevented from happening again. In a ninetieth birthday tribute to Friedman, Ben Bernanke,15 the Federal Reserve chairman at the time, offered a belated apology for the Fed’s shortcomings in the 1920s.

“The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement, an Essay in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,” (in Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money [University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956]). Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. Two Lucky People: Memoirs (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998). Friedman, Milton, and Anna D. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963). Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1992). Galbraith, James K. Ambassador’s Journal (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1969). —. A Life in Our Times (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1981). —. The Essential Galbraith, ed. Andrea D. Williams (Mariner Books, Orlando, Fla., 2001). —. The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, New York, 2008).


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Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap by Graham Allison

9 dash line, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, conceptual framework, cuban missile crisis, currency manipulation / currency intervention, Deng Xiaoping, disruptive innovation, Donald Trump, facts on the ground, Flash crash, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, game design, George Santayana, Haber-Bosch Process, industrial robot, Internet of things, Kenneth Rogoff, liberal world order, long peace, Mark Zuckerberg, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, mutually assured destruction, Nelson Mandela, one-China policy, Paul Samuelson, Peace of Westphalia, purchasing power parity, RAND corporation, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, selection bias, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley startup, South China Sea, special economic zone, spice trade, the rule of 72, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, trade route, UNCLOS, Washington Consensus, zero-sum game

Acknowledging that the “lines between [civilizations] are seldom sharp,” Huntington argued that they are nonetheless “real.”12 Huntington by no means ruled out future violent conflicts between groups within a common civilization. His point, rather, was that in a post–Cold War world, civilizational fault lines would not dissolve in a global convergence toward liberal world order—as one of Huntington’s former students, the political scholar Francis Fukuyama, had predicted in his 1989 article “The End of History?”13—but become more pronounced. “Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence,” Huntington allowed. “Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.”14 Huntington was keen to disabuse readers of the Western myth of universal values, which he said was not just naive but inimical to other civilizations, particularly the Confucian one with China at its center.

[back] 9. Ibid., 227, 306. [back] 10. Qianlong’s First Edict to King George III (September 1793), in The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, ed. Pei-kai Cheng, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan Spence (New York: Norton, 1999), 104–6. [back] 11. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22. [back] 12. Ibid., 24. [back] 13. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18. [back] 14. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 25. [back] 15. Ibid., 41. [back] 16. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003), 225. [back] 17. Ibid., 169. [back] 18. Ibid., 234. [back] 19. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), 271.

As Geoff Dyer has explained, “The Communist Party has faced a slow-burning threat to its legitimacy ever since it dumped Marx for the market.” Thus the Party has evoked past humiliations at the hands of Japan and the West “to create a sense of unity that had been fracturing, and to define a Chinese identity fundamentally at odds with American modernity.”47 During the 1990s when many Western thought leaders were celebrating the “end of history” with the apparent triumph of market-based democracies, a number of observers believed that China, too, was on a path to democratic government. Today, few in China would say that political freedoms are more important than reclaiming China’s international standing and national pride. As Lee put it pointedly, “If you believe that there is going to be a revolution of some sort in China for democracy, you are wrong.


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Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy by Benjamin Barber

airport security, anti-communist, Apple's 1984 Super Bowl advert, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, computer age, Corn Laws, Corrections Corporation of America, David Brooks, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, digital map, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Gilder, global village, invisible hand, Joan Didion, Kevin Kelly, laissez-faire capitalism, late capitalism, Live Aid, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, minimum wage unemployment, new economy, Norbert Wiener, North Sea oil, pirate software, postnationalism / post nation state, profit motive, race to the bottom, Right to Buy, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, undersea cable, young professional, zero-sum game

Finally, neither Jihad nor McWorld has any intrinsic interest in the fairness question and here, as in other domains, the poorest nations with neither energy reserves nor a productive economy do the worst. They are “good energy citizens” by default, because in the cruel competition of McWorld they are not citizens at all. APPENDIX B TWENTY-TWO COUNTRIES’ TOP TEN GROSSING FILMS, 1991 Notes Introduction 1. Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992), although he is far less pleased by his prognosis in his book than he seemed in the original National Interest essay that occasioned all the controversy; and Walter B. Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scribner’s, 1992). 2. See Georgie Anne Geyer, “Our Disintegrating World: The Menace of Global Anarchy,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year, 1985 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 11-25.

I underscore the importance of these new market hyperrealities here for two reasons: because the free market ideology they rehabilitate is a battering ram against the walls of the nation-state, exposing McWorld’s antagonism to nationalisms of every kind; and because they challenge and ultimately rewrite the traditional account of markets in terms of free trade in raw materials, manufactured goods, and services. For in the economics of McWorld, the traditional dominance of raw materials and goods yields to a novel and distinctive new realm of activity—what I call the infotainment telesector—that redefines the economic realities of McWorld and reorders the relations of nation-states in ways that neither Francis Fukuyama nor Paul Kennedy could anticipate. 2 The Resource Imperative: The Passing of Autarky and the Fall of the West TRADE IN NATURAL resources and the fruits of the land, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, is among the oldest and most prosperous and profitable sectors of the economy, dating back to the beginning of economic time. Slave/master societies as well as agricultural and feudal societies were grounded in the discovery, processing, and use of these primary goods.

In the short run the forces of Jihad, noisier and more obviously nihilistic than those of McWorld, are likely to dominate the near future, etching small stories of local tragedy and regional genocide on the face of our times and creating a climate of instability marked by multimicrowars inimical to global integration. But in the long run, the forces of McWorld are the forces underlying the slow certain thrust of Western civilization and as such may be unstoppable. Jihad’s microwars will hold the headlines well into the next century, making predictions of the end of history look terminally dumb. But McWorld’s homogenization is likely to establish a macropeace that favors the triumph of commerce and its markets and to give to those who control information, communication, and entertainment ultimate (if inadvertent) control over human destiny. Unless we can offer an alternative to the struggle between Jihad and McWorld, the epoch on whose threshold we stand—postcommunist, postindustrial, postnational, yet sectarian, fearful, and bigoted—is likely also to be terminally postdemocratic.


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The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War by Robert D. Kaplan

Berlin Wall, clean water, Deng Xiaoping, edge city, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Honoré de Balzac, mass immigration, Peace of Westphalia, Ronald Reagan, Thomas Malthus, trade route, unemployed young men, Yom Kippur War

The breaking apart and remakina of crack • 8 H ^ T ^ f t G m i R f n f t U S e r e and OF T H E P O S T C O L D W A R of the Arab-Israel milita^ Qngp^tj^n^areQnerely prologues^tothe realU Ina changes that lie ahead. . . . A u t h o r of B A L K A N GHOSTS U.S.A. $21.95 Canada $33.00 When "The Coming Anarchy" was published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1994, it was hailed as among the most important and influential articulations of the future of our planet, along with Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History" and Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations." Since then, Robert Kaplan's anti-utopian vision of the fault lines of the twentyfirst century has taken on the status of a paradigm. "The Coming Anarchy" has been hailed as the defining thesis for understanding the post-Cold War world. At the heart of this book is a question as old as America and one that is crucial to our national self-definition: what can and should we do when violence breaks out in countries far from our borders?


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To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism by Evgeny Morozov

3D printing, algorithmic trading, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Andrew Keen, augmented reality, Automated Insights, Berlin Wall, big data - Walmart - Pop Tarts, Buckminster Fuller, call centre, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, citizen journalism, cloud computing, cognitive bias, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, data acquisition, Dava Sobel, disintermediation, East Village, en.wikipedia.org, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, frictionless, future of journalism, game design, Gary Taubes, Google Glasses, illegal immigration, income inequality, invention of the printing press, Jane Jacobs, Jean Tirole, Jeff Bezos, jimmy wales, Julian Assange, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, license plate recognition, lifelogging, lone genius, Louis Pasteur, Mark Zuckerberg, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, moral panic, Narrative Science, Nelson Mandela, Nicholas Carr, packet switching, PageRank, Parag Khanna, Paul Graham, peer-to-peer, Peter Singer: altruism, Peter Thiel, pets.com, placebo effect, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, recommendation engine, Richard Thaler, Ronald Coase, Rosa Parks, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Silicon Valley startup, Skype, Slavoj Žižek, smart meter, social graph, social web, stakhanovite, Steve Jobs, Steven Levy, Stuxnet, technoutopianism, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, The Nature of the Firm, the scientific method, The Wisdom of Crowds, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, Thomas L Friedman, transaction costs, urban decay, urban planning, urban sprawl, Vannevar Bush, WikiLeaks

. ,” see Frederic Jameson, “Future City,” New Left Review 21 (2003): 65–80. 22 this experience of the “offline” is also profoundly affected: Nathan Jurgenson, “The IRL Fetish,” The New Inquiry, June 28, 2012, http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-irl-fetish. 23 the French finally pull the plug on Minitel: Scott Sayare, “After 3 Decades in France, Minitel’s Days Are Numbered,” New York Times, June 27, 2012. 23 Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reprint ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23 “policymakers should work with the grain of the Internet”: Eric Schmidt, “Let Luvvie Embrace Boffin in the Digital Future,” The Guardian, August 26, 2011. 23 “without a major upgrade”: Rebecca MacKinnon, “Why Doesn’t Washington Understand the Internet?,” Washington Post, January 22, 2012. 23 “nagging fear Germans harbor”: Jeff Jarvis, Public Parts: How Sharing in the Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 24 “Web 2.0 means using the Web”: Paul Graham, “Web 2.0,” PaulGraham.com, November 2005, http://www.paulgraham.com/web20.html. 24 “There are laws of Nature”: David Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 211. 25 it’s not “the solution to the problem”: Steven Johnson, Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age (New York: Penguin, 2012), xxxv. 25 “one could use the Internet directly”: ibid., xxxv, 26 “the creation of ARPANET and TCP/IP”: ibid., 16. 26 “Slowly but steadily”: ibid., 18. 26 “The question with Kickstarter”: ibid., 43. 27 Kickstarter’s most famous failed alumnus is Diaspora: see Jenna Wortham, “Success of Crowdfunding Puts Pressure on Entrepreneurs,” New York Times, September 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/technology/success-of-crowdfunding-puts-pressure-on-entrepreneurs.html. 28 Inge Ejbye Sørensen has studied how crowdfunding: see Inge Ejbye Sørensen, “Crowd-sourcing and Outsourcing: The Impact of Online Funding and Distribution on the Documentary Film Industry in the UK,” Media, Culture & Society 34 no. 6 (September 2012): 726–743; I’ve written about Sørensen’s research in my Slate column, from which the following few paragraphs are drawn: see Evgeny Morozov, “Kickstarter Will Not Save Artists from the Entertainment Industry’s Shackles,” Slate, September 25, 2012http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/09/kickstarter_s_crowdfunding_won_t_save_indie_filmmaking_.single.html . 29 What Would Google Do?

If “the Internet” goes, it seems, the entire armament of our technologies—all those artifacts on display in our museums of science and technology and history textbooks—would go with it. But perhaps we can’t imagine life after “the Internet” because we don’t think that “the Internet” is going anywhere. If the public debate is any indication, the finality of “the Internet”—the belief that it’s the ultimate technology and the ultimate network—has been widely accepted. It’s Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: just as capitalism-driven liberal democracy in Francis Fukuyama’s controversial account remains the only game in town, so does the capitalism-driven “Internet.” It, the logic goes, is a precious gift from the gods that humanity should never abandon or tinker with. Thus, while “the Internet” might disrupt everything, it itself should never be disrupted. It’s here to stay—and we’d better work around it, discover its real nature, accept its features as given, learn its lessons, and refurbish our world accordingly.

But, alas, the preservation of “the Internet” seems to have become an end in itself, to the great detriment of our ability even to imagine what might come to supplant it and how our Internet fetish might be blocking that something from emerging. To choose “the Internet” over the starkly uncertain future of the post-Internet world is to tacitly acknowledge that either “the Internet” has satisfied all our secret plans, longings, and desires—that is, it is indeed Silicon Valley’s own “end of history”—or that we simply can’t imagine what else innovation could unleash. The irony is that Zittrain’s theory of generativity, while very critical of gatekeepers like Apple, is itself a gatekeeper. While generativity green-lights good, reliable, and predictable innovation, the kind that promises to stay within the confines of “the Internet” and leave things as they are, it frowns upon—and possibly even blocks—the unruly and disruptive kind that might start within “the Internet” but eventually transcend, supplant, and perhaps even eliminate it.


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Culture and Imperialism by Edward W. Said

Ayatollah Khomeini, Bartolomé de las Casas, Bretton Woods, British Empire, colonial rule, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Howard Zinn, Joseph Schumpeter, Khartoum Gordon, lateral thinking, lone genius, Mikhail Gorbachev, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, traveling salesman

And texts create not only their own precedents, as Borges said of Kafka, but their successors. The great imperial experience of the past two hundred years is global and universal; it has implicated every corner of the globe, the colonizer and the colonized together. Because the West acquired world dominance, and because it seems to have completed its trajectory by bringing about “the end of history” as Francis Fukuyama has called it, Westerners have assumed the integrity and the inviolability of their cultural masterpieces, their scholarship, their worlds of discourse; the rest of the world stands petitioning for attention at our windowsill. Yet I believe it is a radical falsification of culture to strip it of its affiliations with its setting, or to pry it away from the terrain it contested or—more to the point of an oppositional strand within Western culture—to deny its real influence.

If every American student were required to read Homer, Shakespeare, the Bible, and Jefferson, then we would achieve a full sense of national purpose. Underlying these epigonal replications of Matthew Arnold’s exhortations to the significance of culture is the social authority of patriotism, the fortifications of identity brought to us by “our” culture, whereby we can confront the world defiantly and self-confidently; in Francis Fukuyama’s triumphalist proclamation, “we” Americans can see ourselves as realizing the end of history. This is an extremely drastic delimitation of what we have learned about culture—its productivity, its diversity of components, its critical and often contradictory energies, its radically antithetical characteristics, and above all its rich worldliness and complicity with imperial conquest and liberation. We are told that cultural or humanistic study is the recovery of the Judeo-Christian or Western heritage, free from native American culture (which the Judeo-Christian tradition in its early American embodiments set about to massacre) and from that tradition’s adventures in the non-Western world.

James, Neruda, Tagore himself, Fanon, Cabral, and others—discriminates among the various forces vying for ascendancy within the anti-imperialist, nationalist camp. James is a perfect case in point. Long a champion of Black nationalism, he always tempered his advocacy with disclaimers and reminders that assertions of ethnic particularity were not enough, just as solidarity without criticism was not enough. There is a great deal of hope to be derived from this if only because, far from being at the end of history, we are in a position to do something about our own present and future history, whether we live inside or outside the metropolitan world. In sum, decolonization is a very complex battle over the course of different political destinies, different histories and geographies, and it is replete with works of the imagination, scholarship and counter-scholarship. The struggle took the form of strikes, marches, violent attack, retribution and counter-retribution.


pages: 604 words: 161,455

The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life by Robert Wright

"Robert Solow", agricultural Revolution, Andrei Shleifer, Asian financial crisis, British Empire, centre right, cognitive dissonance, double entry bookkeeping, double helix, fault tolerance, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Gilder, global village, invention of gunpowder, invention of movable type, invention of the telegraph, invention of writing, invisible hand, John Nash: game theory, John von Neumann, Marshall McLuhan, Norbert Wiener, planetary scale, pre–internet, profit motive, Ralph Waldo Emerson, random walk, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, Silicon Valley, social intelligence, social web, Steven Pinker, talking drums, the medium is the message, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade route, your tax dollars at work, zero-sum game

After Berlin and Popper wrote, the kind of “bigthink” they opposed—“speculative history,” or “metahistory”—became an endangered species. In the 1960s, one philosopher of history observed that historians “tend to use the term ‘metahistorian’ to mark deviations from normal professional activity in either the law-seeking or the pattern-seeking direction.” Not much has changed since then. The one pattern-seeking work of history to make a big splash over the past two decades—The End of History—was written not by a historian but by a political scientist, Francis Fukuyama. Oddly, pondering laws of history is less deviant behavior for a political scientist than for a historian. Opponents of “metahistory” have often been candid about their motivations. The dedication to Popper’s book reads, “In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny.”

Wright is right about so many things: evolution is seeded with inevitabilities, cultures have common trajectories, and human history has seen great hopes and terrible crimes but is capable of achieving a final destiny.” —Simon Conway Morris, The New York Times Book Review “An extraordinarily insightful and thought-provoking book. . . . Wright does an astonishingly effective job of finding directionality in history, not just over the past few thousand years but over the almost four billion years since the beginning of life on earth.” —Francis Fukuyama, The Wilson Quarterly “A dazzling tour of world history. . . . Although he takes into account the tooth-and-claw battles of nations, the vanished empires, social violence and chaos, the shocks and changes of technology, Mr. Wright finds pattern and meaning in history. We are moving toward connectedness, toward one world. . . . Does that mean we can rest on our laurels and simply let the game go on?

. ——— (1997) “Models of Symbiosis.” American Naturalist 150:S80–S99. Fried, Morton (1983) “Tribe to State or State to Tribe in Ancient China,” in Keightley, ed. (1983). Friedman, Thomas (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Friedrich, Otto (1986) The End of the World: A History. Fromm International. Fromkin, David (1981) The Independence of Nations. Praeger. Fukuyama, Francis (1993) The End of History and the Last Man. Avon. Gaddis, John L. (1999) “Living in Candlestick Park.” The Atlantic, April, pp. 65–74. Garraty, John A., and Peter Gay, eds. (1981) The Columbia History of the World. Harper and Row. Garsoian, Nina (1981) “Early Byzantium,” in Garraty and Gay, eds. (1981). Gernet, Jacques (1962) Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276. Macmillan. ——— (1996) A History of Chinese Civilization.


pages: 1,015 words: 170,908

Empire by Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri

Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, colonial rule, conceptual framework, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Fall of the Berlin Wall, feminist movement, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global pandemic, global village, Haight Ashbury, informal economy, invisible hand, late capitalism, low skilled workers, mass immigration, means of production, Monroe Doctrine, Nelson Mandela, New Urbanism, open borders, post-industrial society, postindustrial economy, Scramble for Africa, social intelligence, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, union organizing, urban planning

We are thinking here primarily ofHannah Arendt’s notion ofthe political articulated in The Human Condition (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1958). 8. For Los Angeles, see Mike Davis, City of Quartz (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 221–263. For Sa˜o Paulo, see Teresa Caldeira, ‘‘Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation,’’ Public Culture, no. 8 (1996); 303–328. 9. See Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994). 10. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 11. ‘‘We have watched the war machine . . . set its sights on a new type of enemy, no longer another State, or even another regime, but ‘l’ennemi quelconque’ [the whatever enemy].’’ Gilles Deleuze and Feĺix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 422. 12. There are undoubtedly zones ofdeprivation within the world market where the flow ofcapital and goods is reduced to a minimum.

The liberal notion of the public, the I M P E R I A L S O V E R E I G N T Y 189 place outside where we act in the presence ofothers, has been both universalized (because we are always now under the gaze ofothers, monitored by safety cameras) and sublimated or de-actualized in the virtual spaces ofthe spectacle. The end ofthe outside is the end ofliberal politics. Finally, there is no longer an outside also in a military sense. When Francis Fukuyama claims that the contemporary historical passage is defined by the end ofhistory, he means that the era of major conflicts has come to an end: sovereign power will no longer confront its Other and no longer face its outside, but rather will progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain.10 The history ofimperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over.

The postmodern situation is eminently paradoxical when it is considered from the biopolitical point of view— understood, that is, as an uninterrupted circuit of life, production, and politics, globally dominated by the capitalist mode of production. On the one hand, in this situation all the forces of society tend to be activated as productive forces; but on the other hand, these same forces are submitted to a global domination that is continually more abstract and thus blind to the sense of the apparatuses of the reproduction of life. In postmodernity, the ‘‘end of history’’ is effectively imposed, but in such a way that at the same time paradoxically all the powers of humanity are called on to contribute to the global reproduction of labor, society, and life. In this framework, politics (when this is understood as administration and management) loses all its transparency. Through its institutional processes of normalization, power hides rather than reveals and interprets the relationships that characterize its control over society and life.


pages: 281 words: 69,107

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order by Bruno Maçães

active measures, Admiral Zheng, autonomous vehicles, Branko Milanovic, BRICs, cloud computing, deindustrialization, demographic dividend, Deng Xiaoping, different worldview, Donald Trump, energy security, European colonialism, eurozone crisis, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global supply chain, global value chain, industrial cluster, industrial robot, Internet of things, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, liberal world order, Malacca Straits, one-China policy, Pearl River Delta, smart cities, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special economic zone, trade liberalization, trade route, zero-sum game

This means not only the end to the global political landscape of Western civilization’s domination since the age of great discoveries, but also breaking the global dominance of Western civilization in the past half a millennium in the cultural sense, and hence ushering in a new era in human progress.36 Zhang Weiwei and Jiang Shigong may be right or wrong on these points of doctrine. That in the end is not the question. What their arguments show is that, far from suffering from a dearth of alternatives, we have too many universal values to choose from and they are evidently not compatible or even fully commensurable between them. When discussing world politics today, we often revert to one of two models. The first, popularized by Francis Fukuyama, sees the whole world converging to a European or Western political framework, after which no further historical development is possible. Every country or region is measured by the time it will still take to reach this final destination, but all doubts and debates about where we are heading have been fundamentally resolved. The other model, defended by Samuel Huntington, is skeptical of such irreversible movement.

After the completion of the project, a Chinese company operating a port might modestly slow transit to send a coercive signal about China’s control over a target country’s trade flows.24 The idea of a “harmonious world” or a “community of shared destiny” may appeal to the pursuit of peace, cooperation and respect for cultural difference, but when—in a curious imitation of the Western concept of the end of history—it is presented as the inevitable endpoint of historical development, it becomes uncompromising and oppressive. Once a “community of shared destiny” has been advanced as the only correct option, the temptation is to start identifying disharmonious elements, those who, as the Chinese authorities like to put it, still harbor a Cold War mentality or a zero-sum approach to world politics. The implication is that the same Chinese elites who developed the concepts guiding the Belt and Road must now be left to decide how those concepts are to be executed.

Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Harbored Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific”, C4ADS, 2017, pp. 16–17. 11. Mei Xinyu, “The Gwadar Port Disillusion,” Caijing, December 19, 2016. 12. Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), p. 113. 13. Bruno Maçães, “Russia’s New Energy Gamble,” Cairo Review, 2018. 14. Nadine Godehardt, “No End of History: A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order”, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, January 2016. 15. Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road Initiative: What China Will Offer the World in Its Rise (New World Press, 2016), p. 1. 16. See Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia, 天下),” Social Identities, January 2006, pp. 29–41. 17. “一带一路”: 人类命运共同体的重要实践路径 作者: 张耀军 来源: 人民论坛 18.


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The Secret War Between Downloading and Uploading: Tales of the Computer as Culture Machine by Peter Lunenfeld

Albert Einstein, Andrew Keen, anti-globalists, Apple II, Berlin Wall, British Empire, Brownian motion, Buckminster Fuller, Burning Man, business cycle, butterfly effect, computer age, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, cuban missile crisis, Dissolution of the Soviet Union, don't be evil, Douglas Engelbart, Douglas Engelbart, Dynabook, East Village, Edward Lorenz: Chaos theory, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, Grace Hopper, gravity well, Guggenheim Bilbao, Honoré de Balzac, Howard Rheingold, invention of movable type, Isaac Newton, Jacquard loom, Jane Jacobs, Jeff Bezos, John Markoff, John von Neumann, Kickstarter, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, Mercator projection, Metcalfe’s law, Mother of all demos, mutually assured destruction, Nelson Mandela, Network effects, new economy, Norbert Wiener, PageRank, pattern recognition, peer-to-peer, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, post-materialism, Potemkin village, RFID, Richard Feynman, Richard Stallman, Robert Metcalfe, Robert X Cringely, Schrödinger's Cat, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, SETI@home, Silicon Valley, Skype, social software, spaced repetition, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Ted Nelson, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, Thomas L Friedman, Turing machine, Turing test, urban planning, urban renewal, Vannevar Bush, walkable city, Watson beat the top human players on Jeopardy!, William Shockley: the traitorous eight

I adopt this notion of long and short decades from the ways in which historians have proposed that the nineteenth was a long century, from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and that the twentieth was a short one, running from 1914 to 1989. Likewise we can say that in the United States, the 1960s were a long decade, lasting from 1957 to 1973 (roughly the publication of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road to the triple shocks of the OPEC oil embargo, Watergate, and the loss in Vietnam). 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. For a sterling analysis of New Economy hubris, see Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 4. This figure comes from Lawrence Haverty Jr., senior vice president of State Street Research, quoted in Rachel Konrad, “Assessing the Carnage: Sizing Up the Market’s Swift Demise,” CNET News, March 8, 2001, available at <http://news. com.com/2009-1017-253125-2.html?

The post-1989 period contained a multitude of features, but one unifying construct was the belief that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the Soviet Union itself, not just Communism, but all the countervailing forces against market capitalism were vanquished, and not just for the moment but literally for all time. The Market with a capital M was the grail at the end of Francis Fukayama’s treatise The End of History.2 The Market was the solution for all questions, the Market would bring peace and prosperity, and would free itself from the tyranny of the business cycle, evolving into an entirely invisible, frictionless, perpetual motion machine that would take the name of the New Economy (again with capital letters).3 This immediate post-1989 period coincided with the most utopian phase of the culture machine: the euphoria of the World Wide Web’s first Wild, Wild West phase.

., 9 Difference engine, 149 Digg, 34 Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 71, 149, 153, 163, 170 Digital video discs (DVDs), 2, 7–8, 15, 58 Digital video recorders (DVRs), 2, 7, 15, 23, 181n3 Disco, 63 Disney Concert Hall, 39 DIY (do-it-yourself) movements, 67–70 203 Dot-com bubble, 79, 145, 174 Doubleclick, 177 Downloading, xiii–xiv, 180nn1,2 animal kingdom and, 1 bespoke futures and, 97, 123, 132, 138 best use and, 13–14 commercial networks and, 4–5 communication devices and, 15–16 cultural hierarchy of, 1–2 culture machine and, 143, 168 dangers of overabundance and, 7–10 defined, 1 diabetic responses to, 3–5 disrupting flow and, 23–24 figure/ground and, xvi, 42–43, 46, 102 Freedom software and, 22–23 habits of mind and, 9–10 humans and, 1–2 information overload and, 22, 149 info-triage and, xvi, 20–23, 121, 132, 143 as intake, 5 mindfulness and, xvi, 14, 17, 20–24, 27–29, 42, 77, 79, 123, 129, 183n6 patio potato and, 9–10, 13 peer-to-peer networks and, 15, 54, 92, 116, 126 stickiness and, 13–17, 20–23, 27–29, 184n15 surfing and, 20, 80, 180n2 television and, 2 unimodernism and, 41–42, 49, 54–57, 66–67, 76–77 viral distribution and, 30, 56, 169 wants vs. needs and, 13, 37, 57 Web n.0 and, 79, 82–83, 86–87 Duchamp, Marcel, 44, 48, 94 Dymaxion map, 73 Dynabook, 161–162, 196n17 Dynamic equilibrium, 117–120 EBay, 68 Eckert, J. Presper, 148 INDEX Efficiency, 21–24, 98, 103 8 Man (Hirai and Kuwata), 108 8–track tapes, 2 89/11, xvi, 97, 100–102, 105, 130 Einstein, Albert, 49–50, 186n4 Eisenstein, Sergei, 31 52, 88 El Lissitzky, 45 Eminent Victorians (Strachey), 19 End of History, The (Fukayama), 97 Engelbart, Douglas, 144, 157–167 ENIAC computer, 148 Enlightenment Electrified, xvi, 47 bespoke futures and, 129–139 determinism and, 131–132 Nietzschean self-satisfaction and, 132 religion and, 130–135, 138 secular culture and, 133–134 technology and, 131–133, 136–139 Entrepreneurs, 99, 109, 156–157, 174 Environmental impact reports (EIRs), 79–80 Ethernet, 161 Etsy.com, 68 Evans, Walker, 41–42 Everyone Is a Designer!


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Independent Diplomat: Dispatches From an Unaccountable Elite by Carne Ross

barriers to entry, cuban missile crisis, Doha Development Round, energy security, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, iterative process, meta analysis, meta-analysis, one-China policy, Peace of Westphalia, Pearl River Delta, stakhanovite, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, zero-sum game

As liberalism evolved in the twentieth century (and some called it neo-liberalism), it argued that cooperation and collective security in a multipolar system of democratic states and strong international institutions would best serve the interests of stability (echoing Kant’s “perpetual peace”). Many contemporary liberals viewed the end of the Cold War (the realist paradigm of a bipolar system) as the ultimate confirmation of liberalism as the only viable mode of political life. Champion among such thinkers was Francis Fukuyama who, in his seminal book The End of History and the Last Man, argued that political history had come to a close with the death of the Cold War and, by default, the triumph of liberalism. Not only will liberal democracy and capitalism spread through an ever-globalising world, but also such a system would be ideal. A world wherein all states adhere to liberal democratic norms, institutions and universal political values would be one that neutralises war and conflict.

Governments and politicians, and the diplomats who serve them, have a profound interest in claiming that they can understand and order the world in this way. They cannot be anything other than wrong. Simplification, though tempting, must inevitably be inaccurate and wrong and is therefore dangerous. Academics are as guilty of this thought-crime as the politicians, providing glib generalisations with which we can organise our thoughts and dinner-party arguments. The absurdity of theses such as “the clash of civilizations” or the “end of history” (though the latter book admits to a more nuanced analysis) is only revealed at the point that any situation, anywhere, is examined using such templates. 8. At a more prosaic level, contemporary diplomacy is deeply unbalanced and unfair. Its practice and machinery are dominated by rich and powerful states, whose political and economic power is reinforced and supplemented by their less-recognised diplomatic power.


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What About Me?: The Struggle for Identity in a Market-Based Society by Paul Verhaeghe

Berlin Wall, call centre, cognitive dissonance, deskilling, epigenetics, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, invisible hand, jimmy wales, job satisfaction, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, Louis Pasteur, market fundamentalism, Milgram experiment, new economy, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, post-industrial society, Richard Feynman, Silicon Valley, Stanford prison experiment, stem cell, The Spirit Level, ultimatum game, working poor

Just as in the case of religion, everything was fine as long as there was only a single ideology. But whenever a number of religions or ideologies laid claim to being the one true belief, wars broke out in the name of faith or reason. Since that time, secular religions have followed hot on each other’s heels, each with their promise of a new and better world: socialism, communism, fascism, and, most recently, liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of the latter as marking ‘the end of history’ again conjures up the idea of a ladder with a substandard beginning and a glorious end. Once again, it’s not hard to see the legacy of Christianity in these different ideologies: the better society, Heaven on Earth, is always located in the future, and requires a great deal of effort and sacrifice. It makes me think of Freud’s laconic response after being told that communism would create a social paradise, albeit after an initial period of revolution involving the necessary sacrifices and privations.


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Financial Market Meltdown: Everything You Need to Know to Understand and Survive the Global Credit Crisis by Kevin Mellyn

asset-backed security, bank run, banking crisis, Bernie Madoff, bonus culture, Bretton Woods, business cycle, collateralized debt obligation, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, cuban missile crisis, disintermediation, diversification, fiat currency, financial deregulation, financial innovation, financial intermediation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, global reserve currency, Home mortgage interest deduction, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Kickstarter, liquidity trap, London Interbank Offered Rate, long peace, margin call, market clearing, mass immigration, money market fund, moral hazard, mortgage tax deduction, Northern Rock, offshore financial centre, paradox of thrift, pattern recognition, pension reform, pets.com, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, profit maximization, pushing on a string, reserve currency, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, South Sea Bubble, statistical model, The Great Moderation, the new new thing, the payments system, too big to fail, value at risk, very high income, War on Poverty, Y2K, yield curve

The collapse of the Soviet Union twenty years ago largely discredited the notion that governments rather than markets should control economic life. The state had clearly failed to deliver prosperity and had destroyed the liberty of billions and the lives of millions in the process. Outside of its strongholds in the universities and cultural elites of the rich capitalist world, state socialism was universally seen to be an abject failure. THE END OF HISTORY In 1992, a renowned scholar published a book that stayed on the bestseller list for months. Francis Fukuyama based The End of History and the Last Man on a lecture he gave in 1989 when state socialism began to crumble in Eastern Europe. He argued persuasively that ‘‘liberal democracy remains [after the fall of communism] the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics—the ‘‘free market’’—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that have been part of the impoverished third world.’’

The triumph of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States during the 1980s had started the pendulum of history swinging back to the classical liberalism of Bagehot’s Britain. The triumph of the AngloAmerican model of business and finance appeared complete and final. Conclusion REAL HISTORY DOES NOT END Of course, real history as we have seen is always a series of accidents. It never really comes to an end. Instead of the end of history, Fukuyama was really observing a turnover in the long, never complete grudge match between free markets and those people and institutions that seek to suppress and manipulate markets through political power. The game continued, and in 2008, the other team—the left wing of the Democratic Party, not its basically mainstream membership as a whole—was able to turn a very scary market panic that had nothing to do with the fundamentals of capitalism into a big score for a return to state control of the economy.

.), 20, 28, 42, 54–55, 72, 82, 88–89, 93–97, 120, 167, 169 Fannie Mae, 57, 133, 142 FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 16, 128–129, 131–132, 159, 163 federal funds rate, 146 Federal Home Loan Banks, 56, 142 Federal Reserve, 6, 11, 13–14, 44, 84, 86, 102–110, 123–124, 128, 132, 140, 152, 156, 159, 162–163, 186 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 103–104, 124 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 105 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 104, 107 Ferguson, Niall, concept of ‘‘Chimerica,’’ 185; on John Law, 92; on Medicis, 79; on the Rothschilds, 88; Fiat money, 155, 173, 184 FICO scores, 63, 65, 68 financial economy, ix, 1–5, 8, 150, 174 financial innovation, 58, 60, 74 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 132 financial instruments, 19–20, 64; customization, 65, 150; standardization of, 66; risks, 47, 49, 52; types of, 29–31; 32–40, 42–45, 54–55; uses of, 31–32 financial markets, x, xx, 19–20, 22, 24–25, 29, 40, 45, 75, 79–80, 88, 90, 99, 101, 119, 127, 139–141, 160, 165, 167, 176, 180, 186, 189 First National Bank of Boston, 143 First National City Bank of New York, 145 fixed income, 43, 48, 52, 67, 93, 153 floating currencies and FX market, 155 foreign exchange, x, 55, 72, 93–95, 125, 149, 156 401(k) plans, 122, 157 fractional reserves, 151 Freddie Mac, 57 Friedman, Tom, World Is Flat, The, 184 Fukuyama, Francis, End of History and the Last Man, The, 182–183 ‘‘futures,’’ 54–55 Galbraith, John Kenneth, Affluent Society, The, 153 Garn-St. Germain Act, 130–131 GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 6, 14, 27, 133, 169, 171, 188 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 115 Genoa and origins of banking and finance, 77–79 Glass-Steagall, 141, 149, 159 gold, xiv–xvi, xix, 8, 12, 19, 34, 83–84, 106, 147, 149, 154–155, 184 Goldman Sachs, 159 Goldsmiths, 83 gold standard, 94–98, 108, 115, 125–126, 137–139, 155, 162 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 159 Great Inflation, 130, 152, 154, 156 Great Moderation, 140–141, 152 Greenberg, Maurice ‘‘Hank,’’ and AIG, 138, Index Greenspan, Alan, 101, 111, 140, 157 ‘‘Greenspan put,’’ 101, 111 Gresham, Sir Thomas, 80, 82 GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises), 57, 133, 142, 176, 186 Health Care, 51, 162, 187–189 Hedge Funds, 25–27, 65 High Street (UK equivalent for Main Street), 91 High Street Bank, 89.


pages: 333 words: 76,990

The Long Good Buy: Analysing Cycles in Markets by Peter Oppenheimer

"Robert Solow", asset allocation, banking crisis, banks create money, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Bretton Woods, business cycle, buy and hold, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, collective bargaining, computer age, credit crunch, debt deflation, decarbonisation, diversification, dividend-yielding stocks, equity premium, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, fixed income, Flash crash, forward guidance, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Akerlof, housing crisis, index fund, invention of the printing press, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kickstarter, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, Live Aid, market bubble, Mikhail Gorbachev, mortgage debt, negative equity, Network effects, new economy, Nikolai Kondratiev, Nixon shock, oil shock, open economy, price stability, private sector deleveraging, Productivity paradox, quantitative easing, railway mania, random walk, Richard Thaler, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, South Sea Bubble, special economic zone, stocks for the long run, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade route, tulip mania, yield curve

Although these reforms were aimed at reversing the bureaucratic structure that had become a major constraint to economic progress, now they are often seen as important catalysts in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and, as such, the end of the Cold War and the start of the modern era of globalisation. In the summer of 1989, just a few months before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, as the pressures on the Eastern European communist states intensified, Francis Fukuyama, a US State Department official, wrote a paper titled ‘The End of History’ where he argued, ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’4 The paper seemed to capture the zeitgeist. In parallel, about this time China was also beginning to open up its economy and embark on reforms.

Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-31602871 3 In fact, this wasn't the first global live event. This had already been achieved in 1967 with Our World, which had used satellites to beam to a global audience of 400,000 to 700,000 people, the biggest ever at the time, and included appearances and performances from Pablo Picasso, Maria Callas, and the famous UK entry, The Beatles, who performed ‘All You Need Is Love’ for the first time. 4 See Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. 5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/16/newsid_2519000/2519013.stm 6 The Maastricht Treaty, officially known as the Treaty on European Union, marked the beginning of ‘a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. It laid the foundations for the euro single currency and also expanded cooperation between countries in several areas.

The debt-deflation theory of the great depressions. Econometrica, 1, 337–357. Five things you need to know about the Maastricht Treaty. (2017). ECB [online]. Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html Frehen, R. G. P., Goetzmann, W. N., and Rouwenhorst, K. G. (2013). New evidence on the first financial bubble. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 585–607. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., and Sack, B. (2011). The financial market effects of the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, 7(1), 3–43. Galbraith, J. K. (1955). The great crash, 1929. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. George Hudson and the 1840s railway mania. (2012). Yale School of Management Case Studies [online].


pages: 276 words: 78,061

Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of Flags by Tim Marshall

anti-communist, Ayatollah Khomeini, Berlin Wall, British Empire, colonial rule, Donald Trump, drone strike, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Mahatma Gandhi, Malacca Straits, mass immigration, megacity, Nelson Mandela, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, trade route, white picket fence

Flags, and the importance nation states and peoples attach to them, give the lie to the famous theory of the American thinker Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. Dr Fukuyama argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall was not ‘just the end of the Cold War but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’. This damaging idea continues to influence generations of foreign-policy thinkers who appear oblivious to the patterns of history and the political direction of Russia, the Middle East, China, swathes of Central Asia and elsewhere. It is damaging because it causes some people to assume that such a thing as the end of history is possible, and that mankind’s ‘ideological evolution’ must end in liberal democracy.


pages: 281 words: 78,317

But What if We're Wrong? Thinking About the Present as if It Were the Past by Chuck Klosterman

a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, British Empire, citizen journalism, cosmological constant, dark matter, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, George Santayana, Gerolamo Cardano, ghettoisation, Howard Zinn, Isaac Newton, Joan Didion, non-fiction novel, obamacare, pre–internet, Ralph Nader, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Stephen Hawking, the medium is the message, the scientific method, Thomas Kuhn: the structure of scientific revolutions, too big to fail, Y2K

[2]When I spoke with Horgan, he’d recently completed his (considerably less controversial) fifth book, The End of War, a treatise arguing against the assumption that war is an inescapable component of human nature. The embryo for this idea came from a conversation he’d had two decades prior, conducted while working on The End of Science. It was an interview with Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist best known for his 1989 essay “The End of History?” The title of the essay is deceptive, since Fukuyama was mostly asserting that liberal capitalist democracies were going to take over the world. It was an economic argument that (thus far) has not happened. But what specifically appalled Horgan was Fukuyama’s assertion about how a problem-free society would operate. Fukuyama believed that once mankind eliminated all its problems, it would start waging wars against itself for no reason, almost out of boredom.

Hyde (Stevenson), 143–44 dreaming content of dreams, 142–43 dimethyltryptamine (DMT), 141–42 “Dream Argument,” 137n lucid, 137, 141 meaningless nature of, 138–39 and near-death experiences, 141–42 Dress, The (viral phenomenon), 146–47 dying and sleep, relationship between, 141–42 Dylan, Bob, 74–77, 86–87, 230 Earth, location in Milky Way, 120 earthquakes, 258–60 echolocation sonar, 254 Ed Sullivan Show, The, 60, 66 Egan, Jennifer, 52 Eggers, Dave, 52 Ehrlich, Paul, 14 Einstein, Albert, 4, 112, 114 elections, US Ohio’s importance in, 196–97 political polarization since 9/11, 198–99 presidential race of 2000, 197–98, 216 See also voting electronic dance music (EDM), 79 EmDrive rocket thruster, 119–20 Empire (TV show), 170 “End of History?, The” (Fukuyama), 226–27 End of Science, The (Horgan), 223–24, 226 End of War, The (Horgan), 226–27 Entourage (TV show), 170 equality, 212–14 Esquire, 246 E.T. (film), 182 “Ethicist, The” (New York Times Magazine column), 255 Everest, Mount, 183 extraterrestrials, music for, 83–84 fact-checking, 154n false memories, 150–51 Fight Club (Palahniuk), 53 film industry, 28–30, 90, 227, 243–45 financial crisis of 2008, 41 First Amendment rights, 211–12 flawed assumptions, 93–94, 185–86 fleeting popularity, 23–24 Foer, Jonathan Safran, 47 Fomenko, Anatoly, 135 football college level, 191–93 comparative risks in other sports, 183 dangerous nature of, 179–80, 185 future of, 178–82 hypothetical scenario of its decline, 180 National Football League (NFL), 180–81, 182–83 safety modifications envisioned, 181 silo analogy, 184–85 forces fundamental vs. emergent, 4 gravity, 3–7 Fourteenth Amendment rights, 220 fox vs. hedgehog, 199–201 Franzen, Jonathan, 27, 36, 261 free speech, limitations to, 211–12 Freed, Alan, 59 freedom, 214 Freud, Sigmund, 138 Frost, Robert, 93 Fukuyama, Francis, 226–27 future, thinking about, 252–53 Galileo, 5, 100, 117–18 Gaussian curve, 22n Gazzaniga, Michael, 203n Gehry, Frank, 90 genius, recognizing, 23–24, 73 Gibbon, Edward, 207 Gillett, Charlie, 14 Gioia, Ted, 77–79 Gladwell, Malcolm, 177–79, 181 Glass, Stephen, 154n global politics, 15, 17 God and the simulation hypothesis, 124–27 Gone Girl (Flynn), 53 “good job” response to art, 188–89 Goodman, John, 174 Gore, Al, 197–98 gorillas, 255–56 GQ, 242–43 Grand Theft Auto (video game), 128 Grant, Ulysses S., 206 gravity Aristotle’s ideas about, 5, 101 author’s knowledge of, 3 evolution of ideas about, 3–7 temperature analogy, 4n greatness, 51n Greene, Brian, 3–4, 101–8, 112–14, 124–25 Gross, David, 104n Gumbel, Bryant, 185 Halley’s Comet, 136 Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, 156–57 Harbaugh, Jim, 185 Hard Rain (album), 75 Hardcore History (podcast), 201–3 Harrison, George, 84n heliocentrism, 117 Hellman, Martin, 260 Hemingway, Ernest, 93 Hendrix, Jimi, 60 “Here Comes the Sun” (song), 84 Hero with a Thousand Faces, The (Campbell), 74n hero’s journey, 74 Hersh, Seymour, 151–53 Herzen, Alexander, 201 Hidden Reality, The (Greene), 103 Higgs boson (“God particle”), 130–31 historical figure game, 155–56 history confirming, 151, 153–57, 203–5 revisionist, 233–35 History: Fiction or Science?


pages: 264 words: 74,688

Imperial Legacies by Jeremy Black;

affirmative action, British Empire, centre right, colonial rule, Donald Trump, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, imperial preference, Khartoum Gordon, mass immigration, Monroe Doctrine, out of africa, Scramble for Africa, transatlantic slave trade

Westermann, Hitler’s Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016). 4 On “our disregard of the Boer War,” Matthew Parris, “Forgotten Wars,” Times, April 4, 2018. 5 David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History (London: Allen Lane, 2018). 6 Bruce D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 7 For this concept, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (spring 1989): 2–18. 8 Henry Chauncy, Historical Antiquities of Hertfordshire (London, 1700), p. 1. 9 Judith M. Brown, “Epilogue,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: IV: The Twentieth Century, ed. Brown and Wm R. Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 710. 10 Karim Bejjit, English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 11 P.


pages: 859 words: 204,092

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom by Martin Jacques

Admiral Zheng, Asian financial crisis, Berlin Wall, Bob Geldof, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, credit crunch, Dava Sobel, deindustrialization, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, discovery of the americas, Doha Development Round, energy security, European colonialism, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global reserve currency, global supply chain, illegal immigration, income per capita, invention of gunpowder, James Watt: steam engine, joint-stock company, Kenneth Rogoff, land reform, land tenure, lateral thinking, Malacca Straits, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, Nelson Mandela, new economy, New Urbanism, one-China policy, open economy, Pearl River Delta, pension reform, price stability, purchasing power parity, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, special drawing rights, special economic zone, spinning jenny, Spread Networks laid a new fibre optics cable between New York and Chicago, the scientific method, Thomas L Friedman, trade liberalization, urban planning, Washington Consensus, Westphalian system, Xiaogang Anhui farmers, zero-sum game

For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001. 32 . Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4-5. 33 . Chris Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia (London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166. 34 . Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25. 35 . John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue. 36 . Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Jim Rohwer, Asia Rising (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), Chapters 1-3. 37 .

The significance of this debate to a world in which the developing nations are increasingly influential is far-reaching: if their end-point is similar to the West, or, to put it another way, Western-style modernity, then the new world is unlikely to be so different from the one we inhabit now, because China, India, Indonesia and Brazil, to take four examples, will differ little in their fundamental characteristics from the West. This was the future envisaged by Francis Fukuyama, who predicted that the post-Cold War world would be based on a new universalism embodying the Western principles of the free market and democracy.34 If, on the other hand, their ways of being modern diverge significantly, even sharply, from the Western model, then a world in which they predominate is likely to look very different from the present Western-made one in which we still largely live.

., ‘China’s Sunshine Boys’, International Herald Tribune, 7 December 2006 ——‘Democrats and China’, International Herald Tribune, 11- 12 November 2006 ——The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999) ——The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the Twenty-first Century (London: Allen Lane, 2005) Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, 16, Summer 1989 ——The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) ——Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995) Gall, Susan, and Irene Natividad, eds, The Asian American Almanac: A Reference Work on Asians in the United States (Detroit: Gale Research, 1995) Gardner, Howard, To Open Minds (New York: Basic Books, 1989) Garrett, Valery M., Chinese Clothing: An Illustrated Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) ——Traditional Chinese Clothing in Hong Kong and South China, 1840- 1980 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987) Garrison, Jim, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power?


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What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right by George R. Tyler

8-hour work day, active measures, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, bank run, banking crisis, Basel III, Black Swan, blood diamonds, blue-collar work, Bolshevik threat, bonus culture, British Empire, business cycle, business process, buy and hold, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, carried interest, cognitive dissonance, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, commoditize, corporate governance, corporate personhood, corporate raider, corporate social responsibility, creative destruction, credit crunch, crony capitalism, crowdsourcing, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Brooks, David Graeber, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, deindustrialization, Diane Coyle, disruptive innovation, Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich, eurozone crisis, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, George Gilder, Gini coefficient, Gordon Gekko, hiring and firing, income inequality, invisible hand, job satisfaction, John Markoff, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, labor-force participation, laissez-faire capitalism, lake wobegon effect, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, manufacturing employment, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, minimum wage unemployment, mittelstand, moral hazard, Myron Scholes, Naomi Klein, Northern Rock, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, pension reform, performance metric, pirate software, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, precariat, price stability, profit maximization, profit motive, purchasing power parity, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, rent-seeking, reshoring, Richard Thaler, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Robert Shiller, Robert Shiller, Ronald Reagan, Sand Hill Road, shareholder value, Silicon Valley, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, South Sea Bubble, sovereign wealth fund, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, The Chicago School, The Spirit Level, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, too big to fail, transcontinental railway, transfer pricing, trickle-down economics, tulip mania, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, upwardly mobile, women in the workforce, working poor, zero-sum game

Henry Olson of the American Enterprise Institute, writing in the Wall Street Journal during 2008, miscast Europe this way: “Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands are poorer than the United States, with substantially higher unemployment rates and slower economic growth.”61 France is regularly demonized, including a 2007 editorial in the Washington Post arguing it needs “weaning … from a mind-set that disdains and devalues work.”62 And here is reporter Simon Heffer of London’s Daily Telegraph, cheerleader for the conservative Tory party and critic of continental Europe: “While much of the rest of the World moves on through the application of free-market disciplines, France is demoralized, impoverished, overtaxed, and in despair.”63 A similar verdict was issued in 2001 by law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, who described stakeholder capitalism and codetermination as “a failed social model.”64 Disciples of Milton Friedman and Ayn Rand, their article was entitled “The End of History for Corporate Law.” Their writing was reminiscent of political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s inaccurate commentary on the end of the Cold War or Oswald Spengler’s much earlier prediction amid the carnage of World War I, in his chilling The Decline of the West, that Western civilization had begun an inevitable downturn. Even the Economist magazine promotes the canard of a sickly Europe, as it did in June 2006 with unfortunate timing, not long before the US housing bubble burst.

Pew found that fewer American youths believe in the superiority of the US culture (37 percent) than youths in Germany, Spain, or Britain who view their own cultures as superior, even amid the European sovereign debt turmoil.23 Reaganomics has caused America’s children to conclude that their nation is no longer the exceptional land of opportunity it was for their grandparents. It has also sparked a much more dramatic reappraisal. Extrapolating these trends, political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama has grown alarmed that the decline of the American middle class poses an existential threat to democracy itself. By widening income disparities and shrinking the middle class that anchors societies, he frets that global integration threatens the very foundation of Western democratic institutions and practices. Frustrated and angry voters from the devolving middle class might well demand that leaders emulate Chinese state capitalism—or worse.

Kris Warner, “Protecting Fundamental Labor Rights: Lessons from Canada for the United States,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, August 2012, http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/canada-2012-08.pdf. 51 Kate Bronfenbrenner, “The NLRB Got It Right on Boeing,” Washington Post, June 23, 2011. 52 Thomas Geoghegan, “Infinite Debt,” Harper’s Magazine, April 2009. 53 David Leonhardt, “In Wreckage of Lost Jobs, Lost Power,” New York Times, Jan. 19, 2011. 54 Ken Silverstein, “Labor’s Last Stand,” Harper’s Magazine, July 2009. 55 “The Imperfect Union Bill,” Editorial, Washington Post, May 11, 2009. 56 Harold Meyerson, “Card Check and Gut Check,” Washington Post, May 14, 2009. 57 Silverstein, “Labor’s Last Stand.” 58 Geoghegan, “Infinite Debt.” 59 Ibid. 60 Norbert Häring, “The Economist Who Wanted to Make a Difference,” Handelsblatt, July 27, 2010. 61 Henry Olson, “The GOP’s Time for Choosing,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 2008. 62 “The ‘Omnipresident’s’ Crucible,” Editorial, Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2007. 63 Quoted by Martin Newland, The Observer, May 6, 2007. 64 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law,” 89 Georgetown Law Journal, 439–468, 2001. Also see Irene Lynch Fannon, “The European Social Model of Corporate Governance: Prospects for Success in an Enlarged Europe,” European Union Studies Association Conference, March 30, 2005. 65 “The Financial Crisis: What Next?,” Economist, Sept.18, 2008. 66 Andrew Moravcsik, as quoted in “Suddenly, Europe Looks Pretty Smart,” Dealbook, New York Times, Oct. 20, 2008. 67 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 70. 68 Mark Leonard, Ibid., 74. 69 “Bankruptcies Eliminate Millions of Jobs,” Berliner Zeitung, Dec. 28, 2009. 70 Mary Bartnik, “They Could Renounce Their RTT to Save Their Jobs,” Le Figaro, July 19, 2010. 71 Floyd Norris, “A Shift in the Export Powerhouses,” New York Times, Feb. 20, 2010. 72 Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 380. 73 “France Is Open for Business with Foreign Investors,” Paris: Invest in France Agency, November 2007. 74 Steven Hill, “5 Myths about Sick Old Europe,” Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2007. 75 Julia Werdiger, “To Woo Europeans, McDonald’s Goes Upscale,” New York Times, Aug. 25, 2007. 76 Daniel S.


pages: 361 words: 81,068

The Internet Is Not the Answer by Andrew Keen

"Robert Solow", 3D printing, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Airbnb, AltaVista, Andrew Keen, augmented reality, Bay Area Rapid Transit, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Black Swan, Bob Geldof, Burning Man, Cass Sunstein, citizen journalism, Clayton Christensen, clean water, cloud computing, collective bargaining, Colonization of Mars, computer age, connected car, creative destruction, cuban missile crisis, David Brooks, disintermediation, disruptive innovation, Donald Davies, Downton Abbey, Edward Snowden, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, Frederick Winslow Taylor, frictionless, full employment, future of work, gig economy, global village, Google bus, Google Glasses, Hacker Ethic, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, index card, informal economy, information trail, Innovator's Dilemma, Internet of things, Isaac Newton, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, job automation, Joi Ito, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Assange, Kevin Kelly, Kickstarter, Kodak vs Instagram, Lean Startup, libertarian paternalism, lifelogging, Lyft, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, Martin Wolf, Metcalfe’s law, move fast and break things, move fast and break things, Nate Silver, Nelson Mandela, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, nonsequential writing, Norbert Wiener, Norman Mailer, Occupy movement, packet switching, PageRank, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, Paul Graham, peer-to-peer, peer-to-peer rental, Peter Thiel, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Potemkin village, precariat, pre–internet, RAND corporation, Ray Kurzweil, ride hailing / ride sharing, Robert Metcalfe, Second Machine Age, self-driving car, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Skype, smart cities, Snapchat, social web, South of Market, San Francisco, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, TaskRabbit, Ted Nelson, telemarketer, The Future of Employment, the medium is the message, the new new thing, Thomas L Friedman, Travis Kalanick, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, Uber for X, uber lyft, urban planning, Vannevar Bush, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks, winner-take-all economy, working poor, Y Combinator

Six months later, a few hundred miles to the northeast of Geneva, the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War came to an end. Back then, with the dramatic destruction of the Wall in November, it was thought that 1989 would be remembered as a watershed year that marked the end of the Cold War and the victory of free-market liberalism. The Stanford University political scientist Francis Fukuyama, assuming that the great debate between capitalists and socialists over the best way to organize industrial society had finally been settled, described the moment that the Wall came down as the “End of History.” But the converse is actually true. Nineteen eighty-nine actually represents the birth of a new period of history, the Networked Computer Age. The Internet has created new values, new wealth, new debates, new elites, new scarcities, new markets, and above all, a new kind of economy. Well-intentioned technologists like Vannevar Bush, Norbert Wiener, J.

And yet if there is just one answer, a single solution, to the Internet’s epic failure, it is the opposite of forgetting. That answer is more memory—of the human rather than the computer kind. The answer is history. It’s not just Michael Birch who has seceded from time and space. Fukuyama may have thought that history ended in 1989, but it’s that other world-historic 1989 event, Tim Berners-Lee’s invention of the World Wide Web, that has unintentionally created another, more troubling version of the end of history. “I recently took my 16-year-old daughter Adele to see a section of the Berlin Wall that has been preserved as part of a museum devoted to the division of the city, Germany and Europe. It was a bright Berlin morning,” writes the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen about revisiting the divided Berlin of Erich Mielke and the Stasi. “Adele, born in 1997, with just a toehold in the last century, wandered around.

As the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland explains, today’s networked generation, in their preoccupation with “trading Instagrams and Vines,” has created an intimate, always-on culture that will—like a disappearing Snapchat photograph—vanish forever and leave nothing to posterity. “The point is that a fundamental aspect of human life—memory—is being altered by the digital revolution,” Freedland warns.20 The savage irony is that the more accurately the Internet remembers everything, the more our memories atrophy. The result is an amnesia about everything except the immediate, the instant, the now, and the me. It’s the end of history as a shared communal memory, the end of our collective engagement with the past and the future. “Once we had a nostalgia for the future,” warns Mark Lilla. “Today we have an amnesia for the present.”21 “The libertarian age,” Lilla argues, “is an illegible age.”22 But this isn’t quite right, either. It might be illegible for a traditional historian like Lilla, but not for a seasoned observer of networked society like the American media theorist Douglas Rushkoff.


pages: 561 words: 87,892

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity by Stephen D. King

Admiral Zheng, asset-backed security, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, Bernie Madoff, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, capital controls, Celtic Tiger, central bank independence, collateralized debt obligation, corporate governance, credit crunch, crony capitalism, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, demographic dividend, demographic transition, Deng Xiaoping, Diane Coyle, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial deregulation, financial innovation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, G4S, George Akerlof, German hyperinflation, Gini coefficient, hiring and firing, income inequality, income per capita, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, knowledge economy, labour market flexibility, labour mobility, liberal capitalism, low skilled workers, market clearing, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, Mexican peso crisis / tequila crisis, Naomi Klein, new economy, old age dependency ratio, Paul Samuelson, Ponzi scheme, price mechanism, price stability, purchasing power parity, rent-seeking, reserve currency, rising living standards, Ronald Reagan, savings glut, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, sovereign wealth fund, spice trade, statistical model, technology bubble, The Great Moderation, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Market for Lemons, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, trade route, transaction costs, Washington Consensus, women in the workforce, working-age population, Y2K, Yom Kippur War

Globalization is a natural feature of the economic landscape, leading to a happier, more contented, global community driven on by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the spread of liberal democracy. In this view of the world, it is relatively easy to incorporate the hopes, aspirations and economic muscle of the emerging nations into an already established world economic order. This is the kind of message that found favour in books such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and which still finds sympathy today in international gatherings such as the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (where the great and the good of the global community can solve mass poverty for the benefit of the international media before heading off to the nearest champagne reception or ski slope). Admittedly it’s a seductive view. If globalization is inevitable, the only things that can hold it back are evil men, stupid ideas and wars.

., Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2007 Friedman, B., The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2005 Friedman, M., A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957 Friedman, T., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York, 1999 ———, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, New York, 2005 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992 Gibson, C. and Lennon, E., Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850–1990, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, US Bureau of the Census, Washington DC, 1999 Gohkale, J. and Smetters, K., Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities, Policy Discussion Paper No. 5, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, OH, 2003 Greenspan, A., The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Federal Reserve, Washington DC, 1996 ———, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Allen Lane, London, 2007 Headrick, D.R., Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981 Heilbroner, R., The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, 7th edn, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1999 Hertz, N., The Silent Takeover, The Free Press, New York, 2002 Hobbes, T., ed Gaskin, J., Leviathan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Globalisation: Prospects and Policy Responses, Fourteenth Report of Session, London, 2006/7 Hume, D.

(i) Canada (i), (ii), (iii) Canning, David (i) capital Asian economic growth (i) empires (i), (ii) inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability (i) protectionism (i) resource scarcity (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) capital controls (i), (ii), (iii) capital flows see cross-border capital flows capital goods (i), (ii), (iii) capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) capital markets anarchy in capital markets (i) emerging nation war-chest (i) at the end of the rainbow (i) foreign-exchange reserves (i) gold rush revisited (i) the hole in the story (i) hunt for yield (i) Japan’s currency appreciation (i) liquidity and greed (i) mispricing of Western capital markets (i) no promised land (i) role of capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) resource scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) capital mobility (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) car industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) carry trades (i), (ii) Catholic Church (i) Ceauşescu, Nicolae (i) Celler, Emanuel (i) central banks capital controls (i) capital flows and nation states (i) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) printing money (i) Central Europe (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Chang, Ha-Joon (i) Chelsea FC (i) Cheney, Dick (i) Chevron (i) China anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) currency (i) globalization (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) savings (i) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (i), (ii) Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) (i) choice (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Christianity (i), (ii), (iii) Chrysler (i) Clark, Gregory (i) classical economists (i) climate change (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) coal (i) COFER (currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves) (i), (ii) Collier, Paul (i) colonialism (i), (ii), (iii) Columbus, Christopher (i), (ii) Comet jet airliner (i), (ii) Commission of the European Union (i) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (i) commodity prices globalization (i) income inequality (i) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) savings (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) Common Agricultural Policy (i) communications (i), (ii), (iii) communism capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) fall of (i) political economy and inequalities (i) population demographics (i), (ii) scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels) (i) Communist Party (i), (ii) comparative advantage political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) computers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Congress of Vienna (i) Conservative Party (i) consumer prices (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) contraception (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘core’ inflation (i), (ii) corruption (i), (ii) Cortés, Hernando (i), (ii) Costa Rica (i) cotton industry (i), (ii) Cour de Cassation (i) credit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) credit crunch anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) politics and economics (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) crime (i), (ii), (iii) Crimean War (i) ‘crony capitalism’ (i) cross-border capital flows anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) capital flows and nation states (i), (ii), (iii) comparative advantage (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) economic models (i), (ii) globalization (i), (ii) Japan (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Cuba (i), (ii) Cultural Revolution (i), (ii), (iii) currency capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economic integration, political proliferation (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) monetary union (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) protectionism (i) single capital market and many nations (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) current account (balance of payments) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account deficit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account surplus capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Cyprus (i) Czechoslovakia (i) Czech Republic (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) debt capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i) population ageing (i) price stability and economic instability (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) deflation (i), (ii), (iii) demand-management policies (i), (ii), (iii) democracy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) demographic deficit (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividend (i), (ii), (iii) demographic profile (i), (ii), (iii) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii) dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Depression see Great Depression Desai, Meghnad (i) Deutsche Mark (i), (ii), (iii) developed world capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) diet (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) see also food diversification (i), (ii) division of labour (i) dollar see US dollar Dominican Republic (i) dot.com bubble (i), (ii) drugs (i), (ii), (iii) Dubai Ports World (DP World) (i), (ii) Dutch East India Company (i), (ii) East Asia (i), (ii) Eastern Europe capital markets (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) East Germany (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) East India Company (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes) (i), (ii), (iii) economic crisis see also Asian economic crisis anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) economic instability (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) economic growth capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividends and deficits (i) globalization (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i), (ii) US domestic reform (i) economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) economic models (i), (ii), (iii) economic rent (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) economics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economies of scale (i), (ii), (iii) The Economist (i) Ecuador (i) EdF (Électricité de France) (i), (ii) education capital markets (i) migration (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) Eichengreen, Barry (i), (ii) elderly population (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) electricity (i) Elizabeth II, Queen (i) Ellis Island (i), (ii) emerging economies anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) globalization (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Western progress (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘enabling’ resources (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) The End of History (Fukuyama) (i) energy supplies political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) politics and economics (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) resource scarcity (i), (ii) Russian power politics (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Engels, Friedrich (i) England (i), (ii), (iii) English language (i) English Premier League (i), (ii), (iii) Enlightenment (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Enron (i) Entente Cordiale (i) equities anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population ageing (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) savings (i) An Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus) (i), (ii), (iii) EU see European Union euro (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) Europe political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) European Central Bank (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) European Union (EU) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) exchange rates anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) income inequality (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) sovereign wealth funds (i) the West’s diminished status (i) exports China (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Eyser, George (i) Fannie Mae (i) Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) (i), (ii) Federal Reserve anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) economic integration, political proliferation (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Ferrari (i) fertility rates (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Fidelity International (i) financial services industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Finland (i) First World War (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) FOMC see Federal Open Markets Committee food political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) rent-seeking behaviour (i) resource scarcity (i), (ii) savings (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Forbes.com (i) foreign direct investment anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) income inequality (i) population demographics (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) foreign-exchange reserves anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i) single capital market and many nations (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) fossil fuels (i) France economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) Louisiana Purchase (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) Frank, Barney (i) Freddie Mac (i) freedom of speech (i), (ii) free market (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) free trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Friedman, Milton (i), (ii), (iii) Friedman, Thomas (i) Fu Chengyu (i) fuel (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Fukuyama, Francis (i) fund managers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) G7 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) G8 (i), (ii), (iii) G20 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Gagon, Joseph E.


Toast by Stross, Charles

anthropic principle, Buckminster Fuller, cosmological principle, dark matter, double helix, Ernest Rutherford, Extropian, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, glass ceiling, gravity well, Khyber Pass, Mars Rover, Mikhail Gorbachev, NP-complete, oil shale / tar sands, peak oil, performance metric, phenotype, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, slashdot, speech recognition, strong AI, traveling salesman, Turing test, urban renewal, Vernor Vinge, Whole Earth Review, Y2K

Historian Eric Hobsbawm dated it as running from June 28th, 1914 (when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, raising the curtain on the First World War) until December 25th, 1991 (when Mikhail Gorbachev formally dissolved the Soviet Union). But that diagnosis was carried out in the 1990s, back when it was possible for conservative political analyst Francis Fukuyama to publish a book titled The End of History without being laughed out of town and pelted with rotten fruit. It is seductively tempting in 2005 to say that the 20th century really ended on September 11th, 2001, with an iconic act of violence that may well lead to long-term consequences as horrific as the start of the First World War. Terrorism begets terrorism, and the scramble to dismember the Ottoman Empire during the Versailles conference that followed the war created the preconditions for the political mess that is theMiddle East today.

“I should like to stress that this holocaust of our own making is nothing less than a matter of complacency,” the Professor continued. “Once we quantized time, we tied our work to the clock; and now that the work is automated, so is the ticking. We are a short-sighted species. That there was a quarter of a trillion lines of bad software out there seven years ago is no surprise. That such a quantity has been halved to date is good news, but not quite adequate. We have, in a very real way, invented our own end of history: a software apocalypse that in the day ahead will engulf banks, businesses, government agencies, and anyone who runs a large, monolithic, database that is more than perhaps ten years old. Let us hope for the future that the consequences are not too serious—and that the lesson will be learned for good by those who for so long have ignored us.” Polite applause, then louder: a groundswell of clapping as the ship gently pushed its way through the waves.


pages: 324 words: 86,056

The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality by Bhaskar Sunkara

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, Bernie Sanders, British Empire, business climate, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, Charles Lindbergh, collective bargaining, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, Donald Trump, equal pay for equal work, feminist movement, Ferguson, Missouri, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gig economy, Gunnar Myrdal, happiness index / gross national happiness, Honoré de Balzac, income inequality, inventory management, labor-force participation, land reform, land value tax, Mark Zuckerberg, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, Neil Kinnock, new economy, Occupy movement, postindustrial economy, precariat, race to the bottom, Ralph Waldo Emerson, self-driving car, Silicon Valley, single-payer health, telemarketer, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, too big to fail, union organizing, Upton Sinclair, urban renewal, We are the 99%

And while we defend newly won gains, we must fight to avoid the crippling bureaucratization that pushed the great social-democratic movements of the early twentieth century into a self-defeating accommodation with the system. It won’t be easy, but we still have a world to win. TEN STAY FLY IN RECENT DECADES, socialism has been challenged from all directions. The influential German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf was right when he wrote that Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of “liberal democracy as the final form of human government” was “a caricature of a serious argument,” but he agreed with its core premise: “socialism is dead, and none of its variants can be revived for a world awakening from the double nightmare of Stalinism and Brezhnevism.” From the Left, Andre Gorz echoed that sentiment: “As a system, socialism is dead. As a movement and an organized political force, it is on its last legs.

He didn’t want to fall into the same trap of the utopian socialists, such as France’s Saint-Simon and Britain’s Robert Owen. They spent their energy writing detailed blueprints for the future but had no strategy to realize them besides the goodwill of elites. What’s more, they suffered from a profoundly antidemocratic sensibility. Marx believed that socialism came from the struggles of workers, not the plans of a few intellectuals. In The German Ideology, Marx did describe an “end of history”: communism. He wrote of a world without states and with class divisions overcome, in which “society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.”

Nikita Khrushchev was sincere when he said that communism would be built “in the main” by 1980. At the very least, socialism of other stripes seemed to offer the only way out of underdevelopment for the formerly colonized world and welfare-state prosperity for the former colonizers. Socialist confidence was destroyed over the course of the 1980s. By the early ’90s, the Marxist theory of history was stood on its head: proponents of capitalism were confident that their own “end of history” had been reached. If you could even find Marx outside of university classrooms (where he was increasingly presented as a humanist philosopher instead of a revolutionary firebrand), it was on Wall Street, where cheeky traders put down Sun Tzu and heralded the long-dead German as a prophet of globalization. Capitalism had certainly yielded immense progress in countries such as China and India.


pages: 279 words: 87,910

How Much Is Enough?: Money and the Good Life by Robert Skidelsky, Edward Skidelsky

"Robert Solow", banking crisis, basic income, Bertrand Russell: In Praise of Idleness, Bonfire of the Vanities, call centre, creative destruction, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, death of newspapers, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, happiness index / gross national happiness, income inequality, income per capita, informal economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invisible hand, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Joseph Schumpeter, market clearing, market fundamentalism, Paul Samuelson, profit motive, purchasing power parity, Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, Tobin tax, union organizing, University of East Anglia, Veblen good, wage slave, wealth creators, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

(The adoration of a sycophant or a mob leads more often to self-contempt than to self-respect.) In all ages, we find groups of “peers” or “equals” respecting each other while looking down on everyone else. The citizenry of ancient Athens was one such group, as was the medieval nobility. Modern democracy extends the circle of peers to all adults in a given territory. Whether or not its triumph is guaranteed by History, as Francis Fukuyama has claimed, it now has the support of almost all the world, at least on paper. No modern vision of the good life can be such as to thwart it. This rules out, as we noted in Chapter 3, values such as mastery and “greatness of soul,” which cannot in principle be universalized. Respect has many sources, varying from culture to culture. Strength, money, land, nobility, education and office have all figured prominently at one time or another.

The Book of Revelation, source of so much poetry and madness, prophesies a “new heaven and a new earth,” in which “there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.” The millenarian seed lies deep in the Christian consciousness, ready to sprout forth lusciously in times of hardship or turmoil. But mainstream Christianity has kept a wary distance from it. St. Augustine, a former Platonist, positioned his “city of God” not at the end of history but outside time altogether, abandoning the “city of man” to its old cyclical fate. Sacred history was thus sharply distinguished from mundane, secular history. However, the potential for intermingling was always there. Joachim of Flora, a twelfth-century mystic, developed an ingenious theory of human history based on the three persons of the Trinity. The age of the Father had ended with the birth of Christ; the age of the Son was coming to a close; the age of the Holy Spirit, in which all Christians would be united in a new spiritual kingdom, free from the letter of the law, was at hand.


pages: 220 words: 88,994

1989 The Berlin Wall: My Part in Its Downfall by Peter Millar

anti-communist, back-to-the-land, Berlin Wall, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, glass ceiling, kremlinology, Marshall McLuhan, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, pre–internet, QWERTY keyboard, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, Sinatra Doctrine, urban sprawl, working-age population

And we committed wanton vandalism: kicking in a few doors, smashing the occasional window. It was stupid, childish, futile and meaningless. But it didn’t half feel good. * See also Peter Millar’s All Gone to Look for America: Riding the Iron Horse Across a Continent and Back. London: Arcadia Books, 2008 12 Brave New World And with that, history came to an end. I wish. American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, arguing that the collapse of communism spelled the global triumph of Western liberal democracy could not have been more wrong. In early 1990, I described the tumultuous events of the previous year as a wave of revolutions that had finally ended a seventy-five-year European civil war. Round One, 1914–1918, had been a furious slugfest, with the heavyweight empires of the old world battling it out, ending with them all battered but one lot more bloodied than the rest.


pages: 267 words: 82,580

The Dark Net by Jamie Bartlett

3D printing, 4chan, bitcoin, blockchain, brain emulation, carbon footprint, creative destruction, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, deindustrialization, Edward Snowden, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, global village, Google Chrome, Howard Rheingold, Internet of things, invention of writing, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Julian Assange, Kuwabatake Sanjuro: assassination market, life extension, litecoin, longitudinal study, Mark Zuckerberg, Marshall McLuhan, moral hazard, moral panic, Occupy movement, pre–internet, Ray Kurzweil, Ross Ulbricht, Satoshi Nakamoto, Skype, slashdot, technological singularity, technoutopianism, Ted Kaczynski, The Coming Technological Singularity, Turing test, Vernor Vinge, WikiLeaks, Zimmermann PGP

But his ultimate vision is for us to return to what we once were, thousands of years ago: roaming groups of hunter-gatherers. ‘I accept, of course,’ says Zerzan, ‘this is going to be rather difficult to achieve.’ Zerzan’s solutions are pretty extreme. But it’s not just anarcho-primitivists who are worried by a transhumanist future of boundless possibilities. Francis Fukuyama, the prominent economist who coined the expression ‘the end of history’ to pronounce the victory of the capitalist system, has declared transhumanism the ‘most dangerous idea of the twenty-first century’. That’s probably a little unfair. One of the stated aims of Humanity+ is to think through the ethical, legal and social implications of dramatic technological change. But the sort of rapid technological advances we’re living through certainly raise several difficult questions.


pages: 287 words: 82,576

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream by Tyler Cowen

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Airbnb, Alvin Roth, assortative mating, Bernie Sanders, Black Swan, business climate, business cycle, circulation of elites, clean water, David Graeber, declining real wages, deindustrialization, desegregation, Donald Trump, drone strike, East Village, Elon Musk, Ferguson, Missouri, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gig economy, Google Glasses, Hyman Minsky, Hyperloop, income inequality, intangible asset, Internet of things, inventory management, knowledge worker, labor-force participation, low skilled workers, Marc Andreessen, Mark Zuckerberg, medical residency, meta analysis, meta-analysis, obamacare, offshore financial centre, Paul Samuelson, Peter Thiel, purchasing power parity, Richard Florida, security theater, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, Skype, South China Sea, Steven Pinker, Stuxnet, The Great Moderation, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, total factor productivity, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, upwardly mobile, Vilfredo Pareto, working-age population, World Values Survey

As overall social and economic dynamism declines and various forms of lock-in increase, it becomes harder to finance and maintain the superstructure that keeps stability and all of its comforts in place. The most talented of the middle rise to the top, while a lot of other forms of mobility slow down and congeal, thereby heralding the loss of dynamism and, eventually, control. And so the complacent class is but a phase in American life, rather than Francis Fukuyama’s much-heralded “End of History.” Still, for whatever cracks may be showing in the edifice, the complacent class defines our current day, even though we are starting to see parts of it crumble before our eyes. One of the great ironies of the situation is that those most likely to complain about the complacent class are themselves the prime and often most influential members of that class themselves, namely what I call the privileged class.


pages: 286 words: 87,168

Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World by Jason Hickel

air freight, Airbnb, basic income, Bernie Sanders, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, British Empire, capital controls, cognitive dissonance, coronavirus, corporate governance, corporate personhood, COVID-19, David Graeber, decarbonisation, declining real wages, deindustrialization, dematerialisation, Elon Musk, energy transition, Fellow of the Royal Society, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gender pay gap, income inequality, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), invention of the steam engine, James Watt: steam engine, Jeff Bezos, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, land reform, liberal capitalism, longitudinal study, Mahatma Gandhi, Mark Zuckerberg, McMansion, means of production, meta analysis, meta-analysis, microbiome, moral hazard, mortgage debt, Naomi Klein, new economy, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, out of africa, passive income, planetary scale, plutocrats, Plutocrats, quantitative easing, rent control, rent-seeking, Ronald Reagan, Scramble for Africa, secular stagnation, shareholder value, sharing economy, Simon Kuznets, structural adjustment programs, the scientific method, The Spirit Level, transatlantic slave trade, trickle-down economics, universal basic income

‘There is no such thing as limits to growth,’ he said, ‘because there is no such thing as limits to the human imagination.’ It was a winning message, and Americans bought it. Reagan beat Carter in a landslide. During the decade that followed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the euphoria around the globalisation of American-style consumerism, Limits to Growth was more or less forgotten. Its warnings were cast aside in favour of the consensus celebrated by Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 book The End of History: free-market capitalism was the only game in town, and it seemed for all the world that it was going to last for ever. * But then something changed. With the global financial crisis of 2008 the party came crashing to an end. People’s faith in the limitless magic of the free market and the universal promise of the American Dream was shaken to its core. Major banks collapsed, and millions of people around the world lost their homes and jobs.


pages: 304 words: 90,084

Net Zero: How We Stop Causing Climate Change by Dieter Helm

3D printing, autonomous vehicles, Berlin Wall, blockchain, Boris Johnson, carbon footprint, clean water, congestion charging, coronavirus, COVID-19, Covid-19, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, demand response, Deng Xiaoping, Donald Trump, fixed income, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Haber-Bosch Process, hydrogen economy, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Internet of things, market design, means of production, North Sea oil, off grid, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, peak oil, planetary scale, price mechanism, quantitative easing, remote working, reshoring, Ronald Reagan, smart meter, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, statistical model, Thomas Malthus

For climate change and a carbon cartel, it is the medium and long term that count, and despite all the claims to the contrary, the UN’s carbon cartel has fallen flat. That is why emissions keep going up. The appeal to universal interests The initial cheerleader for what became the Kyoto Protocol was the US, and Bill Clinton in particular. In the heady days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the zeitgeist was captured by Francis Fukuyama’s bestseller, The End of History and the Last Man.[3] The theme of the book is the recognition that, after trying almost everything else, including socialism, the rational enlightenment had produced its final end-product: liberal democracy. All nations would eventually converge on this model. Politics is a rational business, and to the extent that people are organised into nations, they would all come to share the democratic model, with markets to allocate most resources.

There would be diversity, but all within a rational framework. As people got richer, because liberal markets worked, they would lend their support to the liberal model. They would not, it was easily assumed, act parochially and nationalistically, as the old nationalisms of the past withered away. There would be no Donald Trumps, Vladimir Putins and Xi Jinpings, and no Marine Le Pens or Viktor Orbáns. Behind this end-of-history thesis lay a deeper intellectual idea, one that was instrumental in the very creation of the UN. It was that rationalism would prevail, with a universal appreciation of the rights of all people, wherever and whenever they lived. It would find its expression in Nicholas Stern’s The Economics of Climate Change.[4] Stern is a utilitarian who cannot see why we should discriminate between current and future people.

The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations. London: Penguin, 2006. Back to text 2. See Barrett, S., Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; and Victor, D. G., Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Back to text 3. Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man. Hamondsworth, Penguin, 1989. Back to text 4. Stern, N., The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, HM Treasury. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, January 2007. Back to text 5. For an analysis, see Baltensperger, M. and Dadush, U., ‘The European Union–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and risks’, Policy Contribution, 11 September 2019, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PC-11_2019.pdf.


We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent by Nesrine Malik

affirmative action, Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, barriers to entry, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, British Empire, centre right, cognitive dissonance, continuation of politics by other means, currency peg, Donald Trump, feminist movement, financial independence, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, gender pay gap, ghettoisation, glass ceiling, illegal immigration, invisible hand, mass immigration, moral panic, Nate Silver, obamacare, old-boy network, payday loans, planetary scale, Ponzi scheme, race to the bottom, Ronald Reagan, Saturday Night Live, sexual politics, Steven Pinker, The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, Thomas L Friedman, transatlantic slave trade

This has enabled the ‘All Lives Matter’ tactic of invoking universalism – which always means one thing, passiveness. And it is something which the right, the centre and the left agree on because identity is so subjective – you cannot hold on to it, you cannot achieve traction with it, it is too atomised for an ideology, whether that ideology is nationalism or socialism. You can see this frustration in the works of thinkers who have come to the identity debate. Francis Fukuyama, in 2018, pines for a time when the nation state was the unit of identity, in his book Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition. Philosopher Kwame Appiah, in the 2018 book The Lies That Bind, thinks identity is ‘imagined’. Unable to conceive of coalitions of inequality as the way forward, people reach for universal values that are not relevant when people are disenfranchised.

., 12 May 2018), https://twitter.com/david_goodhart/status/995279834753495040 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘racial grievance outburst’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 4:42 p.m., 12 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995328243065675776?s=20 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘the nihilistic grievance culture’: David Goodhart, ‘The riots at the end of history’ (Prospect, 9 August 2011), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/08/the-riots-at-the-end-of-history/ [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘How does it help black inner city youth’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 2:52 p.m., 13 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995663062433783808?s=20 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘Windrush would have been less likely’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 3:19 p.m., 13 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995669746619207680?

s=20 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 236 ‘The “thickest” solidarities’: David Goodhart, ‘Too Diverse?’ (Prospect, 20 February 2004), https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation [accessed on 25 July 2019] 237 ‘will not get a job if you don’t give a shit’: David Goodhart, ‘The riots at the end of history’ (Prospect, 9 August 2011), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/08/the-riots-at-the-end-of-history/ [accessed on 25 July 2019] 237 ‘… a “metropolitan” fixation’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 4:12 p.m., 5 November 2017), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/927207074278313984 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 239 ‘… the British media is 95 per cent white’: Neil Thurnan, ‘Does British Journalism Have a Diversity Problem?’ (City University London, full results published in May 2016 by the Reuters Institute), https://drive.google.com/a/guardian.co.uk/file/d/0B4lqRxA4qQpjakl1UEd5WEFlRGc/view?


pages: 327 words: 90,542

The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth Is Unattainable and the Global Economy Is in Peril by Satyajit Das

"Robert Solow", 9 dash line, accounting loophole / creative accounting, additive manufacturing, Airbnb, Albert Einstein, Alfred Russel Wallace, Anton Chekhov, Asian financial crisis, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, bitcoin, Bretton Woods, BRICs, British Empire, business cycle, business process, business process outsourcing, call centre, capital controls, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Carmen Reinhart, Clayton Christensen, cloud computing, collaborative economy, colonial exploitation, computer age, creative destruction, cryptocurrency, currency manipulation / currency intervention, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, declining real wages, Deng Xiaoping, deskilling, disintermediation, disruptive innovation, Downton Abbey, Emanuel Derman, energy security, energy transition, eurozone crisis, financial innovation, financial repression, forward guidance, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, gig economy, Gini coefficient, global reserve currency, global supply chain, Goldman Sachs: Vampire Squid, happiness index / gross national happiness, Honoré de Balzac, hydraulic fracturing, Hyman Minsky, illegal immigration, income inequality, income per capita, indoor plumbing, informal economy, Innovator's Dilemma, intangible asset, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Jane Jacobs, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kenneth Rogoff, knowledge economy, knowledge worker, light touch regulation, liquidity trap, Long Term Capital Management, low skilled workers, Lyft, Mahatma Gandhi, margin call, market design, Marshall McLuhan, Martin Wolf, Mikhail Gorbachev, mortgage debt, mortgage tax deduction, new economy, New Urbanism, offshore financial centre, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, old age dependency ratio, open economy, passive income, peak oil, peer-to-peer lending, pension reform, plutocrats, Plutocrats, Ponzi scheme, Potemkin village, precariat, price stability, profit maximization, pushing on a string, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, Ralph Nader, Rana Plaza, rent control, rent-seeking, reserve currency, ride hailing / ride sharing, rising living standards, risk/return, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Satyajit Das, savings glut, secular stagnation, seigniorage, sharing economy, Silicon Valley, Simon Kuznets, Slavoj Žižek, South China Sea, sovereign wealth fund, TaskRabbit, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, the market place, the payments system, The Spirit Level, Thorstein Veblen, Tim Cook: Apple, too big to fail, total factor productivity, trade route, transaction costs, uber lyft, unpaid internship, Unsafe at Any Speed, Upton Sinclair, Washington Consensus, We are the 99%, WikiLeaks, Y2K, Yom Kippur War, zero-coupon bond, zero-sum game

The Dow Jones Industrial Average would be at least 50,000, probably on its way to 100,000. A utopian future of endless expansion beckoned, where the economy doubled every dozen years, bringing prosperity to billions. Growth would help resolve poverty and political tensions, without damaging the environment.5 The power and mobility of capital, free trade, and a globally integrated economy were now articles of faith. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, made the case for the triumph of Western liberal democracy and market systems as the end point of ideological evolution. In reality, though, the period was punctuated by a series of rolling bubbles and crises: the 1987 stock market crash, the 1990 collapse of the junk bond market, the 1994 great bond market massacre, the 1994 Tequila economic crisis in Mexico, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, the 1998 default of Russia, and the 2000 dot-com crash.

Following the collapse of the Internet bubble and a US slowdown after the 9/11 attacks, Greenspan dropped interest rates sharply. In his book about the period, Greenspan proudly quoted an economist's assessment of his policy: “The housing boom saved the economy…. Americans went on a real estate orgy. [They] traded up, tore down, and added on.”6 It was to end, of course, in disaster. In 2008, in a deliberate rejoinder to The End of History, Robert Kagan titled his new book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, an appropriate description of the events that unfolded. The financial crisis in the US subprime mortgage market commenced in 2007. It spawned jokes about loans made to NINJAs (no income, no job or asset), NINAs (no income, no asset), and to unemployed men in string vests buying houses with no money. In truth, subprime loans to people with poor or no credit records, whether due to unemployment, bad health, disability, or family problems, had always been a part of the US financial system.

By stage six, boredom sets in and mention of the book regresses into the polite or mannered. In stage seven, people disassociate themselves from the idea, becoming embarrassed to refer to it directly. In stage eight, it becomes fashionable to admit that you never read the book in the first place. In stage nine, the book is moved from its prominent place in the library or living room to the guest toilet, joining other such notable works as A Brief History of Time, The End of History, The Black Swan, and The Tipping Point. There may be an additional stage when the author and the book are subsequently rediscovered, usually posthumously, and undergo a revival. But inequality remains a serious issue, constraining economic recovery and improvements in living standards globally. In his November 2013 apostolic exhortation, Pope Francis, familiar with poverty and inequality in his native Argentina, criticized the “idolatry of money”: “While the earnings of a minority are growing exponentially, so too is the gap separating the majority from the prosperity enjoyed by those happy few.


pages: 327 words: 88,121

The Vanishing Neighbor: The Transformation of American Community by Marc J. Dunkelman

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, Albert Einstein, assortative mating, Berlin Wall, big-box store, blue-collar work, Bretton Woods, Broken windows theory, business cycle, call centre, clean water, cuban missile crisis, dark matter, David Brooks, delayed gratification, different worldview, double helix, Downton Abbey, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Filter Bubble, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, George Santayana, Gini coefficient, glass ceiling, global supply chain, global village, helicopter parent, if you build it, they will come, impulse control, income inequality, invention of movable type, Jane Jacobs, Khyber Pass, Louis Pasteur, Marshall McLuhan, McMansion, Nate Silver, obamacare, Occupy movement, Peter Thiel, post-industrial society, Richard Florida, rolodex, Saturday Night Live, Silicon Valley, Skype, social intelligence, Stanford marshmallow experiment, Steve Jobs, telemarketer, The Chicago School, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the medium is the message, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, urban decay, urban planning, Walter Mischel, War on Poverty, women in the workforce, World Values Survey, zero-sum game

The disparity is particularly harrowing for anyone who has recently returned from China, where many of the airports gleam.19 The United States devotes only 2 percent of its annual GDP to infrastructure investment—less than half of what Europe spends, and a mere sixth of China’s equivalent investment.20 Nevertheless, it’s not entirely clear how we would finance an explosion of new building: though some dispute whether the nation’s budget is really in such dire need of rebalance, a country whose deficit is out of control seems a lousy candidate for the next New Deal.21 No one can doubt that many of the institutions that were once uniquely American—or, at least, creatures of the West—have recently been adopted elsewhere around the world. It’s been more than two decades since Francis Fukuyama published The End of History, arguing that free-market democracy had finally vanquished its competitors as the prescription for societal success.22 Whether or not you bought into Fukuyama’s thesis—even if you believe, as some do, that history has “returned”—what’s undeniable is that many of the rhythms that propelled American preeminence have been adopted elsewhere. Nevertheless, compelling as the declinists’ explanation may be, it suggests that American society is just another iPhone, blessed by nothing more that a better menu of apps.

Norton, 2009), 211–12. 16Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 12. 17Binyamin Appelbaum and Robert Gebeloff, “Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It,” New York Times, February 12, 2012. 18Martin Wolf, ”How Austerity Has Failed,” New York Review of Books, July 11, 2013. 19Friedman and Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us. 20Paul Weinstein Jr., “Cut to Invest: Establish a ‘Cut-to-Invest Commission’ to Reduce Low-Priority Spending, Consolidate Duplicative Programs, and Increase High-Priority Investments,” Brookings Institute, November 2012. 21http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html. 22Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996). 24Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 54, 81–83. 25The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, November 15, 2012. 26Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm. 27Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Classics, 1909–14). 28Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 29Gordon S.

Jamaica, 179–81 in Brazil, 178–79 Clinton and, 113, 114 economics, economy, xix, 7, 10, 14–15, 85, 132, 138, 232 globalization and, 17–18, 141, 221 inequality and, 21–24, 26, 31 Economy of Cities, The (Jacobs), 166–68 Edison, Thomas, 160, 161 Ed Sullivan Show, The (TV show), 36, 37 education, xiv–xvii, 23, 32, 75, 194, 202, 215, 218, 220–26, 234 decline of, xiv, xvi, xvii, 11 intermarriage and, 43–44 segregation by, 237–38 efficiency, 19, 34, 138, 152, 166–67, 170, 176, 209, 236 EHarmony, 69–70 Ehrenhalt, Alan, 48, 139 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Eisenhower administration), 14, 51, 58, 65, 100, 190 elderly people, 196–211 independence of, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 elections, U.S., 15, 50, 56, 187, 190 Chinatown Bus effect and, 47 gerrymandering and, xvi, 182–87, 189 of 2012, 7, 37–38, 184–85 Elks Lodges, 44, 116 e-mail, xi, 8, 109–10, 125, 145 End of History, The (Fukuyama), 230–31 England, xii, 81, 82, 157, 158, 166–67, 179, 194 entrepreneurialism, 82, 164 ethnicity, 32, 79, 147, 148, 231, 237 ethnic tensions, 4, 39 Europe, 81, 226, 230, 232 evangelism, 42, 71 evolution, 90–91 expectations, 30, 60, 70–71, 82 Facebook, 37–38, 45, 48, 108, 114, 124–25, 140, 145, 148–49, 152, 190, 194, 219 faith, loss of, xv, xvii, xviii, 14, 181–82, 193, 195 family, 70, 119, 125, 129, 139, 194 affirmation and, 104–7 extended (traditional), 12, 15, 16, 26–27, 68, 97, 106 health care and, 201, 210 income inequality and, 21–22 nuclear, 16, 26, 32, 84, 145 in Saturn model, 95, 96 single-parent, 26, 30–31, 43, 105, 216 Farmer, Paul, 64 fathers, 12, 106, 131 of author, 132–33, 134, 240 fax machines, 16, 35, 74 fear, 71, 84, 119, 128, 157, 233, 235 of hitchhiking, 133, 134, 135 homosexuality and, 42 quality of life and, 50–52, 55–57, 60 Federal Express, 147–48 Ferguson, Niall, 229 Fiddler on the Roof (musical), 69–70 filibuster, xvi, 182, 185, 188, 191, 248n Filter Bubble, The (Pariser), 37 Fiorina, Morris, 139 First Wave society, 16, 20, 31–32, 233 Fischer, Claude, 87, 88, 105, 106, 128–29, 237–38 Fishkin, James, 192–93 Florida, Richard, 83, 175 food, 51, 58, 62, 79, 136–37, 202 brain and, 90–91 see also agriculture Ford, Gerald, 47 Fortune, 4–5, 14 Fowler, James, 96 Fox News, 184, 187–88 France, 80 Franklin, Rosalind, 161 Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner), 7, 133–34 freedom, 25, 26, 43, 49, 52, 60, 67, 82, 102, 161, 207 French and Indian War, 157 Friedman, Thomas, xiv, 17–21, 24, 141–42, 151–52, 240 friends, 8, 12, 24, 25, 91, 95, 99–100, 101, 119, 120, 122, 124, 152, 194 affirmation from, 102–3, 104, 107, 110, 111 agreement of, 148–49 health care and, 201, 210 Fukuyama, Francis, 230–31 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 52 Gans, Herbert, 144–45 Gates, Bill, 10 gay marriage, 42, 50, 69 GDP (gross domestic product), 17, 53, 99, 180, 198, 227, 230 gemeinschaft, 86 General Social Survey, 105, 119–20, 260n–61n generational succession, 135 genetics, 160–62 genius, 159, 160, 162 Genovese, Kitty, 84–85 Georgetown University, 118 gerrymandering, xvi, 182–87, 189 ghettos, 128 Gingrich, Newt, 14, 15 Gini coefficient, 22, 23 Girls (TV show), 30 Gladwell, Malcolm, 6, 91–92 globalization, 17–18, 20, 50, 138, 141, 152, 221 global village, 16, 142–43 Google, 37, 194 government, U.S., xii–xviii, 52, 67, 200, 234 dysfunction of, 181–90 French government compared with, 80 health care and, 201–5 public frustration with, xiv–xvii, 181–83, 195 urban decay and, 127 Graduate, The (movie), 4, 28, 30, 248n Granovetter, Mark, 168–69, 266n Great Depression, 60, 68, 85, 202–6, 210, 226 Greatest Generation, 51, 70 Great Migration, 40–41, 43, 137 Great Recession, xv, 54, 55, 62, 106 Great Society, 210, 255n Gresens, Mr., 220–22, 225 grit, 5, 6, 216–25 Grove, Andy, 10 Guest, Avery, 118 Gutenberg, Johann, 162 “habits of the heart,” 81, 89, 115, 138, 258n Habits of the Heart (Bellah), 65–66, 141, 258n Hampton, Keith, 118–19 Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), 222, 224 health, health care, 101, 197–211 costs of, 198–200, 204–5, 206, 209–10 public, 197, 199, 204 quality of life and, 31, 51, 52, 57–60, 204 Hearst, William Randolph, 188 heart attack, 58, 200, 207 Heckman, James, 223 helicopter parent, 106 Henry, Peter Blair, 179–81 history, 51, 59, 67, 68, 230–34 affirmation and, 109, 110 of American community, 79–89 Dunbar’s number and, 94 Tofflers’ view of, 15–16 hitchhiking, 132–35 Hoffman, Dustin, 28 homogeneity, 46–47, 135, 147–48, 189, 191 homophobia, 42, 43, 51 homosexuality, 42–43, 87, 88 hospitals, 197, 199–204, 206–7 House of Representatives, U.S., xvi, 182, 184–85, 186 Hout, Mike, 237–38 Hughes, Charles Evans, 187 Hunter, James Davison, 69 hunter-gatherers, 16, 92, 142, 144–45 Hussein, Saddam, 67 Hutterites, 94 identity, 20, 42, 74, 130, 146 immigrants, 79, 82–83, 88, 232 income, xv, 21, 147, 180, 216, 227 discretionary, 55 inequality and, 21–24, 31 national, 21–22, 54 online communities and, 250n working women and, 27, 28 independence, 28–29, 30, 52, 57, 60, 106, 138, 151 of elderly, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 individualism, 65–66, 73, 74, 102 networked, 111 industrial paradigm, 14–15, 26, 82, 84–87, 170–71, 233 Industrial Revolution, xiii, 4, 16, 85, 86, 127, 138, 166, 201 inequality, economic, 21–24, 26, 31 information, 6–8, 18, 21, 26, 138, 260n brought together in a new way, 159–66, 209 Chinatown bus effect and, 35–38 information technology, 13, 16, 125, 141–43, 187, 209 affirmation and, 103–4, 108, 109–10 online communities and, 114–15 infrastructure, xiv, xv, xvi, 11, 25, 45, 194, 236 decay of, 229, 230 health, 200–201, 203–4, 206, 210 Inglehart, Ronald, 67–69, 73 inner directedness, 5–7 inner-ring relationships, see intimate relationships innovation, xiii, xvii, xviii, 158–75, 209 intellectual cross-fertilization, 158–68 interdependence, 17, 85–86 intermarriage: educational, 43–44 racial, 68 Internet, 10, 18, 36, 37, 121, 125, 146, 250n interracial marriage, 68 intimate relationships (inner-ring relationships), 92, 93, 96, 119–20, 137, 138–39, 145, 238 affirmation and, 103–7, 110, 112, 115 Chinatown Bus effect and, 42–46 health care and, 201, 204, 210 see also marriage iPhones, 160, 231 Iraq, 67 isolation: intellectual, 176 social, 73, 87, 113, 115, 118–19, 122, 127, 149, 207 Issacson, Walter, 164 Italy, 17, 163 It Gets Better Project, 43 Jackson, Kenneth, 40 Jacobs, Jane, 85–88, 127, 166–68, 170, 176 Jamaica, 179–81, 191 James, LeBron, 8–9 Japan, 226, 233 Jews, Orthodox, 98–99 jobs, 18–20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 131, 139, 170–71, 235–36, 260n–61n affirmation and, 104–5, 107 assembly line, 53, 85 exporting of, 197–98 service, 18–19, 53, 132, 138, 236 Jobs, Steve, 10, 64, 160, 164–65 Johansson, Frans, 163, 168, 172 Johnson, Lyndon B., 127, 187, 210 Johnson, Steven, 159 Kahneman, Daniel, 13 Kelling, George, 150 Kelly, Mervin, 164 Kennedy, Robert, 206 Kenner, Edward, 158, 159 Kentucky, 147–48 Kerry, John, 47 Keynes, John Maynard, 53 Khrushchev, Nikita, 56 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 24, 46, 108–9, 128, 238 King, Stephen, 123 Kiwanis Club, 44, 45, 116 “Knowledge Is Power Program” (KIPP), 222, 223, 224 Koestler, Arthur, 158–60, 162, 166 Krebs cycle, 220–22 Ku Klux Klan, 111, 146 labor, labor unions, 14, 19, 20, 23, 53, 180, 181 leadership, xv, xvii, 23, 101, 108–9, 182, 186, 191 Leave It to Beaver (TV show), 34–35, 51 legislative districts, manipulation of (gerrymandering), xvi, 182–86, 189 Lehigh Valley, 170, 171 leisure, 53, 104–5, 139 Levin, David, 223 Levitt, Steven, 133–34 Lexus and the Olive Tree, The (Friedman), 141, 151–52 LGBT rights, 24, 42–43 libraries, 18, 36, 37 lifespan, longevity, 17, 31, 57–60, 62, 199, 204–5 Lincoln, Abraham, 228 Ling, Richard, 122–23 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 231 LISTSERVs, 114, 151 Little House on the Prairie (TV show), xii, 247n lobbyists, 183, 187, 229 Locke, Richard, 165, 172 Lonely Crowd, The (Riesman), 5–6, 7, 65, 141 Loose Connections (Wuthnow), 239 Lorain, Ohio, 79–80, 135 “lord of the manor” community, xii–xiii, 81 Lowery, Rev.


pages: 357 words: 95,986

Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work by Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams

3D printing, additive manufacturing, air freight, algorithmic trading, anti-work, back-to-the-land, banking crisis, basic income, battle of ideas, blockchain, Boris Johnson, Bretton Woods, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, carbon footprint, Cass Sunstein, centre right, collective bargaining, crowdsourcing, cryptocurrency, David Graeber, decarbonisation, deindustrialization, deskilling, Doha Development Round, Elon Musk, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ferguson, Missouri, financial independence, food miles, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of work, gender pay gap, housing crisis, income inequality, industrial robot, informal economy, intermodal, Internet Archive, job automation, John Maynard Keynes: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes: technological unemployment, Kickstarter, late capitalism, liberation theology, Live Aid, low skilled workers, manufacturing employment, market design, Martin Wolf, mass immigration, mass incarceration, means of production, minimum wage unemployment, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberal agenda, New Urbanism, Occupy movement, oil shale / tar sands, oil shock, patent troll, pattern recognition, Paul Samuelson, Philip Mirowski, post scarcity, post-work, postnationalism / post nation state, precariat, price stability, profit motive, quantitative easing, reshoring, Richard Florida, rising living standards, road to serfdom, Robert Gordon, Ronald Reagan, Second Machine Age, secular stagnation, self-driving car, Slavoj Žižek, social web, stakhanovite, Steve Jobs, surplus humans, the built environment, The Chicago School, The Future of Employment, Tyler Cowen: Great Stagnation, universal basic income, wages for housework, We are the 99%, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population

For a contemporary updating, see the Laboria Cuboniks manifesto in Helen Hester and Armen Avanessian, eds, Dea Ex Machina (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2015). 69.Benedict Singleton, ‘Maximum Jailbreak’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate. 70.Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: Verso, 2014), pp. 144–5. 71.Sadie Plant, ‘Binary Sexes, Binary Codes’, 3 June 1996, at future-nonstop.org. 72.Reza Negarestani, ‘The Labor of the Inhuman’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate, 452. 73.Ibid., p. 438. 74.For examples of these parochial defences, see Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile, 2003). 75.For two fascinating accounts of bodily experimentation, see Shannon Bell, Fast Feminism (New York: Autonomedia, 2010); and Beatriz Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era (New York: Feminist Press CUNY, 2013). 76.The remainder of this book will be concerned mostly with the first two aspects of synthetic freedom: the basic conditions of existence, and the collective capacities to act.

Triumph in the political battles to achieve it will require organising a broadly populist left, building the organisational ecosystem necessary for a full-spectrum politics on multiple fronts, and leveraging key points of power wherever possible. Yet the end of work would not be the end of history. Building a platform for a post-work society would be an immense accomplishment, but it would still only be a beginning.1 This is why conceiving of left politics as a politics of modernity is so crucial: because it requires that we not confuse a post-work society – or indeed any society – with the end of history. Universalism always undoes itself, possessing its own resources for an immanent critique that insists and expands upon its ideals. No particular social formation is sufficient to satisfy its conceptual and political demands. Equally, synthetic freedom compels us to reject contentment with the existing horizon of possibilities.


pages: 298 words: 95,668

Milton Friedman: A Biography by Lanny Ebenstein

"Robert Solow", affirmative action, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business cycle, Deng Xiaoping, Fall of the Berlin Wall, fiat currency, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, Hernando de Soto, hiring and firing, inflation targeting, invisible hand, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Lao Tzu, liquidity trap, means of production, Mont Pelerin Society, Myron Scholes, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, Ponzi scheme, price stability, rent control, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Ronald Coase, Ronald Reagan, Sam Peltzman, school choice, school vouchers, secular stagnation, Simon Kuznets, stem cell, The Chicago School, The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, zero-sum game

Is there anything more to say than free markets are the most efficient way to organize a society? Is it the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama put it? Friedman: Oh no. “Free markets” is a very general term. There are all sorts of problems that will emerge. Free markets work best when the transaction between two individuals affects only those individuals. But that isn’t the fact. The fact is that, most often, a transaction between you and me affects a third party. That is the source of all problems for government. That is the source of all pollution problems, of the inequality problem. There are some good economists like Gary Becker and Bob Lucas who are working on these issues. This reality ensures the end of history will never come. Many books and articles have been written on Friedman over the decades. J.


Hiding in Plain Sight: The Invention of Donald Trump and the Erosion of America by Sarah Kendzior

"side hustle", 4chan, Berlin Wall, Bernie Sanders, borderless world, Chelsea Manning, Columbine, corporate raider, desegregation, don't be evil, Donald Trump, drone strike, Edward Snowden, Ferguson, Missouri, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, hiring and firing, illegal immigration, income inequality, Jaron Lanier, Jeff Bezos, Jeffrey Epstein, Julian Assange, Mohammed Bouazizi, Naomi Klein, Nelson Mandela, new economy, payday loans, plutocrats, Plutocrats, QAnon, Robert Hanssen: Double agent, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, Thomas L Friedman, trickle-down economics, unpaid internship, white flight, WikiLeaks, Y2K, zero-sum game

This was the era after the Iran-Contra criminals were sentenced but before future Trump attorney general William Barr helped pardon them; when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union soon followed; when dissidents like Nelson Mandela, Lech Walesa, and Václav Havel went from prisons to presidencies; when America had a war and a recession and both of them came to a seemingly definitive end. This was an actual era of hope and change, and it did not last long. At the time, I was too young to appreciate the novelty of this reversal of fortune—or to appreciate that political and economic fortunes could be reversed at all. I took global shifts in stride like a preteen Francis Fukuyama, lumping “the USSR” in with “gangster rap” in the category of “things only adults are dumb enough to fear.” My parents had been ridiculous to hide under their desks in the 1950s and 1960s, I thought, waiting for bombs that never dropped and invaders that never came. My main resource on the end of the Cold War may have been the Scorpions’ “Wind of Change” video, but my casual conviction that America was indomitable put me in the mainstream.

Throughout the early 1990s, public intellectuals proclaimed that American-style democracy and capitalism had begun their ceaseless triumph across the globe. Peace and prosperity were not mere aspirations, but the permanent condition of the new world order. The contention that we were on a brand-new geopolitical path, free from age-old travails, was discussed in bestsellers like Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. This idea reflected the doctrine of American exceptionalism that post–Cold War US presidents pushed citizens to embrace. The rest of the world had to fall in line with America because America no longer had a rival of equal might—a position US officials marketed as civic-minded benevolence rather than de facto domination. When I was a teenager, I started reading newspapers like The New York Times, which told me no two countries would ever go to war so long as both of them had a McDonald’s.1 The biggest worry for my generation, I was told, would be how to cope with the dazzling array of options the forthcoming utopia would present.

Please use the search function on your e-reading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below. Abramovich, Roman academia Access Hollywood tape Acosta, Alexander Afghanistan Agalarov family Ailes, Roger Akin, Todd Allen, Woody al-Qaeda “alternative facts” American exceptionalism danger of definition of and The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama) illusion of and normalcy bias Andrew, Prince, Duke of York Apprentice, The Arab Spring Arendt, Hannah Arif, Tevfik Arpaio, Joe Assange, Julian authoritarianism adult children of authoritarian leaders American authoritarianism asylum seekers from and conspiracy narratives and digital media and fear in former Soviet republics in Hungary and the judiciary and kinship rivalries networked authoritarianism and pageantry of branding and protest scholars of and Trump, Donald and voice of individual conscience See also autocracy; dictatorship autocracy abdication of vigilance as bedrock of and The Apprentice autocratic consolidation and black Americans and climate change definition of expecting versus accepting and hope in Hungary international axis of autocrats and Karimov, Islam and kleptocracy in Kyrgyzstan and loss of sense of time and nepotism predictability of and propaganda and the Republican Party in Russia state recovery from and technological change traits and warning signs transition to and transnational criminal networks and Trump, Donald and writers See also authoritarianism; dictatorship Bannon, Steve Baquet, Dean Barak, Ehud Barr, Donald Barr, William Barrett, Wayne “battleground states” Bayrock Group Ben-Menashe, Ari Bezos, Jeff Biegun, Stephen “Big Lie” (Third Reich technique) Billy Bush Principle bin Laden, Osama Black, Charles Black Lives Matter Blavatnik, Len Bloom, Lisa Bloomberg, Michael Blunt, Matt Blunt, Roy Bogatin, David Bogatin, Jacob “both-sidesing” Bouazizi, Mohamed Boyle, Matthew Breitbart (website) Breitbart, Andrew Browder, Bill Brown, Julie K.


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Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty First Century City by Anna Minton

Albert Einstein, Berlin Wall, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, Boris Johnson, Broken windows theory, call centre, crack epidemic, credit crunch, deindustrialization, East Village, energy security, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, ghettoisation, hiring and firing, housing crisis, illegal immigration, invisible hand, Jane Jacobs, Jaron Lanier, Kickstarter, moral panic, new economy, New Urbanism, race to the bottom, rent control, Richard Florida, Right to Buy, Silicon Valley, Steven Pinker, the built environment, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, The Spirit Level, trickle-down economics, University of East Anglia, urban decay, urban renewal, white flight, white picket fence, World Values Survey, young professional

All around the country industrial heartlands were in decline, nowhere more visibly than in Docklands. Once the largest port in the world, Docklands was reduced to a largely derelict wasteland, bereft of its economic base and identity. Tens of thousands of jobs were lost, factories were abandoned and the riverfront was crumbling. In 1989, as the Cold War came to an end and the political economist Francis Fukuyama declared ‘the end of history’, Canary Wharf, the emblem of Thatcher’s free-market revolution, was going up. The foundations of the landmark tower, One Canada Square, the tallest building in Britain, were laid at the height of the 1980s’ boom. It followed the deregulation of the financial markets, which was the catalyst for the exponential growth of the global financial services industry in Britain. The 1980s established the physical, technological and regulatory framework for an unfettered financial services industry in the UK, to replace the failing industrial economy.


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The Year That Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall by Michael Meyer

Ayatollah Khomeini, bank run, Berlin Wall, Bonfire of the Vanities, Bretton Woods, BRICs, call centre, Fall of the Berlin Wall, falling living standards, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, haute couture, mass immigration, Mikhail Gorbachev, mutually assured destruction, Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: Tear down this wall, union organizing

For them, the revolutions of 1989 became the foundation of a new post–Cold War weltanschauung: the idea that all totalitarian regimes are similarly hollow at the core and will crumble with a shove from the outside. If its symbol is the Berlin Wall, coming down as Ronald Reagan famously bid it to do in a speech in Berlin in 1987, the operational model was Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania. “Once the wicked witch was dead,” as Francis Fukuyama, the eminent political economist, has put it, “the munchkins would rise up and start singing joyously about their liberation.” It is true that instead of seeking to contain the former Soviet Union, as previous administrations had done, the United States under Ronald Reagan chose to confront it. He challenged Mikhail Gorbachev not only to reform the Soviet system from within but to “tear down this wall.”

In it, he warned of the dangers of “mismemory” or, worse, the deliberate rewriting of memory (not unlike the onetime overlords of the Soviet empire) to shape the future. “In the wake of 1989,” he said, “with boundless confidence and insufficient reflection, we put the twentieth century behind us and strode boldly into its successor swaddled in self-serving half-truths: the triumph of the West, the end of History, the unipolar American moment.” If there is a real enemy, he concluded, it is less the rogues’ gallery of Washington’s “bad guys” than America’s ignorance of itself and the past—a prescription, according to Judt, for self-defeat. America will sort out its troubles. The country does that well, better than most others. But it begins with stock-taking—going back to where things went wrong and facing problems squarely.


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The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty by Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson

Affordable Care Act / Obamacare, agricultural Revolution, AltaVista, Andrei Shleifer, bank run, Berlin Wall, British Empire, California gold rush, central bank independence, centre right, collateralized debt obligation, collective bargaining, colonial rule, Computer Numeric Control, conceptual framework, Corn Laws, corporate governance, creative destruction, Credit Default Swap, credit default swaps / collateralized debt obligations, crony capitalism, Dava Sobel, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, discovery of the americas, double entry bookkeeping, Edward Snowden, en.wikipedia.org, equal pay for equal work, European colonialism, Ferguson, Missouri, financial deregulation, financial innovation, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, information asymmetry, interest rate swap, invention of movable type, Isaac Newton, James Watt: steam engine, John Harrison: Longitude, joint-stock company, Kula ring, labor-force participation, land reform, Mahatma Gandhi, manufacturing employment, mass incarceration, Maui Hawaii, means of production, megacity, Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, obamacare, openstreetmap, out of africa, PageRank, pattern recognition, road to serfdom, Ronald Reagan, Skype, spinning jenny, Steven Pinker, the market place, transcontinental railway, War on Poverty, WikiLeaks

Women didn’t get rights in Britain because of magnanimous grants by some (male) leaders. Gaining rights was a consequence of their organization and empowerment. The story of women’s liberation isn’t unique or exceptional. Liberty almost always depends on society’s mobilization and ability to hold its own against the state and its elites. Chapter 1 HOW DOES HISTORY END? A Coming Anarchy? In 1989, Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history,” with all countries converging to the political and economic institutions of the United States, what he called “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.” Just five years later Robert Kaplan painted a radically different picture of the future in his article “The Coming Anarchy.” To illustrate the nature of this chaotic lawlessness and violence, he felt compelled to begin in West Africa: West Africa is becoming the symbol of [anarchy] . . .

The excerpts from Gilgamesh are taken from Mitchell (2004, 69–70, 72–74). The 2018 UAE Gender Equality Awards, https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jan/28/uae-mocked-for-gender-equality-awards-won-entirely-by-men. See Holton (2003) for the women’s suffrage movement in Britain and the empowerment of women and the facts we use. CHAPTER 1. HOW DOES HISTORY END? The contrasting arguments made by Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kaplan, and Yuval Noah Harari are presented in Fukuyama (1989), Kaplan (1994), and Harari (2018). We quote from Fukuyama (1989, 3), and Kaplan (1994, 46). The text of the 2005 Constitution of the DRC can be found at http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kongo.pdf. A useful overview of the rebel groups of the Eastern DRC is provided by the BBC: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20586792.

In the same way that the Leviathan can shackle the Texan gunmen, so that they cannot do harm to ordinary citizens, it can itself be shackled by common people, by norms, and by institutions—in short by society. It is not that the Shackled Leviathan isn’t Janus-faced. It is, and repression and dominance are as much in its DNA as they are in the DNA of the Despotic Leviathan. But the shackles prevent it from rearing its fearsome face. How those shackles emerge, and why only some societies have managed to develop them, is the major theme of our book. Diversity, Not the End of History Liberty has been rare in human history. Many societies have not developed any centralized authority capable of enforcing laws, resolving conflicts peacefully, and protecting the weak against the strong. Instead they have often imposed a cage of norms on people, with similarly dire consequences for liberty. Wherever the Leviathan has shown up, the lot of liberty has hardly improved. Even though it has enforced laws and kept the peace in some domains, the Leviathan has often been despotic, thus unresponsive to society, and has done little to further the liberty of its citizens.


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Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State by Paul Tucker

Andrei Shleifer, bank run, banking crisis, barriers to entry, Basel III, battle of ideas, Ben Bernanke: helicopter money, Berlin Wall, Bretton Woods, business cycle, capital controls, Carmen Reinhart, Cass Sunstein, central bank independence, centre right, conceptual framework, corporate governance, diversified portfolio, Fall of the Berlin Wall, financial innovation, financial intermediation, financial repression, first-past-the-post, floating exchange rates, forensic accounting, forward guidance, Fractional reserve banking, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, George Akerlof, incomplete markets, inflation targeting, information asymmetry, invisible hand, iterative process, Jean Tirole, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Rogoff, liberal capitalism, light touch regulation, Long Term Capital Management, means of production, money market fund, Mont Pelerin Society, moral hazard, Northern Rock, Pareto efficiency, Paul Samuelson, price mechanism, price stability, principal–agent problem, profit maximization, quantitative easing, regulatory arbitrage, reserve currency, risk tolerance, risk-adjusted returns, road to serfdom, Robert Bork, Ronald Coase, seigniorage, short selling, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, stochastic process, The Chicago School, The Great Moderation, The Market for Lemons, the payments system, too big to fail, transaction costs, Vilfredo Pareto, Washington Consensus, yield curve, zero-coupon bond, zero-sum game

And having become, by doctrine, inclination, and expertise, overly detached from the system’s stability, there was nothing short of a reawakening among central banks to the significance of most monetary liabilities being issued by private businesses (banks). Inflation targeting had no more heralded the End of Monetary History than, twenty years earlier, the collapse of the Berlin Wall had marked the End of History (as Francis Fukuyama had wondered in his paean to Hegel). As the financial and economic crisis broke and deepened, there was unscripted innovation on a grand scale. In addition to finding themselves acting in their institutions’ traditional role as lenders of last resort to the banking system, central banks provided liquidity to “shadow” banks, such as money market funds and finance companies. With the banking system on its knees, they stepped in as “market makers of last resort” to keep key capital markets open.

Nor, bigger picture, is it an exploration of whether the modern state is compromised by the way its tentacles reach into so many parts of our everyday lives and how that has gradually transformed who we are, individually and collectively. It does not remotely have the range, let alone ambition, of the work of the Continental European public intellectuals who have taken on that vast subject, perhaps most famously Michel Foucault and Juergen Habermas. Nor is it a broad examination of shortcomings in the modern democratic state of the kind recently pursued by Francis Fukuyama.19 Rather, it looks at just one corner of the state apparatus and its position in democratic society—independent agencies—albeit one of great importance for understanding the role and legitimacy of the state more generally. As will become apparent, for my taste too many discussions of the regulatory state, perhaps especially in Europe, are about “independence versus accountability” or about combining “accountability and control,” often stretching the concept of accountability until those supposed antonyms can coexist.20 To find our way through this, we have to think about what democratic legitimacy entails, but not about whether insulated agencies can help to prop up or restore the ailing authority of a state.


pages: 356 words: 102,224

Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space by Carl Sagan

Albert Einstein, anthropic principle, cosmological principle, dark matter, Dava Sobel, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, germ theory of disease, invention of the telescope, Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, Kuiper Belt, linked data, low earth orbit, nuclear winter, planetary scale, profit motive, scientific worldview, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, Stephen Hawking, telepresence

CHAPTER 22, TIPTOEING THROUGH THE MILKY WAY I. A. Crawford, "Interstellar Travel: A Review for Astronomers," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. 31 (1990), p. 377. I. A. Crawford, "Space, World Government, and `The End of History,' "Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 46 (1993), pp. 415-420. Freeman J. Dyson, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (London: Birkbeck College, 1972). Ben R. Finney and Eric M. Jones, editors, Interstellar Migration and the Human Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Charles Lindholm, Charisma (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). The comment on the need for a telos is in this book. Eugene F. Mallove and Gregory L. Matloff, The Starflight Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989).

The prospects of such a time contrast provocatively with forecasts that the progress of science and technology is now near some asymptotic limit; that art, literature, and music are never to approach, much less exceed, the heights our species has, on occasion, already touched; and that political life on Earth is about to settle into some rock-stable liberal democratic world government, identified, after Hegel, as "the end of history." Such an expansion into space also contrasts with a different but likewise discernible trend in recent times—toward authoritarianism, censorship, ethnic hatred, and a deep suspicion of curiosity and learning. Instead, I think that, after some debugging, the settlement of the Solar System presages an open-ended era of dazzling advances in science and technology; cultural flowering; and wide-ranging experiments, up there in the sky, in government and social organization. In more than one respect, exploring the Solar System and homesteading other worlds constitutes the beginning, much more than the end, of history. IT'S IMPOSSIBLE, for us humans at least, to look into our future, certainly not centuries ahead.


pages: 299 words: 19,560

Utopias: A Brief History From Ancient Writings to Virtual Communities by Howard P. Segal

1960s counterculture, British Empire, Buckminster Fuller, complexity theory, David Brooks, death of newspapers, dematerialisation, deskilling, energy security, European colonialism, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, future of journalism, G4S, garden city movement, germ theory of disease, Golden Gate Park, invention of the printing press, Isaac Newton, Jeff Bezos, John Markoff, John von Neumann, knowledge economy, liberation theology, Louis Pasteur, Mark Zuckerberg, mass immigration, means of production, Nelson Mandela, Nicholas Carr, Nikolai Kondratiev, out of africa, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ray Kurzweil, Ronald Reagan, Silicon Valley, Skype, stem cell, Stephen Hawking, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, Thomas Malthus, Thorstein Veblen, transcontinental railway, traveling salesman, union organizing, urban planning, War on Poverty, Whole Earth Catalog

For that matter, in the spirit of Victor Frankenstein, the ultimate dream of many of Noble’s visionaries is the creation through genetic engineering of a womanless world—the culmination of centuries of mistreatment of women in general and of female engineers and scientists in particular.5 Such schemes go beyond the eugenics crusades of many “reformers” in both Europe and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that culminated in Nazism’s quest for a pure Aryan race—but not, of course, one of men alone. The Absence of Historical Context History can therefore be ignored, so profoundly different will the future be from the past. History no longer matters.6 One might, of course, suggest that our ahistorical contemporary visionaries have embraced a watered-down version of Francis Fukuyama’s still controversial The End of History and the Last Man (1992), but there is no evidence of that kind of sophisticated argument in any of their writings. Consequently, few if any of the high-tech zealots of our own day have ever considered the possibility that, far from being original, their crusades fit squarely within a rich Western tradition of 188 The Resurgence of Utopianism scientific and technological utopianism.

As someone devoid of ideological purity and persistence of any kind (having repeatedly changed his positions on most major issues in order to advance his political career), Bush’s dismissal of “vision” might seem merely self-serving, the crassest kind of practical political bent. But it was sometimes taken up by others who, for whatever reasons, dismissed serious and systematic thinking about the future as a waste of time, an indulgence not The Future of Utopias and Utopianism 241 fit for respectable leaders daily confronting endless challenges. Fukuyama’s provocative The End of History and the Last Man (1992) might have been Bush’s gospel had he ever read, much less understood, it; but he did neither. Ironically, Bush lost re-election in part because of his inability to present specifics to support the New World Order that he mentioned from time to time in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not having “that vision thing” in the end hurt his presidency and his legacy.

Adams) 82–83 Educational Network of Maine 208 Edutopia 203–213 higher education and Edutopia 206–213 Edwards, Robert 127 Ehrenreich, Barbara 168 Einstein’s general theory of relativity 202 Eisenhower, President Dwight D 108–109, 115, 143 el dorado, Latin America 21 Electricite de France 152 “electronic battlefield” 105, 112 “electronic campus” 208, 210 Elements of Technology (Bigelow) 52 Elizabeth II, Queen, on economic crisis 166–167 Ellicott, Thomas 77 Embree, Ainslie 171 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 84 empowerment of the individual 122–123 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) 188, 242 End of Ideology, The (Bell) 101 end of science 116 Endangered Species Act, United States 111 Energy Policy Act, US 153, 157 Index 273 Engels, Friedrich 32, 53, 60, 66–67, 250, 251 engineers and scientists compared 52 engineering as a culture 121 Engineers and the Price System, The (Veblen) 97, 106 “Enlightenment Project” 104, 116 Enlightenment 50, 55–56, 104, philosophies of 160 environmental disasters 115 environmental rights 253 Epode 47 Equality movement Washington state 25 equality 56 equality of genders 26, 92–93, 196 equality of opportunity 31, 54, 210 Erasmus 190 Espy, James 188 ethnopsychiatry 170 Etzler, John Adolphus 78, 79–80, 81 eugenics 159, 188 Evans, Oliver 77 Ewbank, Thomas 78, 80 experts 109, 112 and activism 107 attitudes toward 114, 115, 155–156, 157–160, 192 and changing of society 97 and education 205, 211 experts and scientists 100, 119, 121 need for 57 and nuclear power 155–156 as social engineers 108 systems experts 160 and Systems Analysis 110 and TQM 217 274 Index Expo 2010 Shanghai, China 38 Fabianism 20 Facebook 193, 194, 238 Fair America: World’s Fairs in the United States (Rydell, Findling, Pelle) 36 fascism 98, 104 Federal Communications Commission 210 Female Man, The (Russ) 92 Findling, John 36 Flanagan, Judy 145 Fleming, James 187–188, 207 Flubber 202 Fogarty, Robert 25 Ford Motor Company 139, 246 Ford, Henry 104, 157, 165 Ford, President Gerald 108 Fourier, Charles 25, 53, 60, 64–66, 67, 255 utopian views 64–65 Fourierists 29 Fourth Eclogue 47 Fragments (Pindar) 47, 237 France: and energy 157 French Revolution 57, 60, 64 French student revolt 1968 252 nuclear industry in 152 utopian housing projects in 2 utopianism in 24 Frankenstein (M.


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Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang

affirmative action, Albert Einstein, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, mega-rich, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

They have come back into fashion just as the more dominant cultures (narrowly Anglo-American, more broadly European) have started to feel ‘threatened’ by other cultures – Confucianism in the economic sphere; Islam in the realm of politics and international relations.20 They also offered a very convenient excuse to the Bad Samaritans – neo-liberal policies have not worked very well, not because of some inherent problems but because the people practising them had ‘wrong’ values that diminished their effectiveness. In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

While the developed countries should open their markets, the developing countries could continue to protect their own markets. Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J.Bhagwati & M.Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.


pages: 347 words: 99,317

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity by Ha-Joon Chang

affirmative action, Albert Einstein, banking crisis, Big bang: deregulation of the City of London, bilateral investment treaty, borderless world, Bretton Woods, British Empire, Brownian motion, business cycle, call centre, capital controls, central bank independence, colonial rule, Corn Laws, corporate governance, David Ricardo: comparative advantage, Deng Xiaoping, Doha Development Round, en.wikipedia.org, falling living standards, Fellow of the Royal Society, financial deregulation, fixed income, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, income inequality, income per capita, industrial robot, Isaac Newton, joint-stock company, Joseph Schumpeter, Kenneth Rogoff, Kickstarter, land reform, liberal world order, liberation theology, low skilled workers, market bubble, market fundamentalism, Martin Wolf, means of production, mega-rich, moral hazard, Nelson Mandela, offshore financial centre, oil shock, price stability, principal–agent problem, Ronald Reagan, South Sea Bubble, structural adjustment programs, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, trade liberalization, transfer pricing, urban sprawl, World Values Survey

They have come back into fashion just as the more dominant cultures (narrowly Anglo-American, more broadly European) have started to feel ‘threatened’ by other cultures – Confucianism in the economic sphere; Islam in the realm of politics and international relations.20 They also offered a very convenient excuse to the Bad Samaritans – neo-liberal policies have not worked very well, not because of some inherent problems but because the people practising them had ‘wrong’ values that diminished their effectiveness. In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

While the developed countries should open their markets, the developing countries could continue to protect their own markets. Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J. Bhagwati & M. Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.


pages: 325 words: 99,983

Globish: How the English Language Became the World's Language by Robert McCrum

Alistair Cooke, anti-communist, Berlin Wall, British Empire, call centre, Charles Lindbergh, colonial rule, credit crunch, cuban missile crisis, Deng Xiaoping, Etonian, failed state, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, invention of movable type, invention of writing, invisible hand, Isaac Newton, jimmy wales, knowledge economy, Livingstone, I presume, Martin Wolf, Naomi Klein, Norman Mailer, Parag Khanna, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Republic of Letters, Ronald Reagan, sceptred isle, Scramble for Africa, Silicon Valley, Steven Pinker, the new new thing, The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, Thomas L Friedman, trade route, transatlantic slave trade, transcontinental railway, upwardly mobile

Now the Anglo-American hegemony-often hotly disputed by anti-American liberals – was wholly underpinned by rampant capitalism, represented by Margaret Thatcher’s premiership in Britain and Ronald Reagan’s two-term presidency in the United States. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 this new global culture would morph into the worldwide cultural revolution that would become Globish. The eerie decade that preceded the crisis of 2001 was the first in a century in which the world was no longer in the shadow of war. Francis Fukuyama declared ‘the End of History’. It was during this unreal and optimistic hiatus that the little term coined by Jean-Paul Nerrière in 1995, ‘Globish’ – simple, inelegant and almost universal-first gained currency. Now Globish began to emerge, in the words of The Times, as ‘the language of the present and the future’, the worldwide dialect of the third millennium. CHAPTER THIRTEEN ‘The World At Your Fingertips’ From Google to Globish, 1989–2009 Because it amplifies our potential in so many ways, it’s possible that the long-term impact of the Internet could equal that of electricity, the automobile and the telephone all rolled together


pages: 281 words: 95,852

The Googlization of Everything: by Siva Vaidhyanathan

1960s counterculture, activist fund / activist shareholder / activist investor, AltaVista, barriers to entry, Berlin Wall, borderless world, Burning Man, Cass Sunstein, choice architecture, cloud computing, computer age, corporate social responsibility, correlation does not imply causation, creative destruction, data acquisition, death of newspapers, don't be evil, Firefox, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full text search, global pandemic, global village, Google Earth, Howard Rheingold, informal economy, information retrieval, John Markoff, Joseph Schumpeter, Kevin Kelly, knowledge worker, libertarian paternalism, market fundamentalism, Marshall McLuhan, means of production, Mikhail Gorbachev, moral panic, Naomi Klein, Network effects, new economy, Nicholas Carr, PageRank, Panopticon Jeremy Bentham, pirate software, Ray Kurzweil, Richard Thaler, Ronald Reagan, side project, Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley ideology, single-payer health, Skype, Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, social web, Steven Levy, Stewart Brand, technoutopianism, The Nature of the Firm, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thorstein Veblen, urban decay, web application, zero-sum game

Abigail Cutler, “Penetrating the Great Firewall: Interview with James Fallows,” Atlantic, February 19, 2008; James Fallows, “ ‘The Connection Has Been Reset,’ ” Atlantic, March 2008; Ronald Deibert et al., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 51. Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 52. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Pres, 1992). 53. Ideology, as the Cambridge University sociologist John Thompson argues, is “meaning in the service of power,” or a sense of how symbolic expressions support or challenge structures and habits of social domination. See John Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 54.


pages: 357 words: 99,684

Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions by Paul Mason

anti-globalists, back-to-the-land, balance sheet recession, bank run, banking crisis, Berlin Wall, business cycle, capital controls, centre right, citizen journalism, collapse of Lehman Brothers, collective bargaining, creative destruction, credit crunch, Credit Default Swap, currency manipulation / currency intervention, currency peg, do-ocracy, eurozone crisis, Fall of the Berlin Wall, floating exchange rates, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, full employment, ghettoisation, illegal immigration, informal economy, land tenure, low skilled workers, mass immigration, means of production, megacity, Mohammed Bouazizi, Naomi Klein, Network effects, New Journalism, Occupy movement, price stability, quantitative easing, race to the bottom, rising living standards, short selling, Slavoj Žižek, Stewart Brand, strikebreaker, union organizing, We are the 99%, Whole Earth Catalog, WikiLeaks, Winter of Discontent, women in the workforce, working poor, working-age population, young professional

He calls the resulting phenomenon ‘capitalist realism’, defined as the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it … a pervasive atmosphere conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining action.11 Up to 2008, the left’s inability to imagine any alternative to capitalism was like a mirror image of the right’s triumphalism. The establishment’s tramline thinking on Islam and its theories of ‘durable authoritarianism’ conformed, like the rest of its ideology, to Francis Fukuyama’send of history’ thesis and the paeans of various commentators—Thomas Friedman foremost among them—to the triumph of globalization. Together, left and right created a shared fatalism about the future. The right believed that with indomitable power it could create whatever truth it wanted to. In a famous phrase, Karl Rove, senior advisor to then US President George W. Bush, scorned those without power as the ‘reality-based community’.


pages: 444 words: 107,664

The Secret Lives of Buildings: From the Ruins of the Parthenon to the Vegas Strip in Thirteen Stories by Edward Hollis

A Pattern Language, battle of ideas, Berlin Wall, facts on the ground, Fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama: the end of history, Frank Gehry, place-making, South China Sea, the scientific method, Wunderkammern

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 10 November 1989 concluded what the historian Eric Hobsbawm calls “the little twentieth century,” which began with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, ran through the horrors of the trenches, Auschwitz, and Hiroshima, through Nuremberg and the Prague Spring, and finished in Berlin. The events of that night represent the end of history, a term invented by the political economist Francis Fukuyama. Democratic capitalism defeated autocratic communism, bringing the last great ideological conflict to a close once and for all. But unlike the Hulme Crescents, the Berlin Wall, whose spectacular destruction marked Fukuyama’s “end of history,” was not obliterated. Indeed, as hated as it had been, the Wall soon took on something of the preciousness of the marble of the Parthenon, which dissolves and crumbles even as it is gathered. The strange afterlife of the Berlin Wall is the history of the end of history. ONCE UPON A TIME, an obscure woman st